Mishlei 27:3 - The Weight of a Fool's Anger

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Artwork: Grindstone, by Greg Simanson

Mishlei 27:3 - The Weight of a Fool's Anger

משלי כז:ג

כֹּבֶד אֶבֶן וְנֵטֶל הַחוֹל וְכַעַס אֱוִיל כָּבֵד מִשְּׁנֵיהֶם:

Mishlei 27:3

The weight of a stone and the heft of sand – the anger of the fool is heavier than both of them.

There are four questions here:

1. What differentiates the anger of a fool from the anger of a non-fool? Clearly, the metaphors will address this in detail, but it's worth asking as its own question.
2. What are these metaphors? In what sense is the fool's anger comparable to both "the weight of stone" and "the heft of sand"? 
3. What does it mean to describe anger as "heavy"? There are a number of adjectives typically used to describe anger - such as "hot," "intense," "strong," "fierce," "unyielding" - but "heavy" isn't one of them.
4. Heavy for whom? Is the pasuk characterizing the fool's anger as heavy for the person who he's angry at, or for the person who is forced to confront the fool in his anger, or for the fool himself? 

Personally, I'm not bothered by the question of why the pasuk uses the word "koved" (weight) for a stone and "neitel" (heft) for sand. Either these are the two terms that are appropriate to use for their respective substances, or the pasuk is just using synonyms for stylistic reasons. 

[Time to think! Read on when ready.]

Here is my four-sentence summary of the main idea:

A stone and a load of sand are both heavy, but for different reasons: the individual stone is an inherently heavy substance, whereas sand is light as a substance but heavy in large quantities. So too, the Mishleic fool, whose expects reality to always work out in his favor, is “weighed down” by his anger in two different ways: (1) since he takes reality personally, he will perceive each individual instance of reality not aligning with his desires as an intolerable hardship; (2) since the fool’s anger stems from his ego, he will experience a high volume of these “anger incidents,” the sheer quantity and frequency of which will be its own source of pain. In other words, the fool is burdened by the fact that he gets very angry, very often. This is one of the many reasons why the Mishleic chacham works on his expectations, striving to make them as realistic as possible. 

This would be a good place to review a methodology point that I've mentioned earlier. Chapter 25 begins a new section of Sefer Mishlei: "These, too, are the Mishlei of Shlomo ha'Melech, which were copied by the men of Chizkiyah, king of Judah" (25:1). This section continues through the end of Chapter 29. 

These pesukim are stylistically different than the "mainstream" Mishlei written by Shlomo ha'Melech in Chapters 10-24. Most of the pesukim are quite straightforward and unequivocal in their wording - as opposed to many of the pesukim in Chapters 10-24, which can be confusing and ambiguous to read and translate. The mashalim (metaphors) in Chapters 25-29 are also very direct, and tend to be stated simply as "X is like Y" or "as X is to Y, so is A to B." 

I was recently asked whether the ideas taught in Chapters 25-29 differ from the ideas taught in Chapters 10-24. I haven't noticed any difference. I would expect the pesukim in Chapters 25-29 to presuppose familiarity with the content of Chapters 10-24, since the latter were composed earlier, but I don't even know whether this is supposition is the case. 

Mishlei 17:12 - Hell Hath No Fury Like a Fool Scorned

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Artwork: Awaken the Bear, by Svetlin Velinov

Mishlei 17:12 - Hell Hath No Fury Like a Fool Scorned

משלי יז:יב

פָּגוֹשׁ דֹּב שַׁכּוּל בְּאִישׁ וְאַל כְּסִיל בְּאִוַּלְתּוֹ:

Mishlei 17:12

Better to for a man to confront a mother bear bereft of its cubs than a ksil (fool) in his eeveles (foolish rage).

This translation is based on R' Moshe Kimch (printed in the standard Mikraos Gedolos under the name "Ibn Ezra"), who explains that "shakool" means "deprived of its cubs." The Meiri, among others, adds that "shakool" implies a female bear. Although the second half of the pasuk says "than a fool in his foolishness," Rabbeinu Yonah explains it to mean "than a fool in his foolishness and his anger." Presumably, he gets this from the first half of the pasuk: a bear bereft of its cubs is "crazy enraged" rather than merely "crazy."

There are a few basic questions here:

1. How? Whenever Mishlei compares one thing to another, the question is: in what framework? "Better" in what sense? 
2. Really?! This pasuk seems to be an exaggeration. The Wikipedia article on bear attacks makes them seem pretty bad. 
3. What is unique about the eeveles (foolish rage) of a ksil (Mishleic fool)? All rage is destructive. What makes the rage of a ksil unique enough to single out in this pasuk?

[Time to think! Read on when ready.]

Here's my MORE than four-sentence summary of the main idea:

A mother bear bereft of its cubs is in the grips of a powerful, unthinking, animalistic rage; the same is true of a fool whose ego (or false sense of security) has been threatened and whose anger has been awakened. However, the fool is much more dangerous than the bear for a number of reasons: 

(1) the bear has a very narrow range of activity, making it relatively easy to anticipate its attack and to take the necessary precautions; the fool, on the other hand, has a wide variety of retaliatory actions at his disposal and is willing to go to any lengths to get his revenge, making him unpredictable and difficult to guard against 

(2) the bear’s anger subsides within a short period of time, whereas the fool might harbor a grudge for days, months, years, or decades 

(3) the danger level of the bear is apparent to all, whereas the fool might appear to be totally harmless, when – in truth – he is just waiting for the right moment 

(4) no one in his right mind deludes himself into thinking that he can control an enraged bear, but when dealing with a fool, it is easy to fall prey to the illusion that one has more control than one actually has.  

For these reasons (and more), one should avoid provoking fools, and steer clear of fools who have already been provoked.

The reason why I allowed myself to summarize the main idea in more than four sentences is because this pasuk falls into the category of "list pesukim." I've already explained this methodological point elsewhere, but I'll repeat my explanation here for the sake of convenience.

Many pesukim in Mishlei state a specific consequence for a specific foolish behavior or bad decision. In contrast, "list-pesukim" simply identify the actions of the fool/rasha and leave it to the reader to figure out the consequences, of which there are many. "List pesukim," such as our pasuk, will typically make general reference to the consequences in vague or categorical terms, so as not to lead the reader to focus on a narrow set of consequences.

The phenomenon of "list pesukim" exemplifies one of the many differences between Shlomo ha'Melech's proverbs and (for lack of a better term) "English proverbs." English proverbs are essentially spoon-fed truths which are instantly understandable: "the early bird catches the worm," "no pain no gain," "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." In contrast, the vast majority of Shlomo ha'Melech's proverbs are not readily understandable; their ideas can only be accessed after thought and analysis.

I believe that the main reason for this is because Shlomo ha'Melech is trying to do more than just deliver content. His goal is for his students to train their minds and acquire a different way of thinking about life. By stating these ideas in cryptic language, he forces the student to explore the subject matter of each pasuk in-depth and try out different ways of learning. In the end, the students gains more from the analysis of the pasuk than a single idea.

"List pesukim" fit into this paradigm because there isn't even a specific idea that he's conveying. Instead, these pesukim are like Shlomo pointing to a certain behavior and saying, "Hey - check that guy out. What do you think is going to happen to him? What mistake(s) is he making?" The "lesson" of the pasuk ultimately comes from the student's own analysis, with zero spoon-feeding.

"List pesukim" are also consistent with Shlomo ha'Melech's brand of "mussar without 'should's and 'shouldn't's," which I wrote about here.

Mishlei 11:2 - Mishleic Tznius 1.0

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Mishlei 11:2 - Mishleic Tznius 1.0

משלי יא:ב

בָּא זָדוֹן וַיָּבֹא קָלוֹן וְאֶת צְנוּעִים חָכְמָה:

Mishlei 11:2

When zadon comes, disgrace will come, but wisdom is with those who are tzenua.

