My chavrusa and I have been delving into Megilas Rus for the first time this year. So far we haven't yet uncovered any fundamental themes or approaches to the sefer - just individual ideas here and there. I'm going to try to write up a few of them before and after Shavuos. Note: I've been sick since Shabbos and have been feeling quite out of it today. Still, I tried finishing this post in time to meet my daily blogging schedule. Pardon me if it's not up to my usual standards.
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| Artwork: Council's Judgment, by Kev Walker |
Megilas Rus: Judging the Judges
Rus opens with the following pasuk:
"And it happened in the days when the judges judged that there was a famine in the land, and a man went from Beis-Lechem in Yehuda to sojourn in the fields of Moav - he, his wife, and his two sons" (Rus 1:1).
According to the plain pshat, this pasuk is establishing the historical context in which the events of the Megilah took place. Rashi fills us in on the details: "And it happened in the days when the judges judged - before the monarchy of King Shaul, during which the generations were governed by the judges; and this was in the days of Ibtzan."
Chazal are bothered by the seemingly redundant phrase "And it was in the days when the judges judged" (bi'ymei shefot ha'shofetim). The pasuk could have simply said, "And it was in the days of the judges." Why the extra word?
Moreover, we know that whenever a calamity befalls the Jewish community, it is the result of a communal cheit (sin). [1] This was especially true during the period of the Shoftim, when there was a more direct correlation between the hashgachah and righteousness/sinfulness of the people. [2] In light of this we may ask: What was the cheit of this generation? Furthermore, why did this cheit warrant the severe punishment of famine?
The Gemara (Bava Basra 15b) answers both questions in one shot:
R' Yochanan said: What meant by the words, "And it was in the days of shefot ha'shofetim"? - It was a generation which judged its judges. If the judge said to a man, "Take the splinter from between your teeth," he would retort, "Take the beam from between your eyes!" If the judge said, "Your silver is dross," he would retort, "Your liquor is mixed with water!"
By interpreting phrase "shefot ha'shofetim" not as "when the judges judged" but "during the judging of the judges," this midrash identifies the cheit of the generation which caused the famine. But this still needs clarification. What, exactly, was the cheit of "judging the judges"?
From the examples provided by the Gemara it would seem that the cheit beloged to the judges themselves. Indeed, this is how Rashi interprets our Gemara:
[a generation] which judges its judges - for the judges, themselves, were corrupt; this [corruption] gave the defendant an opening to rebuke his rebuker, for if the judge said to him, "Take the splinter from between your eyes" - remove and separate yourself from the small sin that you have done - he could say back, "Take the beam from between your eyes!" - separate yourself from the major sin that you have done. [3]
The Baalei Tosafos disagree with this interpretation:
a generation which judges its judges - The Ri was astounded by this, for it said in [the first chapter] of Temurah (15b): "All of the 'grape-clusters' (i.e. righteous leaders) who arose for Israel from the time of Moshe until the death of Yosef ben Yoezer were free from the blemish [of sin]."
The Ri is bothered by Gemara's implication that the judges were corrupt, since Chazal say that the judges were righteous during this time. The Chasam Sofer also rejects Rashi's interpretation, and offers an interpretation of his own:
Heaven forbid that the judge [in the days of Rush] sinned! For we find that Osniel ben Kenaz, Boaz, Eli ha'Kohen, and Shmuel ha'Navi were among them; and even Yiftach and Gideon were "grape-clusters." Heaven forbid that Hashem's spirit would be driven by transgressors!
Rather, [the meaning of the Gemara is that the judges] didn't watch over Israel in the proper manner, as Chazal said about the Elders who did not rebuke the nobles, and the righteous Eli, who didn't rebuke his sons. This is the meaning of "from between your eyes" - namely, the eyes of the congregation, who were supposed to be watched over.
Personally, I don't know enough about the period of the Shoftim to assess how righteous or corrupt the judges were at that time; I'll leave that argument up to Rashi and Tosafos.
