Monday, July 30, 2018

Announcement: Dialing Back the Daily Blogging



Dear Readers and Friends, 

For the past couple of summers I've kept up my blogging schedule until mid/late-August. Unfortunately, it looks like I'm going to need to get an early start on my school prep for the upcoming year. If I could do preparation while keeping up my blogging schedule, I'd do it, but each blog post takes anywhere from 6 to 20 hours to write, and I simply don't have enough time and mental energy to juggle both. 

I still plan on writing an occasional post about Mishlei and Tehilim, and I hope I'm able to continue with the Friday dvar Torah. I just can't keep up the daily grind. 

I hope you've enjoyed what you've read this summer, and that you'll periodically check back (or follow Facebook updates) to read whatever I end up writing for the rest of the summer!

Thank you for your support!

- Kol ha'Seridim

Friday, July 27, 2018

Parashas Vaeschanan: Methodology Battle - Ibn Ezra vs. Malbim

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Artwork: Battle of Wits, by Edward Beard Jr.
Also, depiction of Ibn Ezra vs. the Malbim


Parashas Vaeschanan: Methodology Battle - Ibn Ezra vs. Malbim

The Battleground

In Parashas Vaeschanan, Moshe Rabbeinu reviews the Aseres ha'Devarim (Decalogue) for the generation that will enter the Land after his passing. The Ibn Ezra, in his introduction to the Torah's original presentation of the Aseres ha'Devarim in Parashas Yisro, acknowledges the glaring problem which confronts any student who carefully reads both parshiyos: the two versions of the Aseres ha'Devarim contain differences in wording! Some of these differences are major, such as:
Shemos 20:8-11 (Yisro)Remember the Shabbos day to sanctify it. Six days shall you work and accomplish all of your work; but the seventh day is Shabbos to Hashem, your God; you shall not do any work - you, your son, your daughter, your slave, your maidservant, your animal, and your convert within your gates - for in six days Hashem made the heavens and the earth, the sea and all that is in them, and He rested on the seventh day. Therefore, Hashem blessed the Shabbos day and sanctified it. 

Devarim 5:12-15 (Vaeschanan)Safeguard the Shabbos day to sanctify it, as Hashem, your God, has commanded you. Six days shall you do labor and do all of your work; but the seventh day is Shabbos to Hashem, your God; you shall not do any work - you, your son, your daughter, your slave, your maidservant, your ox, your donkey, and your every animal, and your convert within your gates, in order that your slave and your maidservant may rest like you. And you shall remember that you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and Hashem, your God, has taken you out from there with a strong hand and an outstretched arm; therefore, Hashem, your God, has commanded you to make the Shabbos day.
In other cases, the differences are more subtle, such as:
Shemos 20:13: You shall not murder; you shall not commit adultery; you shall not steal; you shall not bear false witness against your fellow. 
Devarim 5:17You shall not murder; and you shall not commit adultery; and you shall not steal; and you shall not bear vain witness against your fellow.
Also subtle:
Shemos 20:14You shall not covet your fellow's house; you shall not covet your fellow's wife, his manservant, his maidservant, his ox, his donkey, nor anything that belongs to your fellow. 
Devarim 5:18And you shall not covet your fellow's wife; you shall not desire your fellow's house, his field, his manservant, his maidservant, his ox, his donkey, nor anything that belongs to your fellow.
The Ibn Ezra notes the difficulties raised by these changes and addresses them. If you are interested in his answers, see his lengthy treatise at the beginning of Shemos Chapter 20. 

I'm not going to present any answers of any meforshim (commentators) to these difficulties in this post. Instead, I'd like to focus on a major methodological divide between the meforshim. I've wanted to write about this for a while, and since the Ibn Ezra states his shitah (position) in his introduction to the Aseres ha'Devarim, I decided to use this blog post as a springboard for the discussion.

Ibn Ezra's View: Meanings Matter Most

The Ibn Ezra [1] introduces his shitah prior to explaining the discrepancies between the Aseres ha'Devarim in Yisro and Vaeschanan:
As a general rule, the masters of the Holy Language will sometimes explain their words very clearly, and other times they will say what is necessary in a few concise words from which the listener can derive their meaning. Know that words are like bodies and meanings are like souls, and the body is like a vessel for the soul. Therefore, the general rule of all chachamim (wise men) in any language is to preserve the meanings without any concern about a change of words, so long as the meanings remain the same
In other words (ha! get it?), the words are merely the vessels for conveying meaning, and as long as the meaning is preserved, it doesn't matter if the words change. Therefore, when learning Tanach - even the text of the Torah itself - one need not obsess over the nuanced variations in wording which occur when the Torah repeats material. Instead, just focus on getting the main idea, and don't worry be nitpicky about the words.   

The Ibn Ezra then provides some examples:
Hashem said to Kayin: "You are cursed from the ground ... When you will work the ground, it will no longer give forth its strength to you. You shall become a vagrant and a wanderer upon the earth" (Bereishis 4:11-12). Kayin replied: "Behold! You have driven me out this day from upon the face of the ground!" (ibid. 4:14). Now who is so mindless as to think that the meaning [of these two descriptions of Kayin's punishment] isn't the same on account of the change in words! 
Behold! Eliezer said: "Let me sip, if you please, [a little water from your jug]" (ibid. 24:17). However, he [subsequently] quoted himself as saying: "Please give me a drink" (ibid. 24:45). 
Moshe said: "the firstborn of the captive that was in the dungeon" (Shemos 12:29). However, it is written earlier: "the firstborn of the maidservant that is behind the mill" (ibid. 11:5).  
In Devarim, Moshe quoted the prayer which he offered on behalf of Israel because of the Golden Calf (Devarim 9:26-29). Now to the person who lacks a mind capable of understanding, this prayer appears totally different from the one recorded in the Torah portion Ki Sisa (Shemos 32:11-14). 
The general rule is: any change in the wording - such as in the dreams of Paroh (Bereishis 41:1-17, 17-24) and Nevuchadnetzar (Daniel 4), and many other things - you will find the meaning to be the same, even if the words are different
The Ibn Ezra goes on to mention other types of cases which fall into this category. Sometimes a word will be lengthened or shortened, or a prefix will be added or taken away, or the spelling of the word will change - all without changing the meaning. 

On the basis of this approach, the Ibn Ezra explains - or brushes away - the differences between the two versions of the Aseres ha'Devarim. According to him, even Moshe Rabbeinu didn't care about changing Hashem's wording in the original Aseres ha'Devarim, so long as he successfully conveyed the Divine intent. (The Ibn Ezra does, however, admit that the radically different presentations of Shabbos requires an actual explanation.)


This approach may seem radical to a student who was raised hearing the standard premise that "there are no extra words in the Torah" and "every letter has a meaning." The Ramban takes the Ibn Ezra to task for his answer here. Apparently, the Maharal devoted an entire chapter of his book, Tiferes Yisrael (chapter 43), to challenging the Ibn Ezra's view. 

On the surface it might seem that Ibn Ezra lacks the reverence for the Torah's use of hebrew. However, one must remember that the Ibn Ezra is considered to be one of the leading authorities in the Hebrew language among the Rishonim, and was an ardent defender of a strictly textual approach to Biblical exegesis. In his introduction to his Torah commentary, [2] he characterizes his approach to Scriptural interpretation as "the grammatical approach," which focuses on the rules of the Hebrew language and the definitions of its words:
The fifth method [of Torah interpretation] is the one upon which I will base my commentary. It appears to me to be correct in the presence of God whom alone I fear. I will not show favoritism to anyone when it comes to interpreting the Torah. I will, to the utmost of my ability, try to understand grammatically every word and then to do my best to explain it. Every word whose meaning the reader desires to know will be found explained the first time the word is encountered. For example, the meaning of "shamayim" will be given in the first verse of Bereishis. This will apply to all terms.
When Ibn Ezra made the statement about "masters of the language" playing fast and loose with their wording, he was speaking as a "master of the language." 

