Bodily Posture as a Sensory Anchor for Kavanah in Tefilah

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Artwork: Memory Lapse, by Kristina Collantes

Bodily Posture as a Sensory Anchor for Kavanah in Tefilah

In Hilchos Tefilah Chapter 4, Rambam identifies five essential requirements for tefilah (i.e. the Amidah). One of these is kavanas ha’leiv (mental focus): “a person should empty their mind of all thoughts and see themselves as though they are standing before the shechinah (Divine presence)” (Hilchos Tefilah 4:15).

In Hilchos Tefilah Chapter 5, Rambam lists eight additional requirements for tefilah. Although these eight are obligatory, they are not indispensable for discharging one’s obligation. One of these requirements is tikkun ha’guf (preparation of the body):

When he stands in tefilah, he needs to place his feet side by side; he should direct his eyes downwards, as if he is looking at the earth; his heart should be faced upwards, as if he is standing in the sky; he places his hands clasped over his heart, the right on the left; he stands like a servant before his master, in awe, fear, and dread; and he shouldn’t rest his hands on his hips. (Hilchos Tefilah 5:4)

I am aware that there are specific ideas associated with each of these requirements. For example, the Rashba (Chidushei Aggadah Berachos 10b) explains that by placing our feet side by side and clasping our hands together – positions which restrict our movement – we are emulating the malachim (angels), whose movements are bound and determined solely by the will of God. However, I haven’t yet learned all the sources, so I can’t say anything about the general halachic character of tikkun ha’guf.

That being said, I recently discovered a new function of tikkun ha’guf, even if it’s not the actual purpose. In her book, True Refuge: Finding Peace and Freedom in Your Own Awakened Heart, Tara Brach writes:

[The] path to mindfulness begins with concentration – a one-pointed focusing of attention. It’s difficult to be mindful of your experience if your mind is lost in a continuous stream of discursive thought. So first we collect and quiet the mind by directing attention to a sensory anchor. This might mean following the breath, or scanning the body for sensations, or listening to sounds … With practice, whatever anchor you choose can become a reliable home base for your attention; like a good friend, it will help you reconnect with an inner sense of balance and well-being.

I had just read this passage in Tara Brach before davening one day and I realized: “Hey! I wonder whether the bodily postures of tikkun ha’guf could serve as sensory anchors for helping maintain kavanah?”

I decided to try it. When I stood up for my amidah, I paused and focused on my bodily sensations. I felt my two feet next to each other. I felt the weight of my right hand clasped on my left. I felt my left hand resting on my beating heart. I felt my bowed head. I felt my downward eyes. I began to daven … and it worked! In my usual davening, I’ll often “wake up” in the middle of a later berachah, my mind having wandered without realizing it. But after anchoring myself in the somatic sensations of my tefilah posture, whenever my mind started to wander, my focus would snap back to my bodily awareness, and be redirected to my kavanah. It kind of felt like a trampoline safety net: whenever I fell off the kavanah beam, I’d hit the trampoline of bodily awareness, and bounce back onto the beam. This occurred many times throughout my Amidah, and it’s worked for every tefilah in which I’ve consciously implemented it.

To be clear: I’m not saying that this is the purpose of tikkun ha’guf. The purpose undoubtedly lies in the particulars. All I’m saying is that utilizing tikkun ha’guf as a sensory anchor for kavanas ha’leiv has helped me to have better kavanah in my davening, and if you give it a try, maybe it’ll help you too.

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Shavuos 5780: Torah and the Limits of Human Intellect

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Artwork: Mind Unbound, by Jason Felix

Shavuos 5780: Torah and the Limits of the Human Intellect 

The Mysterious Case of the Incomprehensible Haftarah 

The haftarah for Shavuos morning is the infamous first chapter of Sefer Yechezkel. Known as Maaseh Merkavah (the Work of the Chariot), this nevuah (prophecy) is considered to be one of the deepest and most cryptic passages in all of Tanach. Its meaning is so abstruse that there are halachos governing how and to whom it is expounded, as the mishnah in Chagigah 2:1 states: “One may not expound … on Maaseh Merkavah in the presence of [even] one [student], unless he is wise and intuitively understands with his own mind.” 

