Haftaras Parashas Devarim: Permanent Stains

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Haftaras Parashas Devarim: Permanent Stains

The haftarah for Shabbos Chazon (i.e. the Shabbos before Tishah b'Av) is the first chapter of Sefer Yeshayahu. The navi (prophet) begins with a scathing censure of the citizens of Yerushalayim and Yehudah. He labels them as "rebels," decries their refusal to know God, calls them "a sinful nation, a people weighed down by iniquity, evil offspring, destructive children" who have "forsaken Hashem and turned their back [to Him]" (Yeshayahu 1:4). He tells them that their sacrifices, their holidays, and their prayers are worthless and are abhorrent to Him because "[their] hands are filled with blood" (ibid. 1:15). He refers to his fellow Jews as "chiefs of Sedom ... people of Amorah" (ibid. 1:10), urging them:

Wash yourselves, purify yourselves, remove the evil of your deeds from before My eyes; cease doing evil. Learn to do good, seek justice, vindicate the victim, render justice to the orphan, take up the grievance of the widow. (ibid. 1:16-17)

But then, in the midst of this harsh rebuke, he delivers a message of hope:

"Come, now, let us discuss together," says Hashem, "If your sins are like scarlet they will become as white as snow; if they have become red as crimson, they will become [white] as wool. If you are willing and obey, you will eat the goodness of the land. But if you refuse and rebel, you will be devoured by the sword" - for the mouth of Hashem has spoken. (ibid. 1:18-20)

The Abravanel [1] explains the import of this message:

The correct [explanation] to me is that because the navi rebuked the people of Yehudah and Yerushalayim so much, and called them “chiefs of Sedom, people of Amorah,” “wicked offspring, corrupt children,” he was worried that perhaps they would give up hope from [doing] teshuvah. Therefore, he spoke to their hearts, [saying:] “Come, let us discuss.” It is as if he had said, “My brothers and friends! Let us come, now, and accept rebuke by returning to Hashem” – for this (i.e. doing teshuvah) is the true acceptance of rebuke … And he informed them that even though their sins are like scarlet – that is, red from the blood of the victims of murder and oppression – then if they accepted rebuke, [their garments] would immediately be whitened like snow and like wool, and there wouldn’t remain any mark at all, for the color white signifies purity.

This message is consistent with our understanding of Judaism's stance on teshuvah. Hashem is always willing to accept our teshuvah and forgive our sins. He is "the Gracious One, abundant to forgive," as we say three times a day. This theme permeates the liturgy on Yom ha'Kippurim, especially in Neilah. The Rambam [2] writes at the end of his list of the 24 things which prevent teshuvah:

All of these things: even though they hold back teshuvah, they do not prevent teshuvah. Rather, if a person did teshuvah from them, then he is baal teshuvah, and he has a portion in Olam ha’Ba (the World to Come).

So what is the problem here? The problem doesn't stem from the way Yeshayahu talks about teshuvah. The problem is the way Yirmiyahu talks about teshuvah. He says, in Hashem's name:

For I have always broken your yoke and torn off your straps, and you have said, "I will not transgress!" Yet upon every lofty hill and under every leafy tree you wander like a harlot. I had planted you from a choice vine, entirely of faithful seed; how, then, have you turned yourself into an inferior, alien vine before Me? Even if you were to cleanse yourself with nitre (i.e. stain-remover) and use much soap, your iniquity has become a stain before Me - the word of my Lord, Hashem-Elokim. (Yirmiyahu 2:20-22)

The same analogy is used by these two neviim (prophets), but the message is the opposite: according to Yeshayahu, our iniquity is like a stain that can be removed; according to Yirmiyahu, it is like a stain that can't be removed. 

Now, one might try to resolve this by saying that these two neviim were speaking at different times in Jewish history, separated by nearly 200 years: Yeshayahu was the first navi to prophesy about the destruction of Yerushalayim, and Yirmiyahu was the last. Similarly, one can answer that these two neviim were speaking to two different groups of Jews; the Jews in Yirmiyahu's time were undoubtedly more corrupt than the Jews addressed by Yeshayahu.

The reason why this answer fails is that Yirmiyahu, himself, delivers Yeshayahu's same message later on in his sefer, saying: "Cleanse your heart from evil, O Yerushalayim, so that you may be saved; how long will you lodge your iniquitous thoughts within yourself?" (ibid. 4:14). Apparently, their hearts can be cleansed from iniquity, even according to Yirmiyahu!

Chazal (Rosh ha'Shanah 18a) note this internal contradiction and offer a cryptic resolution:

It is written: "cleanse your heart from evil" and it is written: "even if you were to cleanse yourself with nitre and use much soap, your iniquity is a stain before Me"! ... There is no contradiction: here [in the latter case] we are dealing with a [Divine] verdict accompanied by a [Divine] oath, whereas there [in the former case] we are dealing with a [Divine] verdict that is not accompanied by a [Divine] oath.

According to Chazal, we can cleanse ourselves from iniquity even after the Divine verdict has been sealed, but only if this verdict was not accompanied by a Divine oath. If a Divine verdict is sealed with a Divine oath, then the iniquity cannot be cleansed. As an example of the latter, they cite the case of the House of Eli: "Therefore, I have sworn concerning the House of Eli that the iniquity of the House of Eli would never be atoned for by sacrifice or minchah-offering" (I Shmuel 3:14). 

The Abravanel doesn't accept Chazal's answer:

If we were to say like the words of Chazal – that “your iniquity is a stain before Me” because it was a Divine verdict accompanied by an oath, which cannot be overturned, and the teshuvah cannot be accepted – then a huge difficulty is posed to us by the repeated sending of the neviim and their rebukes, and all their words would be in vain and for no purpose, for if the decree were true, the diligence of the neviim would be false. Moreover, [according to Chazal’s answer], this severely weakens the doctrine about the virtue of teshuvah that we have received [through the Oral Tradition, namely,] that nothing stands in the way [of teshuvah].

In other words, if teshuvah cannot atone for a sin when the Divine verdict was accompanied by an oath - as in the case of Yirmiyahu 2:22, according to Chazal's reading - then the sending of the neviim urging the people to do teshuvah was pointless! Furthermore, this answer flies in the face of everything we know about the unstoppable power of teshuvah!