We'll return to the Ibn Ezra's shitah in a moment. For now, let's look at his strongest opposition.

Malbim's View: Words Matter Most


It is safe to say that the Malbim was one of the most creative meforshim in recent times. Like the Ibn Ezra, the Malbim wrote a commentary on almost all of Nach which is grounded in a thorough understanding of the Hebrew language. Unlike the Ibn Ezra, the Malbim is not keen on the idea of glossing over any linguistic nuances in the Torah's repetition of material. Indeed, he holds that the Torah contains no repetitions or synonyms or anything extra whatsoever. 

The clearest summary of the Malbim's approach that I know of can be found in the introduction to his commentary on Sefer Yeshayahu. The Malbim introduces his own method by articulating its three foundational principles:
My commentary rests upon three central pillars: 
(1) Nowhere in the eloquent speech [4] of the neviim is there to be found any repetition of the same idea in different words, nor is there a repetition of ideas, statements, or allegories, nor are there two sentences with the same content, nor are there two mashalim (metaphors) with the same nimshal (interpretation), nor are there even two repeated words.

(2) Nowhere in the eloquent speech of the neviim – neither in their simple nor compound sentences – is there to be found words or verbs which are placed by chance without a specific intent, to the extent that all words, nouns, and verbs which constitute every sentence – not only is it necessary that they occur in that sentence, but it would not have been possible for a divine messenger to use another word in its place, for all of the words in the divine eloquent speech have been weighed on the scales of wisdom and knowledge, evaluated, preserved, counted, and recounted by the metric of Supreme Wisdom which alone is sublime enough to utter it.

(3) Nowhere in the eloquent speech of the neviim is there to be found a husk without content, a body without a soul, a garment without a wearer, a statement devoid of sublime thought, a statement in which understanding doesn’t dwell – for the living God resides in all statements of the living God, with the breath of life in their nostrils, the spirit of the Dreaded, Mighty, Glorious, and Awesome One.
In short, the Malbim maintains that every sentence, every word, and every nuance in the text of Tanach was chosen to convey a specific meaning. There is no repetition, there are no textual features which are there for purely stylistic reasons, and there is no room for multiple possibilities of what the pesukim could have said. According to the Malbim, every single pasuk had to say exactly what it said, in exactly the manner it said it - otherwise, the meaning would be lost. 

Perhaps the most salient feature of the Malbim's approach is his firm instance that there are no true synonyms in Hebrew. Every word means something different. Any two terms which appear to have the same meaning will, upon careful study of their usage throughout Tanach, reveal that they have different definitions. The Malbim's commentary on Tanach is comprised of two parts. One part of his commentary is a "beur ha'devarim" (commentary on the meaning of the pesukim, in context), and the other part is a "beur ha'milos" (glossary of terms). Even a casual glance through the Malbim's beur ha'milos will reveal that his favorite phrase is: "yesh hevdel bein ____ u'bein ____" (there is a difference between [this word] and [this synonym]), which he uses hundreds of times throughout his commentary to elucidate the definitions of these so-called "synonyms."

The Malbim writes that he labored intensively to figure out the definition of each and every Hebrew word in based on exhaustive research. He criticizes other chachamim who have arrived at speculative distinctions between these apparent synonyms by inferring universal definitions from isolated cases, instead of conducting a thorough analysis of every instance of every word in all of Tanach, as he did:
Before I approached this precious work – the holy work of explaining and elucidating the books of Hashem – I first set out to investigate, to explore, and to search for the definitions of the words and verbs that occur in the holy Scriptures until their essential definitions became clear to me with a clear knowledge … 
This path has been followed by all of the later chachamim, who have expounded and clarified the synonyms, and have been satisfied with themselves if they found one distinction in the entire sentence, and thought that the other different words in the two sentences are for beautifying the poetic speech [of the navi] or came about by happenstance; consequently, even the universal principles which [these chachamim] have produced and the distinctions they have made, they are unable to substantiate with proofs, since their words are nothing but guesswork rooted in imagination
I, however, have set a law not to be overstepped, for no words have entered into the counsel of Hashem by way of chance, but only with intelligent choice; therefore, the labor which I have taken upon myself is great and difficult, and I have surpassed the work of all others who have endeavored in this manner …
Here the Malbim warns those who attempt to emulate his approach. Unless one is prepared to undertake a complete survey of Biblical Hebrew, one risks falling into "guesswork rooted in imagination," which will inevitably lead to error and falsehood.

The Malbim also makes it clear that he was not relying on anyone else in developing his approach:
You should also know that even though I have been preceded by many chachamim who have distinguished between synonyms – some of whose books I own, such as Sefer Gan Naul and Sefer Yerios Shelomo – despite all of this, I have not relied upon the words of any man, but I have tested everything myself, whether all pesukim can be explained based on the path that I, myself, have paved. Therefore, [my work] has nothing to do with that of another person: I have neither built nor destroyed the words of anyone other than myself, because I analyzed every rule and universal principle myself and committed my own intuition to writing. And if you find that someone else established a universal principle which accords with my own statement, this is an indicator that anyone who possess intelligence will arrive at the same path regarding any matter which is simple and upright.
Suffice it to say, the Malbim would not - and does not - accept the Ibn Ezra's assertion that "the general rule of all chachamim in any language is to preserve the meanings without any concern about a change of words, so long as the meanings remain the same." The Malbim would certainly never accept the Ibn Ezra's general approach to explaining the differences in the Torah's two statements of the Aseres ha'Devarim. If Moshe reversed "you shall not covet your neighbor's wife" and "you shall not covet your neighbor's house" in his restatement, there must be a reason. If the Torah says "eidus sheker" (false testimony) in Yisro but "eidus shav" (vain testimony) in Vaeschanan, there must be a reason. The same goes for all other changes in wording and textual nuances throughout all of Tanach.


"Team Ibn Ezra" 

I view the Ibn Ezra and Malbim as existing along a spectrum, each at one end. The other meforshim throughout the ages - both Rishonim (medieval) and Achronim (post-medieval) - tend to fall on one side of the spectrum or another in this battle of methodology. 

I would argue that most of the classical Rishonim fall closer to the Ibn Ezra's side in their commentaries. This is indicated by their decision not to take up the types of questions about textual nuances which are the focus of the Malbim's commentary. If you compare the commentary of the Malbim side by side with the traditional meforshim, you'll find that many of the linguistic questions which bother him are completely ignored by them. This suggests that they had a different approach.

Granted, I am aware that absence of evidence doesn't always equal evidence of absence. One could argue that they did hold like the Malbim, but assumed that their audience was familiar enough with Hebrew that such questions didn't need to be addressed in their commentaries. One could also argue that they held like the Malbim, but didn't prioritize this type of explanation in their commentaries for some unstated reason. Personally, I don't buy such arguments. In the Malbim's introduction to Sefer Yeshayahu, he makes it pretty clear that the approach in his commentary is unprecedented among the commentators. That, combined with the drastically different content in their commentaries, has me convinced that most classical commentators did not share the Malbim's views on Biblical interpretation.

Moreover, we see a number of mainstream meforshim take stances which directly oppose the  three pillars of the Malbim's method. For example, when confronted with synonyms or repetitions in the pesukim, many meforshim will simply say: "kafal ha'davar b'milos shonos" (the pasuk repeated the same statement in different words) or "kafal ha'inyan b'milos shonos" (the pasuk repeated the same idea in different words). One of my favorite meforshim on Nach, the Radak, uses these phrases over 200 times in his Nach commentary. Metzudas David makes recourse to "kafal ha'davar" over 400 times. The Malbim wouldn't accept this even once.

Similarly, when the classical meforshim explain obscure words in the pesukim, they'll do so by making reference to more common synonyms - and they will do so without explaining the differences, suggesting that they believe the terms to be genuinely synonymous, and not just apparently so. In contrast, the Malbim will point out a synonym, and will then go on to explain how the two terms have subtly different meanings. To me this is a clear indication of a divergence in methodology. It would be a stretch to say that these other meforshim hold that there are no synonyms or repetitions in Tanach, but simultaneously feel so comfortable saying "the pasuk is repeating the same idea" or "this word means basically the same thing as this word." If they hold that the terms are different, they should explain how. And if, like the Malbim, they held that this difference in meaning is critical for understanding the main idea of the pasuk, they would be negligent not to give a full explanation.

