Ki Teitzei: On the Merit of Giving Bad Explanations of Mitzvos

Today's Torah content is sponsored by an anonymous donor, out of gratitude for all of the awesome opportunities for learning over Zoom that are available at YBT.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this article, and click here for an audio version.

Artwork: Professor of Symbology, by Jason Rainville

Ki Teitzei: On the Merit of Giving Bad Explanations of Mitzvos

As a Torah educator, I am a strong proponent of teaching students the taamei ha’mitzvos (reasons for the commandments). This is especially relevant for teenagers and young adults, many of whom were raised without any real awareness that the mitzvos have rational reasons and were commanded for our benefit. Accordingly, it is a pet peeve of mine when I hear someone give a bad explanation for the taam of a mitzvah. Is there ever any justification for bad explanations of mitzvos? Shockingly, according to the Sefer ha’Chinuch, the answer is: yes.

In his introduction, the Sefer ha’Chinuch explains that he wrote his book so that his son and his son’s friends will accustom themselves to thinking about the mitzvos and seeking out their reasons. He then writes at length about how unqualified he is for this task, but why he didn’t let that stop him from writing. Here are some excerpts:

I do not think and proclaim that I will arrive at the ultimate truth. Who am I, “but a worm and not a man” who has not seen the lights of wisdom all the days, to raise my hand about that which exceedingly wise sages have not grasped? … However, I said: If only it would be that my thoughts be preoccupied with [taamei ha’mitzvos] all of the days … Are [the mitzvos] not all refined and pure – “every precious stone is their adornment”? And if there sometimes be sediment in that which is written in their explanation, the food should be separated from it for oil, and [sediment] returned to the house of the owners … And at the beginning of my words, I mention as a merit for me that which my teachers said: "All chatter is bad, [but] Torah chatter is good."

In Parashas Ki Teitzei, there are two instances in which the Sefer ha’Chinuch acknowledges the inadequacy of the taamei ha’mitzvos explanations he has provided. The first is regarding the prohibition “to offer up a harlot’s wage or the exchange-price of a dog on the altar” (Mitzvah #571). After giving a satisfactory taam for the first component of this mitzvah, the Sefer ha’Chinuch tackles the second with decidedly less confidence:

Now, it is known that dogs are arrogant in spirit. Perhaps, as a result of thinking about them and their tough nature, his spirit will grow tough and he will become stiff-necked, too stubborn to regret his sins, as is proper for him. However, my son, if these words [of mine] be childish, may you be aroused by them to acquire the reason of elders.

In other words: if you don’t like my explanation of the taam, may it inspire you to look for a better one. Similarly, after giving a basic taam ha’mitzvah for yibum (levirate marriage, Mitzvah #598), he writes:

Now, although I know that in this mitzvah lies a great principle and a true reason [known] by the mekubalim (i.e. those who have received the esoteric tradition), I will rely on what I wrote at the beginning of my work. There I set forth my justification for the fact that I would not restrain my pen from writing my entire mind on a simple, plain reason for the mitzvos, to stimulate the spirit of the youngsters to ask questions about them of their elders and teachers. Out of the preoccupation with them, perhaps the merit will come about through me to reveal the truth of their purposes, and I will gain merit in my place among them.

What emerges from these three excerpts is an insight about the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s approach. There are two reasons to offer explanations for the taamei ha’mitzvos: (1) to identify the actual reasons for the mitzvos, and (2) to strengthen our attachment to seeking taamei ha’mitzvos. In most cases, the Sefer ha’Chinuch maintains that his taamei ha’mitzvos are the real thing, but in cases where he is uncertain whether he has attained “the ultimate truth” of a mitzvah, he consoles himself by saying, “At least my thoughts and my chatter were preoccupied with mitzvos! Perhaps my inadequate explanations will prompt my students to discover the truth on their own.”

This approach should not be taken as a license to spout off dumb ideas, but for those who have sufficient intellectual humility, perhaps the Sefer ha’Chinuch will provide justification for sharing their half-baked thoughts.

___________________________________________________________________________________

If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you. 

If you would like to sponsor an article, shiur, or podcast episode, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone. 

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast", "The Stoic Jew" Podcast, "Rambam Bekius" Podcast, "Machshavah Lab" Podcast, "The Tefilah Podcast"  For the full guide to all of my Torah content, click here. 

Halacha as a Playground of Mindfulness

Today's Torah content has been brought to you by the generosity of my Patrons on Patreon.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this article, and click here for an audio version.

Halacha as a Playground of Mindfulness

Last week I saw a comic depicting a fishbowl floating in an ocean. The fish in the fishbowl is labeled “religion.” The fish in the water outside the fishbowl is labeled “spirituality.” The implication is that the spirituality fish is looking upon the religion fish with pity, as if to say, “You poor thing. Why do you insist on being confined to this fishbowl when you could be free in the open ocean, like me?”

The comic had been posted in a mindfulness group on Facebook. This is not the first time I’ve encountered an underlying streak of anti-religious sentiment among self-identified practitioners of mindfulness. I don’t blame the creator of the comic, nor do I blame those for whom the comic resonates. As an Orthodox Jew, I would even describe myself as “anti-religious.” (And if that sounds like a paradox, read my article, Is Judaism a Religion?) Still, it irks me when I see legitimate criticisms and complaints about other religions indiscriminately applied to Judaism, and this is a perfect example: the sentiment in this comic is the polar opposite of my own experience as an observant Jew who aspires to live a life of mindfulness.

I agree with the image and captioning of the comic, but I disagree with its implied value judgment. Orthodox Judaism is like a fishbowl in that it imposes restrictions on an otherwise unrestricted life. Those who choose not to observe halacha are like the fish in the ocean in that they aren’t confined. However, being unconfined is not the same as being free, and the boundaries of halacha constitute a path to true human freedom.

This is not a chidush (novel insight). I’ve given shiurim and written articles about my own take on the liberating qualities of halacha. My favorite of these articles is I Hate Sukkah (in a Good Way), in which I draw upon dialogue from My Dinner With Andre and the teachings of Bruce Lee to frame halacha as a system of “skillful frustrations” designed to promote our development as truth-seeking human beings.

But while I have written articles on the relationship between halacha and freedom, I haven’t addressed the relationship between halacha and mindfulness – specifically, the type of mindfulness valued by those who agree with the comic. Chapter 14 of Greg McKeown’s book, Essentialism: the Disciplined Pursuit of Less, is entitled: “Limit: the freedom of setting boundaries.” The author illustrates this counter-intuitive point with an anecdote:

This truth is demonstrated by the story of a school located next to a busy road. At first the children played only on a small swath of the playground, close to the building where the grownups could keep their eyes on them. But then someone constructed a fence around the playground. Now the children were able to play anywhere and everywhere on the playground. Their freedom, in effect, more than doubled.

Similarly, when we don’t set clear boundaries in our lives we can end up imprisoned by the limits others have set for us. When we have clear boundaries, on the other hand, we are free to select from the whole area – or the whole range of options – that we have deliberately chosen to explore.

Halacha transforms every aspect of life into an anchor for mindfulness. Our “fishbowls,” the boundaries created by our halachic obligations and restrictions, serve as our prompts. By surrounding ourselves with these manifold mindfulness prompts, we enjoy countless opportunities for awakening. And since all the mitzvos have reasons – to develop our intellects, our character traits, or to promote justice in society – these prompts not only pull us out of the trance of mindlessness, but they also develop us in specific ways. In other words, not only do they facilitate “awakening from,” but also “awakening to.” Halacha guides us towards mindfulness in everything we do.

For these reasons and more, I believe that the fish inside the bowl enjoys more freedom than the fish in the ocean.

___________________________________________________________________________________

If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you. 

If you would like to sponsor an article, shiur, or podcast episode, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone. 

