Parashas Balak: One Reason Why Women Should Learn Gemara

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Parashas Balak: One Reason Why Women Should Learn Gemara 

Two Like-minded Rebellions 

Zimri ben Salu, prince of the tribe of Shimon, staged a public rebellion against Moshe: 

Behold! A man from the house of Israel came and brought near a Midianite woman in the sight of Moshe and in the sight of the entire assembly of the Children of Israel, and they (i.e. Moshe and the Children of Israel) were crying at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. (Bamidbar 25:6) 

Rashi, citing a midrash in Sanhedrin 82a, fills in the details of Zimri’s public demonstration: 

[Zimi] seized [Cozbi, the Midianite woman] by her hair and brought her before Moshe. “Son of Amram,” he exclaimed, “is this woman forbidden or permitted? And if you say, ‘she is forbidden,’ then who permitted you [to marry] Yisro’s daughter [Tzipora]?” 

This isn’t the first time that a leader of Israel challenged Moshe by attempting to undermine his halachic authority. The most famous instance was the rebellion of Korach. The midrash Tanchuma fills in the details of Korach’s confrontation with Moshe: 

What did [Korach] do? He arose and gathered 250 heads of courts … and he dressed them in tallisos (prayer shawls) made entirely of techeiles (i.e. the blue threads which it is a mitzvah to incorporate into the tzitzis – white fringes – on every four-cornered garment). They came and stood before Moshe. They said to him, “A tallis made entirely of techeiles – is it obligated in tzitzis or exempt?” He said to them, “Obligated.” They began to laugh at him, [saying,] “Is it possible that [in the case of] a tallis is made entirely out of another [color of] material, a single thread of techeiles exempts it, [but] this [tallis] which is made entirely of techeiles will not exempt itself?” 

There are clear parallels between the rebellions of Zimri and Korach. Both were driven by personal motives: Zimri by his lust for non-Jewish women, and Korach by his jealousy over the leadership positions held by his cousins, Moshe and Aharon. Both Zimi and Korach staged public acts of defiance which aimed to discredit Moshe in the eyes of the assembly. Both sought to undermine Moshe’s authority by showing that halacha is ridiculous, and should therefore not be taken seriously. 

Anyone who has even a basic knowledge of halacha can see through the childish arguments made by Zimri and Korach. Why was Tziporah permitted to Moshe? Because they got married before Matan Torah (the Giving of the Torah), when there was no halacha prohibiting a Jew from marrying a non-Jew! In fact, before Matan Torah, there were no “Jews” in a technical sense. Both Moshe and Tziporah were halachically non-Jewish, and both became Jews at the same time as the rest of the Children of Israel, after the Torah was given and the covenant was made. Why does a tallis made entirely of techeiles still require a thread of techeiles? Because the halacha states that every four-cornered garment, no matter what color, is obligated in tzitzis and techeiles! Although Korach might be able to argue that there is no philosophical purpose to the thread of techeiles on a tallis made entirely of techeiles, this would have no bearing on the halachic requirements of the mitzvah, since we never make halachic rulings on the basis of philosophical considerations. 

Rationalization of “Going Off the Derech” (i.e. Becoming Irreligious) 

Every year, usually at springtime, I am asked to give a presentation to the 12th graders about how to retain and continue to develop their Orthodox Jewish identity after graduation, when they venture out into the secular world as young adults. One of the main points I make and stress is that the human being cannot tolerate cognitive dissonance for an extended period of time. If there is a contradiction between one’s beliefs, ideas, and values on the one hand, and one’s desires, actions, and habits on the other, the latter will tend to prevail. The most common means by which this will occur is theological rationalization. 

In other words, a person will not, in the long-run, be able to say, “I believe that the Torah is true and halacha is binding, but I don’t keep such-and-such halacha because I can’t help myself.” The cognitive dissonance and negative self-image will be too much for the psyche to bear for any prolonged period of time. Instead, she will rationalize her violation of halacha, coming up with spurious reasons as to why the halacha doesn’t make sense, or why it shouldn’t apply in her situation, or – in the most severe cases – why halacha as a whole is irrational. The individual will convince herself that her abandonment of halacha stems from her arguments, but in reality, the reverse is true: first she made the decision to abandon halacha, and only afterwards did she come up with arguments to retroactively justify her behavior. 

