Picking and Choosing in Halacha

Artwork: Fact or Fiction, by Matt Cavotta

Picking and Choosing in Halacha

Many of us have been raised with the notion that one cannot, or should not, "pick and choose" when it comes to halacha l'maaseh (practical halachic rulings). When I first converted to Judaism, I thought that this was an actual law. I thought that a person was halachically obligated to choose one exclusive posek (rabbinic authority who issues practical halachic rulings), and that this posek's rulings were eternally binding, and that it was not permissible to consult other rabbis for piskei halacha (halachic rulings). I have encountered many observant Jews who hold a similar belief. 

But the more I learned about how halacha works, the more I began to question my understanding of this "principle." I learned about the difference between horaah and psak din, and how the verb "paskin" can mean different things in different contexts. I learned about the difference between authentic "Mosaic semichah," which died out sometime around the 4th or 5th century, and the type of "modern day semichah" that is granted today. I learned about the principle of eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim Chayim ("Both these and these are the words of the Living God"), which means that any halachically sound view is considered to be "true" in the eyes of Hashem, even if that view runs contrary to the halacha that was given at Sinai. 

This last point raised the biggest question in my mind. If, in Hashem's eyes (so to speak), the opinions of Rashi and Tosafos are both valid, then why can't I pick and choose? If I choose to follow Tosafos over Rashi or Rashi over Tosafos, are you really going to tell me that I am wrong, or that what I am doing is assur? That seems to fly in the face of eilu v'eilu. 

Eventually it dawned on me that this injunction against "picking and choosing in halacha" cannot, itself, be a halachic principle. At most this must be a meta-halachic principle which governs the way we relate to halacha. I assumed that this principle was legitimate, due to its ubiquity, and because I had never really heard any learned person say that you can just pick and choose whichever shitah (opinion) you want to follow. 

Still, I was bothered by the vague and amorphous nature of this "no picking and choosing" rule, and I wanted to understand its basis and its scope. I gradually began to form my own understanding of this principle, but had never seen it explicitly discussed in the classical sources. 

All of that changed this weekend when I stumbled upon the commentary of the Sforno on a mishnah in Pirkei Avos. I was pleased to see that the Sforno's explanation for why we shouldn't "pick and choose" in halacha corresponds to the conclusions I had arrived at on the matter. 

The mishnah in Avos 1:16 states: 

Rabban Gamliel says: "Make a rav for yourself, and remove yourself from doubt, and do not accustom yourself to tithe by estimation."

The Sforno treats the two clauses of "make a rav for yourself" and "remove yourself from doubt" as two halves of the same dictum. He writes:

Even though [Chazal] said, "One who wishes to act in accordance with the words of Beis Shammai may do so, [and one who wishes to act] in accordance with the words of Beis Hillel may do so" (Eiruvin 6b), on account of eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim Chayim ("these and these are the words of the Living God"), nevertheless, it is fitting for you to make (i.e. appoint) for yourself a designated rav, whose opinion you will always follow, and whose halachic instruction will direct you. Through this, you will remove yourself from the doubt of machlokess such that your heart will not incline you to sometimes act in accordance with one authority and other times in accordance with another, for Chazal say about this: "regarding someone like this the pasuk says, 'the fool walks in darkness' (Koheles 2:14)."

The Sforno directly addresses the question that I had found to be the most problematic: If, in matters of halacha, we say, "eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim Chayim" - namely, that every halachically sound view is considered to be valid - then why can't we pick and choose in halacha? 

The Sforno's answer is clear. From a strictly halachic standpoint, a person is allowed to pick and choose, since eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim Chayim. However, from a meta-halachic standpoint, this is not an advisable practice. Why not? Because picking and choosing leads to the habit of determining halacha based on personal preference. 

Halacha is beneficial on many levels, but if you strip away all of its layers - all of the taamei ha'mitzvos (the reasons for the commandments), all of the philosophy, and all of its other ideational content - you will find, at the core, an objective system of rational law which operates based on principles which are scientific in their conceptual character. Take an uneducated Jew who knows nothing about halacha except for what to do and what not to do. At the very minimum, his life will be a continual exercise in subordinating himself - his desires, his actions, and his will - to an objective legal framework, commanded by the Author of the universe. By keeping his own desires in check and subduing them to the chochmah of halacha, the observant Jew elevates himself above his animal nature, and lives as a tzelem Elokim - albeit on a minimal level. 

But the more a person allows his subjective preferences to dictate his practice of halacha, the more he dilutes this fundamental character of the halachic system. Even if he is choosing between two halachically valid opinions (e.g. Rashi vs. Tosafos), and is acting still within the scope of halachically acceptable views, he has ipso facto undermined the objective quality of the halachic system and subordinated it to his personal whims and desires.

This is why the Sforno says "Nevertheless, it is fitting for you (ראוי לך) to appoint for yourself a designated rav, whose opinion you will always follow, and whose halachic instruction will direct you." There is no halachic obligation to "choose a posek." But by doing so, one ensures that one's subjective emotions will never interfere with the determination of halachic practice. The yetzer ha'ra knows how to operate as a subtle arbiter, and can infiltrate without being detected.

This sheds a new light on the necessity of having a posek. Not only does the posek function to determine correct halachic practice, but he also serves as way to anchor oneself to the underlying objective character of the halachic system, thereby enabling one to reap the maximum benefits of following halacha.

In retrospect, I can see why people treat this "no picking and choosing" principle as an actual halacha. It is so fundamental to the integrity of the halachic system that to neglect it would mean putting all of halacha at risk.

While the Internet has contributed to the development of wonderful tools for advancing and spreading Torah knowledge, it has also given rise to a culture in which people feel more at ease "conducting their own research" and making independent halachic decisions, without consulting an actual posek, and with little or no training in the science of halacha. For this reason, I feel even more compelled, as a teacher, to urge my students to choose a posek and to consult him with any and all of their halachic questions. Thankfully, I can now direct them to Pirkei Avos and to the Sforno as a support for this practice.