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast", "The Stoic Jew" Podcast, "Rambam Bekius" Podcast, "Machshavah Lab" Podcast, "The Tefilah Podcast"  For the full guide to all of my Torah content, click here. 

Parashas Emor: Does Hashem Hate Unibrows?

Does Hashem hate unibrows? No, of course not! But then why does the Torah ban a Kohen with a unibrow from serving in the Beis ha’Mikdash? In this dvar Torah we will examine the nature of these physical disqualifications and consider their implications within the Torah system as a whole.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Parashas Emor: Does Hashem Hate Unibrows? 

Parashas Emor introduces the prohibition for a physically blemished Kohen to perform avodah (service) in the Beis ha’Mikdash (Holy Temple): “Any man from among the offspring of Aharon the Kohen who has a blemish shall not approach to offer the fire-offerings of Hashem” (Vayikra 21:21). This parallels the prohibition to offer blemished animals as offerings, which is also discussed in this parashah: “Any [animal offering] in which there is a blemish you shall not offer, for it will not be favorable for you” (ibid. 22:20). 

The pesukim (verses) specify a number of examples of both categories of blemishes which are expanded upon in great detail by Torah she’baal Peh (the Oral Torah). There are a total of 140 physical blemishes that disqualify a Kohen from avodah, 90 of which are unique to human beings, and 50 of which are common to Kohanim and animals. The halacha classifies these 140 blemishes by their location on the body. In order to appreciate the nature and scope of these blemishes, here are a few examples from each category: 

• head (misshapen skull, various forms of baldness)
• neck (too short, too long)
• ears (blindness, too small, asymmetrical in size) 
• eyebrows (unibrow, asymmetrical in appearance)
• eyelids (no eyelashes, too squinty)
• eyes (abnormal positioning, abnormal shape, abnormal size)
• nose (abnormal positioning, abnormal shape, abnormal size)
• lips (over/under-bite, cracked lips, frequent spittle)
• belly (swollen, "outie" navel)
• back (crooked spine, hunchback)
• hands (abnormal number of fingers, webbed fingers, left-handed person)
• reproductive organs (abnormal size, injured scrotum, missing testicle)
• legs (bowlegged, abnormal number of toes, clicking ankles)
• stature (disproportionate trunk, abnormal height)
• skin (albino, very red skin, any type of mole, scarring)
• miscellaneous (deaf, epileptic, suffering from tremors on account of sickness or old age, suffering from severe depression, bad body odor) 

The major question here is: Why should these blemishes disqualify a Kohen from avodah? Does Hashem have something against physically blemished individuals? Does He find clicking ankles to be annoying? Does He regard albinos as subhuman? Does bad B.O. spoil the “fragrant aroma” (Vayikra 1:9) of the burnt offerings? Indeed, some modern readers may find these laws to be not only questionable, but morally reprehensible, and accuse the Torah of stoking the flames of certain forms of discrimination, such as ableism, ageism, and other prejudices. 

Before offering an answer, we will briefly respond to the types of charges against Torah mentioned in the aforementioned paragraph. Renowned pathologist Dr. J. Beckwith begins his historical essay, Congenital Malformations: from Superstition to Understanding, as follows: 

Throughout most of human history, congenital anomalies were perceived as omens, portents, or punishments of supernatural origin. This concept is reflected in the term “monster,” probably derived from the Latin verb monstrare (to show or reveal). Other explanations for congenital abnormalities included witchcraft, astrological configurations, or emotional experiences of the pregnant mother. 

Individuals suffering from physical deformities and bodily abnormalities were feared, shunned, and ostracized in many cultures, especially in ancient times. Dr. Beckwith elaborates on this phenomenon, citing an example from a neighboring ancient civilization to ours: 

Birth defects were interpreted as omens or portents in many early cultures. For example, Babylonian–Assyrian cuneiform tablets include an extensive catalog of anomalies believed to represent omens, some of which are clearly based upon observation of actual cases. 

Torah society stands in stark contrast to these prevailing views and attitudes in the ancient world. Judaism does not regard individuals with physical abnormalities to be inferior in any way to any other person. There is no discrimination when it comes to their religious observance nor are there any limitations to their roles in the community (with the sole exception of Kohanim in Mikdash). These individuals were never regarded as “cursed” or “harbingers of evil” or anything that even remotely negative. Indeed, the Sages decreed that a blessing should be recited upon seeing such an individual: “Blessed are You, Hashem, our God, King of the universe, Who makes creations different.” In other words, physical abnormalities are not viewed as negative, but are regarded positively as expressions of the wisdom and magnificence of the Creator. Moreover, the Torah clearly states that the essence of the human being is the tzelem Elokim (truth-seeking intellect) – not the physical body. Thus, there are no grounds for the assumption that a person should have lesser value in the eyes of God simply because his or her body looks different.

Of course, this only strengthens our question! These laws of Kohanim’s blemishes are an anomaly – the only Torah laws which, on the surface, seem to stigmatize physical imperfections. 

The Sefer ha’Chinuch (Mitzvah #275) answers this question as follows: 

At the root of this mitzvah lies the reason that the majority of people’s actions are favorable to the hearts of those who see them in accordance of the eminence of those who do them. For when a man is distinguished in his appearance and good in his actions, he “will find favor and good success” (Mishlei 3:4) in everything he does in the eyes of all who observe him. If, however, he is the opposite of this – inferior in his form or peculiar in his limbs – then even if he is straight in his ways, his activities will not be so attractive to the heart of those who see him. 

It is therefore truly fitting that the messenger (i.e. the Kohen), on whom atonement depends, should be a man of grace, handsome in appearance and fair in features, and pleasing in all his ways – that the minds of men may be drawn to him. And in addition to this, it is possible that in the perfection of his form lies an intimation of matters through which, as a man’s thoughts dwell on them, his spirit will be cleansed and exalted. 

It is therefore not right in any way that there should be in him [the Kohen] any deviation in any of his forms whatsoever, lest the spirit of the contemplator be distracted on account of the peculiarity and stray from the desired goal. 

According to the Sefer ha’Chinuch, physically blemished Kohanim were not barred from performing the avodah on account of any inherent deficiency or inadequacy on their part. Rather, as we say nowadays, it was all about “the optics.” The Beis ha’Mikdash is meant to be an awe-inspiring place, as the Sefer ha’Chinuch describes (Mitzvah #95): 

Hashem desired the good for human beings, as we have stated. Therefore He commanded us to establish a location that should be pure and clean to the ultimate degree of cleanliness, to purify there the thoughts of people and to rectify and perfect their hearts towards Him. 

Indeed, it is a mitzvah to be in awe of Mikdash, as the Sefer ha’Chinuch writes (Mitzvah #254): 

[He commanded us] to have a reverent awe of the Sanctuary: in other words, that we should regard and establish it in our souls as the place of awe and veneration, so that our hearts will be moved when we come there to pray or to bring offerings, as it is stated: “and you shall revere My Sanctuary” (Vayikra 19:30). 

The Sefer ha’Chinuch’s explanation of the Kohanim’s blemishes is built upon this idea, namely, that in order to produce the proper degree of awe, reverence, and inspiration in those come to the Beis ha’Mikdash, the Kohanim had to be flawless in their appearance. Anything less would detract from the intended effect of the Sanctuary, which was to inspire the visiting Jews to emulate the priestly models of avodah who ministered therein. 

A modern example of this phenomenon can be drawn from the world of fashion. Clothing companies know that in order to sell their products, they must use flawlessly attractive models, in ads and in clothing stores. These companies know that the vast majority of individuals will never live up to the beauty standards of these models, but will nevertheless purchase this clothing hoping that they will partake of some level of attractiveness, like these models. 

