Chukas/Balak : Ethnic Retribution in Torah

Truthfully, this is more about Ki Seitzei, but I kept the heading since that’s where my investigation started. And to my regular readers: my apologies for the unusual the length of this post!

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Artwork: Campaign of Vengeance, by Igor Kieryluk

Chukas/Balak: Ethnic Retribution in Torah 

Introduction 

Should the descendants of one nation or ethnic group be held accountable for the wrongdoings of their ancestors, or treated differently on the basis of their predecessors’ conduct? 

The answers given to this broad and multifaceted question tend to be opinionated and heated, especially at this particular juncture in American history. For instance, there are those who maintain that the descendants of white slave owners share in the guilt of their ancestors’ crimes and are obligated by the principles of justice to make reparations to the descendants of Black slaves. Some extend this principle even further, regarding slavery as a sin shared by all white people and demanding restitution for all Black people, regardless of their actual familial connection to the institution of American slavery. Others argue that enough time has passed that the descendants of the criminals and victims of American slavery bear no connection to their ancestors – or at least, not enough of a connection to warrant the enactment of transgenerational justice – and that any attempt to enact such justice would be as unjust as punishing a child for his father’s sins. Similar questions have been raised about the wrongs committed against Native Americans by the American government, the crimes committed by the Nazis against the Jews of Europe, and other cases of oppression around the world. 

This article was born out of a desire to explore such cases of “ethnic retribution” in Torah – cases in which the descendants of one nation or ethnic group are subject to some form of discrimination on account of who their ancestors were or what their ancestors did. In this article we will focus on three such groups, each comprised of two nations or ethnicities: (a) Amonites and Moabites, (b) Edomites and Egyptians, (c) Amalekites and Canaanites; the latter includes seven specific nations – the Canaanites, Amorites, Girgashites, Hittites, Hivites, Jebusites, and Perizzites – but we’ll refer to them collectively as “Canaan” for simplicity’s sake. 

Each of these nations is singled out by the Torah on the basis of decisions made by their forebears and are subjected to laws which can be characterized as “retaliatory” in nature. We’ll begin with an overview of how each of these nations is treated according to halacha, as codified by the Rambam. [1] We will then raise some questions on these laws, examine some answers, and discover that the answers generate more questions and problems than they solve. 

Ethnic Discrimination in Marriage 

Four out of the six aforementioned nations are subject to the prohibition of “entering into the congregation of Hashem.” The prohibitions and their reasons are stated in Parashas Ki Seitzei: 

An Amonite or Moabite shall not enter the congregation of Hashem, even their tenth generation shall not enter the congregation of Hashem, to eternity, because of the fact that they did not greet you with bread and water on the road when you were leaving Egypt, and because he hired against you Bilaam son of Beor, of Pesor, Aram Naharaim, to curse you. But Hashem, your God, refused to listen to Bilaam, and Hashem, your God, reversed the curse to a blessing for you, because Hashem, your God, loved you. You shall not seek their peace or their welfare, all your days, forever.

 

You shall not reject an Edomite, for he is your brother; you shall not reject an Egyptian, for you were a sojourner in his land. Children who are born to them in the third generation may enter the congregation of Hashem. (Devarim 23:4-9) 

We will delay our analysis of the reasons given in these pesukim (verses) and will focus instead on the halachic parameters of these restrictions. The Rambam [2] codifies them as follows: 

12:17 – Regarding every [member of] every nation: when they convert and accept upon themselves all the mitzvos of the Torah, and [likewise] slaves upon being freed, they become like an Israelite in every respect, as it is stated: “there shall be one statute for the congregation” (Bamidbar 15:15). And it is permissible for them to enter into the congregation of Hashem immediately – namely, that a male convert or freed slave may marry a native-born Jewish woman, and a native-born Jewish man may marry a female convert or freed slave – except for four nations alone, and they are: Amon, Moav, Egypt, and Edom; regarding these nations, when a member of one of them converts, they are like an Israelite in every respect except with regards to entering the congregation [by marrying a native-born Jew]. 

12:18 – What is their law? The prohibition on Amon and Moav is for all time, on the males but not the females, as it is stated: “no Amoni (literally, male Amonite) or Moavi (literally, male Moabite) may enter” and it is a law given to Moses from Sinai that only a male Amonite and a male Moabite is forever prohibited to marry a native-born Jewish woman – even the son, of a son, of a son, until the end of time – but a female Amonite or Moabite is permitted [to marry a native-born Jew] immediately, like the other nations. [Note: a male Amonite or Moabite may marry another convert or freed slave without restriction.] 

12:19 – Regarding Egyptians and Edomites, whether males or females, the first and second generation are prohibited from entering [the congregation] of Israel, but the third generation is permitted, as it is stated: “children who are born to them in the third generation” … 

To summarize: all gentiles who convert to Judaism are allowed to marry any Jew with the exception of gentiles from four specific nations: Amonite and Moabite men may never marry native-born Jewish women; Edomite and Egyptian men and women are not allowed to marry native-born Jews, nor may their children, but their grandchildren may. 

In the cases of Amonite and Moabite male converts the prohibition is expressed in terms of marriage and is violated through the act of sexual intercourse. However, in the cases of Edomites and Egyptians, although it is prohibited to marry or have relations with 1st and 2nd generation converts, the prohibition is expressed in terms of rejection: “You shall not reject an Edomite … You shall not reject an Egyptian.” What does this mean practically? Rambam [3] writes: 

We are prohibited from rejecting the descendants of Eisav (i.e. the Edomites) after they convert. In other words, we are forbidden to avoid marrying them after they convert … 

We are prohibited from rejecting the Egyptians and avoiding marrying them after they convert … 

In other words, for a native-Jew to reject a first or second generation Edomite or an Egyptian on the basis of their ethnicity is not only permitted, but is actually backed by force of a Torah prohibition – and yet, if a person were to avoid marrying a third generation Edomite or Egyptian convert on the basis of their ethnicity, then they would be in violation of a different Torah prohibition. In this sense it may be said that the Torah legislates the exact parameters of our ethnic discrimination towards Edomites and Egyptians. 

What about Amalek and Canaan? One might assume that the effort to distance ourselves from these nations would be even more extreme – and yet, the opposite is true. According to the Rambam, there is no Torah prohibition to marry an Amalekite or a Canaanite convert whatsoever. The Rambam explicitly states in 12:22: “One who converts from the seven [Canaanite] nations is not prohibited by the Torah to enter into the congregation.” Why mention Canaanites at all if they’re all permissible? Because, as the Rambam goes on to explain, Yehoshua and David subsequently imposed Rabbinic marriage restrictions on the Gibeonites – the only Canaanite community that actually converted. The fact that the Rambam doesn’t even mention Amalekite converts [4] clearly implies that they were included in his statement in 12:17, namely, that they are no different than a convert from any other non-Jewish nation, and “it is permissible for them to enter into the congregation of Hashem immediately.” 

Are these laws observed today? The Rambam concludes the chapter with an answer: 

12:25 – When Sancheriv, King of Assyria, arose, he confounded [the identity of] all the nations, intermingling them with one another and exiling them from their place. [Consequently,] these Egyptians that are presently in the land of Egypt are other people; likewise, the Edomites in the field of Edom. And since these four prohibited nations have assimilated into all of the nations of the world which are permissible, all of them are [now] permissible, since if [a member of] one of them separates himself for conversion, it is assumed that he separated from the majority. [5]

Therefore, when anyone converts in the present era in any location – whether an Edomite, an Egyptian, an Amonite, a Moabite, an Ethiopian, or any other ethnicity, whether male or female – they are permitted to enter the congregation immediately. 

