Wishful Thinking and Prophetic Interpretation

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Wishful Thinking and Prophetic Interpretation

Last summer, my mom asked me to look through a bunch of random Jewish books in our possession to see which ones we should keep and which ones we should sell or give away. One of the books I found (and have no idea how we came to own) was called, Fascinating Torah Prophecies Currently Unfolding (1997). The contents are exactly what you’d expect from a book with that title – especially one with a teaser banner on the cover advertising “fascinating codes and more.” 

I found myself thinking of this book after reading R’ Yosef ibn Kaspi’s introduction to Sefer Yirmiyahu:

This prophet Yirmiyah also did what Yeshaya [did], mentioning at the beginning of his book the name and intent of its author. This prophet also informed us of the intent of his book by stating that his prophecies were from the time of Yoshiyahu until the end of the days of Tzidkiyahu, in whose days and era the Temple was destroyed. Therefore, note that this prophet doesn’t speak at all about the building of the Third Temple, which we undoubtedly yearn for today. This is clear, for he prophesied the destruction of the First Temple and the building of the Second Temple, as Yeshaya did. The general rule is that it is not at all appropriate to ascribe to any prophet a prophecy about the building of the Third Temple unless we first find written in his book a promise about the destruction of the Second Temple. Without a doubt, Yirmiyah did not strive to assure them about the destruction of the Second Temple, even though he undoubtedly alluded [to it] with hints, as Yeshayahu did – just as Moshe alluded to the destruction of the First Temple with hints that would not be grasped by the masses … someone who is an expert in these holy books will understand the truth of our words.

Ibn Kaspi’s “general rule” is not unanimous. Others maintain that prophets do prophesy beyond their stated range. Rashi, for instance, interprets “I shall yet build you, and you shall be built, O virgin of Israel” (Yirmiyahu 31:3) to mean: “You had two buildings made by men. Therefore, they were destroyed. Yet again, I, Myself, will build a third building which will be built forever.” Ibn Kaspi was aware of such views, which is why he stated his objections at the outset of his commentary.

Which side of the machlokess do I think is correct? I have no idea. Why not? Because, as Ibn Kaspi said, only “someone who is an expert in these holy books will understand the truth of our words,” and I am not an expert in prophetic exegesis. Not even close. I have heard it said in the name of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik that “we no longer know how to learn Neviim nowadays.” I was unable to track down a source or a context for this quotation, but I refuse to believe he meant that the ideas and mussar (rebuke) of the neviim is inaccessible to us. Instead, I assume he meant that we, unlike the medieval commentators, are unable to decipher the precise meanings of the prophecies in the Neviim portion of Tanach.

It is very easy for a person to think they’re deciphering cryptic prophecies with their mind when all they’re doing is engaging in wishful thinking with their imagination. Who wouldn’t want to find a message of hope in a pasuk from Sefer Yirmiyahu about yemos ha’Moshiach and the building of Bayis Shelishi? But that’s exactly the point: our interpretation of the neviim should not be guided by hope, but by our knowledge of how nevuah works and how the neviim wrote. Rashi did not interpret the aforementioned pasuk to be about Bayis Shelishi simply because he wanted it to be about yemos ha’Moshiach. His interpretation was guided by his understanding of the subject matter.

Lastly, we must remember the Rambam’s words (Hilchos Melachim u’Milchamos 12:2) about Messianic speculations:

Regarding all of these [details of the time of Moshiach] – no person knows how they will be until they happen, for these things were hidden even from the prophets, and there is no clear tradition from the Sages on these matters. Therefore, there is disagreement about them. Nevertheless, neither the order nor the details of these matters are an essential part of the religion. A person shouldn’t involve himself in the words of the aggados (homiletical teachings), nor should he spend time in the words of the midrashim which were stated about these topics, and he shouldn’t regard them as fundamental, for they do not bring a person to fear [of God] nor to love [of God]. 

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17th of Tammuz 5779: Sforno - On the Breaking of the Tablets

Technically speaking, this post can be thought of as the completion of 17th of Tammuz: The Breaking of the Tablets (Unfinished). As it so happens, I completely forgot about that unfinished post when I set out to write this one! That's why I decided to make this a standalone. Perhaps it would have led elsewhere if I wrote it as the completion of the unfinished one, but for now, I'm happy I got the main idea down in writing in some form. 

