Tuesday, June 20, 2017

"Are Mitzvos Arbitrary?" or "The Pillow Mashal"

Originally published in July 2013. It is recommended to read Rambam: On the Reasons for Mitzvos before reading this post.

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"Are Mitzvos Arbitrary?" or "The Pillow Mashal"

Summary of the Rambam's View

This post is about the Rambam's view of taamei ha'mitzvos (the reasons for the commandments), as stated in his Guide for the Perplexed 3:26. Although I posted the full translation of this chapter yesterday, I'll summarize it here and then state the central question/problem which will be the focus of this post.

According to the Rambam, Chazal unanimously held that all mitzvos have reasons and were commanded for our benefit - even chukim. The only thing preventing us from knowing these reasons is our own ignorance. 

However, there is one puzzling statement from Chazal which seems to imply that some mitzvos do not have reasons:
What difference does it make to Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu whether an animal is slaughtered by shechitah (cutting the front of the neck) or by nechirah ("poleaxing it" i.e. chopping the back of its neck)? Surely the mitzvos were only given in order to test human beings, as it is stated: "The word of Hashem is tested (lit. refined)" (Tehilim 18:31).
On the surface, this statement implies that there is no real reason for shechitah over nechirah. This would appear to undermine the otherwise unanimously accepted principle that all of the mitzvos have reasons.

The Rambam resolves this apparent contradiction by making a subdivision. He writes that 
the mitzvos have specific reasons as far as their general character is concerned, and were commanded for a specific purpose; but as regards to their particulars - that is where we say that they have no reason other than being commanded.
He then explains the aforementioned statement of Chazal on the basis of this distinction. The general character of shechitah has a reason (i.e. that we should kill an animal before eating it, instead of eating it while it is still alive), but the particular requirements of shechitah (e.g. cutting the windpipe and esophagus, sharpening the knife, etc.) have no reason other than the commandment itself.

The Question/Problem

The problem is that in the very next sentence, the Rambam asserts that there are reasons for such details! He writes that the specific requirements for shechitah (e.g. cutting the windpipe and esophagus) are designed to ensure an easy death for the animal, and requiring a sharp knife is more convenient than requiring something like a sword or an ax.

The Rambam then proceeds to fall into the same apparent contradiction, but in an even more extreme way. First he boldly states that anyone who spends time seeking reasons for the details of mitzvos is "chasing after a huge delusion," and "will increase difficulties rather than remove them," and "is as far from the truth as one who assume that the entire mitzvah is without any real purpose." But then, at the end of the chapter, he declares his intention to explain the reasons for all of the mitzvos, including "the reasons for many of the conditions and details, as far as these can be discovered"!

And the Rambam follows through on this promise. For example, in his explanation of korbanos, he first writes that "we cannot say why one korban should be a lamb whilst another is a ram, and why a fixed number of them should be brought" and supports this claim with a solid argument. Yet, in subsequent chapters, the Rambam provides philosophical reasons for these very details!

All of this leaves us wondering what the Rambam really holds. The bottom-line question is: Do the details of mitzvos have reasons, or are they arbitrary? If the former, then what does the Rambam mean when he emphatically states that the particulars of mitzvos have no reasons, and that it is delusional to look for such reasons. And if the latter, then how can the Rambam offer reasons for such details? And if some details do have reasons and others are arbitrary, how can we know which is which? 

And, at the end of the day, we are still left with the question: From a philosophical, non-halachic standpoint, does God care about shechitah (vs. nechirah) or not?

The Answer: the Three Tiers of Mitzvah Design

Here's the plan: First I will state my answer with the briefest of explanations. I will then elaborate on the answer by means of a detailed mashal (analogy). I will follow that up by showing how this answer plays out in another mitzvah (arbah minim). I will conclude by answering the question about shechitah.

Every* mitzvah is a complex structural system comprised of many particular halachos. When analyzing taamei ha'mitzvos - that is, engaging in a speculative philosophical analysis of the reasons for mitzvos, as opposed to a purely halachic (or Talmudic) analysis - these halachos can be divided into three groups. For the sake of brevity, we will henceforth refer to these groups as Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3. Here are their definitions:
Tier 1: halachos which are designed to directly facilitate the mitzvah's primary purpose
Tier 2: halachos which serve a secondary purpose - one which may or may not be related to the primary purpose of the mitzvah
Tier 3: halachos that are best described as "arbitrary technicalities" which have no purpose whatsoever, and only exist because of structural necessity
If at this point these distinctions are not clear, have no fear! The following mashal will (I hope) clear everything up.