Another category of opposition to the Malbim's approach can be seen in the classical commentators' treatment of the numerous allegories, parables and instances of figurative speech in Nach. The Malbim explicitly criticized chachamim who explain extra words and  phrases by claiming that these words serve only "in order to beautify the poetic speech" or that "they came about by happenstance," and serve no real purpose. And yet we find many classical meforshim who take precisely this approach. The Rambam [5] goes so far as to make this into an interpretive rule:
Know that the prophetic parables are of two kinds. In some of these parables each word has a meaning, while others the parable as a whole indicates the whole of the intended meaning. In such a parable very many words are to be found, not every one of which adds to the intended meaning. They serve rather to embellish the parable and to render it more coherent or to conceal further the intended meaning; hence, the speech proceeds in such a way as to accord with everything required by the parable's external meaning.
An example of the first kind of prophetic parable is the following text: "And behold - a ladder set up on the earth etc." (Bereishis 28:12-13). In this text, the word "ladder" indicates one subject; the words "set up on the earth" indicate a second subject; the words "and the top of it reached to the heaven" indicate a third subject; the words "and behold the angels of God" indicate a fourth subject; the word "ascending" indicates a fifth subject; the words "and descending" indicate a sixth subject; and the words "and behold - Hashem stood above it" indicate a seventh subject. Thus, every word occurring in this parable refers to an additional subject in the complex of subjects represented by the parable as a whole." 
An example of the second kind of prophetic parable is the following text: For I have looked out from the window of my house through my lattice, and I saw among the fools, I discerned among the youths, a lad who lacked [an understanding] heart passing through the marketplace near her corner, and he strode toward her house, in the twilight, as daylight wanes, in the blackness of night and darkness. Then behold, a woman approached him, bedecked as a harlot and with siege in [her] heart. She coos and she entices, her feet do not dwell at home. Sometimes in the courtyard, sometimes in the streets, she lurks at every corner. She seized him and kissed him; she thrust forth her face and said to him: "I had vowed to bring peace-offerings, and today I have fulfilled my vow. That is why I went out toward you, to seek your countenance, and I have found you! I have decked my bed with spreads; carved bed poles are hung with Egyptian linen. I have perfumed my bed with myrrh, aloes, and cinnamon. Come, let us sate ourselves with love until the morning; let us rejoice with acts of love, for [my] husband is not at home; he has gone on a distant journey. He has taken the money-pouch with him; he will come home at the appointed time." She sways him with her abundant sophistication; she thrusts him with the glibness of her lips. He follows her unsuspectingly, like an ox to the slaughter; rushing like a venomous snake to discipline the foolish one, until the arrow splits his liver; he is like a bird hurrying to the trap, unaware that its life will be lost" (Mishlei 7:5-20). The outcome of all this is a warning against the pursuit of bodily pleasures and desires. Accordingly he [Shlomo] likens matter, which is the cause of all these bodily pleasures, to a harlot who is also a married woman. In fact his entire book is based on this allegory. And we shall explain in various chapters of this treatise his wisdom in likening matter to a married harlot, and we shall explain how he concluded this book with a eulogy of the woman who is not a harlot but confines herself to attending to the welfare of her household and husband. For all the hindrances keeping man from his ultimate perfection, every deficiency affecting him and every disobedience, come to him from his matter alone, as we shall explain in this treatise. This is the proposition that can be understood from this parable as a whole. I mean that man should not follow his bestial nature; I mean his matter, for the proximate matter of man is identical with the proximate matter of other living beings. And as I have explained this to you and disclosed the secret of this parable, you should not hope to find some signification corresponding to every subject occurring in this parable] so that you could say: what can be submitted for the words, "I had vowed to bring peace-offerings, and today I have fulfilled my vow"? What subject is indicated by the words, "I have decked my bed with spreads"? And what subject is added to this general proposition by the words, "for my husband is not at home"?The same holds good for the other details in this chapter. For all of them only figure in the consistent development of the parable's external meaning, the circumstances described in it being of a kind typical for adulterers. Also the spoken words and other such details are of a kind typical of words spoken among adulterers. Understand this well from what I have said, for it is a great and important principle with regard to matters that I wish to explain.
The Rambam and the Malbim clearly disagree on this point! The Malbim would criticize the Rambam for saying that all of these details were included by Shlomo solely for the purpose of developing the external allegory, and convey no ideational content or significance. The Rambam, in turn, would criticize the Malbim for seeking an interpretation of these details and descriptions when no such interpretation exists. In fact, the Rambam goes on to voice just such a criticism:
When, therefore, you find that in some chapter of this treatise I have explained the meaning of a parable and have drawn your attention to the general proposition signified by it, you should not inquire into all the details occurring in the parable, nor should you wish to find significations corresponding to them. For doing so would lead you into one of two ways: either into turning aside from the parable's intended subject, or into assuming an obligation to interpret things not susceptible to interpretation and that have not been inserted with a view to interpretation. The assumption of such an obligation would result in extravagant fantasies such as are entertained and written about in our time by most of the sects of the world, since each of these sects desires to find certain significations for words whose author in no way had in mind the significations wished by them. Your purpose, rather, should always be to know, regarding most parables, the main idea that was intended to be known. 
Basically, the Rambam is warning us that if we follow the Malbim's approach, looking for deep significance in every detail, we'll end up missing out on major ideas and projecting our own fantasies onto the pesukim which have nothing to do with the meaning that the authors (or Author) intended to convey. 

To my mind it is clear that the Malbim's approach was not shared by many of the classical meforshim among the Rishonim and Achronim. This conclusion is supported by the lack of Malbim-esque explanations in their commentaries, and the abundant interpretations they do provide which violate the three pillars of the Malbim's approach.

"Team Malbim"

And yet, the Malbim is not alone in his methods. First and foremost, his approach - or at least, something like his approach - was shared by none other than Chazal (i.e. the Tannaim and Amoraim). In his book, Ayeles ha'Shachar, the Malbim [6] writes: 
Chazal strove to figure out the essential definitions of all borrowed terms … Similarly, they showed the relationship between homonyms … And each synonym has a unique definition on which they build their many drashos. The same is true of parallel expressions: after much study, [one can understand] when one expression is used and when another is used …
In other words, the approach that Chazal took in their drashos parallels the Malbim's own approach - so much so that the Malbim attempted to fuse the two in Ayeles ha'Shachar, and in his commentary on Torah. Anyone who has learned Gemara and the various collections of midreshei aggadah and midreshei halacha will be able to see that Chazal's approach to Tanach is far more similar to the Malbim's than the Ibn Ezra's. They clearly cared about textual nuances, apparent repetitions, and anomalous words and phrases. They clearly held that every feature of the text was there for a specific reason, to convey specific Torah content. They would never say, "The Torah repeated the same thing in different words" or "this description is just here to develop the allegory, and has no significance beyond that." (Of course, the Rambam would say that they actually held this, but just didn't say it.)

And since Chazal followed this approach, the meforshim who regularly integrate Chazal's explanations can also be included on "Team Malbim." Rashi would definitely be part of the group. So would the Torah Temimah and the Baal ha'Turim. Other commentaries accept this approach, even if they supplement it with other approaches, such as the Ramban, Rabbeinu Bachya, and even the Ralbag, in his own way 

But the Malbim's true kindred spirit was Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, who was a contemporary of his. Like the Malbim, Rav Hirsch set out on an ambitious linguistic project to understand all the nuances of Hebrew, based on his own analysis and his own theories on etymology. Rav Hirsch would certainly agree with the Malbim that synonyms should be scrutinized for subtler shades of meaning, and he would also agree that the subtleties in the text are important. When reading Rav Hirsch's commentary one gets the feeling that he and the Malbim would make a great chavrusa (learning pair), having different ideas - owing to the differences in their creativity - but fundamentally sharing the same outlook in their interpretive methodology and linguistic framework.