There are plenty of questions on this pasuk: 

1. What is "zadon" in this context? Even on a simple level, the term is difficult to translate. Common translations include "willfulness," "aggression," "malice," "wantonness," "brazenness," but it's difficult to know which of these applies here, or if it means something else entirely.
2. What is "tznius" in this context? This term is also tricky. It is often translated as "modesty," with an emphasis on physical modesty - usually in terms of attire. Some prefer to translate it as "humility," but then again, we have another word for humility: anavah. 
3. What is "kalon" (disgrace) in this context? Specifically, what type of disgrace, shame, or infamy is this talking about?
4. What is "chochmah" (wisdom) in this context? Although chochmah is a basic term in Mishlei, it can mean different things in different contexts.
5. What is the cause and effect relationship between zadon and disgrace? How is disgrace an inevitable result of zadon? And if, as many of the meforshim explain, the pasuk means that the ish zadon causes others to be disgraced, why not say so directly? Why phrase so awkwardly: "when zadon comes, disgrace will come"? 
6. What is the relationship between tznius and chochmah? On the surface, it would seem that a person could have tznius without chochmah, but the pasuk makes it sound like they go hand in hand. Why? 

[Time to think! Read on when ready.]

Here's my four-sentence summary of the main idea, which I will follow with some thoughts on Mishlei's take on tznius:

“Zadon,” in this context, refers to self-assertive, domineering, kavod-seeking behavior; an “ish zadon” is a person who aggressively seeks gratification by putting others down in order to boost his own self-image. The ish zadon fails to realize that by embracing a competitive, relative, image-based value system, in which his own happiness is contingent on the approbation of other people, he has ipso facto subjected himself to the fate of regularly suffering social disgrace. In contrast, an ish tzenua’s value system is objective insofar as it is based on chochmah (wisdom), and his happiness is not dependent on his image in the eyes of others. Therefore, he is immune to social disgrace, since he relates to any social “failures” as inconsequential, or as opportunities for wisdom and growth, rather than as “disgraceful” losses of kavod.

You may have noticed that the title of this post is followed by a "1.0." That's because I consider my concept of Mishleic tznius to still be "in the works." Still, I felt confident enough in my approach to share my findings thus far. I'd like to further clarify the ideas in my four-sentence summary by giving a play-by-play of how I arrived at my current understanding. 

This post began with a "Yom Iyun" ("Day of Study" = "Special Program") held at the high school where I teach. Every other year or so we have a school-wide program on tznius. In planning that year's event we expressed dismay over how easy it is for a girl to shut down during such tznius programs, saying, "Ugh! Another program where we're lectured on how long our sleeves and skirts can be!" 

This led to an epiphany: What if we designed a tznius program which has nothing to do with how people dress? We realized that many girls probably aren't aware that tznius a middah (character trait), and not merely a dress code. If we could craft a program which explored what the middah of tznius is, and we didn't mention dress codes at all, then even the most close-minded girl wouldn't walk away thinking that the program was about telling her how she can and can't dress. And if the only message she left with was, "Tznius is not just about the length of sleeves and skirts," then we would have accomplished something. 

Each of the teachers involved in the program chose one aspect of tznius to focus on. I volunteered to take on the topic of "tznius and chochmah" because I wanted to focus on Mishlei, and I recalled this pasuk. I was intrigued by two non-intuitive features of the pasuk: (1) the fact that it identifies "zadon" as the opposite of tznius, as opposed to something like "immodesty" or even "arrogance," and (2) the assertion that tznius and chochmah go together. 

In preparing my lesson I found four clues which ultimately led me to the idea summarized above. The first was Saadia Gaon's Arabic translation of the pasuk as: "If azus (brazenness / assertiveness) comes, disgrace comes, and with anavim (humble people) is wisdom." This provided me with my first clue: according to Saadia Gaon, the tznius in our pasuk is synonymous with anavah (humility), and is the opposite of brazenness / assertiveness. 

Rabbeinu Yonah provided a second and third clue by expanding on the definition of zadon, and by commenting on the relationship between tznius and chochmah. Here is a translation of his commentary on our pasuk: 

when zadon comes, disgrace will come - It is the nature of [an ish] zadon to mock and insult people, because he will deride and degrade his fellow for the temporary pleasure of taking pride in [the latter's] shame, or he will not be willing to tolerate the immediate pain of controlling his anger; is there a greater or more powerful zadon than that which culminates in words of shame and insult? 

but wisdom is with those who are tzenua - Tznius prevents a person from [speaking] words of disgrace and obscenity, and minimization of speech is one of the characteristics of those who are tzenua. And tznius causes wisdom for those who possess it, for it is a trait of the wise on account of which they are called wise, for they listen and pay close attention and do not desire to reveal their hearts, as it is stated: “Even a fool who is quiet will be considered wise,[and] one who seals his lips is understanding” (Mishlei 17:28). 

This is a difficult Rabbeinu Yonah, and I'll admit up front that I don't fully grasp what he is saying. Nevertheless, I took away several important points about zadon from his commentary:

• Whatever zadon is, its fullest expression is derision, mockery, and rejoicing in the shame of one's fellow. 
• The unwillingness to restrain one's anger at another person is also symptomatic of zadon. 
• A third feature of zadon is the inability to listen to other people, due to the need "to reveal one's heart" (i.e. to express one's own thoughts and feelings). 

At this point my picture of zadon started to come into focus. What type of person feels compelled to mock others for his own ego-gratification, is unable to hold back from retaliating when he's angry, and is so intent on expressing his own thoughts and feelings that his mind is closed to chochmah? Someone who operates in a competitive, relative, image-based value system, in which the most efficient way to boost your own standing is to put other people down. Bullying is a common form of zadon behavior. 

And what, then, is tznius if the term is being used as the opposite of zadon? Tznius must refer to the type of humility exhibited by a person who operates in an objective value system, whose self-image is based on chochmah rather than the opinions of other people. 

The fourth and final clue supported this conclusion. I looked up the chapter on tznius in Mivchar ha'Peninim - a collection of Jewish and Arabic ethical teachings widely quoted by the meforshim on Mishlei and Pirkei Avos - and I found the following three proverbs: [Full disclosure - there were more proverbs about tznius than these, and even these weren't presented in this order, but since they're proverbs, I feel that it's okay to pick and choose and rearrange.]

They asked the wise man: “What is tznius?”
He answered: “Chochmah.” 

They asked the wise man: “What is tznius?”
He answered: “That a person feels shame from himself.” 

They asked the wise man. “What is the tznius?”
He answered: “That a person shouldn’t do in secret what he is ashamed to do in public.”

The first proverb goes even further than our pasuk. Whereas Mishlei merely asserts that chochmah is found with tznius, Mivchar ha'Peninim says that chochmah is synonymous with tznius, or is at least an essential component of what tznius is. This is what planted the notion in my head that when Mishlei says, "chochmah is with those who are tzenua," it means that tznius cannot exist without chochmah.  

The other two proverbs fill in a missing piece of our pasuk in Mishlei by explaining the relationship between tznius and shame. In contrast to the ish zadon, who feels shame from other people (which he perceives as "disgrace," since views it as a negative thing), the ish tzenua "feels shame from himself," to the extent that his personal conduct will not change based on whether is being observed by others. In other words, the ish zadon might refrain from doing something wrong if it would cause others to look down on him, but he would act differently if nobody were watching. The ish tzenua, whose value system is based on chochmah, which is objective, would refrain from doing the wrong thing even if nobody saw him do it. 

