The Limits of she'Lo Lishmah

This post is predicated on a basic familiarity with the two levels of doing a mitzvah or learning Torah: lishmah (for its own sake) and she'lo lishmah (not for its own sake). The Rambam defines these two terms in his introduction to Perek Chelek. If you haven't yet read his discourse on this topic, or if you need a refresher, I advise you to check out the translation I posted here before reading this post.

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Artwork: Seedtime, by Rebecca Guay
(I used this here because it's how I picture "the pampered women of Machoza")

The Limits of she'Lo Lishmah

The Question

The highest level of learning Torah and doing mitzvos is lishmah. Nevertheless, Chazal urged us to be involved in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah. Why? Because "mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah - from she'lo lishmah, one will come to lishmah." [1]

A couple of years ago my chavrusa and I took up the question: What are the limits of she'lo lishmah? How far removed from "the ideal motives" for Torah and mitzvos would still be considered she'lo lishmah such that the aforementioned statement of Chazal would apply?

The examples of she'lo lishmah in the Rambam's parable are fairly straightforward:

• learning Torah in order to get a piece of candy or a fig
• learning Torah in order to get a fancy pair of shoes or item of clothing
• learning Torah in order to get money
• learning Torah in order to become a rabbi who receives honor from other people

In all four cases the student is learning Torah in order to obtain some good other than the learning itself. Presumably, the child is aware that he is learning Torah, and that learning Torah is a mitzvah, but he is simply not motivated by the learning itself. It's easy to see how this type of she'lo lishmah might naturally lead to lishmah, especially when it comes to learning. Doing mitzvos she'lo lishmah is bit trickier, but it's still conceivable that a mitzvah she'lo lishmah would lend itself to development towards lishmah.

But how far can this principle be extended? Compare the Rambam's examples with the following questionable cases:

• Case #1: a person is forced to do a mitzvah without any awareness at all about the nature of what he is doing. For example, imagine an immigrant from a repressive regime who is forced by a Chabad emissary to put on tefillin, and has no idea what's going on because he doesn't speak English and he's neither seen nor heard of tefillin in his life. [Note: for the purposes of this example, and this post, I am assuming we hold "mitzvos ein tzrichos kavanah" ("mitzvos do not require intention") from a halachic standpoint.]
• Case #2: a person has a completely warped notion of the nature of what he's doing. For instance, imagine a person who shakes a lulav believing that he's drawing upon spiritual earth-energy in order to "realign his chakras," or a person who avoids eating non-kosher food because he thinks it will literally kill him. These individuals definitely fulfill their halachic obligations, but will they naturally come to lishmah in the same way as the child in the Rambam's example?
• Case #3: a person does a mitzvah in an entirely incidental or accidental manner, with absolutely no intention for the mitzvah at all. For example, it would be entirely possible for someone who is allergic to gluten to neither eat nor own chametz on Pesach by default, without taking any special effort to do so for mitzvah reasons. It's even easier to observe mishpatim (i.e. mitzvos whose reasons are obvious) out of sheer common sense, without any mitzvah motives whatsoever. Building a maakeh (parapet) around one's roof so people don't fall and injure themselves, helping an elderly person cross the street, using accurate weights and measures, refraining from murder, kidnapping, and lying under oath - there are dozens of mitzvos that people keep every day without any awareness that they're observing halacha. 

Are these cases still within the scope of "mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah" or would we say that although these individuals might fulfill a technical halachic obligation, they would not fall within this category? 

The Indolent Women of Machoza

In searching for an answer to this question, my chavrusa and I stumbled upon an important Gemara which sheds a great deal of light on the topic. The Mishnah in Pesachim 4:1 (50a) states:

In a place where [the people] were accustomed to work on Erev Pesach (Passover eve) until midday, one may do so. In a place where the people were accustomed not to work, one may not do so. 

The Gemara (50b) discusses the parallel halachos (laws) which pertain to the eves and conclusions of other special days:

One who performs labor on Erev Shabbos (Sabbath eve) or Erev Yom Tov from minchah-time onward, and on Motzai Shabbos (the conclusion of the Sabbath), on Motzai Yom Tov, or Motzai Yom ha'Kippurim ... [such a person] will never see a sign of blessing [from this work].

The Gemara then classifies the types of people who receive this aforementioned blessing and those who don't:

The Sages taught [in a Tosefta]: "There is one who is diligent and rewarded; and there is one who is diligent but suffers a loss; there is one who is indolent but rewarded; and there is one who is indolent and suffers a loss. [How so?] 'Diligent and rewarded' is one who works the entire week and does not work on Erev Shabbos. 'Diligent but suffers a loss' is one who works all week and works on Erev Shabbos. 'Indolent but rewarded' is one who does not work the entire week and does not work on Erev Shabbos. 'Indolent and suffers a loss' is one who does not work the entire week and works on Erev Shabbos." 

Rava said: "With regard to those women of Machoza, even though they do not work on Erev Shabbos, it is due to excessive pampering, because they don't work on any other day [either]. Even so, we call them 'indolent but rewarded.'"

Rava brought up a contradiction: "It is written: 'for Your mercy is great unto the heavens' (Tehilim 57:11) and it is [also] written: 'for Your mercy is great above the heavens' (ibid. 108:5). How [can this contradiction be resolved]? [The pasuk which describes His mercy as above the heavens refers to a case where] one does [a mitzvah] lishmah, [whereas the pasuk which describes His mercy as merely reaching the heavens refers to a case where] one does [a mitzvah] she'lo lishmah."  

[This teaching of Rava] accords with what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: "a person should always engage in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah, because from she'lo lishmah one will come to lishmah."

The salient point here is Rava's statement about the women of Machoza. These "pampered" women never work, and yet the Gemara places them in the category of "indolent but rewarded" for their abstaining from work on Erev Shabbos.