Another group of people who would be in good company with the Malbim are those who are inclined to apply modern methods of literary analysis to Tanach. Like the Malbim, they strive to be in tune with the textual landscape, in all of its particularity. They also care about intertextuality, parallel phrasing, organizational schemes, and a bunch of other fancy shmancy literary devices - which I imagine the Malbim would appreciate (judging by my experience with his style).

Concluding Thoughts

Obviously I am in no position to decide which approach is “better” or “more correct.” There are advantages and disadvantages to each. 

If I had to choose, though, I would side with the Ibn Ezra. Our priority in learning must be to get the main idea, even if we don’t appreciate all of the details of how that idea is expressed in the pesukim. Furthermore, even the Malbim would admit that we cannot expect to do what he did, and that if we tried, we would be engaging in speculative guesswork. The only way to truly learn Tanach on the level of the Malbim would be to study the text with his commentary as the infallible (for all practical purposes) guide to Biblical Hebrew. The advantage of this approach is that we’d get to see all of the amazing insights that the Malbim’s approach draws out of the text. The disadvantage is that we’d be totally dependent on him for our learning. 

As a teacher, I default to the Ibn Ezra side. However, that doesn’t stop me from sharing with my students the ingenious, creative, nuanced interpretations offered by the Malbim in his monumental commentary.

[1] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer Shemos (Long Version) 20:1
[2] ibid. Commentary on Sefer Bereishis: end of Introduction
[3] Rav Meir ben Yechiel Michel (Malbim), Commentary on Sefer Yeshayahu: Introduction
[4] The term used here is "מליצות" which can mean "allegories," "figurative speech, "flowery speech," "poetic speech," "rhetoric," and the like. I've translated it as "eloquent speech," since I believe that the Malbim intends this to cover all the words of the prophets - not just select sections.
[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim: Introduction
[6] Rav Meir ben Yechiel Michel (Malbim), Ayeles ha'Shachar 30:248

Thursday, July 26, 2018

Tu b'Av and the Joy of National Cognitive Dissonance

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Artwork: [Title Unknown], by Maciej Kuciara


Tu b'Av and the Joy of National Cognitive Dissonance

Tomorrow is Tu b'Av. When I first heard about Tu b'Av (the 15th day of the month of Av), I thought it was a modern innovation - like the recent incarnation of Tu bi'Shvat as a day of environmental activism, or the secularized Yom ha'Shoah which is detached from its proper place in the framework of halacha. As it so happens, the celebration of Tu b'Av does have an authoritative source in none other than the Mishnah itself. The mishnah in Taanis 4:8 states:
Rabban Simeon hen Gamliel said: "There are no days more joyous in Israel than the 15th of Av and Yom ha’Kippurim, for on them the maidens of Jerusalem used to go out dressed in white garments — borrowed ones, in order not to cause shame to those who had them not of their own, and these clothes were also to be previously immersed – and thus they went out and danced in the vineyards, saying, ‘Young men, look and observe well whom you are about to choose [as a spouse]; regard not beauty [alone], but rather look to a virtuous family, [for it is stated:] “Grace is deceitful and beauty is futile, but a woman who fears Hashem – she should be praised” (Mishlei 31:3); and it is also said: “Give her the fruit of her hands, and let her own works praise her in the gates” (Mishlei 31:31).’ And thus is it said [in allusion to this custom], ‘Go out, maidens of Jerusalem, and look on King Solomon, and on the crown with which his mother has encircled [his head] on his wedding day, and on the day of the gladness of his heart’ (Shir ha’Shirim 3:11)‘his wedding day’ alludes to the giving of the Torah, and ‘the day of the gladness of his heart’ alludes to when the building of the Temple was completed. May it soon be rebuilt in our days. Amen!”
The Gemara (Talmud Bavli: Taanis 30b) asks what is so special about Tu b'Av:
It is reasonable [to make this statement] about Yom ha’Kippurim, which has forgiveness and pardon, and is the day on which the second tablets were given. But the 15th of Av – what is it?
The Gemara answers by listing six joyous events associated with Tu b'Av. Here is a summary:
  1. the shvatim (twelve tribes) were permitted to intermarry with one another
  2. the temporary ban against the tribe of Binyamin was lifted, thereby permitting Benjaminites to marry into the rest of Israel once again
  3. the Dor ha'Midbar (Generation of the Wilderness) stopped dying on Tishah b'Av, indicating the end of the punishment for the Cheit ha'Meraglim (Sin of the Spies)
  4. the sentries set up by Yeravam ben Navat blocking access to Jerusalem were removed
  5. the massacred Jews of Beitar were permitted to be buried
  6. the annual wood-chopping for the Mizbeach (Altar) was completed

Of these six reasons, the one that caught my attention this year was #4. The Gemara says:
Ulla said: This is the day on which Hoshea ben Elah abolished the sentries that were set up by Yeravam ben Navat on the roads [to Yerushalayim], so that [the citizens of the Northern Kingdom of] Israel couldn’t make their aliyah l'regel (festival pilgrimage); [Hoshe ben Elah] said [to the people]: "Go wherever you please." 
These sentries were set up by Yeravan ben Navat way back in 797 B.C.E. (according to the timeline on chabad.org), when Shlomo ha'Melech's unified kingdom was split and Yeravam became Melech Yisrael (king of the Northern Kingdom of Israel):
Yeravam built up Shechem in the Mountain of Ephraim and dwelled in it; then he left there and built up Penuel. Yeravam then thought, “Now the kingship may revert to the House of David. If this people will go up to bring offerings in the Temple of Hashem in Yerushalayim, the heart of this people will revert to their lord, to Rechavam, king of Yehudah, and they will kill me and return to Yeravam, king of Yehudah.” Then the king took counsel, and he made two golden calves; and he said to the people, “It is too far for you to go up to Yerushalayim. These are your gods, O Israel, who brought you up from the land of Egypt!” He placed the one in Beis-El and the other one in Dan. This matter became a sin, and the people traveled all the way to Dan to worship before one of them. (I Melachim 12:25-30)
Although the pesukim do not explicitly mention the sentries set up by Yeravam to block access to Yerushalayim, these obstacles are alluded to in the pesukim about Hoshea ben Elah - the very last Melech Yisrael, who assumed power in 574 B.C.E. (according to chabad.org), over 200 years later. Unlike all of the other Malchei Yisrael, about whom it is said that they "did what was evil in the eyes of Hashem," the pesukim report about Hoshea ben Elah that "he did what was evil in the eyes of Hashem, but not like the kings of Israel who were before him" (II Melachim 17:2). The Gemara (Gittin 88a) explains this qualification:
Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav: “It is written of Hoshea ben Elah: ‘He did what was evil in the eyes of Hashem – but not like the Kings of Israel’ and it is written: ‘Shalmaneser, King of Assyria, went up against him; and Hoshea became his vassal and sent him a tribute’ (ibid. 17:3)”! [This would seem to imply a wrongdoing on his part!]
[Rav] replied to them: “Yeravam had stationed sentries on the roads so that Israel wouldn’t go up [to Yerushalayim to make pilgrimage] on the festivals, and Hoshea abolished [these sentries]. Nevertheless, Israel didn’t make pilgrimage on the festival. Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu [therefore] said: “[Corresponding to] those years during which Israel didn’t make pilgrimage, they should go into captivity.”
The reason why Ulla's explanation of Tu b'Av caught my attention is because it didn't lead to a good outcome! I'd understand if Hoshea removed the sentries and the citizens of the Northern Kingdom flocked to the Mikdash (Temple) in Yerushalayim once the sentries were removed - but as our Gemara says, that didn't happen! I'd also understand if Hoshea's decision as king was an entirely praiseworthy act - but according to Chazal, it wasn't! The Talmud Yerushalmi's (Taanis 4:6) version of the aforementioned Gemara in Gittin includes an explanation of Hoshea's misstep:
R’ Chiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: “It was on that day that Hoshea ben Elah removed the sentries that Yeravam ben Navat set up on the roads.” Kahana asked Rav: “He did all this good, and yet it is written concerning him: ‘Against him came up Shalmaneser, king of Assyria; [and Hoshea became his vassal and paid him tribute]’?” 
[Rav] replied to him: “It was because he took the chain from around his own neck and put it around the neck of the community. He did not say, ‘Everyone go up [to Yerushalayim for the pilgrimage festival]!’ but rather ‘Whoever wants to go up may go up [for the pilgrimage].’”
In other words, removing the sentries was good, but it wasn't good enough. As king, he should have been more proactive in guiding his people on the proper path. Apparently, his proto-progressive "freedom of religion" policy was not enough in Hashem's eyes to spare Hoshea.