To appreciate just how incomprehensible this haftarah is, here is an excerpt: 

I looked and saw a stormy wind coming from the north, a great cloud and flashing fire, surrounded by a radiance and within it was something that looked like chashmal within the fire. Within it there were four creature-like shapes. This was how they looked: they had the shape of a human. Each had four faces, and each had four wings. Their feet were straight feet, and the bottoms of their feet were like the bottom of a calf’s hoof, sparkling like burnished bronze. [They had] human hands beneath their wings on their four sides, and the four had faces and wings; their wings were intertwined. They did not turn when they moved; each [could] move in the direction of [any of] its faces. Their faces were shaped like a man’s, with a lion’s face on the right of each of the four of them, an ox’s face on the left of the four of them, and the four of them had an eagle’s face. Their faces and wings were separated above; each had two [wings] linked to one another and two covering their bodies. Each moved in the direction of its faces. They went wherever the spirit drove them, and they did not turn as they moved. (Yechezkel 1:4-12)

Every Shavuos morning, upon the conclusion of this haftarah, someone inevitably makes a joke to the effect of, “Did you get all that?” or “Simple!” or “Crystal clear!” 

This raises a question that I have every Shavuos: If virtually nobody can understand this nevuah, and if even those who can understand it are forbidden to explain it, then why do we read it in public as the haftarah of Shavuos? And I don’t mean to ask: “What is the source?” or “What is the halachic rationale behind the selection of this haftarah?” I mean: “What is the point of reading something that is both intellectually and halachically inexplicable?” 

The Other Merkavah 

A couple centuries prior to Yechezkel’s nevuah, Yeshayahu ha’Navi also had a nevuah which is referred to as “the Merkavah.” Here it is in its entirety: 

In the year of King Uzziah’s death, I saw the Lord sitting upon a high and lofty throne, and its legs filled the Temple. Seraphim were standing above, at His service. Each one had six wings: with two it would cover its face, with two it would cover its legs, and with two it would fly. And one would call to another and say, “Kadosh, kadosh, kadosh [1] is Hashem, Master of Legions; the whole world is filled with His glory.” The doorposts moved many cubits at the sound of the calling, and the Temple became filled with smoke. (Yeshayahu 6:1-4) 

Yechezkel’s vision of the Merkavah is described in great detail over the course of 28 pesukim whereas Yeshayahu’s description is only four pesukim long. Nevertheless, Chazal maintained that Yeshayahu’s nevuah was the greater of the two, as the Gemara in Chagigah 13b states: 

Rava said: Everything that Yechezkel saw was seen by Yeshayah. To what can Yechezkel be compared? To a villager who saw the king [and for whom such a sighting was rare]. And to what can Yeshayah be compared? To a city-dweller who saw the king [and who was accustomed to seeing the king on a more frequent basis]. 

Rashi [2] explains: “a city-dweller who [frequently] sees the king isn’t bewildered and isn’t amazed, and [therefore] doesn’t care to report [what he saw in great detail].” The Radak [3] goes further, explaining the metaphor’s implications about the relative levels of these two neviim: 

In other words, Yechezkel reported the details of these phenomena because it was extremely novel to him … but Yeshayah only described them in general terms, since he was more perfected than Yechezkel and this vision wasn’t as novel to him. 

And yet, despite being the more profound of the two prophetic visions, Yeshayahu’s Merkavah is even more familiar to the average Jew than Yechezkel’s. Why? Because an embellished version of it was incorporated into the daily davening in the berachos of Krias Shema: 

[The angels] all accept upon themselves the yoke of heavenly kingship from one another, and grant permission to one another to sanctify the One Who formed them, with tranquility, with clear articulation, and with sweetness. All of them as one proclaim His kedushah and say with awe: “Kadosh, kadosh, kadosh is Hashem, Master of Legions, the whole world is filled with His glory!” (Yeshayahu 6:3). Then the Ofanim [4] and the Chayos ha’Kodesh with great noise raise themselves towards the Seraphim; facing them, they give praise, saying: “Blessed is the glory of Hashem from his place” (Yechezkel 3:12). 

Our question about the haftarah of Shavuos is even stronger if asked about this part of davening: Why did the Anshei Kneses ha’Gedolah (The Men of the Great Assembly) select one of the most recondite prophetic visions and make it a centerpiece of our daily davening? What did they expect us to understand? What Jew comprehends the distinction between Ofanim, Chayos ha’Kodesh, and Seraphim? Who understands what it means for angels to “accept upon themselves the yoke of heavenly kingship from one another” or “grant permission to one another to sanctify”? Who can explain what it means for angels “to praise” or even “to know”? 