Just as attractive models enhance the attractiveness of the clothing they wear and cause the onlookers to aspire to this level of attractiveness, the same is true of the Kohanim. These are individuals who have devoted their lives to Hashem, to learning and teaching Torah, and to giving up their private civilian roles in order to live a life apart as models of avodas Hashem. They are intended to be the equivalent of Hollywood celebrities, epitomizing the life of chochmah (wisdom) and divine service rather than the life of fame and glamour. We are meant to look up to them and want to be like them, knowing full well that their lifestyle will likely be outside of our reach. When a Jew makes a pilgrimage to the Beis ha’Mikdash and sees Kohanim in action, he should be filled with a sense of awe and admiration. If that Kohen were blemished in any way, this would shatter the illusion and dilute the effect, thereby impeding the fundamental mission of Mikdash. 

This is why physical blemishes only disqualify Kohanim from their role in avodah, and do not invalidate any other Jew from doing any other mitzvah. Only Kohanim in the awe-inspiring Mikdash occupy this celebrity status in Judaism. There are other classes of individuals who are to be admired and emulated – such as talmidei chachamim (Torah scholars), tzadikim (righteous people), chasidim (pious people) – but none of these individuals function in the same capacity as the Kohanim of Mikdash. “For the lips of the Kokhen should safeguard knowledge, and people should seek teaching from his mouth, for he is an angel of Hashem, Master of Legions” (Malachi 2:7). Just as the true “angels of Hashem” are pristine in their metaphysical purity, so must their earthly counterparts be pristine in their physicality. 

I believe that this gives us some insight into the Torah’s general approach in mitzvos. The Rambam (Moreh ha’Nevuchim 3:32), in his famous explanation of korbanos (sacrifices), writes: 

Many commandments in our Torah are the result of a similar course adopted by the same Director, for it is impossible to go suddenly from one extreme to the other; therefore, it is impossible for man – according to human nature – to suddenly discontinue everything to which he has been accustomed. 

The Rambam applies this to korbanos, explaining that it would have been too much for Hashem to completely abolish a mode of worship to which the people had become so attached. He cites an example of Hashem using this approach in a non-mitzvah area: 

There occurs in the Torah a passage which contains exactly the same idea; it is the following: “God did not lead them by way of the land of the Philistines, even though it was near, for God said, ‘lest the people change their mind when they see war, and return to Egypt;’ but God led the people around, by way of the wilderness of the Sea of Reeds” (Shemos 13:17). Here Hashem led the people around, away from the direct road which He originally intended, because He was concerned that they might meet on that way with hardships too great for their ordinary strength; He took them by another road in order to obtain thereby His original goal. In the same manner Hashem refrained from commanding what the people by their natural disposition would be incapable of obeying, and gave the aforementioned commandments as a means of accomplishing His primary goal– namely, knowledge of Him, and the rejection of avodah zarah. 

The disqualifying blemishes of the Kohanim are another example of this phenomenon. On the one hand, the Torah does not assign any inherent value to physical attractiveness. At the same time, the Torah recognizes that it is human nature to care about physical appearances. The Torah can emphasize time and again that the essence of a human being is the tzelem Elokim and that true success lies in the pursuit of knowledge rather than beauty, but at the end of the day, the average Jew will still look askance at a Kohen with a unibrow, will be distracted by a Kohen who is an albino, and will be put off by a Kohen with bad body odor. 

In other words, the Torah must walk a fine line between its idealistic goal of perfecting human beings and the pragmatic realities of catering to human nature. That line can only be drawn by the Creator of man, “the God of the spirits of all flesh” (Bamidbar 16:22). Shlomo ha’Melech said: “Train the youth in accordance with his way (i.e. his nature), and even when he is old, he will not deviate from it” (Mishlei 22:6), and the same pedagogical tactic is employed by the Giver of Torah.

The Limits of she'Lo Lishmah

This post is predicated on a basic familiarity with the two levels of doing a mitzvah or learning Torah: lishmah (for its own sake) and she'lo lishmah (not for its own sake). The Rambam defines these two terms in his introduction to Perek Chelek. If you haven't yet read his discourse on this topic, or if you need a refresher, I advise you to check out the translation I posted here before reading this post.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Seedtime, by Rebecca Guay
(I used this here because it's how I picture "the pampered women of Machoza")

The Limits of she'Lo Lishmah

The Question

The highest level of learning Torah and doing mitzvos is lishmah. Nevertheless, Chazal urged us to be involved in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah. Why? Because "mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah - from she'lo lishmah, one will come to lishmah." [1]

A couple of years ago my chavrusa and I took up the question: What are the limits of she'lo lishmah? How far removed from "the ideal motives" for Torah and mitzvos would still be considered she'lo lishmah such that the aforementioned statement of Chazal would apply?

The examples of she'lo lishmah in the Rambam's parable are fairly straightforward:

• learning Torah in order to get a piece of candy or a fig
• learning Torah in order to get a fancy pair of shoes or item of clothing
• learning Torah in order to get money
• learning Torah in order to become a rabbi who receives honor from other people

In all four cases the student is learning Torah in order to obtain some good other than the learning itself. Presumably, the child is aware that he is learning Torah, and that learning Torah is a mitzvah, but he is simply not motivated by the learning itself. It's easy to see how this type of she'lo lishmah might naturally lead to lishmah, especially when it comes to learning. Doing mitzvos she'lo lishmah is bit trickier, but it's still conceivable that a mitzvah she'lo lishmah would lend itself to development towards lishmah.

But how far can this principle be extended? Compare the Rambam's examples with the following questionable cases:

• Case #1: a person is forced to do a mitzvah without any awareness at all about the nature of what he is doing. For example, imagine an immigrant from a repressive regime who is forced by a Chabad emissary to put on tefillin, and has no idea what's going on because he doesn't speak English and he's neither seen nor heard of tefillin in his life. [Note: for the purposes of this example, and this post, I am assuming we hold "mitzvos ein tzrichos kavanah" ("mitzvos do not require intention") from a halachic standpoint.]
• Case #2: a person has a completely warped notion of the nature of what he's doing. For instance, imagine a person who shakes a lulav believing that he's drawing upon spiritual earth-energy in order to "realign his chakras," or a person who avoids eating non-kosher food because he thinks it will literally kill him. These individuals definitely fulfill their halachic obligations, but will they naturally come to lishmah in the same way as the child in the Rambam's example?
• Case #3: a person does a mitzvah in an entirely incidental or accidental manner, with absolutely no intention for the mitzvah at all. For example, it would be entirely possible for someone who is allergic to gluten to neither eat nor own chametz on Pesach by default, without taking any special effort to do so for mitzvah reasons. It's even easier to observe mishpatim (i.e. mitzvos whose reasons are obvious) out of sheer common sense, without any mitzvah motives whatsoever. Building a maakeh (parapet) around one's roof so people don't fall and injure themselves, helping an elderly person cross the street, using accurate weights and measures, refraining from murder, kidnapping, and lying under oath - there are dozens of mitzvos that people keep every day without any awareness that they're observing halacha. 

Are these cases still within the scope of "mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah" or would we say that although these individuals might fulfill a technical halachic obligation, they would not fall within this category? 

The Indolent Women of Machoza

In searching for an answer to this question, my chavrusa and I stumbled upon an important Gemara which sheds a great deal of light on the topic. The Mishnah in Pesachim 4:1 (50a) states:

In a place where [the people] were accustomed to work on Erev Pesach (Passover eve) until midday, one may do so. In a place where the people were accustomed not to work, one may not do so. 

The Gemara (50b) discusses the parallel halachos (laws) which pertain to the eves and conclusions of other special days:

One who performs labor on Erev Shabbos (Sabbath eve) or Erev Yom Tov from minchah-time onward, and on Motzai Shabbos (the conclusion of the Sabbath), on Motzai Yom Tov, or Motzai Yom ha'Kippurim ... [such a person] will never see a sign of blessing [from this work].

