Showing posts with label Taamei ha'Mitzvos. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Taamei ha'Mitzvos. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 26, 2022

Ralbag on the Speculative Nature of Taamei ha'Mitzvos

The Torah content for this week has been sponsored by Ellis and Janice Cohen in memory of Rabbi Moskowitz zt"l.

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Ralbag on the Speculative Nature of Taamei ha'Mitzvos

Throughout his Torah commentary, Ralbag provides numerous taamei ha’mitzvos (reasons for the commandments), endeavoring to show how each mitzvah perfects our middos (character traits) and deios (knowledge of the universe). Many of these explanations are “Aristotelian” in character. Ralbag takes no measures to conceal this. He often quotes Aristotle directly or refers the reader to his works. 

What are we to make of these Aristotelian taamei ha’mitzvos explanations? Does Ralbag really believe that Hashem had these Aristotelian ideas “in mind” when He “designed” these mitzvos? How certain is Ralbag that his taamei ha’mitzvos theories are true? Thankfully, Ralbag addresses these questions in his introduction:

You should not overlook the fact that when giving causes (i.e. reasons, or as Aristotle would call them, “final causes”) in Torah matters such as these, it is impossible to provide causes which necessitate the existence of these mitzvos in an absolute manner, as it is in the deductive branches of wisdom. It is also impossible to provide the same types of causes as those given in the study of the natural world. This is not at all possible, since the nature of the subject matter of Torah does not lend itself to this degree of certainty, as Aristotle explained in the Sefer ha’Middos

Ralbag is referring to the following passage in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1:3:

We must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle in different ways; the former does so insofar as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth.

In other words, it would be a methodological mistake to look for the same degree of certitude in the study of history as in math, the same level of precision in literary analysis as in physics, or the same degree of necessary conclusions in moral philosophy as in symbolic logic. Every intellectual discipline has its own methods and standards, and it would be wrong to expect one subject matter to comply with the conventions of another. Ralbag then goes on to explain why he felt compelled to include this point in his introduction:

We mentioned this so that the reader does not devalue the reasons we provided for the mitzvos of the Torah in our commentary for failing to meet the standards of other disciplines; the subject matter of those subjects lends itself to a greater degree of verification than these Torah matters and other things like them.

Ralbag was concerned that someone might read his speculative taamei ha’mitzvos and think to themselves, “How can he claim that this is the reason for this mitzvah? How does he know? Can he prove it? Can he explain why this middos/deios objective necessarily warrants this particular mitzvah-structure with these particular halachos?” Such questions stem from the methodological error of demanding that the study of taamei ha’mitzvos conform to the standards of other branches of knowledge. Such an error would be disastrous if it led the reader to make light of the taamei ha’mitzvos theories that Ralbag provides – or worse, to disregard the study of taamei ha’mitzvos altogether.

At the end of the day, how might Ralbag respond to the charge (leveled by some) that he has projected Aristotelian ideas onto Torah? I’d like to think he’d say something like this: “First, the study of taamei ha’mitzvos is not an exact science. Second, I do not regard Aristotle to be infallible. I have recorded what, to my mind, are the most compelling explanations for the taamei ha’mitzvos. Since I hold that Aristotle was right about a great many things, I have chosen to express my ideas by drawing upon his writings.” 

What would Ralbag say about alternative explanations? I suspect he would say what he, in fact, writes in his introduction to Sefer Mishlei: “And if you will find another suitable way to explain a pasuk [which differs from our explanation], this does not constitute an argument against us, for we do not proclaim that the pasuk cannot tolerate any other explanation.” 

For all his radical views, Ralbag was an intellectually humble thinker.
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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Thursday, July 14, 2022

The Pros and Cons of a Postmodernist Analysis of Halacha

The Torah content for these two weeks has been sponsored by Judah and Naomi Dardik in loving memory of Rabbi Moskowitz zt''l, who taught his students to pursue truth by asking questions, who modeled love of Torah and learning, and who exemplified living a life of the mind.

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The Pros and Cons of a Postmodern Analysis of Halacha

I recently read Faith Shattered and Restored: Judaism in the Postmodern Age (2017), by Rabbi Shagar. I found it to be exceedingly thought-provoking, if fundamentally objectionable. I agreed with many of Rabbi Shagar’s particular insights while disagreeing with his overall framework. (If you’re interested in my review of the book, let me know and I’ll share it with you.) One example of this is his approach to taamei ha’mitzvos (the reasons for the commandments). He writes:

The test of halakha is not its truth, but its ability to maintain the integrity of its character as a linguistic and practical system. This character is the core of halakha, whose scale of values and beliefs - which neither proves nor justifies it - is merely a byproduct of the nature of the halakhic system. Thus, rather than justify or rationalize halakha, we must describe it phenomenologically. For instance, we should examine how the laws of family purity shape the relationship between husband and wife, instead of propounding justifications for them with facile pronouncements about how halakha "exalts women," or "acknowledges the body," or "values emotion," and so forth. Such apologetics emanate from a self-deceptive desire to beautify the halakhic world in the face of criticism from the world of Western cultural values. Instead, one should lay down the ethical and existential consequences of halakha: What sort of romance is shared by couples who lead such a lifestyle, how their passion manifests, and so on.

I hold the study of taamei ha’mitzvos in high regard. Although I regularly engage in what Rabbi Shagar disparagingly refers to as “self-deceptive apologetics,” I also see the benefits of a phenomenological analysis of halacha. See, for instance, my article entitled The Non-Symbolic Trumpets, in which I cite the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s phenomenological explanation of the reason for the mitzvah of sounding the trumpets at the time of korbanos. He explains that (a) man needs help focusing, (b) korbanos require focus, and (c) a loud trumpet sound helps man to focus on the korban. Likewise, in my shiur entitled Kiddush: The Universe of Torah in a Glass of Wine, I discuss R’ Yehuda ha’Levi’s explanation of making berachos on food: pausing and contemplating what you’re about to eat results in greater enjoyment from the food. I appreciate how such analyses can be readily integrated into one’s practice because they are rooted in our immediate experience.

At the same time, I disagree with Rabbi Shagar’s postmodernist foundation. In his preface to the book, Aryeh Rubin defines post-modernism as “the denial and deconstruction that come from the erosion of belief in any ‘grand narrative’ and in the ability to perceive the truth.” This is why Rabbi Shagar is opposed to the traditional approaches to taamei ha’mitzvos. He would look at the Ralbag’s definition of Torah (“a God-given regimen that brings those who practice it properly to true success”) as being influenced by Ralbag’s immersion in the Greek world of Aristotelianism, dismissing it as an artificial “grand narrative.” Likewise, he would characterize Rav Hirsch’s Torah im Derech Eretz paradigm as a 19th century German Jew’s noble (or ignoble) effort to integrate the values of Western Culture into Judaism. He would chalk up the various kabbalistic explanations of mitzvos as byproducts of this or that cultural or intellectual influence. And so on.

I think that Rabbi Shagar’s approach is self-defeating. He claims to reject the “grand narratives” and value systems that other thinkers employ in their analyses, yet somehow maintains that he is able to engage in an objective phenomenological description untethered to any particular value system. Is this possible? Can he really assess “what sort of romance is shared by couples” who follow the laws of family purity without imposing some culturally biased view of romance? Romance in 21st century America differs from the romance of the Victorian era which differs from Romance during the Persian Empire. Can he make statements about “how their passion manifests” without subscribing to his own narratives about “passion”? Can he “examine how the laws of family purity shape the relationship between husband and wife” without taking a stance on what “relationship” means and what constitutes “shaping” that relationship?

One might respond to the above, saying, “Ha! Your objections reveal that you agree with his postmodern framework after all!” Yes and no. I agree that our view of reality is influenced by our personal theoretical frameworks. But at least I’m not the one who is claiming to reject all grand narratives while insidiously framing everything in my own grand narrative.
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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Friday, August 20, 2021

Ki Teitzei: On the Merit of Giving Bad Explanations of Mitzvos

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Artwork: Professor of Symbology, by Jason Rainville



Ki Teitzei: On the Merit of Giving Bad Explanations of Mitzvos

As a Torah educator, I am a strong proponent of teaching students the taamei ha’mitzvos (reasons for the commandments). This is especially relevant for teenagers and young adults, many of whom were raised without any real awareness that the mitzvos have rational reasons and were commanded for our benefit. Accordingly, it is a pet peeve of mine when I hear someone give a bad explanation for the taam of a mitzvah. Is there ever any justification for bad explanations of mitzvos? Shockingly, according to the Sefer ha’Chinuch, the answer is: yes.