My decade of experience as a high school teacher, combined with my exposure to hundreds of “off-the-derech Jews” on the internet and social media platforms, have shown me countless examples of how flimsy these types of theological rationalizations tend to be. Every day online I encounter lapsed Jews making laughably fallacious and counterfactual lines of reasoning in support of their irreligious life choices. They think that their Clever, Enlightened, Superior minds have discovered a Truth which their religious brethren are too Dull-witted or Brainwashed to have spotted. They do not realize how ignorant, simplistic, and baseless their arguments are. 

[To be clear: I am not saying that anyone who goes off the derech is ipso facto a self-deceiving ignoramus whose arguments are all straw-men. I have encountered many Jews who do have knowledge of Judaism but have rejected it because of powerful questions and substantial philosophical arguments to which they could not find satisfactory answers. It just so happens that such individuals are rare, and tend not to be as vocal and militantly anti-religious on the internet. I also know Jews who went off the derech for personal reasons (e.g. tragedy, abuse, familial or martial relationship problems, etc.), and while these Jews may also engage in anti-religious rhetoric without substance, their situation ought to be viewed differently.] 

Rav Soloveitchik on Women Learning Gemara 

I will preface this next section with a disclaimer. The topic of whether women may or should learn Torah she’baal Peh (the Oral Torah) and Gemara (Talmud) is vast, nuanced, and fraught with difficulty. We will not even attempt to present an in-depth analysis or comprehensive overview of the topic in this article. Instead, the scope of this topic will be limited to a single statement of a single rabbinic authority: that of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik (a.k.a. “The Rav”). 

On May 27, 1953, the Rav wrote a letter to Rabbi Leonard Rosenfeld on the topic of teaching Torah she’baal Peh to girls in a coeducational Jewish day school. Here is the letter in its entirety; the underlined portions do not appear in the original, and were added by me for emphasis: 

Dear Rabbi Rosenfeld,

Please accept my apologies for not answering your letters sooner. The delay was due to my overcrowded schedule. As to your question with regard to a curriculum in a coeducational school, I expressed my opinion to you long ago that it would be a very regrettable oversight on our part if we were to arrange separate Hebrew courses for girls. Not only is the teaching of Torah she’baal Peh to girls permissible, but it is nowadays an absolute imperative. This policy of discrimination between the sexes as to subject manner and method of instruction which is still advocated by certain groups within our Orthodox community has contributed greatly to the deterioration and downfall of traditional Judaism. Boys and girls alike should be introduced into the inner halls of Torah she’baal Peh.

I hope to prepare in the near future a halakhic brief on the problem which will exhaust the various aspects of the same. In the meantime I heartily endorse a uniform program for the entire student body.

With kindest personal regards, I remain
Sincerely yours,
Joseph Soloveitchik 

The Rav is unequivocal in his endorsement of women learning Torah she’baal Peh in exactly the same manner as men. Practically speaking, this means that girls should study Gemara and be trained in the rigors of Talmudic analysis to the same extent and following the same methods and curriculum as boys. Although the Rav was addressing a coed school, there is no reason to believe that he would hold differently about an all-girls school or seminary. 

The only part of the Rav’s letter which is unclear is his statement that “This policy of discrimination between the sexes as to subject manner and method of instruction … has contributed greatly to the deterioration and downfall of traditional Judaism.” The question is: How so? How does teaching women Torah she’baal Peh and Talmud prevent this deterioration? 

Halachic Thinking and Assimilation 

I don’t know how the Rav would answer this question, but I do have my own answer. The failure to train Jewish girls and women in the highest levels of Torah she’baal Peh and Talmud renders them susceptible to the specious arguments used to denigrate and delegitimize halacha. 