At this point I was able to answer all six questions on the pasuk. Although Rabbeinu Yonah played a major role in helping me to understand the pasuk, I deviated from his approach in one major way. He explains "When zadon comes, disgrace will come" to mean that the ish zadon brings disgrace to other people by putting them down, whereas I explain that not only does he bring disgrace to other people, but he subjects himself to disgrace by pledging allegiance to a relative value system which ascribes importance to how other people view him. Likewise, Rabbeinu Yonah explains "wisdom is with those who are tzenua" to mean that the ish tzenua will acquire chochmah by listening to others, whereas I understand it to mean that chochmah is what makes him tzenua in the first place, as the Mivchar ha'Peninim implies. I think this is a more satisfactory explanation of the awkward phrasing in the pasuk: "When zadon comes, disgrace will come." 

So that's my basic understanding of tznius according to Mishlei. As we emphasized in our Yom Iyun, Mishlei teaches that tznius is about more than the way we dress. And yet, it is easy to see how the importance we place on clothing and appearances can be either consonant with or antithetical to the middah of tznius. A person who lacks tznius will relate to her clothing and appearance as a barometer for her own self-worth, and will make fashion choices designed to garner maximum admiration from other people in order to achieve "success" in the arena of public opinion. A person who has the quality of tznius will base her sense of self-worth on that which is objectively good (i.e. her knowledge, her middos, her mitzvos), and will not attach any real value to how much people admire her external beauty. To the contrary, she will recognize how easy it is to get caught up in such a relative value system, and will take measures to safeguard herself from its allure, and she will find that her dress code is a good method for such safeguarding.

Mishlei 16:18 - Two Types of Arrogance

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Artwork: Tragic Slip, by Christopher Moeller
(color-adjusted using Google Photos)

Mishlei 16:18 - Two Types of Arrogance

משלי טז:יח

לִפְנֵי שֶׁבֶר גָּאוֹן וְלִפְנֵי כִשָּׁלוֹן גֹּבַהּ רוּחַ:

Mishlei 16:18

Arrogance comes before breaking, and haughtiness comes before stumbling.

The questions I had this time around are very straightforward:

1. What is the difference between gaon (arrogance) and govah ruach (haughtiness)? It's possible that the two halves of the pasuk are saying the same thing in different words, but the next question makes that assumption unlikely.
2. What is the difference between shever (breaking) and kishalon (stumbling)? These two terms seem quite different, but what do they mean? "Breaking" seems worse than merely "stumbling," but in what sense?
3. How does gaon cause "breaking," and govah ruach cause "stumbling"? The implication is that gaon leads to "breaking" specifically, as opposed to "stumbling," whereas govah ruach leads specifically to "stumbling" but not "breaking."

[Time to think! Read on when ready.]

Here is my four-sentence summary of the main idea. Because I am not 100% clear about my answer to Question #1, I've erred on the side of wordiness:

Govah ruach (“haughty spirit”) is the opposite of “shfal ruach” (“lowly spirit”), and refers to arrogance as a character disposition (i.e. an accidental quality of the personality) – a psychological tendency to overestimate one’s own abilities and relative superiority; like other dispositions, the degree of govah ruach may fluctuate based on external circumstances or internal moods.

Gaon (“arrogance”) is the opposite of “anavah” (“humility”) and refers to arrogance as a fundamental temperament (i.e. an essential quality of the personality) – a view of oneself as intrinsically superior and inherently deserving of success; the quality of gaon is so deeply rooted in the individual’s character that it tends to remain at a constant heightened level, which only grows more severe with each accomplishment.

Govah ruach will result in “stumbling” – bad decisions from which the individual can recover; since govah ruach is merely an inclination towards overestimation of the self, it is possible (albeit unlikely) for the individual to experience a “wake-up call” after suffering the consequences of his misstep, provided he recognizes his hubris as the cause.

In contrast, gaon will ultimately lead to “breaking” – total destruction; the baal gaon’s unshakable conviction that he is destined for greatness will render him blind and deaf to anything which might lead him to question this fundamental egocentric premise, and he will continue to march forward in his megalomaniacal pursuits until he is utterly destroyed by the harsh reality which refuses to show him the favoritism to which he feels entitled.

The question I haven't answered is how to determine whether a particular individual suffers from gaon or merely govah ruach. In certain cases it seems pretty clear that a person suffers from a terminal case of gaon, but it other cases it will take a lot of data (i.e. instances of arrogant decisions and their aftermath) to be able to make this determination with any degree of certainty - and even then, I'm not sure whether it's possible to know for sure. 

A Note on Methodology: Reviewing Without Reviewing

Readers of this blog might have seen this post and thought to themselves, "Wait a minute - didn't he already write a post about this pasuk?" Yes, I did! I called it Mishlei 16:18 - Pride Goeth Before the Fall, published in June 2017.

I learn with my Mishlei rebbi almost every Friday. A few years ago we started Mishlei Chapter 12, and have continued pasuk by pasuk. This past Friday we arrived at Mishlei 16:18. If I know I've written about a pasuk before or learned or taught it within the past few years, I'll usually remember the idea I came up with. This time, however, I couldn't remember. This afforded me the valuable opportunity to relearn it from scratch, and possibly arrive at a different idea.

After I learned through this pasuk again with my Mishlei rebbi, I went back and reread my old post. I was delighted by the fact that not only did we come up with a different idea this time, but the questions we asked were quite different. Last time I was most bothered by the phrasing and ordering of the clauses in the pasuk, but that question didn't even occur to me this time around. This time my mind seized upon the differences between the first and second half, and viewed that as the primary question, whereas last time I was more bothered by the question of "Duh! This idea seems obvious!"

I am fortunate to have had a Mishlei rebbi who has a terrible memory, who almost never recalls ideas and explanations we've come up with in the past. Consequently, no matter how many times we've learned a pasuk in the past, we always learn it from scratch with him. This has shown me how valuable it is to approach the material with fresh eyes and a fresh mind. Sometimes this takes me to the same conclusions as before, but most often, it leads to new discoveries and deeper insights that I missed the first time around. This pasuk was a nice reminder of that, especially since I have a written record of my thought process the last time around!

Mishlei 17:15 - Making Exceptions to Justice

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Artwork: Vindicate, by Igor Kieryluk

Mishlei 17:15 - Making Exceptions to Justice

משלי יז:טו

מַצְדִּיק רָשָׁע וּמַרְשִׁיעַ צַדִּיק, תּוֹעֲבַת יְיָ גַּם שְׁנֵיהֶם:

Mishlei 17:15

One who treats a rasha as a tzadik and one who treats a tzadik as a rasha – both are an abomination to Hashem.

There are four major questions on this pasuk: 

(1) What are the definitions of “tzadik” (righteous person) and “rasha” (evil person) in this context? Even if we have “working definitions” of how these terms are often used in Mishlei, it’s an important methodological step to not just plug these definitions in without thinking, especially because Sefer Mishlei itself uses general terms like this in different ways. The most advisable course is to think about these terms in as fresh and unprejudiced of a way as possible within the context of the pasuk. If this approach is unfruitful, or if one is pressed for time, then it is acceptable to plug in preconceived definitions.  

(2) What does it mean to “treat a rasha as a tzadik” or “treat a tzadik as a rasha”? The Hebrew phrases are “matzdik rasha” and “marshia tzadik.” I’ve tried to preserve the ambiguity of the Hebrew as much as possible. Alternative translations of “matzdik” include “vindicate,” “justify,” and “behave righteously with.” The term “marshia” can be translated as “vilify,” “mistreat,” and “behave wickedly with,” and more. How should we translate these terms in this context?  

(3) What is meant by “an abomination to Hashem”? Both “toeivah” and “toavas Hashem” are loaded terms which are used in different ways throughout Mishlei, and certainly throughout Tanach. What does this phrase mean here?  

