Showing posts with label Avraham ben ha'Rambam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Avraham ben ha'Rambam. Show all posts

Friday, October 22, 2021

Parashas Vayeira: Avraham and Islam

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Parashas Vayeira: Avraham and Islam

Avraham Avinu is distressed by Sarah’s instructions to banish Hagar and Yishmael from their home. Hashem addresses Avraham’s concerns:

God said to Avraham, “Do not let the matter of this youth and your maidservant be evil in your eyes. Whatever Sarah tells you, heed her voice, since through Yitzchak will offspring be considered yours. But also the son of the maidservant I will make into a nation, for he is your offspring.” (Bereishis 21:12-13)

The plain pshat of the statement “I will also make [Yishmael] into a nation” is that Yishmael’s offspring will be numerous, as the Rambam explains in his Iggeres Teiman. However, R’ Avraham ben ha’Rambam notes (ibid.) that this statement contains an allusion to another aspect of Yishmael’s destiny:

But also the son etc.this alludes to the revelation of Islam, [the adherents of which] believe in the Oneness of the Creator, [and who descend] from him (i.e. from Yishmael). How precise are His words, exalted is He: “I will make him [into a nation]” [implying] at a later time, after the revelation of the religion of Israel, and at a time of darkness for them, on account of their sins. “He told the end from the beginning” (cf. Yeshayahu 46:10).

R’ Avraham ben ha’Rambam saw the rise of the monotheistic Islam as a fulfillment of the promise to Avraham regarding Yishmael. When the offspring of Yitzchak are in “darkness … on account of their sins,” the offspring of Yishmael will raise the banner of Yichud Hashem (God’s Oneness), as their legacy from Avraham Avinu.

When taken in isolation, these words seem like an unqualified endorsement of Islam. Even more, they would seem to indicate R’ Avraham’s view that Islam is sanctioned by Hashem, Himself! However, this overly simplistic view ignores a comment that R’ Avraham made two pesukim earlier (ibid. 21:10):

The religious perfection that was promised to the offspring of Avraham would not include a partnership between the offspring of Yishmael and the offspring of Yitzchak, for [Yishmael] would not inherit a complete partnership with Yitzchak in terms of perfection. This is true, since the offspring of Yishmael would not be obligated in Torah, and even though they believed in it, they renounced it with claims of invalidation and emptied it with claims of modification and forgery. And even though they believe in the Oneness of the Creator, [their belief] in common with the offspring of Yaakov would only be during times of darkness for the offspring of Yitzchak. Therefore, Yishmael would not inherit perfection with Yitzchak.

R’ Avraham is referring here to the Islamic doctrine of Taḥrīf, by which the Muslims maintain that the Jews modified our Torah to remove references to Mohammad.

We see from here that Judaism’s stance on Islam is nuanced. Some of its features are good enough to be alluded to in Hashem’s promises to Avraham; other features are bad enough to remove Yishmael’s descendants from Avraham’s legacy of perfection. Likewise, the role that Islam will play in the unfolding of Hashem’s plan is unclear. Many Jews have been oppressed and killed at the hands of Muslims – and yet, it is impossible for us to see the big picture from our limited vantage point. Rambam expresses this truth in Hilchos Melachim u’Milchamos 11:4:

But the plans of the Creator of the Universe are not within the capacity of man to grasp, for our ways are not His ways and our thoughts are not His thoughts. All these matters of Jesus of Nazareth and the Ishmaelite who arose after him – all of these have only straightened the path for the Melech ha'Moshiach (King Messiah), and prepared the world to serve Hashem together, as it is stated: "then I will transform all the peoples, that they all will call upon the name of Hashem and serve Him with one purpose" (Tzephania 3:9).
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Wednesday, June 27, 2018

Tehilim 146: Do Not Trust in Noble Benefactors

This can be read as a standalone post, but is also a follow-up to How to Learn Tehilim (Psalms), which I recommend reading first if you haven't already done so.

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Artwork: Noble Benefactor, by DiTerlizzi
(note that the word nedivim can be translated as "nobles," "benefactors," or "generous people"

Tehilim 146: Do Not Trust in Noble Benefactors

תהלים פרק קמו

(א) הַלְלוּיָהּ הַלְלִי נַפְשִׁי אֶת יְיָ: (ב) אֲהַלְלָה יְיָ בְּחַיָּי אֲזַמְּרָה לֵאלֹהַי בְּעוֹדִי: (ג) אַל תִּבְטְחוּ בִנְדִיבִים בְּבֶן אָדָם שֶׁאֵין לוֹ תְשׁוּעָה: (ד) תֵּצֵא רוּחוֹ יָשֻׁב לְאַדְמָתוֹ בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא אָבְדוּ עֶשְׁתֹּנֹתָיו: (ה) אַשְׁרֵי שֶׁאֵל יַעֲקֹב בְּעֶזְרוֹ שִׂבְרוֹ עַל יְיָ אֱלֹהָיו: (ו) עֹשֶׂה שָׁמַיִם וָאָרֶץ אֶת הַיָּם וְאֶת כָּל אֲשֶׁר בָּם הַשֹּׁמֵר אֱמֶת לְעוֹלָם: (ז) עֹשֶׂה מִשְׁפָּט לַעֲשׁוּקִים נֹתֵן לֶחֶם לָרְעֵבִים יְיָ מַתִּיר אֲסוּרִים: (ח) יְיָ פֹּקֵחַ עִוְרִים יְיָ זֹקֵף כְּפוּפִים יְיָ אֹהֵב צַדִּיקִים: (ט) יְיָ שֹׁמֵר אֶת גֵּרִים יָתוֹם וְאַלְמָנָה יְעוֹדֵד וְדֶרֶךְ רְשָׁעִים יְעַוֵּת: (י) יִמְלֹךְ יְיָ לְעוֹלָם אֱלֹהַיִךְ צִיּוֹן לְדֹר וָדֹר הַלְלוּיָהּ:

Here is the text of Tehilim 146, which we say every morning after Ashrei:
(1) Halleluyah, praise Hashem, O my soul! (2) I will praise Hashem during my lifetime; I will sing to my God while I am still [alive]: (3) "Do not trust in noble benefactors - in a human being, for he holds no salvation. (4) His spirit will depart; he will return to his earth; on that day his plans will perish. (5) Happy is the one whose help is the God of Jacob; his hope is on Hashem, his God. (6) He is the maker of the heavens and the earth, the sea and everything that is in it, Who guards truth forever. (7) He does justice for the exploited, He gives bread to the hungry, Hashem releases the bound, (8) Hashem gives sight to the blind, Hashem straightens the bent, Hashem loves the righteous, (9) Hashem guards strangers, He encourages the orphan and the widow, but He twists the path of the wicked. (10) Hashem will reign as king forever – your God, O Zion – from generation to generation, Halleluyah."
Time to tackle our four questions! (see How to Learn Tehilim for a full presentation of the methodology we will be using)

Question #1: What is this perek (chapter) about as a whole?