A well-trained yeshiva bochur (a young man engaged in post-high school Torah study in a rabbinic seminary) should be able to spot the flaws in anti-halachic sophistry with relative ease, due to the depth and breadth of his halachic knowledge, as well as the critical thinking skills he has acquired from his Talmudic training. But what about bas Yisrael (Jewish woman) who is only familiar with halacha on a simple level? How would she respond to an accusation of halachic hypocrisy, like Zimri’s, or a pseudo-halachic polemical protest, like Korach’s? Ask her a question about a detail of halachic practice and she may know the answer, but present a critique of Torah as a system which is rhetorically engineered to make halacha seem foolish, outdated, or unreasonable, and what is she supposed to do? How can we expect her to know what to say or think in response? 

This, I believe, is why neglecting to teach young women Torah she’baal Peh and Talmud “contributes greatly to the deterioration and downfall of traditional Judaism.” Women who do not have a firm grasp of the inner-workings of halacha and the nature of halachic thinking are particularly vulnerable to the false claims about halacha and false critiques of its validity. 

If this was true in the 1950’s when the Rav penned his letter to Rabbi Rosenfeld, then it is even truer in today’s world. Almost every Modern Orthodox girl has unfettered access (via the internet and social media) to all of the anti-halacha arguments under the sun. Teenagers and young adults are already at an age that is prone to rebellion and experimentation. Combine this with the dwindling numbers of religious people in general, and the increase in anti-religious sentiment on college campuses – both of which will make her a minority amid a hostile majority – and how can we expect her religiosity to survive intact through the crucible of her college years? Even if she remains religious, her internal conviction in Judaism will undoubtedly suffer due to the questions and doubts that have been raised and gone unanswered. 

This is one of the main reasons why I believe that girls should learn Gemara just like boys. This is also one of the long-term objectives in my own introductory Gemara course. Many of the girls in my class have never learned Gemara before, so the responsibility lies with me to give them a strong foundation. I don’t particularly care whether my female students retain knowledge of the details of what we learn. If they graduate from high school with enough Talmudic experience to appreciate halacha as a system, to be able to differentiate between the taamei ha’mitzvos (philosophical reasons for the commandments) and the technical halacha itself, and to have begun to realize that halacha operates based on its own internal principles and halachic reasoning rather than common sense, then I have done my job. 

And if I have done my job successfully, then perhaps I will have helped stem the tide of assimilation, thereby giving the next generation of Orthodox Jews a better chance to survive and thrive in Torah.

Conversations with non-Jewish English Teachers

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Conversations with non-Jewish English Teachers

Last week I attended a week-long professional development program for English teachers. Over the course of the week I found myself confronted with a number "culture clash" moments, in which I was confronted by the stark differences between by the intellectual world of my Torah learning and the world inhabited by these non-Jewish, highly educated, predominantly white, "coastal elite" group of English teachers. I'd like to write about three of the insights I had.

Ideas vs. People

One of the in-class exercises we did involved reading and analyzing the claims and arguments made by Michael Levin in his article, "The Case for Torture." I was paired with two other teachers. One of the teachers suggested that we look up when the article was written in order to get a better idea of the rhetorical situation. We agreed that this was a good idea. The other teacher looked up Michael Levin on Wikipedia to find the answer. As he scrolled down to find information about the article, this is what he saw:

After skimming the Wikipedia entry, this teacher huffed: "Oh, so he was a capitalist, misogynistic homophobe." Because I wasn't exactly sure where he was going with this, I hesitantly asked: "But ... we're not factoring that into our analysis of his arguments, right?" to which the teacher replied with a seriously baffled expression on his face: "Why not?" 

What I wanted to say was: "Why not? Because these things have nothing to do with his arguments on torture! Not only that, but all you did was read these wiki-sourced summaries. You haven't even bothered to understand his arguments and you've already labeled him as 'an enemy' and are poised to interpret the ideas in his article based on that label!"

