Showing posts with label Sefer Bereishis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sefer Bereishis. Show all posts

Friday, January 6, 2023

Vayechi: The Wolf as an Allegory for the Shechinah

This week's Torah content has been sponsored by Rachayl as a "thank you" to me for teaching, and as a "thank you" to all those who participate in my shiurim and share their thoughts and questions.

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Artwork: DALL-E’s response to the prompt “impressionist painting of a wolf’s face made up of flames” (variation 2b)

Vayechi: The Wolf as an Allegory for the Shechinah

The most important shiur I gave in 2021 was called Of Wolves, Men, and Methodology: an Attempt to Capture and Articulate an Epistemological Upheaval (available in video and audio). The catalyst for my “epistemological upheaval” was the book Of Wolves and Men (1979) by nature writer Barry Lopez. The goal of the shiur was to identify the many forms of unwarranted intellectual reductionism that dominate our thinking about wolves, Torah, and everything else. We must be on guard against reductionist fallacies and constantly remind ourselves of how little we know, and how little we can know.

Ever since I gave that shiur, my ears perk up when I encounter any mention of wolves. It should come as no surprise, then, that of all the blessings given by Yaakov Avinu to Bnei Yisrael, it is the final one that caught my eye: “Binyamin is a predatory wolf; in the morning he eats plunder, and in the evening he divides spoils” (Bereishis 49:27). Targum Onkelos renders this blessing as follows: “Binyamin: the shechina (divine presence) will dwell in his land, and in his inheritance the Mikdash (Temple) will be built; in the morning and afternoon the Kohanim will offer korbanos (sacrifices), and in the evening they will divide their leftover share from other kodshim (sacred things).”

The plain meaning of the Targum is straightforward: the Beis ha’Mikdash was located in the territory of Binyamin. Every morning and afternoon the Kohanim would bring a korban tamid (continual sacrifice), each consisting of a single lamb, and in the evening they would distribute their portions of other kodshim among themselves. My question is: What does any of this have to do with wolves? Onkelos provides no insight as to why the imagery of a wolf is employed.

One answer is given by R’ Pinchas in the midrash: “just as a wolf seizes [its prey,] so did the mizbeach (altar) seize the korbanos” (Bereishis Rabbah 99:3). The Etz Yosef explains that this “seizing” refers to the miraculous fire that would consume the sacrifices on the mizbeach. Unlike Onkelos, R’ Pinchas learns the entire pasuk to be about the korban tamid: “in the morning [the wolf] eats plunder” corresponds to the lamb-offering brought in the morning and “in the evening [the wolf] divides spoils” corresponds the lamb offered in the afternoon.

On the last page of Maseches Sukkah (56b) the mizbeach is compared to a wolf again, but in a derisive manner:

There was an incident involving Miriam bas Bilgah, who apostatized and went and married a soldier of the Greek kings. When the Greeks entered the Sanctuary, [she entered with them and] kicked the mizbeach with her sandal, saying: “Lukos, Lukos! (Wolf, wolf!) For how long will you consume the property of the Jewish people, yet you do not stand with them in dire circumstances?”

The difference between R’ Pinchas and Miriam bas Bilgah illustrates one of Lopez’s concluding thoughts:

We create wolves … in the wolf we have not so much an animal that we have always known as one that we have consistently imagined. To the human imagination the wolf has proved at various times the appropriate symbol for greed or savagery, the exactly proper guise for the Devil, or fitting as a patron of warrior clans. (p.203-204)

The same is true of the mizbeach. To R’ Pinchas, the mizbeach is the locus of the rendezvous between the shechinah and Israel: the two lambs we offer each day are seized in a wolflike fashion by a miraculous fire which testifies to the indwelling of God’s hashgachah (providence) among His people. But to Miriam bas Bilgah, the mizbeach is a predatory institution which drains Israel’s resources, yielding nothing in return. It is a relic of a bad deal with a God Who abandoned His people.