Instead, the Abravanel offers two answers: first the Radak's, and then his own. The Radak [3] resolves the contradiction based not on the acceptance of teshuvah, but on the process of kaparah (atonement) for different levels of sin:

Based on the divisions of kaparah (atonement) expounded by Rebbi Yishmael (Yoma 86a), the view of the Radak is proper and acceptable. [He answers] that if the Jews of that generation did teshuvah, they would be saved from the enemy and would not have gone into exile, but they [still] would have received [some degree of] punishment for their iniquities – whether by plague, or by famine, or by other catastrophes while they were still on their land. This is because there are iniquities for which teshuvah alone is not sufficient to provide kaparah; [in some cases the teshuvah must be accompanied] with yisurin (afflictions) that cleanse [the remnants of the iniquities] or with death. Regarding the possibility of saving the people from exile by means of teshuvah, [Yirmiyahu] said: “cleanse your heart from evil so that you may be saved.” Regarding the other punishments which cleanse iniquities it was stated here: “even if you cleanse … [your iniquity is a stain before Me.”

The Radak's answer is that teshuvah is always accepted - completely and fully - but this doesn't mean that the teshuvah will remove all of the punishments or consequences. In some cases, the sinners may need to endure suffering or even death in order to provide full kaparah. Accordingly, it would seem that in Yeshayahu's time, Bnei Yisrael could have done teshuvah and attained complete kaparah, whereas in Yirmiyahu's time, their teshuvah would have successfully "cleansed their hearts from evil," but there would remain a stain which could only be removed through additional suffering.

The Abravanel answers through a subtle reading of the metaphor which dissolves the contradiction:

But according to my own opinion, this question doesn’t apply to our pasuk, for here it did not state: “if you cleanse your heart from evil" - which alludes to true teshuvah - as he said in the other pasuk: “cleanse your heart from evil.” He didn’t say that in this pasuk because the navi didn’t intend to say here that even if they did teshuvah it wouldn’t benefit them. 

Rather, his intent was to say that the people of his generation were wicked in secret, but outwardly portrayed themselves as pious. Regarding this he said to them that even though they do outward acts of piety, Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu knows their secret wicked actions. This is the meaning of: “even if you cleanse yourself with nitre and use lots of soap” – which are things used to whiten clothing. Behold! Despite all of the outward actions that you do with deception and fraud, “your iniquity is a stain before Me” – in other words, your hidden iniquity is a stain and a blemish before Me.

There is a difference between cleansing your clothing (i.e. doing external acts of piety) and cleansing your heart (i.e. doing real teshuvah, thereby changing yourself). The navi here doesn't say "you can't cleanse your heart" but rather "even if you cleanse your clothing, the sin of your heart is a stain before Me." 

Personally, I prefer the Abravanel's interpretation over the Radak's. Time and again we see the Navi rebuking Klal Yisrael for engaging in external forms of teshuvah while retaining their inner corruption. A great example of this can be found in another one of Yeshayahu's prophecies, which we read as the haftarah on the morning of Yom ha'Kippurim:

Cry out vociferously, do not restrain yourself; raise your voice like a shofar - proclaim to My people their willful sins, to the House of Jacob their transgressions. They pretend to seek Me every day and to desire to know My ways, like a nation that acts righteously and has not forsaken the justice of its God; they inquire of Me about the laws of justice, as if they desire the nearness of God, [asking,] "Why did we fast and You did not see? Why did we afflict ourselves, and You did not know?"

Behold! On your fast day you seek out personal gain and you extort all your debts. Because you fast for grievance and strife, to streak [each other] with a wicked fist; you do not fast as befits this day, to make your voice heard above. Can such be a fast I choose, a day when man merely afflicts himself? Can it be merely bowing one's head like a bulrush and spreading sackcloth and ashes?

Surely this is the fast I choose: to break open the shackles of wickedness, to undo the bonds of justice, and to let the oppressed go free, and to annul all perversion. Surely you should break your bread for the hungry, and bring the moaning poor [to your] home; when you see a naked person, clothe him; and do not hide yourself from your kin. 

This provides us with valuable practical insight: having a religious self-image can be an obstacle to teshuvah. The Jews in Yeshayahu's time - and, according to the Abravanel, in Yirmiyahu's time as well - viewed themselves as pious and religious. They brought their korbanos, they observed the moadim (holidays), they made their aliyos l'regel (festival pilgrimages), they davened, and they learned. This is precisely why Hashem's rebuke in our haftarah was calculated to shatter their pious self-image, which which was reinforced with outward actions of piety and the scrupulous observance. Yeshayahu's central message in our haftarah may be summed up as: "Who do you think you are?" He goes on to dismantle every characteristic that the Jews of his time used to prop up their righteous façade:

"You think you are loyal? You are rebels! You think you're special because you're the descendants of the Avos? You are like the citizens of Sedom and Amorah! You think you're righteous because you are scrupulous in the avodah ba'Mikdash (Temple service)? Your avodah is worthless to me. I am sick of your korbanos, your moadim, your aliyah l'regel, and I refuse to listen to your tefilos - all so long as you continue to harbor inward corruption and injustice towards your fellow man. Yerushalayim was once a city of righteousness and faithfulness. Now it is a city of murderers and liars." 

This "assault on self-image" is a harsh tool, but an effective one. My chavrusa gave an apt analogy: if you point out policy problems among the respective parties of conservative Republicans or liberal Democrats, this will be very easy for them to shrug off these critiques - but if you accuse the Republicans of being hell-bent socialists intent on destroying America or if you accuse Democrats of being villainous fascists who oppress minorities, that'll get their attention. And if you are skillful enough in making your case, you might succeed in getting them to question the veracity of their own self-image and identity. 

This is what many of the neviim sought to do in their rebukes of Klal Yisrael. If they merely pointed out specific aveiros (transgressions) and avonos (iniquities), it would be very easy for the Jews to shrug and say: "Sure, I agree that this is a problem, but there's always room for improvement." No real teshuvah would take place; any teshuvah they did would be confined to their outward actions - their clothing, rather than their heart. Instead, the neviim framed their rebukes in terms of identity: "Is that who you think you are? You are exactly the opposite." Once their self-image is shattered, the real teshuvah process can begin.

This is a core objective of the annual ymei taanis (fast days). Rather than wait for a national catastrophe to befall our people and compel us to engage in a national soul-searching, we use the national tzaros (catastrophes) of the past to prompt this type of introspection in the present, at regular intervals. Who are we, as a nation? Who are we supposed to be, and how have we become what we have become? 

This is also why we read haftaros such as this one today. Nevuah has ceased from our nation, as a result of our iniquities, but the contents of nevuah are more relevant than ever. The question is whether we will listen to the words of the navi and ask ourselves: “Who are we, as a nation? Who are we supposed to be, and how have we become what we have become?” 