(4) What is the “abomination” that is common to these two cases? On the surface, the case of “one who treats a rasha as a tzadik” is quite different from the case of “one who treats a tzadik as a rasha.” It can be argued that the former is worse of a crime than the latter, insofar as it will tend to result in greater harm. Yet, our pasuk equates these cases by characterizing them both as “an abomination to Hashem.” What do these two perversions of justice have in common? One cannot simply answer, “they are both unjust.” While this may be true, it fails to explain our pasuk in a manner that enhances our practical decision-making, which is the foundation of our approach to Mishlei. 

[Okay - time to think! Read on when ready.] 

This time around I’m going to follow the Ralbag’s style of commentary by first defining the terms in the pasuk (beur ha’milos) and only afterwards explaining the ideas (beur ha’devarim). In other words, I will answer Questions #1, 2 and #3 by explaining what our pasuk means by tzadik, rasha, matzdik, marshia, and “abomination to Hashem.” 

I think the most straightforward answer to Questions #1 and 2 is that our pasuk is not referring to tzadik and rasha as types of people or archetypal Mishlei personalities. Rather, these terms are being employed in a juridical sense. “Tzadik” means “tzadik ba’din,” one who is innocent vis a vis a particular law, and “rasha” means “rasha ba’din,” one who is guilty of violating a particular law. Similarly, the term “matzdik” should be translated as “vindicate” or “exonerate” and “marshia” should be translated as “incriminate” or “convict.” The Torah itself uses these terms in this way (see, for example, Shemos 23:7 and Devarim 25:2), and the Ralbag takes this approach in our pasuk. Accordingly, our pasuk ought to be translated as follows: 

One who vindicates the guilty and one who incriminates the innocent – both are an abomination to Hashem. 

Question #3 is dicey. I do have a theory about how the term “toeivah” is used in Tanach, but I don’t think it’s necessary to delve that deeply into the term in order to explain how it’s used in our pasuk. It is sufficient to say that “abomination to Hashem” is a hyperbolic anthropomorphism intended to stigmatize the act(s) in question, usually because the behavior is one that people tend to rationalize. It is for this reason that the term “abomination” is employed in different situations for wildly different and unrelated reasons. The use of this term doesn’t tell us anything specific about of the behaviors or phenomena to which it is applied. Indeed, it ought to be viewed as more of a prescriptive than a descriptive adjective. It essentially conveys the message, “Stay away from this, no matter how good of a reason you think you have for engaging in it.” 

Having defined the terms, here's my four-sentence summary of the main idea of this pasuk: 

People have an intuitive sense of punitive justice which can be summed up as: “those who violate the law should be punished, and those who do not violate the law should not be punished.” In any system, particular cases will arise in which those who are responsible for adjudicating or enforcing the law will be tempted to pardon those who violate the law or punish those who adhere to the law; for example, a teacher might excuse a violator in order to “give him a second chance,” or might punish an entire class in order to put social pressure on the wrongdoer. The practical lesson of this pasuk is that no matter how reasonable and justifiable these exceptional cases may be, they will be perceived by the members of the system as undermining justice; this, in turn, will cause their overall commitment to justice – or at least, to the rules of that system – to weaken and deteriorate. Thus, whenever a judge or a law enforcer is tempted to make one of these two exceptions to justice, he should consider the detrimental ripple effect of his decision on the system as a whole. 

To be clear: “one who vindicates the guilty” and “one who convicts the innocent” are not the same. There are differences between these two cases – but the subject of our pasuk is what they have in common, not how they differ. 

Likewise, our pasuk does not mean to suggest that such exceptions to justice should never be made. Sometimes those who are guilty of violating a law should be vindicated, and maybe there are even cases in which those who are innocent should receive a punishment. Nevertheless, like almost all pesukim in Mishlei, this pasuk is speaking of the majority of situations. Generally speaking, it is unwise to vindicate the guilty and incriminate the innocent, and before an adjudicator or law enforcer decides to make an exception, he or she must assess the decision through the framework provided by our pasuk, asking: “If I make this exception, what will be the impact on the relationship of these people to justice in general, or to this system in particular?” 

For example, I am a classroom teacher. The students in my classes are subject to clearly delineated policies, rules, and obligations. One such policy is that if a homework assignment is submitted after the deadline, then the maximum number of points that can be earned on the assignment is capped at 80% (e.g. an assignment worth 10 points would only earn 8 points, even if it were flawless). Students are informed of this policy at the beginning of the year, and are reminded throughout. 

Now, there are many cases in which I feel compelled to make an exception to my own rule. Sometimes a student really does have a valid excuse, or just really needs to be cut some slack. However, I know that if I did allow myself to make such exceptions, that would harm my students’ relationship to the system of my class in the long-run. Other students might feel that my decision to waive the point deduction for their classmate was unfair, which in turn, might lead these students to be lax in submitting their own assignments, either because they hope I will excuse their lateness like I did for their classmate, or because they know that they needn’t take my rules seriously, since even I – the teacher who authored those rules – apparently do not take them seriously. This harm in this deterioration of “classroom justice” is evident. 

Similarly, the student who was the recipient of this exemption will also be inclined to repeat the offense. She will be more willing to turn in a late assignment, falling back on the hope (either consciously or unconsciously) that she might receive another exemption. Because this will lead to homework laxity, it is harmful for the student’s learning. 

Even my relationship as a teacher to my own system of rules will suffer if I make such exceptions. If I cave in and make an exception for one student, it will become that much easier for me to rationalize making other exceptions in other cases, even in cases where exceptions are not warranted. I would think to myself, “Well, it’s not fair that I made an exception for this student and not this other one, so even though the latter doesn’t really deserve it, I have to be fair.” Even worse, my decision whether to grant such exemptions may be influenced by subjective factors (e.g. being lenient with my favorite students and strict with the others). This, too, would be detrimental to the classroom system. 

But as I mentioned, there are ways to allow for merciful exceptions without jeopardizing the system as a whole. For example, another policy of mine is that that every student gets one “freebie” per year – that is, one instance of submitting a late assignment without any point deductions for lateness. Similarly, I have another policy that if a student knows she will not be able to complete an assignment on a given night (e.g. she is sick, there is an emergency, she forgot her books at school, etc.) then as long as she emails me to ask for an extension before the deadline, then I will grant her an extension without penalty. 

By incorporating these two “exception to the rule” rules into my class policies, I am allowing the space to make exceptions in a manner which will not be perceived as unfair by my students, and will not endanger the integrity of the system. If a student fails to complete an assignment on time because she was sick but she didn’t email me ahead of time and she already used up her freebie, then she will accept her 20% deduction as fair because she knows that it was her responsibility to email me before the deadline, and since she didn’t, then the loss of points is on her, not on me. And if a classmate of hers also neglected to hand in her assignment but didn’t receive a penalty because she emailed me ahead of time to ask for an extension, then my waiving of the second student’s lateness deduction will not be perceived by the first student as arbitrary or unfair because she knows that the second student followed the procedure. 

The reason why I have gone on at length with this real-world example is to illustrate how Mishlei is not giving practical rules for decision-making, which must be rigidly implemented in every situation. Rather, Mishlei is providing practical advice to consider when making decisions, and the chacham will factor in this advice, but will ultimately make his own decision using Mishleic thinking, rather than blindly applying the pasuk to every case it covers. 

In other words, don’t make the mistake of converting Mishlei pesukim into rules. Mishlei is a decision-making guide – not a halacha sefer.