The Pillow Mashal 

Let us perform a thought-experiment. Imagine that you are an owner of a pillow factory, producing bed pillows for sleeping. You must draft a set of pillow-making regulations and procedures which will yield high-quality pillows.

Where should you begin? By defining the purpose of a bed pillow, of course. The purpose of a bed pillow is to provide support and comfort for the head while sleeping or lying down. (I'm sure someone can come up with a more precise formulation for the purpose of a pillow, but this is sufficient for the purposes of this mashal.) 

This definition of the pillow's function will serve as our guiding principle in pillow-making. If we produce an object which fails to serve this function, then then object is not a successful pillow. Moreover, the superiority and inferiority of our pillows will be measured by the extent to which they achieve this purpose.

Tier 1 Design Features

Basically, there are two structural components of a pillow: the pillowcase and the stuffing. Of the two, the latter is primary, since the pillowcase is only there to contain the stuffing, and would be completely dispensable if the stuffing could be self-contained.

The purpose of a pillow which we outlined above directly dictates the general character of what can and can't be used for stuffing. The general guideline may be stated as follows: in order for a pillow to fulfill its purpose, its stuffing must consist of a material which is soft. Examples of adequate materials are feathers, down, cotton, and certain synthetic materials. A pillow filled with sticks, stones, or shards of glass would not be suitable for the pillow's function.

This is an example of a "Tier 1" feature of the pillow's design, since the requirement of "softness" directly facilitates the primary purpose of the pillow. 

Tier 2 Design Features

But once we've narrowed the field down to "soft materials," this doesn't mean that anything goes. The material we use must possess other qualities which are not directly related to the primary function of the pillow. Some of these qualities might contribute to the primary function in an indirect manner, whereas others will serve secondary roles which are entirely unrelated to the pillow's primary function.

For example, the material we select must be non-perishable. A pillow stuffed with mashed bananas, beef tallow, or carrion might be comfortable, but it wouldn't last very long (and the resulting odor would preclude a comfortable sleep for olfactory reasons). Likewise, the material we select must be available for use. The feathers of the threatened Northern Spotted Owl, the now extinct North Island Giant Moa, or the prehistoric Archaeopteryx might make for a comfy pillow, but the unavailability these materials makes them impractical for pillow-making. The material we select must also be safe. A pillow made of asbestos might provide a satisfying sleep, but it will also shorten your lifespan; a pillow from Chernobyl is just as soft as a pillow from Albequerque, but is likely to produce undesirable effects. 

The need for our pillow-stuffing to be non-perishable, available, and safe are all "Tier 2" requirements. Each of these characteristics serves a purpose, but unlike the "Tier 1" requirement of softness, they do not directly serve the primary function of the pillow (i.e. to provide support and comfort for the head). 

As can be seen from these examples, Tier 2 considerations are often the basis of deciding among otherwise equal or viable Tier 1 candidates. For example, polyester and memory foam are both soft, but memory foam is more hygienic, and is therefore advantageous. Eiderdown and goose down are both soft, but although eiderdown makes for a more comfortable pillow, it is more costly, and might prove to be a disadvantage from a financial standpoint.

But there are other Tier 2 aspects of the design which must be determined even after we settle on the ideal stuffing. One example of this is the aesthetic qualities of the pillow. Sometimes the decisions we make about the appearance of the pillow might be indirectly related to the pillow's primary function. For example, it can be argued that the colors "pure white" and "sky blue" contribute to a greater sense of psychological comfort than "jaundice yellow" or "barf brown." Likewise, a pillow should appear inviting and evoke positive feelings. If a pillow's appearance triggered negative feelings, this might detract from the Tier 1 superiority of the pillow as an object of comfort.

All things being equal, most girls will prefer the pillow on the right based on Tier 2 considerations.

On the other hand, the pillow's appearance might be dictated by factors which have nothing to do with the primary function of the pillow. For example, colored pillows might be more expensive to produce than white pillows, or perhaps a certain color is preferable because it is more popular among a certain consumer population (e.g. pink for girls), or perhaps making pillows in a variety of colors will lead to greater brand exposure.

All of these Tier 2 features are important, and all Tier 2 design-decisions will be made on the basis of specific reasons, but none of these reasons are directly related to the primary function of the pillow.