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Yeshayahu 1:18; this goes for all Abravanel references in this post

[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 4:6

[3] Rabbeinu David Kimchi (Radak), Commentary on Sefer Yeshayahu; I've chosen to quote the Abravanel's summary of the Radak's view, since it's a little bit clearer

Excessive Righteousness and Foolish Piety

Originally published in August 2012. This version has been toned down significantly.

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Excessive Righteousness and Foolish Piety

My Shul Rabbi's Message to Congregants 

When my family and I were on our journey to Orthodox Judaism, we were fortunate to find the perfect shul with the perfect rabbi. The shul was filled with Jews from across the spectrum - Chasidish, Modern Orthodox, Zionist, Yeshivish - and the majority of the congregation was, and still is, comprised of baalei teshuvah (non-observant Jews who became observant).

As you might imagine, it might be very daunting for a shul rabbi to please such a diverse crowd - but our shul rabbi is a master. He is completely non-judgmental, and makes everyone feel welcome. His shiurim (classes) and his conversation are filled with enough explanation to make baalei teshuvah feel welcome, and sufficient references to advanced material to please the scholarly crowd.

But there is one message that is often reiterated by our shul rabbi which (I believe) is intended equally for baalei teshuvah and yeshivish students alike: "Don't be too religious." Yes, he says this partially in jest, but usually does so when a congregant inquires about a halacha which is actually just a chumrah (stringency).

I used to think that our rabbi coined this phrase on his own. It wasn't until the first time I read Koheles that I realized he was borrowing the language of the pasuk: "Do not be overly righteous or excessively wise - why should you make yourself desolate?" (Koheles 7:16).

We'll return to this at the end of the post.

Blurry Glasses 

A few years ago my chavrusa (learning partner) brought a short article to my attention:

Soon, it will no longer be necessary for charedi men to walk around while covering their eyes with their hands to avoid seeing women.

Recently, a new start-up company has begun marketing and selling special glasses in charedi neighborhoods such as Meah Shearim. The purpose of the glasses is to prevent charedi men from seeing immodestly-dressed women.

The glasses contain blurry lenses that obscure the wearer’s vision and do allow men not to (sic) see more than three meters. For those who already wear glasses, the company has designed stickers that can be affixed to the existing pair of glasses which will obscure the vision.

Yedioth Ahronot reports that the glasses, designed for the charedi community, are intended for charedi men who must go to places where women will be present. The new patent cost the inventors only NIS 25. The patent includes non-prescription glasses and the obscuring stickers. The glasses with the blurry lenses contain perforations at the bottom of the lenses enabling charedi men to look down at the ground through the perforation and still see where they are walking.

My chavrusa pointed out that the subject of this article is straight out of a Gemara (Sotah 22b) we once learned. When sitting down to write this blog post, I found myself paralyzed by the numerous directions it might take. But I think I'll just content myself with citing the text of the Gemara, drawing the connection, and making a few observations here and there - without attempting any grand theories or explanations.

The Scourges of Prushim Ruin the World

In order to fully appreciate the Gemara, we'll need to see it in the context of the Mishnah, which appears on 20a. The last clause of the Mishnah reads:

[R' Yehoshua] used to say: a chasid shoteh (foolish pietist), a rasha arum (cunning evildoer), an ishah prushah, and the scourges of prushim - these are the ruiners [or alternatively: "destroyers"] of the world.

The Gemara explains that each of these terms refers to a personality-type which expresses itself in specific behaviors. For instance, "chasid shoteh" is a man who refuses to save a the life of a drowning woman because he doesn't want to gaze at women. "Rasha arum" is a person who explains his argument to the judge before his fellow litigant arrives, which the Meiri universalizes to mean "someone who strategically harms others for his own benefit in undetectable ways." An "ishah prushah" is the subject of a machlokes (disagreement), which we won't get into now. We will focus on the last item in the list: "scourges of prushim," which is somewhat related to the first. 

I think it will be beneficial to read the Rambam's commentary on this Mishnah, since he gives us a better idea of the types of people we are talking about. The Rambam [1] first explains the term "chasid shoteh":

The Talmud explains that this refers to an individual who exhibits an exaggerated level of [halachic or pseudo-halachic] precaution and scrupulousness to the point where he becomes disgusting in the eyes of people, and he does actions which are not obligatory. It is as if the Mishnah said that he is "shoteh b'chasiduso" ("foolish in his piety"). The Sages said in the Gemara Yerushalmi that anyone who is exempt from something and does it anyway is considered a hedyot (ignoramus, probably related to the Greek idiōtēs).

Similarly, the Meiri [2] defines the chasid shoteh as "a person who makes himself excessively pious in a manner which causes harm, either to himself or to others." He adds a few more examples of this type of behavior: "someone who fasts every day ... someone who sees a baby drowning in a river and says, 'Let me take off my tefillin first' [before he jumps in to save him]."

Next, the Rambam addresses the ambiguity of the term "prushim" (lit. "those who are separated"). The difficulty is that "Prushim" (with an uppercase "P") refers to the Phraisees who opposed the Sadducees during the era of the second Beis ha'Mikdash, whereas "prushim" (with a lowercase "p") means "ascetics." The Rambam first explains the origin of the term and then how it is used in our Mishnah and the accompanying Gemara:

The Sages, of blessed memory, called themselves “Prushim” on account of their separating themselves from vices, abominations, and the pursuit of the phenomena of Olam ha'Zeh (This World) which preoccupy the rest of mankind; instead, they turn towards life in Olam ha'Ba (The World to Come) and lofty matters.

However, there is another type of person who decorates himself with these things and makes himself appear in other people’s eyes that he has separated himself from these lowly and abominable things, while at the same time, these very same things permeate his character, and he only separates himself from them on account of some worldly motive.

This is what the Sages are referring to when they say, “there are seven prushim [who ruin the world],” and they enumerate anyone who makes himself seem pious, due to one of these worldly motivations – for example, so that people should honor him, or that Hashem shouldn’t cause him to lose his money and bring harm to him. In the opinion of the Sages, there is no true parush except for one who serves God out of love, like Avraham Avinu; the other six are despicable, since they add onto their preexisting obligations and exaggerate their external superficialities in order to deceive people.

Therefore, because they add to the Torah and make it despicable, they are nicknamed “scourges” and the Sages refer to them as “the scourges of the prushim.” The Sages said that they are the “destroyers of the world (mechalei olam)” or “ruiners of the world (mevalei olam)” because these things are harmful to man’s existence. 

