Yom ha’Kippurim 5783: Musings on Erev Yom ha’Kippurim Anxiety

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Yom ha'Kippurim 5783: Musings on Erev Yom ha'Kippurim Anxiety

This morning I woke up, realized it was Erev Yom ha’Kippurim, and was filled with existential anxiety. I didn’t utilize these past eight days of the Aseres Ymei Teshuvah (Ten Days of Repentance) as much as I could have. I haven’t done my best to maximize my potential throughout the year. I have so many flaws and fall short in my avodas Hashem in so many ways. But then I had a very simple epiphany: the din (judgment) of Yom ha’Kippurim and the kaparah (atonement) of Yom ha’Kippurim are two separate phenomena, and one is not necessarily dependent on the other. 

By “the din of Yom ha’Kippurim” I am referring to the judgment on humanity which occurs on Rosh ha’Shanah and is finalized on Yom ha’Kippurim. This din pertains to “health and sickness, and death and life, and [other] human circumstances” (Rambam, Commentary on Rosh ha’Shanah Chapter 1 Mishnah 4). Rambam explains how this din works in Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 3:

Each and every human being has zechuyos (merits) and avonos (iniquities). Someone whose zechuyos are more than their avonos is a tzadik (righteous in terms of this judgment). Someone whose avonos are more than their zechuyos is a rasha (wicked in terms of this judgment). Half and half is a beinoni (one who is in the middle) …

Just as the avonos of a person are weighed against his zechuyos at the time of his death, so too each and every year the avonos of each and every person are weighed against his zechuyos on the Yom Tov of Rosh ha’Shanah. One who is found to be a tzadik is sealed for life; and one who is found to be a rasha is sealed for death. But the beinoni hangs in the balance until Yom ha’Kippurim. If he did teshuvah – he is sealed for life; but if not – he is sealed for death.

Although it is natural to feel anxiety about how our din will turn out, I realized this morning that such anxiety is inevitable, since “this weighing can only take place in the mind of the God of Minds, and He is the [only] One Who knows how to weigh the zechuyos against the avonos” (ibid.). In other words, there is a fantasy at work here beneath the surface. The anxiety makes us feel “if only I had prepared adequately, then I would enter Yom ha’Kippurim with the assurance that I’ll receive a good din!” In truth, such security is impossible. To the contrary – the more perfected a person is, the more uncertain they will be about their din, since they’ll have a more accurate grasp of what perfection entails and how far they are from that ideal. While this state of mind can be productive insofar as it spurs a person to do more teshuvah and mitzvos, it is sheer folly to think that there’s a way to avoid feeling anxious about one’s din. At the end of the day, none of us knows how our din will turn out.

In contrast, the kaparah of Yom ha’Kippurim is available to the entire Jewish people irrespective of their din. The Rambam (Hilchos Teshuvah 1:3) writes:

At a time when we do not have a Beis ha'Mikdash nor a Mizbach Kaparah (Altar of Atonement), all we have is teshuvah. Teshuvah brings kaparah for all transgressions ... And the day of Yom ha'Kippurim, itself, brings kaparah for shavim (i.e. those who engaged in teshuvah), as it is stated, “for on this day he shall atone for you” (Vayikra 16:30).

The Torah does not say, “for on this day he shall atone for tzadikim” or “for those who were sealed for life” but rather “for you” – that is, for all of Klal Yisrael, provided they utilized the Aseres Ymei Teshuvah to be involved in teshuvah, as the Rambam clearly stated: “If [the beinoni] did teshuvah – he is sealed for life; but if not – he is sealed for death.” [1] The kaparah of Yom ha’Kippurim is not tied to the outcome of our din. Unlike our din, which is fraught with uncertainty, kaparah is guaranteed to those who engage in teshuvah. It is for this reason that we can declare as a praise – not as a request – in each of our tefilos: “Blessed are You, Hashem, the King Who pardons and forgives our iniquities and the iniquities of His people, the family of Israel, and removes our sins every single year, King over all the world, Who sanctifies Israel and Yom ha’Kippurim.” Kaparah is within our grasp.