In his introduction, the Sefer ha’Chinuch explains that he wrote his book so that his son and his son’s friends will accustom themselves to thinking about the mitzvos and seeking out their reasons. He then writes at length about how unqualified he is for this task, but why he didn’t let that stop him from writing. Here are some excerpts:

I do not think and proclaim that I will arrive at the ultimate truth. Who am I, “but a worm and not a man” who has not seen the lights of wisdom all the days, to raise my hand about that which exceedingly wise sages have not grasped? … However, I said: If only it would be that my thoughts be preoccupied with [taamei ha’mitzvos] all of the days … Are [the mitzvos] not all refined and pure – “every precious stone is their adornment”? And if there sometimes be sediment in that which is written in their explanation, the food should be separated from it for oil, and [sediment] returned to the house of the owners … And at the beginning of my words, I mention as a merit for me that which my teachers said: "All chatter is bad, [but] Torah chatter is good."

In Parashas Ki Teitzei, there are two instances in which the Sefer ha’Chinuch acknowledges the inadequacy of the taamei ha’mitzvos explanations he has provided. The first is regarding the prohibition “to offer up a harlot’s wage or the exchange-price of a dog on the altar” (Mitzvah #571). After giving a satisfactory taam for the first component of this mitzvah, the Sefer ha’Chinuch tackles the second with decidedly less confidence:

Now, it is known that dogs are arrogant in spirit. Perhaps, as a result of thinking about them and their tough nature, his spirit will grow tough and he will become stiff-necked, too stubborn to regret his sins, as is proper for him. However, my son, if these words [of mine] be childish, may you be aroused by them to acquire the reason of elders.

In other words: if you don’t like my explanation of the taam, may it inspire you to look for a better one. Similarly, after giving a basic taam ha’mitzvah for yibum (levirate marriage, Mitzvah #598), he writes:

Now, although I know that in this mitzvah lies a great principle and a true reason [known] by the mekubalim (i.e. those who have received the esoteric tradition), I will rely on what I wrote at the beginning of my work. There I set forth my justification for the fact that I would not restrain my pen from writing my entire mind on a simple, plain reason for the mitzvos, to stimulate the spirit of the youngsters to ask questions about them of their elders and teachers. Out of the preoccupation with them, perhaps the merit will come about through me to reveal the truth of their purposes, and I will gain merit in my place among them.

What emerges from these three excerpts is an insight about the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s approach. There are two reasons to offer explanations for the taamei ha’mitzvos: (1) to identify the actual reasons for the mitzvos, and (2) to strengthen our attachment to seeking taamei ha’mitzvos. In most cases, the Sefer ha’Chinuch maintains that his taamei ha’mitzvos are the real thing, but in cases where he is uncertain whether he has attained “the ultimate truth” of a mitzvah, he consoles himself by saying, “At least my thoughts and my chatter were preoccupied with mitzvos! Perhaps my inadequate explanations will prompt my students to discover the truth on their own.”

This approach should not be taken as a license to spout off dumb ideas, but for those who have sufficient intellectual humility, perhaps the Sefer ha’Chinuch will provide justification for sharing their half-baked thoughts.
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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you

If you would like to sponsor an article, shiur, or podcast episode, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone. 

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  For the full guide to all of my Torah content, click here

Friday, June 5, 2020

Naso: Twelve Identical Offerings

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Naso: Twelve Identical Offerings

The Question 

Without a doubt, the strangest section of Parashas Naso is its conclusion. Bamidbar Chapter 7 begins by establishing the narrative context: 

And it happened on the day Moshe finished setting up the Mishkan (Tabernacle) that he anointed it and consecrated it and all its furnishings, and he anointed them and consecrated them. And the leaders of Israel – the heads of their fathers’ houses, they are the leaders of the tribes, they are the ones who stand over the reckoning – brought forward and set their offering before Hashem … And the leaders brought forward the dedication offering of the altar on the day it was anointed, and the leaders brought forward their offering for the dedication of the altar. And Hashem said to Moshe: “One leader each day, one leader each day, shall offer his offerings for the dedication for the altar.” (Bamidbar 7:1-2,10-11) 

The first of these offerings is then described in detail: 

And the one who brought forward his offering on the first day was Nachshon ben Aminadav of the tribe of Yehudah. And his offering was one silver bowl, a hundred thirty shekels its weight, one silver basin, seventy shekels by the sanctuary shekel, both of them filled with fine flour mixed with oil for a grain offering. One golden ladle of ten shekels filled with incense. One bull from the herd, one ram, one yearling lamb for the burnt offering. One goat for an offense offering. And for the communion sacrifice two oxen, five rams, five he-goats, five yearling lambs. This is the offering of Nachshon ben Aminadav. (ibid. 7:12-17) 

And that’s when things start to get repetitive. The Torah goes on to describe the offering brought on the second day by the second tribal leader, Nesanel ben Tzuar. It is exactly the same offering, and its contents are spelled out in exactly the same words. The Torah continues in this manner with the third, fourth, and fifth identical offerings – all the way up to the twelfth. Each tribal leader brings exactly the same offering, which the pesukim describe in exactly the same way. It is as if Moshe Rabbeinu took these same six pesukim, with the same 66 words, and copied and pasted them eleven more times, then went back and changed the name of the tribal leader and in the ordinal designation of the day for each. 

This seemingly gratuitous repetition has astounded medieval and modern commentators alike. The Abravanel [1] raises this question explicitly: 

Why did the text here mention the offering of each leader in elaborate detail, considering that their offerings were exactly equal without any variation? It would have been enough for it to say about the first of them “this was the offering of Nachshon ben Aminadav” as an example, and afterwards for each and every day, “and likewise, so-and-so offered on the such-and-such day” – as opposed to writing the same thing twelve times, which is excessively repetitive and is a very strange thing

The modern translator and commentator, Robert Alter [2], notes how anomalous this section is: 

This is the one single instance in the entire Bible of extensive verbatim repetition without the slightest variation … Biblical narrative, as we have had many occasions to see, characteristically deploys significant swerves from verbatim repetition as it approximately repeats strings of phrases and whole clauses and sentences. This passage, however, is manifestly not narrative, but a kind of epic inventory. 

In simple terms the question is: Why did the Torah repeat the list of these twelve identical offerings verbatim when it only needed to list them once? 

The Simple Answer 

The most straightforward answer is given by several commentators, namely, that the Torah wanted to stress the absolute equality of the leaders and their offerings, for them and for us. The Bechor Shor [3] states that this was the reason why each leader was given his own day and why his offering was spelled out in detail, despite it being identical with the others: 

“one leader each day” – in order to give honor to the leaders, that each one would have his day; so too, a section [describing the offering] was written for each one of them, so that they would not become jealous of one another – for it could have written the first section and then said, “Thus did so-and-so, and thus so-and-so.” 

The Ramban [4] offers a similar explanation: 

The best reason for Scripture [stating each leader’s offering separately] is that Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu apportions honor to those who fear Him, as it was said: “for I honor those who honor Me” (I Shmuel 2:30). Now, all the leaders brought on the same day this offering upon which they agreed together, but it was impossible that one should not precede his fellow [in the actual offering. Therefore, Hashem] honored those that had precedence in the arrangement [of the camp] with precedence in the days [of offering,] but He wanted to mention them by name and their offerings in detail and to mention each one’s day, rather than [simply] mentioning and honoring the first one, [saying:] “This is the offering of Nachshon ben Aminadav” and [then] saying: “And so the leaders offered, each man on his day,” since that would have been an affront to the others’ honor. And afterwards He went and combined them [by stating the total quantities of the offerings] to teach that all of them were equal before Him, blessed is He. And thus [the Sages] said there in Sifrei: “Scripture teaches that just as [the leaders] were all equal with regard to the idea [of these offerings,] so were they equal with regard to the merit.” 