It should be noted that the Mishnah and Gemara are only condemning those "prushim" whose piety is a sham - not to those who have truly reached the true virtue of prishus, who are praised by Chazal and looked upon with favor in the eyes of Hashem. We'll refer to these as "bad prushim."

The Seven Types of Bad Prushim 

Now we are ready for the Gemara in Sotah 22b, which begins by quoting the braisa referenced by the Rambam above:

The Rabbis have taught in a Braisa: There are seven types of [bad] prushim: (1) the Shechemite Parush, (2) the Scuffed Parush, (3) the Bloodletting Parush, (4) the Pestle Parush, (5) the “What-is-my-obligation-that-I-may-do-it!” Parush, (6) the Parush out of Love, and (7) the Parush out of Fear.

The Gemara then goes on to define each of these terms. I will include the text of the Gemara, followed by Rashi's commentary [3] in brackets:

(1) the Shechemite Parush is one who does an act of Shechem. [Rashi: they circumcised themselves not for the sake of heaven; likewise, this parush's actions are for his own gratification - so that people should honor him - and they are not for the sake of heaven.]

(2) the Scraped Parush: he is the one who knocks his feet together. [Rashi: he walks in a lowly manner, heel to toe, and he doesn't lift his eyes from the ground; as a result of this, he scrapes his toes against the rocks.]

(3) the Bloodletting Parush: he is the one who causes his blood to flow against the walls. [Rashi: he makes himself like one who closes his eyes so as not to look at women, and as a result of this, he crashes his head into the wall and draws blood.]

(4) the “Pestle” Parush: Rabbah bar Shila said that he is one [whose head is] bowed like [a pestle in] a mortar. [Rashi: he walks hunched over.]

(5) the “What-is-my-obligation-that-I-may-do-it!” Parush: [Rashi explains this question to mean: "Teach me what my obligation is and I will do it."] 

[Based on this initial definition, the Gemara asks:] But isn't this is a virtue?! [The Gemara answers:] No, for this person says, “What further obligation is there for me, that I may do it?” [Rashi: "What more can I do that I haven't done?" - and he makes himself appear as though he has fulfilled everything.] 

(6) the Parush out of Love [Rashi: out of love of the reward of the mitzvos, but not out of love for the mitzvos of the Creator] 

(7) the Parush out of Fear [Rashi: out of fear of punishment; rather, what is incumbent upon a person? - To do the mitzvos of Hashem, blessed is He, out of love, as Hashem, our God, commanded us, and the reward will ultimately come.]

It would be very interesting to define all seven prushim and to understand the mentality of each personality type. It would be also be interesting to identify the modern day correlatives. Perhaps we'll do this in a subsequent post, if I can figure all of them out.

It seems clear which category our blurred-glasses-wearing brethren have stumbled into: the "Bloodletting Parush" category. Rashi's description fits perfectly: "he makes himself like one who closes his eyes so as not to look at women." I wonder whether Rashi's use of this somewhat awkward wording ("makes himself like one who closes his eyes") implies that type of parush only pretends to close his eyes. 

Either way, Rashi seems to learn the Gemara's criticism of Bloodletting Prushim to have something to do with the physical harm they bring upon themselves by their misguided attempts to eschew (what they regard to be) situations of sin. True, halacha must be followed no matter what the cost, but if a person's adherence to halacha routinely leads to physical injury, then one must wonder whether that person is actually keeping halacha, or if it is his yetzer ha'ra masquerading under the guise of religiosity. 

Lo Lishmah Exceptions

After mentioning the last two categories of prushim (i.e. the Parush out of Love and the Parush out of Fear), the Gemara comments:

Abaye and Rava said to the tanna [who was reciting the braisa:] “Do not mention the Parush out of Love and the Parush out of Fear [in the list of bad prushim], for Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: A person should always involve himself in Torah and mitzvos even she’lo lishmah (not for their own sake), because from she’lo lishmah, he will come to involvement lishmah (for their own sake).” 

According to Abaye and Rava, it was a mistake to include a Parush out of Love and a Parush out of Fear along with the other five individuals mentioned in the braisa. They argued that although it is not ideal to keep halacha out of love of reward or fear of punishment, these are nevertheless valid she'lo lishmah motivations which may lead a person to eventually keep Torah and mitzvos lishmah.

What I find interesting is that Abaye and Rava did not say this about the other five types of prushim. Apparently, their motivations for keeping halacha are not she'lo lishmahs which can lead to lishmah. What is the basis for this distinction? I do not yet have an answer for this. We'll leave it as a question.

Pious Garb

The last point we will consider in this post is about the retribution for this type of prushim behavior, which our Gemara goes on to state:

Rav Nachman ben Yitzchak said: “That which is hidden is hidden and that which is revealed is revealed, but the Great Beis Din will punish those who wrap themselves in gundei.” 

Rashi explains "gundei" to refer to taleisim (plural of "tallis" or "prayer shawl"). He explains the Gemara as follows:

That which is hidden is hidden from people and that which is revealed is revealed [to people]; nevertheless, to the Great Beis Din (i.e. the Heavenly Tribunal), everything is revealed, and it will exact retribution from those who wrap themselves in taleisos and make themselves appear to be prushim when they really are not prushim.

The Aruch, [4] however, learns that the word "gundei" refers to black cloaks. Apparently, even in the time of the Gemara, these types of "bad prushim" wore black in order to appear pious.

What idea is Rav Nachman ben Yitzchak teaching us in this statement? I can't say for certain, but I will take one speculative step. Why do Chazal need to reassure us that a certain aveirah will not go unpunished? Because it must be that on some level we feel that this aveirah will go unpunished. Why might we feel this way about prushim?

Perhaps the answer is simple: we are easily swayed by appearances. If we weren't easily swayed by appearances, everyone would easily see through the facades of these "bad prushim." Even those who know that wearing a black hat and a white beard has absolutely nothing to do with the state of a person's soul vis-a-vis God, it can sometimes be difficult to really feel that this is true. Perhaps this is why Rav Nachman ben Yitzchak emphasizes must tell us that our view is only partial: we only see the outward actions of these people, but not their inner state, and it is their inner state - their knowledge and their true values - which are the real basis of the Divine judgment.

Concluding Thoughts

There you have it: Chazal's diagnosis of "the scourges of prushim." There is much left to think about. But if there's one point that we walk away with, I think it should be this: that these are not new problems. The same personalities we see in the world around us were also walking around in Chazal's time. Chazal knew about them, discussed them, and recorded their thoughts in writing. If we, as a nation, ever hope to remove these ills from our society, we would be wise to understand their teachings on these matters.