In other words, despite the fact that these Torah prohibitions are still in effect, they are practically not observed anymore because there is no way for us to tell which individuals descended from these nations, thanks to Sancheriv’s campaign of forced international exile and assimilation. [6] Due to the principle of “whoever separates is assumed to have separated from the majority,” every convert is now permitted to marry a native-born Jew because it is assumed that that convert did not come from one of those four nations. 

Ethnic Discrimination in War and Peace 

It is well-known that the Jewish people were commanded to wipe out the seven nations of Canaan upon our initial conquest of the Land of Israel so that we would not be influenced by their corrupt behavior, practices, and beliefs. The Torah states this explicitly: 

But from the cities of these peoples that Hashem, your God, gives you as an inheritance, you shall not allow any person to live. Rather, you shall utterly destroy them – the Hittite, the Amorite, the Canaanite, the Perizzite, the Hivvite, and the Jebusite – as Hashem, your God, has commanded you, so that they will not teach you to act according to all their abominations that they performed for their gods, so that you will sin to Hashem, your God. (Devarim 20:16-18) 

Likewise, it is well-known that we are commanded to wipe out the nation of Amalek in retaliation for their ambush on the Jewish people as we left Egypt: 

Remember what Amalek did to you, on the way, when you were leaving Egypt, that he happened upon you on the way, and he struck those of you who were hindmost, all the weaklings at your rear, when you were faint and exhausted, and did not fear God. It shall be that when Hashem, your God, gives you rest from all your enemies all around, in the Land that Hashem, your God, gives you as an inheritance to possess it, you shall wipe out the memory of Amalek from under the heaven – you shall not forget! (ibid. 25:17-19) 

However, the parameters of these seemingly sweeping genocidal mandates are not as well-known. In order to understand how we are supposed to relate to Amalek and Canaan, and in order to understand the aforementioned commandment regarding Amon and Moav of “you shall not seek their peace or their welfare,” we must familiarize ourselves with the laws of waging war and making peace. Rambam [7] writes: 

6:1 – We do not wage war with anyone in the world unless we first make overtures for peace, whether in an optional war or an obligatory war, as it is stated: “When you approach a city to wage war with it, you shall call out to it in peace” (Devarim 20:10). If they make peace and accept the seven Noahide commandments, we do not kill a single soul, and they become a tributary, as it is stated: “they shall be for you as a tributary and shall serve you” (Devarim 20:11) … 

6:4 – But if they do not make peace, or if they make peace but do not accept the seven commandments, then we make war with them; we kill all of the adult males and take their property and children as spoils, but we do not kill neither woman nor child, as it is stated: “and the women and children” (Devarim 20:14; 2:34) – this refers to males who are minors. 

When does this [law of sparing women and children] apply? To an optional war with other nations. But [in the case of an obligatory war] with the seven [Canaanite] nations and Amalek, if they do not accept peace, then we do not spare any soul, as it is stated: “thus shall you do to all of the cities … but of the cities of the [seven Canaanite] nations … you shall not allow any soul to live” (Devarim 20:15-16). Likewise, it says about Amalek: “you shall wipe out the memory of Amalek” (Devarim 25:19). 

And from where do we know that this [mandate to kill every man, woman, and child] only applies to those who don’t make peace? As it is stated: “There was not a city that made peace with the Children of Israel except for the Hivvite inhabitants of Gibeon; they took everything in battle. For it was from Hashem, to harden their hearts toward battle against Israel, in order to destroy them” (Yehoshua 11:19-20) – this implies that they made peace overtures which were not accepted … 

6:6 – We do not make peace overtures to Amon and Moav, as it is stated: “you shall not seek their peace or their welfare” (Devarim 23:10). The Sages said: Since it was stated, “you shall call out to it in peace” one might think that this is the case with Amon and Moav; therefore, the verse says: “you shall not seek out their peace.” Since it was said: “he shall dwell with you in your midst … for his benefit” (ibid. 23:17) one might think that this is the case with Amon and Moav; therefore, the verse says: “or their welfare.” But even though we do not make peace overtures towards them, if they initiate overtures for peace on their own, we accept them. 

Note which nations are omitted from these laws: Edom and Egypt. Despite the fact that we single them out when it comes to entering the congregation of Hashem, we treat them the same as any other nation when it comes to waging war and making peace. 

To summarize: we offer peace to almost every nation – including Amalek, Canaan, Edom, and Egypt – but not to Amon and Moav; however, if they offer peace, we accept it. And if a nation doesn’t accept our offers for peace, we only kill the adult males but spare the women and children – except in the case of Amalek and Canaan, in which case we kill everyone. 

We will conclude this section with a chart summarizing how each of these six nations is treated in marriage and in war, with the anomalies emphasized in bold and red: 

Questions, Answers, and Problems 

There are two overarching questions on all of the foregoing laws: (1) On what basis do we discriminate against these six nations? (2) How is it justifiable to discriminate against these people based on what their ancestors did? 

We will begin by reviewing the pesukim – this time with an emphasis on the reasons given: 

An Amonite or Moabite shall not enter the congregation of Hashem, even their tenth generation shall not enter the congregation of Hashem, to eternity, because of the fact that they did not greet you with bread and water on the road when you were leaving Egypt, and because he hired against you Bilaam son of Beor, of Pesor, Aram Haraim, to curse you. But Hashem, your God, refused to listen to Bilaam, and Hashem, your God, reversed the curse to a blessing for you, because Hashem, your God, loved you. You shall not seek their peace or their welfare, all your days, forever. 

You shall not reject an Edomite, for he is your brother; you shall not reject an Egyptian, for you were a sojourner in his land. Children who are born to them in the third generation may enter the congregation of Hashem. (Devarim 23:4-9) 

The Sefer ha’Chinuch [8] explains why the Torah prohibits us from marrying Amonite and Moabite converts based on the reasons mentioned in the pesukim: 

At the root of this mitzvah lies the reason explicitly given in the parshah: “because of the fact that they did not greet you with bread and water etc. and because he hired against you etc.” Scripture here informs us of the greatness of the quality of gemilus chasadim (acts of kindness) and repulsion towards the qualities of villainy and stinginess. Therefore He commanded us to establish a permanent hatred for them, for they (i.e. the Amonites and Moabites) became so corrupt and abominable as to show the utmost degree of their wickedness and villainy, not meeting with even bread and water a great congregation of weary travelers passing through their borders; and because Moav hired Bilam to curse them. 

According to the Sefer ha’Chinuch, it’s not that the Torah has anything against Amonites and Moabites per se. Rather, the Amonites and Moabites embodied bad middos (character traits) which are antithetical to Jewish values. By prohibiting them from marrying native-born Jews, we highlight our opposition to the bad middos associated with those nations – even if the particular Amonite or Moabite doesn’t exhibit them. In other words, our exclusion of Amonites and Moabites is didactic (i.e. intended to teach and reinforce values) and not xenophobic (i.e. stemming from a prejudiced judgment of this particular person based on his nation of origin). 

In light of this explanation one might ask: Why does the prohibition only applies to Amonite and Moabite men, but not women? If these are national traits, shouldn’t we exclude all Amonites and Moabites, as we do with Edom and Egypt? The Sefer ha’Chinuch [9] answers this question: 

The Sages (Talmud Bavli: Yevamos 76b) said as a reason for this: “because it is the derech (lit. way) of a man to meet [oncoming strangers with hospitality] but not of women”; in other words, the women had no hand in the villainy when the Israelites were not met with bread and water, since it is not a woman’s way to go out, and God will not pervert justice to penalize a woman for the villainy of her man. “Far be it from God that He should do wickedness” (Iyov 34:10). 

According to the Sefer ha’Chinuch, the Amonite and Moabite women did not participate in the “villainy” of refusing to provide the Jews with bread and water, which is why they are not included in the prohibition. Excluding them from marriage would not achieve the didactic aim.