The Gemara then classifies the types of people who receive this aforementioned blessing and those who don't:

The Sages taught [in a Tosefta]: "There is one who is diligent and rewarded; and there is one who is diligent but suffers a loss; there is one who is indolent but rewarded; and there is one who is indolent and suffers a loss. [How so?] 'Diligent and rewarded' is one who works the entire week and does not work on Erev Shabbos. 'Diligent but suffers a loss' is one who works all week and works on Erev Shabbos. 'Indolent but rewarded' is one who does not work the entire week and does not work on Erev Shabbos. 'Indolent and suffers a loss' is one who does not work the entire week and works on Erev Shabbos." 

Rava said: "With regard to those women of Machoza, even though they do not work on Erev Shabbos, it is due to excessive pampering, because they don't work on any other day [either]. Even so, we call them 'indolent but rewarded.'"

Rava brought up a contradiction: "It is written: 'for Your mercy is great unto the heavens' (Tehilim 57:11) and it is [also] written: 'for Your mercy is great above the heavens' (ibid. 108:5). How [can this contradiction be resolved]? [The pasuk which describes His mercy as above the heavens refers to a case where] one does [a mitzvah] lishmah, [whereas the pasuk which describes His mercy as merely reaching the heavens refers to a case where] one does [a mitzvah] she'lo lishmah."  

[This teaching of Rava] accords with what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: "a person should always engage in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah, because from she'lo lishmah one will come to lishmah."

The salient point here is Rava's statement about the women of Machoza. These "pampered" women never work, and yet the Gemara places them in the category of "indolent but rewarded" for their abstaining from work on Erev Shabbos.

One might read Rava's remark about the women of Machoza as pertaining solely to the passage that preceded it, regarding the fourfold classification of people who are diligent, indolent, rewarded, and who suffer a loss. Rashi, however, connects the women of Machoza case to the statements that follow, regarding the virtue of learning and doing mitzvos she'lo lishmah. Rashi explains:

"indolent but rewarded" is one who didn't work all week and also [didn't work] on Erev Shabbos - and even though they didn't intend [to abstain from work] for the sake of a mitzvah, it is nevertheless a mitzvah she'lo lishmah, as they say later on: "a person should always be involved in a mitzvah even she'lo lishmah."

The Ran echoes this reading of the Gemara in his comments on Rava's explanation of the contradiction in Tehilim:

If you'll pose a challenge from Rav Yehuda himself who said in the Perek Haya Korei (Berachos 17a) about anyone who engages [in a mitzvah] she'lo lishmah that it's better if they were never created. [How can we reconcile Rav Yehuda's condemnation of she'lo lishmah with Rava's approbation of she'lo lishmah in our Gemara?] 

The answer is: there are many types of she'lo lishmah. [Rav Yehuda's statement condemning she'lo lishmah] pertains to those who engage in Torah in order to be contrarian and to provoke: since his intention is for an aveirah (transgression), then it would be better if he were never created. [2] [In contrast, Rava's statement in our Gemara] is dealing with a case in which his intention is neither for a sinful matter nor for a mitzvah, and instead is like that of the indolent person who is rewarded [and thus, like the women of Machoza]. 

According to Rashi and the Ran, the "indolent but rewarded" individuals who abstain from working on Erev Shabbos have absolutely no intention whatsoever to fulfill any mitzvah, but because their laziness just "happens" to result in the observance of a mitzvah [3], then they are rewarded for their she'lo lishmah observance. In other words, the women of Machoza fit perfectly into the Case #3 scenario mentioned above: their actions incidentally align with a mitzvah, even though their motives have nothing to do with Torah whatsoever. Rashi even goes so far as to explicitly state that their she'lo lishmah observance will (or at least can) lead to lishmah.

The question is: How can this be?! Is it really true that these lazy women of Machoza will eventually come around to refraining from work on Erev Shabbos lishmah simply because they kept this mitzvah by default, due to their pampered lifestyle?

Consider, as a sort of thought experiment, two groups within the women of Machoza: those who are Jewish and those who are non-Jewish. The women in both groups are indolent and pampered. Neither group does any work during any day of the week. They just sit there, lounging around, drinking their "Machoza Mimosas" [4] and gossiping about their fancy jewelry and fancy drinking-water. And yet, the Jewish women of Machoza are rewarded for their indolence simply because their lazy behavior coincides with a halacha. How does that make any sense?

A Possible Answer

If memory serves, my chavrusa and I initially arrived at the conclusion that the Gemara must have been assuming that the women of Machoza had at least some awareness of the fact that their abstention from work qualified as a mitzvah. Otherwise, how would it be possible to say that they'd be rewarded for their behavior?

When I revisited the question this year while writing this blog post I realized that our assumption wasn't warranted. We posited this because we felt compelled to by the strength of the question, but a straightforward reading of the Gemara wouldn't naturally lead to this conclusion.

Instead, I would like to answer as follows: even the she'lo lishmah behavior of the women of Machoza can lead to lishmah insofar as it contributes to the observance of that mitzvah as a behavioral habit. Allow me to explain.

My answer was inspired by the Rambam's approach to character development, as presented in Hilchos Deos (Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada). A full treatment of the Rambam's view is beyond the scope of this blog post. Here is the particular halacha I had in mind:

1:7 - How does a person habituate himself to these character traits until they are firmly established in him? He should do the actions which correspond to these “middle character traits” again, and again, and again, and repeat them constantly until these actions become easy for him without there being any burden in them, and they become firmly established in his soul. 

For example, if a person wants to develop the trait of generosity, he should force himself to repeatedly do acts of generosity (e.g. giving tzedakah to the poor, volunteering at a soup kitchen, donating clothing to those in need) until these actions become second-nature to the point where he can do them naturally, without experiencing any emotional conflict or resistance.

Does the Rambam hold that this is the highest level of ethical development? Not at all. Someone who gives tzedakah lishmah is certainly superior to one who gives tzedakah she'lo lishmah, even though acts of generosity come "easily" for both of them. But from a strictly behavioral standpoint, both of them will be able to do acts of generosity in a manner which is "easy" for them, "without any burden."

This point is even clearer when we consider ethical development in children. Let's use the example of the virtue of gratitude. Imagine two children: one who was raised to say, "Thank you" as soon as she learns to speak, and another who wasn't. At such a young age, it is doubtful whether these children are even capable of understanding what gratitude is. And yet, when these children mature to the point where they can understand what it means to be grateful, which one will have an easier time doing actions which express gratitude? Clearly the child who has already acquired the behavioral habit of demonstrating gratitude by saying, "Thank you." The other child will have to face an uphill battle to become a grateful person even if she intellectually recognizes the value in acquiring that particular virtue.

It is on this basis that I would like to answer the question on our Gemara. The reason why even the women of Machoza's low level she'lo lishmah abstention from work can still be characterized as leading to lishmah is because it contributes to their potential for a lishmah observance. Even though their motives and intentions have nothing to do with the mitzvah, they are nevertheless practicing behavior which is in line with the mitzvah, thereby paving the way for a lishmah observance of the mitzvah by making that observance easier to keep.

Consider another thought experiment: an "indolent but rewarded" woman of Machoza who doesn't work during the week and doesn't work on Erev Shabbos, and a "diligent but suffers a loss" woman of Manhattan who works during the week and works on Erev Shabbos. Imagine that both women decide to become more religious and wish to take on the meritorious practice of not working on Erev Shabbos. Which woman will have an easier time doing so? Clearly the woman of Machoza! Her habit of not working on Erev Shabbos will be a boon for her, even though this habit was initially established out of laziness, and had nothing to do with Torah and mitzvos!