As usual, we will start start by identifying the pivot point. I believe the pivot point is between verses 4 and 5. The first part of the perek seems to be about the mortality of man. David acknowledges his own mortality, and then urges people not to trust in mortal man:
(1) Halleluyah, praise Hashem, O my soul! (2) I will praise Hashem during my lifetime; I will sing to my God while I am still [alive]: (3) "Do not trust in noble benefactors - in a human being, for he holds no salvation. (4) His spirit will depart; he will return to his earth; on that day his plans will perish.
The rest of the perek expresses the praises of God, with an emphasis on how He helps those who are weak or disadvantaged:
(5) Happy is the one whose help is the God of Jacob; his hope is on Hashem, his God. (6) He is the maker of the heavens and the earth, the sea and everything that is in it, Who guards truth forever. (7) He does justice for the exploited, He gives bread to the hungry, Hashem releases the bound, (8) Hashem gives sight to the blind, Hashem straightens the bent, Hashem loves the righteous, (9) Hashem guards strangers, He encourages the orphan and the widow, but He twists the path of the wicked. (10) Hashem will reign as king forever – your God, O Zion – from generation to generation, Halleluyah."
The major question is: What is the unity of these two themes? 

[If you're playing along at home, now's the time to pause the tape and think about the main idea on your own. When you're ready, continue watching!]

Here is the 1-4 sentence summary of the main idea, according to our understanding:
This perek is about why (and how) we should place our bitachon (trust/security/reliance) in Hashem rather than in man. Man is a mortal - and, therefore, a contingent - being; no matter how grandiose his plans may be, they can all be brought to an end in an instant with his death, and there is nothing he can do to stop it. The only One in Whom we can place our bitachon is "the maker of the heavens and the earth" - the Being Who is not contingent, but upon Whom everything else depends for its continued existence. The way to develop our trust in Hashem is to recognize mortality and vulnerability of all human beings, and that all goodness and salvation is dependent on Hashem; the truth of this recognition should be reinforced through praise and song, as David does here.
Question #3: Is this perek true, in whole or in part?

As I did in my write-up of Tehilim 23, I'm going to address Question #3 before Question #2, since there are a couple of questions on the main idea we need to resolve in order to fully appreciate the particulars.

Perhaps the most glaring question on this perek is: "Really? Are you really telling me that if I am wrongfully exploited then I shouldn't trust my lawyer ("[Hashem] does justice for the exploited"), or if I have a problem with my eyes then I shouldn't trust my ophthalmologist ("Hashem gives sight to the blind"), or if my back is sore then I shouldn't trust my orthopedic specialist ("Hashem straightens the bent")  - all because these human beings might die? Isn't that going kind of overboard?"

In order to answer this question, we need to understand the unrealistically high expectations associated with psychological security and insecurity. Wikipedia actually does a fairly good job of providing an operational definition of "emotional insecurity":
Emotional insecurity or simply insecurity is a feeling of general unease or nervousness that may be triggered by perceiving of oneself to be vulnerable or inferior in some way, or a sense of vulnerability or instability which threatens one's self-image or ego.
Accordingly, the level of emotional security we seek is absolute. So long as there is any sense of vulnerability whatsoever, then the insecurity can take hold. We do not feel secure until we feel totally secure.

With this foundation, we can answer our question. David isn't saying that you shouldn't trust in a particular person because you should be worried that he's going to suddenly drop dead. When it comes to practical decision-making, it is rational to operate on the basis of probability, and unless you have reason to assume that a person will drop dead, then you should practically rely on that person. Rather, David's aim is to shatter our absolute trust in human beings by pointing out the one vulnerability we can't escape: death. In other words, it's not that we should assume that the people we trust are going to die, but the fact that they can die invalidates them as the basis for our bitachon.

The second major question on the main idea has to do with free will, and may be stated as follows: "How is it possible to practically rely on human beings and simultaneously have bitachon in Hashem? Isn't a contradiction? If you truly trust in Hashem, then what does it mean 'to rely on human beings,' and if you are relying on human beings, how can you trust in Hashem?"

The Radak [1] answers our question in his commentary on verse 3:
"Do not trust in noble benefactors - in accordance with Yirmiyahu's approach of: "[Thus said Hashem: Accursed is the man who trusts in people and makes flesh his strength] and turns his heart away from Hashem" (Yirmiyahu 17:5). Rather, if he trusts in man, he should place his fundamental trust in God (blessed is He) Who instilled in the noble benefactor the desire to help him.
The Radak understands [2] the pasuk in Yirmiyahu to mean that a person is only curse-worthy if he removes his heart from Hashem completely, and only trusts in human beings. If, however, a person trusts in human beings with the recognition that their dependability is, itself, dependent on Hashem, then this is acceptable.

This raises yet another question: How is their dependability dependent on Hashem? The second half of the Radak's commentary on verse 3 answers this. Even though the individual human being is the one who ultimately makes the decision to help, the desire - or disposition, or impetus, or enabling circumstance - to help was given to that person by Hashem. Were it not for that person's upbringing, or his genetics, or his exposure to certain people or teachings which influenced the development of his generosity, or the situation he was in, or the situation you were in, etc. etc. he would not have displayed the generosity in question. It all traces back to Hashem.

A chavrusa of mine gave an analogy which might help illustrate this point. Imagine working hard to beat a difficult video game and finally doing it. Your natural reaction would be to rejoice in your victory and to feel proud of your accomplishment. However, upon reflection, you would realize that the path to victory only succeeded because of the specific parameters set by the programmer. Had the programmer wished to increase the difficulty level, or change the path to victory to make it impossible for you to win, he could have done so, and you would not have accomplished what you did. Thus, even though you can take credit for the decisions you made in order to beat the game, the credit for the victory does not belong entirely to you. In fact, a rather large measure goes to the programmer.

Now, imagine if the programmer had live access to the game, and could respond to each in-game decision you made by allowing it to succeed as you envisioned it, or by modifying the conditions to thwart your ambition in real-time. Clearly if this were the case, you would not be able to take full credit in your victory, since it was clear that you were only able to win because your programmer opponent allowed for it.