Rav Hirsch, citing the same Gemara, takes a slightly different approach: 

The reason for this halacha (of distinguishing between men and women) is attributed to the reason the Torah gives for this prohibition: because they did not practice international humaneness; they did not offer food and drink to the people who were passing by their territory and who were exhausted from traveling in the wilderness. Such international humaneness is exercised primarily by men. Hence, the women were not to blame … 

The later prophets continued to reprove Moav for this attribute of harshness toward other nations and inhumane coarseness. When the time came for Moav’s destruction, Yeshayahu described the cause of its fall (Yeshayahu 15-16). All the nations bordering on Moav were crying out about the Moabites’ actions (ibid. 15:8). From far off one heard only tales of this nation’s arrogance, pride, and blind fury (ibid. 16:6). The only way for Moav to avert the evil decree is to turn to kindness. While still at the height of its success, while its light shines like the sun at noon, it must show kindness to unfortunate refugees. As Yeshayahu calls out to Moav: “Give thought, imagine the shades of night had already fallen in bright midday. Hide the outcasts, betray no wanderer, let my outcasts find a home with you. Moav, be their protector against the spoiler. For extortion must cease; spoiling must be brought to an end; oppressors must disappear from the land. A throne shall be established through mercy” (ibid. 16:3-5). 

According to the halacha, the Moabite women had no part in these attributes; they did not banish from their hearts humane feelings toward other nations and did not cultivate singular national pride. This was credited to them as a double merit, since they had to overcome the influence of the men. 

So, too, we should appreciate Ruth, woman of Moav, a woman of exquisite humanity, who was mother of the Davidic kingdom. In her heart burned a flame of love for people, a love that bridges the barrier that separates nation from nation. Surely she had a part in the spirit that, in the tones of the harp of her great-grandson [David], sings of a future morning when nations will be united around God and heralds the break of that dawn. 

According to Rav Hirsch, it’s not just that the women of Moav happened to not participate in villainy. Rather, there was a completely different culture and value system among Moabite men and Moabite women. Moabite men were cruel, arrogant, and unkind, whereas Moabite women exhibited none of these traits. This distinction is reflected in the structure of the halacha. 

What about the additional reason given for Moav: “because he hired against you Bilaam son of Beor, of Pesor, Aram Haraim, to curse you”? This is somewhat problematic. The Sefer ha’Chinuch only mentions this reason as an afterthought. Based on the pasuk here, which says “because he hired,” the hiring of Bilaam sounds like the decision of one man: Balak, King of Moav. If so, why should it affect our judgment of Moav as a whole? And if the king’s decision was driven by his people, then why does the pasuk speak in the singular? 

Other than that minor issue, the Sefer ha’Chinuch seems to be well on his way to answering our questions. But then he is forced to confront a glaring conundrum: If the Torah distances us from Amonite and Moabite men for all generations because they didn’t provide us with bread and water (and secondarily because of the hiring of Bilaam), then certainly we should treat Egypt the same way, since they enslaved us for 210 years – and yet, we only keep Egypt at a distance for two generations! The Sefer ha’Chinuch then provides a problematic answer: 

Now, even though [the people of] Egypt enslaved us and afflicted us for a long time, we are only kept away from them until the third generation. With this we know that it is better for a person to commit many sins than one great act of villainy. By deciding to do a vile act of villainy, without any concern about exposing his mind and his shame before many nations, one thus shows the evil of his temperament and the utter degree of his baseness, and that there is no longer any corrective measure to make himself worthy and to improve his action. His depravity has become so entrenched that it cannot be fixed. A man like that is not fit to intermingle with the blessed people of holiness. 

This answer is baffling on a number of levels. First, does this reasoning even make sense? Are 100 acts of moderate violence always better than one act of severe wrongdoing? It’s debatable, at the very least. Second, enslaving us and embittering our lives wasn’t the only thing Egypt did. They also participated in a state-sponsored extermination of all Jewish boys! Does that not qualify as “one great act of villainy”? Doesn't that show a far more reprehensible national character than neglecting to provide a nation with food and water? Third, what about Amalek? Amalek ambushed us in a cowardly manner, preying upon “the weaklings at [our] rear” when we “were weak and exhausted,” and intended to annihilate us completely. Does that not warrant a prohibition against marrying Amalekite converts on par with Amon and Moav? Fourth, his final few sentences suggest that our refusal to marry Amonite and Moabite men is not just didactic, but actually stems from three assumptions: (a) that Amonite and Moabite men actually possess these bad middos, (b) these qualities are so entrenched they are beyond hope of correction, and (c) allowing them to marry native-born Jews will “corrupt” the nation of Israel. These assumptions are highly problematic! Nations and cultures change. Individuals can choose to rise above the trends of their societies. Who is to say that every Amonite or Moabite will embody an incurable condition of cruelty and villainy, to the extent that the Torah needs to impose a blanket prohibition on them to prevent them from “infecting” our people? If the barbaric and lawless Assyrian capital of Nineveh did teshuvah when rebuked by Yonah, how can we say that Amon and Moav are beyond hope?

But wait: it gets even more problematic. In his presentation of the prohibition against rejecting an Edomite and an Egyptian, the Sefer ha’Chinuch raises our initial question and offers his own answer: 

The root reason for this mitzvah is obvious: it is to inform us that we should not behave with a prohibition toward the descendants of Edom, and should not reject them by kal va’chomer (i.e. reasoning from less to more) from the Amonites, saying: “If Amon and Moav, because of one time that they did not meet us with bread and water, were distanced from us by God, how much more so the Edomites and the Egyptians, who made the Israelites suffer so much!” Therefore, the admonition was given us about them, not to refrain from intermarrying with them. For the periods of servitude to which they subjected us were a decree of Hashem for us, and we ought not to set a permanent hatred in our heart for that. They are rather called our brothers when they undergo conversion and come to shelter under the wings of the shechinah (divine presence). With Amon and Moav, though, there is another reason for hatred toward them: that is the matter of the enormous villainous outrage which they found in their heart to commit, as I wrote shortly above. 

What? The first time around he acknowledged that the Egyptian enslavement of Bnei Yisrael really did involve wrongdoing, but because it involved “many sins” rather than “one great act of villainy,” Egypt didn’t warrant the same treatment as Amon and Moav. Now he’s saying that because the servitude was “a decree of Hashem for us,” then we shouldn’t harbor a permanent hatred. On its surface, this would seem to somewhat excuse the Egyptians for their mistreatment of their Hebrew slaves, and opens up a huge can of worms as to the justice (or injustice) of the divine punishment of Egypt through the ten plagues. 

We are left with mixed feelings about the Sefer ha'Chinuch. The crux of his approach has a lot of merit, but in his efforts to consistently explain the discriminatory laws concerning these four nations, he raises new problems, the solutions to which are not readily apparent.