I’m not the only one who is bothered by the inclusion of such incomprehensible statements in our davening. Ibn Ezra [5] excoriates ha’Kalir [6] and other paytanim (liturgical poets) for incorporating enigmatic statements, allegories, and sodos (deep ideas) into the prayer service. Ibn Ezra maintains that the language of tefilah should be straightforward. He writes: 

Why don’t we learn from Shlomo [ha’Melech], who was not surpassed by anyone wiser, and yet, his tefilah that he davened is readily coherent; anyone who knows Hebrew can understand it, and it contains no enigmas or metaphors. The same is true of the tefilah of Daniel, [despite the fact that he] was a “solver of riddles” (5:12). They only davened with clear statements, and they were wise men – all the more so regarding the masses of men who daven and are not wise! [7] … 

[Furthermore,] all of [ha’Kalir’s] liturgical poems are filled with aggados and midrashim [which are allegorical and contain statements that are not meant to be taken at face-value], but the Sages said: “no verse departs from its straightforward meaning.” If so, then it is not proper to daven with anything other than pshat (a straightforward meaning), [and it is not proper to daven] with something that contains a sode, or an allegory … 

Granted, Ibn Ezra’s criticisms were only directed at those paytanim who introduced their own compositions into the liturgy. He certainly wouldn’t object to the tefilos and berachos composed by the Anshei Kneses ha’Gedolah. Yet, in light of his objections to the paytanim for their use of esoteric material, one wonders why one of the most esoteric prophetic visions was made into the centerpiece of the berachos of Krias Shema for every Jew to say. What are we supposed to get out of this? 

An Answer to Our Second Question … 

I recall an answer to this last question that was given by my Rosh Yeshiva. [8] He said that the Anshei Kneses ha’Gedolah incorporated this description of the angelic host praising Hashem in order to remind us that the human intellect is not supreme. 

The Torah maintains that mankind is the greatest species on earth – the only creature with a tzelem Elokim (truth-seeking intellect capable of grasping abstract concepts). Yet, man’s mind is qualitatively inferior to that of the angels, as David ha’Melech states: “You have made [frail man] but slightly less than the angels, crowning him with soul and splendor” (Tehilim 8:6). 

Even Moshe Rabbeinu, the greatest human being who ever existed, was unable to obtain positive knowledge of Hashem, due to the limitations imposed by his physicality, as it is stated: “[Hashem] said, ‘You will not be able to see My face, for no human can see Me and live’” (Shemos 33:20). In contrast, the Rambam [9] writes about the angels: 

All of these immaterial forms (i.e. angels) are alive and comprehend the Creator, and know Him with a great and exceeding knowledge. And each and every immaterial form [knows the Creator] in accordance with its level, but not in accordance with His [true] greatness. Even the highest level [of angel] is unable to completely grasp the reality of the Creator as it really is, due to its deficient mind. 

But it comprehends and knows more than that which is grasped by the immaterial form beneath it; and likewise for each and every level, until the 10th level. And the 10th level also knows the Creator with a knowledge that human beings - who are comprised of a material body and an immaterial form - are not able to comprehend and know like it. But none [of these beings] knows the Creator as He knows Himself. 

In other words, there is a hierarchy of knowledge: animal intelligence is incapable of grasping abstract concepts; human intelligence can grasp abstract concepts, but cannot obtain positive knowledge of that which is purely immaterial; angelic intelligence can grasp that which is purely immaterial, but not fully; only the Creator truly knows Himself. 

Why is concept relevant to mention in the berachos of Krias Shema? I don’t remember what my Rosh Yeshiva said on this particular point, but I would say as follows. Krias Shema is referred to by Chazal as kabbalas ole malchus shamayim (lit. “acceptance of the yoke of heavenly kingship”), which is an acknowledgment of Hashem’s Oneness. [10] This may be the highest level knowledge we can have of the Creator, but we must not fall into the trap of thinking that it is the highest level of knowledge. By prefacing our kabbalas ole malchus shamayim with an acknowledgment of the kabbalas ole malchus shamayim of the angels, who “all accept upon themselves the yoke of heavenly kingship from one another,” we remind ourselves that as humans, our knowledge is imperfect, and we can’t even grasp what it means for the angels to have knowledge of Hashem and praise Him. 

