Ralbag: On Akeidas Yitzchak (The Binding of Isaac)

In accordance with (what is apparently) my custom to hurriedly churn out a blog post on the eve of a holiday, mere hours before its onset, I present to you this post on Akeidas Yitzchak. I also urge you to re-read last year's post on Yom ha'Din and Yom Teruah, and ponder the connection between the two.

Click here  for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Nyx-fleece Ram, by Terese Nielsen

Ralbag: On Akeidas Yitzchak (Binding of Isaac)

Disclaimer: Ralbag's Radical Views

The Ralbag has several views which radically diverge from "mainstream Jewish thought," and which some - most notably, the Rambam - might consider to be heretical. Two of these views show up in the Ralbag's treatment of the Akeidah. 

The first of these radical views has to do with God's Omniscience. In short, the Ralbag holds that God does not have foreknowledge of free will decisions made by human beings.  As one can imagine, this premise has a drastic effect on the Ralbag's reading of Akeidas Yitzchak. Unlike the other meforshim, who are confronted with the question of what it means for Hashem to "test" Avraham Avinu, the Ralbag maintains that the Akeidah was an actual test: Hashem did not know what Avraham would do when confronted with such a commandment, and the only way for Him to find out was to actually issue the command. 

The second radical view involves the difference between the nevuah (prophecy) of Moshe Rabbeinu, and the nevuah of other neviim. I am not too familiar with the details of the Ralbag's view here. Suffice it to say, it appears he holds that Avraham received nevuah in the form of words - not merely visions - and that these words were somewhat ambiguous. Not only that, but the Ralbag learns that Avraham was able to receive nevuah while awake and fully conscious. According to my understanding, the Rambam would vehemently disagree on all three scores, and would say that a navi like Avraham would receive his nevuah in the form of images, and that the meaning of these images would be 100% clear, and that this nevuah would occur while the navi was asleep or in a trance. 

I do not plan on taking up these disagreements between the Ralbag and the other Rishonim in this blog post. This is not the place for such an inquiry, and even if it were, I would not be qualified to conduct it. I am only pointing these things out because I want to make several things clear at the outset: (a) the Ralbag differs in a major way on these major issues, (b) the fact that I write about his views without critiquing them should not be interpreted as an endorsement; (c) do not expect me to assess these views at the present time; and (d) for the purposes of this blog post, we will be working within the Ralbag's premises in order to understand what he holds the Akeidah teaches us.

Having said that, let us now begin.

Avraham's Test

Ralbag begins his commentary with an explanation of the nisayon (test):

The substance of the nisayon - according to my opinion - is that the nevuah came to him in an ambiguous language, namely, that Hashem said to him regarding Yitzchak, "ve'ha'aleihu sham l'olah." 

It is possible for this statement to be understood to mean that he should slaughter [Yitzchak] and make him into an olah (burnt offering) OR that he should "bring him up there" (yaaleihu) to do an olah, in order to educate Yitzchak in avodas Hashem (the service of Hashem). 

Hashem tested him [to see] whether it would be difficult in his eyes to do anything that Hashem commanded him, to the point where he would understand this statement to be other than its straightforward meaning - namely, that he would understand from it that he should bring another olah, rather than sacrifice his son.

In other words, according to the Ralbag, Avraham was deliberately given an ambiguous nevuah: "ha'aleihu sham l'olah." The straightforward meaning of the nevuah was "slaughter your son as a korban olah." If Avraham truly loved Hashem, He would take the commandment at face value, and be willing to sacrifice his precious son, despite the difficulty of the task.

But if his attachment to his son were stronger than his love of Hashem, he would look for a different way to interpret Hashem's instructions, and would end up forcing the reading of "bring your son up onto a mountain to teach him how to bring a korban olah." 

[As an aside, the Ralbag raises the classic question: How could Avraham think that Hashem would command him to slaughter his only son, after promising that Yitzchak would be the source of his progeny? Ralbag answers that since Hashem's promises only come true if the recipients are on the level to merit them, Avraham figured that Yitzchak must have sinned in such a way that he was no longer worthy of this promise being carried out through him.] 

Lo and behold, Avraham passed the test. Not only did he interpret the nevuah according to its straightforward meaning, but he fulfilled the mitzvah with zeal, joy, and alacrity. He got up early in the morning, saddled his own donkey, prepared the wood for the olah, and set out to fulfill the will of his Creator. And when the moment came to slaughter his beloved son, he wasn't plagued with despair and suffering. To the contrary, he was ready to perform the mitzvah with love and gladness - even to the point where he was able to receive the nevuah of the malach (angel) calling out to stop him, while he was awake, which would have been impossible had he been sad, despondent, or in pain.

That, in short, is the Ralbag's account of the Akeidah. Are there questions and problems that remain unanswered? Yes. But this sums up the crux of the sipur (narrative) according to his reading.