[1] Contrary to what it may seem, the Rambam does not mean that Yom ha’Kippurim only provides kaparah for the specific sins you did teshuvah on; see my article entitled Yom ha’Kippurim 5780: Kaparah as a Means to an End for elaboration.

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Shoftim: Atonement for the Dead (Part 1 of 2)

This is half of a blog post. I wasn't able to finish writing the full blog post in time, and I figured it would be better to publish half of it than allow it to languish in my drafts folder for who knows how long. 

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Shoftim: Atonement for the Dead (Part 1 of 2)

Parashas Shoftim concludes with the mystifying mitzvah of Eglah Arufah (the Decapitated Heifer). When the corpse of a slain person is found outside of a nearby city, the elders and judges of that city perform a ritual involving an uncharacteristically gruesome slaughter of a heifer. The ceremony concludes with a declaration and petition made by the Kohanim: 

“Our hands did not shed this blood, and our eyes did not see. Atone for Your people Israel whom You redeemed, Hashem, and do not put innocent blood in the midst of Your people Israel, and let the blood be atoned for them.” (Devarim 21:6-8) 

The question is: Why does the pasuk (verse) say “atone for Your people Israel whom You redeemed” rather than “atone for Your people Israel” full stop? The Sifre [1] answers: 

“atone for Your people” – these are the living; “whom You redeemed” – these are the dead, which teaches that the dead need kaparah (atonement); consequently we learn that one who sheds blood sins [retroactively] until the Exodus from Egypt. 

Although the Sifre explains the apparent redundancy in the pasuk, it raises a number of additional problems: 

1. Why is this act of murder reckoned as a sin for the Yotzei Mitzrayim (the generation that left Egypt), such that they would require kaparah? The person who committed the murder certainly sinned. The elders and judges of the nearby city sinned, insofar as they didn’t do their part as leaders to foster a society in which such murders don’t happen. But how is this considered to be a sin for the generation that left Egypt hundreds or thousands of years ago? They didn’t do anything! Why do they need kaparah? 

2. How is it fair to hold anyone responsible for a sin they didn’t commit? According to the Rambam [2], the eleventh of the Thirteen Fundamental Principles of Torah is that Hashem rewards each person for the mitzvos they have done and punishes each person for the transgressions they have committed. Hashem does not reward people for doing mitzvos that they didn’t do, nor does He punish people for transgressions they didn’t commit. The Yotzei Mitzraim lived their own lives, and had their own mitzvos and sins. Ostensibly, it would be unjust to hold them accountable for the sins of their offspring. As Avraham Avinu asked: “Heaven forfend doing something like this! … Will the judge of all the earth not enact justice?” (Bereishis 18:25). 

3. How is it halachically possible for the dead to receive kaparah? The Gemara (Zevachim 9b) openly states “there is no kaparah for the dead” and the Rambam [3] rules in accordance with this view. Rashi [4] explains that “there is no kaparah for the dead because their death atoned for them.” In other words, there is no kaparah for the dead because the dead don’t need kaparah. The Baalei Tosafos [5] point out the halachic ramifications: if it were possible for the dead to receive kaparah, their surviving relatives would be responsible for bringing a korban (sacrifice) to atone on their behalf. Likewise, if a person designated a korban as a sin-offering and then died, then there would be even more of a reason for his relatives to offer it in order to bring about post-mortem kaparah. These sources indicate that kaparah for the dead is a halachic impossibility. [6]

4. How is it metaphysically possible for the dead to receive kaparah? Once a person dies, and their soul separates from their body, it is impossible for the soul to undergo further change, for good or for bad. This is why Chazal urge us to do mitzvos and teshuvah in Olam ha’Zeh (This World), since there’s no way to elevate the soul after death, as the Rambam [7] states: “for if one does not acquire wisdom and good deeds here, then he will have nothing by which he merits.” On the basis of this principle, the Ran questions the entire notion of punishments in Olam ha’Ba. At the beginning of his tenth derashah the Ran [8] sets forth the premise that all of Hashem’s punishments in Olam ha’Zeh are for our benefit, “either to improve the sinner himself so that he does teshuvah from his evil path” or “to improve others, so they will not be evil like him.” He then raises the question about Olam ha’Ba: “it is impossible for the punishments of Olam ha’Ba to be like this, since the soul cannot be improved there; rather, it will forever remain in the state it was in when it left the body.” If that is the case, then how would it be possible for someone to receive kaparah after death? Moreover, how would it be possible for the sin of the slain victim to necessitate kaparah for the soul of a dead person? 