Mishlei 21:12 - When to Help a Rasha Succeed

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Artwork: Kambal, Consul of Allocation - by Vincent Proce

Mishlei 21:12 - When to Help a Rasha Succeed

משלי כא:יב

מַשְׂכִּיל צַדִּיק לְבֵית רָשָׁע מְסַלֵּף רְשָׁעִים לָרָע:

Mishlei 21:12

A tzadik brings success to the house of a rasha, corrupting resha’im towards evil.

For an expanded definition of "tzadik" and "rasha," see my post The Mishleic Spectrum: A Glossary of Mishleic Personalities.

The root of the word "maskil" (ש.כ.ל.) can be translated as either "comprehend" or "success." Consequently, the meforshim (commentators) are divided as to how this word should be translated here, in the phrase "maskil tzadik l'beis rasha." Most meforshim maintain that the proper translation is: "a tzadik comprehends the house of a rasha" (see Meiri, Rabbeinu Yonah, Rid, Ri Nachmias, and others), but a minority of meforshim translate it as "a tzadik brings success to the house of a rasha" (Ralbag and Metzudas Tzion). 

My Mishlei rebbi always taught me that when faced with the choice between two translations, go for the more difficult one. Why? Because it's more fun that way! 

Based on the translation of "maskil tzadik l'beis rasha" as "a tzadik brings success to the house of a rasha," there are three questions:

(1) Why would a tzadik bring success to the house of a rasha? Isn't it a bad thing if the rasha succeeds? Why would a tzadik facilitate that? 

(2) Under what circumstances does a tzadik do this? Even if we can find a reason why a tzadik would bring success to the house of a rasha, it doesn't seem likely that the tzadik would always do this, but would only do so in specific situations. What are those situations?

(3) What is meant by "corrupting resha'im towards evil"? The phrase is ambiguous. (Whenever I teach this in my Mishlei class, there's always a student who asks, "Does it mean corrupting a rasha towards what he considers to be evil, which is actually good? Maybe it means that the tzadik helps the rasha to do teshuvah?" I don't think this is a plausible reading of the pasuk, but the fact that this question comes up shows the extent of the pasuk's ambiguity.) 

[Time to think! Read on when ready.]

Here's my four-sentence summary of the main idea of this pasuk:

According to Mishlei, a rasha is someone who one who seeks to impose his own “system” onto reality in order to achieve power and greatness, often at the expense of the other members of the system, whom he will use, abuse, and trample underfoot without any compunction. The tzadik recognizes that "the path of the wicked [leads to] destruction" (Tehilim 1:6) and knows that rasha is destined to fail, since his ambitions will continue to grow more and more fantastical and unrealistic either his artificial system self-destructs because reality itself can’t sustain it, or the people he oppresses rise up and put an end to his reign. For this reason, the tzadik will sometimes facilitate the rasha’s success by corrupting him further towards evil in order to hasten his inevitable downfall. Of course, the tzadik will only do this after weighing the consequences of playing the role of enabler and determining whether this route is the lesser of two evils. 

My favorite example of this in Tanach involves Esther the tzadekes and Haman the rasha. Chazal (Megilah 15b) ask why Esther invited Haman to a series of parties with herself and Achashveirosh instead of immediately informing her husband of Haman's plot and asking for his assistance. One of the Amoraim answers that she intended to make the king and the other nobles jealous of Haman by showering him with attention. Another Amora answers by citing the pasuk: "Pride goes before the fall, and haughtiness comes before stumbling" (Mishlei 16:18). Both answers exemplify the strategy in our pasuk. Haman sought power and greatness. Esther knew that Haman's pursuit of this goal would eventually result in his destruction, but because her people were in danger, she couldn't afford to wait. Instead, she acted as a catalyst by inviting him to her parties, thereby feeding his ego fueling his success. Her plan worked. After the first party, Haman went home and bragged to his wife, sons, and friends about his recent ascendancy. In Haman's eyes, Esther was helping him to succeed, but in actuality, she was "corrupting him towards evil," in order to bring about his destruction. 

My favorite historical example - or pair of examples - involves two power-hungry men whose haughty ambition directly led to their downfall in similar ways: Napoleon and Hitler. [Note: obviously, history is very complicated, but I'm going to oversimplify these events in order to use them as examples for our pasuk.] Both men amassed powerful military forces, the likes of which the world had never seen. Both men strove for absolute power and world domination. Both men foolishly attempted to invade Russia in the winter, and failed horrendously. These failures marked turning points in their respective wars, and ultimately led to their defeat. I don't know whether Napoleon or Hitler had advisors who cautioned them against these ill-fated military campaigns, but if a tzadik were to find himself in just such an advisory position, this would be a case in which he would implement the strategy in our pasuk. Such advisors would convince their rasha-leaders to go ahead with these invasions and lead them to believe they would succeed, concealing their knowledge that these plans would most certainly lead to failure and destruction.

On a more mundane level, this strategy can be implemented in situations involving non-full-fledged reshaim, but merely a person who wishes to impose a doomed-to-fail system in an otherwise stable environment. Say, for instance, a CEO has a plan to radically change how his company is run, and one of his lower-ranking employees knows that this plan will be terrible for the company's efficiency. First this employee will see if there is any way at all to persuade his boss that the plan will be ineffective. If he sees that his boss is unlikely to change his mind, then our pasuk would suggest that the employee take the opposite approach by facilitating the success of his boss's plan as much as possible. If the plan truly is doomed to fail, then it is in his best interest enable his boss's plan to "succeed" with maximum efficiency, so that its failure is quicker and more pronounced. Even though his boss refused to listen to reason, perhaps he'll recognize his error when he sees with his own eyes that his plans resulted in failure. Additionally, by actively striving to maximize the success of his boss's plan, the employee prevents his boss from being able to point at various factors in hindsight, saying, "My plan is great! The only reason it didn't work because of XYZ." If the employee had attempted to sabotage the plan or even if he dragged his feet and was lax in carrying it out, then his boss could still maintain that his plan was a good idea, and blame its failure on its implementation.

This pasuk is a great example of how a tzadik's mind works. Because he thinks systemically, he will see strategies that strike the non-tzadik as counter-intuitive, or even detrimental. Perhaps this is what the majority of meforshiim are getting at when they translate the pasuk as: "a tzadik comprehends the house of a rasha." 

Mishlei 14:4 - Dealing with Ox-Filth

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Mishlei 14:4 - Dealing with Ox-Filth

משלי יד:ד

בְּאֵין אֲלָפִים אֵבוּס בָּר וְרָב תְּבוּאוֹת בְּכֹחַ שׁוֹר:

Mishlei 14:4

Where there are no oxen, the trough is clean; but many crops come [through] the power of an ox. 

There is one major question on this pasuk: 

1. Duh! This pasuk is obvious! Of course if there are no oxen then your trough will be clean, and of course the only way to produce many crops is through the power of an ox. What is the chidush (new insight) here? What would we have thought?

Most meforshim (commentators) interpret this pasuk metaphorically, but not us! This type of pasuk is a real test for our Mishlei methodology of taking every pasuk as literally as possible.

[Okay - time to think! Read on when ready.]

Here's my four-sentence summary of the main idea of this pasuk:

The only way to have abundant crops is by harnessing the power of an ox, but if you have an ox, you’ll have to deal with all of the filth it produces. The same is true in all other areas of life: if you desire an end, not only will you have to deal with the hassle of implementing the means, such as using the ox to plow your field, but you will also have to deal with the byproducts of the means, such as cleaning up the filth produced by the oxen. To desire or expect to benefit from an end without needing to deal its means and their byproducts is to desire an impossible fantasy, and will only increase your frustration and misery. Just as one cannot “have a cake and eat it, too,” one cannot expect to have abundant crops and a clean trough.