And what is true of the mizbeach is true of the shechinah itself. God’s hashgachah is an objective reality, but our perception of it is a reflection our own premises. We, as a nation, have fallen prey to such biases in the past: “the Children of Israel imputed things that were not true to Hashem, their God” (II Melachim 17:9). Like the wolf, the shechinah is what it is, but it is also what we make of it in our minds and imaginations. We must proceed with the utmost intellectual humility, cognizant of our human limitations. Only with such humility can we be worthy to stand before the shechinah, as it stated about the most humble of us all: “Moshe hid his face, for he was afraid to gaze at God” (Shemos 3:6).

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

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Friday, December 30, 2022

An Etymological Drash from Rav Hirsch on Jewish vs. Pagan Priests

This week's Torah content has been sponsored by Sarah in celebration of the marriage of Rivkie and Dovi Siderson. Mazal tov!

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Artwork: Shadal and Rav Hirsch having a debate in a library
(generated using the "outpainting" tool on DALL-E)

An Etymological Drash from Rav Hirsch on Jewish vs. Pagan Priests

There are two types of linguistic analysis of the Hebrew language found in Torah commentaries. The first type takes into consideration all available data as the basis for its conclusions and follows the evidence wherever it may lead. This approach may be described as “scientific,” “evidence-based,” or “academic.” The second type of analysis avowedly does not factor in all the data but is guided by a particular set of assumptions, philosophical beliefs, and rhetorical objectives. This approach may be described as “poetic,” “imaginative,” or “homiletical.” The first type of analysis is “bottom-up” whereas the second is “top-down.” The first is a necessity for “pshat” whereas the second is a valuable a tool in the arsenal of “drash.”

Shadal (Samuel David Luzzatto, 1800-1865) exemplifies the scientific approach, as Daniel Klein writes in his preface to Shadal on Genesis: “In his investigation of word meanings, Luzzatto drew upon every means at his disposal” including “comparisons with the later (Mishnaic) Hebrew of the rabbis and with languages cognate to Hebrew, such as Aramaic, Syriac, and Arabic” (p.22) Shadal’s commentary is replete with philological analyses based on his understanding of the evolution of the Hebrew language.

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808-1888), a grand master of the poetic approach, holds by a different set of premises from Shadal. According to Mattityahu Clark (ed. Etymological Dictionary of Biblical Hebrew Based on the Commentaries of Samson Raphael Hirsch), Hirsch believed that Hebrew “is not a language that has historically developed and grown by absorbing or adapting words and expressions from foreign sources. Rather, it is a single, integral unit with its own internal structure and grammar, its own logic and patterns, its own meanings and nuances” (p.x). Hirsch “states repeatedly that one should not look to foreign languages to find meanings of words in the Torah,” believing instead that “the Hebrew language is self-contained” (p.xi). Thus, “in his analysis, Hirsch makes no use of or references to other languages of the ancient Near East” (p.293), instead basing his conclusions on his idiosyncratic theory of three-letter roots.

Although there are hundreds of examples which illustrate the differences between these two approaches, the main reason I wrote this article is to showcase a single excerpt from Rav Hirsch’s commentary in Parashas Mikeitz. Yosef is overcome with emotion upon seeing his younger brother Binyamin. “Yosef hurried because נִכְמְרוּ רַחֲמָיו towards his brother, and he sought to weep; he went into the room and wept there” (Bereishis 43:30). The basic question is: What does נכמרו רחמיו mean in the context of this pasuk?

A second question arises from a more common use of this three-letter root in the word כומר, which is universally understood to mean “pagan priest,” as in “[Yoshiyahu] also dismissed the כומרים” (II Melachim 23:5), “for its people will mourn over it, as well as its כומרים” (Hoshea 10:5), and “I will cut off from this place any remnant of the Baal and the memory of the ministers with the כומרים” (Tzfanya 1:4). The second question is: What, if anything, is the relationship between the expression נכמרו רחמיו and the word כומר?