The same is true in our world. You - or the person you rely upon - might be tempted to take full credit for your success or salvation. But upon further contemplation you will realize that this success or salvation was only made possible by the Programmer of the laws of nature, and allowed by His decision not to intervene. This recognition leads to a humble mentality, in which one recognizes that ultimately, success and salvation belong to "the Maker of the heavens and the earth" - not to mankind.

Once we recognize this, the particular praises in verses 7-9 make sense. Although these salvations (i.e. justice for the exploited, bread for the hungry, releasing for the bound, etc.) are brought about through human agency, it is Hashem Who makes this possible - whether by the laws of nature, or by His personal supervision. This recognition enables us to trust in Hashem, even when relying on human beings.

Question #2: What is being said in detail, and how?

As I did last time, I will now provide a brief commentary on each pasuk with the goal of showing how each part develops or reflects the main idea.
(1) Halleluyah, praise Hashem, O my soul! At first glance this sounds like a vanilla expression of praise of the kind we usually see in Tehilim. Upon closer examination we realize that David is urging himself to praise Hashem. Why would he do that? The fact that he has to tell himself to praise Hashem suggests that there is some resistance on his part which must be overcome. I believe that this resistance stems from the old enemy: the mentality of "kochi v'otzem yadi"  - "my ability and the strength of my own hand made me this wealth" (Devarim 8:17). So long as a person takes credit for his own successes, it is impossible to place one's trust in Hashem. The first step must be to overcome this self-glorification by forcing oneself to recognize that it is Hashem "Who gives you the ability to make wealth" (ibid. 8:18)
(2) I will praise Hashem during my lifetime; I will sing to my God while I am still [alive]: But even within the act of praising Hashem there is ample room for distortion. It is very easy to fall into the mode praising Hashem as "the One Who gives me good things" while simultaneously preserving an illicit feeling of independence - as if "I exist independently but I get stuff from God." In order to counteract this, David incorporates the recognition of his own mortality into his praise of Hashem. He recognizes that insofar as Hashem is the continual cause of his own existence, it would only be proper to devote what life he has to praising the "the Life of the worlds." This is the true level of praise: to recognize that not only the good I receive comes from Hashem, but that the I who receives this good is sustained by Hashem.
(3) Do not trust in noble benefactors. David specifies the class of "nedivim" (which may be translated as "nobles," "benefactors," or "generous people"), since they are the ones in whom we are most likely to take security. Next, he clarifies that the reason why we shouldn't place our security in them, for a noble is but a human being, who holds no salvation. Why does he hold no salvation? Because ...
(4) His spirit will depart; he will return to his earth; on that day his plans will perish. The Radak offers a poetic commentary on this pasuk, saying: "How could salvation 'belong to man' if he can't even save his own spirit?! For his spirit can depart immediately, and return to his earth, and whatever he had planned, he will not be able to do, because the spirit that sustained him has departed!" This is in line with our explanation in our answer to Question #3.
(5) Happy is the one whose help is the God of Jacob; his hope is on Hashem, his God.  Here David introduces the theme of trusting in Hashem. He refers to Him as "the God of Jacob" either because Yaakov demonstrated trust in Hashem, or because he lived a life of suffering, and frequently had to implement the principles of this perek
(6) Why is Hashem, alone, the One in Whom we can trust? Because He is the maker of the heavens and the earth, the sea and everything that is in it. Everything that happens in the world can only happen in accordance with His will, whether by the laws of nature or by Hashem's personal supervision. Who guards truth forever - that is to say, His will is absolutely reliable, since it operates in accordance with chochmah (wisdom), tzedek (righteousness), and mishpat (justice).
(7) He does justice for the exploited, He gives bread to the hungry, Hashem releases the bound, (8) Hashem gives sight to the blind, Hashem straightens the bent, Hashem loves the righteous, (9) Hashem guards strangers, He encourages the orphan and the widow, but He twists the path of the wicked. Undoubtedly there are insights to be gained here about how Hashem operates, but the general purpose of these pesukim is to illustrate the derech (method) by which we develop bitachon in Hashem - namely, by praising Him and recognizing that He is the ultimate cause of all forms of salvation and rehabilitation. The methodological premise of both Tehilim and Mishlei are illustrated here: the only way to affect the emotions is to go over example after example of particulars. I don't even think there's a necessity to say that the praises in these pesukim constitute a complete set or reflect a unified idea. I think these are just examples of David carrying out the directive he stated in the opening pasuk: "praise Hashem, O my soul!" (which is why, in my translation, I placed pesukim 3-10 in quotation marks).
(10) Hashem will reign as king forever – your God, O Zion – from generation to generation, Halleluyah." This is the only pasuk I don't understand in light of the approach we've taken. I understand it according to those meforshim who learn our perek to be about Bnei Yisrael at the time of moshiach, but I don't understand why "your God, O Zion" would be invoked if the perek is about bitachon in Hashem for all human beings, as the rest of the perek suggests. Perhaps this pasuk is directed specifically towards the Jew who, by virtue of his knowledge and practice of Torah, his membership in the Jewish people, his following in the footsteps of the Avos, has access to a greater degree of Divine protection, and can reach even higher levels of bitachon

Question #4: What of it?

The practical implications of this perek are clear. David's objective is for us to wean ourselves from trust in human beings, and to rewire our bitachon to attach to Hashem. In addition to providing the arguments to back his claim, he also shows us that our praising of Hashem is a mechanism by which we can cultivate this bitachon.

At first I was skeptical about this - until I realized that we do this with human beings all the time. Imagine you were just diagnosed with a rare medical condition. All of the insecurities begin to creep in. A friend of yours mentions the name of doctor. You aren't moved, since you don't know anything about this doctor, so you ask around. You begin hearing things: "Oh, Dr. So-and-so? He's the BEST!" "Dr. So-and-so is regarded as the top doctor in his field!" "My aunt had the same condition, and Dr. So-and-so was able to help her make a full recovery." As you hear more and more praises, your view begins to change. You suddenly find yourself taking security in Dr. So-and-so. How did that change come about? Through praise, and praise alone.

David is suggesting that we take the same approach when praising Hashem. By contemplating and verbalizing these praises of Hashem - on a daily basis, and when faced with situations of vulnerability, adversity, and lack - we slowly but surely build up our bitachon in Him. And the more we recognize the fragility of human beings, the more we wean ourselves from bitachon in man.