And yet, for all of the insights yielded by Chazal's analysis, my shul rabbi's quip ("Don't be too religious") packs a pithier punch. Like Shlomo ha'Melech's warning ("Don't be overly righteous"), his statement prompts us to look at ourselves and examine what we mean by "religious." I'm sure Chazal would approve.

[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah, Sotah 3:4
[2] Rabbeinu Menachem ha'Meiri, Beis ha'Bechirah, Sotah Chapter 3
[3] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Talmud Bavli: Sotah
[4] Rabbeinu Nosson ben Yechiel (ha'Aruch), Sefer ha'Aruch

The Mishleic Spectrum: A Glossary of Mishlei Personalities

If you are interested in Mishlei methodology, I highly recommend that you read Saadia Gaon's Introduction to Mishlei, How to Learn Mishlei: a Step by Step Guide, and Mishlei Methodology: Meiri - Nigleh and Nistar. Those three posts, together with this one, constitute my online "Mishlei 101" class. 

Click here for a printer friendly version of this blog post. It is recommended to print this in color.

The terms on this chart will be translated, defined, and explained in the post below - after an introduction. 

The Mishleic Spectrum: A Glossary of Mishlei Personalities

What This Is, and What This Is Not

Several years ago my Mishlei rebbi and I sat down to write a book on Mishlei. Our goal was to write a "Mishlei Primer" comprised of three parts: (1) a methodological "How to Learn Mishlei" guide, and (2) a Mishlei Glossary, in which we would provide definitions for the many terms and personalities of Mishlei, and (3) a "sampler" of pesukim and their explanations, in accordance with our method.

We decided to begin our research with two of the most obscure Mishleic personalities: the bogeid ("Traitor") and the bliyaal ("Lawless Person"). We ended up spending the whole summer trying to define those two personalities, and we didn't get any further. The following year we tackled the atzel ("Lazy Person"), and spent the whole summer working on that. Suffice it to say, writing a Mishlei glossary was more difficult than we thought at the outset. We shelved the project and haven't returned to it since.  

In retrospect, I think that the standard we established for ourselves was too high. We set out to define each of these terms to the best of our understanding, with the greatest degree of certainty we could muster. This led to a continual revision, re-revision, and re-re-revision of our definitions. For instance, we ended up learning through every pasuk in Mishlei about laziness a total of six times; we started with the first pasuk, then moved on to the second, and so on - but by the time we got to the final pasuk, we felt the need to relearn all of the pesukim again in light of our updated understanding. This was great in terms of our own learning, but not great in terms of our project.

Perhaps what we should have done is to try to figure out working definitions instead of absolute definitions. Our goal should have been to provide definitions which were clear to enable the beginner to get started, but without aiming to definitively proclaim, "This is Mishlei's definition of tzadik" or "This is what Shlomo ha'Melech meant by chochmah." 

This more realistic goal is what I intend to accomplish here, in my rough draft of a "Mishleic Glossary." My goal is to provide working definitions - NOT absolute, authoritative, definitive definitions - of primary, secondary, and some tertiary Mishleic personalities. This definitions in this dictionary should be clear enough to consult and use in case you get stuck on a pasuk and need to "plug in" a definition to work with until you are able to arrive at your own understanding.

Understanding Mishleic Labels

It should be noted that Mishlei speaks in absolutes. Shlomo ha'Melech will say things like, "The ksil (fool) does such-and-such, but the chacham (wise man) does such-and-such" - as if "the ksil" and "the chacham" are living, breathing individuals whom you might run into one day on the street. 

In reality, this isn't the case. Real human beings are complex, and don't fit neatly into Mishleic labels. It is entirely possible for the same individual to be a chacham in his business dealings, an atzel when it comes to Torah study, a rasha in his relationships, and a chasid in halacha. To an extent, we all have elements of ALL Mishleic characteristics within ourselves, in different proportions. 

Mishlei's labels should be thought of as archetypes or paradigms. From a pedagogical standpoint, it is much easier for Shlomo ha'Melech to teach the reader how to become a chacham and avoid the pitfalls of a fool by describing "pristine" decision-making scenarios involving a prototypical chacham character and a prototypical fool character as his foil. 

Sources (or Lack Thereof)

Each of the meforshim (commentators) on Mishlei has his own understanding of the terms we are about to discuss. Some meforshim state their definitions explicitly and bring support from other pesukim or Chazal. Other meforshiim simply explain the pesukim in accordance with their understanding, and the reader of Mishlei must infer their implicit definitions. 

The definitions in this post reflect my current "working definitions" as of June 13th, 2017. Some of these can be traced back to explicit statements provided by pesukim, statements of Chazal, and other meforshim; other definitions I have inferred from their commentaries, some of these definitions are from my Mishlei rebbi, and some are the result of my own Mishleic knowledge and intuition (which I have been cultivating over the past 16 years of uninterrupted Mishlei learning). 

Likewise, the arrangement of these Mishleic personalities on a spectrum is the result of my own analysis, synthesized from a number of different meforshim. There is no unanimous agreement as to where each personality falls out on the spectrum. For example, some (like myself) view the tzadik as a further development of the yashar; others flip the two. 

I have chosen not to cite any sources for these definitions, since this would be a herculean task which I am not up to at the moment. Instead, I will now identify my "go to" meforshim from which these definitions were drawn. The five meforshim I used the most, in order, are: Meiri, Rabbeinu Yonah, Saadia Gaon, Metzudas David,  and Ralbag. These are the five meforshim who, along with my Mishlei rebbi, gave me a derech (method) of Mishlei, and have shaped my development of my own derech.

Color Code

I've decided to color-code the labels in my spectrum, to add a layer of clarity:

Without further ado, here are sixteen Mishleic personalities - presented in the most suitable conceptual order. 

A Glossary of Mishleic Personalities

Primary Mishleic Personalities: these are the ones I focus on in my introductory Mishlei classes, since they are the most basic; all other personalities are subdivisions within these. 

1. נער - Naar ("Youth"): the average person who hasn't learned Mishlei. The term "youth" isn't a reference to age, but to wisdom - just as the Torah uses zakein ("elder") in reference to someone who has acquired much wisdom, regardless of his age. The naar has had enough life experience to form his own views, personality, and habits, but for the most part, he has no major flaws which stand in the way of Mishlei learning and Mishleic development. The naar is one of the audience members for whom Shlomo ha'Melech intended his book, as it is stated: "to [provide] the naar with knowledge and intelligent planning" (Mishlei 1:4).