The Relevance of the Akeidah for Us

The Akeidah takes on a central role on the day of Rosh ha'Shanah. In addition to reading the Akeidah for the krias ha'Torah (Torah reading) on the second day, we also make repeated references to the Akeidah throughout our tefilos (prayers). One of the most prominent references to the Akeidah can be found at the forefront of the Zichronos (Remembrances) section of the Mussaf prayer:

Remember for us, Hashem, our God, the coveneant, the kindness, and the oath that You swore to our father Avraham on Mount Moriah. Let there appear before You the Akeidah when Avraham, our father, bound Yitzchak, his son, upon the altar and he suppressed his mercy to do Your will wholeheartedly. Therefore, may Your mercy suppress Your anger from upon us, and in Your great good may Your burning anger withdraw from Your people, from Your city, and from Your heritage ... For it is You Who eternally remembers all forgotten things, and there is no forgetfulness before Your Throne of Glory, and may You mercifully remember today the Akeidah of Yitzchak for the sake of his offspring. Blessed are You, Hashem, Who remembers the covenant.

The question is: Why do we recall the Akeidah in pleading for mercy before Hashem? There are many events throughout Torah which we could recall in petitioning Hashem to have mercy. What makes the Akeidah special? 

I would like to offer an answer based on the Ralbag's explanation above. At best, this is a true explanation. But if I am wrong, then this will at least be a useful drush. 

According to the Ralbag, Avraham's essential test was whether he would understand and accept the dvar Hashem (word of God) at face value, or whether he would twist it and reinterpret it to bring it in line with his own desires. This, I submit, is the test we face every day in our relationship with Hashem by our adherence to Torah and mitzvos.

We were given the dvar Hashem at Sinai, as we emphasize at the beginning of the Shofros section:

You were revealed in Your cloud of glory to Your holy people to speak with them. From the heavens You made them hear Your voice and revealed Yourself to them in thick clouds of purity. Moreover, the entire universe shuddered before You and the creatures of creation trembled before You during Your revelation, our King, on Mount Sinai to teach Your people Torah and mitzvos. You made them hear the majesty of Your voice and Your holy utterances from fiery flames. 

Like Avraham, we are called upon by the Torah to obey commandments which run contrary to our desires (usually due to our own imperfections). In some cases the Torah merely pushes us slightly beyond our comfort zone, causing us to experience mild frustration, inconvenience, and unpleasantness. In other cases the Torah's demands cause us to recoil with distaste, anger, frustration, revulsion, or horror. And occasionally, the Torah brings us to the very edge, prompting us to confront those aspects of reality - of the world or ourselves - that fill us with absolute dread and terror. It is only through these "skillful frustrations" that we truly grow, but that fact doesn't mitigate the conflict they generate

Like the ambiguous nevuah received by Avraham, the Torah of Moshe is subject to many interpretations - and consequently, many distortions. And, like Avraham, we can choose to flee rather than submit to Hashem. If we so choose, we can warp the dvar Hashem in accordance with our own preconceived notions and values; we can pick and choose within the halachic system to suit our subjective preferences; we can hastily dismiss, deny, or delegitimize those parts of Torah that do not accord with our sensibilities, without conducting an intellectually honest investigation to see whether our understanding is deficient; or we can cope with the cognitive dissonance in the easy way - by violating the dvar Hashem, whether unintentionally, intentionally, or rebelliously, in a particular or with regards to the system as a whole.

By recalling the Akeidah in our tefilos, we are affirming our recognition of this fundamental human choice: will we bend reality to suit our desires, or will we subdue our desires in order to align ourselves with reality? This is the lesson we were taught by Avraham Avinu when he was put to this test in the ultimate way. Most of us would not be able to pass the test that he underwent, but we recognize the correctness of his decision and we strive to live in accordance with his derech to the extent that we can. 

And it is on that basis that we ask Hashem for mercy. We stand before Him and say: "Hashem - we know that we have committed countless errors and sins, and that by our actions alone, we are not worthy of escaping Your anger. But we are Your people, the children of Your covenant, the children of Avraham, Your beloved, to Whom You swore on Mount Moriah - the offspring of Yitzchak, Your akeidah, who was bound on Your altar. We identify with the derech set forth by our patriarch who passed this ultimate test which we have failed, time and again. We aspire to follow in his footsteps because we see with absolute clarity the uprightness of his path at that fateful event. In light of this recognition and longing on our part, please grant us mercy!" 

In other words, it is because the nisayon of Akeidas Yitzchak encompasses kol ha'Torah kulah (all of Torah in its entirety) that we are able to use it as the basis for beseeching Hashem to forgive us for all of our sins. The Akeidah represents the core of zechus Avraham, and by recalling it, we can tap into that zechus and can change the decree. 

May we all merit the rachamim of the Kadosh Baruch Hu this year, and follow in the footsteps of Avraham Avinu!