Shadal’s Italian translation of the pasuk in Mikeitz (rendered into English by Daniel Klein) reads as follows: “And immediately Joseph, pity having been kindled in him toward his brother, and wanting to weep, entered into the room and wept there.” Shadal elaborates on his reasoning in his commentary (43:30):

kindled (nikhmeru). Became hot and burning, as in, “Our skin is hot [nikhmeru], like an oven” (Eichah 5:10). In Rosenmueller’s opinion (and before him the Alexandrian translation), the original meaning of rahamim [here translated as “pity”] was “bowels,” just as [the singular form] rehem [means “womb”].

Shadal is not the first one to translate נכמרו as “hot and burning” Ibn Ezra, Avraham ben ha’Rambam, Ralbag, and others took the same approach, many of them citing the same pasuk from Eichah.

As for our second question, we – or at least, I – don’t have access to Shadal’s commentary on any of the three instances of the word כומר cited above. We do, however, have the commentary Hoil Moshe by Rabbi Moshe Yitzchak Ashkenazi (Moisè Tedeschi, 1829-1898), one of Shadal’s “informal” students, who employs a similar evidence-based linguistic approach to that of his teacher:

הכומרים. According to [Heinrich Wilhelm] Gesenius (1786-1842) in his lexicon, its meaning is “those who burn incense.” If so, one must assume that the letters ג,י,כ,ק were transposed and its origin is Aramaic or Syriac. Gachalei eish (fiery coals) is translated as gumrin d’iysha, and the priests raise up smoke with fiery coals on the firepan; accordingly, they are superior in rank to priests whose forms of service are not as significant.

Thus far the scientific approach of Shadal. Rav Hirsch’s poetic approach stands in stark contrast. He reads our pasuk as: “Yosef hastened, for his feelings toward his brother had been stirred up and he wished to cry, and he went into the room and wept there” (trans. Daniel Haberman). Rav Hirsch’s commentary begins with a pshat answer to our first question, then segues into a drash answer to our second question:

נכמרו רחמיו. For Yosef knew what he intended to do to Binyamin, the painful ordeal he intended to put him through, even if only briefly.

כמר, the stirring up of strong emotions, is also the root of מכמורת, a net. A כומר is a pagan priest. The Rabbinic term כמר של זיתים denotes laying fruit on top of one another so that they should heat up and ripen, or it denotes burying them in the earth for this purpose, sealing them off until they become ripe and tender. מכמר בשרא (Pesachim 58b) – initial spoilage in meat. ביב שהוא קמור תחת הבית (Ohalos 3:7) – a hidden drain.

The basic meaning of כמר, then, is to keep back something, shut it up and prevent it from going free, and thus to bring it to fermentation. Thus, on the one hand, a net, and on the other, the process of fermentation. Transposed to the emotional realm, כמר denotes pent-up feelings which, as a result of repression, reach an intense state of ferment. Compare  כִּי יִתְחַמֵּץ לְבָבִי (Tehilim 73:21), emotional ferment which can no longer be contained in one’s breast; intense emotional excitement.

For this reason, apparently, pagan priests are called כמרים as opposed to כהנים. The Jewish כהן is not dependent on devotion, emotion. Jewish Divine service is not designed to excite dark mysterious feelings. The Jewish Sanctuary appeals primarily to the intellect: התפלל means to rectify one’s judgment and to make clear to oneself one’s relationship to things in general, one’s duties. Feelings are very cheap. One can weep copiously before God in prayer, and then get up and be no better than one was before! The כומר counts on exciting the emotions. The כהן, however, has to be כן with himself and מכין, provide others with firm direction and a firm basis. Heathenism works on the emotions and thereby shackles the intellect. The emotions, however, are like a clock mechanism without hands, restless movement that knows not whence or wither, which can be exploited for any purpose. The כומר fans the flames of hell and arouses fanaticism; he celebrates his triumph when נכמרו מעים, when the innards of the believers reach a point of total ferment.

This is a beautiful example of what I call “etymological drash.” Rav Hirsch uses the Hebrew language to expound on a core idea about Judaism. The fact that his analysis of the root כ.מ.ר. may or may not be “scientifically accurate” by the standards of modern philology is immaterial. This is the way of drash.

