How to Deal with an Uncontrollable Yetzer

Originally posted in July 2013.

Artwork: Lose Calm, by Justin A. Engle

How to Deal with an Uncontrollable Yetzer

Elai ha'Zaken's Statement

One of the most astounding Gemaras can be found in Kiddushin 40a:

Rebbi Elai ha'Zaken said: "If a person sees that his yetzer (inclination) is overpowering him, he should go to a place where they don’t recognize him, put on black clothes and cover himself in black, and do what his heart desires, and not cause a chillul shem shamayim b'farhesya (public desecration of God's Name)."

[The Gemara asks:] Is this true? Wasn't it taught in a Braisa: “If a person does not have mercy on the glory of his Creator, he’d be better off not being born”? To whom does this refer? Rabbah says: "to a person who stares at a rainbow." Rav Yosef says: "to a person who transgresses in private." [According to Rav Yosef, this Braisa contradicts Elai’s statement!]

This is not a contradiction: [the Braisa refers to a situation] in which it is possible for him to control his yetzer, whereas [Elai’s statement refers to a situation] in which it is not possible for him to control his yetzer.

The same statement of Elai ha'Zaken can be found in Chagigah 16a:

[As] Rebbi Yitzchak said: "If a person transgresses in private, it is as if he trips the legs of the shechinah, as it is stated, 'Thus said Hashem: The heavens are My throne and the earth is My footstool' (Yeshaya 66:1)." 

Is this true? Didn't Rebbi Elai ha'Zaken say: "If a person sees that his yetzer is overpowering him, he should go to a place where they don't recognize him, put on black clothes and wrap himself in black, and do what his heart desires, and not cause a chillul shem shamayim b'farhesya"?

This is not a contradiction: [Rebbi Yitzchak's statement referred to a situation] in which it is possible for him to control his yetzer, whereas [Elai's statement refers to a situation] in which it is not possible for him to control his yetzer. 

There is one major problem with Elai ha'Zaken's statement: How can he encourage someone to intentionally sin?

Understanding Elai ha'Zaken's Statement

The Rishonim address this question in their interpretations of the Gemara. The most conservative approach is that of Rabbeinu Chananel, which is cited by the Baalei Tosafos (Chagigah 16a d"h v'yaaseh mah she'libo chafetz) as follows:

God forbid that [Elai ha'Zaken] would permit a person to commit an aveirah (transgression)! Rather, this is what he is saying: he should don black clothes and go to another place, since the wearing of black clothes and lodging [in different locations] will break his heart, and he will not come to transgress, and from that point and on he can do what his heart desires, for [at this point] his yetzer will certainly not overpower him!

The version of Rabbeinu Chananel printed in our version of the Gemara is quite different:

God forbid that Elai ha'Zaken permitted the transgression of any aveirah at all! Rather, this is what he said: If a person sees that his yetzer is overpowering him with regards to eating, drinking, and partying, and he fears that he will become drunk and come to transgress, [Elai] permitted him to go to another location and to dress in black - all in order to break his yetzer, since the heart of a traveler is broken ... Once he does this, his heart will be broken and he will automatically refrain [from sinning]. But to transgress an aveirah, or even to drink wine amid music which brings one to simchah - this is prohibited! And all the more so to do what is worse than this. All of this (i.e. Elai's advice) only applies to a situation in which he isn't able to control his yetzer ... and only where there is no aveirah.

In spite of these differences, both versions of Rabbeinu Chananel's opinion reflect his view that (a) Elai ha'Zaken was not talking about about doing an aveirah, and (b) he intended his advice to be deterrent, rather than permissive.

The Baalei Tosafos (ibid.) maintain that Rabbeinu Chananel's reading is forced and incorrect. They interpret the Gemara in the most straightforward manner possible:

"and do what his heart desires" completely, which implies that it is better for a person to carry out his desires in private than in public - not like Rabbeinu Chananel. 

Rashi's view (Kiddushin 40a d"h yilbash shchorim) is somewhat of a hybrid of the two interpretations. He writes:

"he should don black clothes" so that he doesn't view himself with dignity - perhaps this will cause his heart to become softened; furthermore, if he does sin, people won't pay attention to him since he will not appear distinguished in their eyes; therefore, he should wear black. 

In his comments on the Gemara in Chagigah, he simply writes:

"in which it is not possible for him to control his yetzer" it is better for him [to sin] in private than in public. 

In other words, Rashi learns that Elai's advice was intended as both a deterrent and as a form of damage control, in the event that the deterrent fails. Like Rabbeinu Chananel, Rashi learns that wearing black and going to a different location is likely to subdue the person's inclination, causing him to lose his resolve to sin. Like Tosafos, and unlike Rabbeinu Chananel, Rashi maintains that Elai is talking about a case involving a temptation to do an actual aveirah, and is recommending that the sinner opt for the lesser of two evils.

Implications of Elai ha'Zaken's Statement

This Gemara has some eye-opening implications, which I'd like to point out in a concise form:

Implication #1: Chazal held that some urges cannot be controlled.

We see from this Gemara that there are two states of hisgabrus ha'yetzer (being overpowered by one's inclination): one in which the person can control himself, and another in which he can't. This goes against the opinion of the many frum Jews out there who believe that we all have the ability to control our yetzer ha'ra in every situation, or that God wouldn't give you a desire that you can't control. Elai ha'Zaken would beg to differ.

Implication #2: Not every "overpowering urge" is actually uncontrollable.