Tier 3 Design Features

The Tier 3 features are necessary, but arbitrary in their specifics. For example, let's say we choose to make our pillows out of eiderdown because it is the softest material (Tier 1). We are willing to forego the cost (Tier 2) because we plan on marketing our pillows to wealthy consumers (Tier 2). We decide to use eiderdown from Iceland rather than China for political reasons (Tier 2) and we decide to go with "free range" eider ducks in order to make a public statement about animal cruelty (Tier 2), ensuring brand loyalty (Tier 2) among a subsection of our consumers.

But now we find ourselves at the eider duck farm in Iceland and it is time to choose which flock of ducks we will use for our first run of pillows. We will have to choose ducks of a certain a size and age in order to ensure the highest quality feathers (Tier 1), but out of the thousands of eider ducks within that large category, which particular ducks will we use? This decision is completely arbitrary (Tier 3). No matter how the decision is made - whether by the age of the ducks, or their size, or by a random lottery - it will be neither informed nor influenced by the primary function of the pillow, nor by any secondary considerations. Tier 1 and Tier 2 decisions must be based on reasons; Tier 3 decisions do not.

Consider another example: the exact size of the pillow. Of course, there will be a certain size-range which is determined based on Tier 1 considerations. Generally speaking, the pillow will need to accommodate an average-sized head. There are four basic pillow sizes: standard (20" by 26"), queen (20" by 30"), king (20" by 36"), and euro (26" by 26").

But why settle on 20" by 26" for a standard sized pillow? Why not 20" by 25.5" or 21" by 27"? The answer is that this aspect of the pillow's design is arbitrary. The range of sizes was set by Tier 1 considerations, but the specific dimensions within that range has absolutely no reason, other than the fact that some length had to be chosen.

One last example of a Tier 3 quality: the particular hue of the pillow's color. We've already mentioned that the color of the pillow is a valid Tier 2 consideration, but within each color, there are an infinite number of hues. There might be a Tier 2 difference between blue and red, and there might even be a Tier 2 difference between light blue and dark blue, but at some point, the choice between hues of blue is arbitrary.

There might be reasons for choosing between 01 and 20,
but the choice of 11 over 10 is arbitrary.

The Answer: Restated

By now I hope the analogy is clear. Just like there are three tiers in the design of pillows, so too, there are three tiers in the design of mitzvos. Certain features of a mitzvah's design are directly dictated by its primary purpose - just like the Tier 1 characteristic of a pillow (i.e. its soft stuffing) is directly dictated by the pillow's function (i.e. to provide support and comfort for the head while sleeping or lying down). Other features of a mitzvah's structure serve secondary purposes which may or may not be related to the primary reason - just like the Tier 2 design considerations of the pillow (e.g. its color, its cost, its durability, etc.). Last but not least, there are aspects of the mitzvah which are completely arbitrary from a taamei ha'mitzvos standpoint - just like the Tier 3 specifications of the pillow (i.e. which specific specimens its materials derive from, its exact dimensions, and its precise hue).

Some people find this last category difficult to accept. "How can a mitzvah contain something arbitrary, without any purpose? Isn't that an imperfection in the Torah? How can we believe that Hashem would command us in something for no reason?" I will repeat the Rambam's response to these types of objections:
It is important for you to know that chochmah demanded it - or, if you prefer, say that necessity dictated - that there should be parts [of the mitzvos] for which reasons are inapplicable; it is, as it were, inherently impossible for the mitzvah not to have something of this type.
Any mitzvah which involves physical phenomena will, of necessity, have quantifiable characteristics, such a length, height, volume, duration, number of components, etc. The Tier 1 and Tier 2 design-considerations will usually dictate a certain range of values for these quantities, but once you get down to a certain level of specificity, the final number will have to be arbitrary. This is what the Rambam meant when he said:
It is almost similar to the nature of a thing which can potentially receive different forms, but actually receives only one of them: we must not ask why it has this form and not another which is likewise possible, because we should have to ask the same question if instead of its actual form the thing had any of the other possible forms. Note this, and understand it.
We will now examine two examples from the mitzvah system - arbah minim and shechitah - in light of our answer.