Concluding Thoughts

Fortunately, Tehilim 146 is something we say every day, as part of Pesukei d'Zimra. As such, we have a unique opportunity to incorporate these ideas into our worldview. For this reason, it is especially important to think into the ideas of this perek - the main idea and the particular pesukim - and get them crystal clear, so that every morning we can review them, internalize them, and live by them.

[1] Rabbeinu David Kimchi (Radak), Commentary on Sefer Tehilim 146:3
[2] ibid. Commentary on Sefer Yirmiyahu 17:5. Also, see Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha'Rambam's Ha'Maspik l'Ovdei Hashem: Shaar ha'Bitachon, where he elaborates on this interpretation. I would have incorporated it into this blog post, but I don't have access to all of my books at the present time. I believe he says something to the effect of: "If the pasuk only said, 'Accursed is the man who trusts in people' then the majority of humanity would be doomed! Instead, it added: 'and turns his heart away from Hashem.' In other words, the navi is only condemning those who trust exclusively in man, but those who trust in man and in Hashem are not accursed."

Tuesday, June 6, 2017

On Interpreting "Miracle Stories" in the Talmud

Originally published in March 2013. Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Counterspell, by Zack Stella - or an abstract rendition of Choni ha'Maagal


On Interpreting "Miracle Stories" in the Talmud

The author of the Haggadah quotes the last Mishnah in the first chapter of Berachos:
R' Elazar ben Azaryah said: I am like a seventy-year-old man, yet I did not merit [to prove that] the Exodus from Egypt must be mentioned at night until Ben Zoma expounded it [from the verse], as it is stated: “So that you will remember the day of your departure from Mitzrayim all the days of your life” (Devarim 16:3). The days of your life” indicates the days. All the days of your life” indicates the nights. The Sages say: The days of your life” indicates this world. All the days of your life” comes to include the Messianic Era.
R' Elazar ben Azaryah's statement is peculiar. Why does he say, "I am like a seventy-year-old man" and not simply, "I am a seventy-year-old man"?

The Gemara (Berachos 27b-28a) addresses this question. R' Elazar ben Azaryah was being considered as a candidate for the office of nassi, the head of the Sanhedrin (Supreme Court). He was hesitant about accepting the position, so he consulted his wife. She expressed her concern about his youthful appearance. The Gemara states: 
She said to him: “You have no white hair.” He was eighteen years old that day, and a miracle was done for him and eighteen rows of hair [on his beard] turned white. That is why R. Elazar ben Azaryah said: “Behold I am like a seventy-year-old man,” and he did not say, "I am a seventy year old man."
Most people take the Gemara's account at face value: a miracle was done for R' Elazar ben Azaryah, and his beard turned white. There doesn't seem to be anything objectionable about the Gemara's explanation.

The Rambam [1] begs to differ. In his commentary on that Mishnah he writes: 
Regarding the statement of R’ Elazar ben Azaryah, “Behold, I am like a seventy-year-old man” He didn’t say, “I am seventy years old” because he wasn’t seventy years old; he was but a young lad. However, he exerted himself in his learning and reading, day and night, until his bodily powers weakened and aged, and he became like a seventy-year-old man. He brought old age upon himself intentionally, as it is stated in the Talmud. For this reason he said, “In spite of my tremendous effort and my learning with other wise men, I did not merit to discover the allusion in the Written Torah for the obligation to read the paragraph of tzitzis at night until Ben Zoma expounded it.”
Not only does the Rambam explain R' Elazar ben Azaryah's elderly appearance in an entirely naturalistic way, but he cites our Gemara as his source! Even though Chazal go out of their way to ascribe R' Elazar ben Azaryah's transformation to a miracle, the Rambam doesn't see this as a sufficient reason to abandon a naturalistic explanation. 

The question is: How can the Rambam (seemingly) ignore Chazal's words? It would be one thing if the Gemara merely described a wondrous transformation in R' Elazar ben Azaryah's appearance without explicitly using the term "miracle" - but the Gemara does use the term "miracle"! What gives the Rambam the right to ignore the Gemara's plain meaning?

This isn't the first time we've seen a Rishon interpret such an event naturalistically in the face of Chazal's assertion that a miracle was involved. Several years ago I wrote a dvar Torah about Yocheved's age when she gave birth to Moshe. The Gemara (Bava Basra 119b) explicitly states that Yocheved was 130 years old when she gave birth to Moshe, and that this childbirth involved a miracle. Nevertheless, the Ibn Ezra and Ralbag disregard the Gemara's statement and offer a naturalistic interpretation. They, like the Rambam, seem to ignore Chazal's express statement that a miracle was done for Yocheved. 

Ralbag [2] goes even further than this. He writes that Chazal only said that Yocheved's childbirth was a miracle “for the benefit of the masses, to establish in their hearts the power of Hashem’s ability to do miracles.” In other words, Ralbag maintains that even Chazal didn't believe that Yocheved miraculously gave birth at the age of 130. Nevertheless, Chazal taught that a miracle was done for Yocheved in order to underscore the fundamental belief in miracles. 

Some might object to the Ralbag's statement, saying: "How can the Ralbag maintain that Chazal didn't mean exactly what they said? How can he say that Chazal believed one thing, but taught something else in public? Since when do Chazal conceal their opinions from the masses?" ... and that's when the objections start to break down. Anyone who is familiar with the way that the Rishonim approach midrashim knows that Chazal write cryptically. There are thousands of midrashim in which Chazal said things which they didn't intend to be taken literally, or made statements which contain "secret ideas" that were not intended for the masses. 