One might read Rava's remark about the women of Machoza as pertaining solely to the passage that preceded it, regarding the fourfold classification of people who are diligent, indolent, rewarded, and who suffer a loss. Rashi, however, connects the women of Machoza case to the statements that follow, regarding the virtue of learning and doing mitzvos she'lo lishmah. Rashi explains:

"indolent but rewarded" is one who didn't work all week and also [didn't work] on Erev Shabbos - and even though they didn't intend [to abstain from work] for the sake of a mitzvah, it is nevertheless a mitzvah she'lo lishmah, as they say later on: "a person should always be involved in a mitzvah even she'lo lishmah."

The Ran echoes this reading of the Gemara in his comments on Rava's explanation of the contradiction in Tehilim:

If you'll pose a challenge from Rav Yehuda himself who said in the Perek Haya Korei (Berachos 17a) about anyone who engages [in a mitzvah] she'lo lishmah that it's better if they were never created. [How can we reconcile Rav Yehuda's condemnation of she'lo lishmah with Rava's approbation of she'lo lishmah in our Gemara?] 

The answer is: there are many types of she'lo lishmah. [Rav Yehuda's statement condemning she'lo lishmah] pertains to those who engage in Torah in order to be contrarian and to provoke: since his intention is for an aveirah (transgression), then it would be better if he were never created. [2] [In contrast, Rava's statement in our Gemara] is dealing with a case in which his intention is neither for a sinful matter nor for a mitzvah, and instead is like that of the indolent person who is rewarded [and thus, like the women of Machoza]. 

According to Rashi and the Ran, the "indolent but rewarded" individuals who abstain from working on Erev Shabbos have absolutely no intention whatsoever to fulfill any mitzvah, but because their laziness just "happens" to result in the observance of a mitzvah [3], then they are rewarded for their she'lo lishmah observance. In other words, the women of Machoza fit perfectly into the Case #3 scenario mentioned above: their actions incidentally align with a mitzvah, even though their motives have nothing to do with Torah whatsoever. Rashi even goes so far as to explicitly state that their she'lo lishmah observance will (or at least can) lead to lishmah.

The question is: How can this be?! Is it really true that these lazy women of Machoza will eventually come around to refraining from work on Erev Shabbos lishmah simply because they kept this mitzvah by default, due to their pampered lifestyle?

Consider, as a sort of thought experiment, two groups within the women of Machoza: those who are Jewish and those who are non-Jewish. The women in both groups are indolent and pampered. Neither group does any work during any day of the week. They just sit there, lounging around, drinking their "Machoza Mimosas" [4] and gossiping about their fancy jewelry and fancy drinking-water. And yet, the Jewish women of Machoza are rewarded for their indolence simply because their lazy behavior coincides with a halacha. How does that make any sense?

A Possible Answer

If memory serves, my chavrusa and I initially arrived at the conclusion that the Gemara must have been assuming that the women of Machoza had at least some awareness of the fact that their abstention from work qualified as a mitzvah. Otherwise, how would it be possible to say that they'd be rewarded for their behavior?

When I revisited the question this year while writing this blog post I realized that our assumption wasn't warranted. We posited this because we felt compelled to by the strength of the question, but a straightforward reading of the Gemara wouldn't naturally lead to this conclusion.

Instead, I would like to answer as follows: even the she'lo lishmah behavior of the women of Machoza can lead to lishmah insofar as it contributes to the observance of that mitzvah as a behavioral habit. Allow me to explain.

My answer was inspired by the Rambam's approach to character development, as presented in Hilchos Deos (Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada). A full treatment of the Rambam's view is beyond the scope of this blog post. Here is the particular halacha I had in mind:

1:7 - How does a person habituate himself to these character traits until they are firmly established in him? He should do the actions which correspond to these “middle character traits” again, and again, and again, and repeat them constantly until these actions become easy for him without there being any burden in them, and they become firmly established in his soul. 

For example, if a person wants to develop the trait of generosity, he should force himself to repeatedly do acts of generosity (e.g. giving tzedakah to the poor, volunteering at a soup kitchen, donating clothing to those in need) until these actions become second-nature to the point where he can do them naturally, without experiencing any emotional conflict or resistance.

Does the Rambam hold that this is the highest level of ethical development? Not at all. Someone who gives tzedakah lishmah is certainly superior to one who gives tzedakah she'lo lishmah, even though acts of generosity come "easily" for both of them. But from a strictly behavioral standpoint, both of them will be able to do acts of generosity in a manner which is "easy" for them, "without any burden."

This point is even clearer when we consider ethical development in children. Let's use the example of the virtue of gratitude. Imagine two children: one who was raised to say, "Thank you" as soon as she learns to speak, and another who wasn't. At such a young age, it is doubtful whether these children are even capable of understanding what gratitude is. And yet, when these children mature to the point where they can understand what it means to be grateful, which one will have an easier time doing actions which express gratitude? Clearly the child who has already acquired the behavioral habit of demonstrating gratitude by saying, "Thank you." The other child will have to face an uphill battle to become a grateful person even if she intellectually recognizes the value in acquiring that particular virtue.

It is on this basis that I would like to answer the question on our Gemara. The reason why even the women of Machoza's low level she'lo lishmah abstention from work can still be characterized as leading to lishmah is because it contributes to their potential for a lishmah observance. Even though their motives and intentions have nothing to do with the mitzvah, they are nevertheless practicing behavior which is in line with the mitzvah, thereby paving the way for a lishmah observance of the mitzvah by making that observance easier to keep.

Consider another thought experiment: an "indolent but rewarded" woman of Machoza who doesn't work during the week and doesn't work on Erev Shabbos, and a "diligent but suffers a loss" woman of Manhattan who works during the week and works on Erev Shabbos. Imagine that both women decide to become more religious and wish to take on the meritorious practice of not working on Erev Shabbos. Which woman will have an easier time doing so? Clearly the woman of Machoza! Her habit of not working on Erev Shabbos will be a boon for her, even though this habit was initially established out of laziness, and had nothing to do with Torah and mitzvos!