The Abravanel [10] has a completely different take on the Torah's exclusion of Amon and Moav from the congregation of Hashem based on the background information provided way back in Sefer Bereishis. Amon and Moav descended from Lote, Avraham Avinu’s nephew. Avraham saved Lote on two occasions: by rescuing him after he had been taken captive (Bereishis 14:12-16), and by sending messengers to save him from being destroyed along with the other inhabitants of Sedom and Amora (ibid. Chapter 19). Lote’s wife perishes in the escape and he and his two daughters take shelter in a cave. Under the severely mistaken impression that all human civilization had been destroyed, Lote’s daughters ply their father with wine and sleep with him in an effort to repopulate the earth. The resulting offspring become the progenitors of Amon and Moav. On this basis the Abravanel writes: 

The Amonites and Moabites did not greet [the Children of Israel] with bread and water, nor did they allow them to pass through their land. Since Amon and Moav were descendants of Lote, who received tremendous kindness from Avraham who saved him from the sword and from capture, and in whose merit he escaped from the upheaval of Sedom and Amora, they (i.e. Amon and Moav) were indebted to do so (i.e. to give provisions and allow passage) to Israel – but they did the opposite. Therefore, it is fitting that their punishment be excessive and severe. Additionally, Moav added a rebellious offense to its sin by hiring Bilaam to curse Israel, and although his counsel was thwarted, this is only because Hashem (exalted is He) did not listen to Bilaam and transformed his curse to blessing out of His love for Israel. Therefore, it was fitting that even though [the Children of Israel were commanded] not to provoke war [with Moav] and not to take their land, since they descended from Lote [and were given the Plains of Moav as an inheritance], they were also [commanded] not to seek out their peace and welfare, for just as they were inhospitable to you by not providing you with bread and water, so too, you should not be hospitable to them by allowing them to marry the daughters of Israel. And since they possess a corrupt nature and such a deteriorated character, it is not fitting that they should illicitly intermingle [11] with the seed that Hashem has blessed. For this reason it was stated: “even their tenth generation shall not enter the congregation of Hashem” – meaning to say that this [exclusion] is eternal, which is why it said “all your days, forever.” 

According to the Abravanel, the sin of Amon and Moav was not merely that they refused to provide us with bread and water; rather, it’s that they refused to provide us with bread and water despite being doubly indebted to us, on account of the kindness shown to their forefather Lote by our forefather Avraham. This was more than an act of international inhospitality. It was also an ungrateful refusal to recognize and repay the descendants of Avraham for the acts of kindness which resulted in their very existence. 

The Abravanel then contrasts Amon and Moav with Edom and Egypt: 

It is not fitting to reject [the Edomites and the Egyptians] completely, like Amon and Moav – the Edomite because of his familial relation, “for he is your brother,” and it is appropriate for a person to love his relative even if he is wronged by him, and the Egyptian because “you were sojourners in his land,” and Yaakov went down to Egypt because of the “fevers of famine” (Eichah 5:10) and found [relief] at the time of his trouble, as the Sages said: “they provided lodging at a time of pressing need.” Therefore, even though they did evil to you, it is appropriate for you not to reject them [entirely] and not to withhold their reward. This is [the reason why] “children who are born to them in the third generation” may marry [native-born Jewish] women and enter into the congregation of Hashem. 

Although we were wronged by Edom, we should be more forgiving because they are our brothers. Although we were wronged by Egypt, we were also saved by them at a time when our forefathers were in danger of dying of starvation. Indeed, we owe our existence to Egypt in the same way that Amon and Moav owe their existence to us.

Next, the Abravanel addresses two problems: (1) We are related to Amon and Moav, so why not treat them like Edom? (2) Edom refused to provide us with bread and water, as the pesukim in Bamidbar 20:14-21 [12] imply, so why don’t we treat them like Amon and Moav? He writes: 

But why didn’t it mention a “brotherly covenant” with Amon and Moav as it did with Edom? And why didn’t it mention the fact that Edom didn’t greet us with bread and water, as it mentioned by Amon and Moav? The answer, according to me, is as follows: 

Although Edom harbored animosity [towards Israel] and didn’t allow Israel to pass through its territory and didn’t greet them with bread and water, they had a huge claim against us, because Yaakov took the birthright from Eisav, his older brother, and also took his blessings through deception. It would have been enough for Edom if they didn’t greet Israel with war, as did Amalek. Therefore it said: “do not reject an Edomite, for he is your brother” – in other words, there is a strong relationship between you, and he didn’t harm you, despite having a huge claim against you. 

However, Amon and Moav did not have a claim [which would constitute a valid reason] to hate Israel and harm them. [To the contrary,] they should have granted them a double benefit, in accordance with the benefit that Avraham gave their father. Neither Lote nor his descendants were subjected to insults from Avraham and his descendants, as Eisav received from Yaakov. Therefore, Amon and Moav were deserving of great punishment for refusing to benefit Israel, whereas Edom was deserving of great reward for not harming them. Additionally, our relatedness to Edom was great and powerful, since Eisav and Yaakov were the sons of Yitzchak and Rivkah. However, even though Lote was related to Avraham, that [relationship] was distant, since he was his nephew; also, the descendants of Lote came about in an improper manner from his two daughters. For this reason, Edom is called “brother” in Scripture (see Malachi 1:2), whereas Amon and Moav are never referred to as [our] “brothers” in any place. 

According to the Abravanel, Edom had every right to hate us, to deny us provisions, to refuse passage through their territory, and – remarkably – to go to war with us, on account of our forefather Yaakov’s taking of the birthright and blessings from their forefather Eisav. Although Edom’s wrongdoing towards Israel still warrants a reprisal, this long-standing claim combined with our kinship mitigates the punishment that they would have otherwise deserved. Amon and Moav may participated in the same international relations misconduct, but their crime is considered far worse on account of their indebtedness to Avraham. That, combined with the fact that they are only “distant cousins” rather than “brothers,” is why the Torah gave them the full degree of punishment they deserved. 

Let us assess the Abravanel’s approach. On the one hand, he avoids many of the problems we raised on the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s explanations. The Abravanel's approach is firmly grounded in the pesukim and even sheds light on the background information about Amon and Moav provided in Sefer Bereishis. 

However, there is one major problem: according to the Abravanel, the Torah is effectively punishing descendants for the wrongdoings of their ancestors. According to the Sefer ha’Chinuch, the Torah excludes Amon and Moav from the congregation in order to reinforce our rejection of the bad middos associated with their nations, and this didactic exclusion from the congregation is equally relevant to any and every generation of Amonites and Moabites. In contrast, the Abravanel's explanation only accounts for why those particular groups of Amonites, Moabites, and Edomites who actually committed these crimes against the Children of Israel in the Wilderness were worthy of punishment. Why should their offspring be similarly punished for all generations? If, for example, the son of a Holocaust survivor had the opportunity to repay the offspring of his father’s liberator and neglected to do so, he would certainly be worthy of censure – but would this justify punishing all of his offspring until the end of time? Lehavdil, when North Koreans commit crimes against the regime which are punishable by life imprisonment, they are subject to the "three generations of punishment" policy established by Kim Il-Sung, by which their children and grandchildren are also imprisoned for life. We recognize this as inexcusably unjust - so how can the Torah punish future generations of Amonites, Moabites, Edomites, and Egyptians for the crimes of a particular generation of their ancestors? “Far be it from God that He should do wickedness” (Iyov 34:10).

Concluding Thoughts 

In this article we set out to answer the question: Should the descendants of one nation or ethnic group be held accountable for the wrongdoings of their predecessors? Our ultimate objective was to shed light on the similar questions being asked in America and around the world today. 

Did we emerge from our investigation with a clear answer to this question? Absolutely not! We now have more questions and problems than we did when we started. 

But does that mean that our investigation was a failure? Not at all! If anything, it has become abundantly clear that the answer to this question is not simple or clear cut by any stretch of the imagination. For example, if one believes that descendants of slave owners should not be held accountable to pay reparations to the descendants of slaves, then why does the Torah hold the descendants of the Amonites and Moabites accountable for their ancestors' injustices towards our ancestors, as the Abravanel explained? And if one maintains that such reparations should be made, due to the centuries of oppression that African American slaves suffered at the hands of their masters, what about the Sefer ha'Chinuch's statement that "it is better for a person to commit many sins than one great act of villainy" or the fact that Egypt's punishment for enslaving Israel is mitigated by the fact that they provided for us in our time of need? Perhaps there is a statute of limitations on this transgenerational justice in the case of slavery as there is in the case of Egypt? And for those who either support or condemn the rioting and looting in the name of BLM, what about the Abravanel's view that the Edomites were somewhat justified in their mistreatment of the Israelites on account of what Yaakov did to Eisav hundreds of years earlier? 