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Artwork: Karmic Justice, by Ray Lago

17th of Tammuz 5779: Sforno - On the Breaking of the Tablets

Commemorating the Breaking of the Luchos

The mishnah in Taanis 4:6 (Taanis 26a) lists five events which we commemorate by fasting on the 17th of Tammuz:

1. the breaking of the Luchos (i.e. the stone tablets that Moshe Rabbeinu received at Sinai) 
2. the cessation of the tamid (i.e. the daily sacrifice) in the first Mikdash (Holy Temple) 
3. the breaching of the city of Jerusalem prior to the destruction of the second Mikdash
4. the burning of a Torah scroll by Apostomos (a Greek official) during the second Mikdash era
5. the setting up of an idol in the Mikdash 

This year when I sat down to learn about the 17th of Tammuz, I found myself bothered by Event #1 the most. Events #2-5 are all related to the Churban ha'Bayis (destruction of the Temple) in some way, but the breaking of the Luchos doesn't quite seem to jive with the others. The basic question is: Why do we commemorate this particular tragedy with an annual taanis tzibur (communal fast) along with the other four events? Does it share any thematic connection with them at all, or do we commemorate it now simply because it happened on the same calendar date? [1]

Even if we can't answer that question, we at least need to answer the most basic question: What insight are we supposed to get out of commemorating this event? The purpose of these annual commemorative fasts is to promote national teshuvah (repentance), as the Rambam explains in Hilchos Taaniyos 5:1:

There are days on which all of Israel fasts because of the catastrophes that occurred on them, in order to awaken the hearts [of the people] and to open the paths of teshuvah. This will be a remembrance of our corrupt actions and the corrupt actions of our fathers that were like our actions today, which ultimately reached the point that [these corrupt actions] caused these catastrophes for them and for us. Through the remembrance of these things we will return to do good, as it stated, “they will confess their sins and the sins of their fathers” (Vayikra 26:40).

What national cheit (sin) led to the breaking of the luchos, which is still extant in our nation today? 

Why Moshe Broke the Luchos

If you ask the average Jew why Moshe broke the luchos, they'll probably say: "Because of the Cheit ha'Eigel (Sin of the Golden Calf)." Although this answer isn't false, the truth is a bit more complicated than that. Let's review the pesukim in Shemos 32 about the Cheit ha'Eigel:

Hashem spoke to Moshe: "Go, descend - for your people that you brought up from the land of Egypt has become corrupt. They have strayed quickly from the way that I have commanded them. They have made themselves a molten calf, prostrated themselves to it, and sacrificed to it, and they said, 'This is your god, O Israel, which brought you up from the land of Egypt.'" 

Hashem said to Moshe, "I have seen this people, and behold! it is a stiff-necked people. And now, desist from Me, Let My anger flare up against them, and I shall annihilate them; and I shall make you a great nation."

Moshe then davens for Klal Yisrael, and is successful: 

Hashem reconsidered regarding the harm that He declared He would do to His people.  

Moshe turned and descended from the mountain, with the two Tablets of the Testimony in his hand, Tablets inscribed on both their sides; they were inscribed on one side and the other. The Tablets were God's handiwork, and the script was the script of God, engraved on the Tablets. 

Yehoshua heard the sound of the people in its shouting, and he said to Moshe, "The sound of battle is in the camp!" [Moshe] said, "Not a sound of shouting strength nor a sound shouting weakness; a sound of distress do I hear!"  

It happened as he drew near the camp and saw the calf and the dances that Moshe's anger flared up. He threw down the Tablets from his hands and shattered them at the foot of the mountain.

Interestingly enough, it was not the Cheit ha'Egel itself which angered Moshe and moved him to shatter the Luchos. When he was first informed by Hashem of Bnei Yisrael's cheit, Moshe didn't get angry. When he and Yehoshua heard the sounds of Bnei Yisrael's shouts in the camp, Moshe still didn't get angry. It was only when "he drew near the camp and saw the calf and the dances" that Moshe became enraged and that is when he broke the Luchos. The question is: What was it about the dancing that caused him to respond in this manner?

The Sforno offers an explanation which answers our particular question on Shemos and provides insight into what we are fasting about on the 17th of Tammuz:

When [Moshe] saw that they rejoiced in their disgrace - similar to, "when you do evil then you rejoice" (Yirmiyahu 11:15) - this angered him and he despaired that he would be able to repair the crooked in a manner that they would return to their [former] perfection and be worthy [to receive] those tablets.

