Shoftim: Atonement for the Dead (Part 1 of 2)

This is half of a blog post. I wasn't able to finish writing the full blog post in time, and I figured it would be better to publish half of it than allow it to languish in my drafts folder for who knows how long. 

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Artwork: Rest in Peace, by Jarel Threat

Shoftim: Atonement for the Dead (Part 1 of 2)

Parashas Shoftim concludes with the mystifying mitzvah of Eglah Arufah (the Decapitated Heifer). When the corpse of a slain person is found outside of a nearby city, the elders and judges of that city perform a ritual involving an uncharacteristically gruesome slaughter of a heifer. The ceremony concludes with a declaration and petition made by the Kohanim: 

“Our hands did not shed this blood, and our eyes did not see. Atone for Your people Israel whom You redeemed, Hashem, and do not put innocent blood in the midst of Your people Israel, and let the blood be atoned for them.” (Devarim 21:6-8) 

The question is: Why does the pasuk (verse) say “atone for Your people Israel whom You redeemed” rather than “atone for Your people Israel” full stop? The Sifre [1] answers: 

“atone for Your people” – these are the living; “whom You redeemed” – these are the dead, which teaches that the dead need kaparah (atonement); consequently we learn that one who sheds blood sins [retroactively] until the Exodus from Egypt. 

Although the Sifre explains the apparent redundancy in the pasuk, it raises a number of additional problems: 

1. Why is this act of murder reckoned as a sin for the Yotzei Mitzrayim (the generation that left Egypt), such that they would require kaparah? The person who committed the murder certainly sinned. The elders and judges of the nearby city sinned, insofar as they didn’t do their part as leaders to foster a society in which such murders don’t happen. But how is this considered to be a sin for the generation that left Egypt hundreds or thousands of years ago? They didn’t do anything! Why do they need kaparah? 

2. How is it fair to hold anyone responsible for a sin they didn’t commit? According to the Rambam [2], the eleventh of the Thirteen Fundamental Principles of Torah is that Hashem rewards each person for the mitzvos they have done and punishes each person for the transgressions they have committed. Hashem does not reward people for doing mitzvos that they didn’t do, nor does He punish people for transgressions they didn’t commit. The Yotzei Mitzraim lived their own lives, and had their own mitzvos and sins. Ostensibly, it would be unjust to hold them accountable for the sins of their offspring. As Avraham Avinu asked: “Heaven forfend doing something like this! … Will the judge of all the earth not enact justice?” (Bereishis 18:25). 

3. How is it halachically possible for the dead to receive kaparah? The Gemara (Zevachim 9b) openly states “there is no kaparah for the dead” and the Rambam [3] rules in accordance with this view. Rashi [4] explains that “there is no kaparah for the dead because their death atoned for them.” In other words, there is no kaparah for the dead because the dead don’t need kaparah. The Baalei Tosafos [5] point out the halachic ramifications: if it were possible for the dead to receive kaparah, their surviving relatives would be responsible for bringing a korban (sacrifice) to atone on their behalf. Likewise, if a person designated a korban as a sin-offering and then died, then there would be even more of a reason for his relatives to offer it in order to bring about post-mortem kaparah. These sources indicate that kaparah for the dead is a halachic impossibility. [6]

4. How is it metaphysically possible for the dead to receive kaparah? Once a person dies, and their soul separates from their body, it is impossible for the soul to undergo further change, for good or for bad. This is why Chazal urge us to do mitzvos and teshuvah in Olam ha’Zeh (This World), since there’s no way to elevate the soul after death, as the Rambam [7] states: “for if one does not acquire wisdom and good deeds here, then he will have nothing by which he merits.” On the basis of this principle, the Ran questions the entire notion of punishments in Olam ha’Ba. At the beginning of his tenth derashah the Ran [8] sets forth the premise that all of Hashem’s punishments in Olam ha’Zeh are for our benefit, “either to improve the sinner himself so that he does teshuvah from his evil path” or “to improve others, so they will not be evil like him.” He then raises the question about Olam ha’Ba: “it is impossible for the punishments of Olam ha’Ba to be like this, since the soul cannot be improved there; rather, it will forever remain in the state it was in when it left the body.” If that is the case, then how would it be possible for someone to receive kaparah after death? Moreover, how would it be possible for the sin of the slain victim to necessitate kaparah for the soul of a dead person? 

I have an approach but I haven't fully worked it out yet. Let me know if you think of anything!

End Notes

[1] Sifre Devarim: Piska 210; as usual I’ve chosen to translate the version cited by the Torah Temimah 

[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides, Commentary on the Mishnah: Sanhedrin, Introduction to to Perek Chelek 

[3] see Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Avodah, Hilchos Psulei ha’Mukdashim 15:9 

[4] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Talmud Bavli: Me’ilah 10b 

[5] Tosafos, Temurah 15b 

[6] Over the course of my research I did encounter some arguments which attempted to reconcile the implications of the Sifre with these halachos, but I found them to be contrived and didn’t think they warrant being addressed here. If you do find a compelling argument, I would love to hear it. 

[7] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 9:1

[8] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven (Ran), Drashos ha'Ran: Drashah #10

Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife?

This week’s dvar Torah is a digest of the answers given by the Rishonim [1] to a classic question, along with an original answer based on my understanding of Sefer Koheles. 

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Artwork: Honor's Reward, by Izzy

Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife? 

The Question 

Parashas Bechukosai opens with a list of the blessings that Hashem promises to bestow “If you will follow My decrees and observe My commandments and perform them” (Vayikra 26:3). Among these blessings are: rain in its proper time, abundant produce, peace in the land, military success, flourishing of our population, and Divine favor. A similar list of blessings is stated in Parashas Ki Savo (Devarim 28:1-14). 

But there is a shocking omission from both lists of blessings: Olam ha’Ba (the “World to Come” or “afterlife”), the ultimate reward for a life of Torah and mitzvos. 

This is a famous problem. Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? In contrast, the Oral Torah and midrashic literature are replete with references to Olam ha’Ba, the most prominent of which is the Mishnah’s statement: “All of Israel has a portion in Olam ha’Ba” (Sanhedrim 10:1). 

This discrepancy between the Written and Oral Torahs has led modern academics to conclude that the entire notion of an afterlife was a Rabbinic invention, introduced long after the Biblical period. Those who wish to believe such conspiracy theories will not be convinced by any arguments, and I will not even attempt to address them here. Suffice it to say, our Mesorah (tradition) is clear on this point: belief in Olam ha’Ba has always been a unanimously accepted part of Judaism, despite the fact that it is not explicitly referenced in the 24 books of Tanach. 

But the question remains: Why does the Written Torah omit Olam ha’Ba from its lists of rewards? Why does it focus exclusively on the physical blessings? 

Seven Answers from the Rishonim 

The Abravanel [2] raises our question in his Chumash commentary and refers the reader to a book he wrote on the topic of Olam ha’Ba called Tzedek Olamim, in which he answers this question in full. Sadly, this book has been lost to history. Fortunately, the Abravanel provides a brief summary of six answers given to our question by his predecessors, followed by his own seventh answer. Here are my summaries of the Abravanel’s summaries: 

(1) Rambam [3]: The blessings and curses promised in the Torah are not the true reward and punishment for the mitzvos. The true reward is Olam ha’Ba, which is purely spiritual in nature. The reason why the Written Torah didn’t mention this reward is so that a person will follow Torah lishmah (for its own sake) – or, as the Abravanel puts it, “for the sake of perfection” – rather than for the sake of reward or out of fear of punishment. The role of the blessings and curses is to facilitate our pursuit of human perfection for its own sake: to the extent that we follow Hashem, He will provide us with physical goods and remove physical impediments from our lives so that we can continue in our pursuit of perfection without worrying about our material well-being; and to the extent that we neglect His will, He will withhold His blessings and we will be subject to these curses which will impede our pursuit of perfection. 