What inclines me to the side of Tosafos is the Gemara's characterization of this problem as a cheit of the generation - not as a cheit of the judges themselves. If the judges were corrupt, the Gemara should have interpreted "shefot ha'shofetim" as "[a generation] in which the judges were judged [by God]" rather than "[a generation] which judged its judges," or something to that effect. Chazal's attribution of the cheit to the people of the generation leads me to believe that the judges were blemish free, as is indicated by the Gemara cited by Tosafos.
What inclines me to the side of Tosafos is the Gemara's characterization of this problem as a cheit of the generation - not as a cheit of the judges themselves. If the judges were corrupt, the Gemara should have interpreted "shefot ha'shofetim" as "[a generation] in which the judges were judged [by God]" rather than "[a generation] which judged its judges," or something to that effect. Chazal's attribution of the cheit to the people of the generation leads me to believe that the judges were blemish free, as is indicated by the Gemara cited by Tosafos.
What, then, do we make of the Gemara's examples of the typical dialogue that would take place between the judge and the defendant?
Perhaps we can interpret this dialogue as an expression of the corrupt mindset that plagued the people of that generation. There is a well-known idiom which comes to mind here: "the pot calling the kettle black." The formal name for this is the tu quoque (or "appeal to hypocrisy") fallacy, which Wikipedia defines as "an attempt [to discredit the validity of the opponent's logical argument by asserting the opponent's failure to act consistently in accordance with its conclusion(s)." According to this fallacy, Reuven has no right to point out a flaw in Shimon if Reuven partakes of a similar flaw. While there might be a psychological truth at play here (i.e. people tend not to listen to someone if they view that person as a hypocrite), this way of thinking has little relevance in matters of law, mussar, or practical advice.
For example, if Reuven the Judge convicts Shimon the Defendant of selling dross labeled as "pure silver," Shimon can accuse Reuven all day long for diluting his liquor with water, but that accusation will not change Shimon's liability in a court of law. True, Shimon might be less willing to accept a ruling from a judge whom he feels is also guilty of a crime, but that has no bearing on the reality of what Shimon did, nor does it exempt him from the legal consequences of his actions. This is true even if Reuven were guilty of a crime - and certainly if Reuven is guilt-free, as Tosafos and the Chasam Sofer would say about the Shoftim in our case.
Likewise, if Reuven - a nutritionist who happens to be obese - advises Shimon to cut back on his excessive consumption of sugar and trans fats because they're bad for his health, and Shimon responds, "Oh, look at the pot calling the kettle black!" who is really acting foolishly here? True, Shimon might feel uncomfortable trusting Reuven's health advice if Reuven doesn't live a healthy lifestyle, but that discomfort doesn't in and and of itself undermine the scientific validity of Reuven's advice. Reuven's expert pronouncement stands on its own merit, regardless of Reuven's personal decisions.
It seems that this was the cheit of the generation at the time of Rus: they viewed halacha as the subjective imposition of human will, rather than an objective system of divine law. We maintain that the Torah's laws are objectively true and real - just as real as the laws of nature. It is evident from the examples mentioned in the Gemara that this generation did not regard the Torah's laws as objective reality, nor did they regard the judges as the knowers and adjudicators of that law. Instead, they relegated the judges' verdicts to the realm of human opinion, such that they could be dismissed on the basis of hypocrisy - whether real or imagined.
Perhaps this sheds light on Rav Avigdor Kohen Tzedek's explanation of the famine:
Rav Avigdor adds that the gematria of "ויהי בימי שפוט" ("and it was in the days of judging") is equivalent to the gematria of "ילדים שפטו" ("children judged"). If we take this gematria in tandem with Rav Avigdor's earlier citation of our Gemara in Bava Basra, we can clerly see how the people at the time of the Shoftim were behaving like children. The response of, "Oh yeah? Remove the beam from between your eyes!" smacks of the infantile reaction of "Oh yeah? You're not the boss of me!" This is a fine way for a child to retort to the bully on the playground, but if a patient responded this way to his doctor's prescription or a contractor used this statement to deflect an architect's counsel, then disaster is sure to follow. The same is true for those who childishly ignore halachic rulings out of a similarly misguided sentiment of, "Who does that rabbi think he is telling me what to do?"