The Radak, commenting on the pasuk from Yirmiyahu cited by the Sforno, explains the phrase "when you do evil then you rejoice" to mean that "you lack shame and contrition."  

According to the Sforno, Moshe did not get angry at Bnei Yisrael for the Cheit ha'Egel per se, as we noted in our reading of the pesukim. Rather, he got angry when he saw their shameless joy in their transgression, which revealed that they were beyond the point of teshuvah. That is why he broke the Luchos.

In order to appreciate Moshe's seeming change of attitude upon seeing the dancing, we need to understand why the Cheit ha'Egel itself didn't elicit an angry response from Moshe. The Rav (Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik), in his famous shiur On Leadership, provides some context for understanding Moshe's initial take on the Cheit ha'Egel:

The making of the Egel was the result of great primitive fright. The people thought that Moshe was died, they were afraid of the desert, they did not know what the future held in store for them, they were simply overwhelmed by a feeling of loneliness and terror, consequently, they violated the precept of Avodah Zarah (idolatry). There were mitigating circumstances - they wanted the golden calf to substitute for Moshe, as all the Rishonim (medieval commentators) say. 

This would explain why Moshe didn't become enraged when he first learned of the Cheit ha'Eigel. Bnei Yisrael's transgression, though egregious, was not an outright rebellion, but rather a severe lapse of judgment triggered by a national panic. The people were overwhelmed by extreme fear which caused them to temporarily revert back to the primitive religiosity that had been instilled during the Egyptian Exile. 

At least, that's what Moshe thought when Hashem informed him of their cheit. But when he witnessed the dancing, and saw that they related to the worship of the Eigel not in the manner of a scared child clutching a talisman, but in the manner of a wild reveler indulging in an unbridled pagan orgy - at that moment he knew that complete national teshuvah would be an impossible task. This wasn't a brief and temporary regression to an infantile mentality. The joyous dancing was evidence that these were people "who speak of evil as good and of good as evil" (Yeshayahu 5:20), whose obstinacy would doom the nation from the start. [2]

To illustrate this point using a loose analogy: there is a difference between a recovering drug addict who, in a moment of weakness, caves to his craving and relapses, in shame and in private, and a recovering drug addict who joyously leaps off the wagon and throws a drug-fueled house party with music and dancing. Moshe assumed that he would encounter the former, and was shocked to discover the latter.

17th of Tammuz in a New Light

Thanks to the Sforno, we now have a better understanding of the tragedy of the breaking of the Luchos. We aren't just mourning the fact that Bnei Yisrael engaged in avodah zarah so soon after Yetzias Mitzrayim, nor are we just mourning the fact that we lost the symbol of the covenant that Hashem made with us at Sinai (i.e. "the marriage contract" as it were). We are mourning the first time that we, as a nation, reached a point of no return in our degree of transgression. This was the first time that we had become so entrenched in our warped mentality and value system that we actually rejoiced in our degradation. This same phenomenon would occur twice more, in what would prove to be a far more disastrous fashion, in the long series of national iniquities which brought about the destruction of the first and second Beis ha'Mikdash. 

I don't know whether this explanation is sufficient to unify all five events commemorated by the 17th of Tammuz, but at least it gives us something new to reflect on when observing this taanis tzibur. The Jews who worshipped the Eigel crossed a critical threshold in their level of corruption, and we are just as susceptible. Are we close to that point now? Have we already reached it? These are the types of questions we must ask of ourselves as a nation on the 17th of Tammuz. 

[1] I also have a minor question. Maybe it's not even a question, but just something that bothers me. I am 99% certain that the fast of the 17th of Tammuz wasn't instituted until after the destruction of the first Beis ha'Mikdash - an event that took place over 700 years after the breaking of the Luchos. Apparently, the tragedy of the Luchos was not sufficient in and of itself to warrant its own taanis tzibur. If the Beis ha'Mikdash had never been destroyed, we wouldn't observe a commemorative day of mourning for the breaking of the Luchos at all. In this sense, it seems like commemorating the breaking of the Luchos is an afterthought to the essential tragedies associated with Churban ha'Bayis. This just strengthens the question of why we fast for the breaking of the Luchos in the first place.