And perhaps someone will object to our entire endeavor to draw parallels and inferences from these Torah laws to other historical cases and current events. That, too, is a legitimate possibility. Perhaps only Hashem, in His Omniscience and love of righteousness and justice, is in the position to enact such transgenerational measures of justice and retribution, but for human beings to even attempt to do so would be sheer folly.

This is precisely the type of confusion that I believe we need in this country right now. In an era plagued by extremism, absolutism, and "us versus them" politics, it is a step in the right direction to acknowledge that the problems with which we are confronted are far more complex and nuanced than we'd like to think. The difficulties we encountered in our analysis should give us pause, and in that pause, we should reassess whether the feelings of certainty we have on current events are backed by reason or merely by passion.

Footnotes:

[1] There are certainly other views on these topics, but I’m most familiar with the Rambam, and I’m sticking to him. 

[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Kedushah, Hilchos Issurei Biah 

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Sefer ha’Mitzvos: Lo Taaseh #54-55 

[4] Some want to argue that according to the Rambam it is prohibited for an Amalekite to convert to Judaism at all. This argument falls apart when one considers the fact that the Rambam doesn’t mention Amalek at all in the laws of conversion and doesn’t mention conversion in the laws of Amalek. The pasuk says: “David then asked the young man who was telling him, ‘Where are you from?’ and he replied, ‘I am the son of an Amalekite convert’” (II Shmuel 1:13), and we have every indication to believe that the Rambam would take that pasuk at face value. 

[5] This is a general principle in halacha: whenever there is a mixture of indistinguishable entities and one of them separates from the mixture, we assume that it came from the majority component. 

[6] It is for this reason that I decided to characterize these laws as “ethnic retribution” rather than “national retribution.” The Rambam does not say that these marriage restrictions are null and void because the national identities or cultures of Amon, Moav, Edom, and Egypt have ceased to exist. Rather, he says that Amonite, Moabite, Edomite, and Egyptian individuals are still out there – even though their nations have long since vanished – but the problem is that we just can’t tell who they are. In other words, the prohibition focuses on ethnicity, not national identity. Theoretically (albeit not halachically), if we knew for certain that a particular male convert was an ethnic Amonite or Moabite, he would not be allowed to marry a native-born Jewish woman. 

[7] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer Shoftim, Hilchos Melachim u’Milchamos 

[8] Sefer ha’Chinuch: Ki Seitzei Mitzvah #561 

[9] This passage actually comes later on. I’m citing it here to maintain the flow of the article. 

[10] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Devarim 23:4-9 

[11] Here the Abravanel uses the word “kilayim” which means “forbidden mixture.” 

[12] See? I told you this connected to Chukas and Balak!

Mishlei 17:15 - Making Exceptions to Justice

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Artwork: Vindicate, by Igor Kieryluk

Mishlei 17:15 - Making Exceptions to Justice

משלי יז:טו

מַצְדִּיק רָשָׁע וּמַרְשִׁיעַ צַדִּיק, תּוֹעֲבַת יְיָ גַּם שְׁנֵיהֶם:

Mishlei 17:15

One who treats a rasha as a tzadik and one who treats a tzadik as a rasha – both are an abomination to Hashem.

There are four major questions on this pasuk: 

(1) What are the definitions of “tzadik” (righteous person) and “rasha” (evil person) in this context? Even if we have “working definitions” of how these terms are often used in Mishlei, it’s an important methodological step to not just plug these definitions in without thinking, especially because Sefer Mishlei itself uses general terms like this in different ways. The most advisable course is to think about these terms in as fresh and unprejudiced of a way as possible within the context of the pasuk. If this approach is unfruitful, or if one is pressed for time, then it is acceptable to plug in preconceived definitions.  

(2) What does it mean to “treat a rasha as a tzadik” or “treat a tzadik as a rasha”? The Hebrew phrases are “matzdik rasha” and “marshia tzadik.” I’ve tried to preserve the ambiguity of the Hebrew as much as possible. Alternative translations of “matzdik” include “vindicate,” “justify,” and “behave righteously with.” The term “marshia” can be translated as “vilify,” “mistreat,” and “behave wickedly with,” and more. How should we translate these terms in this context?  

(3) What is meant by “an abomination to Hashem”? Both “toeivah” and “toavas Hashem” are loaded terms which are used in different ways throughout Mishlei, and certainly throughout Tanach. What does this phrase mean here?  

(4) What is the “abomination” that is common to these two cases? On the surface, the case of “one who treats a rasha as a tzadik” is quite different from the case of “one who treats a tzadik as a rasha.” It can be argued that the former is worse of a crime than the latter, insofar as it will tend to result in greater harm. Yet, our pasuk equates these cases by characterizing them both as “an abomination to Hashem.” What do these two perversions of justice have in common? One cannot simply answer, “they are both unjust.” While this may be true, it fails to explain our pasuk in a manner that enhances our practical decision-making, which is the foundation of our approach to Mishlei. 

[Okay - time to think! Read on when ready.] 

This time around I’m going to follow the Ralbag’s style of commentary by first defining the terms in the pasuk (beur ha’milos) and only afterwards explaining the ideas (beur ha’devarim). In other words, I will answer Questions #1, 2 and #3 by explaining what our pasuk means by tzadik, rasha, matzdik, marshia, and “abomination to Hashem.” 

I think the most straightforward answer to Questions #1 and 2 is that our pasuk is not referring to tzadik and rasha as types of people or archetypal Mishlei personalities. Rather, these terms are being employed in a juridical sense. “Tzadik” means “tzadik ba’din,” one who is innocent vis a vis a particular law, and “rasha” means “rasha ba’din,” one who is guilty of violating a particular law. Similarly, the term “matzdik” should be translated as “vindicate” or “exonerate” and “marshia” should be translated as “incriminate” or “convict.” The Torah itself uses these terms in this way (see, for example, Shemos 23:7 and Devarim 25:2), and the Ralbag takes this approach in our pasuk. Accordingly, our pasuk ought to be translated as follows: 

One who vindicates the guilty and one who incriminates the innocent – both are an abomination to Hashem. 

Question #3 is dicey. I do have a theory about how the term “toeivah” is used in Tanach, but I don’t think it’s necessary to delve that deeply into the term in order to explain how it’s used in our pasuk. It is sufficient to say that “abomination to Hashem” is a hyperbolic anthropomorphism intended to stigmatize the act(s) in question, usually because the behavior is one that people tend to rationalize. It is for this reason that the term “abomination” is employed in different situations for wildly different and unrelated reasons. The use of this term doesn’t tell us anything specific about of the behaviors or phenomena to which it is applied. Indeed, it ought to be viewed as more of a prescriptive than a descriptive adjective. It essentially conveys the message, “Stay away from this, no matter how good of a reason you think you have for engaging in it.” 

Having defined the terms, here's my four-sentence summary of the main idea of this pasuk: 

People have an intuitive sense of punitive justice which can be summed up as: “those who violate the law should be punished, and those who do not violate the law should not be punished.” In any system, particular cases will arise in which those who are responsible for adjudicating or enforcing the law will be tempted to pardon those who violate the law or punish those who adhere to the law; for example, a teacher might excuse a violator in order to “give him a second chance,” or might punish an entire class in order to put social pressure on the wrongdoer. The practical lesson of this pasuk is that no matter how reasonable and justifiable these exceptional cases may be, they will be perceived by the members of the system as undermining justice; this, in turn, will cause their overall commitment to justice – or at least, to the rules of that system – to weaken and deteriorate. Thus, whenever a judge or a law enforcer is tempted to make one of these two exceptions to justice, he should consider the detrimental ripple effect of his decision on the system as a whole. 