If I am correct, then we need to tweak our understanding of "mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah." This statement does not mean that doing a mitzvah she'lo lishmah will naturally develop a person towards doing that mitzvah lishmah. Rather, it can also mean that doing a mitzvah she'lo lishmah will facilitate the move to lishmah in any way - whether by contributing to a person's development in an active way, or by removing an impediment to their lishmah development.

Thus, the immigrant who is forced to put on tefillin without any knowledge of what he's doing, the lulav-shaking chakra realigner, the person who is allergic to gluten - all three types of cases fit into the category of mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah, insofar as they pave the way for lishmah by removing the behavioral impediments to a lishmah observance of the mitzvah. I like to imagine that the Ran had this in mind when he waved his hand, shook his head, and answered his own question by saying, "Don't worry: there are many types of she'lo lishmah."

Conclusion

I'm sure there is more to explore on this topic, but I think that this idea stands on its own. The take-away lesson is this: don't underestimate the impact of behavioral conditioning in the pursuit of ethical and intellectual perfection. It would be very easy to look down on the women of Machoza - or on the immigrant being wrapped in tefillin [5] without knowledge, or on the lulav-waving chakra charger, or the gluten-free chametz avoider - but according to our Gemara, even these low-level she'lo lishmah types of mitzvah observance lead to lishmah, and should be encouraged and looked upon favorably. Similarly, one should never dismiss or discourage anyone from keeping halacha even if their motives have nothing to do with halacha. Lastly, one should not view this type of she'lo lishmah observance as beneath our own standards, and use this reasoning to rationalize not keeping a particular halacha. No matter how far removed from the Torah's ideals we are, we should always involve ourselves in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah, because mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah.

When we bear these points in mind, having mercy on the human condition and recognizing how every step forward is significant, no matter how small, we are aligning our own perspective with that of Hashem, "[Whose] mercy is great unto the heavens."

[1] Sanhedrin 105b, Pesachim 50b, Nazir 23b, Sotah 22b and 47a, Horiyos 10b, Erachin 16b - and probably more
[2] An analysis of what it means to learn “lekanter” and why this is an exception to the rule is beyond the scope of this blog post. I have an explanation, but including it would distract us from the topic at hand.[3] Ordinarily I am reticent to broadly apply the term "mitzvah" to all behavior that is sanctioned or encouraged by halacha, and instead prefer to treat it as a technical term referring to a specific commandment from the Torah or the Rabbis. I've decided to make an exception in this case, since the Gemara itself uses the term "mitzvah" to describe what is actually just a meritorious custom, rather than an actual Biblical or Rabbinic commandment.
[4] Let me be the first to reveal the official "Machoza Mimosa" recipe: In a champagne flute, combine 1/3 cup chilled sparkling wine, 1/3 cup chilled orange juice, 1 tablespoon of honey and 1 tablespoon of absinthe, as a kiyum in: "For the lips of a strange woman drop honey, and her mouth is smoother than oil - but her end is bitter as wormwood, sharp as a two-edged sword" (Mishlei 5:3-4). Yeah, I know that our Gemara doesn't condemn the women of Machoza, and not even Shlomo ha'Melech would consider them to fall into the category of "the strange woman" of Mishlei, but I still think that their "end is bitter as wormwood."
[5] "force-phylacteried" would be the appropriate verb

Parashas Chukas: Overlooking Sacrilegious Speech

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Artwork: Curse of Thirst, by Christopher Moeller

Parashas Chukas: Overlooking Sacrilegious Speech

To anyone who has read through Sefer Shemos and Sefer Bamidbar, it is apparent that Bnei Yisrael complain. A lot. On the surface, their complaints in this week's parashah seem to be harsh - not harsher than usual, but harsh nonetheless: 

The Children of Israel, the whole assembly, arrived at the Wilderness of Tzin in the first month and the people settled in Kadesh. Miriam died there and she was buried there. There was no water for the assembly, and they gathered against Moshe and Aharon. The people quarreled with Moshe and spoke up, saying, "If only we had perished as our brethren perished before Hashem! Why have you brought the congregation of Hashem to this wilderness to die there, we and our animals? And why did you bring us up from Egypt to bring us to this evil place? - not a place of seed, or fig, or grape, or pomegranate; and there is no water to drink!" (Bamidbar 20:1-5)

Sounds pretty bad, right? Not only do these statements reflect Bnei Yisrael's lack of bitachon (trust) and lack of hakaras ha'tov (gratitude), but they actually go so far as to accuse Moshe Rabbeinu of redeeming them from Egypt in order to kill them in the desert! 

One would expect Hashem to respond with a harsh punishment, as He has in many other cases, and to chastise them for speaking disparagingly about His greatest servant. After all, we saw what happened to Miriam when she said even the most slightly wrong thing about Moshe.

The astounding thing is that Bnei Yisrael aren't punished. In fact, they are given exactly what they ask for, without any indication of Divine wrath:

Hashem spoke to Moshe, saying, "Take the staff and gather together the assembly, you and Aharon your brother, and speak to the rock before their eyes that it shall give its waters. You shall bring forth for them water from the rock and give drink to the assembly and to their animals" (ibid. 20:7-8).

The question is: Why didn't Hashem punish them? What makes this instance of complaining different from the other cases in which Bnei Yisrael were punished? 

The Ralbag [1] answers in his summary of the toalos (lessons) we learn from the parashah:

The first lesson we learn [in this section is] in middos (character traits), namely, that it is not proper to excessively denigrate a person who makes inappropriate statements at a time of suffering and lack of strength. We see that when Israel suffered greatly because of thirst, and they were afraid they would die because of the severity of their thirst, they said harsh words against Moshe - and yet, we do not find that they were punished for this. Indeed, Hashem (exalted is He) gave them water.