I have an approach but I haven't fully worked it out yet. Let me know if you think of anything!

End Notes

[1] Sifre Devarim: Piska 210; as usual I’ve chosen to translate the version cited by the Torah Temimah 

[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides, Commentary on the Mishnah: Sanhedrin, Introduction to to Perek Chelek 

[3] see Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Avodah, Hilchos Psulei ha’Mukdashim 15:9 

[4] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Talmud Bavli: Me’ilah 10b 

[5] Tosafos, Temurah 15b 

[6] Over the course of my research I did encounter some arguments which attempted to reconcile the implications of the Sifre with these halachos, but I found them to be contrived and didn’t think they warrant being addressed here. If you do find a compelling argument, I would love to hear it. 

[7] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 9:1

[8] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven (Ran), Drashos ha'Ran: Drashah #10

Yom ha'Kippurim 5777: On Being Human

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Yom ha'Kippurim 5777: On Being Human

There is a passage from Richard Mitchell's The Gift of Fire that I think about going into Yom ha'Kippurim. Here is the excerpt in its entirety:

Chapter 1: "Who is Socrates, now that we need him?" 

I imagine some well-informed and largely wise visitor from another world who comes to Earth to study us. He begins by choosing two people at random, and, since time and place are of no importance to him, but only the single fact of humanity, he chooses Socrates and me, leaving aside for the moment every other human being. He begins with an understanding of the single but tremendous attribute that distinguishes us both from all other creatures of Earth. We are capable of Reason. Capable. We can know ourselves, unlike the foxes and the oaks, and can know that we know ourselves. He knows that while we have appetites and urges just like all the other creatures, we have the astonishing power of seeing them not simply as the necessary attributes of what we are, but as separate from us in a strange way, so that we can hold them at arm's length, turning them this way and that, and make judgment of them, and even put them aside, saying, Yes, that is "me," in a way, but, when I choose, it is just a thing, not truly me, but only mine. He sees, in short, what "human" means in "human beings."

And then he considers the specimens he has chosen, Socrates and me. He measures that degree to which they conform to what "human" means in "human beings." With those superior extraterrestrial powers that imagination grants him, he will easily discover:

That I have notions, certain "sayings" in my mind, that flatly contradict one another; believing, for instance, that I can choose for myself the path of my life while blaming other people for the difficulty of the path. With Socrates, this is not the case.

That my mind is full of ideas that are truly nothing more than words, and that as to the meaning of the words I have no clear and constant idea, behaving today as though "justice" were one thing, and tomorrow as though it were another. That, while wanting to be happy and good, I have no clear ideas by which I might distinguish, or might even want to distinguish, happiness from pleasure, and goodness from social acceptability. With Socrates, this is not the case.

That I usually believe what I believe not because I have tested and found it coherent and consistent, and harmonious with evidence, but because it is also believed by the right people, people like me, and because it pleases me. And that furthermore, I live and act and speak as though my believing were no different from my knowing. With Socrates, this is not the case.

That I put myself forth as one who can direct and govern the minds, the inner lives, of others, that, in fact, I make my living as one who can do that, but that my own actions are governed, more often than not, by desire or whim. With Socrates, this is not the case.

That I seem to have a great need for things, and think myself somehow treated unjustly by an insufficiency of them, and that this insufficiency, which seems strangely to persist even after I get hold of the thing whose necessity I have most recently noted, prevents in me that cheerful and temperate disposition to which I deem myself entitled. With Socrates, this is not the case.

That I seem to know what I want, but that I have no way of figuring out whether I should want what I want, and that, indeed, it does not occur to me that I should be able to figure that out. With Socrates, this is not the case.

And that, in short and in general, my mind, the thing that most makes us human, is not doing the steering of this life, but is usually being hustled along on a wild ride by the disorderly and conflicting commands of whole hosts of notions, appetites, hopes, and fears. With Socrates, this is not the case.