So if Hoshea's removal of Yeravam's stumbling block did not, in actuality, lead to a national teshuvah in the Northern Kingdom, why is this identified as a cause for celebration on Tu b'Av?

The simple answer is that the removal of ra (evil) is, in and of itself, a cause for celebration, even if it doesn't ultimately bear fruit. In this case, the removal of Yeravam's roadblocks was a joyous event, since it left Israel with no impediments to doing the mitzvah of aliyah l'regel.

I would like to suggest a modern day example of this type of opportunity-turned-tragedy: the recapturing and subsequent relinquishment of Har ha'Bayis (the Temple Mount) by Israel in the Six Day War of 1967. Mere hours after the victorious proclamation, "Har ha'Bayis is in our hands!" Moshe Dayan returned it to the control of the Muslim Wakf, and, in a Hoshea-esque justification, said: "We did not come to conquer the sacred sites of others or to restrict their religious rights, but rather to ensure the integrity of the city and to live in it with others in fraternity." Like the removal of Yeravam's sentries, the restoration of Har ha'Bayis to Jewish sovereignty was an occasion worthy of joyous celebration, even though the opportunity was squandered almost immediately thereafter.

I thought of a second possibility for why Hoshea's removal of Yeravam's sentries might be an occasion of joy, even though it didn't lead to any good. I will acknowledge at the outset that this explanation is a bit of a stretch. 

Perhaps the joyous occasion was not the opportunity for the nation to do the mitzvah of aliyah l'regel, but rather, the opportunity for the nation to do teshuvah by making a bechirah (free will) decision

My answer is based on the explanation in the Yerushalmi, that Hoshea "took the chain from around his own neck and put it around the neck of the community" by telling them, "Whoever wants to go may go!" instead of commanding them to go. The Gemara identifies this as a failing on Hoshea's part. This may be true, but at the same time, Hoshea's decision granted the people of Israel a unique opportunity for teshuvah. If he had commanded them to go to Yerushalayim, they might have done it simply because it was mandated by their king. But by giving them the choice, it forced each person to exercise his or her own bechirah by choosing whether or not to do the mitzvah. In the past, it would be easy to rationalize not making aliyah l'regel by placing the blame on Yeravam or on the regnant king, but thanks to Hoshea's "religious freedom" edict, the people could no longer blame anyone but themselves. If they didn't go to Yerushalayim, it was undeniably their choice.

This hearkens back to an earlier event in the history of Malchus Yisrael: Eliyahu ha'Navi's speech to Bnei Yisrael on Har ha'Carmel:
Achav [the evil king of Israel] sent among all the Children of Israel and he gathered the prophets [of Baal] to Mount Carmel. Eliyahu approached all the people and said, "How long will you dance between two opinions? If Hashem is the God, follow Him! And if Baal [is the god], go after him!" - but the people did not answer him at all.
By calling them out with such a direct and provocative challenge, Eliyahu was, in effect, forcing each Israelite to make a decision about what he or she believed. Had he not done this, Bnei Yisrael could have conveniently avoided confronting their cognitive dissonance. They could have gone along with the prophets of Baal when the latter were ascendant, and switched teams when Eliyahu’s side was winning – all without having to take a stand and make a decision. Eliyahu's statement forced each Jew to ask himself: "What do I believe?"

Similarly, Yeravam's sentries prevented Bnei Yisrael from making a real decision - and if Hoshea had commanded them to make aliyah l'regel, they still wouldn't have had to make a decision. But by "placing the chain on their neck," giving them the choice, he was providing them with a unique opportunity to do teshuvah gemurah (complete teshuvah) by confronting their own resistance to aliyah l'regel, and everything that aliyah l'regel entailed. This opportunity – the situation in which a nation is forced to confront its own cognitive dissonance – that is something to be celebrated, even if it didn't lead to teshuvah, and even if Hoshea wasn't motivated by good intentions.

Do I think that this is actually the reason why we celebrate on Tu b'Av? No. My second answer is far more speculative than the simpler explanation mentioned above. Nevertheless, even if this isn't the real reason that Chazal had in mind, I think it's still a valuable insight to think about on Tu b'Av. 

Wednesday, July 25, 2018

Mishlei 29:9 - The Fool's Dirty Debate Tactics

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Artwork: Browbeat, by Chris Rahn


Mishlei 29:9 - The Fool's Dirty Debate Tactics

משלי כט:ט
אִישׁ חָכָם נִשְׁפָּט אֶת אִישׁ אֱוִיל וְרָגַז וְשָׂחַק וְאֵין נָחַת:

Mishlei 29:9
Raw Translation: A wise man who nishpat with a foolish man, and he rages and he laughs, and there is no satisfaction/rest.

I chose this pasuk for today's Mishlei post because it's a good example of how ambiguity in the wording can lead to multiple directions in the analysis. When I learned this pasuk with my Mishlei group this past Shabbos, we didn't have access to my mikraos gedolos (compendium of commentaries), and we were forced to work out the translation on our own. I'll include the difficulties in my list of questions on the pasuk:
(1) What does "nishpat" mean? The root SH.F.T. (ש.פ.ט.) typically denotes "to judge," but can also mean "to dispute" or "to argue." The use of the nifal (passive) form is also very strange. "is judged" makes sense, but "is disputed" or "is argued [with]" are also valid translations.
(2) Who "rages" and "laughs"? Is the chacham (wise man) raging and laughing at the eveel (foolish man), or is the eveel raging and laughing at the chacham
(3) What, exactly, is this "rage" and "laughter"? Is "rage" different than mere "anger"? Is the emphasis on his feeling of anger, or on his display of anger? The laughter is even vaguer than the rage. Is this talking about "laughter" that stems from humor? Is it laughter of mockery? Is it laughter of happiness and camaraderie? And why is this person raging and laughing? What is the relationship between the situation (i.e. arguing, disputing, or being judged) and these two reactions? Is it davka (specifically) these two reactions, or are these just examples from within a larger category?
(4) Who doesn't receive satisfaction - and why not? The answer to this question is dependent on the answer to Question #2, and maybe dependent on the answer to Question #3.
[Time to stop and think about the pasuk in light of these questions. Read on when ready.]

Before we can present the main idea of the pasuk, we need to settle on a translation. Here are the approaches taken by the various meforshim:
Rashi: A wise man who argues with a foolish man may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction [for the wise man].
Ralbag: When a wise man argues with a foolish man, [the fool] will rage and laugh, and there will be no rest [for the wise man].
Ibn Ezra: When a wise man is judged with a foolish man, [the fool] may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction [for the wise man].
Metzudas David: A wise man who is judged with a foolish man may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction [for the wise man]. 
As I mentioned, we didn't have access to meforshim when we learned this pasuk. The translation we came up with happens to be one that none of the meforshim explicitly say:
Our Translation: When a wise man is judged with a foolish man, [the fool] may rage and laugh, but he will have no satisfaction.
For those of you who appreciate charts, here are the five translations side by side:



The fact that none of the meforshim proposed this translation doesn't bother me. I am not aware of any grammatical or syntactical problems, and our translation reflects the most straightforward reading, both in terms of the use of the passive "nishpat" (which literally means "he is judged") and in the conservative reading of the ambiguous pronouns (i.e. "the fool may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction for the fool"). Plus, "raging" and "laughing" seem more like the actions of an eveel than the actions of a chacham, which is why we shied away from translating the pasuk like Rashi and Metzudas David.