[2] Rav Hirsch provides a similar explanation of Moshe breaking the Luchos, but with a different emphasis - different enough that I didn't want to include it in the main body of the post, but similar enough that I wanted to at least share it in a footnote. He writes:

As long as pagan delusions, no matter what their form, are based merely on intellectual error and remain confined to the intellect, there is always hope that error will give way to enlightenment, that delusion will give way to truth, and that those afflicted by such notions will readily change for the better. 

Not so, however, when pagan delusion goes beyond intellectual error and corrupts people's character and conduct, and licentiousness is openly worshipped upon the altar of falsehood. In that case, sensuality clings to the roots that offer it such welcome nourishment. Just as it is the character of people sunk in moral corruption, and also difficult to enlighten them.

As long as Moshe knew only of the calf and its deification, he still hoped that he would be able to establish a pure home for the Torah among the people. Hence, when he descended the mountain, he took with him the Testimony of the Torah. But when he saw the calf and the dancing, he realized that the pagan error had already borne its usual fruit - the unleashing of sensuality. He then understood that the nation would have to be re-educated, for the sake of this Torah. So, without hesitation, with both his hands - yadav, the unified plural - he threw down the Tablets and shattered them. By this act he declared in no uncertain terms that the people in its present state was unworthy of the Torah and not fit to receive it. 

Parashas Mattos/Masei: Who is to Blame?

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Artwork: Memorial to Folly, by Sung Choi

Parashas Mattos/Masei: Who is to Blame?

This week we conclude our reading of Sefer Bamidbar. I taught Sefer Bamidbar for seven years, and there is one sentiment I encountered among my high school students every time: anger at Bnei Yisrael. Whenever we’d learn an episode of Bamidbar in which Bnei Yisrael sinned and were punished, my students would grow frustrated and exclaim: “How could Bnei Yisrael be so stupid?!” “They’re so childish and immature!” “Why do we have to suffer for their sins?” 

As tempting as it is to place the blame entirely on Bnei Yisrael for their sins, that is not the approach that Moshe Rabbeinu takes in our parashah, nor is it the approach that Yirmiyahu takes in our haftarah. 

Parashas Mattos begins with Hashem commanding Bnei Yisrael to wage war with the Midianites. The Jewish men lead the battle, killing the Midianite kings and male soldiers, and taking the women, children, livestock, and wealth as spoils. 

Moshe becomes enraged. [1] However, his anger is not directed at the soldiers who engaged in the looting, but at the commanding officers who were appointed over them. Rashi, [2] citing Sifre, [3] explains why: 

and Moshe became enraged at the appointed of the soldiers – [namely,] those who were appointed over the soldiers; [the pasuk says this] in order to teach you that every deterioration of the generation is contingent on the gedolim (leaders), since they have the ability to protest. 

The Rambam codifies this principle in two places in the Mishneh Torah. The first is in Hilchos Deos,[4] in his exposition of the mitzvah of hocheach tochiach (“you shall surely rebuke a member of your people”): 

One who sees his friend who sinning or following a path that is not good is commanded to return him to the good, and to inform him that he is sinning against himself with his bad decisions, as it is stated: "You shall surely rebuke [the member of] your people" (Vayikra 19:17) … and one who has the ability to rebuke but refrains from rebuking is included in the sin of those [sinners], so long as he had the ability to rebuke them. 

The second instance is in Hilchos Teshuvah, [5] in his list of sins which impede teshuvah: 

There are four sins which are so severe that if a person does one of them, Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu will not provide him with the ability to do teshuvah, due to the magnitude of the sin. They are:  

1. one who causes the masses to sin; included in this is one who prevents the masses from doing a mitzvah  

2. one who turns his friend from a good path to a bad path, such as a meisis (one who leads a person to worship avodah zarah) or a mediach (one who leads a city to worship avodah zarah)  

3. one who sees his son with a bad crowd and doesn’t protest: since his son is under his dominion, then he is like a person who causes him to sin; included in this is anyone who has the ability to protest against others – whether a multitude or a few individuals – and doesn’t protest, but leaves them with their stumbling block  

4. one who says, “I will sin and then I will do teshuvah”; included in this is one who says, “I will sin and Yom ha’Kippurim will atone.” 