Alter [5] also favors this approach, depicting the Torah’s intended rhetorical effect as follows: 

Each of the tribes, here accorded absolutely equal status before the sanctuary without political hierarchy, brings exactly the same offering. One can readily imagine that the members of each tribe in the ancient audience of this text would be expected to relish the sumptuousness of its own tribal offering exactly equal to all the others, as it hears the passage read. 

Yet, as reasonable as this objective may be, was it really necessary to “waste” 726 needless words simply in order to demonstrate the equality of the tribal leaders? Surely the Torah could have found a more verbally efficient way to convey the same sentiment. For example, Chazal [6] interpret the Torah’s extremely concise statement: “and the sons of Yaakov were twelve” (Bereishis 35:22)to teach that all of them are equal.” Likewise, on the pasuk: “they are Aharon and Moshe” (Shemos 6:26), Rashi [7] observes that “in some places Moshe precedes Aharon and in other places Aharon precedes Moshe in order to convey their equality.” So too here: the Torah could have stated the contents of the identical offerings and framed them in a manner which would have conveyed the equality of the tribal leaders. 

Two Midrashic Approaches 

The Abravanel notes that there are two categories of answers given in the midrashic literature: 

In [the midrashic collection] Bamidbar Sinai Rabbah (13:14) they expound “and his offering” in a different manner, saying: “Why did the leaders see fit to bring their offerings in this manner? The Rabbis say: even though their offerings were the same, each one brought them [in order to allude] to great principles, each and every one in accordance with his own intent.” Likewise, Rebbi Shimon (ibid.) expounded: “Why does the pasuk say, ‘from the leaders of Israel’? This teaches that they donated of their own accord.” Consequently, each one’s offering was equal in its value, its quantity, and its weight. In other words, each and every one was motivated by himself to offer these items mentioned in the pasuk in accordance with his own intention, in order to allude to the concepts in his own mind … 

The midrash then proceeds to expound on the symbolism of each leader’s offering in accordance with a specific theme. For example, the tribe of Yehuda is the tribe of malchus (Kingship), and its tribal leader intended each detail of his offering to allude to different ideas about malchus. The tribe of Yissachar was known for its prowess in Torah, and its tribal leader intended each detail of his offering to allude to concepts about Torah. And so on for each of the other ten tribes. After paraphrasing [8] the themes of each of these offerings based on this midrash, the Abravanel concludes: 

The general thrust of this view is that each of the leaders made his offering in accordance with his own intentions which differed from the intentions of the other leaders. Thus, their offerings were the same, but their intentions were different

Next, the Abravanel cites an opposing view stated in the same midrash: 

However, Rebbi Pinchas ben Yair held that all of the leaders had a single intention and a single allusion in mind, namely, [that their offerings] correspond to the generations from Adam ha’Rishon until the Mishkan. 

For example, the first item in the offering was “one silver bowl (kaaras kesef), a hundred and thirty shekels its weight.” The phrase “kaaras kesef” has a numerical value of which is 930, which represents Adam ha’Rishon who lived for 930 years. The fact that there was only one such bowl represents Chava, since she was created from him. Its weight of 130 shekels represents the 130 years that Adam separated from Chava before they reunited and had their third son. The second item in the offering was “one silver basin (mizrak echad), seventy shekels by the sanctuary shekel.” The phrase “mizrak” (from Z.R.Q., meaning “to throw”) represents Noach, who was “thrown out” of the Generation of the Flood. Its weight of 70 shekels corresponds to the 70 nations that emerged from him. And so on. 

Even though I tend to favor pshat, I find that both of these approaches provide a more satisfactory answer to our question than the pshat explanations cited above. If these offerings were intended to convey ideas through the symbolism of their particulars, then the Torah going out of its way to emphasize these particulars is a great way to draw the mind. According to the first midrashic approach, each offering is restated in full because each detail has its own ideational content. According to the second midrashic approach, each offering is restated in full in order to underscore the unanimity of the tribal leaders in their common intent. 

The Methodological Underpinnings of These Midrashic Approaches 

No matter how appealing these symbolic interpretations may be, one cannot help but wonder: “How did the authors of these midrashim know what the tribal leaders intended to symbolize in their offerings?” 

For those who believe that midrashim were given at Sinai, along with the rest of Torah she’baal Peh (the Oral Torah), the answer is simple: mesorah (an oral tradition). But for those who follow the mainstream approach, [9] maintaining that midrashim reflect the views of their authors, the answer is even simpler: the authors of these midrashim didn’t know the intentions of the tribal leaders. Rather, these midrashim reflect their own speculative theories which may or may not correspond to what the tribal leaders actually intended. 

This attempt to find meaning in the details of the leaders’ offerings is reminiscent of an approach mentioned by the Rambam. The Rambam states that it is incumbent upon every person to seek out the reasons for the mitzvos of the Torah. This injunction applies to both categories of mitzvos: to mishpatim, those mitzvos whose reasons are evident, and to chukim, the mitzvos whose reasons are hidden. At the end of Hilchos Me’ilah the Rambam [10] writes: 

It is proper for a person to contemplate the laws of the Holy Torah and to know their ultimate concepts according to his ability. If he doesn't find a reason and doesn't know a cause of something, it should not be less in his eyes, nor should he break forth to ascend to Hashem lest He burst forth against him, nor should he think of it as a mundane matter … a person should not kick against them just because he doesn’t know their reasons, nor should he ascribe matters which are not true onto Hashem, nor should he think about them as he thinks about mundane matters. It was stated in the Torah: “And you shall guard all of my chukim (statutes) and all of my mishpatim (judgments) and you shall do them” (Vayikra 19:37; 20:22). The Sages said that we should apply shmirah (guarding) and asiyah (doing) to chukim in the same manner as mishpatim. The [meaning of] “asiyah” is evident: namely, that we should do the chukim. The [meaning] of “shmirah” is that we must be careful with them and not imagine that they are less than mishpatim. The mishpatim are the mitzvos whose benefits in this world are evident, such as the prohibitions of stealing and murder, and honoring one's father and mother. And the chukim are the mitzvos whose reasons are not evident. The Sages said: “[These are] the statutes that I have inscribed for you, and you do not have permission to be suspicious about them, and man’s yetzer (inclination) confronts him regarding them, and the nations of the world dispute them.” Examples include the prohibition of [eating] pork, meat and milk, the decapitated calf, the red heifer, and the goat which is sent away. 

In this excerpt the Rambam speaks of "finding" the “cause” of the chukim – the actual reasons why they were commanded. In contrast, at the end of Hilchos Temurah [11] he writes: 

Even though all of the chukim of the Torah are [Divine] decrees, as we explained at the end of Hilchos Meilah, it is proper to contemplate them; anything for which you can give a reason, you should give a reason. The Early Sages said that Shlomo ha’Melech understood the majority of reasons for all of the chukim of the Torah. 

All of these matters [in Hilchos Temurah] are to subdue man’s inclination and to correct his character traits. And the majority of the laws of the Torah are but counsels from afar, from the Great Counselor, to correct [our] character traits and to make all [of our] actions upright. Likewise, it is written: “Surely, I have written for you extremely noble things, with counsel and knowledge, to teach you the veracity of true words, so that you may answer words of truth to those who send word to you” (Mishlei 22:20-21). 

Here the Rambam does not speak about finding the “cause” of the chukim. Instead, he states, “anything for which you can give a reason, you should give a reason.” In other words, in contrast to the approach of Hilchos Me'ilah, the approach of Hilchos Temurah is not to attempt to find the actual reason why Hashem commanded us to keep this mitzvah in all of its particulars. Rather, the objective is to ascribe meaning to the structure of this mitzvah in order to transform it from an incomprehensible ritual into “counsels from afar, from the Great Counselor, to correct our character traits and make all of our actions upright.” Whether or not our explanations correspond to the Divine intent is irrelevant. What matters is that our explanation renders the mitzvah into a vehicle for perfection. 