Indeed, Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha'Rambam, in his essay on the drashos of Chazal [3], mentions "taking midrashic miracle stories literally" as an example of superficial approaches to the drashos of Chazal: 
[Those who study my essay on midrashim] will be saved from thinking that the [events recorded in midrashim involved] miraculous occurrences are like those which were done for the prophets, and that such miracles are done for every wise and pious person, and that there is no difference between the splitting of the sea for Moshe and the Jews who left Egypt or the parting of the Yarden for Elisha and Eliyahu, and the like. These conclusions are only necessary if you take these drashos literally, or based on a superficial reading.
R' Avraham ben ha'Rambam then goes on at length to demonstrate that Chazal used hyperbole in their midrashic teachings:
There are many incidents that actually happened but were exaggerated in the belief that no reasonable person would mistake their meaning. The Rabbis condoned the use of exaggeration, saying, "The Torah used overstatement, the prophets used overstatement, and the Sages used overstatement." 
The Torah used hyperbole, like in the verse, "Great cities fortified to the skies" (Deuteronomy 1:28). The prophets used hyperbole, like in the verse, "The people were playing flutes and rejoicing with great joy; the ground burst from their noise" (1 Melachim 1:40). The Sages exaggerated when they described the heap of ashes on the altar [saying that there were three hundred kor of ashes - an immense quantity - on the altar]; they exaggerated when they spoke of the golden vine [on which the people used to hang their gifts of gold for the Beis ha'Mikdash, saying that it took three hundred kohanim to collect those gifts]; and they exaggerated when they described the curtain that separated the Kodesh ha'Kodashim from the Sanctuary, [saying that it was so heavy that it took three hundred kohanim to immerse it in a mikveh] (Tamid 29a). 
These are just three examples in the Mishnah, but in the Gemara there are countless cases of exaggeration. To cite one example: Rabbah and R' Zeira had the Purim feast together. They became intoxicated, and Rabbah got up and slew R' Zeira. On the next day Rabbah prayed for R' Zeira and revived him (Megillah 7b). What it means is that Rabbah beat R' Zeira and wounded him so badly that R' Zeira was near death. The Gemara uses the phrase "he slew him" because the wound was life-threatening, or it might have been on the throat. And the word achyei [he revived him] means "he recovered." The term achyei is often used for that meaning. Many similar stories are found in the Talmud.
It is clear from these Rishonim that Chazal didn't intend for everything they wrote in their midrashim to be taken literally, and that they chose to formulate their teachings in this way for a variety of reasons. For instance Rambam states that one of the Sages in the Gemara "responded to his student incorrectly, in accordance with the student's inadequate understanding of the matter, as it is stated, 'Answer a fool according to his foolishness' (Mishlei 26:4)" (Introduction to Perek Chelek). 

Perhaps the most astounding example of this is provided by the Rashba. Rashba writes [4] that these drashos were often given in public. "[The Sages] would go on at length with beneficial, but the people would be sleeping. In order to wake them up, [the Sages] would say crazy things to shock them and rouse them from their sleep." He cites the following amusing example from Shir ha'Shirim Rabbah 1:3:
Rebbi was sitting and giving a drashah, and the congregation was dozing off; he wanted to wake them up, [so] he said: “There was one woman in Egypt who gave birth to 600,000 [babies] in a single pregnancy!” There was one student present whose name was Rebbi Yishmael b’Rebbi Yossi. He asked: “Who was she?” [Rebbi] responded: “This was Yocheved, who gave birth to Moshe, who was equal to 600,000 Jews!”
The upshot of all of this something that most of us have known all along: Chazal didn't intend for their all of their midrashic statements to be taken literally, and made many statements which were not meant to be accepted at face value. What we might not have realized is just how far to extend this principle. We might have thought that when it comes to midrashim like the story of R' Elazar ben Azaryah's beard, which appears to be a problem-free factual account of a miraculous event, we should accept it as literal truth. We see from the Rambam (et al.) that this is not necessarily the case. 

We've established that the Rambam "has a right" to dismiss a literal reading of Chazal's assertion that R' Elazar ben Azaryah's aging was the result of a miracle. One question remains: What prompted the Rambam to deviate from the plain pshat and take this naturalistic approach? 

The best answer to this question was given by the Rambam himself, in his Maamar Techiyas ha'Meisim [5]. The Rambam was faced with the task of defending his belief in the literal truth of techiyas ha'meisim (the resurrection of the dead). As a prelude to his explanation the Rambam provides a beautiful account of why he interprets so many other seemingly miraculous accounts in a naturalistic fashion: 
I will explain to you that which brought me to this approach, and that is that our aim and the aim of every intelligent person among the select few is opposite to the aim of the multitude of people. For the most cherished and beloved thing to the multitude of Torah-observant people, because of their ignorance, is to consider the Torah and human intellect to be two opposite poles. Everything which is incomprehensible to the intellect they consider to be a miracle. They flee from explaining something as a natural phenomenon whether it pertains to something recorded in the past, or in regard to something which is discernible at the present time, or whether it relates to something which is written will happen in the future. We, on the other hand, strive to reconcile the Torah with human intellect and regard everything in its natural light wherever possible, unless it is self-evident therefrom that it is of miraculous connotation and cannot be interpreted at all; then we are forced to say it is a miracle.
There you have it. According to the Rambam, the correct approach is to interpret everything as naturalistically as possible unless we are forced to interpret it as a miracle. 

It is reasonable to conclude that this is what led the Rambam to interpret the Gemara about R' Elazar ben Azaryah as he did. There are "miracle stories" in Gemara which we are forced to take literally, but this isn't one of them. The Rambam saw that R' Elazar ben Azaryah's aged appearance could be explained without making recourse to miracles. Since a naturalistic explanation was available to him, that is the explanation he preferred. 

It is also important to note that the Rambam's explanation is harmonious with the subject at hand. The Gemara was discussing R' Elazar ben Azaryah's qualifications for being appointed as nassi and the Mishnah was emphasizing R' Elazar ben Azaryah's superb chochmah. The Rambam's explanation - namely, that R' Elazar ben Azaryah devoted many years to intensive learning - completes the picture that these two sources aimed to paint. (Perhaps this also explains the strange detail added by the Gemara: that R' Elazar ben Azaryah was 18 years old, and 18 rows of hairs on his beard turned white - as if to say that he had fully devoted his number of years on this earth to perfecting his chochmah).

So next time you encounter a "miracle story" in the Talmud or midrashim, be sure to think twice. The words of Chazal are not always what they appear to be on the surface.

[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Berachos 1:9
[2] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on Sefer Shemos 1:7
[3] Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha'Rambam, Essay on Aggadah
[4] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Aderet (Rashba), Commentary on the Aggadic portion of Berachos 54b
[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Treatise on the Resurrection of the Dead

Wednesday, July 22, 2015

Pink Hair, the Derech ha'Yachid, and Compulsory Piety

Pink Hair

As many of you know, I am a full-time teacher at a Modern Orthodox Jewish high school. Yesterday we had our end-of-the-year faculty meeting. One issue that came up - and which comes up in every faculty meeting - was tznius (modesty). Almost all Jewish schools have a tznius-based dress code, and all of them have at least some degree of trouble enforcing it. Our school is no different.

I zoned out during the initial discussion of the usual issues (i.e. skirt length, sleeve length, penalties, responsibility of enforcement). Thank God, male teachers are not responsible for enforcing the dress code, since this, itself, would be contrary to the values of tznius. But my ears perked up when this issue was brought to the table:

Note: the girl pictured above is not one of our students,
though it is an accurate depiction of the attitude displayed by some.
Apparently, towards the end of the year, one of our students dyed the tips of her hair pink. The question was raised at the faculty meeting: Should we add a "girls may not dye the tips of their hair" clause to the school's dress code?