This does not mean that such sins are entirely the fault of the leaders, and that the sinners themselves are free from blame. The foundational principle of Torah is that that every human being has free will, and is the cause of his or her own actions. At the same time, the Torah recognizes that leaders hold a great sway over the parameters of their followers’ free will. Thus, if a leader fails to use his position of influence to save or prevent his followers from sinning, then he is considered to be partially at fault, and shares in the culpability of the sinners. 

For example, every Nazi in Hitler’s Germany had free will, and could have chosen not to align himself with the forces of evil. Yet, it is clear that a Nazi soldier raised by a Nazi family, educated in a Nazi school, and surrounded by Nazi ideas, Nazi patriotism, and Nazi ascendancy – such an individual has far more impediments to exercising his free will for the good than his American counterpart among the Allies. There are many paths of choosing the good which are clear and unobstructed for the American, but blocked or obscured in darkness for the Nazi. However, if Hitler and the upper echelon of Nazi leaders radically changed their view of their “enemies” – just as Japan and its citizens changed their view of Americans after World War II – then it would be far easier for the individual Nazi to exercise his free will and choose good over evil. Freedom of choice is universal, but it is not equal in mankind, nor does it exist in a vacuum. It is a tenuous thing, subject to external disturbances – like a flickering candle on a blustery night, in need of protective hands to shield it and prevent it from being extinguished. 

Yirmiyahu follows Moshe’s approach in his rebuke of Bnei Yisrael, but is even more explicit in ascribing blame to the leaders of the nation. He begins with a general message to the nation: 

Hear the word of Hashem, O House of Jacob, and all families of the House of Israel: Thus said Hashem: "What wrong did your fathers find in Me that they distanced themselves from Me, and they went after nothingness and they became nothingness? And they did not say, ‘Where is Hashem Who brought us up from the Land of Egypt, Who led us in the Wilderness, in a land of desert and pit, in a land of waste and the shadow of death, in a land through which no man passed and no person settled there?’ I brought you to a fruitful land to eat its fruit and its goodness; but you came and you contaminated My land, and My inheritance you made into an abomination.” (Yirmiyahu 2:4-7) 

But then he turns his rebuke to the leaders, specifying how each group of leaders is culpable: 

“The Kohanim didn’t say, ‘Where is Hashem?’ and those who grasp the Torah (tofsei ha’Torah) didn’t know Me, and the shepherds rebelled against Me, and the [false] prophets prophesied by the Baal, and went after that which has no benefit. Therefore, I will continue to quarrel with you,” the word of Hashem, "and with your grandchildren I will quarrel." (ibid 2:8-9) 

The Radak [6] explains how each of these groups was at fault for the sins of the nation: 

the kohanim [didn’t say,] “Where is Hashem?” – we have explained this [as follows:] the Kohanim who are before Hashem (i.e. in the Beis ha’Mikdash) all day, bringing sacrifices before Him, should have said to the nation that worships Baal, “Where is Hashem, such that you worship someone other than Him?” 

those who grasp the Torah – these are the wise men who learn Torah; they “did not know Me” in that they didn’t learn Torah for its own sake, to fulfill what is written in it, but learned only with their mouths and a divided heart; this is what it means by “they did not know Me,” because good thought with good actions is [real] “knowledge [of God]” – not [mere] learning.

the shepherds – these are the kings who shepherd the nation, just like shepherds shepherd sheep.

and the prophets – these are the false prophets. 

If these religious and political leaders had stepped up to the plate, they could have halted the downward spiral of Bnei Yisrael, thereby preventing the destruction of the Beis ha’Mikdash (Holy Temple) and the galus (exile), or at least diminishing the severity of the catastrophe and suffering.[7] The people of the nation, themselves, are – as the navi said – like a flock of sheep. Each sheep has its own agency, but that agency is contingent on the decisions of the shepherd. If the shepherd leads his sheep to lush meadows, they will freely roam and graze; if he leads them within proximity of the wolves, they will have little choice but to flee for survival. 

I believe that this perspective on the sins of our ancestors has a bearing on the way we view the faults in our fellow Jews today. The Jewish world is split into so many different factions, religiously, politically, culturally, racially, socio-economically. Each faction has its own problems, errors, and transgressions. Some of these flaws are recognized by all; others fester, unnoticed. 

It would be easy to blame each of these groups of Jews for their own problems, but it would also be wrong. The bulk of the blame lies with the leaders – those in the remote past, the recent past, and the present. It is the leaders who have the power to protest and to put a stop to the problems which plague their people. It is the leaders who can articulate a vision of the good and formulate a plan to bring it about in action. The blame lies with them. 