How could the alien enquirer help concluding that there is something "wrong" with me, and that the humanness that is indeed in me has been somehow "broken," which he can clearly see by comparing me with Socrates? Must he not decide that Socrates is the normal human, and I the freak, the distortion of human nature?

When he pronounces me the freak, and Socrates the perfectly ordinary, normal human being, living quite obviously, as perhaps only an "alien" can see, by the power of that which most makes a human a human, shall I defend myself by appeal to the principle of majority rule? Shall I say: Well, after all, Socrates is only one human being, and all the others are more like me. Would I not prove myself all the more the freak by my dependence on such a preposterously irrelevant principle? If that visitor were rude, he might well point out that my ability to see, on the one hand, what is natural to human beings, and to claim, on the other, that its absence is only natural, and thus normal, is just the sort of reasoning that he would expect of a freak, whose very freakishness is seen in his inability to do what is simply natural to his species -- that is, to make sense.

But Socrates would defend me. He would say, for this he said very often:

No, my young friend is not truly a freak. All that I can do, he can do; he just doesn't do it. And if he doesn't do it, it is because of something else that is natural to human beings, and just as human as the powers that you rightly find human in me. Before we awaken, we must sleep, and some of us sleep deeper and longer than others. It may be, that unless we are awakened by some help from other human beings, we sleep our lives away, and never come into those powers. But we can be awakened.

In that respect, my friend is not a freak. He might better be thought a sleepwalker, moving about in the world, and getting all sorts of things done, often on time, and sometimes very effectively indeed. But the very power of routine habit by which he can do all that has become the only government that he knows. And the voices of his desires are loud. He is just now not in a condition to give his full attention to any meaning that might be found in all that he does, or to consider carefully how to distinguish between the better and the worse. He might be thought a child, and a perfectly natural child, who lives still in that curious, glorious haze of youth, when only desire seems worthy of obedience, and when the mighty fact of the world that is so very "there" looms immeasurably larger than the fact of the self that is in that world. He might grow up, and it is the "mightness" in him that makes him truly human, however he may look like a freak just now. From time to time, we are all just such freaks, and mindless, for mindlessness is the great background of noise out of which some few certain sounds can be brought forth and harmonized as music.

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Although Mitchell's words stand on their own, I find that I associate them to a statement from Chazal, which the Rambam brings down in Hilchos Beis ha'Bechirah 2:2:

There is a unanimous tradition that the place on which David and Shlomo built the Altar, the threshing floor of Arnan, is the location where Abraham built the Altar on which he prepared Yitzchak for sacrifice. Noach built [an altar] on that location when he left the ark. It was also [the place] of the Altar on which Kayin and Hevel brought sacrifices.[Similarly,] Adam, the first man, offered a sacrifice there and was created at that very spot, as our Sages said: "Man was created from the place of his atonement" ("Adam mi'makom kaparaso nivra").

Cheit (sin) is unavoidable. Shlomo ha'Melech said: "There is no [entirely] righteous man on earth who does [only] good and does not sin" (Koheles 7:20). Alexander Pope said: "To err is human." However, even though it is natural to sin, this doesn't mean that to sin is our nature.

This, I believe, is what Mitchell was getting at, and what Chazal were alluding to when they said that man was created from the place of his kaparah. Judaism does not entertain fanciful notions of "saints." The cycles of cheit and teshuvah, avon and kaparah, regression and development, are part of what it means to be human. Our struggle to overcome our natural inclinations to live in line with our true nature is by design.

In this sense, it is a mistake to view cheit as an utter failure. Instead, cheit should be viewed as an opportunity for self-knowledge and development. I believe that this shift in our perspective of cheit is essential in order to have a Yom ha'Kippurim that is a "fresh start" day of growth rather than a "dead end" day of guilt and self-castigation.

"I am only human." This argument is, at the same time, our greatest defense, but also our greatest liability - depending on what we mean when we invoke it. And what better time to contemplate that meaning than Yom ha'Kippurim, when we stand before the Creator and beseech Him to help us live as He designed us to live.