(2) Ibn Ezra [4]: The reward in Olam ha’Ba is a deep concept which is difficult for the average person to grasp. Since the Written Torah was given to the entire Jewish nation – not just the elite scholars – it was necessary to only mention the physical rewards and punishments, which can be understood by everyone. The sode (“secret” or esoteric concept) of Olam ha’Ba was relegated to the realm of the Oral Torah, thereby allowing every teacher to assess their student’s readiness for this concept on an individual basis, in accordance with that student’s level of development. 

(3) Ramban [5] / Sefer ha’Chinuch [6]: Belief in the eternality of the soul and its reward in Olam ha’Ba is a matter that can be rationally demonstrated by way of philosophical argument, and therefore did not need to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. In contrast, the blessings and curses are miraculous [7] phenomena which operate according to the principles of hashgachah (Divine providence) known only through nevuah (prophecy), which is why it was necessary for the Torah to spell them out in detail. 

(4) Ran [8] / Kuzari [9]: The majority of the people, in ancient and modern times, denied the reality of hashgachah pratis (individual Divine providence). This denial was rampant among the Jews as well. Were the Torah to only promise spiritual reward and punishment after death, then these misguided Jews would take this as a confirmation of their deistic worldview. Therefore, it was necessary for the Torah to reinforce the truth of hasghacha pratis by going into great detail about the physical blessings and curses that will transpire as a result of our adherence to Torah. As for the reality of the spiritual reward and punishment for the soul in Olam ha’Ba: this can be inferred from the physical blessings and curses in Olam ha’Zeh (the physical world). Once we see that God provides us with physical rewards, which relate to the lower part of our nature (i.e. the body), we will realize that certainly He must provide us with spiritual reward, to compensate the higher part of our nature (i.e. the soul). 

(5) Saadia Gaon [10]: The ovdei avodah zarah (idolaters) engaged in various behaviors which they believed would bring them material success and protection from physical harm. When Hashem prohibited these idolatrous practices, He didn’t want His people to think that they would lose out on these material benefits. Therefore, He promised us as part of His covenant that by keeping the Torah, we would enjoy rewards in the physical world greater than anything that the ovdei avodah zarah hoped for from their false gods, since Hashem is the true God of heaven and earth, Who has the ability to bestow such blessings as He sees fit. There was no need to mention spiritual rewards, since the promises of physical rewards were only included in the covenant to refute the false promise of physical blessings by the ovdei avodah zarah. (Apparently, the ovdei avodah zarah of that era did not yearn for spiritual rewards, which is why there was no need to mention them in the covenant.) 

(6) Kuzari [11] / Ran [12]: The afterlife of the soul is explicitly mentioned in the blessings promised by the Torah in such statements as: “I [Hashem] will walk among you” (Vayikra 26:12), “I will place My dwelling among you” (ibid. 26:11), “I will be God unto you” (ibid. 26:12). [The Abravanel then goes on to explain how, if the nature of this spiritual reward is properly understood, then even the promises of physical blessings will serve as a proof that the souls of the righteous will survive after death. However, I’m not 100% sure that I follow every step of his explanation, and I would rather omit it from my summary than risk misrepresenting this line of reasoning.] 

(7) Abravanel [13]: It would not be proper to mention Olam ha’Ba in the context of Bechukosai and Ki Savo, since these blessings are for the nation as a whole rather than for individuals, whereas the spiritual rewards of the afterlife are for individuals and not for the nation as a whole. If the Torah had mentioned Olam ha’Ba in its lists of blessings, this might lead to misconceptions about the nature of the reward in the afterlife. For example, one might mistakenly conclude that one’s portion in Olam ha’Ba is determined or affected by the righteousness and wickedness of the majority of nation, as is the case with the physical blessings and curses. 

An Eighth Answer 

Shlomo ha'Melech says: “Give a portion to seven but also to eight” (Koheles 11:2). While the seven of the aforementioned answers all have their merits, I would like to offer an eighth answer – one which lines up with that of the Rambam, but with a twist. 

The Rambam [14] devotes the final chapter of Hilchos Teshuvah to a discussion of the motives for serving Hashem. He opens his discussion by defining two levels of Divine service: 

A person should not say, “I will do the mitzvos of the Torah and involve myself in its wisdom in order to receive all of the blessings that are written in it,” or “in order that I will merit life in Olam ha’Ba” and “I will separate myself from the transgressions about which the Torah warns us, in order to escape from the curses written in the Torah” or “so that I will not be cut off from Olam ha’Ba.”  

It is not proper to serve Hashem in this manner, for one who serves Hashem in this manner is called “oveid mi’yirah” (“one who serves out of fear”). This is neither a virtue of the prophets nor of the wise. The only ones who should serve Hashem in this manner are the ignoramuses, the women, and the children, whom we train to serve out of fear until their minds develop and they serve out of love.  

An “oveid me’ahavah” (“one who serves out of love”) involves himself in Torah and mitzvos and walks on the paths of wisdom not because of anything in the world, neither out of fear of the bad nor out of a desire to inherit the good. Rather, he does what is true because it is true, and the good will come of its own accord … 

It is easy to understand why doing mitzvos in order to receive the blessings promised by the Torah is considered to be an inferior motive, but why should this apply to one whose service is motivated by the prospect of reward in Olam ha’Ba? Didn’t the Rambam write earlier [15] that Olam ha’Ba is the greatest good? 

The [ultimate] goodness which is hidden away for tzadikim is Olam ha’Ba. This is the life which has no death with it, and the good which has no bad. This is what is written in the Torah, “so that it will be good for you, and you will prolong your days” (Devarim 22:7). From the Oral Torah we learn: “so that it will be good for you” [refers] to the world which is entirely good, and “you will prolong your days” [refers] to the world which is entirely long – and this is Olam ha’Ba. 

If Olam ha’Ba is the ultimate good, why shouldn’t it motivate our observance of mitzvos? 

The answer lies in the fact that it is impossible for us to comprehend the true nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba. The Rambam [16] introduces this difficulty in his introduction to Perek Chelek. He writes: 

Know that just as a blind man cannot experience colors, nor can a deaf man experience sounds, nor can a eunuch [experience] sexual desire, so too, physical bodies cannot experience spiritual enjoyments. And just as a fish does not recognize the element of fire because it (i.e. the fish) is immersed in its opposite, so too, one cannot know the enjoyments of the spiritual world while one is in this physical world, for we have no enjoyment other than bodily enjoyments alone – [such as] the experiences of our senses in eating, drinking, and sex – and everything outside of these [physical enjoyments] is not experienced by us, nor can we recognize it, nor can we apprehend it in our initial analysis, but only after much investigation. This is because we are in a physical world and cannot apprehend anything other than its enjoyments, but enjoyments of the soul are constant and unceasing, and there is no relationship at all whatsoever between these and those. 

Similarly, the Rambam [17] writes in the Mishneh Torah: 

Regarding the great good which the soul will enjoy in Olam ha’Ba: there is no way in Olam ha’Zeh to comprehend it or know it, because we only know in Olam ha’Zeh the good of the body, and that is what we desire; but that good [in Olam ha’Ba] is exceedingly great, and there is no comparison among the goods of Olam ha’Zeh except by way of analogy. 

Indeed, a few paragraphs earlier the Rambam condemns those who harbor foolish notions about the nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba, writing: 

Maybe this good will seem trivial in your eyes, and you’ll imagine that the only reward for mitzvos and for being a person who is perfected in the ways of truth is to eat and drink good foods, have relations with beautiful figures, wear garments made of silk and woven fabrics, dwell in houses of marble, and use gold and silver utensils and other things like this – as is imagined by the foolish and idiotic Arabs who are steeped in lechery.

But the wise and those who possess knowledge know that all of these things are fantasy and nothingness, and there is no hope in them. They are only considered to be a great good for us in Olam ha’Zeh because we have bodies, and all of these things are bodily needs, and the soul only desires them and favors them because they are bodily needs, in order that its desires will be fulfilled and its health maintained. And when there is no body, all of these things will be found to be pointless. 