The Three Tiers of Arbah Minim

The mitzvah of the arbah minim is to pick up the four species of vegetation specified by the Torah, on the first day of the Chag ha'Sukkos. The Rambam states his theory about the purpose of this mitzvah in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:43:
It appears to me that the four species of the lulav are [an expression of] joy and gladness for going out from the Wilderness – which was a place “without seed, fig, vine, and pomegranate, and without any water to drink” (Bamidbar 20:5) – to a place of fruit-trees and rivers. Therefore, in order to remember this, we take the most beautiful of its fruits, and a fragrant [plant], and beautiful leaves, and the most beautiful of herbs – that is, the willows of the brook.
The Rambam then goes on to explain why these four species in particular (i.e. citron, date palm, myrtle, and brook-willow) were chosen:
These four species have three common denominators. First, they were plentiful in the Land of Israel at that time and everyone was able to obtain them. Secondly, they are exceedingly beautiful in their appearance and aesthetic qualities; some of them – namely, the citron and the myrtle – are fragrant, but the date palm and the willows have neither a good nor a bad smell. The third quality is that they retain their appearance for seven days, which is not the case with peaches, pomegranates, asparagus, nuts, and the like.
Note the difference between the Rambam's two explanations. The explanation in the first paragraph pertains to Tier 1 features, which relate directly to the primary reason for the mitzvah: we joyously pick up beautiful species of plants in order to express our gratitude to Hashem for taking us from the barren Wilderness into the fertile Land of Israel. In contrast, the explanations mentioned in the second paragraph all pertain to Tier 2 features of the mitzvah, and the reasons provided are secondary.

Allow me to spell out the implications of this. The Rambam implies that the mitzvah of arbah minim could have served its primary purpose if we had been required to pick up four species of, say, exotic orchids. The only problem is that orchids are not plentiful in Israel. Similarly, the mitzvah could have served its primary function if we had been commanded to pick up an oleander instead of a myrtle. However, the Gemara (Sukkah 32b) explains that the oleander - which is poisonous - would not be in line with the Torah's nature, as described by Shlomo ha'Melech: "its ways are ways of pleasantness" (Mishlei 3:17). Likewise, the Torah could have even used pomegranates and peaches were it not for the fact that their appearance dwindles in beauty and freshness over the seven day period.

As for Tier 3 features: the Rambam doesn't mention any, but they certainly exist. For example, a lulav must be at least four tefachim (handbreadths) long. The Gemara explains that it must be long enough to shake. Fine; we can understand why being long enough to shake is a Tier 1 or Tier 2 consideration - but why exactly four tefachim? Wouldn't five tefachim also be reasonable? What about 10 etzbaos (finger-breadths), or one amah

The same might be said for the requirement of four species. It would seem that the mitzvah could have fulfilled its primary purpose if three or five species were required. The same can be said for many of the detailed specifications of the halachic blemishes which disqualify the four species: once it became necessary to include blemishes within the structure of the mitzvah (due to Tier 1 reasons), halacha had to define these blemishes in a precise, quantifiable manner. At a certain level of detail, halacha had to draw the line at an arbitrary point, just like in any other legal system or design.

(Note: Some of you might be wondering, "Isn't it necessary for there to be these four specific species to teach us specific ideas, as explained by Chazal - like the four types of Jews, or the four parts of the body used in serving Hashem?" The Rambam maintains that these statements of Chazal are just drash, and don't have anything to do with the real purpose of arbah minim; read Pshat vs. Drash II for an elaboration on this point.)

The Three Tiers of Shechitah

Now we are finally ready to answer our original question: from a philosophical, non-halachic standpoint, does God care about shechitah? The answer is: "no" in a Tier 1 framework, and "yes" in a Tier 2 framework. Rambam explains the reasons for the mitzvah of shechitah in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:48:
It is prohibited to cut off a limb of a living animal and eat it, because such act would produce cruelty, and develop it; the gentile kings used to do this, and it was also done for avodah zarah – namely, they would cut a specific limb of an animal and eat it … The mitzvah concerning the killing of animals is necessary, because the natural food of man consists of vegetables and of the flesh of animals, and the best meat is that of animals permitted to be used as food; no doctor has any doubts about this. Since, therefore, the desire of procuring good food necessitates the slaughtering of animals, the Torah enjoins that the death of the animal should be the easiest, and prohibits us to torment the animal by cutting the throat in a crude manner, or by poleaxing, or by cutting off a limb whilst the animal is alive.
If we consider this excerpt in light of the previously cited excerpt on shechitah, it would seem that according to the Rambam the primary purpose of shechitah is to ensure that we eat the flesh of dead animals, and not living animals. Even non-Jews are prohibited from eating a limb from a living animal. From this Tier 1 perspective, God doesn't care whether we kill an animal by shechitah, nechirah, or bazooka.