To be clear: “one who vindicates the guilty” and “one who convicts the innocent” are not the same. There are differences between these two cases – but the subject of our pasuk is what they have in common, not how they differ. 

Likewise, our pasuk does not mean to suggest that such exceptions to justice should never be made. Sometimes those who are guilty of violating a law should be vindicated, and maybe there are even cases in which those who are innocent should receive a punishment. Nevertheless, like almost all pesukim in Mishlei, this pasuk is speaking of the majority of situations. Generally speaking, it is unwise to vindicate the guilty and incriminate the innocent, and before an adjudicator or law enforcer decides to make an exception, he or she must assess the decision through the framework provided by our pasuk, asking: “If I make this exception, what will be the impact on the relationship of these people to justice in general, or to this system in particular?” 

For example, I am a classroom teacher. The students in my classes are subject to clearly delineated policies, rules, and obligations. One such policy is that if a homework assignment is submitted after the deadline, then the maximum number of points that can be earned on the assignment is capped at 80% (e.g. an assignment worth 10 points would only earn 8 points, even if it were flawless). Students are informed of this policy at the beginning of the year, and are reminded throughout. 

Now, there are many cases in which I feel compelled to make an exception to my own rule. Sometimes a student really does have a valid excuse, or just really needs to be cut some slack. However, I know that if I did allow myself to make such exceptions, that would harm my students’ relationship to the system of my class in the long-run. Other students might feel that my decision to waive the point deduction for their classmate was unfair, which in turn, might lead these students to be lax in submitting their own assignments, either because they hope I will excuse their lateness like I did for their classmate, or because they know that they needn’t take my rules seriously, since even I – the teacher who authored those rules – apparently do not take them seriously. This harm in this deterioration of “classroom justice” is evident. 

Similarly, the student who was the recipient of this exemption will also be inclined to repeat the offense. She will be more willing to turn in a late assignment, falling back on the hope (either consciously or unconsciously) that she might receive another exemption. Because this will lead to homework laxity, it is harmful for the student’s learning. 

Even my relationship as a teacher to my own system of rules will suffer if I make such exceptions. If I cave in and make an exception for one student, it will become that much easier for me to rationalize making other exceptions in other cases, even in cases where exceptions are not warranted. I would think to myself, “Well, it’s not fair that I made an exception for this student and not this other one, so even though the latter doesn’t really deserve it, I have to be fair.” Even worse, my decision whether to grant such exemptions may be influenced by subjective factors (e.g. being lenient with my favorite students and strict with the others). This, too, would be detrimental to the classroom system. 

But as I mentioned, there are ways to allow for merciful exceptions without jeopardizing the system as a whole. For example, another policy of mine is that that every student gets one “freebie” per year – that is, one instance of submitting a late assignment without any point deductions for lateness. Similarly, I have another policy that if a student knows she will not be able to complete an assignment on a given night (e.g. she is sick, there is an emergency, she forgot her books at school, etc.) then as long as she emails me to ask for an extension before the deadline, then I will grant her an extension without penalty. 

By incorporating these two “exception to the rule” rules into my class policies, I am allowing the space to make exceptions in a manner which will not be perceived as unfair by my students, and will not endanger the integrity of the system. If a student fails to complete an assignment on time because she was sick but she didn’t email me ahead of time and she already used up her freebie, then she will accept her 20% deduction as fair because she knows that it was her responsibility to email me before the deadline, and since she didn’t, then the loss of points is on her, not on me. And if a classmate of hers also neglected to hand in her assignment but didn’t receive a penalty because she emailed me ahead of time to ask for an extension, then my waiving of the second student’s lateness deduction will not be perceived by the first student as arbitrary or unfair because she knows that the second student followed the procedure. 

The reason why I have gone on at length with this real-world example is to illustrate how Mishlei is not giving practical rules for decision-making, which must be rigidly implemented in every situation. Rather, Mishlei is providing practical advice to consider when making decisions, and the chacham will factor in this advice, but will ultimately make his own decision using Mishleic thinking, rather than blindly applying the pasuk to every case it covers. 

In other words, don’t make the mistake of converting Mishlei pesukim into rules. Mishlei is a decision-making guide – not a halacha sefer.

Ralbag: A Statement About Rasha v'Tov Lo

Ralbag: A Statement About Rasha v'Tov Lo

Sefer Iyov deals with the question of tzadik v'ra lo (a.k.a. Why do bad things happen to good people?) and rasha v'tov lo (a.k.a. Why do good things happen to bad people?). 

The answer to these two questions is "longer than the earth and wider than the sea" (Iyov 11:9), and I wouldn't dare attempt to answer either question in a single blog post. That is why I have titled this "A Statement About Rasha v'Tov Lo." It is not by any means a full answer to the problem of rasha v'tov lo. It is merely a piece of the puzzle - albeit an important one.

This blog post was inspired by Charles Schulz's Peanuts cartoon shown above. Charlie Brown observes that "the rain falls on the just and the unjust," and Linus remarks, "That's a good system." 

Upon reading this comic I was reminded of an excerpt from the Ralbag's commentary on Sefer Iyov.  [1] After stating his theory on divine providence (which I will not attempt to summarize here), the Ralbag responds to an objection one might make based on the "inequitable" (i.e. unfair) distribution of goods and evils in the world:

Nor does the inequitable distribution of goods and evils among individual men invalidate our theory, as is evident. For on our theory, it does not follow that it is impossible for sinners to receive benefits that are determined by the laws of nature. Indeed, we do maintain that they are left and abandoned to those accidents that are ordered by the laws of nature and that they are not protected by God from the evils that are to befall them, for they are not at the level of perfection such that this [kind] of divine providence could extend to them. 

In other words, since sinners are abandoned to the laws of nature, it is entirely possible that they will receive the benefits that accrue from these laws - just as they will suffer the natural harms that befall them. He then goes on to explain how this is in line with Hashem's justice: 

That the occurrence of benefits to sinners through the laws of nature is not an evil can be shown as follows. These benefits received by sinners are due to hashgachah klalis (the laws of nature), i.e. are from those patterns that are concerned with man as a species. Therefore, the benefits they receive result from the fact that they are born at a time when the natural forces are in that position which determines that condition; these benefits do not occur because these people are sinners.

It is clear that it is inappropriate for God (may he be blessed) to refrain from providing for the human species by means of this type of providential care, which is necessary for the preservation of the human species, because of the sinners that might exist at that specific time. It would be a moral defect, however, if benefits would accrue to them because of their sins or because of their individual natures.

 

And just as it would be inappropriate to say that the divine providence exhibited in the divine creation in man of many organs for his preservation (to the utmost degree that is possible) is an evil because this beneficence extends to the sinners despite their debauchery, so too, would it be improper to say that the benefits received by the sinners from the patterns determined by the heavenly bodies constitute an evil. For it is not proper for God (may He be blessed) to refrain from providing for the human species in a general way because of the sinners that might exist. Moreover, it is the nature of God (may He be blessed) to bestow benefits upon existing things as far as this is possible.

 

In short, just as it is not a moral defect [in God] for non-rational animals, even wild ones, to [enjoy] food and [other] pleasures, so too, it is not a moral defect [in God] if these imaginary benefits are found among sinners, whose level of perfection is comparable to that of the wild animal. 

To summarize: Hashem bestows benefits to all of His creatures through the laws of nature. The fact that sinners and evildoers enjoy these benefits is no more unjust than the fact that they receive the benefits of their bodily systems – or the fact that animals enjoy bodily pleasures.