Fortunately, we are not forced to choose between the approaches of Shadal and Rav Hirsch, just as we need not commit ourselves exclusively to either pshat or drash. Rabbi David Fohrman once likened the interrelationship between pshat and drash to that of melody and harmony: both play different roles – the parameters of which must be understood to be effectively used – but together, they result in beautiful music.

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Friday, December 16, 2022

Vayeishev: Should this Rashi be Taught to Children?

The Torah content for the month of Kislev has been sponsored by Serena and Paul Koppel, who want to be makir tov and express gratitude.

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Artwork: DALL-E's response to the prompt, "post-impressionist painting of young Biblical Joseph being forgotten in prison by the king's steward"



Vayeishev: Should this Rashi be Taught to Children?

The final episode in Parashas Vayeishev opens with Yosef incarcerated in Potiphar’s dungeon. After interpreting the dream of the sar ha’mashkim (chief cupbearer), Yosef makes a request: “But if you would remember me when things go well for you, please do me a favor and make mention of me to Paroh and take me out of this house. For indeed, I was stolen from the land of the Hebrews, and here, too, I did not do anything that they should have put me into the pit.” (Bereishis 40:14-15). The parashah concludes on a somber note: “And the Sar ha’Mashkim did not remember Yosef; he forgot him” (ibid. 40:23).

Ask any child educated in the Jewish day school system “Why was Yosef forgotten?” and they’ll likely answer: “as a punishment for trusting in the sar ha’mashkim instead of Hashem.” This is Rashi’s (ibid.) explanation:

Because Yosef placed his [trust] in [the sar ha’mashkim] to recall him, it became necessary for him to be imprisoned for two more years, as it is stated: “Praiseworthy is the man who has placed his trust in Hashem, and did not turn to the haughty” (Tehilim 40:5) – that is, he shouldn’t have trusted in Egypt, who is called “haughty” (Yeshayahu 30:7).

Ralbag takes the opposite approach. He highlights this in his list of toalos (lessons) on the parashah (40:14):

The seventh lesson [we learn from this section] is in middos (character traits), namely, that it is proper for a person to strive with all his might to save himself from the bad [situation] in which he finds himself, using all the means at his disposal that might help him, and he should not rely on a miracle, even if he is under Hashem’s providence to a high degree. You see that despite the wondrous extent of Hashem’s providence towards Yosef, he [nevertheless] entreated the sar ha’mashkim to recall him to Paroh to take him out of the dungeon.

Why, then, was the righteous Yosef forced to languish in prison for two additional years? Ralbag answers (ibid. 41:39-45, Toalos, after the 8th toeles), explicitly doubling down on his rejection of Rashi’s approach:

It should be clear that Yosef did not place his trust in human beings (lit. “make flesh his strength,” cf. Yirmiyahu 17:5) when he spoke to the sar ha’mashkim; he merely saw that mentioning him to Paroh would bring about good, as it ultimately did. But Hashem caused the sar ha’mashkim to not remember him until the time arrived that would be most beneficial to Yosef. Thus, you will find that all the misfortunes that befell [Yosef] from the time he was sold – all of them were a means of bringing him into power, and this is clear with even the most superficial analysis.

Neither Rashi nor Ralbag were the originators of the interpretations they cite in their commentaries. Both can be found in the midrashic literature (Bereishis Rabbah 89:3). First the Sages present the view that Yosef’s sentence was increased by two years because he asked the sar ha’mashkim to recall him, in violation of “Praiseworthy is the man who has placed in trust in Hashem.” A few sentences later, the Sages offer an alternative explanation: “Why were two years added to his imprisonment? So that Paroh would dream a dream, through which [Yosef] would become great.” Rashi prefers the first explanation, whereas Ralbag opts for the second.

Of the two views, Rashi’s is the most difficult. We see numerous examples in Tanach of righteous individuals who had great bitachon (trust) in Hashem, but nevertheless adhered to the unanimously accepted principle of “ein somchin al ha’neis” (“we do not rely on a miracle”). Thankfully, my Rosh ha’Yeshiva wrote an essay featuring a beautifully nuanced explanation of how Yosef’s appeal to the sar ha’mashkim evinced a lack of bitachon in Hashem and why, in this case, a person who fully trusted in Hashem would have simply awaited His salvation.