If we were to interpret Chazal’s explanations of the offerings of the tribal leaders as the type of analysis advocated by Hilchos Me’ilah, we would have ample grounds for suspicion. How could the authors of the midrashim know with such precision what the tribal leaders had in mind? But if we understand these midrashim in the sense of Hilchos Temurah, then the ingenuity of these symbolic interpretations becomes a feature, rather than a bug. The more ideas of human perfection we can associate with the details of these chukim and the stronger the association, the better.

These two methods for understanding taamei ha’mitzvos (the reasons for the commandments) ought to be kept in mind whenever one encounters a theory about why the structure of a mitzvah is the way it is. It is easy to dismiss an “explanation” of a mitzvah on the grounds of being speculative if one assumes that the explanation is being offered as a theory about the cause of the mitzvah, in the vein of Hilchos Me’ilah. But if one allows for Hilchos Temurah type explanations, then homiletic creativity is a boon.


[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar, Introduction to Chapter 7, Question #8 
[2] Robert Alter, The Five Books of Moses: A Translation with Commentary (2004), pp. 716-717 
[3] Rabbeinu , Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 7:11 
[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 7:13 
[5] ibid. Alter adds another explanation: “It is also well to remember that lists and the repetitions they entail constitute an established literary form with its own aesthetic pleasures – as, for example, in the catalogue of the ships in the Iliad or in the cumulative repetitive structures of songs like Had Gadya (‘An Only Kid’) and, more apposite to this catalogue of gifts, ‘On the Twelve Days of Christmas.’” 
[6] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Bereishis 35:22, paraphrasing Shabbos 55b. 
[7] ibid. Commentary on Sefer Shemos 6:26 
[8] In case you’re wondering about the themes of each tribe, here is the Abravanel’s summary: Zevulun’s is about his partnership with Yissachar, Reuven’s is about saving Yosef, Shimon’s is about the order of the Mishkan, Gad’s is about Amram and his descendents, Ephraim’s is about Yaakov’s blessings of Yosef’s sons, Menashe’s is about Yaakov’s transfer of the bechorah status from Reuven to Yosef, Binyamin’s is about the offspring of Rachel, Dan’s is about Shimshon, Asher’s is about Israel as Hashem’s Chosen People, Naftali’s is about the Avos and Imahos; as you can see, some of these themes are directly connected to the identity of the tribe, whereas others are only loosely connected, or are not apparently connected at all. 
[10] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Avodah, Hilchos Me’ilah 8:8
[11] ibid. Sefer ha'Korbanos, Hilchos Temurah 4:14

Tuesday, July 17, 2018

Honoring Our Non-Jewish Elders

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Left: [Great] Uncle William, at the age of 4, in February 1921
Right: [Great] Uncle William, at the age of 101, in July 2018


Honoring Our Non-Jewish Elders

Uncle William

My brother and I recently returned from our annual trip to Hawaii, where our mom's side of the family has lived for several generations. My mom's father was one of thirteen siblings, the oldest of whom was born in 1902. Of those thirteen siblings, only one is still alive: [Great] Uncle William (whom we refer to as "Uncle William," even though he's my grandfather's brother). 

Uncle William was born on April 1st, 1917.

Yes, your math is correct: this past April 1st was his 101st birthday. 

Let's put Uncle William's personal timeline into perspective by using American history and American innovation as a basis of comparison. The year Uncle William was born, Woodrow Wilson was president (#28), and Liliuokalani, the last Queen of Hawaii, was still alive. Hawaii wouldn't become a state until 42 years later. Television wasn't invented until Uncle William was almost 10 years old. He was a teenager during the Great Depression, and in his mid-20's he witnessed the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. He still holds it against FDR for taking America off the gold standard in 1933. He was too old to be in the Korean War, which started in his mid-30's, and he was nearly 60 when the Vietnam War ended. He was 75 at the birth of the World Wide Web, and he was 84 on 9/11. 

Impressive, no?

Uncle William worked as a furniture repair man for most of his life, and only retired at the age of 95, when he started having a hard time getting up after sitting down on the floor to work. He remained active into his 90's, riding his bike into town, trading up his vehicle for a new one (because "the old car didn't fit my lifestyle"), and mowing his own lawn ("it takes me three days").

All the while, his mental faculties didn't dull in the slightest. While not a towering intellectual or even a deep thinker, Uncle William definitely has a reflective soul. Although he didn't go to college or graduate from high school (my grandfather was the only one of his siblings to do that), Uncle William was a reader - especially of newspapers. He followed the news to the point where we could ask him for his opinion on any current event, and he would have something thoughtful to say. (For the record: he didn't like Obama because he was a politician and didn't like Trump because "he's just a big mouth" and he thinks that America is going downhill because Democracy appeals to the lowest common denominator; when we asked him who America's last great leader was, he said, "Clinton was good ... the man - not the wife.")

Unfortunately, Uncle William had a prostate issue two years ago, and needed to start using a catheter, which slowed him down. Things started going downhill from there. He had made it to the age of 98 living on his own, but was finally forced to hire an attendant to help him. By the time we visited him this summer his vision and hearing had deteriorated, and he now has 24-hour care.

And yet, he's still mentally with it! We talked with him for about an hour, and said that we'd visit him next summer ("If I'm still around!").

After visiting Uncle William this summer, I found myself wondering: "What would Torah say? How would Judaism frame my interaction with a man of Uncle William's age?"

I decided I'd look into it. This is what I found.

The Halacha of Honoring Non-Jewish Elders

The "halachic address" of our topic is the mitzvas aseh (positive commandment) of "mipnei seivah takum," which is derived from the pasuk: "In the presence of old age you shall rise, and you shall honor the presence of a sage, and you shall revere your God - I am Hashem" (Vayikra 19:32). Here is the Sefer ha'Chinuch's [1] summary of the basic mitzvah:
[The 257th mitzvah is] to honor chachamim (the wise) and rise before them, as it is stated: "you shall rise up before seivah (lit. white hair)," which Onkelos translated as: "you shall rise up before one who knows Torah." Our Sages of blessed memory explained "and you shall honor the presence of a zakein (lit. elder)" as referring to none other than zeh she'kanah chochmah (one who has acquired wisdom). The reason why Scripture expresses "chacham" as "zakein" is because a young chacham has seen through his chochmah (wisdom) what an elder has seen through the multitude of his years.
While the primary form of this mitzvah is to honor chachamim, we follow the opinion of R' Issi ben Yehudah in the Gemara who says that "[this pasuk] implies all [types of] seivah" which even includes elders who are not chachamim. Here is the Rambam's [2] codification of this secondary component of the mitzvah, which includes the case at hand:
We stand in the presence of a zakein ha'muflag b'ziknah (an elder who is very advanced in age) even though he is not a chacham (wise man). Even a young chacham should stand in the presence of a zakein ha'muflag b'ziknah – though he is not obligated to stand to his full stature, but only enough to show respect to him. And even a non-Jewish elder we honor with words, and we lend him a supporting hand, as it is stated: “rise up in the presence of old age” – which implies old age in any sense of the term.
The Shulchan Aruch [3] brings down the Rambam's formulation almost verbatim. Although there is some debate as to what age would qualify someone as a zakein ha'muflag b'ziknah - with opinions ranging from 60, to 70, to 90 - I suspect everyone would agree that Uncle William's age of 101 years places him firmly within this halachic category.

The source of the Rambam's halacha is the Gemara in Kiddushin (33a), which states:
R’ Yochanan would rise up in the presence of a non-Jewish elder, saying: “How many experiences he has endured!” Rava would not rise up, but he would show him honor. Abaye would lend his hand to [such] elders.
The Rambam paskins (halachically rules) in accordance with Rava and Abaye that although we do not stand up for a zakein goy (non-Jewish elder) as we would for a zaken Yisrael (Jewish elder), we show him honor in other ways: verbally and by providing assistance.

Although the Rambam's citation of our pasuk and subsequent explanation might seem to imply that he holds that honoring a zakein goy is part of the mitzvah de'oraisa (Biblical obligation), it is pretty clear that this isn't what he actually holds. If it were, then there would be no differentiation between a zakein goy and a zakein Yisrael. Rather, showing honor to a zakein goy is either a mitzvah mi'de'rabbanan [4] (Rabbinic mitzvah), or something we do out of darchei shalom [5] ("ways of peace," intended to maintain peace between Jews and non-Jews). This explains why we differentiate between a zakein goy and a zakein Yisrael - to show that the two acts of giving kavod do not share the same halachic nature.