But here’s the catch: by “leaders” I’m not just referring to those at the top of their respective spheres of influence; I’m talking about “anyone who has the ability to protest against others – whether a multitude or a few individuals – and doesn’t protest, but leaves them with their stumbling block.” By this definition, “leaders” include kings and fathers, roshei yeshiva and school-teachers, statesmen and neighbors, elders and older brothers, those who are respected for their wealth or for their wisdom. And yes, “leaders” include ourselves. 

Today is Rosh Chodesh Av. Nine days from now we will observe Tishah b’Av, one of the public fast days. These days have a common mission, as the Rambam articulates in Hilchos Taaniyos: [8] 

There are days on which all of Israel fasts because of the catastrophes that occurred on them, in order to awaken the hearts [of the people] and to open the paths of teshuvah. This will be a remembrance of our corrupt actions and the corrupt actions of our fathers that were like our actions today, which ultimately reached the point that [these corrupt actions] caused these catastrophes for them and for us. Through the remembrance of these things we will return to do good, as it stated, “they will confess their sins and the sins of their fathers” (Vayikra 26:40). 

Our national teshuvah has to start somewhere, but it is hard to begin if we don’t know where or with whom to place the blame. It is, after all, human nature to assign blame whenever something goes wrong. 

According to the implications of what we’ve written about today, the blame lies with ourselves, to the extent that each of us is a leader with a sphere of influence, however large or small that sphere may be. 

Perhaps, by recognizing the interconnectivity of Klal Yisrael, and by appreciating the weight of the power we have to shape the paths of the people within our daled amos (four cubits), we will, as a nation, begin anew the long process of returning to the good. 

[1] It’s unclear from the pesukim why Moshe got angry; see Ramban on Bamidbar 31:6 for an explanation. 

[2] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 31:14 

[3] Sifre 42 

[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Deos 6:7 

[5] ibid. Hilchos Teshuvah 4:1 

[6] Rabbeinu David Kimchi (Radak), Commentary on Sefer Yirmiyahu 2:8 

[7] Truthfully, according to my understanding, by the time Yirmiyahu’s prophetic career began, Bnei Yisrael had reached the point of no return. If they responded positively to his message and did teshuvah, the Beis ha’Mikdash would still be destroyed, and the exile still would have happened, but it wouldn’t have been as severe. 

[8] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Zmanim, Hilchos Taaniyos 5:1

A Definition of "Torah"

What is "Torah"?

This is one of the most basic question we can ask about Judaism. Like most basic questions, it is a surprisingly difficult one to answer.

Let's be more specific. What kind of a thing is Torah? Is it a book? Is it a system of law? Is it a collection of teachings and stories? Is it a religion? And if one is tempted to answer "all of the above," is there a unified definition of Torah which provides a framework for understanding how all of these characteristics are interrelated?

And what about the components of Torah? How do Torah she'bi'Chsav (the Written Torah) and Torah she'baal Peh (the Oral Torah) fit into a unified definition? What is the relationship between the Torah's narratives, prophecies, laws, philosophical ideas, and ethical guidelines? What place do halachos mi'de'rabbanan (Rabbinic laws) and minhagim (halachic customs) have within Torah, seeing as how they came into existence post-Sinai, but are clearly an integral part of Torah?

Artwork: Hassid Reading From Torah Scroll With Yellow Fiery Passion Going Up To Heaven He Points To Letters, by M. Zimmerman

The clearest and most explicit definition of Torah I have seen is the one provided by the Ralbag in the final sentence of the opening paragraph of his Introduction to Torah. Although his definition stands on its own, it can only be fully understood in context. You'll soon see why. Here is the first paragraph in its entirety:

Blessed and exalted be the Rock, Who, with His Understanding, His Wisdom, and His Knowledge, gives existence to all existing things – the existence of which manifests a chochmah (wisdom) and chaninah (beneficence) that none but He can completely apprehend. Praised be the Creator, Who, out of His desire to benefit these existences and to bring them from deficient existence to complete existence, directed His hashgachah (providence) upon these lowly existences, developing them stage by stage until He reached the existence of man. In addition to directing His hashgachah on man’s existence in the wondrous design of his anatomy, his abilities, and the faculties by which his [physical] existence is preserved, He did not refrain from directing His hashgachah on man by guiding him on the path to true perfection – man’s ultimate state of existence, for the sake of which this lowly material existence was endowed with tzurah (design) to the extent that it is. He did this by giving us the divine Torah, which is a nimus (regimen) that brings those who practice it properly to the true success.