2. חכם - Chacham ("Wise Person"): one who makes decisions based on long-term consequences. Chazal express this definition in the dictum: "Who is a chacham? One who sees the consequences [of his decisions]" (Tamid 32a). The chacham wants to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. He realizes that in order to do this, he must make decisions using his intellect and not just act based on his feelings and whims. When faced with a decision the chacham will weigh the long-term benefits/pleasures against the short-term pain/harm, and the long-term painful/harmful consequences against the short term pleasures/benefits. Shlomo ha'Melech also intended Mishlei to be learned by chachamim, who are still developing in their chochmah towards becoming tzadikim, as it is stated: "the chacham will hear [the words of Mishlei] and increase his learning" (Mishlei 1:4).

3. אויל - Eveel ("Foolish Person"): one who seeks immediate gratification. The eveel is the opposite of the chacham. He is so caught up in his single-minded pursuit of immediate gratification that he will choose short-term pleasure/benefit even if this brings about long-term pain/harm, and he will forego long-term pleasure/benefit if the price is short-term pain/harm. This severely limits the perspective of the eveel, restricting his view of reality to a superficial level. Although it might be possible to reach the eveel through Mishlei, this is an uphill battle. For this reason, the eveel is not included in Shlomo ha'Melech's intended readership.

NOTE: Mishleic fools (i.e. eveel, ksil, pesi, arum, etc.) should NOT be thought of as "stupid" in the sense of having a low IQ, nor should they be thought of as bumbling imbeciles. In Mishlei "foolishness" refers to a flawed pattern/habit of decision-making - not a lack of intelligence. It is possible to be extremely smart but still be classified as a "fool" according to Mishlei. 

4. כסיל - Ksil ("Fool"): one who is addicted to immediate gratification to the extent that he unconsciously expects reality to align itself with his desires. The ksil is similar to the eveel in his superficial outlook on reality and his focus on immediate gratification - so similar, in fact, that many of the meforshim seem to regard the two terms as synonyms. But to my mind, there is one important difference: the ksil has an arrogance which the eveel lacks. The eveel's resistance to chochmah stems from his dim recognition that chochmah threatens his mindless pursuit of immediate gratification. In contrast, the ksil is attached to a worldview with himself at the center; his resistance to chochmah stems from his vested interest in this egocentric worldview. Unlike the chacham, who recognizes that he must align himself with reality to get what he wants, the ksil expects reality to yield to his will. The difference between the eveel and the ksil might seem minor, but it is this modicum of arrogance which allows the ksil to develop into something worse (i.e. leftward on the Mishleic spectrum), whereas the eveel will usually remain locked in place. Furthermore, the ksil displays a degree of stubbornness and close-mindedness which the eveel lacks. To use an analogy: if chochmah is the father, the eveel is the kid being dragged to the school bus kicking and screaming, whereas the ksil is the kid with crossed arms and an angry face who has firmly planted himself behind the locked doors of his bedroom.

5. צדיק - Tzadik ("Righteous Person" or "Person of Justice"): one who makes decisions based on the good of the system, as a whole, of which he is a part. The tzadik may be thought of as "the finished product" of the Mishlei Program. Like the chacham, the tzadik thinks long-term, but whereas the chacham's long-term thinking is linear - and therefore, limited - the tzadik's is systemic. For those who think visually, perhaps this diagram will clarify what I mean by "linear" vs. "systemic":

Here is the explanation of this diagram:

• The perspective of the eveel is limited in two ways: (a) his thinking is extremely short-term, and (b) when he does think ahead, he can only think in a linear fashion ("If I do A, then B will happen.") 
• The perspective of the chacham is broader: (a) his thinking is long-term, but (b) it is also limited to a linear perspective.
• The perspective of the tzadik is even broader than that: (a) his thinking is long-term, but extends beyond the long-term thinking of the chacham because (b) he thinks systemically ("If I do A, this will have an impact on the entire system, which will bring about B, C, D, etc."). 

To further clarify, here are three examples to illustrate the differences between the decision-making of an eveel, a chacham, and a tzadik.

SCENARIO #1: LOST OBJECT

• When an eveel encounters a lost object, he will either take it for himself, if he wants it (seeking of short-term pleasure), or he will leave it there and move on if he doesn't want it (avoidance of short-term pain).
• A chacham would make an effort (short-term pain) to return the lost object to its owner knowing that this might yield long-term benefits (e.g. a reward, goodwill, being owed a favor, increasing the likelihood that the owner of the lost object will look out for the chacham's lost objects, being viewed as an honest and caring person, etc.). 
• A tzadik would also return the lost object; he is aware of the long-term benefits that motivated the chacham, but he will think beyond those benefits and consider how his action will impact the system of which he is a part. The tzadik knows that by returning this lost object, he will contributing to a society (e.g. school, workplace, neighborhood, etc.) in which people care about each other's possessions. Such a society is beneficial for all of its members - including the tzadik himself. For this reason, the tzadik - unlike the chacham - will return the lost object even if there is no chance of a direct personal benefit which will result from his efforts. He views the short-term cost of returning the lost object as an investment in the greater long-term benefits of shaping his society for the better.

SCENARIO #2: STEALING

• An eveel will have no problem cheating or stealing. The prospect of immediate gain will overshadow the consequences that he might suffer as a result. He is likely to either not think about the possibility of getting caught, or hastily convince himself that he won't get caught.
• A chacham will refrain from cheating and stealing. He knows that the consequences of getting caught far outweigh the short-term gains. He knows that even if he doesn't get caught this time, it will be extremely difficult to limit himself after stealing just one time. That initial crime will make it easier for him to rationalize stealing again, and again, and again. Eventually, he will get sloppy, or take too big of a risk, and he will get caught and suffer the consequences. Moreover, this will tarnish his reputation, which will make it even harder to make an honest profit in the future.
• A tzadik will factor in all of the pros and cons considered by the chacham, but he will also think about how his actions will impact the system of which he is a part. For example, if he steals a pen from his colleague in the office, this might lead his colleague to feel that it is okay to do the same thing. Not only would this put his own pens in danger from being stolen by that colleague, but it would push the entire office one step closer to being a society in which people don't respect each other's ownership. This disregard for personal property might extend to other areas as well (e.g. failing to clean up after themselves in the cafeteria, not pulling their weight in shared responsibilities, not being willing to cover for each other in extenuating circumstances). This might seem like a slippery slope type argument, but the tzadik knows that this is how systems devolve: one self-centered decision at a time. "No snowflake in an avalanche ever feels responsible."