May we all attain kaparah this Yom ha'Kippurim and arrive at a truer relationship with our own humanity.

Yom ha'Kippurim 5775: What is Kaparah?

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Yom ha'Kippurim 5775: What is Kaparah?

Introduction

Every year - usually around Rosh ha'Shanah and Yom ha'Kippurim - I find myself bothered by the question: "What is kaparah?" According to the Radak, the word "kaparah" in this context refers to the removal of sin (see the Sefer ha'Shorashim, כ.פ.ר.). But what, exactly, does this mean? Does it refer to some mystical notion of "erasing our sins" from Hashem's "record"? Does kaparah pertain to the state of our souls in Olam ha'Ba? Is kaparah a type of hashgachah that somehow aids us in Olam ha'Zeh? We have an obligation and responsibility to engage in certain actions which are said to effectuate kaparah, and yet, we often speak of kaparah as though it must be "granted" to us - as though our role in obtaining kaparah is passive. How does that work? And what is the relationship between kaparah and teshuvah? If a person does complete teshuvah, why does he still require kaparah? What more is there left for him to do?

Needless to say, this is a massive topic, and it would be unrealistic to expect any theory to answer all questions and to remove all doubts. That being said, our objective in this post will be to propose one theory of kaparah based on several sources in the Ralbag and the Rambam. If this theory makes sense here then perhaps we will be able to apply it to other instances of the term kaparah throughout the Torah system.

Semichah al ha'Korban

Our journey begins with the first instance of the term kaparah in Sefer Vayikra, which occurs within the first several pesukim:

He called to Moshe, and Hashem spoke to him from the Tent of Meeting, saying: Speak to the Children of Israel and say to them: When a man among you brings a sacrifice to Hashem: from animals - from the cattle or from the flock shall you bring your sacrifice. If one's offering is a burnt-sacrifice from the cattle, he shall sacrifice an unblemished male; he shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, voluntarily, before Hashem. He shall lean his hands upon the head of the burnt-sacrifice; and he shall attain favor through it, to provide kaparah (atonement) for him. He shall slaughter the bull before Hashem; the sons of Aharon, the Kohanim, shall bring the blood and throw the blood on the Altar, all around - which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting (Vayikra 1:1-5).

The pesukim imply that the act of semichah is a component of the kaparah that is attained through the korban. This implication is confirmed by Torah she'baal Peh. The Rambam writes in Hilchos Maaseh ha'Korbanos 3:12 (based on a Gemara in Yoma 5a):

We slaughter the animal in the same location as the semichah, and the shechitah (slaughtering) takes place immediately after the semichah. If one did semichah in another location or delayed [between the semichah and the shechitah], his shechitah is still valid. Semichah is an incremental aspect of the mitzvah. Therefore, if one did not do semichah, his korban still effectuates kaparah, and does not jeopardize his fulfillment of the mitzvah. Nevertheless, it is considered as if his korban did not effectuate kaparah.

This is a strange halacha. Apparently, if a person does not do semichah, his korban still fulfills the halachic requirements of kaparah - and yet, his kaparah is considered to be lacking in another sense (see Ritva on Yoma 5a). In what sense is it considered as if he did not achieve kaparah? And why not? What makes semichah such an integral part of the kaparah process?

Ralbag's Explanation

The Ralbag answers this question. In doing so, he provides a fundamental insight into the purpose of korbanos and lays the groundwork for a theory of kaparah. In his commentary on the parashah the Ralbag writes:

"He shall lean his hands upon the head of the burnt-sacrifice" (1:4) Since this semichah is a sort of kaparah-device in the same manner as the burnt-sacrifice itself provides kaparah, the sinner therefore confesses his avonos (iniquities) at the time of semichah. We learn this from what was said in Parshas Acharei Mos: “Aharon shall lean his two hands upon the head of the living he-goat and confess upon it all the avonos of the Children of Israel, [and all their rebellious sins among all their sins, and place them upon the head of the he-goat, and send it with a designated man to the desert]” (Vayikra 16:21). The semichah was for this very reason: to demonstrate [that it is] as if he removed those avonos from himself and transferred them to the head of that animal, in order to reassure him in his heart that his avonos have already been removed. This provides a tremendous benefit, for if a person does not think that his sins are removed when he does teshuvah to Hashem (exalted is He), then a person who committed terrible sins will think that he is utterly doomed, and he will continue to sin even more, for he thinks that there is no benefit in doing teshuvah to Hashem, since he is already doomed by his sins [in his own mind]. This is the general benefit in all of the korbanos which are brought for sins; they will not bring kaparah without teshuvah.