We are expected to be able to tell the difference between the two states of hisgabrus ha'yetzer. There are many people who minimize or ignore this distinction, especially the Jews who are born and raised in American-galus. They point to people who are challenged by their instinctual urges, saying, "What do you expect these people to do? They can't help themselves!" Elai ha'Zaken would disagree: just because a person is overpowered by his yetzer doesn't necessarily mean that he can't control himself. It is entirely possible to be faced with an overwhelming urge, and to resist its demands. Addicts who are in recovery manage to do this every day.

Implication #3: A person who is overcome by an uncontrollable urge still has free will.

To my mind, the most amazing implication of Elai ha'Zaken's statement is this: even when a person finds himself in the grip of an uncontrollable yetzer, and he is definitely going to sin, the Torah still expects him to be able to exercise enough self-control to travel to a different location and put on black clothing before he indulges. In other words, "uncontrollable" just refers to the fact the need to act on one's urge; he is still expected to be able to control how he acts on it. This is the premise of Elai ha'Zaken's statement.

Implication #4: Chazal had a realistic view of the challenges of the yetzer.

Last, and perhaps most importantly, Chazal were realistic! They know that "There is no man on earth who is a tzadik who does [only] good and does not sin" (Koheles 7:20). We are human beings. We are not perfect, and we can't always live up to the ideal. Some of us will consider this point to be obvious, but, as we mentioned before, there are those who claim that the Torah doesn't make any demands of a person which he can't handle. Elai ha'Zaken definitely would not agree. 

Implication #5: The Torah still has advice for those who are going to transgress its laws

Chazal use the term "lifnim mi'shuras ha'din" (a.k.a. "beyond the letter of the law") to describe actions which go beyond the demands of the halacha, and are in line with the Torah's ultimate objectives. The term "shuras ha'din" (a.k.a. "the letter of the law") refers to the minimal requirements of halacha. 

I'd like to coin a new term: "me'achorei shuras ha'din" ("behind the letter of the law"). This refers to a person who, for whatever reason, must violate halacha, but wishes to do so in accordance with the Torah's principles to the greatest extent possible. This category is a very important one to keep in mind, especially when dealing with individuals who (for whatever reason) feel they must compromise the observance of halacha. 

There are so many Jews who have an "all or nothing" attitude when it comes to halachic observance. This is ridiculous. Don't get me wrong: from a philosophical, halachic, and metaphysical standpoint, Torah is an "all or nothing" system. You can't pick and choose which halachos to keep. At the same time, realistically speaking, not every person is able to keep every halacha in every case. But the Torah has advice even for these people. The Torah doesn't just say, "To hell with you. Do whatever you want. See if I care." 

This is highlighted very clearly in Elai ha'Zaken's teaching. He is essentially telling this person: "I understand. You can't control yourself in this case. Your own observance of this halacha will be compromised. But there is still the consideration of chillul shem shamayim, and you should at least retain that consideration as a priority." 

I once taught a group of "rebellious teenage boys" at a Modern Orthodox Jewish high school. They refused to daven, and had done so for years. I asked my rebbi what I should do. My rebbi asked me if I was sure that they weren't going to daven, and I answered in the affirmative. He then asked, "What if you told them just to say the Shema and daven shemoneh esrei - could you get them to do that?" I told him that I think I have a way. Guess what? It worked! For the rest of the year (at least), they said shema and davened shemoneh esrei every day. 

Some would look at this and say, "How dare you deviate from Chazal's prescribed tefilos! You have no right!" But to view it this way would be to miss the point entirely. There were two options here: continue to face the problem of these boys not davening at all, or at least get them to fulfill their de'oraisa obligations. To choose the former over the latter is to mix up one's priorities. That was my rebbi's cheshbone (calculation), and I agree with him. I believe Elai ha'Zaken's would also approve. 

Disclaimers

Needless to say, this Gemara is not a halachic matir (license) for a person to indulge whenever he wants. I wouldn't even consider this to be a matir, even according to Tosafos, since it is meta-halachic, rather than halachic. In other words, the Gemara isn't saying, "It is mutar (permissible) for such a person to go and fulfill his heart's desire." Rather, the Gemara is saying, "It is definitely assur (prohibited) for a person to go and fulfill his heart's desire, but in this case, that is what he should do in order to minimize chilul shem shamayim."

Moreover, the Gemara is clearly talking about an isolated instance of being overpowered by his yetzer. If a person finds himself scheduling regular "yetzer ha'ra indulgence" weekends, then I'd question whether such a person is actually "overcome by an uncontrollable yetzer" or whether he's just faking himself out.

I've seen some people mistakenly claim that this Gemara is talking about a case of oneis (i.e. being compelled against one's will to transgress halacha). I don't think that's the case. According to Tosafos, the person that Elai ha'Zaken is talking about is still committing an aveirah b'meizid (intentionally), and the aveirah still "counts" and he still needs to do teshuvah. This isn't a "freebie." 

Obviously, if a person found himself in a situation of an uncontrollable yetzer and decided to follow Elai ha'Zaken's advice, he should do so in a practical, cautious, intelligent way - unlike so many public figures. This goes hand in hand with the "you still have free will" point: just because you can't control yourself with regards to one instinctual urge doesn't mean you should throw caution to the wind and behave like a Mishleic fool. 

I'm sure there's a lot more to say about this Gemara. Although I am interested in your questions, insights, and critiques on all of my posts, I am particularly interested in what you have to say about this Gemara.