According to the Ralbag, Hashem didn't punish Bnei Yisrael for their otherwise inappropriate statements because they were in a state of extreme suffering. In contrast, Bnei Yisrael's other complaints were not out of genuine distress. For example, the first time Bnei Yisrael complained about water, the pesukim make it clear that they were doing so in a quarrelsome manner, in order to test Hashem:

"The entire assembly of the Children of Israel journeyed from the Wilderness of Sin to their journeys, according to the word of Hashem. They encamped in Rephidim and there was no water for the people to drink. The people quarreled with Moshe and they said, 'Give us water that we may drink!' Moshe said to them, 'Why do you quarrel with me? Why do you test Hashem?'" (Shemos 17:1-3). 

Another example is the first time Bnei Yisrael complain in Sefer Bamidbar the Torah says: "The people acted as complainers; it was evil in the ears of Hashem" (Bamidbar 11:1). The meforshim (commentators) explain that they weren't genuinely complaining out of any real need; rather, they were "acting like complainers" in order to test Hashem, or to rebel against Him. [2] 

Similarly, in the very next episode: "The mixed multitude that was among them cultivated a craving, and the Children of Israel also wept once more, and said, "Who will feed us meat?" The meforshim explain that the people initially didn't feel the need for meat. It was only when the mixed multitude awakened their desire that they complained to Hashem. 

In all three of these cases, Hashem did not tolerate their inappropriate speech. Punishment was swift and unequivocal. Why? Because in none of these cases did Bnei Yisrael's complaining stem from any genuine need or state of distress. 

It is important to note that the Ralbag categorizes this lesson as a lesson in middos (character traits) rather than a lesson in deos (knowledge of how Hashem operates). In other words, Hashem's willingness to overlook Bnei Yisrael's inappropriate speech should not be regarded "merely" as some abstract principle of metaphysics. Rather, it should be looked upon as one of Hashem's middos ha'rachamim (merciful modes of behavior), which we are commanded to emulate. [3] 

Whenever one comes across a lesson in middos, it is useful to think about specific ways in which it can be implemented in one's own life. As a high school teacher, I am often confronted by complaining teenagers. They complain about everything under the sun: homework, tests, school rules, teachers, administrators, field trips, student activities, parents, the weather, the temperature, Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Judaism, Jews, non-Jews ... the list goes on. Sometimes their negative remarks cross the border into the "inappropriate" or even the "prohibited" category. 

As was the case with Bnei Yisrael, most of my students' complaints are out of line. However, after reading this Ralbag, I realize that sometimes - on rare occasion - my students' negative remarks do come from a place of genuine pain, distress, or unjust treatment. When this happens, I am sometimes quick to lump these complaints into the general category of unwarranted teenage complaining. But I now realize that if I am to emulate the middos ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu, I should really take the care to discern the nature of their complaint. I must at least make the effort to see past the words they are saying and try to understand where these words are coming from. And if they are coming from a state of real suffering, then it might be correct to respond with merciful tolerance, as Hashem did with Bnei Yisrael. 

In highlighting this lesson in middos the Ralbag is reminding us of a derech in learning ethics from Chumash. Whenever we find ourselves confronted with a situation in which Hashem acts differently than the way we would be inclined to act, we must investigate the situation and strive to understand the wisdom and mercy in Hashem's approach, so that we may learn lessons from His conduct which we can apply to our own lives.

[1] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar, end of Parashas Chukas

[2] see Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi) and Rabbeinu Ovadiah Sforno on Bamibdar 11:1

[3] see Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada - Hilchos Deos Chapter 1

Pink Hair, the Derech ha'Yachid, and Compulsory Piety

Pink Hair

As many of you know, I am a full-time teacher at a Modern Orthodox Jewish high school. Yesterday we had our end-of-the-year faculty meeting. One issue that came up - and which comes up in every faculty meeting - was tznius (modesty). Almost all Jewish schools have a tznius-based dress code, and all of them have at least some degree of trouble enforcing it. Our school is no different.

I zoned out during the initial discussion of the usual issues (i.e. skirt length, sleeve length, penalties, responsibility of enforcement). Thank God, male teachers are not responsible for enforcing the dress code, since this, itself, would be contrary to the values of tznius. But my ears perked up when this issue was brought to the table:

Note: the girl pictured above is not one of our students,
though it is an accurate depiction of the attitude displayed by some.

Apparently, towards the end of the year, one of our students dyed the tips of her hair pink. The question was raised at the faculty meeting: Should we add a "girls may not dye the tips of their hair" clause to the school's dress code?

The difference in opinion was drastic. Some faculty members were staunchly in favor of the proposed policy, others were vehemently against it, and a variety of reasons were given on both sides:

• We should ban dyed tips because it's an outright violation of tznius. 
• We shouldn't ban dyed tips because it doesn't violate tznius. 
• We should ban dyed tips because if one or two students did it, then who knows how many more will follow suit? 
• We shouldn't ban dyed tips because it was just one or two students; if we ban this, then many more will follow suit! 
• We should ban dyed tips because people in the community will see our girls and get a bad impression of our school. 
• We shouldn't ban dyed tips because we've taken away enough forms of personal expression from the girls; since this doesn't violate halacha and isn't immodest, why shouldn't they be able to do this? 
• We should ban dyed tips because there must be a certain look of professional propriety among students: just as teachers are required to dress for work and the boys in Modern Orthodox schools are required to be clean-shaven, so too, our girls shouldn't be permitted to engage in radical forms of fashion. 
• We shouldn't ban dyed tips because the girls already view the dress code as oppressive, which causes them to develop a negative attitude toward the value of tznius in general; by crossing the line to banning something as "innocent" as dyed tips, we're just adding fuel to the fire. 