As I said at the beginning of this post, this excerpt from the Ralbag is not meant to fully answer the questions of tzadik v'ra lo and rasha v'tov lo. It is merely an additional piece of the puzzle which brings us one step closer to grasping the fundamental insight of Sefer Iyov "'that My thoughts are not your thoughts, nor are your ways My ways' - saith Hashem" (Yeshayahu 55:8).

[1] Unfortunately, I only have my English translation of this excerpt on my computer. Try as I might, I cannot seem to locate where I found this excerpt in his actual commentary, so I cannot cite a specific source. When I manage to find it, I will cite the exact location. My apologies. 

Parashas Devarim: Abominable Judgment

Artwork: Corrupted Conscience, by Jason Chan

Parashas Devarim: Abominable Judgment

Moshe Rabbeinu's opening speech in Sefer Devarim is mostly a recap of Klal Yisrael's 40-year sojourn in the Wilderness. One of the first incidents that Moshe reviews is the appointment of shoftim (judges) to assist him in his governance of the nation:

So I took the heads of your tribes, distinguished men, who were wise and well known, and I appointed them as heads over you ... I instructed your judges at that time, saying, "Listen among your brethren and judge righteously between a man and his brother or his litigant. You shall not show favoritism in judgment; small and great alike shall you hear; you shall not tremble before any man, for the judgment belongs to God; any matter that is too difficult for you, you shall bring to me and I shall hear it." I commanded you at that time all the things that you should do (Devarim 1:15-18).

Chazal expound upon each of these qualifications and requirements, in accordance with Torah she'baal Peh. In this short dvar Torah, we will focus on the statement "small and great alike shall you hear." The following two explanations are given in Sifrei:

"the small and the great alike shall you hear": Perhaps you [the judge] might have said, "Since it is a mitzvah for this rich man to support this this poor man, I will vindicate the latter [in judgment], thereby enabling him to be supported in a respectable manner." Thus, the verse teaches, "the small and the great alike shall you hear." 

Another interpretation of "the small and the great alike shall you hear": Perhaps you will say, "How can I blemish the honor of this rich man over a single dinar (i.e. a small sum of money)? [Instead] I will vindicate him [in judgment], and when he goes outside I will say to him, 'Give [the poor man] the money, for you are [actually] liable [to pay him].'" Therefore, the verse teaches, "the small and the great alike shall you hear."

It is easy to understand why a judge might be tempted to favor the poor or the rich in one of these scenarios. After all, these motives seem reasonable - even noble. And as long as the end result is in line with justice and righteousness, why does it matter how that result was brought about? Moreover, isn't it the judge's job to promote justice and righteousness? What's wrong with him using his position to facilitate this through "meta-legal" means?

Shlomo ha'Melech offers one answer to this question in Mishlei: "One who vindicates an evildoer [in judgment] and one who vilifies a righteous person [in judgment] – both are an abomination to Hashem" (Mishlei 17:15). The major question on this pasuk is: In what sense are both perversions of justice considered to be "an abomination to Hashem"? 

In the Sefer Mishlei, the term "toeivah" (abomination*) is used for actions which might not necessarily be so harmful as particulars, but nevertheless pose a threat to the system as a whole - often in an insidious manner. This is why the emotionally charged word "abomination" is used: one would naturally be inclined to view these actions as harmless, since the consequences are not readily apparent; therefore, a harsher term is needed for added deterrence. 

I believe this is why the term "abomination to Hashem" is used in our pasuk: the particular instance of perverting justice might be justifiable in a vacuum, but nevertheless, it poses a threat to the greater system. The question is: How?

Here is the main idea. People have an intuitive "sense of justice" which ultimately boils down to one principle: “those who do wrong should be punished, and those who do no wrong should not be punished.” Within any system of law, situations will arise in which the adjudicators and law enforcers will be tempted to pardon those who violate the law or punish those who adhere to the law. For example - an example from outside for the legal system - a teacher might pardon the penalty of student in order to “give her second chance,” or he might punish an entire class in order to create a social stigma around the violation**. 

The lesson of this pasuk is that no matter how reasonable or noble these motives are, they will be perceived by the members of the system as undermining justice. This, in turn, will cause the overall commitment to justice to deteriorate within the society (e.g. the teacher who repeatedly pardons guilty students or punishes innocent students, they will soon lose respect for the class rules). Thus, whenever a law enforcer is tempted to make one of these "exceptions to the rule," he should recognize the detrimental ripple effect of his actions on the entire system. He must consider whether it is worthwhile to jeopardize the whole system for the sake of an individual. 

One might object and argue that this detrimental effect on the system would only come about if people are aware of the judge's malfeasance. Theoretically, if nobody knows about it, then there would be no problem! However, upon the slightest scrutiny, this objection falls flat on its face. In the vast majority of cases, there will be at least one person who knows that the judge perverted justice, namely, the recipient of the judge's manipulation of the system. And even in cases where the judge manages to conceal his subterfuge, it is unlikely that his secrecy will last. Eventually, people will find out - especially if he perverts justice on multiple occasions. The truth will ultimately come out, and when it does, the system will suffer.

In his introduction to the Mishnah, the Rambam states that Avos was written primarily for judges, and only secondarily for laymen. He explains:

[The subject] of Avos is that of the ethical exhortations expounded upon by each of the Sages (peace be upon them) so that we may learn the good character traits from them. Now, no one needs this section more than the judge. If a layman doesn't learn mussar (ethical perfection), this will not be harmful to the masses, and will only harm himself. However, if a judge does not possess ethical perfection and discipline, he will harm not only himself, but all of the populace as well! 

The prohibition in our parashah is a perfect example of this. An ordinary individual who bends the rules for the sake of an individual will cause little or no harm, but that same behavior for a judge can unravel the fabric of the society. It is for this reason that the Torah holds its judges to the highest standards. 

* I have been meaning to dedicate an entire post to the term "toevah," in which I present the sources and proofs, but I haven't gotten around to it yet. When I do, I'll go back and link it in this post.

** I do NOT endorse this practice; it's just something I've seen teachers do.

Punishing Children for their Fathers' Sins

Artwork: Pillory of the Sleepless, by Marc Simonetti

Punishing Children for their Parents' Sins

The second of the Aseres ha'Dibros (Ten Commandments) includes a problematic statement: 

You shall not recognize the gods of others in My presence. You shall not make yourself a carved image or any likeness of that which is in the heavens above or on the earth below or in the water beneath the earth. You shall not prostrate yourself to them nor worship them, for I am Hashem, your God - a jealous God, Who visits the sin of fathers upon children to the third and fourth generations, for My enemies; but Who shows kindness for thousands [of generations] to those who love Me, and observe My commandments (Shemos 20:3-6).

The question is clear: How is it fair for Hashem to punish children for the sin of their fathers? This would appear to be a major injustice! Moreover, there are many pesukim (verses) throughout Tanach which support this point: 

"In those days it will no longer be said, 'The fathers ate sour grapes, and the teeth of sons are set on edge.' Rather, every man will die for his own sin, and the man who eats the sour grapes, his own teeth will be set on edge." (Yirmiyahu 31:28-29)

"The soul that sins, it shall die! A son shall not bear the iniquity of [his] father and a father shall not bear the iniquity of [his] son; the righteousness of the righteous person shall be upon him and the wickedness of the wicked person shall be upon him." (Yechezkel 18:20) 

"Vindicating an evil person and condemning a righteous person - both are abominations of Hashem." (Mishlei 17:15)

Targum Onkelos (ibid.) addresses this problem by translating our pasuk as follows:

You shall not bow down to them nor serve them, for I am Hashem, your God - a jealous God, Who visits the liability of fathers upon rebellious children, upon the third generation and upon the fourth generation, for My enemies, when the children continue to sin [as did] their fathers. 