… Which Answers Our First Question 

I believe that my Rosh Yeshiva’s answer to our second question also answers our first question. What is the point [11] of reading the Maaseh Merkavah, which almost nobody can understand, as the haftarah on Shavuos? To remind us that as much Torah we think we understand, a complete grasp of Torah is entirely beyond us. 

I wrote about this at length in my article, The Limits of Our Understanding of Torah, in which I cited the second paragraph of the Ralbag’s Introduction to Torah [12]: 

It is vital not to lose sight of the fact that it is impossible for us to completely apprehend the chochmah (wisdom) and chaninah (beneficence) which is manifest in the Torah’s existence. Rather, we have very little knowledge of this, and we are exceedingly ignorant – just as we have very little knowledge of the wisdom and beneficence which is manifest in the nature of all existing things; we apprehend very little of the chochmah in their design, as is evident to those anyone who has intensively studied the natural sciences, and who recognizes the gap between our theoretical models of the laws of the universe and their reality … It therefore follows from the fact that the Torah is divine – namely, that it is from Hashem, as is known to all people today – [that its nature will also be incompletely understood], even though it is the absolute truth. 

There is only one human being who completely understood Torah: Moshe Rabbeinu. And even his understanding was restricted by the limitations of his physicality, which prevented him from having positive knowledge Hashem. 

Shavuos is Zman Matan Toraseinu, a celebration of the giving of the Torah. [13] If we were to mistakenly think that our intellect is supreme, and that a full comprehension of the Torah is within our grasp – even theoretically, if not practically – then our view of Torah would be fundamentally flawed. Hashem set up boundaries around Har Sinai, “lest [the people] break through to Hashem to see, and a multitude will fall” (Shemos 19:21). At the event of Matan Torah there was a danger that Bnei Yisrael would overestimate their own abilities, push themselves beyond their limitations, and be irreparably harmed. The same is true in our own acceptance of Torah on a daily basis. 

On the celebration of Matan Torah we remind ourselves of our limited ability to grasp Torah by reading a passage of Torah which nobody but the most delusional and haughty individual could possibly think he or she fully understands. This reminder keeps our ego and our self-knowledge in check, which in turns, helps make us worthy to accept the Torah. 

So next time you hear Maaseh Merkavah being read in shul on Shavuos, and you find that you don't understand a single thing, remind yourself that that is precisely the point.

[1] The word “kadosh” is typically translated as “holy,” which is an anathema to me. Seeing as how ק.ד.ש. means “separate” and in relation to Hashem it means “separate from physicality,” I prefer to translate “kadosh” as “transcendent” – but if I translated “kadosh, kadosh, kadosh” as “transcendent, transcendent, transcendent,” then I’d get weird looks from people in shul.
[2] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Chagiga 13b
[3] Rabbeinu David Kimchi (Radak), Commentary on Sefer Yeshayahu 6:1
[4] “Ofanim,” “Chayos ha’Kodesh,” and “Seraphim” are types of angels. See Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Yesodei ha’Torah 2:7 for a comprehensive list and ranking.
[5] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer Koheles 5:1
[6] From Wikipedia: “Eleazar ben Kalir, also known as Eleazar HaKalir, Eleazar ben Killir or Eleazar Kalir (c. 570 – c. 640) was a Byzantine Jew and a Hebrew poet whose classical liturgical verses, known as piyut, have continued to be sung through the centuries during significant religious services.”
[7] I expect someone to object to my reading of the Ibn Ezra on the grounds that he’s referring specifically to using metaphors like referring to Hashem as a lion (based on Hoshea 11:10) or fire (based on Devarim 4:24). Yes, one can argue that his critique is limited to a specific kind of metaphor-usage. Nevertheless, one can also argue that this objection stems from the sort of nitpicking which misses the main point. That’s my argument.
[8] Regrettably, I do not recall where, when, or in what context I heard this explanation. I hope I am conveying it accurately, but it is entirely possible that I am not. Take it with a grain of salt.
[9] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Yesodei ha’Torah
[10] See Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Sefer ha’Mitzvos: Mitzvas Aseh #2. Incidentally, if anyone tries to claim that kabbalas ole malchus shamayim refers to the acceptance of mitzvos, this line from tefilah is a good disproof. The angels most definitely know God’s Oneness, but they do not “accept” His mitzvos.
[11 Again I will remind you that I am NOT answering the question, “What is the halachic rationale for this reading?” I am answering the practical question, “What are we supposed to get out of it?”
[12]Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershon (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on Sefer Bereishis: Introduction to Torah
[13] Among other things. See my article Shavuos is NOT About Matan Torah for other views.