Having established all of these premises, I would like to propose my own answer to our original question: Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? Because since it is absolutely impossible to conceive of the spiritual enjoyments of Olam ha’Ba, then if we were to be motivated by the promise of such a reward, we would – by definition – be chasing a fantasy. In other words, whatever notion of Olam ha’Ba is driving our motivation must, of necessity, be false, since it is impossible for a physical being to conceive of non-physical enjoyments. 

It is for this reason that the Torah promises physical blessings to those who obey Hashem. The individual whose avodah (Divine service) is motivated by these physical blessings and the individual whose avodah is motivated by Olam ha’Ba are both engaged in avodah she’lo lishmah (not for its own sake), but the former individual is on a higher level because at least he’s being motivated by a reality, whereas the latter is being motivated by a fantasy. 

Make no mistake: Olam ha’Ba itself is a reality, but the version of Olam ha’Ba as a motivator is a fantasy. The vision of Olam ha’Ba in our minds and imaginations, to which our psyche attaches value, and which acts as the proverbial carrot (paired with the proverbial stick) – that notion of Olam ha’Ba has no basis in reality whatsoever. In contrast, “rains in their proper time,” “eating bread in satiety,” “peace in the land” and all of the other physical blessings exist as motivators in our imaginations which do correspond to their physical reality. 

This sheds light on the Divine wisdom in relegating Olam ha’Ba to the Oral Torah. In Hashem’s “Plan A” (so to speak), students would not be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba until they were developmentally ready, as the Rambam [18] describes: 

Therefore, when we teach the children, women, and general populace of laymen, we should only teach them to serve out of fear and in order to receive reward, until their minds mature and they gain additional wisdom; we should reveal this secret to them bit by bit, and accustom them to this concept with pleasantness, until they apprehend it and know it and serve out of love. 

Parents and teachers would motivate their children and students to serve Hashem for the she’lo lishmah motive of obtaining the blessings mentioned in the Written Torah. As they reached the requisite level of psychological and intellectual maturity, they would be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba, which would click into its proper intellectual place as a truth about reality, rather than as a motivator for avodah. In this manner, they would bypass the stage of being motivated by a fantasy notion of Olam ha’Ba altogether. 

Ultimately, we cannot know why Hashem chose not to mention Olam ha’Ba explicitly in His lists of rewards, but these eight theories allow us to appreciate the fact that this was done with reason, and with wisdom. 

[1] This is a general remark, but I might as well mention it here. The line between Rishonim and Achronim is a matter of debate. Some distinguish between the two periods based on dates (e.g. the Rishonim are those who wrote in the 11th century to the 15th century, and the Achronim are post-15th century) or by specifying a cutoff point (e.g. all commentators who came before the composition of the Shulchan Aruch were Rishonim, and all who came after are Achronim). Personally, I don’t like either of these approaches. I prefer to define the two groups by their time period AND their relationship to their predecessors and/or their style. For example, I classify the Abravanel (1437 – 1508) as a Rishon because he argues with his predecessors as a contemporary, rather than a disciple. I classify the Sforno (1475 – 1550) as a Rishon because of his commentary’s style and commentary. 

[2] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 26:3 

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1); Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 9 

[4] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer Devarim 32:39; it should be noted that the Ibn Ezra’s answer to this question parallels his answer to R’ Yehuda ha’Levi’s question on the first of the Aseres ha’Dibros: Why does Hashem introduce Himself to the Jewish people by saying “Who took you out from the land of Egypt” instead of “Who created the heavens and the earth”? See the Ibn Ezra’s long commentary on Shemos 20:2. 

[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 18:29 

[6] Sefer ha’Chinuch: Introduction. The Abravanel doesn’t actually quote the Sefer ha’Chinuch with reference to this view, but since it was the first place I encountered it in my own learning, and since the Sefer ha’Chinuch expands upon this view even more than the Ramban, I decided to attribute this view to him in my list. Moreover, the Abravanel attributes this view to “Rabbeinu Bachya ha’Zaken, as mentioned by the Ibn Ezra” but according to the Warsaw manuscript and H. Norman Strickman, the name mentioned by the Ibn Ezra is actually “Rabbeinu Hai.” This possible misattribution is yet another reason why I opted to label this under the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s name. 

[7] According to the Ramban, as the Abravanel himself points out. 

[8] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran #1 

[9] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi (Kuzari) 1:104-117 

[10] Rabbeinu Saadia Gaon, Emunos v’Deos 9:2 

[11] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi 1:115 

[12] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran, end of #3 

[13] The Abravanel credits the Ramban for this approach, based on the latter’s Commentary on Sefer Devarim 29:20; he also cites the Sefer ha’Ikkarim 4:40, chastising him for citing this answer in his own name rather than in the name of the Ramban. 

[14] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 10:1-2 

[15] ibid. 8:1 

[16] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1) 

[17] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 8:6 

[18] Ibid. 10:5

The Harmful Notion of the "Jewish Soul"

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The Harmful Notion of the "Jewish Soul"

Disclaimer and Context

This is more of a "rant" than a strictly "lishmah" post. I have consciously chosen to write this post as more polemical than dialectical. For this reason, do not expect this to be a comprehensive treatment of the topic at hand, in which both sides of the issue are examined from a detached, analytical, non-judgmental perspective. Unlike most of the posts on this blog, which I strive to write from a neutral standpoint, this post has an agenda: to articulate why I object to the notion of "Jewish souls."

I think it would help to provide some context for how I came to write this post. Last week I was invited to join a new (secret) Facebook support group for gerim (converts). Hearing so many personal stories of discrimination and insensitivity towards gerim has caused me to revisit some of the ger-related topics which I hadn't thought about for a while.

In Friday's dvar Torah (Which Souls Were at Sinai?) I mentioned a pet peeve of mine: when born-Jews learn that I'm a ger (convert) and exclaim, "Oh, but you're such a good Jew! You CLEARLY must have been born with a Jewish soul!" or "You CLEARLY have a spark of Yiddishkeit in your soul!" or "You MUST have had a Jewish ancestor, and now your Yiddishe neshamah (Jewish soul) is just finding its way back home!" 

I am irked by comments like these for three reasons: (1) they are racist, in the sense of being "anti-goyim," (2) they minimize my journey to Judaism and my conversion, and (3) according to my understanding, the notion of a "Jewish soul" is false. 

We will now discuss each of these three reasons. 

Reason #1: Racism / Anti-Gentilism

I know that in most cases, born-Jews don't mean anything bad or malicious by such statements, but that doesn't change the anti-goyim undertones of their words. The underlying message I hear in their words is: "It simply cannot BE that you were once a GOY! Goyim can't POSSIBLY be part of the Jewish people! Therefore, you MUST have been a Jew SOMEHOW! Heaven FORFEND that a dirty goyishe neshamah could have found its way into our holy ranks!"

Now, before any of the born-Jews start "Jewsplaining" to me how I'm reading too much into statements like these, let's see if we can agree to the following four points: (1) there are born-Jews who say these things WITHOUT these intentions, even on an unconscious level; (2) there are born-Jews people who say these things who DO harbor such intentions, even though they aren't aware of them or don't mean anything bad by them; (3) there are geirim who are NOT bothered by such comments, and might even find them to be welcoming and affirming of their Jewish identity; (4) you, as a born-Jew, have never been on the receiving end of comments like these, and therefore, you have a different perspective than I do; you are certainly entitled to your opinion, but you cannot tell me how I feel. 

I've even had students who love my classes and have learned from me for years, but will nevertheless speak in my presence about "the disgusting goyim" and how "goyim don't have souls" or how "goyim were made to be our slaves." Whenever I hear such comments I usually respond, "You know, I used to be a 'disgusting goy.' Are you saying that I didn't have a soul? Was I born to be your slave" to which they respond, "No, Rabbi ______, I wasn't talking about YOU! Obviously YOU are different!" These kids are too young to realize the weaknesses of "the friend argument" (i.e. "I'm not racist! I have friends who are black!"), but that is essentially the argument they're trying to make.