The Philosophy Behind the Halacha

The Sefer ha'Chinuch offers the following reason for this mitzvah as a whole (i.e. to honor chachamim):
At the root of this mitzvah lies the reason that the main purpose of man's having been created in the world is for the sake of chochmah, so that he will recognize his Creator, therefore, it is fitting for people to honor one who has attained this. As a result, others will be inspired about it. It is based on this reason that Issi ben Yehudah said in the Gemara Kiddushin that even an uneducated elder - i.e. one who is not wise - is included in this mitzvah, for it is befitting to honor him because in his multitude of years he has seen and recognized some of the works and wonders of Hashem, and this is worthy of honor. This is why Rebbi Yochanan said there in the Gemara Kiddushin: "the halacha is in accordance with Issi ben Yehudah" - on the condition that [the elder] is not a confirmed sinner, in which case, he has deprived himself of honor.
Even though we have established that the obligation of honoring a zakein goy is not a part of the mitzvah de'oraisa, the reason behind this act of honor is definitely related. As stated above, R' Yochanan explained his reason for standing in the presence of a zakein goy, saying: "How many (harpatkei) experiences he has endured!" Rashi [6] explains the unusual term "harpatkei":
harpatkei [means] experiences and troubles; and they have seen many miracles and wonders.
According to Rashi, we honor a zakein goy not for any type of specialized chochmah that he may or may not have. Rather, we honor him for the chochmah that he has gained from his life-experience and the wondrous phenomena he has had the opportunity to witness. This would certainly apply to non-Jew elders, no matter where they're from.

Rav Hirsch [7] provides a similar explanation, differentiating between the two reasons for honoring an elder, which he relates to the two words used to denote "old age" (i.e. seivah and ziknah):
He who honors seivah honors experience; that is, he honors the natural human perception that matures through the repeated events of life and nature. He who honors ziknah honors wisdom; that is, he honors the understanding of life and nature that is obtained from God's Word. For God's Word reveals the Divine source and purpose of life and nature, and their significance for our mission. We must pay tribute to both: the clear and circumspect human intellect, which matures through experience; and the spirit of God, which proceeds from the Torah. And whenever we find them, in the aged and in the wise, we are to show our homage by rising and honoring.  
The Ralbag [8] seems to learn our pasuk as teaching two separate mitzvos: "in the presence of old age you shall rise" commands us to honor elders, regardless of their wisdom, and "honor the presence of a sage" commands us to honor chachamim. He explains the first mitzvah very similarly to the Sefer ha'Chinuch, but throws in a Gersonidean twist at the end:
"in the presence of old age you shall rise" is a mitzvas aseh to rise up in the presence of every aged person, in order to honor him. There is a benefit in this: on account of this, those who are young in days will listen to the words of the aged, and their words will be precious to them, and they will behave in accordance with their discipline. For the aged, due to the multitude of worldly events that they have witnessed, will come to know by way of experience many principles of decision-making and ethics. Thus, one who listens to these words will be saved from many afflictions that would have befallen him, were it not for the advice of the aged. Furthermore, [one who honors the aged] will take it to heart to give great honor to Hashem, Who is Eternal - Who never didn't exist, and will never depart [from existence]. 
In other words, this mitzvah operates on two levels. On a practical level, the mitzvah facilitates the bequeathal of valuable life lessons from the older generation to the younger. On a philosophical/psychological level, this mitzvah trains us to have reverence for existence, which - according to the Ralbag - will ultimately strengthen our reverence for Hashem, Whose Existence is Eternal.

Ibn Ezra, [9] however, has a radically different take on this mitzvah:
The meaning of "in the presence of old age you shall rise" is on account of a dead person, because an elder is close to death, since his body is considered to be as though it is dead ... the meaning of "you shall fear your God" is that He will punish you in the days of old age.
According to the Ibn Ezra, we stand up in the presence of the elderly not to show them honor, but to remind ourselves of our impending death!

Concluding Thoughts

As is often the case with taamei ha'mitzvos (reasons for mitzvos), it is entirely possible for multiple explanations to be correct. All of these explanations ring true based on the time I've spent with Uncle William.

Have my encounters with Uncle William led me to value and revere the unique type of wisdom he has attained as a result of his long life? Yes. Am I more inclined to listen closely to his words than I would if I heard them from someone closer to my age? Yes. When I see him, do I become more cognizant of the finitude of my own life, and the eventuality of my own eventual death? Definitely.

And guess what? I even got to perform the mitzvah this trip by lending him a helping hand when he wanted to move to a different chair!

I realize that this blog post didn't break new ground or anything. I just think that it's a great example of how halacha enriches every area of my life, and I wanted to share that example with you.


[1] Sefer ha'Chinuch: Parashas Kedoshim, Mitzvah #257
[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Talmud Torah 6:9
[3] Rav Yosef Karo, Shulchan Aruch: Yoreh Deah 244:7
[4] Rav Yoel Sirkis (Bach), Bayis Chadash: Yoreh Deah 244
[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Yaakov (Semag), Sefer Mitzvos Gadol: Aseh #13
[6] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Talmud Bavli: Kiddushin 33
[7] Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, Commentary on Vayikra 19:32
[8] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on Vayikra 19:32
[9] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Vayikra 19:32

Friday, June 22, 2018

Parashas Chukas: Three Types of Reasons for Mitzvos

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Artwork: Ring of Three Wishes, by Mark Winters


Parashas Chukas: Three Types of Reasons for Chukim

There is a well-known midrash which states that Shlomo ha'Melech understood the reasons for all of the chukim (statutes) except for the Parah Adumah (Red Heifer) in this week's parashah. [1] We have written on numerous occasions about how this midrash has been misunderstood. Even chukim have reasons, though they may not be obvious. In today's post I would like to explore what it means to "find a reason" for a chok

Buried deep within the Mishneh Torah of the Rambam, [2] at the very end of Hilchos Me'ilah, at the very end of Sefer Avodah, is a miniature treatise on understanding the reasons for mitzvos which begins with the following injunction:
It is proper for a person to contemplate the laws of the Holy Torah and to know their ultimate idea (sof inyan), according to his ability. If he doesn't find a reason (taam) and doesn't know a cause (ilah) of something, it should not be lighter in his eyes, nor should he break forth to ascend to Hashem lest He burst forth against him, nor should he think of it as a mundane matter. 
The Rambam begins by urging us to understand the sof inyan (ultimate idea) of every mitzvah. This phrase is somewhat vague. But in the very next sentence he clarifies what he meant by describing what it looks like to fall short of this ideal, saying that "he didn't find a taam (reason)" and "he didn't know an ilah (cause)." The question is: What does the Rambam mean by taam and ilah?

The Rambam [3] provides us with a clue at the end of Hilchos Temurah: 
Even though all of the chukim of the Torah are [Scriptural] decrees, as we explained at the end of Hilchos Me'ilah, it is proper to contemplate them; anything for which you can give a taam (reason), you should give a taam. The Early Sages said that Shlomo ha’Melech understood the majority of taamim for all of the chukim of the Torah.
There are several noteworthy subtleties about the Rambam's phrasing in both sources. First of all, whereas in Hilchos Me'ilah he speaks about all mitzvos - including mishpatim - in Hilchos Temurah he only talks about chukim. Secondly, when discussing the ilah (cause) of a mitzvah he uses the verb "to know," as opposed to when discusses the taam of a mitzvah, in which case he uses the verbs "to find," "to give," and "to understand." Even stranger is his statement "anything for which you can give a taam, give a taam," which almost sounds like he's talking about a subjective form of apologetics, rather than a genuine analysis of the mitzvah in an attempt to uncover its meaning. Lastly, in Hilchos Temurah, the Rambam says that Shlomo understood "the majority of taamim for all the chukim of the Torah," which implies that chukim have multiple taamim. Indeed, 

On the basis of these observations, I would like to suggest the following. The term "ilah" refers to the final cause of the mitzvah - the reason why the mitzvah exists, and without which, the mitzvah would not exist. In contrast, the taam of a mitzvah refers to a benefit which emerges from the mitzvah, but is not necessarily the reason why the mitzvah came into existence in the first place. 