Angelic Advocates and Accusers

Originally posted in June 2012.

Preface

Sometimes I'll begin writing about a relatively localized idea, but as I write, I suddenly find many other yesodei ha'Torah being dragged along. This is one of those instances. Although it would have been possible to write the "chiddush" of this post in only a few paragraphs, I opted for the more expansive presentation. I found myself making reference to many halachos in the Rambam, and I decided to sacrifice brevity and quote them in full. 

I encourage you to read the entire post, but if you are short on time, read "The Facts" and "Questions and Clues," then skip to the section entitled, "The Main Idea."

The Facts

The first clause of the mishnah in Avos 4:11 states:

Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: He who fulfills one mitzvah acquires for himself a single praklit (advocate), and one who violates one aveirah (transgression) acquires for himself a single kateygor (accuser). 

This begs for an explanation. Unfortunately, the commentators don't give us much to work with. Rambam simply defines the terms and leaves us to work out the rest on our own:

A "praklit" is a man who advocates for the good on behalf of a person in front of the king and intercedes on his behalf, and a "kateygor" is the opposite of this: someone who informs upon a person in front of the king and strives to destroy that person. 

For some, this mishnah immediately brings to mind imagery like this:

Artwork: Seraph of the Dawn, by Todd Lockwood

And perhaps like this:

Artwork: Abyssal Persecutor, by Chippy

Based on an informal survey of friends and students, it seems that this is one of those notions that is planted in the minds of Jewish children at an early age: that the performance of a mitzvah produces a good malach (angel) who intercedes before Hashem on our behalf, whereas the violation of an aveirah produces an "evil" malach who acts as a prosecutor who seeks to destroy us. Indeed, there are Rishonim who seem to learn our mishnah this way, including Rashi, Rashbatz, and R' Ovadyah Bertinoro. They translate "praklit" as "angelic advocate" and "kateygor" as "angelic accuser" and cite a pasuk in Iyov as support: "If there will be for someone but a single defending angel out of a thousand to declare a man's uprightness on his behalf" (33:23). 

On the surface, it would seem that the Rambam does not share this view. He doesn't mention angels in his commentary on the mishnah. Furthermore, when defining the terms "praklit" and "kateygor" he explicitly says "ish ha'meilitz" ("a human advocate"), as if to exclude the standard angelic interpretation. The Rambam seems to maintain that this mishnah is speaking allegorically, and that the allegory has nothing to do with angels. We will proceed on the basis of this assumption for the time being, and we will revisit it at the conclusion of this post.

Questions and Clues

The basic question is: What is the meaning of this metaphor? How do mitzvos and aveiros acquire these advocates and accusers on our behalf? In what manner do they advocate and accuse? Moreover, why should we care? Avos is a collection of teachings on the subjects of ethics and piety - not angelology and metaphysics. Even if we can manage to understand what the mishnah is saying, how are we to utilize its principles in our ethical development? The Rambam provided us with the first step, but he left us to decode the metaphor on our own.

We can start by making a simple observation: whatever Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov seeks to teach us in particular, the general import of his statement is to alter our perspective on mitzvos and aveiros. Had we not learned this mishnah, we would not naturally view mitzvos and aveiros as a means of acquiring advocates and accusers. Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov aims to provide us with a new way of looking the halacha we practice.

In order to understand and fully appreciate this paradigm shift, we must first understand how we are naturally inclined to view mitzvos and aveiros. I would like to suggest that there are three basic frameworks through which people relate to mitzvos and aveiros - all of which are identified and explained by the Rambam in the Mishneh Torah. (Heads up: we will discuss these out of order.)

#1: Yirah (Fear)

The first is the framework of avodah mi'yirah (serving God out of fear). The Rambam introduces this concept in Hilchos Teshuvah 10:1: 

A person should not say, “I will do the mitzvos of the Torah and involve myself in its wisdom in order to receive all of the blessings that are written in it,” or “in order that I will merit life in the World to Come,” and “I will separate myself from the transgressions about which the Torah warns us, in order to escape from the curses written in the Torah” or “so that I will not be cut off from the World to Come.” 