SCENARIO #3: EATING

• An eveel will eat foods which yield short-term pleasure and will shun foods which would bring him short-term displeasure - even if these eating habits leads to harmful consequences in the long run (e.g. health problems, image problems, financial costs) and the withholding of long-term benefits (e.g. living longer, being able to enjoy old age, being able to continue eating the foods that he has become accustomed to enjoy).
• A chacham will eat foods which yield long-term benefit/pleasure and enable him to avoid long-term pain/harm - exactly the opposite of the eveel.
• A tzadik shares all of the chacham's motives, but his concern will extend beyond these personal, linear benefits to the entirety of system of which he is a part. For example, if he is a father in a household with a wife and kids, he will eat healthy for his own sake and for the sake of his family as well. Maintaining his long-term health will increase the chances of him being there for his family in the future. If he and his wife eat healthy, their kids will grow up eating healthy as well. Not only will they benefit from the diet itself, but they will have grown up with parents who regularly exercised self-control in the realm of the appetitive. Not only that, but if he and his wife eat healthy, and their kids eat healthy, then this increases the likelihood of healthy progeny all the way down the line. 

I hope the diagram and scenarios clarified these three terms. Back to the glossary.

6. חסיד - Chasid ("Pious Person"): one who goes beyond what is required. This definition is intentionally vague because it deals with a subject matter outside of Mishlei; its usage will differ based on the framework and context in which it is used. For example, in Tehilim the term "chasid" has to do with one's relationship to Hashem - going beyond what is required and acting in accordance with His design and His plan. In Pirkei Avos, the term "chasid" denotes lifnim mi'shuras ha'din (going "beyond the letter of the law") within the system of Taryag Mitzvos. In the Rambam's Hilchos Deos, the term "chasid" refers to an extra degree of vigilance and management in one's own ethical development. The common denominator is that a chasid's actions are characterized by chesed ("excess"), going beyond what is required. I only included the term in this glossary to show that it is barely dealt with in Mishlei. 

7. רשע - Rasha ("Evil Person"): one who seeks to impose his own system onto reality in order to achieve power and greatness. The rasha is the opposite of the tzadik. The tzadik strives to understand the system of which he is a part, and to facilitate the good of that system as a whole. In contrast, the rasha wishes to dominate others and to emerge on top as the greatest and most powerful being. He will do whatever it takes to force this design upon the existing circumstances. Since this is an artificial scheme, rooted in a fantasy-driven megalomania, it will inevitably clash with what is good for the other members of the system, and many people will be trampled and harmed in the rasha's rise to power. The rasha's personality is best exemplified by people like Paroh, Haman, and Hitler (shem reshaim yirkav) - all of whom sought to subjugate others in an attempt to reshape the world into a shrine for their own glory. Ultimately, the rasha is doomed to fail when his delusional master plan clashes with reality. For Paroh, this failure was brought about by Hashem; for Haman, it was orchestrated by Mordechai and Esther; for Hitler, it resulted from his overambitious attempts to extend his reign beyond what was possible (e.g. his failed attempt to invade the Soviet Union).

NOTE: For the most part, each term on the right-hand side of the spectrum builds upon, and includes, the qualities of the previous level. For example, the tzadik includes all the characteristics of the navon, who includes all the features of the chacham. But on the left-hand side of the spectrum, this isn't necessarily true. The ksil embodies all the qualities of the eveel, but the rasha doesn't share the features with either of them. In fact, in order to be a rasha, one must possess the long-term thinking of the chacham. Consider Hitler. He certainly wasn't an eveel or a ksil. Hitler needed to think long-term - and even forego immediate pleasure and endure immediate pain - in order to realize his ego-maniacal vision. The only area in which the rasha is a ksil is when it comes to the end-game. The rasha is blind to the fact that his grand vision is built upon a foundation of falsehood fueled by a denial of reality (i.e. refusal to acknowledge that he is a limited, finite particular within a natural system - not an omnipotent god-like ruler of a self-glorifying system of his own design).

Secondary Mishlei Personalities: these show up with near-equal frequency, but represent variations on - and transitional phases between - the basic personality types. 

8. פתי - Pesi ("Naive Simpleton"): one who is easily "seduced" (mispateh) by his own emotions. The pesi is extremely subject to external influences. The principle which drives his life may be summed up as follows: if it feels true then it is true, and if it feels good then it is good; likewise it feels bad then it is bad, and if it feels false then it is false. The pesi shares qualities with the eveel and the naar. He resembles the eveel in that he views reality in a superficial way. He resembles the naar in that he can be positively influenced by Mishlei. The eveel and the ksil are "locked" into their flawed ways of thinking. The pesi, thanks to his malleable mind, can be guided towards the good by chachamim and tzadikim. For this reason, Shlomo ha'Melech included the pesi in his intended audience - something he didn't do for any other Mishleic fool - as it is stated: "to provide pesaim with cunning" (Mishlei 1:4).

9. ערום - Arum ("Cunning Person"): one who has a working knowledge of how emotions influence decision-making. You'll notice that the arum appears in two places on the spectrum: slightly to the right of the naar (on "the good side") and on the borderline of the group of the evildoers (on "the bad side"). The reason for this is simple: the arum's cunning (i.e. his working knowledge of the psyche and its capacity to influence behavior) is a tremendous gift which can aid his development into a chacham or be used in the pursuit of foolish or wicked ends. The arum has a leg up over the naar because he is keenly aware of how much his own thinking might be influenced by his emotions; if he is wise, this will give him pause in his decision-making - and if he makes this into a habit, then he will be well on his way to becoming a chacham. On the other hand, the arum is also in the perfect position to manipulate others for sinister purposes - as the Torah itself states, "The snake was more cunning than all the other beasts of the field" (Bereishis 3:1). This type of cunning is a valuable tool in the rasha's arsenal, and is essential for his success. In short, the arum is a potential chacham and a potential rasha.

10. נבון - Navon ("Understanding Person"): an abstract thinker (i.e. one who can inductively derive new universal principles from particulars and deductively apply universals to new particulars). This is one of the few definitions which all of the meforshim agree upon. The question is: How does he fit into this spectrum? I'm not entirely clear on that point. Descriptively, the navon represents the transitional stage between the chacham and the tzadik. The chacham must be able to do more than see the long-term consequences of a particular decision. He must be able to uncover universal principles of decision-making from his day-to-day situations, which will allow him to expand his chochmah to new scenarios. Abstract thinking is also necessary to break out of the linear thinking of the chacham and to view things systemically like the tzadik. The navon is also mentioned as a primary audience of Mishlei, as it is stated: "[through Mishlei] a navon will acquire strategies" (Mishlei 1:4).