Ralbag elaborates on this in the toeles section of his commentary:

[This parashah] guides men towards perfection by teaching that when they sin, they should return in teshuvah to Hashem (exalted is He) and He will provide kaparah of their avonos for them. The reason for this is that “there is no righteous person on earth who does only good and does not sin” (Koheles 7:20). If those who committed certain sins believed that their avon would be a permanent stain before Hashem (exalted is He), they would continue to sin, since they would believe that they are already doomed on account of their sin, and they would miss out on the benefits of guarding against sinning in the future. If, however, they know that by doing teshuvah from their evil path and returning to the paths of Hashem (exalted is He) that He will remove their avonos for them, then they will be careful not to sin in the future, and they will do teshuvah to Hashem so that He will have mercy on them and provide kaparah for their sin. Hashem wanted teshuvah to be accompanied by the bringing of a korban in order to reassure the sinner that his sin has already received kaparah. The reason for this is that to the masses it is inconceivable that a man can be wicked and subsequently be cleansed of his wickedness through doing teshuvah in his heart, without any action whatsoever. It is for this reason that Hashem (exalted is He) commanded us to do these korbanos in the revered sanctuary, which houses His shechinah, through the kohen who is set aside for avodas Hashem – in order to complete the kaparah for the sinner along with teshuvah. For this reason there is a mitzvah [for the sinner] to lean with his two hands on the head of his korban and to confess all of his iniquities upon it, in order that his heart may be reassured that it is as if those sins have been removed from him and placed onto the head of that animal. By doing the korbanos in this manner in the order specified in the Torah, man is guided along the path of perfection to avodas Hashem and is distanced from following his yetzer ha’ra (bad inclination).

Ralbag's explanation can be summarized as follows. Kaparah cannot occur without teshuvah. However, even teshuvah is insufficient, for the sinner will still feel that his avon is "a permanent stain before God," and that he is forever tainted by his avonos. This line of thinking is dangerous, for unless a person believes that teshuvah can completely eradicate his avonos, he is prone to give up on teshuvah altogether and to persist in, or increase, his avonos. 

To overcome this psychological roadblock, Hashem commands the sinner to complete his teshuvah process by engaging in symbolic actions - actions which appeal to the imagination and speak to the psyche in its own terms - in order to "reassure his heart" that his avonos have been completely removed, and that no trace of them remains. These symbolic actions include the bringing of a korban in the Beis ha'Mikdash, performing semichah on that korban, and verbalizing a vidui (confession) on that korban - as if one is transferring one's avonos to the head of the animal - whereupon the animal will immediately undergo shechitah (slaughtering) and hakravah (being offered) on the mizbach kaparah (altar of atonement).

This is the manner in which teshuvah, combined with the bringing of a korban - complete with semichah, vidui, and shechitah - effectuates full kaparah (i.e. complete removal of the avon). Full kaparah cannot occur until one has completely abandoned the avon, not only in one's actions, but even from one's psyche. This psychological dimension of the kaparah is difficult to achieve through teshuvah alone. Man requires an symbolic action to impress upon his psyche that his slate is clean and his sin has been erased.

I believe that this is meaning of the halacha that if one fails to do semichah, his korban still effectuates halachic kaparah, but "it is considered as if his korban did not effectuate kaparah." In other words, the korban itself received the requisite "processing" in Mikdash to satisfy the requirements for kaparah, but the gavra - the individual who sinned - will not receive full kaparah since his psyche did not undergo the catharsis which the semichah was designed to facilitate.