I will now summarize and expand upon each of the Ralbag's points in light of my understanding of his hashkafah:

• Hashem is the Eternal ("the Rock") source of good ("blessed") Who transcends physicality ("exalted").
• He is the Cause of all existence.
• All existences are the product of His understanding, His Wisdom, and His Knowledge. 
• Although His chochmah and chaninah are manifest in the universe, He is the only One who completely apprehends it. 
• He is the Yotzer - the One Who fashions the universe. 
• As the Yotzer, He is praiseworthy (since we can only know Him through His creations).
• His will ("his desire") is to benefit His creations. 
• His hashgachah extends to all existing things (not only to man). 
• The role of His hashgachah is to benefit His creations, and to bring them from a state of potentiality ("deficient existence") to actuality ("complete existence"). 
• The hashgachic evolution of the universe's creation progressed from stage to stage (i.e. inorganic matter => organic matter => plants => creatures of the sea => creatures of the air and land) until it culminated with the creation of man.
• Hashem's hashgachah furnished man with everything he needs as a physical organism: his anatomy, his abilities, and the faculties by which he maintains his existence as a biological organism.
• But Hashem didn't stop there. In addition to hashgachically providing for man's physical existence, He also provided for man's metaphysical existence - his existence as a tzelem Elokim (truth-seeking intellect) - thereby guiding him on the path to his true perfection.
• He did this by giving us His Torah: a regimen that brings those who practice it properly to the true success. 

The Ralbag defines the term "the true success" in his commentary on Sefer Iyov: "the true human success consists in man comprehending Hashem, to the extent that this is [humanly] possible" (Ralbag on Iyov 34).

Artwork: Words of Torah, by David Baruch Wolk

The Ralbag's definition is as clear as day. What kind of a thing is Torah? According to the Ralbag, the Torah is a regimen. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "regimen" as "any systematic or prescribed course of action, esp. one adopted for a particular purpose or end." 

What is that end? According to the Ralbag, the ultimate end of the Torah-regimen is "the true human success [which] consists in man comprehending Hashem, to the extent that this is humanly possible." The Ralbag's formulation echoes the words of the navi:

Thus says Hashem: "Let not the wise man glorify himself with his wisdom, nor let the mighty man glorify himself with his strength, nor let the rich man glorify himself in his wealth; but let him that glorify himself glory in this: comprehending and knowing Me, for I am Hashem Who does kindness, justice, and righteousness in the land, for in these is My desire" - the word of Hashem (Yirmiyahu 9:22-23).

All of the Torah's laws, stories, and ethical and philosophical teachings are components of this regimen, and are instrumental in helping us to achieve its goal. The same goes for its components: Torah she'bi'Chsav and Torah she'baal Peh, halachos mi'de'rabbanan and minhagim. Of course, the question still remains: "How do these all of these things work together within the regimen to achieve the desired end?" Thankfully, the Ralbag answers this question in detail in the subsequent paragraphs of his Introduction to Torah. But even if he didn't spell out the answer, his operational definition of Torah would provide us with a sufficient basis for thinking through these questions on our own. That, to my mind, is what makes the Ralbag's definition so useful and enlightening.

The Ralbag's introduction helped me to realize another fundamental truth, namely, that matan Torah (the Giving of the Torah at Sinai) was an instance of the same hashgachah by which Hashem brings all things into existence. Just as Hashem brought the universe into existence through the laws of physics, and just as He brings man's physical body into existence through the laws of biology, so too, man's tzelem Elokim is brought into existence through his adherence to the Torah-regimen.

There is much more that can be said about the Ralbag's definition of Torah, as well as the other ideas in the first paragraph of his Introduction to Torah. With God's help, we will explore these points in future posts. For now, I urge you to take the Ralbag's definition and ponder it from time to time. I think you'll find this to be a fruitful exercise which will enhance your understanding and appreciation of Torah.

Let's review his definition one more time: the Torah is a regimen which brings those who practice it properly to true success - comprehending and knowing Hashem to the extent that is humanly possible.