If I am correct, then we need to tweak our understanding of "mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah." This statement does not mean that doing a mitzvah she'lo lishmah will naturally develop a person towards doing that mitzvah lishmah. Rather, it can also mean that doing a mitzvah she'lo lishmah will facilitate the move to lishmah in any way - whether by contributing to a person's development in an active way, or by removing an impediment to their lishmah development.

Thus, the immigrant who is forced to put on tefillin without any knowledge of what he's doing, the lulav-shaking chakra realigner, the person who is allergic to gluten - all three types of cases fit into the category of mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah, insofar as they pave the way for lishmah by removing the behavioral impediments to a lishmah observance of the mitzvah. I like to imagine that the Ran had this in mind when he waved his hand, shook his head, and answered his own question by saying, "Don't worry: there are many types of she'lo lishmah."

Conclusion

I'm sure there is more to explore on this topic, but I think that this idea stands on its own. The take-away lesson is this: don't underestimate the impact of behavioral conditioning in the pursuit of ethical and intellectual perfection. It would be very easy to look down on the women of Machoza - or on the immigrant being wrapped in tefillin [5] without knowledge, or on the lulav-waving chakra charger, or the gluten-free chametz avoider - but according to our Gemara, even these low-level she'lo lishmah types of mitzvah observance lead to lishmah, and should be encouraged and looked upon favorably. Similarly, one should never dismiss or discourage anyone from keeping halacha even if their motives have nothing to do with halacha. Lastly, one should not view this type of she'lo lishmah observance as beneath our own standards, and use this reasoning to rationalize not keeping a particular halacha. No matter how far removed from the Torah's ideals we are, we should always involve ourselves in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah, because mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah.

When we bear these points in mind, having mercy on the human condition and recognizing how every step forward is significant, no matter how small, we are aligning our own perspective with that of Hashem, "[Whose] mercy is great unto the heavens."

[1] Sanhedrin 105b, Pesachim 50b, Nazir 23b, Sotah 22b and 47a, Horiyos 10b, Erachin 16b - and probably more
[2] An analysis of what it means to learn “lekanter” and why this is an exception to the rule is beyond the scope of this blog post. I have an explanation, but including it would distract us from the topic at hand.[3] Ordinarily I am reticent to broadly apply the term "mitzvah" to all behavior that is sanctioned or encouraged by halacha, and instead prefer to treat it as a technical term referring to a specific commandment from the Torah or the Rabbis. I've decided to make an exception in this case, since the Gemara itself uses the term "mitzvah" to describe what is actually just a meritorious custom, rather than an actual Biblical or Rabbinic commandment.
[4] Let me be the first to reveal the official "Machoza Mimosa" recipe: In a champagne flute, combine 1/3 cup chilled sparkling wine, 1/3 cup chilled orange juice, 1 tablespoon of honey and 1 tablespoon of absinthe, as a kiyum in: "For the lips of a strange woman drop honey, and her mouth is smoother than oil - but her end is bitter as wormwood, sharp as a two-edged sword" (Mishlei 5:3-4). Yeah, I know that our Gemara doesn't condemn the women of Machoza, and not even Shlomo ha'Melech would consider them to fall into the category of "the strange woman" of Mishlei, but I still think that their "end is bitter as wormwood."
[5] "force-phylacteried" would be the appropriate verb

Rambam: On Lishmah and she'Lo Lishmah

I started writing a blog post about doing mitzvos lishmah (for their own sake) and she'lo lishmah (not for their own sake), and was shocked to discover that I haven't yet posted a translation of the Rambam's discourse on this topic anywhere on my blog. I decided to rectify that by posting my translation without any commentary, since it is something that every student of Torah should read. The paragraph divisions are my own.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Frantic Search, by Mitchell Malloy

Rambam: On Lishmah and she'Lo Lishmah

You, the thoughtful reader, should contemplate the following parable which I will present to you, and then pay attention to understand my words on this entire topic. 

A young child is brought to an educator to learn Torah. This is a tremendous good for him, because of the perfection he will attain from it. However, due to his young age and the deficiency of his mind, he will not understand the value of that good, nor [will he understand the value] of the perfection he will gain. Thus, necessity compels the teacher – who is more perfected than the child – to motivate him to learn by using something which is beloved to him, because of his young age. [The teacher] will say, “Learn and I will give you nuts and figs!” or “I will give you a piece of candy!” Then the student will learn and strive not for the learning itself, whose value he doesn’t know, but in order to attain that piece of food. The eating of that food is more important to him and more beneficial [from his perspective], without a doubt. Therefore, he will consider the learning to be a toil and exertion which he must work at in order to attain that desirable objective – that single nut or piece of candy. 

When the child grows and his intellect is strengthened, and that thing which he used to value becomes less important in his eyes and he goes go on to value other things, we motivate him with that which is even more important in his eyes. The teacher will say to him, “Learn and I will buy these fancy shoes for you” or “an article of clothing with such-and-such an appearance.” Then he will strive not for the learning itself, but for that article of clothing, because that article of clothing will be more valuable to him than the learning, and it will be the objective of the learning. 

When his mind becomes more perfected and that thing becomes less significant in his eyes, we motivate him with something greater than this. His teacher will say to him, “Learn this section or this chapter and I will give you a dollar or two.” Then he will learn and strive in order to earn that money, and the earning of that money will be more significant to him than the learning, for the purpose of learning – to him, at this time – is the earning of the money that was promised to him. 

When he becomes more cognizant and this thing [he once valued] becomes less significant in his eyes and he knows that it is a thing of inferior worth, we motivate him with something that is more important to him. We say to him, “Learn in order to become a rabbi and a judge. People will honor you; they will stand up in your presence; your words will be established and your reputation will grow during your lifetime and after your death, like so-and-so.” Then he will learn and strive in order to achieve that level of distinction, and the ultimate objective – to him – will be that people should honor him, exalt him, and praise him. 

All of this is despicable – yet, it is necessary for us, due to the deficiency of the human psyche (or mind), which causes him to make the purpose of learning something other than the learning [itself]. He will say, “Why should I learn this?” – only in order to achieve something which, in truth, is but a fantasy. This is what the Sages referred to as she’lo lishmah (lit. “not for its own sake”). In other words, he fulfills the mitzvos and does them and learns and strives not for the sake of that thing itself, but for the sake of something else. The Sages (peace be upon them) cautioned us, saying, “Do not make them (i.e. matters of Torah) a crown through which to glorify yourself, nor an axe to chop with” (Avos 4:5). They are alluding to that which I have explained to you, that one should not make the purpose of his learning that people should honor him, nor the acquisition of wealth, nor should he make Hashem’s Torah into a livelihood. 

The purpose of his learning should be nothing other than knowledge itself; likewise, the only purpose of truth is to know that it is true; the mitzvos are true, and therefore, their purpose is their fulfillment. It is prohibited for a perfected person to say, “If I do these good things and if I refrain from these bad things which Hashem prohibited to me, what will be my reward?” For this is like what the child says: “If I learn, what will I be given?” And they say to him, “Such-and-such a thing,” for when we see the deficiency of his mind – that he doesn’t understand the value of this thing, and he seeks out a purpose for the purpose – we answer him in accordance with the degree of his foolishness, [as it is stated,] “answer a fool according to his foolishness” (Mishlei 26:5). 