The difference in opinion was drastic. Some faculty members were staunchly in favor of the proposed policy, others were vehemently against it, and a variety of reasons were given on both sides:
  • We should ban dyed tips because it's an outright violation of tznius
  • We shouldn't ban dyed tips because it doesn't violate tznius
  • We should ban dyed tips because if one or two students did it, then who knows how many more will follow suit? 
  • We shouldn't ban dyed tips because it was just one or two students; if we ban this, then many more will follow suit! 
  • We should ban dyed tips because people in the community will see our girls and get a bad impression of our school. 
  • We shouldn't ban dyed tips because we've taken away enough forms of personal expression from the girls; since this doesn't violate halacha and isn't immodest, why shouldn't they be able to do this? 
  • We should ban dyed tips because there must be a certain look of professional propriety among students: just as teachers are required to dress for work and the boys in Modern Orthodox schools are required to be clean-shaven, so too, our girls shouldn't be permitted to engage in radical forms of fashion. 
  • We shouldn't ban dyed tips because the girls already view the dress code as oppressive, which causes them to develop a negative attitude toward the value of tznius in general; by crossing the line to banning something as "innocent" as dyed tips, we're just adding fuel to the fire. 
In my opinion, the most outrageous argument for banning dyed tips was made by a well-meaning faculty member who said, "There might not be anything halachically problematic about dyed tips, but I just feel like it's not tznius!" That was the sum total of her objection. I wanted to say, "The stone-throwers in Meah She'arim also legislate tznius based on their feelings," but I held my breath.

My intent in this post is not to discuss the halachos or philosophy of tznius, nor do I wish to delve into the various considerations that go into school policy legislation. I want to discuss one issue, and one issue only: mandating conduct which is lifnim mi'shuras ha'din (beyond the letter of the law). Before we can discuss this, we need a framework. For that we will turn to Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha'Rambam.