It's no secret that Jewish tribalism and elitism has always "been a thing" in our nation, and has been reinforced by millennia of Antisemitism. This is understandable, and even excusable insofar as it is a natural defense mechanism which is (arguably) necessary for Jewish survival. But the historical reality of Antisemitism certainly does not validate anti-goyim beliefs or sentiments, nor does it justify making anti-goyim remarks in the presence of those of us who used to be goyim.

Reason #2: Minimization of Geirus (Conversion)

When you tell a ger (whether explicitly or implicitly) that he or she "was destined to be Jewish," be aware that you might be perceived by the ger to be minimizing the significance and/or hardship of his or her journey and conversion process. 

There are so many different types of paths that people take to Judaism, some of which are harder than others. I have heard horror stories from gerim that you wouldn't believe, filled with instances abuse, discrimination, and despicable behavior from Jewish laypeople and rabbis alike. Think about what it means to tell a person who has been through such a difficult journey, "Oh, that? Yeah. That wasn't your free will decision, and had nothing to do with your perseverance, or your love for Hashem and His Torah, or your sacrifices you made, or your trust in the truth of your convictions, or your courage. It was in your spiritual DNA. You were basically programmed to follow this path. It had to happen." 

Would you ever say something like this to a veteran who survived a war, or to someone who went through therapy, or to a person who is in recovery from an addiction? These may sound like "negative" comparisons to geirus, but they are apt analogies for those whose path to Judaism was fraught with challenges and hardships. 

Without knowing the full story of the ger to whom you are speaking, making statements such as these can easily stray into the territory of onaas ha'ger (abusing a convert).

Every day, those who are born Jewish make the berachah of "she'lo asani goy" ("Blessed are You, Hashem, King of the universe, Who did not make me a gentile"). I, as a ger, do not make that berachah because Hashem did make me a goy. [1] Let me say that again: Hashem made me a goy, and I chose to become a ger. Don't minimize my life and my decisions by telling me that my soul was already Jewish. 

Reason #3: Falsehood

Since the topic of "the soul" is extremely broad and deep, I will confine my remarks here to a general summary of my reasons for rejecting the notion of a "Jewish soul," and point the way to resources for further reading.

As far as I know, based on my own research and the research of academic scholars I have read on this matter, the idea of a "Jewish soul" is an entirely "Kabbalistic" [2] and/or Chasidic concept. The distinction between Jewish and non-Jewish souls cannot be found anywhere in the Written Torah, the Oral Torah, or in any of the non-"Kabbalistic" works of the Kadmonim [3]. Sure, it can be read into these sources - but if you learn through these classical sources on their own terms, without the influence of "Kabbalah" or Chasidus, you would not encounter any distinction between Jewish and non-Jewish souls. 

Does this lack of sources mean that this belief is false? Not necessarily. "Ee efshar l'beis midrash b'lo chidush - it is impossible to have a study hall without innovation" (Chagigah 3a). Nevertheless, whenever I see a concept which only appears in "Kabbalistic"/Chasidic sources with no basis in the Written Torah, the Oral Torah, or the writings of the non-"Kabbalistic" Kadmonim, then I am suspicious - especially if the concept in question is purported to be a fundamental of Judaism. If there is no evidence that Chazal and the Kadmonim were aware of a particular concept, then at the very least, this means that it is not an essential part of Judaism. At worst, this means that it is not part of Judaism at all. 

According to my understanding of the Written Torah, the Oral Torah, and the writings of the non-"Kabbalistic" Kadmonim, people only have one kind of soul: a human soul. This is the soul that the Torah refers to when it says: "And God said, 'Let us make man in our form (b'tzalmeinu), like our likeness (ki'dmuseinu)'" (Bereishis 1:26) and "God created man in His tzelem (form); in tzelem Elokim He created him; male and female He created them" (ibid. 1:27) and "Hashem-God formed the man of dust from the ground, and He blew into his nostrils nishmas chayim (the soul/breath) of life, and man became a nefesh chaya (living/speaking soul)" (ibid. 2:7).

According to all of the Kadmonim, the tzelem Elokim refers to the human intellect: man's capacity to apprehend and seek conceptual knowledge and understanding. There is no inherent difference between the tzelem Elokim of a Jew and that of a non-Jew. Frankly, I don't even know what it would mean to differentiate between a "Jewish intellect" and a "non-Jewish intellect." [4] 

The distinction between Jew and non-Jew is a legal one - not metaphysical one. In other words, "Jew" and "non-Jew" are halachic labels, indicating the particular system of Divine law by which one is legally bound. A Jew is someone who has entered into the covenant of Torah - whether by birth or by conversion - and is legally obligated to keep the system of Taryag mitzvos (613 Commandments). Non-Jews, on the other hand, are only obligated to keep the Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach (Seven Noahide Commandments), which have been binding on all humans since the time of Noach, and which were "renewed" with the giving of Torah at Sinai. [5] 

Maybe someday I'll write a post in which I compile sources from the Kadmonim which state these points explicitly, alongside a list of the "Kabbalistic"/Chasidic sources which assert a metaphysical distinction between the souls of Jews and non-Jews. However, as I pointed out in my disclaimer, this is a polemical post - not a dialectical one. Suffice it to say, the burden of proof is on the "Kabbalists"/Chasidim to show that their belief has its source in the Mesorah (or to show that their belief is valid despite not having a source in the Mesorah). 

[Incidentally, if you would like to peruse a fairly comprehensive list of sources from both sides, check out The Soul of a Jew and the Soul of a Non-Jew, by Hanan Balk, published in Hakirah. This article also does a great job of illustrating why I consider the belief in "Jewish souls" to be harmful, dangerous, and repugnant.]

There is only one of the Kadmonim who, at first glance, might seem to hold that Jews and non-Jews have different souls: R' Yehuda ha'Levi. In his famous work, "the Kuzari," R' Yehuda ha'Levi [6] writes that only Jews possess the "Inyan ha'Elohi" ("divine quality") - a metaphysical quality which allows Jews to become prophets. Non-Jews do not have the Inyan ha'Elohi. Not only that, but even gerim lack the Inyan ha'Elohi; our conversion doesn't endow our souls with this special quality that only born-Jews possess.

Much has been written about R' Yehuda ha'Levi's view on this matter, but for the purposes of this post we are only interested in one thing: Does this view of Inyan ha'Elohi imply that the souls of Jews and non-Jews are inherently different? The answer is: no. R' Yehuda ha'Levi clearly held that Jews are born with a special quality which non-Jews lack, but their souls are fundamentally the same. Professor Menachem Kellner expressed this eloquently in his book, Maimonides' Confrontation with Mysticism:

It is important to emphasize: Halevi does not affirm that Jews differ biologically from non-Jews, that Jews have special souls, or that Jews are a species apart. He does not hold that non-Jews are any less created in the image of God than are Jews. He maintains that Jews have a special property (the potential to become prophets) lacking in non-Jews. This property is in some fashion (never explained by Halevi) transmitted through lineage. 

[For a detailed exposition and clarification of R' Yehuda ha'Levi's view, I recommend Professor Norman Strickman's article Misrepresenting Rabbi Judah Ha-Levi.]

The bottom line: I will continue to maintain that the Kadmonim did not recognize any difference between the soul of a Jew and that of a non-Jew, until someone shows me that I am incorrect. The only difference between a Jew and a non-Jew is obligation in mitzvos. Our souls are inherently the same. [7]

Jews and Non-Jews: A Common Soul, and a Common Path

I'd like to end this post on a more positive note.

Because Jews and non-Jews have the same human soul, we share a common path. As we said before, the Torah that Hashem gave through Moshe Rabbeinu was intended for Jews and non-Jews alike; the only difference is which system of mitzvos we are legally obligated to keep. According to Judaism, a righteous non-Jew has a portion in the World to Come. [8] Not only that, but a non-Jew is capable of reaching the same spiritual heights as a Jew. Adam ha'Rishon, Shem, Eiver, Chanoch, Noach, and Avraham Avinu were all non-Jews - yet, all of them were able to achieve high levels of closeness to God. The Gemara says (Sanhedrin 59a):

R' Meir says: How do we know that even a non-Jew who involves himself in the study of Torah is equal to a Kohen Gadol (High Priest)? As it is stated, "[You shall observe My decrees and My laws,] which man shall carry out and by which he shall live" (Vayikra 18:5) - it does not say, "Kohanim, Levites, and Israelites" but man. From here we learn that even a non-Jew who involves himself in the study of Torah is equal a Kohen Gadol.