For example, the Rambam famously held that korbanos (sacrifices) were only commanded by Hashem as a means of curtailing, limiting, and uprooting avodah zarah (idolatry) from the nation. From his explanation we have every reason to believe that the Rambam meant exactly what he wrote: had mankind done teshuvah shleimah (complete repentance) from avodah zarah prior to the time that the Torah was given, there would be no korbanos. The uprooting of avodah zarah is the ilah (cause), and all of the mitzvos involving korbanos are the alul (effect). 

Does this mean he holds that there are no other benefits or perfections to be gained from any of the korbanos? Of course not! It's hard to imagine that the Rambam would deny, for example, the Ramban's [4] explanation of how the sacrificing of the animal facilitates teshuvah by bringing us to the recognition that by midas ha'din (absolute justice) standards, we forfeit our right to exist by acting contrary to God's will. Nor would the Rambam deny the Sefer ha'Chinuch's [5] explanation, that when we slaughter the animal as part of our teshuvah process, we are acknowledging that we only came to sin because we allowed our animalistic nature to gain the upper hand. The Rambam would merely say that these explanations reflect taamim, though not the true ilah, of korbanos.

Likewise, the Rambam would undoubtedly agree that the ilah of the Pesach is to remember Yetzias Mitzrayim (the Exodus from Egypt) and that the ilah of Sukkos is "in order that your generations will know that I caused Bnei Yisrael to dwell in Sukkos when I took them out from Egypt" (Vayikra 23:43). Yet, in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim [6] he says that the moadim (holidays) are "appointed for rejoicing and for such pleasant gathering as people generally need; they also promote the good feeling that men should have to each other in their social and political relations." 

I believe this explains all of the anomalies we pointed out. It explains his use of the words "ilah" and "taam." It explains why the Rambam uses the verb "to know" in relation to the ilah, since the ilah is an objective fact that can be discovered through knowledge, whereas it makes more sense to use the verbs "to find," "to give," and "to understand" in relation to the taamim, due to the more speculative nature of that type of inquiry. This is also why the Rambam tells us "anything for which you can give a taam, you should give a taam," since the goal is to find as many ways to benefit from our observance of the mitzvos as possible, even if we don't understand the true ilah. This also explains how Shlomo could have understood "the majority of taamim for all of the mitzvos." In other words, if you asked him, he could give you a taam for every single mitzvah - including Parah Adumah - but he would acknowledge that there are taamim that he hasn't yet uncovered.

That takes care of two types of reasons for mitzvos. But as the title of this post implies, there is a third. In the Rambam's terminology, this third type of reason is called a "remez" (allusion). The Rambam provides two examples of this in the Mishneh Torah. The first is his explanation [7] of the remez in shofar:
Even though the sounding of the shofar on Rosh Ha'Shanah is a Scriptural decree, it contains a remez: it is as if it is saying, "Wake up, wake up you sleepers from your sleep, and you slumberers from your deep slumber! Analyze your actions, return in teshuvah, and remember your Creator" - these are the people who forget reality, due to the empty illusions of the times, and whose entire year is steeped in fantasy and emptiness which neither benefits them nor saves them - "Look into your souls and improve your ways and your actions. Each and every one of you: abandon your evil way and your scheming that is not good!" 
The second example is his explanation [8] of the remez in mikvah:
It is a clear and evident thing that tumah (halachic impurity) and taharah (halachic purity) are a Scriptural decree; they are not matters which are dictated by common sense, but are included in the chukim. Likewise, tevilah (ritual immersion) from tumah is included in the chukim, since tumah isn’t mud or excrement such that it would be removed by water, but is a Scriptural decree, and is a matter which is dependent on the intention of the heart. Therefore, the Sages said that if a person immersed but didn’t intend to purify himself, it is as if he didn’t immerse. Nevertheless, there is a remez in it: just as one who intended in his heart to be purified, and once he immersed he became purified, even though nothing changed in his body, so too, one who intends to purify his soul from spiritual impurity – namely, thoughts of iniquity and bad character traits – once he resolves in his mind to separate from those counsels, and brings is soul into the waters of knowledge, he becomes pure. This is as it says: “I will sprinkle pure waters on you and you will become purified; from all of your impurities and from all of your filth I will purify you” (Yechezkel 36:25).
According to the Rambam, a "remez" is a metaphorical or symbolic interpretation of a mitzvah. The remez differs from the taam in the same way that midrash differs from pshat - that is, the remez explanation is imposed onto the mitzvah from without, whereas the taam explanation highlights a benefit which naturally emerges from within the structure of the mitzvah. 

Now that we are aware of these three types of reasons one can give for the mitzvos, it behooves us to classify accordingly the explanations we encounter or discover. There are many people who believe they are giving a taam when it is merely a remez; sometimes we might mistake a taam for an ilah; and sometimes an ilah might be missed because we are too busy looking for a remez

This classification scheme can be very helpful when learning the reasons for mitzvos given by meforshim (commentators). Ask yourself which type of reason the commentator intended to give. In some cases, the commentator might have believed he was giving one type of reason, but another commentator will disagree and say he's giving a different type.

Is it possible that the definitions stated here are not what the Rambam intended by his use of these terms? Yes. But even if that is the case, I am convinced that this classification scheme will help us to follow the Rambam's advice and strive to understand the sof inyan of every mitzvah. 

[1] Bamidbar Rabbah 19:3
[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Avodah, Hilchos Me'ilah 8:8
[3] ibid. Sefer haKorbanos, Hilchos Temurah 4:13
[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 1:9
[5] Sefer ha'Chinuch, Parashas Terumah: Mitzvah #95
[6] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:32
[7] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 3:4
[8] ibid. Sefer Taharah, Hilchos Mikvaos 11:12

Friday, July 14, 2017

Parashas Pinchas: Making Meaning of Mussafim

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Parashas Pinchas: Making Meaning of Mussafim

The final topic in Parashas Pinchas (Bamidbar Chapters 28-29) is the mussafim (additional offerings) which were brought in the Beis ha’Mikdash (Holy Temple) on the moadim (holidays). These korbanos (offerings) are described as “mussafim” (additional) because they are considered to be additions to the korban tamid (continual offering) which was brought twice each day: once in the morning and once in the afternoon. 

In the present day, when the Beis ha’Mikdash has not been rebuilt, the average Jew encounters these mussafim in two primary ways: (a) the krias ha’Torah (public Torah readings) on the moadim, in which we read the pesukim (verses) from our parashah corresponding to the mussaf of that day, and (b) the tefilas mussaf (additional prayer), which was instituted to parallel the korban mussaf, and in which the prevailing custom is to recite the contents of each mussaf during the middle berachah (blessing). 

Although I have not taken a survey, I suspect that the vast majority of Jews hear and recite these pesukim do so mindlessly, without giving any thought as to the number or type of animal offered in each korban and without thinking about why each mussaf is offered on each day. It is difficult enough to relate to the idea of korbanos in general, and even more difficult to derive any meaning or value from reciting the particular requirements for these holiday offerings.

I, too, suffered from this “mussafic apathy” from the day I learned to daven (pray) right up until this past Pesach. I was davening my tefilas mussaf like any other Yom Tov (holiday), and when I read the pesukim which describe the mussaf of Pesach, I had an epiphany. I realized that the the mussaf of Pesach was exactly the same as the mussaf of Rosh Chodesh (the New Month). Then I took a look at the mussaf for Shavuos and noticed that it was also exactly the same. 

“Huh,” I though to myself, “That’s interesting.” On a whim, I decided to look up the other mussafim – and that’s when the gears started turning. As you can imagine, the facts were incredibly detailed. Since it was Yom Tov, and I couldn’t write, I made a visual representation of all the mussafim using Magic: the Gathering tokens and dice (see below) so that I could more easily spot any patterns and anomalies. After finding these patterns and anomalies, I was able to formulate specific questions. These questions led to answers which yielded insight into the different moadim and their interrelationship. 