Unfortunately, this same distortion prevails among Jews today. There are many modern Jews who are willing to disregard the rulings of rabbeim as nothing but biased predilections of men, rather than as objective dictates of the Creator. Even worse is the fact that the members of the rabbinate are guilty of this charge, in certain sectors. Unfortunately, there are rabbis who abuse their positions of authority and allow their personal feelings to influence their adjudication of halacha.
As we prepare for the celebration of the Giving of our Torah, it behooves us to assess our own relationship with the law. To what extent do we regard halacha as a regimen for human success, and to what extent do we relate to it as the imposition of an psychological authority figure's whims upon our own will?
The Torah was given to us by God, but how we receive it is up to us.
[1] See Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishneh Torah: Sefer Zmanim, Hilchos Taaniyos 1:1-1
[2] See Sefer Shoftim, Chapter 2
[3] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary to Talmud Bavli: Bava Basra 15b
[4] Tosafos, Commentary to Talmud Bavli: Bava Basra 15b
[5] Rav Moshe Schreiber (Chasam Sofer), Commentary to Talmud Bavli: Bava Basra 15b
[6] Rabbeinu Avigdor ben Eliyahu ha'Kohen, Commentary to Megilas Rus 1:1
Perhaps we can interpret this dialogue as an expression of the corrupt mindset that plagued the people of that generation. There is a well-known idiom which comes to mind here: "the pot calling the kettle black." The formal name for this is the tu quoque (or "appeal to hypocrisy") fallacy, which Wikipedia defines as "an attempt [to discredit the validity of the opponent's logical argument by asserting the opponent's failure to act consistently in accordance with its conclusion(s)." According to this fallacy, Reuven has no right to point out a flaw in Shimon if Reuven partakes of a similar flaw. While there might be a psychological truth at play here (i.e. people tend not to listen to someone if they view that person as a hypocrite), this way of thinking has little relevance in matters of law, mussar, or practical advice.
For example, if Reuven the Judge convicts Shimon the Defendant of selling dross labeled as "pure silver," Shimon can accuse Reuven all day long for diluting his liquor with water, but that accusation will not change Shimon's liability in a court of law. True, Shimon might be less willing to accept a ruling from a judge whom he feels is also guilty of a crime, but that has no bearing on the reality of what Shimon did, nor does it exempt him from the legal consequences of his actions. This is true even if Reuven were guilty of a crime - and certainly if Reuven is guilt-free, as Tosafos and the Chasam Sofer would say about the Shoftim in our case.
Likewise, if Reuven - a nutritionist who happens to be obese - advises Shimon to cut back on his excessive consumption of sugar and trans fats because they're bad for his health, and Shimon responds, "Oh, look at the pot calling the kettle black!" who is really acting foolishly here? True, Shimon might feel uncomfortable trusting Reuven's health advice if Reuven doesn't live a healthy lifestyle, but that discomfort doesn't in and and of itself undermine the scientific validity of Reuven's advice. Reuven's expert pronouncement stands on its own merit, regardless of Reuven's personal decisions.
It seems that this was the cheit of the generation at the time of Rus: they viewed halacha as the subjective imposition of human will, rather than an objective system of divine law. We maintain that the Torah's laws are objectively true and real - just as real as the laws of nature. It is evident from the examples mentioned in the Gemara that this generation did not regard the Torah's laws as objective reality, nor did they regard the judges as the knowers and adjudicators of that law. Instead, they relegated the judges' verdicts to the realm of human opinion, such that they could be dismissed on the basis of hypocrisy - whether real or imagined.