The Rambam [9] codifies this principle at the end of his discussion about the special role of Shevet Levi (the Tribe of Levi). He writes:

Why didn’t the Tribe of Levi merit in the inheritance of the Land of Israel and its spoils along with their brethren? Because they are set aside to serve Hashem and to minister to Him and to teach His upright ways and righteous laws to the masses, as it is stated, “They shall teach Your laws to Yaakov and Your teachings to Israel” (Devarim 33:10). 

Therefore, they are separated from the ways of the world. They do not go to war like the rest of Israel, nor do they receive an inheritance, nor do they acquire for themselves with their bodily power, but rather, they are the legion of Hashem, as it is stated: “Bless, O Hashem, His legion” (ibid. 33:11), and He, Blessed is He, provides for them, as it is stated: “I Am your Portion and your Inheritance” (Bamidbar 18:20).  

Not only the Tribe of Levi, but each and every member of humanity whose spirit generously moves him and whose understanding of his knowledge [of all existing things causes him] to separate himself to stand before Hashem to minister unto Him and to serve Him in order to know Hashem, and to walk with uprightness as God made him, removing from his neck the yoke of the many calculations which people seek – he becomes sanctified as holy of holies. God will be His portion and heritage forever and ever, and He will provide what is sufficient for him in this world like He provides for the Kohanim and the Levites. And thus David declared: “Hashem is the lot of my portion; You are my cup; You support my lot” (Tehilim 16:5). 

This halacha is predicated upon the fact that Jews and non-Jews possess the same tzelem Elokim, and are drawn to the truth in the same way, as the Rambam [10] writes in Hilchos Teshuvah:

He instilled within them the capacity to learn and to understand - for this tendency is present in every man, that the more he is drawn after the ways of chochmah (wisdom) and tzedek (righteousness), the more he desires them and pursues them. 

Yes, it is true that our nation has a special status among the nations of the world. Nevertheless, our national identity as "the Chosen People" does not indicate any inherent superiority on our part, nor does it imply that Jews have different souls. Rather, it is a reference to our role in humanity: to be "a kingdom of priests and a holy nation" (Shemos 19:6), to teach mankind to fear and love Hashem. 

It is for this reason that the prophets promise that one day, all of humanity will be united by our pursuit of knowledge of Hashem, which stems from the tzelem Elokim within each and every human being. "For the earth will be filled with knowledge of Hashem, as water covers the sea bed" (Yeshayahu 11:9). "On that day, Hashem will be One and His Name will be One" (Zechariah 14:9).

[1] To my knowledge there is no non-"Kabbalistic" halachic view which maintains that a ger should make the berachah of she'lo asani goy. If anyone knows of such a view, please let me know.

[2] I have chosen to write the word "Kabbalistic" in quotation marks so as not to enter into the dicey analysis of which so-called "kabbalistic sources" are authentic, which are innovations, and which are fabrications. All I mean by "Kabbalistic" (with quotation marks) is that the proponents of these works consider them to be Kabbalistic. 

[3] By "Kadmonim" I am referring to the Geonim, Rishonim, and early Achronim. These Kadmonim include, but are not limited to: Rambam, R' Avraham ben ha'Rambam, Rav Hai Gaon, Saadia Gaon, Ramban, Ibn Ezra, Ralbag, Rabbeinu Bachya ibn Paquda, Rif, Sforno, Rashba, Rashi, Baalei Tosafos, Ritva, Radak, Rashbam, R' Yosef Albo, R' Yehudah ha'Levi, Meiri, Avudarham, Raavad, Ran, Rabbeinu Yonah, Sefer Ha'Chinuch, Abravanel, Chazkuni, Rabbeinu Bachye ben Asher, Rosh, Tur, and more. See my post Neglecting the Thinkers of the Past for more details on this group.
[4] It can be argued that there are "Jewish types of thinking" (e.g. Talmudic analysis, Scriptural analysis in accordance with the principles of Torah she'baal Peh), and one can even try to argue that there are quantitative differences between the intellects of Jews and non-Jews (though I personally don't buy this), but these are a far cry from claiming that there is a qualitative difference between a Jewish intellect and a non-Jewish one.
[5] Taryag is a regimen designed to bring those who practice it properly to true human perfection, whereas the system of Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach is designed to keep mankind from descending to the level of animals, thereby granting them the opportunity to pursue human perfection on their own, or with the aid of the Torah regimen.

[6] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha'Levi, Kuzari 1:95

[7] There is also an ideological definition of Jew, as defined by the first mishnah in the 10th chapter of Sanhedrin, whose meaning and implications are heavily debated by the meforshim (commentators). This definition of Jew is even narrower than the halachic definition. In other words, there are a significant number of people who are halachic Jews (i.e. they are obligated to keep Taryag), but are not considered a part of the Jewish people (i.e. they do not hold by the foundational ideas that define the people "Israel"). This is a separate topic, but I thought it would be worthwhile to mention in passing.

[8] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Shoftim, Hilchos Melachim 8:11

[9] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Zeraim, Hilchos Shemitah v'Yovel 13:12-13

[10] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 6:4

Parashas Vaeschanan: Which Souls Were at Sinai?

In truth this is more of a dvar Torah on Parashas Nitzavim. I was going to save this for Parashas Nitzavim itself, but that time of year is usually occupied with other important ideas to write about, so I decided to go for it this week. 

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Artwork: Spectral Gateguards, by Wayne England

Parashas Vaeschanan: Which Souls Were at Sinai?

The Impetus for This Post

Earlier this week I participated in a Facebook discussion on the various forms of subtle discrimination against geirim (converts) which persist in the Jewish community. I mentioned that one of my personal pet peeves is when born-Jews hear that I am a ger and say something like, "Your neshamah (soul) was definitely at Sinai!" I casually remarked that I don't believe in "Jewish souls" (a topic I intend to write about next week), and even if I did, I don't believe that the souls of geirim were present at Maamad Har Sinai (the Revelation at Sinai).

In response to this statement someone asked, "So you don't believe that your soul was at Mt. Sinai with all the other Jewish souls (including those of geirim), when the Torah was given?" to which I replied with an emphatic: "No - nor do I believe that the souls of all Jews were at Sinai."

That's when I decided to write a blog post on this topic. 

Souls at Sinai

In Parashas Nitzavim the Torah says: 

"Not with you alone do I seal this covenant and this imprecation, but with whoever is here, standing with us today before Hashem, our God, and with whoever is not here with us today." (Devarim 29:13-14)

The Abravanel [1] raises a major question:

Who gave the Dor ha'Midbar (Generation of the Wilderness), who stood at Har Sinai, the power to obligate their children who would come after them by saying, "naaseh v'nishmah - we will do and we will obey" (Shemos 24:7), thereby causing [their offspring] to enter into the covenant with Hashem and making them swear upon their souls that they would not violate it forever, to the point where they obligated them in all the words of the Torah and the covenant which they sealed, and to punish their offspring after them?

My students often ask this question in a slightly different way: "Why don't we get a choice whether or not to be Jewish? How is it fair that our ancestors accepted the Torah for us?"

We will not take up the Abravanel's answer to this question in this post. My apologies for those who were interested in what he has to say. The only reason I brought up the Abravanel's question is so that I can quote his refutation of the incorrect answer he's heard. He writes: 

It is not proper to allow ourselves to be appeased by what the Early Sages (of blessed memory) said, that all of the souls who would ever exist until the end of all generations  - all of them were at Sinai, and all of them affirmed and accepted this covenant [upon themselves] with an imprecation and an oath. 