Before I could respond, the other teacher chimed in and agreed with me, saying: "I could understand if we found out that this author worked for the CIA or if he somehow profited off of his position on torture, since these facts might actually be relevant to our analysis of his argument, but I don't see what his positions on feminism, economics, or homosexuality have to do with his position on the use of torture." I bit my tongue and nodded in agreement. 

This conversation reminded me of the Rambam's famous adage: "kabel ha'emes mi'mi she'omro [1] - accept the truth from whoever says it" (which I wrote about extensively in my article: Rambam: On Not Citing Sources). I was also reminded of Rav Soloveitchik's view [2] on the designation of mach'chish magideha [3] - those who repudiate the baalei Mesorah (transmitters of the Oral Tradition). The Rav suggested that this label applies not only those who actively challenge the halachic authority of the baalei Mesorah, but even extends to those who insinuate that the views of the baalei Mesorah were the products of their emotions, their personalities, or their circumstances, rather than their knowledge and understanding of Torah.

These guiding principles of methodology are really two sides of the same coin. Both emphasize the importance of analyzing ideas based on their merit, rather than treating them as the byproducts of "influences on people" (as I wrote about in Musings on the Academic Approach). This isn't to say that human beings can't be influenced by other factors. However, to make such an assumption about the statements of Chazal is to undermine their wisdom, understanding, and knowledge.

Don't get me wrong: I'm not equating the likes of Rebbi Akiva and the Rambam with a columnist writing about torture in the 1980's. My point is that those who are trained in the authentic methods of talmud Torah (Torah learning) would never make a move like this English teacher did, recognizing that this line of reasoning would shift the inquiry towards people, and away from ideas. This might be relevant in a history class, but not a class which purports to analyze ideas and arguments.

Rogerian Argument

One of the popular methods for analyzing certain types of non-fiction texts is the "Rogerian Argument" framework. The textbook The Language of Composition (2018 edition) summarizes this approach as follows:

Another approach to argument is known as the Rogerian method, named for twentieth-century psychologist Carl Rogers, who stressed the importance of replacing confrontational argument tactics with ones that promote negotiation, compromise, and cooperation. Rogerian argumentation is particularly appropriate and useful for arguments on controversial subjects that for some are matters of belief - such as the death penalty, abortion, gun control, or the place of prayer or the teaching of evolution by natural selection in schools. Rogerian arguments are based on the assumption that having a full understanding of an opposing position is essential to responding to it persuasively and refuting it in a way that is accommodating rather than alienating. The key component of the Rogerian approach is finding common ground on which the speaker and an audience that holds opposing beliefs can both stand. The speaker must show that he or she has everyone's interest in mind, and thus be sympathetic to the audience's point of view. Ultimately, the goal is not necessarily to win the argument, but to reach a compromise through which both speaker and audience will feel that they have gained ground.

As my non-Jewish colleagues voiced the difficulties they've had with getting their students to grok this approach, I thought to myself, "This is what we do every day!" When learning Gemara, halacha, and even Tanach, we approach any machlokes (disagreement) with the premise that both disputants are chachamim (wise), and each of them has a logical, conceptual, insightful view derived from the common pool of data which was known and accepted by both parties. When we analyze a machlokes, we first try to understand wherein the two sides agree, and we assume that they share more in common than they disagree on. Although we differ from the Rogerian model in that we aren't trying to reach a "compromise," we are, in most cases, more interested in understanding both sides than determining who "won" the argument - at least, in matters of theoretical understanding, if not practical application.

One of the first methodology books on how to learn Talmud was Darchei ha'Talmud, written by R' Yitzchak Kanpanton in the 14th century. Compare this excerpt to the aforementioned description of Rogerian Argument:

At the outset of your analysis assume, as the premise of your thought, that each of the speakers - whether the one asking a question or the one giving an answer - is an intelligent person, and that all of his words were stated with wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, and contain nothing that is twisted or crooked. Thus we say, "Are we dealing with fools?!" (Shevuos 48b). Therefore, you should analyze all of their words to see whether they are statements of reason, healthy and "as strong as a molten mirror" (Iyov 37:18), or whether they are "bland food eaten without salt," (ibid. 6:6) and weak statements, or whether they are statements which draw close to the intellect, or distance themselves from it. You must strive to bring near their words and to correct them in such a manner that they are pleasant, acceptable, and intellectually amenable, and you must not ascribe to them the iniquity and guilt of a dubious or weak explanation, because none of their words should fall to the ground, since all of them are divrei Elokim chayim (words of the living God) ... and in general, for every statement of the Oral Torah, you must analyze and know what they agree upon which unifies their view, and on what they differ.