Perhaps this sheds light on Rav Avigdor Kohen Tzedek's explanation of the famine:
and there was a famine in the land - Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu said to them: "You stood [in opposition] against your judges, [so] I will set for you a judge against whom you will not be able to stand. Which [judge] is this? - The plague of famine, which is called "judge," as it is stated: "How much more when I send My four terrible judges: sword, famine, ferocious beast, and pestilence" (Yechezkel 14:21).This was a midah kneged midah punishment: Bnei Yisrael brushed off the judgments of their judges as subjective impositions of human will; in response, Hashem sent forth an objective "judge," whose sentence could not be brushed off so easily. It is easy to dismiss a human judge's verdict as mere opinion, but it is much more difficult to do the same with the verdict of the True Judge.
Rav Avigdor adds that the gematria of "ויהי בימי שפוט" ("and it was in the days of judging") is equivalent to the gematria of "ילדים שפטו" ("children judged"). If we take this gematria in tandem with Rav Avigdor's earlier citation of our Gemara in Bava Basra, we can clerly see how the people at the time of the Shoftim were behaving like children. The response of, "Oh yeah? Remove the beam from between your eyes!" smacks of the infantile reaction of "Oh yeah? You're not the boss of me!" This is a fine way for a child to retort to the bully on the playground, but if a patient responded this way to his doctor's prescription or a contractor used this statement to deflect an architect's counsel, then disaster is sure to follow. The same is true for those who childishly ignore halachic rulings out of a similarly misguided sentiment of, "Who does that rabbi think he is telling me what to do?"
Unfortunately, this same distortion prevails among Jews today. There are many modern Jews who are willing to disregard the rulings of rabbeim as nothing but biased predilections of men, rather than as objective dictates of the Creator. Even worse is the fact that the members of the rabbinate are guilty of this charge, in certain sectors. Unfortunately, there are rabbis who abuse their positions of authority and allow their personal feelings to influence their adjudication of halacha.
As we prepare for the celebration of the Giving of our Torah, it behooves us to assess our own relationship with the law. To what extent do we regard halacha as a regimen for human success, and to what extent do we relate to it as the imposition of an psychological authority figure's whims upon our own will?
The Torah was given to us by God, but how we receive it is up to us.
[1] See Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishneh Torah: Sefer Zmanim, Hilchos Taaniyos 1:1-1
[2] See Sefer Shoftim, Chapter 2
[3] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary to Talmud Bavli: Bava Basra 15b
[4] Tosafos, Commentary to Talmud Bavli: Bava Basra 15b
[5] Rav Moshe Schreiber (Chasam Sofer), Commentary to Talmud Bavli: Bava Basra 15b
[6] Rabbeinu Avigdor ben Eliyahu ha'Kohen, Commentary to Megilas Rus 1:1
First, feel better.
ReplyDeleteSecond, I think we could say that Rashi and the Tosafos are not necessarily arguing. It could be that Rashi maintains a philosophical sin of the judges whereas Tosafos are referring to actual sins. Elimelech may or may not have been a judge, but he was certainly a gadol hador. He left in a time of need. This may have been indicative of a greater apathy towards the people by the leaders. So while they may not have sinned overtly, since they didn't properly lead the people, they sinned as far as Rashi is concerned. When the leaders aren't fulfilling their roles as leaders, the people suffer and therefore were punished for the sins of the leadership.
The megilla seems to contrast the lack of chessed of Elimelech with the chessed of Ruth. The gedolei hador may not have demonstrated the proper attitudes towards the people and therefore they saw the system as subjective rather than objective. Ruth, on the other hand, demonstrated objective chessed (shel emes) that has no subjectivity in it.
Just my two cents (well, my cents mixed with cents from many shiurim on the matter, but I don't want to bias your learning too much with my comments).