Why doesn't the Abravanel accept Chazal's answer at face value? He explains:

It is difficult for the intellect to believe this. How could there be souls [that were present at Sinai] without bodies? Mitzvos are only obligatory upon a soul combined with a body, which we refer to as "man," as it is stated: "that man should do [the mitzvos] and live by them" (Vayikra 18:5). And the dead are free [from obligation in mitzvos], because when their souls separate from their bodies, they are no longer "man." Moreover, mitzvos are a chovas ha'guf (obligation that is incumbent upon the person himself), and we cannot obligate someone who isn't present. 

It's also not enough to answer like the one who says that this group of 600,000 people included all [possible] forms and appearances and all possible [personality] dispositions, and from that point and onward, it is impossible to find a person in the latter generations whose appearance and form were not present [at Sinai] in body and in soul. This would not explain how any man could have sworn an oath at Har Sinai. 

It is difficult for the intellect to accept [these answers], and they are conceptually and inherently weak.

Undoubtedly, the Abravanel's dismantling of this answer will be jaw-dropping for those who have been raised to take this midrash literally. This is a great example of how quick people are to unthinkingly embrace midrashic explanations which cater to the imagination. The difficulties raised by the Abravanel are obvious: How can souls be "present" without bodies? How can a bodiless soul accept mitzvos which were given to human beings? How could such an oath be halachically binding? Yet, these questions don't even occur to most people because the notion of all Jewish souls gathered at Sinai - past, present, and future - is so emotionally appealing.

Before we attempt to figure out what Chazal meant, let's review the major sources inside.

The Midrashim

As far as I can tell, there are three major sources of the notion that "all Jews were at Sinai" in the classic midrashic literature. The first two sources are very similar, and will be examined as one; the third midrash has a different focus, and will be addressed later.

The first source can be found in Shemos Rabbah 28:6:

"And God spoke all of these words, saying etc." (Shemos 20:1). R' Yitzchak said: Everything that neviim (prophets) would prophesy in future generations was received at Har Sinai, for Moshe said to Israel: "with whoever is here, standing with us today before Hashem, our God, and with whoever is not here with us today." It does not say "whoever is not standing here with us today," but "whoever is not with us today." These are the souls that would be created in the future, which do not have substance, and therefore cannot be said to "stand." Even though they were not present at that time, each and every one of them received what was his ... and even the chachamim (wise men) in each and every generation received what was his at Sinai.

A cursory reading might lead one to jump to conclusions: "Ha! You see? Even those souls who were yet to be created were present at Sinai, even though they didn't have bodies!" But upon careful reading we see that Chazal make a distinction: these unborn souls "were not present at that time," and yet, "each and every one of them received what was his" - just as all future neviim received their prophecies, and just as all future chachamim received their wisdom. This needs to be understood. What do Chazal mean? You're telling me that all nevuah and all chochmah was given at Sinai?

To further complicate things, there's a sparser version of this midrash in Midrash Tanchuma (Nitzavim 8) which states:

"not with you alone (Devarim 29:13) - but even the future generations to come were present [at Sinai], as it is stated, "with whoever is here, standing with us ... and with whoever is not here with us today." Why did it say "whoever is here" and "whoever is not here"? Because all souls were there, but the body [corresponding to each soul] had not yet been created; therefore, it didn't say "standing."

This is probably the source that the Abravanel was referring to, since it mentions the issue of souls without bodies. And this midrash explicitly states that all future souls were actually present at Sinai, without bodies.

Nevertheless, we see that this didn't stop the Abravanel from disagreeing. He didn't accept this midrash at face value, due to the difficulties he enumerated.

The question for us is: What do these midrashim mean? Unless you believe that unborn souls can float around at Har Sinai, accept mitzvos, and enter into legally binding oaths and covenants, then what idea are Chazal teaching us in these cryptic statements?

The Idea

I discussed this question with my Mishlei rebbi this morning. He said he'd have to think about it some more, but he gave me his first impression. He suggested that Chazal are teaching a fundamental idea: the basis for our acceptance of the Torah is the Revelation at Sinai, and this basis is open and accessible to all human beings. When Hashem told Moshe: "Behold! I will come to you in the thickness of the cloud, so that the people will hear as I speak to you, and they will also believe in you forever" (Shemos 19:9), He was acknowledging that the Revelation at Sinai would serve as a rational basis for accepting nevuas Moshe (Mosaic prophecy) for all people, in all future generations.

At first I dismissed this interpretation as being overly simple. I thought: "Really? These midrashim are just telling us that Sinai is for everyone? That's it?"

But then I realized the profound implications of this idea. In other religions, the basis of acceptance is only accessible to a select group. In some cases it is the individual priests or prophets who have a special relationship with the god(s) or spirits, and the average person can only connect to the divine through these elite leaders. In other cases the average person must undergo a special "spiritual experience" or attain a transcendental state to establish a foundation for their faith. 

In Judaism, however, the basis of our acceptance is open to everyone with a tzelem Elokim (intellect). There is no special spiritual experience, no listening to mystical inner voices, and no blind faith or divine grace - just the human mind. Using the same criteria by which we evaluate all secondhand knowledge and all historical events, we can rationally demonstrate the historicity of the Revelation at Sinai - and with it, all the contents of Torah.

This also explains what the midrash means when it says that all prophecies of the neviim and all wisdom of the chachamim was given at Sinai. The Rambam [2] and the Ramban [3] explain at length that the only reason we accept other people as neviim is because of the criteria spelled out in the Torah. In other words, we only accept someone as a navi because of the Revelation at Sinai. It is in this sense that all nevuah was "given" at Sinai, since Sinai is the only reason we accept any subsequent nevuah.

So too, the chochmas ha'Torah (Torah wisdom) that our chachamim possess is predicated upon the acceptance of the Revelation at Sinai. When the midrash says "chochmah" it's not talking about the type of chochmah that can be derived outside of Torah - as Chazal say: "If someone tells you that there is chochmah among the goyim, believe him" (Eichah Rabbah 2:13). Rather, the "chochmah" that our midrash is referring to is specifically chochmas ha'Torah, which we only accept because of Sinai. 

This also explains the midrashic sources which use our pasuk in Nitzavim to explain the inclusion of geirim in the acceptance of Torah. For example, the Tosefta (Sotah 7:5) says:

We only [have a proof that] "you [Jews]" accepted Torah. How do we know that the generations that will come after you and convert are also included? Because it is stated: "Not with you alone [do I seal this covenant]" but "with whoever is not here with us today."

One can imagine a religion in which native born Jews are considered to have a special connection to Hashem because their ancestors stood at Sinai, but geirim are relegated to a lower status. That is not how our religion works. When it comes to the Revelation at Sinai and the acceptance of the Covenant, the Jew and the ger are on equal footing.

While this doesn't answer the Abravanel's question about how our ancestors could have accepted the Torah to obligate future generations, it does provide a good explanation for the notion that "all future generations of Jews were present at Maamad Har Sinai."

Snake at Sinai

Another midrash about who was present at Sinai appears in several places in the writings of Chazal (Yevamos 103b, Avodah Zarah 22b, Yalkut Shimoni Bereishis 28, and more). The most complete version can be found in Shabbos 145b-146a:

Why are idolaters mezuhamim (lustful / sexually unrestrained)? Because they didn't stand at Har Sinai, for at the time that the nachash (snake) approached Chava it injected zuhamah (lustfulness / lack of sexual restraint) into her. As for the Jews who stood at Sinai - their zuhamah departed; as for the idolaters who did not stand at Sinai - their zuhamah did not depart. Rav Acha the son of Rava asked Rav Ashi: "What about the geirim?" He responded: "Even though they weren't there, their mazalos (lit. "constellations" or "natural forces") were there, as it is written: 'with whoever is here, standing with us today before Hashem, our God, and with whoever is not here with us today' (Devarim 29:14)."