In my opinion, the most outrageous argument for banning dyed tips was made by a well-meaning faculty member who said, "There might not be anything halachically problematic about dyed tips, but I just feel like it's not tznius!" That was the sum total of her objection. I wanted to say, "The stone-throwers in Meah She'arim also legislate tznius based on their feelings," but I held my breath.

My intent in this post is not to discuss the halachos or philosophy of tznius, nor do I wish to delve into the various considerations that go into school policy legislation. I want to discuss one issue, and one issue only: mandating conduct which is lifnim mi'shuras ha'din (beyond the letter of the law). Before we can discuss this, we need a framework. For that we will turn to Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha'Rambam.

The Derech ha'Yachid

Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha'Rambam wrote a sefer entitled Ha'Maspik l'Ovdei Hashem (which was published by Feldheim as a disappointingly loose translation). He begins his work with a general statement about the derech ha'Torah (path of Torah): 

[The derech ha’Torah] is comprised of two paths: the Derech ha’Am (Path of the Nation) and the Derech ha’Yachid (Path of the Individual). 

The Derech ha’Am consists in the fulfillment of the explicit mitzvos – doing the positive ones and avoiding the negative ones – in accordance with the obligation of each Jew ... The adherent of Torah needs to understand what God has commanded in His Torah to do as well as what God has prohibited to do. He must examine how the laws apply to him, and he must accept upon himself to fulfill what is incumbent upon him and to avoid what is prohibited to him. If he does not know what he has been commanded, his derech will not bring him success ...  

Thus, if a person knows what he is obligated to do and he does it, then he is considered to be walking on the straight path which Hashem has placed before him to follow. One who follows the Derech ha’Am in the fulfillment of mitzvos is called “tzadik,” “tam,” “yashar,” and “sar me’rah.” The most accurate of these terms is “tzadik,” which implies “justice” and “fulfillment of one’s obligations,” for the fulfillment of the obligatory mitzvos is the duty to which we are duty-bound by Him (may He be exalted), like the duty of a servant to fulfill the commandment of his master ...  

One who is lax regarding these statutes is called “rasha,” “poshe’a,” “rah,” and “merah,” and other terms which are self-evident and clear. Each of these terms applies to a person in accordance with the severity of his sin and his intention, his laxity or his lack of integrity. The most accurate of these terms is “rasha,” for he commits an injustice by not fulfilling his obligations towards his Master, and he does not supply his rational soul with its proper due. 

Simply put, the Derech ha'Am is what we refer to as "following halacha." However, the Derech ha'Yachid goes beyond halacha:

The Derech ha’Yachid is a way of life directed towards the objectives and underlying ideas behind the mitzvos, and in accordance with the implicit goals of the Torah and the ways of the prophets and the virtuous and the like. One who follows the Derech ha’Yachid is called “kadosh,” “chasid,” “anav” and the like. The most precise of these terms is “chasid,” which is derived from the term “chesed” meaning “voluntariness,” for he voluntarily does what he is not obligated explicitly to do in the Torah.

Avraham ben ha'Rambam expands upon his explanation of the Derech ha'Yachid by contrasting it with the Derech ha'Am and explaining why we refer to each derech by its name:

We say as follows: One who eats matzah and refrains from eating chametz on Chag ha’Matzos, and one who dwells in a sukkah and takes a lulav on Chag ha’Sukkos, and refrains from work on Shabbos and Yom ha’Kippurim, and from eating and drinking on Yom ha’Kippurim, and from laborious work on Yom Tov, and wears tzitzis and puts on tefilin and refrains from prohibited foods and prohibited sexual relations as explicitly stated in the Torah, and strictly observes the positive mitzvos in which he is obligated and does not transgress the negative mitzvos – we say of such a person that he is following the revealed Derech ha’Am. 

We say “ha’Am” (“of the nation”) because it is the same for the most distinguished members of the Jewish people as well as the masses. Just as Yehoshua bin Nun is prohibited to work on Shabbos and is obligated to dwell in a sukkah on Chag ha’Sukkos, so too, all Jews are prohibited to work on Shabbos and obligated in sukkah-dwelling on Chag ha’Sukkos – those who have already passed on from this world and those who are to come after them, until the end of the generations. We refer to it as “revealed” because every person is capable of understanding it, and therefore, all who willfully transgress it are punished. 

Beyond this we say that one who understands the underlying idea of Shabbos and its purpose, and fulfills [this underling idea and purpose] through contemplation and involvement in the study of cosmology and physics on Shabbos, and focuses his mind on physical science, and in so doing, connects to inner kedushah; and one who understands the underlying idea of tzitzis and, through wearing them, remembers the mitzvos of Hashem in order to save him from the state of forgetting towards which he is drawn, and in so doing, ascends to the true level of inner kedushah, as it is stated, “and you shall be kedoshim to your God” (Bamidbar 15:40); and one who understands the underlying idea of the prohibited foods, and consequently reduces his intake of permitted foods and is content with eating only that which is beneficial and necessary; and likewise, one who understands the underlying idea of the sexual prohibitions and accepts upon himself to fulfill that which he understands – we say of such a person that he is following the inner Derech ha’Yachid.  

We say that it is “l’yechidim” (“for individuals”) because it is a level which is not reached by every adherent of Torah. We refer to it as “inner” because its obligation is not mentioned explicitly in the Torah, and one who disregards it will not be punished by human courts. 