11. לץ - Leitz ("Scoffer"): an egotistical person who is malicious in speech (but not in action). This definition comes directly from a pasuk in Mishlei: "The arrogant malicious one - 'leitz' is his name" (21:24). The leitz has a massively inflated ego which stems from a deep-seated feeling of deficiency and inferiority. Instead of dealing with his flaws through chochmah, he denies his imperfections and degrades others to artificially boost his self-esteem. His self-confidence is so low that he doesn't even take proactive measures to boost his own standing, but instead takes the cowardly approach of speaking rechilus (gossip), lashon ha'ra (negative speech), and hotzaas shem ra (slander) behind people's backs. The leitz is the school bully - not the one that beats kids up and steals their lunch money, but the one who cuts them with hurtful words and makes fun of them in public. The best and worst thing about the leitz is that he is all talk, and no action. This is good in the sense that one don't have to worry about him causing physical damage to oneself or to one's possessions. This is bad in that the leitz can cause a LOT of harm through speech.

Tertiary Mishleic Personalities: these don't appear too often, and this isn't an exhaustive list. Like the secondary personalities, they are variations on the basic types, or transitional phases between developmental milestones.

12. תם - Tam ("Evenly Keeled Person"): one who has no extreme emotions pulling him in either direction. The tam is a "beginning personality" like the naar, but has a huge advantage over the latter. In all probability, the naar is likely to be a mixed bag. While he doesn't have any outstanding flaws in his way of operating (like the eveel and the ksil), he is bound to have certain weaknesses and deficiencies in his middos/personality. He might have a short temper, or be prone to jealously, or have problem managing his money, or be overly timid or overly reckless, or overly competitive or not competitive enough, etc. In contrast, the tam is balanced. His emotions are fluid, and provide little to no resistance. If the situation calls for him to save money, he'll be able to do it. If the situation calls for him to spend money, he will spend it without any conflict. If he needs to be self-assertive, he'll be self-assertive. If he needs to remain in the background, this will not cause him any conflict. Although it is possible to become a tam through the proper training, some people are fortunate to naturally be tamim. We all know certain individuals who are calm, cool, and collected, and don't seem to be disturbed or agitated by anything. Chances are that such an individual is a natural tam. The next step for such a person is to learn how to think like a chacham, which will be much easier for him to do without personality-obstacles and emotional resistances. 

13. ישר - Yashar/Yosher ("Upright" Person): one whose inclinations and intuition draw him towards tzedek (what is good for the system), but without a working understanding of the system. Out of the sixteen terms on this chart, this is the one I understand the least. Descriptively, this is a navon on his way to becoming a tzadik. He frequently makes the same decisions that a tzadik would make, but not in the systematic manner of the tzadik. The tzadik consciously does what is best for the system, with forethought and full understanding. The yashar intuitively acts this way, but he hasn't taken that final developmental step to make tzedek his modus operandi. 

14. עצל - Atzel ("Lazy Person"): one who compulsively attempts to avoid all immediate pain and conflict. Like the eveel, the atzel is locked into the superficial world of immediate pain and pleasure. But unlike the eveel, who seeks immediate gratification above all, the atzel is paralyzed by the compulsive need to avoid immediate pain. In Scenario #1 (about the lost object), the atzel will usually just leave the object where it is, since it's too much work to take it. In Scenario #2 (about stealing) the atzel wouldn't steal in a proactive effort to increase profits, but he might steal if it helps him to avoid work or conflict. In Scenario #3 (about food) the atzel won't necessarily go for the most pleasurable food; he'll just eat whatever takes the least effort, even if he doesn't really like it as much.

15. בוגד - Bogeid ("Traitor" or "the Mishleic Jerk"): one who repays good with bad and impulsively "lashes out" at reality when things don't go his way. This is also a difficult personality to understand. In a sense, the bogeid is as the opposite of the yashar. The yashar's intuition is in line with reality (i.e. tzedek, or "the system"), but the bogeid's intuition routinely brings him in conflict with reality. In the social realm he has no intuitive sense of justice or basic decency, and will act like a jerk even to those who benefit him and treat him kindly. Deep down, he has an anthropomorphic view of reality (i.e. he relates to reality as though it were a person); consequently, he takes reality personally, and will vent his frustration by complaining and acting out when he feels "victimized." Both the bogeid and the ksil have a strong sense of entitlement, but whereas the ksil's sense of entitlement causes him to walk around with a false sense of security leading to proactive self-sabotage, the bogeid's sense of entitlement causes him to throw frequent tantrums and engage in reactive self-sabotage.

16. בליעל - Bliyaal ("Lawless Person"): one who cannot tolerate being subjugated to any authority. The word bliyaal is a compound of bli (without) + ole (yoke). The essence of his personality is that he does not want to feel controlled, ruled, or dominated by anyone. He is anti-authoritarian - not in a philosophical way, but in a "wild animal" or "stubborn child" way. Like the bogeid, the bliyaal has an anthropomorphic view of reality, to the extent that when reality "obligates" him to do something, he rebels. For example, he won't plant his field during the planting season because he unconsciously feels: "How DARE they make me plant! Nobody is gonna tell ME what to do!" Like the leitz, the bliyaal derives enjoyment from causing destruction and harm - not because he shares the leitz's sadism and malice, but because wreaking havoc in this manner makes him feel independent and unrestrained. The only authority to whom the bliyaal will pledge his loyalty is the rasha, so long as the rasha gives him an outlet for his lawlessness. It is for this reason that you will see examples of bliyaal in the second tier of criminal hierarchies (e.g. mafia strongmen, gang members who do the dirty work for gang leaders, Nazis who were given outlets for their sadism by being assigned positions of authority in concentration camps).

Conclusion (for Now)

I repeat: these definitions are not authoritative, nor are they set in stone. These are working definitions intended to aid the beginning in learning Mishlei until he or she forms his or her own understanding.

There are more personalities in Mishlei that I haven't even touched upon here: the ish mezimos ("scheming person"), the meivin ("discerning person"), the ben meivish ("embarrassing son"), the charutz ("diligent person"), the ish chamas ("violent person"), the chasar lev ("one who lacks an understanding mind"), and more. Perhaps I will define these in the next edition of the Mishleic Glossary.

For now, I hope you find this guide to be useful in your own Mishlei learning!