The Sages already warned us about this – namely, that a person shouldn’t make the purpose of his avodah (service) and his fulfillment of the mitzvos any of these things – in the statement of the pious man who grasped the truth, Antignos of Socho: “Do not be like servants who serve the master with the intention of receiving a prize; rather, be like servants who serve their master with the intention not to receive a prize.” By this they mean that one should believe in truth for the sake of the truth itself. This is what [the Sages] referred to as “oved me’ahavah” (“one who serves out of love”). They said, “he desires His mitzvos exceedingly” (Tehilim 112:1). R’ Elazar said: “His mitzvos” and not “the reward of His mitzvos” (Avodah Zarah 19a). How great is this proof and how clear it is, for this is a clear proof to our preceding words! Even greater than this is the statement of the Sages in Sifrei: “Perhaps a person will say, ‘I will learn Torah so that I can become rich’ or ‘so that I will be called “rebbi”’ or ‘so that I will receive reward in the World to Come’ – but the pasuk says, ‘to love Hashem, your God’; everything you do, you should only do out of love” (Eikev: Devarim 11:13). 

It has been explained and made clear that this is the goal of the mitzvos and the foundation of our Sages’ belief. The only person who will be oblivious to this is a fool and a naïve simpleton who has already been corrupted by crazy, fantastical, imaginary and degenerate notions. This [high level of lishmah] is the level of Avraham Avinu, who was oved me’ahavah (Sotah 31a), and this is the path which we are obligated to strive for. 

But the Sages (of blessed memory) knew that this was a very difficult concept which not every person can grasp. Even if he does grasp it, it will not seem correct at first glance, and it will not seem like a true opinion, since man’s nature is to not do an action unless it will bring him some benefit or enable him to avoid some harm, and if it does neither of these, then the act would be pointless. How is it possible to say to a Torah-observant Jew, “Do these actions and don’t do these,” not out of fear of Hashem’s punishment and not out of a hope for reward? This is very difficult, for not all people grasp the truth and will be like Avraham Avinu. 

Therefore, they permitted the masses to remain in accordance with their mentality, to do the good out of hope for reward and to avoid the bad out of fear of punishment. They encouraged them in this, and strengthened their thoughts about it, until the apprehender apprehends and knows the truth and knows what the perfected path is – just like the youth at the time of learning, according to the aforementioned analogy. They were critical of Antignos of Socho for publicizing among the masses what he publicized, saying, “Sages – be careful with your words! etc.” as we explained in Avos. The masses do not lose out completely by fulfilling the mitzvos out of fear of reward and hope of punishment; they are just not perfected. But it is better for them to do this in order for them to acquire the disposition and preparation for fulfilling Torah, so that they will [eventually] move on to the truth and serve out of love. This is what the Sages (of blessed memory) said: “A person should always be involved in Torah even she’lo lishmah, for from she’lo lishmah he will come to lishmah” (Sanhedrin 105b, Pesachim 50b, Nazir 23b, Sotah 22b and 47a, Horiyos 10b, Erachin 16b).

Honoring Our Non-Jewish Elders

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Left: [Great] Uncle William, at the age of 4, in February 1921
Right: [Great] Uncle William, at the age of 101, in July 2018

Honoring Our Non-Jewish Elders

Uncle William

My brother and I recently returned from our annual trip to Hawaii, where our mom's side of the family has lived for several generations. My mom's father was one of thirteen siblings, the oldest of whom was born in 1902. Of those thirteen siblings, only one is still alive: [Great] Uncle William (whom we refer to as "Uncle William," even though he's my grandfather's brother). 

Uncle William was born on April 1st, 1917.

Yes, your math is correct: this past April 1st was his 101st birthday. 

Let's put Uncle William's personal timeline into perspective by using American history and American innovation as a basis of comparison. The year Uncle William was born, Woodrow Wilson was president (#28), and Liliuokalani, the last Queen of Hawaii, was still alive. Hawaii wouldn't become a state until 42 years later. Television wasn't invented until Uncle William was almost 10 years old. He was a teenager during the Great Depression, and in his mid-20's he witnessed the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. He still holds it against FDR for taking America off the gold standard in 1933. He was too old to be in the Korean War, which started in his mid-30's, and he was nearly 60 when the Vietnam War ended. He was 75 at the birth of the World Wide Web, and he was 84 on 9/11. 

Impressive, no?

Uncle William worked as a furniture repair man for most of his life, and only retired at the age of 95, when he started having a hard time getting up after sitting down on the floor to work. He remained active into his 90's, riding his bike into town, trading up his vehicle for a new one (because "the old car didn't fit my lifestyle"), and mowing his own lawn ("it takes me three days").

All the while, his mental faculties didn't dull in the slightest. While not a towering intellectual or even a deep thinker, Uncle William definitely has a reflective soul. Although he didn't go to college or graduate from high school (my grandfather was the only one of his siblings to do that), Uncle William was a reader - especially of newspapers. He followed the news to the point where we could ask him for his opinion on any current event, and he would have something thoughtful to say. (For the record: he didn't like Obama because he was a politician and didn't like Trump because "he's just a big mouth" and he thinks that America is going downhill because Democracy appeals to the lowest common denominator; when we asked him who America's last great leader was, he said, "Clinton was good ... the man - not the wife.")

Unfortunately, Uncle William had a prostate issue two years ago, and needed to start using a catheter, which slowed him down. Things started going downhill from there. He had made it to the age of 98 living on his own, but was finally forced to hire an attendant to help him. By the time we visited him this summer his vision and hearing had deteriorated, and he now has 24-hour care.

And yet, he's still mentally with it! We talked with him for about an hour, and said that we'd visit him next summer ("If I'm still around!").

After visiting Uncle William this summer, I found myself wondering: "What would Torah say? How would Judaism frame my interaction with a man of Uncle William's age?"

I decided I'd look into it. This is what I found.

The Halacha of Honoring Non-Jewish Elders

The "halachic address" of our topic is the mitzvas aseh (positive commandment) of "mipnei seivah takum," which is derived from the pasuk: "In the presence of old age you shall rise, and you shall honor the presence of a sage, and you shall revere your God - I am Hashem" (Vayikra 19:32). Here is the Sefer ha'Chinuch's [1] summary of the basic mitzvah:

[The 257th mitzvah is] to honor chachamim (the wise) and rise before them, as it is stated: "you shall rise up before seivah (lit. white hair)," which Onkelos translated as: "you shall rise up before one who knows Torah." Our Sages of blessed memory explained "and you shall honor the presence of a zakein (lit. elder)" as referring to none other than zeh she'kanah chochmah (one who has acquired wisdom). The reason why Scripture expresses "chacham" as "zakein" is because a young chacham has seen through his chochmah (wisdom) what an elder has seen through the multitude of his years.

While the primary form of this mitzvah is to honor chachamim, we follow the opinion of R' Issi ben Yehudah in the Gemara who says that "[this pasuk] implies all [types of] seivah" which even includes elders who are not chachamim. Here is the Rambam's [2] codification of this secondary component of the mitzvah, which includes the case at hand:

We stand in the presence of a zakein ha'muflag b'ziknah (an elder who is very advanced in age) even though he is not a chacham (wise man). Even a young chacham should stand in the presence of a zakein ha'muflag b'ziknah – though he is not obligated to stand to his full stature, but only enough to show respect to him. And even a non-Jewish elder we honor with words, and we lend him a supporting hand, as it is stated: “rise up in the presence of old age” – which implies old age in any sense of the term.

The Shulchan Aruch [3] brings down the Rambam's formulation almost verbatim. Although there is some debate as to what age would qualify someone as a zakein ha'muflag b'ziknah - with opinions ranging from 60, to 70, to 90 - I suspect everyone would agree that Uncle William's age of 101 years places him firmly within this halachic category.

The source of the Rambam's halacha is the Gemara in Kiddushin (33a), which states:

R’ Yochanan would rise up in the presence of a non-Jewish elder, saying: “How many experiences he has endured!” Rava would not rise up, but he would show him honor. Abaye would lend his hand to [such] elders.

The Rambam paskins (halachically rules) in accordance with Rava and Abaye that although we do not stand up for a zakein goy (non-Jewish elder) as we would for a zaken Yisrael (Jewish elder), we show him honor in other ways: verbally and by providing assistance.