The Derech ha'Am is binding on and accessible to every member of the nation. The Derech ha'Yachid is neither. Only those who dedicate themselves to the study of mitzvos will be able to understand their underlying objectives and be able to refine their keeping of halacha in accordance with their knowledge. This leads to Avraham ben ha'Rambam's next point: 

It should be obvious from this that the Derech ha’Am is not subject to different levels, for there is no intermediate level between one who eats prohibited food and one who does not eat it, or between one who desecrates Shabbos and one who does not desecrate it; rather, each and every Jew either fulfills this Derech ha’Am or deviates from it.  

The only way there could be a differentiation of levels is regarding the number of mitzvos one violates, or the number of times he transgresses a particular mitzvah. For example, one who neglects many positive mitzvos and violates many prohibitions is a greater transgressor than one who neglects few mitzvos and violates few prohibitions. Likewise, two people who violate the same mitzvah would be on different levels depending on how frequently each of them repeats the action. One who did not make tzitzis for his tallis that he wears every day, or one who continually shaves the corners of his head, cannot be compared to someone who donned a garment obligated in tzitzis without tzitzis once in his life, or shaved the corners of his head one time. In this manner there can be a differentiation of levels in the Derech ha’Am.  

When I said above that for the most part there are not different levels, I implied that some explicit mitzvos actually are subject to different levels. This is because the mitzvah of yirah (fear of God), the mitzvah of ahavah (love of God), and the mitzvah of avodas ha’leiv (“service of the heart” i.e. prayer) are general mitzvos, yet are subject to a great differentiation of levels. Everyone can fulfill them on a basic level, but in their ultimate goals they split off into the two paths: the Derech ha’Am and the Derech ha’Yachid. The action-based mitzvos, on the other hand, are not subject to a differentiation of levels in their performance.  

But as regards the Derech ha’Yachid, the range between the extremes is very broad, as broad as the distance between East and West. Those who follow it are on many distinct levels, even with regards to a single mitzvah, and even a single instance.

Avraham ben ha'Rambam concludes with a beautiful example of keeping one mitzvah on different levels:

For example, consider the Shabbos-observance of three highly perfected individuals. The first person follows the Derech ha'Am, which is to keep Shabbos and to refrain from desecrating it, but adds a derech ha'yachid: namely, through reflecting, in a general way, upon the purpose of Shabbos and contemplating the creation of the universe by remembering that the heavens and earth and all of their array were created during the six days, and that there did not exist any first cause with no prior cause except for the Creator (may He be exalted and glorified), Who gave us the Shabbos.  

The second person’s derech ha'yachid is as follows: he will contemplate these matters in all of their details; he will reflect upon everything that the first person did, but in addition, he will contemplate the entirety of existence and the components he can apprehend in particular, from the center of the earth to the far reaches of the cosmos; he will delve into the wisdom of the Creator (may He be exalted) as manifest in the creation, and he will focus specifically on that which was created on the first day, then the second day, and all the other days, in accordance with that which was stated in the section of Bereishis. 

The third person’s derech ha'yachid is as follows: he will contemplate everything that the second person did, but will delve so deeply into his scientific analysis and study that he will ascend to the level of true kedushah; he will rejoice in his Maker, due to the radiance of the shechinah with which illuminated him in his studies; he will attain proof of His Greatness from the greatness of His creations; he will comprehend the bonds between himself and his Creator, the bond of his intellect and the bond of the mitzvos, which is [one of the intended objectives] of his Creator in our observance of Shabbos, as it is stated, “It is a sign between Me and between Bnei Yisrael forever” (Shemos 31:17); he will diminish his involvement in anything which weakens this bond, and therefore, he will refrain from any eating and drinking on Shabbos which interrupts him from his studies, and he will refrain from off-topic conversation, and certainly from idle chatter. Ultimately, through this derech, he will attain an inner fear of Hashem and love of the Heavens and such a strong yearning for the Living God that even when his limbs crave nourishment, he will not sense hunger, since his soul is fattened with its portion which it has attained, as David stated, “My soul is sated as with fat and abundance” (Tehilim 63:6); sounds will resonate in his ears, but he will be too preoccupied to hear them; perceptible items might pass before his eyes, but he will not see them, as if his eyes are covered. Through his derech he will reach the realm of his desire and the hope of his soul, as it is stated, “Your Name and the remembrance of You are the desire of the soul” (Yeshaya 26:8). Without a doubt this third derech of observing Shabbos is different from the second, as the second is from the first. And certainly, there is an enormous difference between the third and first. 

According to this example you will be able to explain the other darchei ha’yechidim (paths of the unique individuals). One whose derech ha'yachid regarding prohibited foods only affects him to the point where he refrains from gorging himself on meat or becoming drunk with wine is far from one who has reached the level were “a kav of carobs was sufficient for him from one erev Shabbos to the next” (Berachos 17b). 

The same is true of the other darchei ha’yechidim: the distance between their different levels is tremendous and the difference between their followers is great.

Avraham ben ha'Rambam's presentation of the Derech ha'Torah revolutionized my view of the Torah system. Perhaps I will elaborate on that at a later time. For now, let us return to the more pressing matteres of life: should my school add "dyed tips" to its dress code?

Compulsory Piety

Let's go back to the faculty member who said, "There might not be anything halachically problematic about dyed tips, but I feel like it's not tznius." Let us assume, for the moment, that this teacher is correct, and that an argument can be made that a girl who goes out of her way to dye the tips of her hair pink is not conducting herself in accordance with the ideal of tznius. I could see myself agreeing with that.

What I cannot agree with is the ongoing trend in the frum world to force derech ha'yachid standards and practices upon the general populace. The Torah was designed with a derech ha'am and a derech ha'yachid for a very good reason. As Avraham ben ha'Rambam pointed out, the derech ha'yachid is a derech of chesed ("voluntariness"). As a person's understanding of Torah and mitzvos develops, he or she will gradually "volunteer" to supplement his or her observance of halacha with the additional strictures that are dictated by the philosophical objectives of the system. To make these strictures compulsory is to transform this derech chesed into a derech achzarius (path of cruelty).