Rambam's Explanation

The Rambam seems to agree with this idea as well. In the taamei ha'mitzvos section of the Moreh ha'Nevuchim, the Rambam divides all 613 mitzvos into fourteen categories and attempts to identify the reasons and/or benefits for each and every mitzvah. The first category is that of yesodei ha'Torah: mitzvos which are designed to teach and strengthen our conviction in the foundational principles of Torah. The Rambam (3:36) concludes his exposition on this category by discussing the mitzvah of teshuvah:

It is obvious that teshuvah is likewise included in this category; that is to say, it is one of the doctrines which are indispensable in maintaining the existence of Torah adherents, for it is impossible for any man not to err and sin – either because he mistakenly adopts a wrongful doctrine or character trait, or else he is overcome by desire or anger – and if man were convinced that he could never make his crooked ways straight, he would forever continue in his errors, and maybe even increase his disobedience if he believed there was no alternative. But with the belief in teshuvah, he will come back to the good and will return to an even more perfected state – even more perfected than he was before he sinned. For this reason, [the Torah commands us] in many actions which strengthen our belief in this very beneficial principle [of teshuvah]: for example, the confessions, and the korbanos for sins committed unknowingly – and in some cases even for sins committed intentionally – and the fasts. The general principle behind teshuvah from any sin is the complete removal of sin, and this is the purpose of this doctrine. 

The Rambam is clearly talking about the same phenomenon as the Ralbag, namely, the sinner's feeling that he is "doomed by his sins." Like the Ralbag, the Rambam maintains that the institutions of vidui and the korbanos are designed to strengthen one's conviction in the efficacy of teshuvah. Moreover, the Rambam implies that the sinner is prone to fall into this type of despair both before and after he engages in teshuvah. We see this from the fact that taaniyos (fast days) and chatzotzros (the sounding of the trumpets, which accompany every taanis) are designed to stimulate and initiate teshuvah whereas vidui and korban occur at the very end of the teshuvah process - and yet, the Rambam states that the purpose of all of these mitzvos is "to strengthen our belief" in the efficacy of teshuvah.

Does the Rambam agree with the Ralbag's idea that the Torah commands us in symbolic actions which are designed to speak to the psyche in its own language? It seems so. In his explanation of the reasons behind the korbanos, the Rambam (3:46) writes:

But the intent behind the burning of these chataos (sin-offerings) is that the memory of the sin [for which the offering is brought] has already been erased and no longer exists, just as the body that is being burnt no longer exists, and no trace will be left of that [sinful] action, just as no trace is left of this chatas, which is utterly destroyed by fire ... And since the seir ha’mishtaleach (the goat that is "cast off" of the Azazel cliff on Yom ha’Kippurim) served as the ultimate kaparah for all major transgressions, more than any other communal-chatas, therefore we do not slaughter it or burn it or bringing it to the altar at all; rather, we remove it as far as possible and cast it off to a desolate, uninhabited land. There is no man who will doubt the fact that sins are not actually an entity that can be transferred from the back of one being onto another. Rather, these are all symbolic actions which impart an impression to the soul in order to arouse it to teshuvah – as if to say, “We have cleansed ourselves from all of our previous deeds, and we have cast them behind our backs and rejected them with the utmost degree of rejection.”

Here the Rambam explicitly acknowledges the symbolic character of these korbanos which are intended to produce a psychological affect (התפעלות - in both the Qafih and Ibn Tibbon translations) on the sinner to spur him to do teshuvah and to strengthen his belief in its efficacy. Although the Rambam does not discuss the specific reason for semichah on korbanos, it is reasonable to interpret it in the same vein as the other aspects of the korban-chatas which he spelled out in the excerpts cited here.

Conclusion

As we stated at the outset, there still remain numerous questions that have yet to be answered. For instance, the Rambam devotes the bulk of Hilchos Teshuvah, Perek 1 to explaining how and when kaparah is attained for various types of transgressions. This hierarchy begs for an explanation. Likewise, our tefilos are filled with requests for Hashem to grant us kaparah. What do all of these requests mean? And what does it mean to ask Hashem for kaparah anyway?

With Hashem's help, we will take up these questions in the future. In the meantime, I hope this explanation provides a true and beneficial insight into the phenomenon of kaparah.