Although the Rambam's citation of our pasuk and subsequent explanation might seem to imply that he holds that honoring a zakein goy is part of the mitzvah de'oraisa (Biblical obligation), it is pretty clear that this isn't what he actually holds. If it were, then there would be no differentiation between a zakein goy and a zakein Yisrael. Rather, showing honor to a zakein goy is either a mitzvah mi'de'rabbanan [4] (Rabbinic mitzvah), or something we do out of darchei shalom [5] ("ways of peace," intended to maintain peace between Jews and non-Jews). This explains why we differentiate between a zakein goy and a zakein Yisrael - to show that the two acts of giving kavod do not share the same halachic nature.

The Philosophy Behind the Halacha

The Sefer ha'Chinuch offers the following reason for this mitzvah as a whole (i.e. to honor chachamim):

At the root of this mitzvah lies the reason that the main purpose of man's having been created in the world is for the sake of chochmah, so that he will recognize his Creator, therefore, it is fitting for people to honor one who has attained this. As a result, others will be inspired about it. It is based on this reason that Issi ben Yehudah said in the Gemara Kiddushin that even an uneducated elder - i.e. one who is not wise - is included in this mitzvah, for it is befitting to honor him because in his multitude of years he has seen and recognized some of the works and wonders of Hashem, and this is worthy of honor. This is why Rebbi Yochanan said there in the Gemara Kiddushin: "the halacha is in accordance with Issi ben Yehudah" - on the condition that [the elder] is not a confirmed sinner, in which case, he has deprived himself of honor.

Even though we have established that the obligation of honoring a zakein goy is not a part of the mitzvah de'oraisa, the reason behind this act of honor is definitely related. As stated above, R' Yochanan explained his reason for standing in the presence of a zakein goy, saying: "How many (harpatkei) experiences he has endured!" Rashi [6] explains the unusual term "harpatkei":

harpatkei [means] experiences and troubles; and they have seen many miracles and wonders.

According to Rashi, we honor a zakein goy not for any type of specialized chochmah that he may or may not have. Rather, we honor him for the chochmah that he has gained from his life-experience and the wondrous phenomena he has had the opportunity to witness. This would certainly apply to non-Jew elders, no matter where they're from.

Rav Hirsch [7] provides a similar explanation, differentiating between the two reasons for honoring an elder, which he relates to the two words used to denote "old age" (i.e. seivah and ziknah):

He who honors seivah honors experience; that is, he honors the natural human perception that matures through the repeated events of life and nature. He who honors ziknah honors wisdom; that is, he honors the understanding of life and nature that is obtained from God's Word. For God's Word reveals the Divine source and purpose of life and nature, and their significance for our mission. We must pay tribute to both: the clear and circumspect human intellect, which matures through experience; and the spirit of God, which proceeds from the Torah. And whenever we find them, in the aged and in the wise, we are to show our homage by rising and honoring.  

The Ralbag [8] seems to learn our pasuk as teaching two separate mitzvos: "in the presence of old age you shall rise" commands us to honor elders, regardless of their wisdom, and "honor the presence of a sage" commands us to honor chachamim. He explains the first mitzvah very similarly to the Sefer ha'Chinuch, but throws in a Gersonidean twist at the end:

"in the presence of old age you shall rise" is a mitzvas aseh to rise up in the presence of every aged person, in order to honor him. There is a benefit in this: on account of this, those who are young in days will listen to the words of the aged, and their words will be precious to them, and they will behave in accordance with their discipline. For the aged, due to the multitude of worldly events that they have witnessed, will come to know by way of experience many principles of decision-making and ethics. Thus, one who listens to these words will be saved from many afflictions that would have befallen him, were it not for the advice of the aged. Furthermore, [one who honors the aged] will take it to heart to give great honor to Hashem, Who is Eternal - Who never didn't exist, and will never depart [from existence]. 

In other words, this mitzvah operates on two levels. On a practical level, the mitzvah facilitates the bequeathal of valuable life lessons from the older generation to the younger. On a philosophical/psychological level, this mitzvah trains us to have reverence for existence, which - according to the Ralbag - will ultimately strengthen our reverence for Hashem, Whose Existence is Eternal.

Ibn Ezra, [9] however, has a radically different take on this mitzvah:

The meaning of "in the presence of old age you shall rise" is on account of a dead person, because an elder is close to death, since his body is considered to be as though it is dead ... the meaning of "you shall fear your God" is that He will punish you in the days of old age.

According to the Ibn Ezra, we stand up in the presence of the elderly not to show them honor, but to remind ourselves of our impending death!

Concluding Thoughts

As is often the case with taamei ha'mitzvos (reasons for mitzvos), it is entirely possible for multiple explanations to be correct. All of these explanations ring true based on the time I've spent with Uncle William.

Have my encounters with Uncle William led me to value and revere the unique type of wisdom he has attained as a result of his long life? Yes. Am I more inclined to listen closely to his words than I would if I heard them from someone closer to my age? Yes. When I see him, do I become more cognizant of the finitude of my own life, and the eventuality of my own eventual death? Definitely.

And guess what? I even got to perform the mitzvah this trip by lending him a helping hand when he wanted to move to a different chair!

I realize that this blog post didn't break new ground or anything. I just think that it's a great example of how halacha enriches every area of my life, and I wanted to share that example with you.


[1] Sefer ha'Chinuch: Parashas Kedoshim, Mitzvah #257
[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Talmud Torah 6:9
[3] Rav Yosef Karo, Shulchan Aruch: Yoreh Deah 244:7
[4] Rav Yoel Sirkis (Bach), Bayis Chadash: Yoreh Deah 244
[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Yaakov (Semag), Sefer Mitzvos Gadol: Aseh #13
[6] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Talmud Bavli: Kiddushin 33
[7] Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, Commentary on Vayikra 19:32
[8] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on Vayikra 19:32
[9] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Vayikra 19:32

Parashas Balak: Bilam as a Teacher of Ethics

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Skirsdag Flayer, by Austin Hsu

Parashas Balak: Bilam as a Teacher of Ethics

Earlier this week I made the following comment on Facebook: "We all have our least-favorite parshiyos, and Balak is mine." A friend of mine, no doubt trying to appeal to my interests, replied that he views Balak as one of the "Mishlei parshiyot, illustrating archetypes of various, mostly negative, character traits." His comment got me thinking. I associated to a mishnah in Avos 5:19 (or 22):

Whoever has the following three traits is among the students of Avraham Avniu, and [whoever has] three different traits is among the students of the wicked Bilam. Those who have an ayin tovah (good eye), a ruach nemuchah (humble spirit), and a nefesh shefalah (lowly soul) are among the students of Avraham Avinu. Those who have an ayin raah (bad eye), a ruach gevohah (arrogant spirit), and a nefesh rechavah (greedy soul) are among the students of the wicked Bilam. 

How are the students of Avraham Avinu different from the students of the wicked Bilam? The students of Avraham Avinu enjoy [the fruits of their good deeds] in Olam ha'Zeh (This World) and inherit Olam ha'Ba (the World to Come), as it is stated: "To cause those who love Me to inherent [an everlasting] possession (i.e. Olam ha'Ba), and I will fill their storehouses (in Olam ha'Zeh)" (Mishlei 8:21). But the students of the wicked Bilam inherit Gehinom and descend into the Be'er Shachas (the Well of Destruction), as it is stated: "And You, O God, shall lower them into the well of destruction, men of bloodshed and deceit shall not live out half their days; but as for me, I will trust in You" (Tehilim 55:54).