Other policy-making factors aside, the teacher who "feels" that dyed tips are not tznius is more than welcome to impose this restriction on herself, in accordance with her own understanding of the character and purpose of tznius. It is one thing for a school to enforce halacha, but to enforce the derech ha'yachid is an entirely different matter.

Imagine what would happen if we started enforcing the derech ha'yachid in kashrus, prohibiting people from eating kosher food for pleasure or "merely" for bodily health and only permitting them to eat if we can ensure that they are eating in order to be involved in Avodas Hashem! Or imagine if we required every Jew to spend the entire Shabbos day involved in the study of physics, with minimal eating, drinking, and socializing. The derech ha'am would collapse under the weight of the enforced derech ha'yachid. People wouldn't be able to take it, and would abandon the derech ha'am altogether.

Sounds crazy, right? But this is exactly what is beginning to happen in many other areas of halacha. I don't know when this trend of standardization of middas chasidus started, but there are examples of this everywhere - not just in the world around us, but in the halachic codes which are the foundation of mainstream practice. 

For instance, let us compare the codification of a middas chasidus practice in two halachic works: the Mishneh Torah of the Rambam, and the Shulchan Aruch of R' Yosef Karo. The Rambam devotes Chapter 5 of Hilchos Deos to discussing the behavior appropriate to talmidei chachamim (Torah scholars). He opens the chapter with an introduction:

Just as a chacham is recognizable in his wisdom and character traits and is differentiated from the rest of the nation, so too, he needs to be differentiated in his actions: in his eating and drinking, in his sexual intercourse and the manner in which he uses the bathroom, in his speech, in his manner of walking, in his clothing, in the content of his words, and in his business dealings. All of these actions must be refined and perfected to a very high degree. 

The Rambam then goes on to specify how a chacham should conduct himself in each of these categories of activity. We will focus on a seemingly trivial behavior: walking. The Rambam writes in 5:8:

A talmid chachamim shouldn't walk with an upright posture and an outstretched neck, as it was stated: “walking with outstretched necks and winking eyes” (Yeshaya 3:16); nor should he walk daintily, heel to toe, like women or those who are haughty, in the manner described: “walking with dainty steps, jingling with their feet” (ibid.).

It is clear from the introduction to this chapter that this halacha about walking is lifnim mi'shuras ha'din. These instructions are for talmidei chachimim - not for average Jews. An regular Jewish fellow who walked with an outstretched neck might not be praiseworthy, but he certainly isn't involved in any halachic transgression. 

Compare this to R' Yosef Karo's formulation in the Shulchan Aruch: "It is prohibited to walk with an upright posture" (Orach Chayim 2:6). Period. End of story. If a person were reading the Shulchan Aruch, he or she would walk away with the impression that this requirement is not not just for talmidei chachamim, but for everybody - and it isn't just a lifnim mi'shuras ha'din guideline, but a full-fledged prohibition. 

There are countless other examples of mandating middas chasidus throughout the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema, not to mention the later halachic codes - and that's not even taking into account the advent of Chassidus, the rise of Chareidim, the surge of yeshivish culture, and all of the other sects and factions in the Orthodox world which push lifnim mi'shuras ha'din standards. 

[Note: R' Yosef Karo, himself, discouraged the practice of reading the Shulchan Aruch without having studied the Beis Yosef first. Those who followed R' Yosef Karo's advice would be much more informed, and would most likely be able to differentiate between shuras ha'din and lifnim mi'shuras ha'din. I am merely pointing to the fact that the popularity of the Shulchan Aruch has, unfortunately, helped to spread the notion that these middas chasidus practices are part of the Derech ha'Am - just like eating matzah and keeping Shabbos.]

I am also reminded of the Rambam's statement in Shemoneh Perakim: 

Once in a while, though, some pious individuals would tend toward an extreme, such as fasting, staying awake all night, doing without meat and wine, separating from women, wearing course wool and sackcloth, dwelling on mountainsides, or withdrawing to the desert. But the only reason they did any of these things was to heal themselves, as we have explained ... 

Now, when some fools who had no idea why the pious were acting this way saw them do these things, they thought that was a good way to act, and they did likewise, in the belief that they would thus become like them. They afflicted their bodies in all kinds of ways and believed they would thus achieve personal virtues and were doing good, since (in their minds) that was how a person draws close to God - as if God is the enemy of the body, and wants to destroy it and annihilate it! 

They never realized that those were in fact bad things to do, and that they would acquire flaws that way [instead]. 

They would be like some fool who knew nothing about medicine who saw expert practitioners giving cathartics to dangerously ill patients and not allowing them to eat, and through this they were healed and their lives were quite dramatically saved. The sort of fool we are referring to would say to himself, "If those things can heal a sick person, they would certainly keep a healthy person well and even make him healthier!" And he would start to take them regularly and to do the sorts of things those ill people were doing - but would become ill instead.

The case of which the Rambam speaks here isn't exactly the same as the issue at hand, but the fool's mistake is, in my opinion, analogous to the mistake being made by those who seek to impose derech ha'yachid strictures as mandatory. Lifnim mi'shuras ha'din practices are good, but not for every person at every stage of his or her development. 

Conclusion

I see that my strong feelings on this topic have caused me to turn this blog post into somewhat of a rant. That's okay. I needed to at least start getting these thoughts out in writing, and I think I've done just that. To wrap it up, let me summarize the take-away points:

1. The derech ha'Torah is comprised of the derech ha'am (i.e. halacha) and the derech ha'yachid (i.e. keeping halacha in accordance with the objectives of the mitzvos and the Torah as a whole).
   
2. The derech ha'am is uniformly obligatory on all Jews, whereas the derech ha'yachid is to be taken on voluntarily by each individual in accordance with his level of understanding, his capacities, and his circumstances.
   