This is just a great example something that the non-Jewish world views as an innovation (reminder: Carl Rogers came up with his "Rogerian" approach in 1970!) which we've been practicing for millennia.

Talmudic Reading

Speaking of Talmudic methodology, I was reminded once again how many analytical skills are needed simply to read the text of the Talmud. My Gemara students are working with a text that has no vowels, punctuation, or paragraphs. The text is written in a language (Aramaic) that operates according to mysterious "rules" which only kinda parallel the other foreign language they're learning (Hebrew). The text assumes that they already have a tremendous breadth of background knowledge about diverse, often unrelated subjects. With each step they take, they have to figure out how to parse the phrases, to identify whether the phrase they're reading is a statement, proof, question, answer, difficulty, or resolution, etc. They must understand how the statement performs that function and fits into the larger give-and-take of the discussion. The discussion, itself, involves a high level of intellectual dexterity, involving every form of inference, derivation, induction, deduction, comparison, distinction, contradiction, refutation, identification of the premise, extrapolation to similar cases, etc., etc., etc. And all of this is necessary for a basic reading of the Talmud! We're not even talking about higher level types of Talmudic study!

This came up in the professional development session when we were learning another framework for analyzing argument, typically referred to as "the Toulmin model." This method was named after its innovator, the ancient sage Stephen Toulmin (1922 - 2009). Basically, you can take any argument and break it down into its component parts, in the following form:

Because (evidence as support), therefore (claim), since (assumption), on account of (backing), unless (reservation).

In diagram form, it looks like this:

This might seem abstract until you apply it to a simple example. Let's say you're planning on leaving your house, and you suddenly realize, "Hey - it's raining! I should take my umbrella!" This realization is an argument, although we don't typically think of it as such. When analyzed using the Toulmin model, the argument looks like this:

Basic Form: Because it is raining, therefore, I should take my umbrella, since it will keep me dry. 

Full Form: Because it is raining, therefore I should probably take my umbrella, since it will keep me dry on account of its waterproof material, unless, of course, it has a hole in it.

In diagram form, it looks like this:

No doubt the reason why my fellow English teachers have had so much difficulty teaching this type of analysis to their students is because their students have never thought like this before! What reading or intellectual activity would they do in the normal course of their teenage lives which would demand such analytical rigor? Perhaps only those students who are on the debate team, or who devote their time and energy to debating in the comment sections on various parts of the Internet and social media.

In contrast, my own students will have practiced this type of thinking for several years by the time they enter my class. This type of analysis is Gemara 101, and even though they'll have to get used to the terminology, the mental moves will already be familiar to them.

Concluding Thoughts

In every weekday tefilah (prayer) we say: "You are the One Who graciously endows man with wisdom, and teaches man understanding." The question is: Why does it use the verb "graciously endow" when describing Hashem giving man wisdom, but "teaches" when describing His giving of understanding?

I don't have a complete answer to this question, but I know one thing for sure: God "teaches man understanding" by giving us the Torah, with its intellectually demanding system of halacha, and commanding us to learn it and master it. The skills of understanding gained through the basic study of Talmud places Jewish students far ahead of the average American citizen in their ability to think and understand.

[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Avos (a.k.a. Shemoneh Perakim), Preface; see also Mishneh Torah: Sefer Zmanim, Hilchos Kiddush ha'Chodesh 17:25
[2] I have only heard this interpretation cited baal peh (orally), and do not know of a written source.
[3] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 3:8