The Derech ha'Yachid

Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha'Rambam wrote a sefer entitled Ha'Maspik l'Ovdei Hashem (which was published by Feldheim as a disappointingly loose translation). He begins his work with a general statement about the derech ha'Torah (path of Torah): 
[The derech ha’Torah] is comprised of two paths: the Derech ha’Am (Path of the Nation) and the Derech ha’Yachid (Path of the Individual). 
The Derech ha’Am consists in the fulfillment of the explicit mitzvos – doing the positive ones and avoiding the negative ones – in accordance with the obligation of each Jew ... The adherent of Torah needs to understand what God has commanded in His Torah to do as well as what God has prohibited to do. He must examine how the laws apply to him, and he must accept upon himself to fulfill what is incumbent upon him and to avoid what is prohibited to him. If he does not know what he has been commanded, his derech will not bring him success ...  
Thus, if a person knows what he is obligated to do and he does it, then he is considered to be walking on the straight path which Hashem has placed before him to follow. One who follows the Derech ha’Am in the fulfillment of mitzvos is called “tzadik,” “tam,” “yashar,” and “sar me’rah.” The most accurate of these terms is “tzadik,” which implies “justice” and “fulfillment of one’s obligations,” for the fulfillment of the obligatory mitzvos is the duty to which we are duty-bound by Him (may He be exalted), like the duty of a servant to fulfill the commandment of his master ...  
One who is lax regarding these statutes is called “rasha,” “poshe’a,” “rah,” and “merah,” and other terms which are self-evident and clear. Each of these terms applies to a person in accordance with the severity of his sin and his intention, his laxity or his lack of integrity. The most accurate of these terms is “rasha,” for he commits an injustice by not fulfilling his obligations towards his Master, and he does not supply his rational soul with its proper due. 
Simply put, the Derech ha'Am is what we refer to as "following halacha." However, the Derech ha'Yachid goes beyond halacha:
The Derech ha’Yachid is a way of life directed towards the objectives and underlying ideas behind the mitzvos, and in accordance with the implicit goals of the Torah and the ways of the prophets and the virtuous and the like. One who follows the Derech ha’Yachid is called “kadosh,” “chasid,” “anav” and the like. The most precise of these terms is “chasid,” which is derived from the term “chesed” meaning “voluntariness,” for he voluntarily does what he is not obligated explicitly to do in the Torah.
Avraham ben ha'Rambam expands upon his explanation of the Derech ha'Yachid by contrasting it with the Derech ha'Am and explaining why we refer to each derech by its name:
We say as follows: One who eats matzah and refrains from eating chametz on Chag ha’Matzos, and one who dwells in a sukkah and takes a lulav on Chag ha’Sukkos, and refrains from work on Shabbos and Yom ha’Kippurim, and from eating and drinking on Yom ha’Kippurim, and from laborious work on Yom Tov, and wears tzitzis and puts on tefilin and refrains from prohibited foods and prohibited sexual relations as explicitly stated in the Torah, and strictly observes the positive mitzvos in which he is obligated and does not transgress the negative mitzvos – we say of such a person that he is following the revealed Derech ha’Am
We say “ha’Am” (“of the nation”) because it is the same for the most distinguished members of the Jewish people as well as the masses. Just as Yehoshua bin Nun is prohibited to work on Shabbos and is obligated to dwell in a sukkah on Chag ha’Sukkos, so too, all Jews are prohibited to work on Shabbos and obligated in sukkah-dwelling on Chag ha’Sukkos – those who have already passed on from this world and those who are to come after them, until the end of the generations. We refer to it as “revealed” because every person is capable of understanding it, and therefore, all who willfully transgress it are punished
Beyond this we say that one who understands the underlying idea of Shabbos and its purpose, and fulfills [this underling idea and purpose] through contemplation and involvement in the study of cosmology and physics on Shabbos, and focuses his mind on physical science, and in so doing, connects to inner kedushah; and one who understands the underlying idea of tzitzis and, through wearing them, remembers the mitzvos of Hashem in order to save him from the state of forgetting towards which he is drawn, and in so doing, ascends to the true level of inner kedushah, as it is stated, “and you shall be kedoshim to your God” (Bamidbar 15:40); and one who understands the underlying idea of the prohibited foods, and consequently reduces his intake of permitted foods and is content with eating only that which is beneficial and necessary; and likewise, one who understands the underlying idea of the sexual prohibitions and accepts upon himself to fulfill that which he understands – we say of such a person that he is following the inner Derech ha’Yachid.  
We say that it is “l’yechidim” (“for individuals”) because it is a level which is not reached by every adherent of Torah. We refer to it as “inner” because its obligation is not mentioned explicitly in the Torah, and one who disregards it will not be punished by human courts. 
The Derech ha'Am is binding on and accessible to every member of the nation. The Derech ha'Yachid is neither. Only those who dedicate themselves to the study of mitzvos will be able to understand their underlying objectives and be able to refine their keeping of halacha in accordance with their knowledge. This leads to Avraham ben ha'Rambam's next point: 
It should be obvious from this that the Derech ha’Am is not subject to different levels, for there is no intermediate level between one who eats prohibited food and one who does not eat it, or between one who desecrates Shabbos and one who does not desecrate it; rather, each and every Jew either fulfills this Derech ha’Am or deviates from it.  
The only way there could be a differentiation of levels is regarding the number of mitzvos one violates, or the number of times he transgresses a particular mitzvah. For example, one who neglects many positive mitzvos and violates many prohibitions is a greater transgressor than one who neglects few mitzvos and violates few prohibitions. Likewise, two people who violate the same mitzvah would be on different levels depending on how frequently each of them repeats the action. One who did not make tzitzis for his tallis that he wears every day, or one who continually shaves the corners of his head, cannot be compared to someone who donned a garment obligated in tzitzis without tzitzis once in his life, or shaved the corners of his head one time. In this manner there can be a differentiation of levels in the Derech ha’Am.  
When I said above that for the most part there are not different levels, I implied that some explicit mitzvos actually are subject to different levels. This is because the mitzvah of yirah (fear of God), the mitzvah of ahavah (love of God), and the mitzvah of avodas ha’leiv (“service of the heart” i.e. prayer) are general mitzvos, yet are subject to a great differentiation of levels. Everyone can fulfill them on a basic level, but in their ultimate goals they split off into the two paths: the Derech ha’Am and the Derech ha’Yachid. The action-based mitzvos, on the other hand, are not subject to a differentiation of levels in their performance.  
But as regards the Derech ha’Yachid, the range between the extremes is very broad, as broad as the distance between East and West. Those who follow it are on many distinct levels, even with regards to a single mitzvah, and even a single instance.
Avraham ben ha'Rambam concludes with a beautiful example of keeping one mitzvah on different levels:
For example, consider the Shabbos-observance of three highly perfected individuals. The first person follows the Derech ha'Am, which is to keep Shabbos and to refrain from desecrating it, but adds a derech ha'yachid: namely, through reflecting, in a general way, upon the purpose of Shabbos and contemplating the creation of the universe by remembering that the heavens and earth and all of their array were created during the six days, and that there did not exist any first cause with no prior cause except for the Creator (may He be exalted and glorified), Who gave us the Shabbos.  
The second person’s derech ha'yachid is as follows: he will contemplate these matters in all of their details; he will reflect upon everything that the first person did, but in addition, he will contemplate the entirety of existence and the components he can apprehend in particular, from the center of the earth to the far reaches of the cosmos; he will delve into the wisdom of the Creator (may He be exalted) as manifest in the creation, and he will focus specifically on that which was created on the first day, then the second day, and all the other days, in accordance with that which was stated in the section of Bereishis. 
The third person’s derech ha'yachid is as follows: he will contemplate everything that the second person did, but will delve so deeply into his scientific analysis and study that he will ascend to the level of true kedushah; he will rejoice in his Maker, due to the radiance of the shechinah with which illuminated him in his studies; he will attain proof of His Greatness from the greatness of His creations; he will comprehend the bonds between himself and his Creator, the bond of his intellect and the bond of the mitzvos, which is [one of the intended objectives] of his Creator in our observance of Shabbos, as it is stated, “It is a sign between Me and between Bnei Yisrael forever” (Shemos 31:17); he will diminish his involvement in anything which weakens this bond, and therefore, he will refrain from any eating and drinking on Shabbos which interrupts him from his studies, and he will refrain from off-topic conversation, and certainly from idle chatter. Ultimately, through this derech, he will attain an inner fear of Hashem and love of the Heavens and such a strong yearning for the Living God that even when his limbs crave nourishment, he will not sense hunger, since his soul is fattened with its portion which it has attained, as David stated, “My soul is sated as with fat and abundance” (Tehilim 63:6); sounds will resonate in his ears, but he will be too preoccupied to hear them; perceptible items might pass before his eyes, but he will not see them, as if his eyes are covered. Through his derech he will reach the realm of his desire and the hope of his soul, as it is stated, “Your Name and the remembrance of You are the desire of the soul” (Yeshaya 26:8). Without a doubt this third derech of observing Shabbos is different from the second, as the second is from the first. And certainly, there is an enormous difference between the third and first. 
According to this example you will be able to explain the other darchei ha’yechidim (paths of the unique individuals). One whose derech ha'yachid regarding prohibited foods only affects him to the point where he refrains from gorging himself on meat or becoming drunk with wine is far from one who has reached the level were “a kav of carobs was sufficient for him from one erev Shabbos to the next” (Berachos 17b). 
The same is true of the other darchei ha’yechidim: the distance between their different levels is tremendous and the difference between their followers is great.
Avraham ben ha'Rambam's presentation of the Derech ha'Torah revolutionized my view of the Torah system. Perhaps I will elaborate on that at a later time. For now, let us return to the more pressing matteres of life: should my school add "dyed tips" to its dress code?


Compulsory Piety

Let's go back to the faculty member who said, "There might not be anything halachically problematic about dyed tips, but I feel like it's not tznius." Let us assume, for the moment, that this teacher is correct, and that an argument can be made that a girl who goes out of her way to dye the tips of her hair pink is not conducting herself in accordance with the ideal of tznius. I could see myself agreeing with that.

What I cannot agree with is the ongoing trend in the frum world to force derech ha'yachid standards and practices upon the general populace. The Torah was designed with a derech ha'am and a derech ha'yachid for a very good reason. As Avraham ben ha'Rambam pointed out, the derech ha'yachid is a derech of chesed ("voluntariness"). As a person's understanding of Torah and mitzvos develops, he or she will gradually "volunteer" to supplement his or her observance of halacha with the additional strictures that are dictated by the philosophical objectives of the system. To make these strictures compulsory is to transform this derech chesed into a derech achzarius (path of cruelty).

Other policy-making factors aside, the teacher who "feels" that dyed tips are not tznius is more than welcome to impose this restriction on herself, in accordance with her own understanding of the character and purpose of tznius. It is one thing for a school to enforce halacha, but to enforce the derech ha'yachid is an entirely different matter.