It is not proper to serve Hashem in this manner, for one who serves Hashem in this manner is an oveid mi’yirah (one who serves out of fear). This is neither a virtue of the prophets nor of the wise. The only ones who serve Hashem in this manner are the unlearned men, women, and children, whom we train to serve out of fear until their minds develop and they serve out of love.

According to the Rambam, the majority of Jews are naturally inclined to focus on the rewards of mitzvos and the punishments of aveiros. Their adherence to halacha is fueled by the expectation of some sort of recompense, whether consciously or unconsciously. This is the lowest level of mitzvah-observance.

#3: Ahavah (Love)

The highest level of mitzvah-observance is what is known as avodah me'ahavah (serving God out of love). The Rambam continues in Hilchos Tehsuvah 10:2:

One who is oveid me’ahavah (serves out of love) involves himself in Torah and mitzvos and walks on the paths of wisdom not because of anything in the world - neither out of fear of the bad nor out of a desire to inherit the good. Rather, he does what is true because it is true, and the good will come of its own accord. 

This is a very difficult level to attain, as is evident from the Rambam's description in the same chapter:

10:2 (continued) - This is an exceedingly high level, and not every wise man merits it. It is the level of Avraham Avinu, whom the Holy One, Blessed is He, described as his “beloved,” since he only served out of love. This is the level that the Holy One, Blessed is He, commanded us through Moshe Rabbeinu [to attain], as it is stated, “And you shall love Hashem, your God, with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your resources” (Devarim 6:5). And when a person loves Hashem with the proper love, he will immediately do all of the mitzvos out of love.  

10:3 - What is the proper [type of] love? That a person will love Hashem with a great, exceedingly powerful love to such a degree that his soul becomes bound up in love of Hashem, and is constantly immersed in it – like those who are lovesick, whose minds are not free from the love of that woman with whom he is constantly preoccupied: when he lies down and when he rises up, when he eats and when he drinks. Love of Hashem will be even more than this in the heart of those who love Him, and they will immerse themselves in it constantly, as we are commanded, “with all your heart and with all your resources” (Devarim 6:5). This is what Shlomo said by way of metaphor, “For I am lovesick” (Shir ha’Shirim 2:5). All of Shir ha’Shirim is an allegory for this idea.  

10:6 - It is an evident principle that love of the Holy One, Blessed is He, will not be bound in the heart of man unless he immerses himself in it in constantly, in the proper manner, and abandons everything in the world besides it, as He commanded and said, “with all your heart and with all your soul” (Devarim 6:5; 10:12; 30:6) – that is, only with the knowledge with which one knows Him; the love and the knowledge correspond with each other – if one is a little, the other is little, and if one is exceeding, the other is exceeding.  

Therefore, a person must exclusively devote himself to gain insight and comprehension of those sciences which make known to him his Creator, according to man’s capacity for insight and understanding, as we have explained in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah.

She'lo Lishmah and Lishmah

The two frameworks of yirah and ahavah are also referred to, respectively, as lo lishmah ("not for its own sake") and lishmah ("for its own sake"). The Rambam goes on to describe these two modes of serving Hashem: 

10:4 – The Early Sages said: Perhaps a person will say, “I will learn Torah so that I will become rich,” “so that I will be called rebbi,” “so that I will receive reward in the World to Come” – but the Torah says, “to love Hashem, your God” (Devarim 11:13) - everything you do, you should only do out of love.  

The Sages also said: “he desired His mitzvos greatly” (Tehilim 112:1) – [it says,] “His mitzvos” and not “the reward for His mitzvos.” Likewise, the greatest Sages commanded their most insightful students who contemplated Hashem’s Oneness: “Do not be like servants who serve the master with the intention of receiving good; instead, be like servants who serve the master with the intention not to receive anything – rather, because he is the master, it is fitting to serve him.” In other words, serve Him out of love. 

10:5 – Anyone who involves himself in the Torah in order to receive reward or so that retribution doesn’t befall them – such a person is involved she’lo lishmah. And anyone who involves himself in Torah not out of fear and not in order to receive reward, but because of the love of the Lord of the whole earth Who commanded it – such a person is involved lishmah. The Sages said: “A person should always involve himself in Torah even she’lo lishmah, for from she’lo lishmah he will come to lishmah.” 

Therefore, when we teach the children, women, and general populace of laymen, we should only teach them to serve out of fear and in order to receive reward, until their minds mature and they gain additional wisdom; we should reveal this secret to them bit by bit, and accustom them to this concept with pleasantness, until they apprehend it and know it and serve out of love.