Here is my four-sentence summary of the main idea:
When a chacham finds himself in a situation in which he is being judged alongside an eveel (e.g. two participants in a public debate, two businessmen competing for the same customers, two candidates vying for the same position), he should prepare himself to face the dirty tactics that the eveel will use. The fool will attempt to prevail by utilizing provocatively aggressive displays of emotion – such as rage and mocking laughter – in an effort to destabilize the chacham, and to make himself appear dominant in comparison. As long as the chacham remains visibly unshaken and unperturbed by the eveel's bombastic onslaught, and doesn’t give him the satisfaction of pushing his buttons, then these tactics will backfire. The audience (i.e. whoever is in a position to pass judgment) will observe the stark contrast between the chacham’s cool, levelheaded, objective disposition and the eveel’s heated, combative, immature bullying; this side-by-side comparison will simultaneously boost the ethos of the chacham and diminish that of the eveel. Chances are that the eveel, himself, will become frustrated with the chacham’s indifference to his assaults, which will destabilize him, making him feel even more frantic and less in control of himself; this, in turn, will make him appear desperate and pathetic in the eyes of the audience, thereby giving the chacham an edge - in addition to the substance of his arguments, which will inevitably be superior to the eveel's.
After we came up with this explanation, and I gained access to my meforshim, I saw that the Ri Nachmias gives a very similar explanation of our pasuk. The only difference is that he translates "nishpat" as "argues" instead of "is judged," like Rashi and Ralbag, in contrast to Ibn Ezra and Metzudas David. Nevertheless, he also learns - like we do - that there is an audience present in the situation, which practically means that the chacham and eveel are being judged. Here is the relevant excerpt from the Ri Nachmias's (much lengthier) explanation:
If a wise man who argues with a fool, [the fool] may rage and laugh ... Since this fool doesn't have much knowledge, he'll project self-images (oseh tzuros me'atzmo) to deceive the people who are there ... These are polemical techniques (darchei nitzuach) which [the eveel uses to] trick listeners [into thinking that he] knows what he doesn't [actually know].
The Ri Niachmias quotes a pasuk from elsewhere in Shlomo ha'Melech's writings which supports our interpretation: "The words of the wise are heard calmness (b'nachas) over the shouting of a ruler among fools" (Koheles 9:17). In the Rambam's description of how talmidei chachamim (Torah scholars) speak and behave, he borrows this phrase from Koheles:
A talmid chachamim shouldn't yell or shout when he speaks, like animals and wild beasts, nor should he raise his voice; rather, his speech with people should be calm. And when he speaks calmly, he should be careful not to distance himself, to the extent that he appears haughty.
In other words, this calmness in speech shouldn't be limited to situations involving a fool. Rather, "nachas" (in the sense of "calmness" rather than "satisfaction") should be the default mode of speech for talmidei chachamim.

The Ralbag would agree with the title of this post, but according to him, our pasuk focuses on a specific tactic used by the eveel in debates: interrupting the chacham. He translates our pasuk as: "When a wise man argues with a foolish man, [the fool] will rage and laugh, and there will be no rest [for the wise man]." Here is his explanation:
When a wise man argues with a foolish man, in a verbal back-and-forth, the eveel will not allow the chacham to speak and to finish his statements. Instead, sometimes he'll react angrily to what he hears the chacham say and will not allow him to complete his statements, and sometimes he'll laugh and mock what he hears [the chacham] say, and he will not give him a pause (nachas) which would enable him to complete what he intended to clarify. This pasuk is, as it were, a warning to the chacham not to argue with an eveel.
One of the best examples of our pasuk in action is the Canadian psychologist Jordan Peterson. I found a video which exemplifies all three interpretations - that of the Ralbag, the Ri Nachmias, and ours. I wanted to find a shorter video, but this is the best I could come up with.


It will not always be possible for a chacham to avoid debating with or being judged alongside an eveel. When such a situation arises, the chacham must keep the eveel's repertoire of tricks at the forefront of his mind, and not allow him to get the upper hand. 

Tuesday, July 24, 2018

The Implications of Chazal's "Godless Kiruv" Approach

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Artwork: Godless Shrine, by Cliff Childs

The Implications of Chazal's "Godless Kiruv" Approach

A few years ago, while perusing Midrash Eichah, I came across a statement made by Chazal about how to get people to return to Torah - a statement which, were it not for the fact that Chazal said it, I would have been reluctant to even consider it as a possibility. 

The midrash is based on a phrase from a pasuk in Yirmiyahu, which I will present in context: 
And it shall be that when you tell all these things to this people, they will say to you, "Why has Hashem spoken all this great evil against us? What is our iniquity, what is our transgression that we have transgressed before Hashem our God?" 
And you shall say to them, "It is because your forefathers have abandoned Me" - the word of Hashem - "and they went after other gods and served them and bowed down to them, and they abandoned Me and they didn't keep My Torah" (Yirmiyahu 16:10-11).
The midrash (Eichah Rabbah: Pesichta 2) says:
R' Huna and R' Yirmiyah said in the name of R' Chiyya bar Abba: It is written, "they abandoned Me and they did not keep My Torah" - if only they had abandoned Me but kept My Torah, because they involved themselves in it, the illumination within it would have returned them to the good.
Rav Huna said: Learn Torah, even she'lo lishmah (not for its own sake), because from she'lo lishmah, one will come [to learn it] lishmah (for its own sake).
According to the midrash, the tragedy of Churban ha'Bayis (the destruction of the Temple) and galus (exile) only happened because Bnei Yisrael abandoned Hashem and didn't learn [1] His Torah, but if they only abandoned Hashem but continued to learn Torah, then the "light of Torah" would have ultimately brought them back. 

There are two major questions on this midrash
(1) What does it mean by "abandoning Hashem"? Is this talking about violating halacha? Is it talking about worshiping other gods? Is it talking about atheism?
(2) How does "the illumination of Torah" bring people back to the good? This question must be answered specifically with regards to people who have "abandoned Hashem." 
To answer the first question it would make sense to consult the meforshim on the phrase "they have abandoned Me" in the pasuk on which our midrash is based. Unfortunately, the answers they provide aren't so clear.

  • The Targum Yonasan [2] strips the phrase of its anthropomorphic implications by rendering "abandoned Me" as "abandoned My worship." 
  • The Metzudas David [3] explains it to mean "they didn't believe in Me in their hearts," which we can't take at face value because the pasuk right before it says that Bnei Yisrael will ask: "Why has Hashem spoken all this great evil against us? What is our iniquity, what is our transgression that we have transgressed before Hashem our God?" Clearly Bnei Yisrael at least professed belief in Hashem, and seems to have believed in Him on a conscious level. Does the Metzudas David mean that their emunah (conviction) in God was flawed or insufficient? If so, how? 
  • According to the Malbim, [4] the phrase "abandoned Me" refers to the fact that prior generations forgot Torah, and therefore they didn't know Hashem. This reading poses its own difficulties when we consider what the midrash might mean when it contemplates the possibility of Bnei Yisrael abandoning Hashem but still learning Torah; this would seem to be worse than abandoning both of them, due to forgetting Torah. 
So the answer to our first question is ... unclear. We'll just have to work on the second question, and then extrapolate as much as we can about the first. 