However, once God saw fit (so to speak) to obligate us to kill an animal before eating it, He legislated a specific method of killing the animal with specific requirements. Some of these requirements are in line with the primary purpose (i.e. distancing us from animalistic behavior and cruelty), some requirements serve secondary purposes (i.e. the ease of the method and the availability of the slaughtering instrument), and other requirements have no specific purpose at all. From this Tier 2 perspective, there is a big difference between killing an animal through shechitah vs. nechirah, and God does care about that difference. 

Conclusion

I have heard people summarize the Rambam's view by saying, "Rambam holds that the details of mitzvos are arbitrary" or "Rambam holds that there are no reasons for the majority of halacha." There is even a well-known acharon who lambasted the Rambam for this point. 

In my opinion, the Rambam's view is far more nuanced than these crude summaries make it out to be. I believe that if we understand the Rambam's explanation in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim - especially regarding Tier 3 - then the objections raised against his view fall away. I also believe that a number of objections raised by people against mitzvos - in general or in particular - can be easily resolved if one understands the three-tiered nature of mitzvah-design. 

I hope this explanation has clarified the subject of taamei ha'mitzvos, and enhanced your appreciation of the chochmah of the Torah system. 


* This only applies to what Rabbeinu Bachya ibn Paquda refers to as chovos ha'eivarim ("duties of the limbs") - that is to say, mitzvos which involve actions. 

6 comments:

  1. Nice post. This is a bit of an aside, but it would appear to me that Rambam did not think that *all* of Chazal held that there are reasons for the Mitzvos. I think this is implied in the chapter you reference (3:26), but it is clearer in 3:48, where, in discussing the mitzvah of shilu'ach ha'keyn, he remarks (Qafih translation):

    ואל תקשה עלי באומרם ז"ל האומר על קן צפור יגיעו רחמיך וגו' , כי זו אחת משתי הסברות אשר הזכרנום, כלומר: השקפת מי שסובר שאין טעם למצוות אלא הרצון המופשט, ואנו הלא הלכנו אחרי ההשקפה השניה

    In fact, if you look at the actual Gemara he references (Brachos 33b), this is perhaps the straightforward way to interpret the second shittah given there:

    מתני' האומר על קן צפור יגיעו רחמיך ועל טוב יזכר שמך מודים מודים משתקין אותו: גמ' בשלמא מודים מודים משתקין אותו משום דמיחזי כשתי רשויות ועל טוב יזכר שמך נמי משמע על הטובה ולא על הרעה ותנן חייב אדם לברך על הרעה כשם שמברך על הטובה אלא על קן צפור יגיעו רחמיך מ"ט פליגי בה תרי אמוראי במערבא רבי יוסי בר אבין ורבי יוסי בר זבידא חד אמר מפני שמטיל קנאה במעשה בראשית וחד אמר מפני שעושה מדותיו של הקדוש ברוך הוא רחמים ואינן אלא גזרות

    Of course, if you take this approach, then it begs the question "what's the machlokes", which is a very hard question. You will also have to reconcile with chapter 3:31 where he denigrates (to the n-th degree) those who say that the mitzvos have no ta'am (although you can answer that there he is talking about a certain emotion leading to this shittah, but it possible to arrive at this shittah through a proper philosophy, like the Amora in the Gemara).

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    1. Thanks, Sammy. It is interesting that the Rambam (via Qafih) uses the phrase "המון החכמים", which would indeed imply "multitude" in the sense of "majority." What, then, do you make of the fact that a few sentences earlier he wrote: "זו היא שיטתנו כולנו ההמונים והיחידים"? Is he just using hyperbole?

      I'd have to take another gander at 3:31, which I will aim to do this Shabbos.

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    2. Indeed, I have no problem chalking that phrase up to hyperbole in light of the other textual evidence. To my mind, it is reminiscent of the "rav hillel" in the gemara who holds the meshiach has already come---I would employ similar phrasing and say that "all of us, the masses, and the individuals" do not hold like rav hillel.