You can figure out the key by comparing it to the chart above. There is one error, though: there are supposed to be seven lambs for Shemini Atzeres - not just one. 


Here is a list of most (if not all) of these questions – many of which I subsequently discovered were noted by the Abravanel [1] in his commentary on Bamidbar:
1) Why do we offer a single lamb for the korban tamid? Or, if you prefer, why do we bring a lamb for the tamid once in the morning and once in the afternoon? 
2) Why is the tamid included here at all, considering the fact (a) that it isn’t a mussaf, and (b) the Torah already dealt with the tamid way back in Parashas Tetzaveh (Shemos 29:38-46)
3) Why are these four species of animal – and only these four species – used as mussafim?  
4) Why do the mussafim of all the moadim involve all four species (bull, ram, lamb, he-goat) whereas the mussaf of Shabbos only involves lambs? Or, if you prefer, why do the daily tamid and the mussaf of Shabbos only involve lambs, whereas the mussafim of all the other moadim involve all four species? 
5) Why are the mussafim of Rosh Chodesh, Pesach, and Shavuos exactly the same? 
6) Why do we offer 2 bulls for Rosh Chodesh, Pesach, and Shavuos, but only 1 bull for Rosh ha’Shanah, Yom ha’Kippurim, and Shemini Atzeres? Alternatively, why are the mussafim of Rosh ha’Shanah and Shemini Atzeres – and Yom ha’Kippurim, if you do’t count the additional he-goat – exactly the same?  
7) Why is the “default number” of rams one? (“Default” in the sense that all mussafim that have rams have only 1, with the exception of Sukkos.) 
8) Why is the “default number” of lambs seven? (“Default” in the sense that all mussafim that have lambs have 7, with the exception of Sukkos.) 
9) Why do we bring 2 rams on Sukkos? Do we understand this to be “a requirement of 2” or “double the requirement of the usual 1”? 
10) Why do we bring 14 lambs on Sukkos? Do we understand this to be “a requirement of 14” or “double the requirement of the usual 7”? 
11) Why, on Sukkos, do we bring 13 bulls on Day 1, 12 on Day 2, 11 on Day 3, etc.? In other words, why do the bulls diminish at all, and why do we start with 13 and end with 7? 
12) Why do we bring a sin-offering with each of the mussafim except for Shabbos? What does this sin-offering atone for? And why a he-goat? 
13) Why, on Yom ha’Kippurim, do we bring an extra he-goat as a sin-offering? 
14) Why, on Shavuos, do we bring a special korban mussaf in addition to the regular one? What accounts for the unique composition of this mussaf, which contains features we don’t see elsewhere – that is, two loaves of bread, seven more lambs in addition to the seven lambs of the regular mussaf, another he-goat as a sin offering in addition to the he-goat sin offering of the regular mussaf, and two more lambs brought as shlamim (peace-offerings)? And if this is really a mussaf, why isn’t it mentioned in Parashas Pinchas?   
15) Why are the bulls, rams, and lambs of the mussafim offered as olah (burnt-offerings), but the he-goat offered chatas (sin-offerings)? 
Now before you get too excited, I am sorry to inform you that we will not be answering all of these questions in this blog post – not even close. Most of the meforshim (commentators) only offer answers to a few of these questions and not others, and their answers are too localized for me to be able to extrapolate their overall approach to the extent that I would be able to reliably guess how they might answer the other questions. The only two meforshim I found who attempted to provide reasons for ALL the details of ALL the mussafim were the Ralbag and the Abravanel. Unfortunately, I did not find their answers compelling enough to write here – though I will cite a few examples from each of them below.

Instead of answering these questions I would like to focus on methodology. I will outline the four different approaches taken by the meforshim in their efforts to answer these questions. I will then offer several examples of each approach. Lastly, I will note the major advantages and disadvantages of each approach. 

Approach #1 – Structural: Personally, my favorite approach to questions like this is the minimalist “structural” approach. According to this approach, the mussafim are not symbolic. Rather, the patterns and anomalies in the mussafim reflect ideas about the moadim on which they are brought. By examining these discrepancies in light of all the information provided by Torah she’bi’Chsav (the Written Torah) and Torah she’baal Peh (the Oral Torah), one can arrive at a deeper understanding of the moadim. For example:
The daily tamid consists of one lamb, whereas the mussaf of Shabbos consists of two lambs. This structural pattern conveys the idea that Shabbos is “double” the weekday, in some sense. What does this mean? The mussafim themselves do not answer this question. To answer this question we must contemplate what we know about Shabbos in relation to the weekdays. We might draw a comparison from the fact that the Torah states, “and God blessed the 7th day and sanctified it” (Bereishis 2:3), which Chazal interpret to foreshadow the fact that Hashem gave Bnei Yisrael a double portion of mahn (manna) on Friday for the sake of Shabbos. Alternatively, perhaps the idea has to do with the fact that the freedom of melachah on Shabbos affords us double the opportunity to perfect ourselves in comparison to the weekday. Or maybe the idea has to do with the fact that we have a neshamah yeseirah (“extra soul”) on Shabbos (Taanis 27b), or that the mitzvah of oneg (enjoyment) results in double the enjoyment, or the fact that the weekday is primarily devoted to the needs of Olam ha’Zeh (This World), whereas on Shabbos we get to enjoy Olam ha’Zeh and Olam ha’Ba (The World to Come).  
Another example has to do with our initial observation: that the mussafim of Rosh Chodesh, Pesach, and Shavuos are exactly the same. This suggests that there is a common theme which unites these three moadim. Again, there are a number of directions we can proceed from there. Perhaps these reflect the three stages of Yetzias Mitzrayim (the Exodus from Egypt): Rosh Chodesh is the moed which represents the preparation stage while Bnei Yisrael were still enslaved in Mitzrayim (since this is when they were commanded in the mitzvah of Rosh Chodesh); Pesach is the moed about the Geulas Mitzrayim (Redemption from Egypt); Shavuos (according to some) is the moed about Matan Torah (the Giving of the Torah), which was the purpose and culmination of Yetzias Mitzrayim.  
A third example comes from the Bechor Shor’s [2] explanation of the mussaf of Shemini Atzeres. He notes that compared to the mussafim of the first seven days of Sukkos (e.g. 31 animals on Day 1, 30 on Day 2, etc.), Shemini Atzeres has relatively few (i.e. only 11). Why should that be? He answers that the term "atzeres" means "to detain" or "hold back." The idea of the holiday is that once Sukkos ends we won't have any more moadim until Pesach, Hashem wants to "hold us back" for one more day of rejoicing. In order to show us that He is doing this because of His love for us, and in order to demonstrate that He is not holding us back to obtain more korbanos, He therefore required the absolute minimum amount of korbanos: one bull, one ram, and the standard amount of lambs. 
The chief advantage of the structural approach is that it is extremely conservative. We simply note the small differences in the mussafim and make small moves based on our prior knowledge to derive small new insights into the moadim. But the minimalism of this approach is a double-edged sword: since we are given very little information from the korbanos themselves, and are forced to draw upon prior knowledge, this approach lends itself to a high degree of speculation. The first example illustrates this point: yes, we see that Shabbos is “double” the weekday, but see how many different ways there are to make sense of this! 

Approach #2 – Torah-Symbolic: This approach is a favorite among the more midrashically inclined meforshim, such as Rashi, the Ramban, and (of course) Chazal themselves, who authored the midrashim. The Abravanel takes this approach all the way, explaining every single detail of every korban in accordance with its Torah-based symbolism. However, he doesn’t maintain that the symbolism is uniform (i.e. bulls don’t always symbolize the same thing; the number 7 also doesn’t always symbolize the same thing). He also doesn’t always use the same “mode” of symbolism: some of his symbolism is based on textual evidence and allusions in Torah she’bi’Chsav, some is based on the physical qualities of the animals, and some of it is based on wordplay. Lastly, the Abravanel does not seem to think that this approach lends itself to absolute certainty, as indicated by the fact that he offers several different interpretations for many of the details. 