The Rambam [1] provides a full elucidation of this mishnah:

We have already explained several times that "ayin tovah" means histapkus (contentedness with what one has) "nefesh shefalah" refers to prishus (separation from sexual indulgence), and "ruach nemuchah" refers to anavah mufleges (excessive humility), as has been explained in the previous chapter. 

The three [other traits mentioned by the mishnah] are the opposite: lehitus ha'mamon (craving after money), which is "ayin raah," taavas ha'mishgal (sexual lust) is "nefesh rechavah," and gaavah (haughtiness) is "ruach gevohah." 

The three [aforementioned] virtues are widely known to be associated with Avraham Avinu. Therefore, anyone who has these three virtues is called "a student of Avraham," since he conducts himself with [Avraham's] traits. Likewise, anyone who has these three vices is "a student of Bilam," since he conducts himself with [the latter's] traits. 

I will now mention the places in which these virtues are explained in relation to Avraham Avinu and these vices in relation to Bilam - all of which are pesukim in the Torah. 

Avraham Avinu's ayin tovah is [reflected] in his statement to the King of Sedom: "Neither a thread nor a shoelace will I take from anything that is yours" (Bereishis 14:23), for this is the utmost degree of histapkus, for he gave up a huge amount of money and didn't profit from it even in the slightest degree. "Prishus" we see from his statement to Sarah when he came to Egypt: "Behold! Now I know that you are a woman of beautiful appearance" (ibid. 12:11), and the [Oral Torah's] explanation comes [and explains] that he had never fully gazed at her beauty before that day, which is the utmost degree of prishus. It also said regarding Hagar, after he married her: "Behold! Your maidservant is in your hand" (ibid. 16:6), which implies that he had no involvement in enjoying her or behaving flirtatiously with her [prior to then]; and when Sarah asked to send her away with Yishmael, the pasuk testifies that it this was only difficult for him because of the matter of Yishmael alone, in order to clear him of the suspicion that he was sexually inclined towards [Hagar] - all of these are signs of prishus - as it was stated, "and the matter concerning Avram's son greatly displeased him" (ibid. 21:11). As for humility - this is [reflected] in his statement: "I am dust and ashes" (ibid. 18:27). 

Bilam's craving for money was publicized when he came from Aram Naharayim on account of the money with which he was hired to harm Israel, as it is stated: "and because he hired Bilam ben Beor from Pesor in Aram Naharayim to curse you" (Devarim 23:5). The sexual lust [of Bilam] is reflected in how he advised Balak to set loose the [Midianite] women to engage in promiscuity with Israel and to be harlots; were it not for this disposition of sexual lust in his soul - which the matter was pleasing and desirable to him - he wouldn't have commanded [them] to do this, for a person's commandments are the reflection of his mind, since good people do not command others to do bad things, but to avoid them. The pasuk says: "Behold! - they caused Bnei Yisrael, by the word of Bilam, to commit a betrayal against Hashem regarding the matter of Peor" (Bamidbar 31:16), and the Sages said: "Bilam would have sexual relations with his donkey" (Sanhedrin 105a). Without a doubt, someone whose thoughts were this way would have [engaged in such] actions. But his haughtiness is [reflected] in the statement "The words of the one who hears the sayings of God [and knows the knowledge of the Supreme One, who sees the vision of Shaddai, while fallen and with uncovered eyes" (Bamidbar 24:16).

My friend's statement about the contents of Parashas Balak is correct: Chazal's interpretation of Parashas Balak is quite Mishleic indeed!

But this raises a question: Why did Chazal in Avos even need to explain these virtues and vices through Avraham and Bilam? Why couldn't the mishnah have just said: "Anyone who has these three traits is praiseworthy ... anyone who has these three vices is worthy of condemnation," or something like that? Why did Chazal frame these ethical teachings in terms of specific individuals?

The Ralbag [2] answers this question in his explanation of the Torah regimen and its parts:

The second part [of the Torah regimen] encompasses ethical-political wisdom in those areas in which commandment and prohibition are not possible, due to the improbability of attaining perfection of this nature among the masses of people to the same degree as it is possible [to attain perfection] in the realm of Torah-mitzvos. 

For example, if the Torah commanded us to only get angry over something that is worth getting angry about, and in the proper measure, and in the proper place, and at the proper time; or to only be happy about what is worthy of being happy about, and in the proper measure, and in the proper place, and at the proper time; and to only overpower someone who is proper to overpower, and in the proper measure, and at the proper place, and at the proper time; and likewise with all of the other traits and dispositions – [if the Torah did this,] all people would be in a continual state of sin, with the exception of an extreme minority. 

Matters of this nature are not fitting to be subject to command and prohibition, for this will bring people to be more lax in their fulfillment of the other mitzvos, once they see that it is impossible to fulfill many mitzvos of the Torah. For this reason, the Torah teaches us about these matters by telling us stories of our predecessors, who were widely known for their perfection of behavior, in order to guide us to follow in their footsteps and to emulate their behavior. And [the Torah] also told us stories of some of the despicable actions they did, and the harmful consequences that came from them, in order that we avoid doing these actions. 

According to the Ralbag, Hashem could have legislated ethical-political middos-development through halacha - that is, He could have commanded us in laws regulating anger and joy which were as detailed as the laws regulating kashrut and Shabbos - but He didn't do this. Why not? Because it would be impossible for people to adhere to this degree of self-control in their emotions, reactions, and dispositions, and they would inevitably sin. And because people would violate these laws constantly, and be in a constant state of sin, the observance of Torah as a whole would suffer, since people would begin regarding the other areas of halacha with greater laxity and less diligence out of sheer hopelessness.

In order to solve this problem, Hashem incorporated ethical-political development into the Torah regimen through role-models, both good and bad. There are several advantages to this method of inculcating ethics:

(1) This allows for a more flexible, personalized, circumstances-dependent path of ethical-political development for each individual, rather than the rigid, uniform, exacting medium of halachic legislation.

(2) By embedding these ethical-political guidelines in concrete cases involving actual people, it becomes much easier for students of all levels to learn from the behavior of these role models on a variety of levels. Instead of learning abstract principles about humility and haughtiness, the students of Torah can look at people like Avraham, Moshe, Bilam, and Haman, and derive developmentally appropriate lessons from the concrete examples, all in accordance with the developmental level of the student. 

(3) Psychologically there are a number of advantages to learning proper and improper middos from role models - too many to specify in this blog post. Perhaps the best proof of this is that the Torah commandment which obligates to develop good middos is "ve'halachta bi'drachav" - "you shall walk in His ways" (Devarim 28:9). Hashem didn't simply say, "Get good middos!" but rather, "Emulate My ways." Hashem was even willing to compromise the presentation of His Oneness by exponentially multiplying the number of anthropomorphic descriptions of Him in the Torah. That is how important it was to Him (so to speak) to utilize this method of ethical instruction in His Torah. 

This sheds a new light on why the Rambam devoted so much space to bringing proofs from the pesukim to show how the three virtues and three vices are reflected in the Torah's accounts of Avraham and Bilam. His objective isn't just to bring proofs for the mishnah's contentions, but to direct our attention to read the Scriptural narratives about these two people through the ethical lens provided by the mishnah.

According to the Ralbag, we should read ALL of the narratives in the Torah about ALL of the main figures through this ethical lens. Indeed, the Ralbag follows this approach in his Nach commentaries. At the end of every section, he identifies toaliyos b'middos (ethical lessons) that we learn from the behavior and decisions of the Torah's tzadikim (righteous people) and reshaim (wicked people).

And this brings us back to my initial feelings about Parashas Balak. Not only was my friend correct to point me to the Mishleic nature of this parashah, but in doing so, he reminded me that this framework can and should be applied to ALL of the Torah's narrative accounts.

Apparently, Parashas Balak is more interesting than I realized! I just needed the right approach.

[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Avos Chapter 5
[2] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on the Torah: Introduction