3. To impose to the derech ha'yachid onto individuals not only conflates the two drachim, but in many cases, will actually harm the individual. That individual's adherence to halacha might be compromised, since he or she will tend to view halacha as more oppressive than it actually needs to be. In the long run, this effect will spread to the society (or community) as a whole.
   
4. When legislating halacha-based school policies, we would be wise to take this phenomenon into account. A girl who dyes her hair pink might not be on a high level of tznius, but the Torah intends for her to come to that conclusion on her own, and to modify her practice at her own pace, in accordance with her own understanding. It is not our place to coerce her into keeping lifnim mi'shuras ha'din standards of tznius. This will only breed resentment towards halacha, and will very likely impede her developmental progress towards true tznius. 

I firmly believe that if we educators successfully established Avraham ben ha'Rambam's framework as the foundation of our students' view of Torah and mitzvos, we could avoid many of the problems which plague our students, our fellow Jews, and ourselves. 

Mishlei 13:15 - The Social Repercussions of One's Relationship with Knowledge

משלי יג:טו

שֵׂכֶל טוֹב יִתֶּן חֵן וְדֶרֶךְ בֹּגְדִים אֵיתָן:

Mishlei 13:15
A good intellect bestows grace, but the way of the violent is harsh.

Notes on Translation

• Rashi translates "אֵיתָן" as "קשה" which we understood to mean "harsh." 
• The term "בֹּגְדִים" is difficult to translate, in general. I've seen it translated as "rebels," "traitors," "the faithless," and "the violent." In this context, I think "violent" makes the most sense.
• I usually translate "דֶרֶךְ" as "path," but "way" makes more sense here. 

Major Questions / Difficulties

1. What is meant by "a good intellect"? That is quite a vague description.
2. What type of "grace" is the pasuk talking about?
3. How does a good intellect bestow such grace?
4. What is a "violent [person]" in this context?
5. What does it mean by "the way of the violent"?
6. In what sense is it "harsh"?
7. How are the two halves of the pasuk opposites? "A person with a good intellect" and "the violent" don't seem to correlate. Moreover, why does the first half talk about the quality of the person's intellect, whereas the second half talks about the derech (way)?

Photo Title: The Modern בוגד

Four-sentence Summary of the Main Idea

A “good intellect” is one that seeks knowledge lishmah (for its own sake), and the person who has this orientation towards knowledge will possess a special type of charisma. People will sense that he relates to them as fellow truth-seekers, working together to learn from each other and with each other to increase their understanding of reality. In contrast, a person with a “bad intellect” is someone who views knowledge as a competition, whose goal in discourse is to prevail over others in order to demonstrate his superior intellectual prowess. He will come off as harsh, antagonistic, and violent, always needing to assert his own dominance to convince others that he is right; those who engage in discussion with him will sense that he is either trying to win them over to his side, or defeat them.

Mishlei 18:23 - The Supplications of the Poor and the Brazenness of the Rich

משלי יח:כג

תַּחֲנוּנִים יְדַבֶּר רָשׁ וְעָשִׁיר יַעֲנֶה עַזּוֹת:

Mishlei 18:23
A poor man speaks [with] supplications, and a rich man responds with brazenness.

Major Questions / Difficulties

1. Why does the first half of the pasuk have to tell us that a poor man will speak with supplication? Isn't this obvious? What is the chidush (new insight)?
2. What, exactly, does the pasuk mean by "responds with brazenness"? 
3. Why does the rich man respond with brazenness? 
4. What scenario is the pasuk talking about? Mishlei usually compares two individuals' decisions in the same decision-making scenario. If that is the case here, what is that scenario? Or is this pasuk describing an interaction between the poor man and the rich man - as it would seem from the use of the word "responds"?
5. Which consequences/benefits is Mishlei pointing out here? Remember that Mishlei is a book about how to make good decisions and avoid bad ones. This pasuk doesn't spell out the ramifications of the decisions being made here. 
6. To whom is this pasuk addressed? Is it giving advice to the poor man about how to speak to the rich man? Is the pasuk rebuking the rich man for how he treats the poor? 
7. What is the subject of this pasuk?

Four Sentence Summary of the Main Idea (According to Rabbeinu Yonah)

When performing a cost/benefit analysis of wealth and poverty, it is easy to focus exclusively on the financial dimension and lose sight of the fact that wealth and poverty have a detrimental effect on a person's middos (character traits) as well. Poverty often spawns detrimental middos, such as subservience (since he is dependent on them for his livelihood), fear of people (insofar as he feels that his fate is in their hands), flattery (since he constantly needs to beg for money), and other degenerate qualities. Likewise, the rich man becomes brazen, arrogant, harsh in his speech, wise in his own eyes, stubborn, and all of the other negative traits which arise from an inflated ego. For this reason, the wise man will pray: "give me neither poverty nor wealth, but provide me with my daily allotment of bread" (Mishlei 30:8) - not only because this makes sense in its own right, but because he is concerned about the harmful ethical effects of wealth and poverty on his character.  

Four Sentence Summary of the Main Idea (According to Us)

A poor man thinks that the best way to ask a rich man for money is to supplicate, in order to awaken the rich man’s mercy and arouse his pity. This is a mistake which will likely backfire: pity stems from identification with the other person, and if the poor man makes himself seem too wretched and needy, the rich man will be repelled, for it he will find it too painful, frightening, and abhorrent to see himself in the poor man’s shoes, and all hope of empathy will be lost. On the other hand, if the poor man is too assertive and demanding, he is sure to tread on the rich man’s ego, and once that happens, there is no way that the rich man will want to help him. The key is to strike a perfect balance: to cater to the rich man’s ego by making him feel like a proud and powerful benefactor, while being careful not to make himself seem too pitiful or too bold – both of which would pose a threat to the rich man’s ego.