#2: Human Development

The challenge is building a bridge from she'lo lishmah to lishmah. The Rambam provides some guidelines for making the transition - both here, in the last chapter of Hilchos Teshuvah, and in his commentary to Perek Chelek in Sanhedrin - but in practice, this is easier said than done. In truth, this bridge-building a daunting topic, and I do not intend to tackle it here. For now, I am just going to state that the best way that I've seen to build this bridge is through a third and middle way of relating to mitzvos: as developmental tools.

The Rambam establishes the foundations of this approach in the last halacha of Hilchos Meilah. The entire halacha is quite long, but here is an excerpt:

8:8 - It is proper for a person to think into the laws of the Holy Torah and to know their underlying reasons, according to his ability. If he doesn't find a reason and doesn't know a cause of something, it should not be of a lesser stature in his eyes, nor should he break forth to ascend to Hashem lest He burst forth against him, nor should he think of it as a mundane matter … 

The mishpatim are the mitzvos whose benefits in this world are evident, such as the prohibitions of stealing and murder, and honoring one's father and mother. And the chukim are the mitzvos whose reasons are not evident.

The Rambam revisits this in the last halacha of Hilchos Temurah:

4:14 - Even though all of the chukim of the Torah are [Divine] decrees, as we explained at the end of Hilchos Meilah, it is proper to think into them to provide reasons for them wherever you are able to do so. The Early Sages said that Shlomo ha’Melech understood the majority of reasons for all of the chukim of the Torah …  

All of these matters [in Hilchos Temurah] are to subdue man’s inclination and to correct his character traits. And the majority of the laws of the Torah are but counsels from afar, from the Great Counselor, to correct [our] character traits and to make all [of our] actions upright. Likewise, it is written: “Surely, I have written for you extremely noble things, with counsel and knowledge, to teach you the veracity of true words, so that you may answer words of truth to those who send word to you” (Mishlei 22:20-21).

Perhaps the most categorical presentation of this approach can be found in the Guide for the Perplexed 3:31:

The sole objective of the Torah is to benefit us ... every one of the 613 mitzvos serves (a) to inculcate some good idea or to remove some bad idea, (b) to establish a just principle or to remove injustice, (c) to guide us in accordance with a good character trait or to warn against a bad character trait. Everything depends on three things: ideas, morals, and social conduct ... These three principles suffice for assigning a reason for every one of the Divine commandments.

Let us refer to this as "the framework of human development." It stands in an intermediary position (#2) between the lowest level of yirah (#1) and ahavah (#3) and partakes of both, which is why I refer to this approach as a bridge. Those who have embraced this framework will focus on the beneficial effects of the mitzvos and the harmful consequences of the aveiros. Their implicit questions are: "How will this mitzvah contribute to my human development? How will it improve me? How will it affect my development as a tzelem Elokim?" and likewise for aveiros. They are interested in how the mitzvos and aveiros will shape them and affect their way of living.

Back to the Mishnah

Now that we've identified the various modes of mitzvah-observance, we can take another step towards understanding our mishnah. Does Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov's statement fit into any one of these three views?

It is evident that the mishnah is not speaking in the framework of ahavah. The oveid me'ahavah would not be concerned about the benefits and consequences of mitzvos and aveiros; he would keep halacha for its own sake (whatever that means). It is also clear that this is not talking about the framework of yirah. I'm sure there are many who learn it this way, but we must remember that Avos was written for the type of person who is working on becoming a chasid (pious individual), as the Sages teach: "One who wants to become a chasid should fulfill the principles of Avos" (Talmud Bavli, Bava Kama 30a). For this reason, it wouldn't make sense for a mishnah in Avos to be appealing to a base motive of avodas Hashem.

What about the framework of human development? It seems that this doesn't work either. Someone who is operating in the framework of human development would look at a given aveirah and ask, "How does this affect me detrimentally?" Likewise, he would look at a mitzvah and say, "How does this help to develop me?" But in Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov's metaphor, the doer of the mitzvah or aveirah remains in the same condition. The metaphor does not depict the mitzvah as directly improving the doer or the aveirah directly harming him. The only thing that changes is the type of intercessor his mitzvah or aveirah produces - and, consequently, the report that this intercessor brings before the King (as it were).

Thus, we see that Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov's metaphor doesn't fit any of our preexisting frameworks. This confirms our original suspicion: that he is trying to establish an entirely new way of looking at mitzvos and aveiros. We are left with our original question: What is the new perspective he is trying to establish?