The answer to our "duh!" question is that this pasuk is not a response to a logical hava amina (false presupposition), but to a psychological hava amina - namely, the feeling/wish that the ends can be achieved without dealing with any "ox-filth" (i.e. annoying byproducts, costs, and other negative features of the means). 

Let's walk this through the example in our pasuk. The farmer wants crops, and he psychologically accepts the fact that the only way to get crops is to use his ox to plow. This is an easy reality to accept because it's evident that the ox's plowing directly contributes to the increase in his crop yield. 

But cleaning up the ox-filth in his barn? That doesn't directly produce crops. Taking his ox to the vet when it's sick or injured? That doesn't directly produce crops. Making sure that the ox doesn't damage any property? That doesn't directly produce crops. All of this makes it much easier to entertain the wish of: "If only I had an ox that didn't require all of this upkeep!" The problem is that there is no such thing, and the more attached a person becomes to this fantasy, the more frustrated he will be with the reality of his ox and its filth.

To fully appreciate this idea, we must consider examples from other areas of life. For example, I am a high school teacher. My goal is to teach. That is the end which I seek. In order to teach, I need to prepare my lessons. Those are the means by which I achieve that end. Psychologically, it is easy for me to accept the fact that the only way to achieve that end is through those means. But being a high school teacher also involves a fair share of "ox-filth," such as grading, proctoring, sitting through faculty meetings, dealing with irate parents, etc. I might fantasize about being a high school teacher who doesn't have to deal with any of this ox-filth, but from a practical standpoint, that would be impossible. 

Here's another example: having a car to drive. The only way to achieve that end is to pay for the gas. Fine: driving is the end I seek, and filling my car with gas is the only means that would enable me to achieve that end. But there's plenty of other "ox-filth" involved in owning a car: paying for insurance and car repairs, finding parking, maintaining up-to-date state inspections and registrations, worrying about the car getting damaged, etc. None of these "ox-filth" responsibilities directly enable me to drive my car - and yet, it is impossible for most people to own a car without having to deal with this upkeep.

Like all pesukim in Mishlei, our pasuk applies to a wide range of practical decisions in everyday life, but unlike many pesukim in Mishlei, our pasuk prompts us to change our thinking rather than our actions. That type of change is far more difficult to achieve, but the payoff is enormous.

Mishlei 29:9 - The Fool's Dirty Debate Tactics

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Artwork: Browbeat, by Chris Rahn

Mishlei 29:9 - The Fool's Dirty Debate Tactics

משלי כט:ט

אִישׁ חָכָם נִשְׁפָּט אֶת אִישׁ אֱוִיל וְרָגַז וְשָׂחַק וְאֵין נָחַת:

Mishlei 29:9

Raw Translation: A wise man who nishpat with a foolish man, and he rages and he laughs, and there is no satisfaction/rest.

I chose this pasuk for today's Mishlei post because it's a good example of how ambiguity in the wording can lead to multiple directions in the analysis. When I learned this pasuk with my Mishlei group this past Shabbos, we didn't have access to my mikraos gedolos (compendium of commentaries), and we were forced to work out the translation on our own. I'll include the difficulties in my list of questions on the pasuk:

(1) What does "nishpat" mean? The root SH.F.T. (ש.פ.ט.) typically denotes "to judge," but can also mean "to dispute" or "to argue." The use of the nifal (passive) form is also very strange. "is judged" makes sense, but "is disputed" or "is argued [with]" are also valid translations.

(2) Who "rages" and "laughs"? Is the chacham (wise man) raging and laughing at the eveel (foolish man), or is the eveel raging and laughing at the chacham? 

(3) What, exactly, is this "rage" and "laughter"? Is "rage" different than mere "anger"? Is the emphasis on his feeling of anger, or on his display of anger? The laughter is even vaguer than the rage. Is this talking about "laughter" that stems from humor? Is it laughter of mockery? Is it laughter of happiness and camaraderie? And why is this person raging and laughing? What is the relationship between the situation (i.e. arguing, disputing, or being judged) and these two reactions? Is it davka (specifically) these two reactions, or are these just examples from within a larger category?

(4) Who doesn't receive satisfaction - and why not? The answer to this question is dependent on the answer to Question #2, and maybe dependent on the answer to Question #3.

[Time to stop and think about the pasuk in light of these questions. Read on when ready.]

Before we can present the main idea of the pasuk, we need to settle on a translation. Here are the approaches taken by the various meforshim:

Rashi: A wise man who argues with a foolish man may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction [for the wise man].

Ralbag: When a wise man argues with a foolish man, [the fool] will rage and laugh, and there will be no rest [for the wise man].

Ibn Ezra: When a wise man is judged with a foolish man, [the fool] may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction [for the wise man].

Metzudas David: A wise man who is judged with a foolish man may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction [for the wise man]. 

As I mentioned, we didn't have access to meforshim when we learned this pasuk. The translation we came up with happens to be one that none of the meforshim explicitly say:

Our Translation: When a wise man is judged with a foolish man, [the fool] may rage and laugh, but he will have no satisfaction.

For those of you who appreciate charts, here are the five translations side by side:

The fact that none of the meforshim proposed this translation doesn't bother me. I am not aware of any grammatical or syntactical problems, and our translation reflects the most straightforward reading, both in terms of the use of the passive "nishpat" (which literally means "he is judged") and in the conservative reading of the ambiguous pronouns (i.e. "the fool may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction for the fool"). Plus, "raging" and "laughing" seem more like the actions of an eveel than the actions of a chacham, which is why we shied away from translating the pasuk like Rashi and Metzudas David.

Here is my four-sentence summary of the main idea:

When a chacham finds himself in a situation in which he is being judged alongside an eveel (e.g. two participants in a public debate, two businessmen competing for the same customers, two candidates vying for the same position), he should prepare himself to face the dirty tactics that the eveel will use. The fool will attempt to prevail by utilizing provocatively aggressive displays of emotion – such as rage and mocking laughter – in an effort to destabilize the chacham, and to make himself appear dominant in comparison. As long as the chacham remains visibly unshaken and unperturbed by the eveel's bombastic onslaught, and doesn’t give him the satisfaction of pushing his buttons, then these tactics will backfire. The audience (i.e. whoever is in a position to pass judgment) will observe the stark contrast between the chacham’s cool, levelheaded, objective disposition and the eveel’s heated, combative, immature bullying; this side-by-side comparison will simultaneously boost the ethos of the chacham and diminish that of the eveel. Chances are that the eveel, himself, will become frustrated with the chacham’s indifference to his assaults, which will destabilize him, making him feel even more frantic and less in control of himself; this, in turn, will make him appear desperate and pathetic in the eyes of the audience, thereby giving the chacham an edge - in addition to the substance of his arguments, which will inevitably be superior to the eveel's.

After we came up with this explanation, and I gained access to my meforshim, I saw that the Ri Nachmias gives a very similar explanation of our pasuk. The only difference is that he translates "nishpat" as "argues" instead of "is judged," like Rashi and Ralbag, in contrast to Ibn Ezra and Metzudas David. Nevertheless, he also learns - like we do - that there is an audience present in the situation, which practically means that the chacham and eveel are being judged. Here is the relevant excerpt from the Ri Nachmias's (much lengthier) explanation:

If a wise man who argues with a fool, [the fool] may rage and laugh ... Since this fool doesn't have much knowledge, he'll project self-images (oseh tzuros me'atzmo) to deceive the people who are there ... These are polemical techniques (darchei nitzuach) which [the eveel uses to] trick listeners [into thinking that he] knows what he doesn't [actually know].