The answer to the second question, I believe, can be found in a statement of the Rambam. [5] In Chapter 6 of Hilchos Teshuvah the Rambam gives his interpretation of the pesukim"Good and upright is Hashem; therefore He guides sinners on the path. He leads the humble with justice and teaches His way to the humble" (Tehilim 25:7-8). He explains:
This means that Hashem has sent prophets to them, who teach them the ways of Hashem and help them to return in teshuvah. Moreover, He instilled within them the capacity to learn and to understand - for this tendency is present in every man, that the more he is drawn after the ways of chochmah (wisdom) and tzedek (righteousness), the more he desires them and pursues them. This is what the Sages meant by "ha'ba l'taher, mesayin oso" ("one who comes to be purified is assisted") - in other words, he will find himself assisted in the matter [by the aforementioned natural tendency].
I believe the answer to our second question is that if a person is learning Torah with the correct approach, then his internal draw towards chochmah and tzedek will increase his attachment to Torah-learning, and will ultimately "return him to the good." Probably not in every case, but enough for the midrash to be able to make its generalization. 

What leads me to believe that this interpretation is correct? Because I have witnessed it with my own eyes. I'm speaking both as a teacher and as a student of Torah. I've seen many cases involving my own students - or my fellow talmidim (students) in high school and in yeshiva - who were atheists, agnostics, or irreligious. At first they displayed emotional resistance to certain Jewish topics, but were nevertheless drawn to the chochmas ha'Torah (the wisdom of Torah). Over the course of several years of learning, their natural desire for chochmah and tzedek was awakened and strengthened, and they wanted more. Eventually, their learning led them to embrace Torah as a system, at which point, it can be said that they have "returned to the good." 

Can this happen on a national level, as it would seem from the context [6] of the pesukim? We might be inclined to say "no," but far be it for us to underestimate the transformative power of the chochmas ha'Torah - especially when presented by a good teacher. 

Now, you may be wondering why the title of this post is: "The Implications of Chazal's Godless Kiruv Approach." Other than clickbait reasons, my intent was to open up the discussion about how the principle in this midrash might be implemented in kiruv (Jewish outreach). 

Disclaimer: I have already written about my personal stance on kiruv. To sum it up: I'm generally not in favor of kiruv. At the same time, we live in an era where "kiruv" and "regular Torah education" overlap in many ways. It is far more common nowadays to encounter students from Orthodox Jewish homes in Orthodox Jewish Day Schools whose Jewish education is sorely lacking, and who - most likely due to the Internet - have numerous questions, doubts, and problems with Judaism which have not been adequately addressed by their teachers.

The standard approach that is often taken with these students is to try making them into "believers." There is a lot of emphasis placed on "curing" them of their atheism or agnosticism. In my personal and professional opinion, this approach is not fruitful, and often backfires.

Instead, I prefer the approach implicit in this midrash. The priority should be exposure to "the illumination of Torah" - namely, providing students with high quality exposure to the chochmah and tzedek of Torah. This doesn't mean that topics about Hashem should be avoided (God forbid!), but rather, that the emphasis should be on the involvement in the learning itself - not in "converting" students to belief in Hashem. The goal should be attachment to Torah learning. If that goal is achieved, then the rest will follow.

This course is fraught with dangers as well. One must be careful not to present an “Orthopraxy” version of Judaism, which downplays (or outright objects to) the role of belief in the practice of Torah. Similarly, one must not fall into the trap of “the bad Academic Approach,” which reduces Torah to a mere cultural repository of ancient beliefs, rather than a regimen designed to develop a truth-seeking mind.

I'm not saying that this is a simple solution. There are many complexities that need to be worked out on paper, and even more which need to be addressed in the classroom. Each and every student is different, and it isn't realistic to hope for a one-size-fits-all approach.

Nevertheless, I think that this midrash is expressing a powerful model of kiruv which should be considered in the present age of Torah education. Tzarich iyun (this requires further analysis).

[1] Last year a chavrusa of mine challenged my reading of the phrase "kept My Torah." He wanted to read "keeping Torah" in this midrash to mean "keeping halacha" rather than "learning Torah." I think such a reading is extremely forced. First of all, the midrash uses the phrase מתוך שהיו מתעסקים בה ("because they involved themselves in it"), and "עוסק בתורה" always refers to learning Torah - not keeping halacha. Secondly, our midrash is followed immediately by Rav Huna's statement, which is about learning Torah - not keeping halacha. Lastly, if you do a search for meforshim who cite our midrash in their commentary, you'll find that they understand it to be talking about learning Torah - not keeping halacha. See Metzudas David on Yirmiyahu 9:12 and Tehilim 119:104; Rabbeinu Yonah in Shaarei Teshuvah 697; Ha'amek Davar on Devarim 32:47; Derech Hashem 4:2.
[2] Targum Yonasan on Yirmiyahu 16:12
[3] Rav David Altschuler (Metzudas David), Commentary on Sefer Yirmiyahu 16:11
[4] Rav Meir Leibush ben Yechiel Michel (Malbim), Commentary on Sefer Yirmiyahu 16:11
[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 6:4
[6] at least, if we take this midrash as an actual interpretation, and not just a drashah

Sunday, July 22, 2018

Tishah b'Av 5778: Where is "So"?

As I have done in past years, I came home from shul and hastily typed up a blog post based on the kinnos recitation and discussion I had in the morning. Think of this as "musings on kinnos" rather than as a proper "shiur." 

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Artwork: Doomsday, by Noah Bradley


Tishah b'Av 5778: Where is "So"?

This year the kinnah (lamentation) that caught my eye was #13. The refrain of this kinnah is based on a Hebrew wordplay involving the first word of Megilas Eichah: איכה (eichah), which is usually translated as "how"? The paytan (poet-author) of this kinnah breaks איכה into two words: אי כה (eiy koh), which translates as "Where is [the] 'so'?

Here is the text of this kinah in English, based on the [bracket-laden] Artscroll translation (with a few of my own tweaks):
Kinnah #13 - by R' Elazar ha'Kalir 
Where is the "so" promised with a proclamation to [our] father [Avraham] at the Covenant Between the Parts, "so shall [your offspring] always be [as numerous as the stars]" (Bereishis 15:5)? Behold, now, how my bones are swallowed up murderously. Why, O God, have You abandoned us [for what seems like] an eternity?
Where is the "so" [mentioned when Avraham] approached [with his son] as with a sheep for a burnt offering to please You? They persuaded [the others to stay behind, saying], "we shall go so far" (ibid. 22:5) [in order to fulfill] Your testimonies. Behold now, how Your beloved ones are speared like a piece of fruit. Why does Your wrath smolder against the sheep of Your pasture?
Where is the "so" in the promise [to Yaakov] in the dark of night [when You promised him an abundance of] striped and spotted [sheep]? When [Lavan] would say, "[with sheep marked] so [I will reward you]" (ibid. 31:8), so was the sign swiftly fulfilled. Behold now, how You admonished [Jerusalem,] the city once filled with a chorus of jubilation. Lift Your footsteps to wreak [eternal] ruin [upon the enemy who destroyed this holy city]. 
Where is the "so" when [Moshe] intentionally killed an Egyptian [who was beating a Jew] in [view of the Israelites, who are like] a garden locked in with holiness? "He turned like so and like so" (Shemos 2:12), and the matter [of the Egyptian's death] was kept sealed within the holy congregation [of Israel]. Behold now, how their portion was devoured in the month [of tragedy, Av], when all of the enemy's wickedness was wreaked in the Sanctuary.
Where is the "so" when Tov[iah, Moshe,] was sent to redeem Your servants? [When You said,] "so shall you say [unto the Children of Israel" (Shemos 3:14), this nation must be sent out to serve You. Behold now, how traitors occupy Your House of Meeting, [as it is written,] Your enemies have roared amidst Your meeting place. 
Where is the "so" when new [blood] covenants were sealed [when the Jews were redeemed from Egypt]? Moshe said, "so says [Hashem]: At about midnight [I shall go out among the Egyptians]" (ibid. 11:4) with miraculous signs. Behold, now, how they have gathered to come into [the Temple] in their shoes; they have made their signs for signs.
Where is the "so" which was heard when Moshe ascended [Mount Sinai and God told him to tell Israel,] "so shall you say unto [the women]" (ibid. 19:3), the distinguished homemakers? Behold, now, how the sons of iniquity blaspheme Him and it is regarded as an attack on [God] above.
Where is the "so" mentioned at [the beginning of] the sixty-letter premier] benediction, "so shall you bless" (Bamidbar 6:23) which is like sixty mighty warriors? Behold, now, the once slumbering [Babylonian Empire] has reawakened [and ascended] to power and its axes are in the wooden thicket.
Where is the "so" when [the wicked Bilaam] opened his mouth to curse - but instead blessed - Your holy nation? [You commanded Bilaam,] "Return [to Balak, the king who hired you,] and so shall you say" (ibid. 23:5) [that the curses were] transformed [into blessings] for Your holy ones. Behold, now, how they have set upon Your holy city; they have sent Your Sanctuary up in flames. 
Where is the "so" when the Levites, Your perfect [attendants,] were taken [into Your service with the words], "So you shall do unto them, to purify them" (cf. Bamidbar 8:7) for your Eternal Temple? Behold, now, how they have stormed [the earthly Temple] and thereby caused Your heaven[ly Temple] to tremble; to the ground have they desecrated the Abode of Your Name.
Where is the "so" [when the Jews circled the walls of Jericho and seven priests sounded] seven powerful ram's horns? [For You had said,] "So shall you do for six days" (Yehoshua 6:3) to topple the wall to the ground. Behold, now, how the gates [of our Holy Temple] have sunk into the ground; [and] they have burned all of God's meeting places on earth.
Where is the "so" [which assured] salvation emanating from [the Holy Temple described as] the storehouses brimming with abundance. [The prophecies of future redemption which God] designated for His visionaries [all began with the words], "So says [Hashem]." Behold, now, how my flower[-like children] lie bloated [from starvation] in each courtyard. How long, O God, will the tormentor revile? 
The theme of this kinnah is easily identifiable: "Where is the 'so'?" The question is: What does this mean? It would seem that the instances of the word "so" in Tanach cited by the paytan have little or nothing to do with each other. What does Hashem's promise to Avraham of "so shall be your offspring" have to do with Moshe Rabbeinu "look[ing] like so and like so"? What does the opening of Birkas Kohanim ("so shall you bless") have to do with Yehoshua's conquest of Jericho ("so shall you do for six days")?