Here are a few examples to give you taste of this approach:
The two lambs of the korban tamid represent the two pivotal events in Jewish history, whose memory is “always” with us: the tamid shel shachar (morning continual offering) symbolizes Yetzias Mitzrayim, which was chronologically the first event; the tamid shel bein ha’arbayim (afternoon continual offering) symbolizes Matan Torah, which was chronologically later. The lamb (כבש) was chosen for these offerings to teach that are we subordinate (נכבשים) to Hashem. 
The Abravanel, citing Chazal, explains that the four species involved in all the mussafim (except for Shabbos) represent the three Avos (forefathers) plus the Shvatim (Twelve Tribes). Avraham is represented by the bull, as it is stated: “And Avraham ran to the cattle” (Bereishis 18:7). Yitzchak is represented by the ram, as it is stated: “Behold! – there was a ram behind him” (ibid. 22:13). Yaakov is represented by the lamb: “and Yaakov separated the lambs” (ibid. 30:40). The Shvatim are represented by the he-goat, as it is stated: “and they slaughtered a he-goat” (ibid. 37:31). 
The Abravanel offers his own explanation for the mussaf of Rosh Chodesh which differs from Chazal. He holds that the mussaf of Rosh Chodesh was designed to remind us of how Bnei Yisrael were commanded in the mitzvah of Rosh Chodesh – our very first mitzvah – in Mitzrayim. The two bulls (פרים) represent Moshe and Aharon, through whom the mitzvah of Rosh Chodesh was given, and who caused Torah to be fruitful (פרים) in Israel. The one ram (איל) represents (lehavdil) Hashem, the all-powerful (בעל האילות), Who commanded Bnei Yisrael in the mitzvah of Rosh Chodesh. The seven lambs represent the seven tzadikim (righteous people) from whom Moshe and Aharon descended: (1) Noach, (2) Avraham, (3) Yitzchak, (4) Yaakov, (5) Levi, (6) Kehas, (7) Amram. The merit of these seven tzadikim stand by us, and protect us from the harmful occurrences that were set in motion with the beginning of the month. Alternatively, the two bulls (פרים) represent the sun and the moon, whose cyclical motion is responsible not only for our calendar, but for all of the fruits (פירות) of the world. The one ram alludes to the fact that we were given the mitzvah of Rosh Chodesh in the month of Nisan – the same month in which we offer the Korban Pesach (Pesach offering), which is brought from the same species as a ram. (Perhaps the Abravanel is also referring to the fact that the constellation of Nisan is the ram.) We bring seven lambs corresponding to the seven days of the Chag ha’Matzos (Festival of Matzah). 
As for the mussaf of Sukkos, the Abravanel quotes Chazal for the first part of his explanation and offers his original interpretations for the rest. The 70 bulls (13+12+11+10+9+8+7) represent the 70 nations of the world, or the 70 “angelic officers” appointed over them; their gradual diminution symbolizes the fact that they will ultimately be gradually diminished in the time leading up to Yemos ha’Moshiach (the Messianic Era). The two rams (אילים) represent the two most powerful nations alluded to in: “” (Devarim 32:14). The fourteen lambs represent the fourteen children of Yaakov: the twelve tribes – with Yosef being split into Ephraim and Menashe – plus Dinah. 
As you can see, there are major advantages and disadvantages within this approach. The advantage is that the use of a highly flexible symbolic language allows these korbanos to reflect a wide variety of concepts. Each mussaf becomes a dazzling allegorical ritual rich with meaning. The disadvantage is that an approach like this is highly speculative – as I wrote about in my post about the perils of metaphor – and lends itself to forced interpretations. Personally, I would accept this approach in the spirit of drash, but not as pshat

Approach #3 – Scientifically Symbolic: This, by far, is the most ambitious approach, and is spearheaded by the Ralbag. [3] The Ralbag maintains that the Beis ha’Mikdash and the avodas ha’korbanos (Divine service of the sacrificial order) was designed to teach us fundamental principles of science and metaphysics. Each and every detail of the avodah symbolizes a fact or a concept which helps us to understand the universe, and which ultimately brings us to knowledge and love of Hashem. Here are a few examples:
The Ralbag maintains that the seven lambs offered on the Shalosh Regalim (Three Pilgrimage Festivals) represent the seven levels of existences – or “forms” – in the universe: (1) elements, (2) minerals, (3) plant life, (4) animal life, (5) human life, (6) angels, and (7) Hashem.  
He explains that the mussaf of Rosh Chodesh was designed to teach us about the motion of the moon, which is the basis of our calendar: the seven lambs symbolize the seven causes of motion which move the seven planets; the one ram represents the mover of the Celestial Sphere which encompasses the seven planets; the two bulls represent the two movers of the Celestial Sphere – namely, the Active Intellect and Hashem (lehavdil). 
Similarly, he explains the mussafim of Rosh ha’Shanah and Yom ha’Kippurim as symbolically reflecting other ideas about the motions of the heavenly bodies: the one bull corresponds to the Active Intellect; the one ram corresponds to the Celestial Sphere which causes the motion of the planets; the seven lambs represent the seven planets; these animals add up to nine olah-offerings – not ten – because Hashem is the Prime Mover, and it would be inappropriate to include Him in the count (though the Ralbag also explains that this idea is alluded to in the fact that the time period between Rosh ha’Shanah and Yom ha’Kippurim is ten days). 
To me, this approach – if it were correct – would be the most impressive and significant. It gives me the chills to think about what it would be like if all of the laws of nature were modeled by the halachos which govern the avodah (service) in the Beis ha’Mikdash. The Mikdash would then truly be “a miniature universe.” 

Unfortunately, all of the Ralbag’s explanations were based on Aristotelian physics, which means that it is entirely invalid. I’m sure it was great while it lasted, though. 

To my knowledge, nobody in the modern age has attempted to follow the Ralbag’s approach according to our modern understanding of science. Furthermore, I have a feeling that if the Ralbag were alive today, and if he were aware of the rapid progress that science has made over the past few centuries, perhaps he would agree that it would be folly to suggest that the the fixed laws of the korbanos reflect our ever-changing scientific understanding of the universe. 

Approach #4 – No Explanation: Last but not least, there is the approach of the Rambam. In his discourse on the reasons for mitzvos in the Moreh ha’Nevuchim, [4] the Rambam writes about korbanos “we cannot say why one korban should be a lamb whilst another is a ram, and why a fixed number of them should be brought.” He adds that:
Those who trouble themselves to find reasons for any of these details are chasing after a huge delusion - one which not only fails to remove any difficulties, but increases them. Anyone who believes that these [details of the laws] have a purpose is as far from the truth as one who assumes that the entire mitzvah is without any real purpose. 
I have written about this at length in a previous blog post this summer, in which I attempted to demonstrate that the Rambam’s view is far more nuanced than it would appear at first glance. Nevertheless, it would seem that the Rambam would hold that at least some – if not all – of the questions we asked are a waste of time, because there are simply no answers. The details are arbitrary. 

The advantage of this approach is that it is entirely immune to speculation. It is impossible to be wrong about what the details of the korbanos teach us if one holds that they don’t teach us anything. The disadvantage of this approach is that it is extremely difficult to accept. Would the Rambam really look at the glaring patterns and anomalies in the mussafim and the questions we asked and conclude that these details are arbitrary? I find that hard to believe, especially since the Rambam does offer reasons for some of these details in the Moreh ha’Nevuchim. 

Still, I am including this in my list of approaches because the Rambam would definitely say that some details here are arbitrary. For example, he explicitly stated that if a person asks, “Why seven lambs and not eight?” then there is no answer; this detail is arbitrary. From this example alone we see a marked difference between the Rambam and many other meforshim

Roll safe, Rambam.
In conclusion, I hope this post can serve as something like a “starter kit” for exploring the topic of mussafim. I have provided a chart which summarizes the relevant facts, a list of questions for investigation, and a summary of the four approaches I’ve seen in the meforshim. “The rest,” as they say, “is commentary; go forth and learn.”

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar Chapter 28
[2] Rabbeinu Yosef Bechor Shor, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 29:35
[3] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar: Parashas Pinchas (Toalos)
[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:26