The Ri Niachmias quotes a pasuk from elsewhere in Shlomo ha'Melech's writings which supports our interpretation: "The words of the wise are heard calmness (b'nachas) over the shouting of a ruler among fools" (Koheles 9:17). In the Rambam's description of how talmidei chachamim (Torah scholars) speak and behave, he borrows this phrase from Koheles:

A talmid chachamim shouldn't yell or shout when he speaks, like animals and wild beasts, nor should he raise his voice; rather, his speech with people should be calm. And when he speaks calmly, he should be careful not to distance himself, to the extent that he appears haughty.

In other words, this calmness in speech shouldn't be limited to situations involving a fool. Rather, "nachas" (in the sense of "calmness" rather than "satisfaction") should be the default mode of speech for talmidei chachamim.

The Ralbag would agree with the title of this post, but according to him, our pasuk focuses on a specific tactic used by the eveel in debates: interrupting the chacham. He translates our pasuk as: "When a wise man argues with a foolish man, [the fool] will rage and laugh, and there will be no rest [for the wise man]." Here is his explanation:

When a wise man argues with a foolish man, in a verbal back-and-forth, the eveel will not allow the chacham to speak and to finish his statements. Instead, sometimes he'll react angrily to what he hears the chacham say and will not allow him to complete his statements, and sometimes he'll laugh and mock what he hears [the chacham] say, and he will not give him a pause (nachas) which would enable him to complete what he intended to clarify. This pasuk is, as it were, a warning to the chacham not to argue with an eveel.

One of the best examples of our pasuk in action is the Canadian psychologist Jordan Peterson. I found a video which exemplifies all three interpretations - that of the Ralbag, the Ri Nachmias, and ours. I wanted to find a shorter video, but this is the best I could come up with.


It will not always be possible for a chacham to avoid debating with or being judged alongside an eveel. When such a situation arises, the chacham must keep the eveel's repertoire of tricks at the forefront of his mind, and not allow him to get the upper hand. 

Mishlei 3:19-26 - Mishleic Security in God

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Artwork: The Mirari Conjecture, by James Arnold

Mishlei 3:19-26 - Mishleic Security in God

Some of my students decided to start learning Mishlei on their own this summer. They recently contacted me and asked for my assistance in learning the pasuk: "Hashem founded the earth with wisdom; He established the heavens with understanding" (Mishlei 3:19). They said that they had made some headway, but the ideas they came up with "didn't feel like Mishlei ideas."

I responded by affirming their observation: yes, the main idea of Mishlei 3:19 doesn't feel like a Mishlei idea, nor should it. Why not? Because this pasuk is from the first nine chapters of Mishlei, which serve a different purpose and are written in a different style than "regular Mishlei."

I wrote about this in my How to Learn Mishlei: A Step-by-step Guide. Chapters 1-9 constitute Shlomo ha'Melech's introductory discourse. The pesukim in chapters 1-9 were written to be learned paragraph by paragraph, sequentially. In contrast, the pesukim in chapters 10-29 are "standalone proverbs" which can be learned in any order, without any regard to their context within the sefer.

For this reason, I urge newer Mishlei students to skip chapters 1-9 and begin with chapters 10-29. These pesukim are easier to learn because they can be analyzed on their own. Moreover, it is also easier to approach chapters 1-9 after building up a basic "Mishleic intuition" from "standard Mishlei" pesukim, which will serve as a guide through the introductory material.

Although I usually write about standalone pesukim from chapters 10-29, I decided to switch it up for this week's Mishlei post and write about the pasuk that my students are learning, in order to illustrate just how different these introductory chapters can be.

The first step is to figure out the unit of which Mishlei 3:19 is a part. It's clearly not related to the pesukim before it, since that unit ends with the paragraph break at 3:18. It's also clear that 3:19 is connected to 3:20 at the very least, and the use of the pronoun "them" in 3:21 suggests that 3:19-20 is connected to 3:21-26. The pesukim after 26 seem to be their own thing.

Thus, the cluster of pesukim we'll be working with is this:

משלי ג:יט-כו

(יט) יְיָ בְּחָכְמָה יָסַד אָרֶץ כּוֹנֵן שָׁמַיִם בִּתְבוּנָה: (כ) בְּדַעְתּוֹ תְּהוֹמוֹת נִבְקָעוּ וּשְׁחָקִים יִרְעֲפוּ טָל: (כא) בְּנִי אַל יָלֻזוּ מֵעֵינֶיךָ נְצֹר תֻּשִׁיָּה וּמְזִמָּה: (כב) וְיִהְיוּ חַיִּים לְנַפְשֶׁךָ וְחֵן לְגַרְגְּרֹתֶיךָ: (כג) אָז תֵּלֵךְ לָבֶטַח דַּרְכֶּךָ וְרַגְלְךָ לֹא תִגּוֹף: (כד) אִם תִּשְׁכַּב לֹא תִפְחָד וְשָׁכַבְתָּ וְעָרְבָה שְׁנָתֶךָ: (כה) אַל תִּירָא מִפַּחַד פִּתְאֹם וּמִשֹּׁאַת רְשָׁעִים כִּי תָבֹא: (כו) כִּי יְיָ יִהְיֶה בְכִסְלֶךָ וְשָׁמַר רַגְלְךָ מִלָּכֶד:

Mishlei 3:19-26

(19) Hashem founded the earth with wisdom; He established the heavens with understanding. (20) With His knowledge the depths were cleaved, and the heavens drip dew. (21) My son – do not let them deviate from your eyes; guard wisdom and strategic thought, (22) and they will be life for your soul, and a graceful [ornament] for your neck. (23) Then you will walk securely on your path, and your foot will not falter. (24) When you lie down, you will not be afraid; you will lie down your sleep will be sweet. (25) Do not be afraid of sudden terror, nor the darkness of the wicked when it comes, (26) for Hashem will be your security, and He will guard your foot from ensnarement.

When learning "standard Mishlei" pesukim from chapters 10-29, we try to ask all the questions we can. If we did that on this paragraph, we'd easily be overwhelmed. Instead, it is advisable to focus on getting the main idea of the paragraph as a whole - much like we do in our approach to Sefer Tehilim - and then examine the details in light of that main idea.

The major questions on this paragraph as a whole are:

(1) What are the first two pesukim saying? This certainly doesn't seem to be a practical decision-making idea, since it's about Hashem's creation of the world. These pesukim seem to be more appropriate for Tehilim or Bereishis than Mishlei!

(2) What is the relationship between 19-20 and 21? I am assuming that there is a connection because of how 21 begins: "Do not let them deviate from your eyes" - with the "them" referring to the chochmah, tevunah, and daas mentioned in 19-20.

(3) How do all of the benefits listed in 22-26 result from implementing the advice in 21? In other words, how do these effects (i.e. "they will be life for your soul ... and He will guard your foot from ensnarement") result from these causes ("do not let them deviate from your eyes; guard wisdom and strategic thought")?

Before we move on to the main idea, I just want to underscore how different these questions are from the kinds of questions we normally ask. For example, if we approached pesukim 22-26 as we would approach "regular Mishlei" (i.e. chapters 10-29), then we'd focus on all of the specifics - but since our pesukim come from Chapters 1-9, we need to prioritize the main idea over the details. 

It's not always clear which questions are major and which are minor. For example, one could expand on Question #1 by asking: "What are the definitions of chochmah (wisdom), tevunah (understanding), and daas (knowledge)?" or "Why is chochmah associated to Hashem's founding of the earth, tevunah to His establishing the heavens, and daas to His causing them to drip with dew?" An argument could be made that these are major questions which are critical for understanding the main idea. However, my intuition tells me that these questions are minor. Pesukim 19-20 are basically saying "Hashem created the universe with knowledge," and the terms used are synonyms.

[Okay - now it's time to think! Continue reading when you're ready.]