Imagine what would happen if we started enforcing the derech ha'yachid in kashrus, prohibiting people from eating kosher food for pleasure or "merely" for bodily health and only permitting them to eat if we can ensure that they are eating in order to be involved in Avodas Hashem! Or imagine if we required every Jew to spend the entire Shabbos day involved in the study of physics, with minimal eating, drinking, and socializing. The derech ha'am would collapse under the weight of the enforced derech ha'yachid. People wouldn't be able to take it, and would abandon the derech ha'am altogether.

Sounds crazy, right? But this is exactly what is beginning to happen in many other areas of halacha. I don't know when this trend of standardization of middas chasidus started, but there are examples of this everywhere - not just in the world around us, but in the halachic codes which are the foundation of mainstream practice. 

For instance, let us compare the codification of a middas chasidus practice in two halachic works: the Mishneh Torah of the Rambam, and the Shulchan Aruch of R' Yosef Karo. The Rambam devotes Chapter 5 of Hilchos Deos to discussing the behavior appropriate to talmidei chachamim (Torah scholars). He opens the chapter with an introduction:
Just as a chacham is recognizable in his wisdom and character traits and is differentiated from the rest of the nation, so too, he needs to be differentiated in his actions: in his eating and drinking, in his sexual intercourse and the manner in which he uses the bathroom, in his speech, in his manner of walking, in his clothing, in the content of his words, and in his business dealings. All of these actions must be refined and perfected to a very high degree. 
The Rambam then goes on to specify how a chacham should conduct himself in each of these categories of activity. We will focus on a seemingly trivial behavior: walking. The Rambam writes in 5:8:
A talmid chachamim shouldn't walk with an upright posture and an outstretched neck, as it was stated: “walking with outstretched necks and winking eyes” (Yeshaya 3:16); nor should he walk daintily, heel to toe, like women or those who are haughty, in the manner described: “walking with dainty steps, jingling with their feet” (ibid.).
It is clear from the introduction to this chapter that this halacha about walking is lifnim mi'shuras ha'din. These instructions are for talmidei chachimim - not for average Jews. An regular Jewish fellow who walked with an outstretched neck might not be praiseworthy, but he certainly isn't involved in any halachic transgression. 

Compare this to R' Yosef Karo's formulation in the Shulchan Aruch: "It is prohibited to walk with an upright posture" (Orach Chayim 2:6). Period. End of story. If a person were reading the Shulchan Aruch, he or she would walk away with the impression that this requirement is not not just for talmidei chachamim, but for everybody - and it isn't just a lifnim mi'shuras ha'din guideline, but a full-fledged prohibition. 

There are countless other examples of mandating middas chasidus throughout the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema, not to mention the later halachic codes - and that's not even taking into account the advent of Chassidus, the rise of Chareidim, the surge of yeshivish culture, and all of the other sects and factions in the Orthodox world which push lifnim mi'shuras ha'din standards. 

[Note: R' Yosef Karo, himself, discouraged the practice of reading the Shulchan Aruch without having studied the Beis Yosef first. Those who followed R' Yosef Karo's advice would be much more informed, and would most likely be able to differentiate between shuras ha'din and lifnim mi'shuras ha'din. I am merely pointing to the fact that the popularity of the Shulchan Aruch has, unfortunately, helped to spread the notion that these middas chasidus practices are part of the Derech ha'Am - just like eating matzah and keeping Shabbos.]

I am also reminded of the Rambam's statement in Shemoneh Perakim: 
Once in a while, though, some pious individuals would tend toward an extreme, such as fasting, staying awake all night, doing without meat and wine, separating from women, wearing course wool and sackcloth, dwelling on mountainsides, or withdrawing to the desert. But the only reason they did any of these things was to heal themselves, as we have explained ... 
Now, when some fools who had no idea why the pious were acting this way saw them do these things, they thought that was a good way to act, and they did likewise, in the belief that they would thus become like them. They afflicted their bodies in all kinds of ways and believed they would thus achieve personal virtues and were doing good, since (in their minds) that was how a person draws close to God - as if God is the enemy of the body, and wants to destroy it and annihilate it! 
They never realized that those were in fact bad things to do, and that they would acquire flaws that way [instead]. 
They would be like some fool who knew nothing about medicine who saw expert practitioners giving cathartics to dangerously ill patients and not allowing them to eat, and through this they were healed and their lives were quite dramatically saved. The sort of fool we are referring to would say to himself, "If those things can heal a sick person, they would certainly keep a healthy person well and even make him healthier!" And he would start to take them regularly and to do the sorts of things those ill people were doing - but would become ill instead.
The case of which the Rambam speaks here isn't exactly the same as the issue at hand, but the fool's mistake is, in my opinion, analogous to the mistake being made by those who seek to impose derech ha'yachid strictures as mandatory. Lifnim mi'shuras ha'din practices are good, but not for every person at every stage of his or her development. 

Conclusion

I see that my strong feelings on this topic have caused me to turn this blog post into somewhat of a rant. That's okay. I needed to at least start getting these thoughts out in writing, and I think I've done just that. To wrap it up, let me summarize the take-away points:
  1. The derech ha'Torah is comprised of the derech ha'am (i.e. halacha) and the derech ha'yachid (i.e. keeping halacha in accordance with the objectives of the mitzvos and the Torah as a whole).
  2. The derech ha'am is uniformly obligatory on all Jews, whereas the derech ha'yachid is to be taken on voluntarily by each individual in accordance with his level of understanding, his capacities, and his circumstances.
  3. To impose to the derech ha'yachid onto individuals not only conflates the two drachim, but in many cases, will actually harm the individual. That individual's adherence to halacha might be compromised, since he or she will tend to view halacha as more oppressive than it actually needs to be. In the long run, this effect will spread to the society (or community) as a whole.
  4. When legislating halacha-based school policies, we would be wise to take this phenomenon into account. A girl who dyes her hair pink might not be on a high level of tznius, but the Torah intends for her to come to that conclusion on her own, and to modify her practice at her own pace, in accordance with her own understanding. It is not our place to coerce her into keeping lifnim mi'shuras ha'din standards of tznius. This will only breed resentment towards halacha, and will very likely impede her developmental progress towards true tznius
I firmly believe that if we educators successfully established Avraham ben ha'Rambam's framework as the foundation of our students' view of Torah and mitzvos, we could avoid many of the problems which plague our students, our fellow Jews, and ourselves.