Apparently, this kinnah is based on a midrash in Eichah Rabbah 1:1, which is quoted by Rav Avigdor Kohen Tzedek in his commentary on Eichah 1:1:
"Eichah" is two words: "eiy koh." This means that Yirmiyahu lamented, saying: "Where is the zechus (merit) of Avraham, that it was said to him: "so shall be your offspring"? This is "Where is the 'so'?" And where is the zechus of Moshe, that it was said to him: "so said Hashem: 'at around midnight etc.'"? Likewise, where is the zechus of the Akeidah (Binding of Isaac), about which it was stated: "we will go until so far"? And where is the zechus of Yaakov, as it is stated: "so shall you say to the House of Yaakov"? And where is the zechus of the berachos, as it is stated: "so shall you bless Bnei Yisrael"? And where is the zechus of David, who said Torah koh times (i.e. 25 times) in the eight-fold [psalm 119]?
In other words, R' Avigdor Kohen Tzedek learns the word "so" as an expression of zechus. Accordingly, this kinnah is a lamentation over the fact that the zechus of these righteous people and phenomena is absent, to the extent that we have been subject to so much destruction and affliction. 

I have a slightly different approach, based on the definition and function of the word "so" in this context. In all of the citations in this kinnah the word "so" is used to signify "in the manner or way indicated or suggested." (If you don't believe me, go back and check; substitute each instance of "so" for "in this manner.") Understood in this way, the word "so" points to a director, who supervises what is going on, and says: "This is what will happen," "This is how things should be," "This is how things will go," "This is what you shall say," "This is how you should act." 

Thus, the repeated question in the refrain: "Where is the 'so'?" expresses astonishment at the seeming absence of Hashem as the manhig (director) - as the mashgiach (supervisor) who oversees the events of Jewish history as they unfold, and ensures that they do so in accordance with what is best for His people. Each of the citations in the kinnah represents a key turning point in Jewish history where Hashem's intervention resulted in a different path for our nation. Were it not for His promise to Avraham Avinu, we wouldn't be here. Were it not for the zechus of the Akeidah or the success of Yaakov Avinu, we wouldn't be here. Were it not for Moshe Rabbeinu killing the Egyptian, or Moshe's statement to Paroh, or makkas bechoros (the plague of the first born), we wouldn't have left Egypt. And so on.

I believe this is why the rendering of "eichah?" as "eiy koh?" is more than just a play-on-words. Lurking behind the question of eichah - "How can this have happened to our city and our people?" - is an underlying feeling that God has abandoned His people, leaving no one to guide the events of history by saying, "So shall it be." The paytan brings out this sentiment by explicitly asking: "Where is God? Where is the Conductor Who says 'so' in steering the course of our people?" This the meaning of the antithesis in each stanza: the paytan juxtaposes God's supervision in the past, expressed in the word "so," with the hester panim (withdrawal of Divine providence) in the calamities of the past and the present:
Where is the "so" promised with a proclamation to [our] father [Avraham] at the Covenant Between the Parts, "so shall [your offspring] always be [as numerous as the stars]" (Bereishis 15:5)? 
(Avraham was promised by Hashem that He would oversee his descendants and help them become as numerous as the stars.) 
Behold, now, how my bones are swallowed up murderously. Why, O God, have You abandoned us [for what seems like] an eternity?
(Where did His supervision go? The fact that our numbers are being diminished by our enemies would seem to indicate that He has forsaken us, and that we are no longer under His watchful care.)
This reading forces us to confront the question: Where is the "so"? Where did our Supervisor go?

The answer lies in the recognition that the abandonment, itself, is an act of Divine providenceHester panim is a type of hashgachah, even if it looks like the absence of hashgachah. 

This perspective is clear from the words of the neviim (prophets) who prophesied about the destruction and exile. They repeatedly emphasize that God will never abandon His people, even when they are deserving of punishment. It is also clear from the words of the Torah itself, at the end of the tochachah (rebuke) in Parashas Bechukosai:
But despite all this, while they will be in the land of their enemies, I will not have been revolted by them nor will I have rejected them to obliterate them, to annul My covenant with them - for I am Hashem, their God. I will recall for them the covenant of the ancients, those whom I have taken out of the land of Egypt before the eyes of the nations, to be God unto them - I am Hashem. (Vayikra 26:44-45)
This is even more explicit in Moshe Rabbeinu's statement about the present exile, which we read this morning:
When you beget children and grandchildren and will have been long in the Land, you will grow corrupt and make a carved image of anything, and you will do evil in the eyes of Hashem, your God, to anger Him. I appoint heaven and earth this day to bear witness against you that you will surely perish quickly from the Land to which you are crossing the Jordan to possess; you shall not have lengthy days upon it, for you will be destroyed. Hashem will scatter you among the peoples, and you will be left few in number among the nations where Hashem will lead you. There you will serve gods, the handiwork of man, of wood and stone, which do not see, and do not hear, and do not eat, and do not smell. From there you will seek Hashem, your God, and you will find Him, if you search for Him with all your heart and all your soul. When you are in distress and all these things have befallen you, at the end of days, you will return unto Hashem, your God, and hearken to His voice. For Hashem, your God, is a merciful God, He will not abandon you nor destroy you, and He will not forget the covenant of your forefathers that He swore to them. (Devarim 4:25-31)
The only way we will be able to find Hashem in our state of distress is if we recognize that the abandonment of the Jewish people is an act of hashgachah (Divine providence), for our benefit, to spur us to do national teshuvah

Without this recognition of Divine immanence in what appears to be Divine neglect, our observance of Tishah b'Av cannot achieve its purpose, and the suffering of our people throughout our many centuries of exile is for naught. 

"imo anochi b'tzarah" says Hashem. "He will call upon Me and I will answer him, I am with him in distress" (Tehilim 91:15) - but only if we recognize it.