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  2. Addendum: Even if you explain away what the Rambam says in 3:31, it is hard to get around the fact that in 3:26 he writes:

    אין המון החכמים סוברים שהם דברים שאין להם טעם כלל, ולא נדרשה בהן תכליות, לפי שזה מביא למעשי ההבל כפי שהזכרנו

    (He is referring to 3:25. Also notice that he writes "the *majority* of Chachamim", supporting what I said above.) The difficultly is that he says this shittah leads to “pointless actions”, which makes it seem as though it is not a tenable shittah at all.

    In summary: Is saying that the mitzvos have no reasons a valid philosophical shittah? It seems so, from the Gemara in Brachos and from chapter 3:48 (although not in the improper framework of 3:31). But then how do we make sense of such a shittah, and how do we define the argument with those who say there are ta’amim? And how could the Rambam say it leads to “pointless actions” if it is a valid shittah?

    ~

    In a different vein, I have a question on 3:26, concerning the passage about shechitah and korbanos. After a *very* careful read (using Pines/Qafih) I came to the following conclusion: It seems the Rambam only used the particulars of shechitah as an example because that was the example given in Breishis Rabbah. But, in fact, those particulars *do* have ta’amim (tier II in your categorization), and it turns out that the particulars of Korbanos (which/number of animals) serve as “true” examples of the Rambam’s idea. Thus we come to the strange conclusion that while the Rambam derived his idea about particulars not having ta’amim from this memra in Breishis Rabbah, the example used in the memra turns out to be a non-example of the Rambam’s idea. Thus, we must ask why the memra used this example. One approach would be to say that the Rambam *argues* with the memra—he holds these particulars of shechitah are tier II, while the memra holds they are tier III. One would then have to define this machlokes. What do you think of that approach? Do you see a different way to make sense of this?

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    1. Re: your "different vein" question - I also noticed this when I initially wrote this post. This what led to my insight about the three-tiered nature of mitzvah-design in the first place. I think that it is entirely possible that the Rambam disagreed with the author of the מימרא as to whether שחיטה is Tier 2 or Tier 3 - especially since he introduces his explanation of שחיטה with "אבל לאמיתו של דבר". We see this type of מחלוקת among the ראשונים all over the place.

      This type of מחלוקת is interesting to me. Some instances seem to be purely philosophical, whereas others are somewhat contingent on how one learns the actual הלכה. For example, I could see a difference in Tier 1/2/3 categorization emerging from a מחלוקת on whether a particular הלכה is מעכב, or what one holds is included in the דאורייתא, or whether one holds that the דאורייתא is one or two מצוות in the מנין המצוות.

      Perhaps "emerge" is too strong of a term to use. What I mean is that any speculation about טעמי המצוות which factors in תורה שבעל פה (in contrast to, say, the רשב"ם's purely תורה שבכתב approach of "לפי עומק הפשט") will have to come AFTER a תורה שבעל פה analysis of the basic structure of the מצוה, and that analysis will "set the parameters" (so to speak) of one's טעמי המצוה explanation.

      A living example of this is the type of סברות given by RSZ in his Kuntress and his yahrtzeit shiurim.

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    2. Interesting. Of course, this type of study is apparently very dangerous, since if one would mistake a tier 3 detail for a tier 2 detail and give reasons for this detail, he would, in the words of the Rambam, be "stricken by a prolonged madness" (Pines). I suppose the authors of Breishis Rabbah would consider the Rambam to be "stricken", since in their eyes, the details of shechitah are tier 3. It is remarkable that despite this textual evidence, the Rambam *still* felt confident enough to offer reasons for the details of shechitah! It is one thing to posit that some given detail of a mitzvah is tier 2, but another thing entirely to disregard an explicit statement of Chazal that a detail is tier 3! I suppose, as you suggest, this type of confidence can only "emerge" after a full analysis of the mitzvah (tsbp etc.); I wonder if one can say more about exactly how to approach this type of study...

      Another question: It is unclear to me whether the Rambam is saying a) that the tier 3 details are completely arbitrary, and do not stem from knowledge in any sense, or b) any wisdom related to tier 3 details is simply closed off from human investigation, but there is wisdom there in a framework that is beyond us. I would not be bothered by the first approach. After all, we are simply asserting that the tier 3 details do not affect the perfection contained in the mitzvah in any way, but simply need to be realized due to the nature of things. Nevertheless, it seems possible to me that he is suggesting the second approach.

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