Due to the difference in style between "regular Mishlei" and the introductory chapters, I think it's best if I answer each of the three questions individually, and then summarize the main idea in 1-4 sentences - much like I do in my posts on Tehilim.

Answer to Question #1: What are the first two pesukim saying? 

The Meiri [1] offers several explanations of these two pesukim, but his final explanation appeals to me the most:

There are those who explain that the phrase "with chochmah" here refers to the [design of the] earth, meaning to say that He created it in accordance with chochmah - that is, with [laws of] nature that do not deviate from their creation, and which are responsible for the establishment and continued existence of the earth, [such as] the rotation of the earth, the rising and setting of the sun, the orders of the moon and stars which provide light at night, etc.

Turns out that the Meiri was quoting the Sefer Chukah, [2] whose explanation is spelled out a bit more:

"Hashem founded the earth with wisdom; He established the heavens with understanding" [means] that from the day He created them, they do not deviate from their ways, nor does any part of His design deteriorate, such that he would need to fix it - unlike human beings, who build a building, only to have it deteriorate years later and be in need of repair. The Creator (blessed is He) created all of His works with wisdom, and firmly established the earth through nature and [laws of] cause-and-effect - [such as] the rotation of the earth, the rising and setting of the sun, the order of the moon and the stars to provide light at night - and each and every one of them stands at its post and performs His commands. 

In other words, these two pesukim convey the idea that Hashem created the world and endowed it with lawful principles of cause and effect, which are consistent, perfect, and harmonious in their preservation of the universe, obedient to the will of the Creator. The terms chochmah, tevunah, and daas here all refer to the quality of intelligent lawfulness that is manifest everywhere in the universe. 

Answer to Question #2: What is the relationship between 19-20 and 21? 

Mishlei's premise, as stated in Saadia Gaon's Introduction to Mishlei, is that man is unique on account of his tzelem Elokim (i.e. truth-seeking intellect), which allows him to comprehend abstract knowledge, and to make decisions based on long-term benefits and consequences. 

In light of this premise, and the premise stated in 19-20 that the universe operates by natural cause-and-effect, it follows that man should utilize his intellect to understand the lawfulness of the world around him, in order to align himself with it to the best of his ability to maximize long-term pleasure and minimize long-term pain (again, as Saadia Gaon wrote in his Introduction to Mishlei). 

This manifests itself in two ways: "guard[ing] wisdom," which refers to avoiding actions and decisions which lead to harmful consequences, and "strategic thought," which refers to using knowledge of the laws of nature to bring about benefits that one wouldn't have otherwise received. But these two things will only be possible if he exercises Mishleic vigilance, "not letting [wisdom, understanding, and knowledge] deviate from his eyes." 

This might also be why the emphasis is on the "eyes": it's not enough to know, in abstract, that the universe operates by lawful cause and effect; you need to be able to see opportunities to implement Mishleic thinking in the sensory particulars of everyday life. 

Answer to Question #3: How do all of the wonderful benefits listed in 22-26 result from implementing the advice in 21?

These pesukim are a breakdown of the two general categories mentioned in the previous pasuk (i.e. "guarding wisdom and strategic design"). I don't know whether this is a comprehensive list or just a series of particular examples. Here's what my intuition tells me about each item on the list:

"they will be life for your soul" - If "soul" means your physical life, then this is a reference to all the ways that Mishlei literally prolongs your life by helping you make intelligent decisions to improve your physical health and to deter you from taking unwarranted risks and engaging in unhealthy practices or behavior. If "soul" means your mind, then this is referring to the enjoyment of Mishleic thinking, which will become the central pleasure of your life. (Judging by the rest of the list, I'd say that the first explanation is the correct one.) 

"and a graceful [ornament] for your neck" - If I recall correctly, "neck" in Mishlei refers to your larynx (a.k.a. vocal cords). [3] Mishlei will change the way you speak, the contents of your speech, and when you exercise your speech - all in a manner which will give you the quality of "grace" (i.e. people will naturally be drawn to you because of the benefits and pleasantness they derive from the effects of Mishlei on your personality, and the beneficial results of Mishlei in your life [4]). 

"you will walk securely on your path" - I think "your path" refers to the general direction you take in life (i.e. the goals you pursue), which will be "secured" by your intelligent decision-making. 

"your foot will not falter" - I doubt this means that you won't make mistakes, since that would be humanly impossible. Rather, I think it means that even when you do make mistakes, you will learn from them and benefit from the insight you gain. Thus, in the long run, even your mistakes will enhance the quality of your life. Either that, or it just means that you will make fewer mistakes than a person who doesn't learn Mishlei. 

"if you lie down, you will not be afraid" - As a student of Mishlei, you will have a healthy recognition and acceptance of what is in your control and what is not in your control; you will take all of the precautions to protect yourself from threats that are within your control, and you will accept that whatever is out of your control is out of your control, to the extent that when you go to sleep (i.e. a state of complete lack of control, and therefore, complete vulnerability), you will still feel secure that you have done everything in your ability to protect yourself from harm.

"when you lie down and your sleep will be sweet" - This physical security will also lead to an emotionally secure state of mind, which will enable you to have a restful sleep, free from those late-night bouts of stress, fear, and anxiety about the worries of the day. 

"do not be afraid of sudden terror, and the darkness of the wicked when it comes" - Even when unexpected catastrophes happen, whether natural ("sudden terror," such as hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanoes, etc.) or brought about by human beings ("darkness of the wicked," such as assaults, robbery, war, the Holocaust, etc.), you need not be afraid; as a student of Mishlei, you will use the same decision-making approach in these situations as you would under normal conditions, and will be sure to achieve the best results that are in your control to achieve. 

"Hashem will be your security, and He will guard your foot from ensnarement" - I believe that this pasuk is framed in terms of Hashem in order to chiastically conclude this cluster of pesukim as it began. How does one take security in Hashem? By aligning oneself with Hashem's chochmah, tevunah, and daas which constitute the fabric of His universe. To the extent that you trust in His will, as manifest in the laws of nature, you will feel secure, and not become ensnared in the consequences of bad decisions, or in the stress and anxiety that results from non-Mishleic thinking.

Having said all of that, here is my four-sentence summary of the main idea:

The basis of Mishleic security in Hashem is the recognition that He created the universe in accordance with laws of cause and effect – laws which are universal, consistent, and rational (i.e. they can be known and understood by human beings). The Mishlei student’s trust in Hashem is based on the reliability of His will as manifest in these laws of nature. By using wisdom and strategic thinking to align himself with these natural laws, thinking and speaking about them constantly and harnessing them to his advantage, he will achieve both physical and emotional security – physical security from making the best decisions within the realm of his control based on the best of his knowledge, and emotional security derived from his trust in Hashem’s will, and from his knowledge that he has done everything in his power to make the best decision he can. And even when he makes a mistake, which will inevitably happen, he will learn from it, and use the insights he gained to improve his decision-making in the future.

There you have it. See how different this feels from a "regular Mishlei" idea? It's far more general and less focused on particular practical decision-making strategies. I also hope you can see what I meant when I said that I encourage students not to learn these introductory chapters until after they've developed their Mishleic intuition by learning chapters 10-29 for a while.

[1] Rabbeinu Menachem ben Shlomo Meiri, Commentary on Sefer Mishlei 3:19

[2] Rabbeinu Yosef Kimchi, Sefer Chukah on Mishlei 3:19

[3] see, for example, Rabbeinu Yonah on Mishlei 1:9

[4] I heard a great example of this yesterday from my Mishlei rebbi, who recently spent nearly an entire week in the hospital. He told me that many nurses and doctors came up to him and told him that he is the best and most pleasant patient they've ever had. My Mishlei rebbi attributed this to the effects of Mishlei on his personality, which we spent a while discussing and analyzing.