Note that this midrash differentiates between Jews who WERE at Sinai (or whose ancestors were at Sinai), and geirim, who were NOT at Sinai. If it were true that geirim have Jewish souls, or that the souls of geirim were at Sinai, then the midrash wouldn't need to say that the mazalos of geirim were at Sinai (whatever that means). Either the Gemara wouldn't have mentioned geirim at all (since they would be included with the rest of the Jews), or it would have simply said that the neshamos (souls) of geirim were at Sinai.

The interesting thing about this midrash is that it isn't dealing with the topic of kabbalas ha'mitzvos (acceptance of the commandments), or Hashem's covenant with the Jews. Rather, the midrash is dealing with the difference in dispositions between Jews and idolaters insofar as sexual immorality is concerned. The version of this midrash in Avodah Zarah 22b follows it up by listing deviant sexual practices which were common among idolaters but not found among the Jewish people. It is in this context that the Gemara raises the question about geirim: What about people who descended from idolaters, but have joined the Jewish people? Do they partake of this strain of zuhamah or not - and if not, then how did they remove it? What idea is this midrash teaching us?

The premise of this midrash is that zuhamah has been a part of human nature ever since the cheit of Adam and Chava. [4] When the midrash says that the nachash injected zuhamah into Chava, this is a reference to the transformation of human nature which occurred as a result of the cheit (sin), as I wrote about in Adam ha'Rishon and Tishah b'Av. As a result of this transformation, human beings became encumbered by an overpowering sexual taavah (lust), which was strengthened by the desires and fantasies that resulted from the cheit. 

On the basis of this understanding, a friend of mine suggested the following interpretation:

Jews have an inherent edge over non-Jews in controlling taavah because of the impact Torah has on our lives by bringing us an awareness of God (I think that's what it means "who stood at Har Sinai"). The Gemara is trying to figure out how it is possible that geirim even exist. How is it possible that some people are drawn to Torah without having the structure of Torah built into the fabric of their family lives (i.e. Mesorah) like we do?

The answer to this question must be that God made it that even non-Jews were endowed with a faculty that can be attracted to truth. So although they didn't "stand at Har Sinai" themselves and are not the direct beneficiaries of a built in system of Torah, they were given a faculty that has the potential to be attracted to Torah. Maybe that's it means that their mazal was there - mazal as in constellation/nature.

I don't know whether this is a valid interpretation of "mazal" (since I understood "mazal" to refer to specific external conditions which affect human behavior, rather than the nature of man as a tzelem Elokim), but I definitely like the approach.

Conclusion

The misguided belief that "all Jewish souls - even the souls of geirim - were at Sinai" is as prevalent (if not more prevalent) than knowledge of what the pesukim say happened at Sinai. I find this to be very sad. This belief perpetuates false ideas about the soul, solidifies harmful prejudices against geirim, and sets students up for midrashic betrayal. Worst of all, it dilutes the potency of Maamad Har Sinai by infusing the Torah's historical account with a mythological aura. The more the popular conception of Maamad Har Sinai deviates from the account stated in the pesukim, the more endangered the proof of Torah mi'Sinai becomes.

Some popular midrashim do little harm, and should be left alone. Not this one. Even if we don't understand what Chazal were teaching in these midrashim, the Abravanel's objections should be popularized to counteract the prevailing view.

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Devarim: Questions on Parashas Nitzavim

[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah Chapter 8

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Devarim 13:2-4

[4] It is interesting to note that according to this midrash, the zuhamah was injected into Adam and Chava before she ate from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Bad. This fits in with our understanding of the cheit, and how it affected mankind.

Parashas Shelach: What is Kareis?

This week I'd like to give a special shout-out to the Abravanel, who did all of the research for me and enabled me to write this dvar Torah on the plane with only his commentary on hand!

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Artwork: Scour from Existence, by Clint Cearley

Parashas Shelach: What is Kareis?

In Parashas Shelach, in the section detailing the various sin-offerings, the Torah mentions the onesh (punishment) commonly referred to as “kareis”: 

But the soul that acts with a high hand, whether the native or the convert – he has blasphemed Hashem; and that soul shall be cut off from among its people. For he has despised the word of Hashem, and has violated His commandment; that soul shall be utterly cut off; his iniquity is upon him (Bamidbar 15:30-31).

The question is: What is kareis? The root of the word kareis (כ.ר.ת.) literally means “to cut” or “to cut off.” This verb is easy to understand if you’re talking about a carrot or a tree branch, but what does it mean for a nefesh (soul) to be “cut off from among its people” or “utterly cut off”? 

Thankfully, the Abravanel does us a tremendous favor by summarizing and critiquing the views of all his predecessors on the matter, and concludes by presenting his own theory [1] Although my usual practice on this blog is to present translations of the meforshim (commentaries) rather than summaries, the Abravanel’s comments here are far too lengthy. For this reason, I will provide my own summary of the Abravanel’s summaries, but I will try to stick to his words as closely as possible. 

For the sake of brevity, I will NOT include the questions and difficulties that the Abravanel raises on each of the views, nor will I include my own analysis. I will leave it to you, the reader, to conduct further research, and to arrive at your own conclusions. 

(1) Saadia Gaon [2] and Ibn Ezra [3]

Both Saadia Gaon and the Ibn Ezra learn that the term nefesh in the context of kareis refers to a person’s physiological vitality, rather than the intellect, or the spiritual part of man. Therefore, they interpret kareis as premature death – the “cutting short” of a person’s life. According to this view, there is no difference between kareis and the other divinely enacted punishment of misah b’ydei shamayim (death by the hands of heaven). 

(2) Rashi [4]

Rashi holds that kareis refers to the premature death of the sinner AND the premature death of his or her children. This latter feature is what differentiates kareis from misah b’ydei shamayim. However, according to Rashi, there is no difference between kareis and the divinely enacted punishment of ariri (childlessness), which is incurred by certain arayos (prohibited sexual relations). [5]

(3) Tosafos [6]

Like Saadia Gaon and the Ibn Ezra, the Baalei Tosafos maintain that kareis refers to premature death. They differentiate between kareis and misah b’ydei shamayim on the basis of when the sinner dies. They hold that someone who is liable for kareis will die before reaching the age of 50, whereas a person who is liable for misah b’ydei shamayim will die before reaching the age of 60.

(4) Tosafos [7]

The Baalei Tosafos offer a second explanation of kareis: that a person will die from an illness, on the third day of that illness. According to this explanation, misah b’ydei shamayim affects the length of a person’s lifespan, whereas kareis affects the duration of (what will turn out to be) a person’s terminal illness. 

(5) Rambam [8]

Unlike the four Rishonim mentioned above, who maintain that kareis affects a person’s physical existence in Olam ha’Zeh (This World), the Rambam maintains that kareis affects a person’s non-physical soul in the purely spiritual Olam ha’Ba (The World to Come). According to the Rambam, kareis refers to the excision and annihilation of the soul after death. The existence of the sinner who incurred kareis will come to an end with his physical demise, just like an animal. Thus, he will be deprived of the everlasting spiritual bliss of Olam ha’Ba, which is the ultimate reward. In contrast, a person who is liable for misah b’ydei shamayim will die prematurely, but his death will provide kaparah (atonement) for him, and his soul will merit existence in Olam ha’Ba. 

(6) Ramban [9]

The Ramban’s view is the most complex of them all. Whereas all of the Rishonim mentioned thus far hold that all instances of kareis are uniform (i.e. the same in every case, no matter who the sinner and no matter what the sin), the Ramban maintains that there are three levels of kareis:

• If a person’s merits outweigh his iniquities, then he will receive a physical kareis in the form of a premature death; his soul, however, will remain untouched in the purely spiritual Gan Eden and in the Messianic Era of Olam ha’Ba after Techiyas ha’Meisim (Resurrection of the Dead). [10] This form of kareis is practically identical with kareis as understood by Saadia Gaon and the Ibn Ezra.
• If a person’s iniquities outweigh his merits, then he will receive a spiritual kareis in the form of his soul being cut off from eternal life in Gan Eden and Olam ha’Ba. This type of kareis is similar to kareis as explained by the Rambam, but whereas the Rambam maintains that the afterlife is purely spiritual, the Ramban maintains that it is a combination of the physical and the spiritual. 
• The most severe form of kareis is reserved for those who worship avodah zarah (idolatry) and for those who commit the transgression of blasphemy; these individuals die prematurely in this world AND their souls are cut off from existence in Gan Eden and Olam ha’Ba.