By clarifying that pasuk is referring specifically to those children who follow in the sinful ways of their fathers, Onkelos's translation bypasses the problem of God punishing innocent children for sins they didn't commit. 

Onkelos's translation follows Chazal's interpretation, as stated in the Gemara (Berachos 7a; see also Sanhedrin 27b and Makkos 24a):

It is written: "He visits the sin of fathers upon their children" (Shemos 34:7), and it is written: "Children shall not die for the sins of their fathers" (Devarim 24:16). These two pesukim contradict each other! 

But [this contradiction] may be answered: it is not a difficulty - the [first pasuk] refers to a case in which [the children] hold on to the actions of their fathers, whereas the [second pasuk] refers to cases in which they do not hold on to the actions of their fathers. 

Ibn Ezra takes a similar approach. He interprets the pasuk not as "[God] visits the sin of fathers upon children" but rather as "[God] remembers the sin of fathers [when dealing with their] children." He explains:

Hashem will prolong [His anger] towards a rasha (evildoer), for perhaps he will repent from his sin, or perhaps he will have a son who is better than he. But if that son follows in the ways of his father, and likewise if the third and fourth generation [follow after the ways of their fathers], then Hashem will not prolong His anger for the fourth generation; if there are four generations of those who hate Hashem, then He will annihilate the memory of all of them. For Hashem will remember what the father did, and what his son did, and what his grandson did, and He will not be tolerant of the fourth generation. 

Like Onkelos, Ibn Ezra learns that the pasuk is not talking about innocent children, but specifically those children who follow in the sinful ways of their fathers. The other meforshim (commentators) deal with this problem in a similar manner.

The Ralbag, on the other hand, takes an approach which differs radically from the mainstream meforshim. Rather than textually sidestepping the problem by reading an unstated qualification into the pasuk, the Ralbag takes the pasuk at face value. He understands the pasuk to be saying that Hashem does punish children - even innocent children - for the sins of their fathers. Thus, Ralbag is faced with the full brunt of the question: How can this be? How is this in line with justice? Here is the Ralbag's explanation (ibid.) in full:

There is a major difficulty with this statement, namely: How is it possible that Hashem (may He be exalted) will punish the children of a sinner, when they do not partake of the guilt of their father's sin?

We will resolve this difficulty in the following manner: Hashem punishes those who violate His words, either through hashgachah derech tochachah (rebuke through divine providence), or by removing hashgachah so that [the sinner] receives the natural raos (harms) which were set to befall him according to the laws of nature. In both cases, the ra that befalls the offspring [of the sinner] would not have befallen them were it not for the sin of their father. 

For example: when our forefathers rebelled [against God], they became liable for the punishment of being exiled among the nations, and the nations would inherit their land. This exile extended to their offspring after them, in that they were born into exile, and it would be impossible for them to escape this ra unless they were able to do so within the laws of nature, or by reaching a level of perfection which would be sufficient for Hashem to miraculously bring them out from the lands to which they had been scattered. 

It is in this sense that the prophet said, "Our fathers sinned and are no more, but we suffer their sins" (Eichah 5:7). In other words, if our fathers had not sinned, we would still be in the Land, and we wouldn't have gone out from there unless we engaged in despicable actions which would make us liable for this type of punishment. However, once we find ourselves in exile due to the sin of our fathers, then [merely] refraining from such despicable actions will not suffice to enable us to return from there. Instead, we need to acquire the degree of perfection necessary to cling to Hashem in a manner that will cause Him to bring us out from this exile through miraculous hashgachah. In this manner, there is no injustice if the punishment of a father befalls his children, for it comes about incidentally [and not directly].

According to the Ralbag, it would only be unjust for Hashem to directly punish a child for the sin of his father, but if the father receives punishment, and that punishment incidentally (or indirectly) affects the child, this would not constitute an injustice. That is just how the world works. This is true for divinely orchestrated hashgachic "rebuke" punishments, as well as the natural punishments within the laws of nature. 

Elsewhere (commentary on Sefer Yehoshua, Chapter 7) Ralbag reiterates his explanation and provides a helpful mashal (example) to bolster his point:

... Hashem does not directly punish children for the sins of their fathers, for this would be unjust. However, it is possible - without injustice - for some punishment to incidentally extend to children on account of their father's sin, and this would not constitute an injustice at all.

For example, if a person sinned against the government and was fined as a penalty, this punishment would also affect his children, since they would be poor and would not inherit the possessions of their father which they would have originally inherited ... In this same manner it may happen that Hashem will visit the punishment of fathers unto children, but not in a direct manner.

While most of us would feel sympathetic towards the children of the man in this example, we understand that this is how the world works. Human beings were endowed with free will and placed in a physical world of cause-and-effect. In such a world, it would be impossible to shield every individual from being affected in any negative way by every other person's actions. Likewise, it would be impossible for each and every person to be born into exactly the same circumstances as every other person on earth, with no relative advantages or disadvantages. The only time that could have happened was in Gan Eden, but those days are long gone. 

Understandably, this explanation might not sit well with everyone. Some people will object, saying, "But shouldn't Hashem just work it out so that this type of thing doesn't even happen? Wouldn't that be more in line with justice?" 

Perhaps the best way to respond to this is by citing the words of the navi (prophet): "For My thoughts are not your thoughts, and your ways are not My ways – says Hashem" (Yeshayahu 55:8). The Rambam expands upon this in his definition of the purpose of Sefer Iyov: 

But the term "hashgachah" (supervision) as applied to Him is not the same concept as our [human form of] supervision, nor is His "hanhagah" (management) of His creations the same concept as our management of what we manage. The two concepts are not even comprised in one and the same definition – as is thought by those who are confused – and there is nothing in common between the two except in name alone. 

In the same way, our actions do not resemble His actions, and the two are not comprised in one and the same definition. Just as natural acts differ from those of craftsmanship, so do the Divine hanhagah, hashgachah, and kavanah (purpose) in these natural phenomena differ from our management, supervision, and intention of what we manage, supervise, and intend. 

This is the objective of the entire Book of Iyov as a whole, namely, the establishing of this foundational concept, and the drawing of attention to the inference to be drawn from natural phenomena, so that you should not err and seek to affirm in your imagination that His yediah (knowledge) is like our knowledge, or that His kavanah, hashgachah, and hanhagah are like our purpose, supervision, and management.

The Rambam is not merely rehashing the oft-repeated statement, "God's ways are mysterious and are beyond human comprehension." Rather, he is saying that God's management and supervision of His universe is completely different than the way we manage and supervise things in our world. He is informing us that understanding this critical point is the gateway to knowledge of the ways of Hashem. To the extent that we judge Hashem's actions by comparing them to our own actions, the true understanding of His ways will be withheld. And to the extent that we open our minds to ideas of hashgachah which are counter-intuitive - and clash with the way we would like to view things - we will come to know and appreciate how the True Judge governs His world.

Thus, when faced with an explanation like the Ralbag's which seems to go against our notion of how God should manage, supervise, and implement justice in His world, perhaps we ought to take a step back and ask ourselves, "Am I making the mistake of looking at God's hashgachah through the lens of human hashgachah?" This doesn't mean that we should ignore our questions and problems. It means that the answer to our question might lie in examining the root of our problem, and opening ourselves up to the possibility that "His thoughts are not our thoughts, nor are His ways our ways."

If we stubbornly try to fit Hashem's actions into our preconceived ideas about how justice ought to be implemented, we will remain developmentally stunted in our understanding. It is precisely by challenging our own intuitive notions of Divine justice that we will gain insight into the beauty and beneficence of Hashem's ways.