The Main Idea

Now we are prepared to understand the new paradigm being proposed by the mishnah. This new framework may be summed up as follows: mitzvos and aveiros are not only tools for development, but tools for self-knowledge.

How so? Every aveirah is a valuable source of feedback about who we are. Every aveirah is the product of the unique and ever-changing amalgam of thoughts, feelings, ideas, values, whims, instincts, urges, desires, fears, fantasies, beliefs, and free will decisions which constitute who we are. That is what Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov means when he allegorically compares the aveirah to an accuser who "informs upon a person before the king and strives to destroy him." Each and every aveirah proclaims our imperfections and testifies to our errors before the King. (Obviously, Hashem does not need anyone to "inform" Him of anything. Rather, the metaphor of "before the King" means "from the standpoint of objective truth.")

Likewise, every mitzvah we do is an expression of who we are and provides us an opportunity to know ourselves. Of course, this idea is based on the premise that the same mitzvah can be performed on a number of different levels, as the Rambam describes in the Guide for the Perplexed 3:51:

We must bear in mind that all such religious acts as reading the Torah, praying, and the performance of other mitzvos, serve exclusively as the means of causing us to occupy and fill our mind with the precepts of God, and free it from worldly business; for we are thus, as it were, in communication with God, and undisturbed by any other thing. If we, however, pray with the motion of our lips, and our face toward the wall, but at the same time think of our business; if we read the Torah with our tongue, whilst our heart is occupied with the building of our house, and we do not think of what we are reading; if we perform the commandments only with our limbs, we are then like those who are engaged in digging ditches in the ground, or hewing wood in the forest, without reflecting on the nature of those acts, or by Whom they are commanded, or what is their objective. We must not imagine that [in this way] we attain the highest perfection; on the contrary, we are then like those in reference to whom Scripture says, “You are near in their mouth, and far from their reins” (Yirmiyahu 12:2).

The highly structured nature of halacha allows for a greater opportunity for self-knowledge, since a person will be doing the same mitzvah-action time and again, thereby allowing for side-by-side comparisons of different instances of mitzvah-performance at different points in one's development.

That's the basic idea, though I'm sure it can be developed further. To sum it up: every mitzvah and aveirah acts like an advocate or an accuser on our behalf, and if we listen to what these intercessors are saying, we can gain a tremendous amount of self-knowledge which will aid us in teshuvah and our pursuit of human perfection.

Addendum: Mitzvos as Angels

I'll end off with some food for thought. At the beginning of this post we mentioned that several Rishonim interpret the terms "praklit" and "kateygor" as angelic advocates and accusers. We noted that the Rambam seems to take a different approach, since he doesn't mention anything about angels in his commentary on this mishnah.

Elsewhere, however, the Rambam does use a peculiar phrase which warrants our attention. At the end of Hilchos Mezuzah 6:13, the Rambam writes:

Every person is obligated to be careful with mezuzah, for it is a continual obligation for everyone. Every time a person enters and exits, he encounters the concept of the Oneness of Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu’s Name; he will remember His love, and will wake up from his slumber and his immersion in vain pursuits and recognize that there is nothing that lasts forever and ever except for the knowledge of the Eternal Rock; immediately, he will returns to his mind and walk in the ways of uprightness. The Sages say: Anyone who has tefilin on his head and arm, tzitzis on his garment, and a mezuzah on his door – it is presumed that he will not sin, for he has many reminders, and these reminders are the angels that save him from sinning, as it is stated, “The angel of Hashem encamps around His reverent ones and releases them” (Tehilim 34:8).

Curiously enough, the Rambam refers to mitzvos as "angels" - specifically, the mitzvos of tefilin, tzitzis, and mezuzah as vehicles of zechirah (remembering). To explain how the Rambam can use the term "angel" in this manner would require another post. To explain why the Rambam chooses to portray the mitzvos in this manner here would require an understanding which I do not currently have. For now, let us leave that as an open question.

In light of this halacha, perhaps the Rambam would not disagree with those other Rishonim. Perhaps he just chose to express the idea in a more straightforward metaphor. Either way, the idea itself is true, and if you happen to associate to this idea when you encounter references to angelic advocates and accusers in tefilah, and if your kavanah is enhanced and your teshuvah is facilitated, then perhaps this idea has merit.