(7) Abravanel

The Abravanel holds that kareis affects the sinner in Olam ha’Zeh AND in Olam ha’Ba: in Olam ha’Zeh his life is cut short, and in Olam ha’Ba, his soul is “distanced from the radiance of the shechinah (divine presence),” which is its source of spiritual pleasure and reward. The Abravanel maintains that kareis is subject to degrees, based on the severity of the sin. Unlike the Rambam, the Abravanel holds that the soul is never fully cut off from Olam ha’Ba, since it is a “spiritual essence” which, by its very nature, does not deteriorate. The Abravanel holds that kareis causes spiritual “pain” to the soul, but after it receives its punishment, it will be restored to a state of pleasure and reward. 

There you have it: a seven-way machlokess (disagreement) on what kareis is. And these are just the opinions of the Rishonim cited by the Abravanel. I would not be surprised if there are other views to be found in other meforshim.

To my mind, this multiplicity of views raises another question: Why is the Torah’s presentation of kareis so vague? 

Perhaps you will dismiss this question. After all, there are many subjects in Torah on which there is a lot of machlokess, and one might ask the same question in each of these cases. Why ask this question here as opposed to any of those cases?

The reason I believe this question is justified here is based on my understanding of why the Torah mandates onshim (punishments) altogether, which I wrote about in another post. There are seven levels of onshim. In order, from most severe to least severe, they are: skilah (stoning), sreifah (burning), hereg (decapitation), chenek (strangulation), kareis, misah b’ydei shamayim, and malkos (lashes). According to the Rambam, these onshim are designed to indicate the severity of the transgression and to deter the would-be sinner from sinning. When it comes to skilah, sreifah, hereg, chenek, and malkos, we know exactly what each onesh entails. The same goes for misah b’ydei shamayim; although there might be some machlokess on the particulars, everyone agrees that this refers to premature death. And yet, when it comes to the onesh of kareis, there is no consensus on what the Torah means. This is an anomaly among onshim, and poses a problem if one maintains that the purpose of onshim is to serve as a deterrent. How can one be deterred by kareis if the meaning of kareis is so unclear? 

The way I see it, we are forced draw one of two conclusions: either (1) there was once a clear and unanimous understanding of kareis which was lost over time, which eventually gave rise to wide-ranging machlokess, or (2) the Torah’s formulation of kareis was intentionally left vague, and that is why there is an inordinate degree of machlokess. 

If the former is true, this would be comparable to the machlokess on the teruah-blast of the shofar: the Torah was clear about it, but the mesorah (transmission of teaching) was lost over time, and machlokess developed as a result. If the latter is true, this would be comparable to the machlokess on how the messianic era will come to be, about which the Rambam [11] writes: 

All of these matters and those that are like them … even the Sages did not have a tradition in these things, but rather, [they theorized] based on the implications of the pesukim, and that is why there is machlokess.

If the answer is (1), then there is nothing more to say. Somehow, sometime, the understanding of kareis was lost, and machlokess developed, just as it has in other areas of Torah. But if the answer is (2), then we are left with our question: Why did the Torah intentionally present kareis in such a vague manner?

The most I can offer at this point is a speculative answer – one which only works for those who hold that kareis affects the soul (i.e. Rambam, Ramban, Abravanel) and not just the body (i.e. Saadia Gaon, Ibn Ezra, Rashi, Tosafos). The Rambam [12] at the end of Hilchos Teshuvah writes:

A person should not say, “I will do the mitzvos of the Torah and involve myself in its chochmah in order to receive all of the blessings that are written in it,” or “in order that I will merit life in the World to Come,” “and I will distance myself from the transgressions about which the Torah warns us, in order to escape from the curses written in the Torah” or “so that I will not be cut off from the World to Come.” 

It is not proper to serve Hashem in this manner, for one who serves Hashem in this manner is called “oveid mi’yirah” (“one who serves out of fear”). This is neither a virtue of the prophets nor of the chachamim. The only ones who should serve Hashem in this manner are ignorant men, women, and children, whom we train to serve out of fear until their minds develop and they serve out of love. 

Hashem does not want us to serve Him out of yirah (fear). Although it is necessary to begin by serving Him that way, and we encourage people to do so in the initial stages of their learning, this is not an ideal state. The Rambam even goes so far as to say about the various yirah-based motives, “All of this is despicable; however, it is necessary for us, due to the deficiency of the human mind/psyche.” The goal is to gradually wean ourselves from serving God out of yirah and develop the ability to serve Him out of ahavah. This is a slow and delicate process which must progress in step with each person's development, as the Rambam writes:

Therefore, when we teach the children, women, and general populace of laymen, we should only teach them to serve out of yirah and in order to receive reward, until their minds mature and they gain additional wisdom; we should reveal this secret to them bit by bit, and accustom them to this concept with pleasantness, until they apprehend it and know it and serve out of ahavah. 

The onshim of the Torah clearly belong to the framework of yirah. All of the other onshim (skilah, sreifah, hereg, chenek, malkos) are things which happen in this world. Fear of them is rooted in observation and experience. Kareis, on the other hand, is not – at least, not according to the Rambam, the Ramban, or the Abravanel. To understand kareis requires knowledge of deep, abstract concepts, such as the nature of the soul, how the soul exists after death, what Olam ha'Ba is, how it relates to techiyas ha'meisim, how we are rewarded and punished after death, etc. These concepts take decades of learning to be able to begin to understand, since they are metaphysical phenomena that are out of this world. Not only that, the imagination is quick to latch onto its own "counterfeit" versions of these ideas, which are rooted in psychological fears and insecurities, and not reality.

Thus, the Torah in a bind. On the one hand, kareis is a reality which has relevance in the halachic system; as such, it must be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. On the other hand, kareis is an exceedingly lofty concept, and any attempt to explain it would only provide the imagination with more fuel for its fantasy-based fear, and threaten to lock a person in yirah-mode.

How did the Torah solve this dilemma? By intentionally speaking about kareis in vague terms. On its most basic level, "to be cut off" is intuitively bad-sounding, even if one doesn't know exactly what that means. Those who are prone to filling in the gaps with their imagination will do so anyway, but at least the Torah will not be lending credence to these detrimental chimerical notions. And since the Torah's formulation of kareis is so vague, it will remain open to reexamination and reevaluation as the individual learns and develops.

I can't say I find this answer to be 100% satisfactory, but I do think it is a fruitful approach. At the very least, I hope you gained from the Abravanel's overview of kareis, and that I've left you with a nice question to think about!

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 15:31 

[2] Rabbeinu Saadia Gaon, Emunos v’Deos 6 

[3] Rabbeinu Avraham ben Ezra (Ibn Ezra), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 15:31 

[4] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben YiTzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Bereishis 17:14; Vayikra 17:9 

[5] Vayikra 20:20-21 

[6] Baalei Tosafos, Yevamos 2a; Shabbos 25a 

[7] The Abravanel seems to say that Tosafos says this on Yevamos 2a, but I can’t seem to find it. If you can track it down, please let me know. 

[8] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Maimonides / Rambam), Commentary on the Mishnah – Sanhedrin 8:6; Introduction to Perek Chelek; Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 3:5-6; 8:1 

[9] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Nachmanides / Ramban), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 18:29; Shaar ha’Gemul [currently do not have access to a precise citation] 

[10] This is neither the time nor the place to go into the Ramban’s view of reward and punishment and the afterlife. If you are interested in this topic, I recommend reading the Shaar ha’Gemul, which is available here in Hebrew, and was translated into English by Chavel. 

[11] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Shoftim, Hilchos Melachim u’Milchamos 12:2 

[12] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 10:2