The problem with Rashi, in my opinion, is not what he wrote, but how it’s presented. Odds are that the young children who are taught this Rashi as pshat (the straightforward meaning of the text) will walk away with the message that Yosef was wrong to ask for help, and that it is better to rely on a miracle than to act intelligently. I am convinced that it is better to teach Ralbag as pshat, but I’m open to hearing arguments in favor of Rashi.

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Monday, November 28, 2022

Vayeitzei: The Eyes of Leah in the Eyes of Three Schools of Commentary

The Torah content for the month of Kislev has been sponsored by Serena and Paul Koppel, who want to be makir tov and express gratitude.

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Artwork: DALL-E's response to the prompt, "impressionist painting of a woman's beautiful and haunting green eyes"

Vayeitzei: The Eyes of Leah in the Eyes of Three Schools of Commentary

The Torah introduces Leah by way of comparison to her sister: "Lavan had two daughters: the name of the older was Leah and the name of the younger was Rachel. And the eyes of Leah were rakos (lit. soft), but Rachel was beautiful of form and beautiful of appearance” (Bereishis 29:17-18). The two basic questions are: What does “rakos” mean, and why does the Torah tell us this?

The commentators here can be divided into three camps: (1) “minimalist pshat” commentators who answer the first question but not the second, (2) “maximalist pshat” commentators, who extrapolate answers to the second question from their answer to the first question, (3) “midrashic” commentators who use the text as a springboard to fill in other details about Leah’s character and backstory. Here is a summary of all the explanations I’ve read.

“Minimalist pshat” explanations include: her eyes were weak (Ibn Ezra); Leah’s eyes were physically beautiful (Onkelos); they were beautiful because they radiated joy (R’ Yosef Kara); she had beautiful pale eyes, and the rest of her was ALSO beautiful (Rashbam); her eyes were her ONLY beautiful feature (R’ Avraham ben ha’Rambam); she was beautiful in all respects EXCEPT for her eyes because she wept frequently (Radak); Leah wasn’t as beautiful as Rachel, but the Torah conveys this euphemistically by praising her beautiful eyes (R’ Hirsch).

“Maximalist pshat” explanations include: Leah’s eyes were beautiful but sensitive to the wind, making her unfit for shepherding (Bechor Shor); similarly, her eyes were overly sensitive to the sun (Ramban); Leah’s eyes were runny because of some disease which Yaakov was concerned might affect her progeny (Ralbag); likewise, the condition of Leah’s eyes made Yaakov think she would go blind (Abravanel); Leah’s eyes indicated that she was emotionally sensitive – not in a bad way, but in a way that made Yaakov more attracted to Rachel (Shadal).

The midrashic interpretation of Chazal is paraphrased by Rashi: “[Leah's eyes were] tender because she cried, thinking that she was destined for the lot of Eisav, because everyone used to say: ‘Rivkah has two sons and Lavan has two daughters: the elder [will marry] the elder, and the younger the younger.’” Chazal tell us that Leah would cry and pray, saying: “May it be [God’s] will that I not fall into the lot of that evildoer” (Bereishis Rabbah 70:15) and that she cried out in prayer “until her eyelashes fell out” (Bava Basra 123a).

Of the three approaches, the second and third are likely to find more favor in people’s eyes than the first. The maximalist pashtanim answer both questions by making reasonable inferences from the text. The midrashic commentators take homiletical liberties to provide a behind-the-scenes glimpse into Leah’s thoughts and feelings, reinforcing her righteous character. Both approaches deepen our understanding of the story in satisfactory ways.

But what are we to make of the “minimalist pshat” approaches? They seem to raise more problems than they solve. Indeed, ibn Kaspi – a staunch member of the minimalist camp – is led by his reading to ask a brazen question:

It should not surprise us that the Giver of the Torah didn't explain for us the reason for Leah's inferiority and Rachel's beauty, for there is no artist like our God. However, what is surprising – based on our principles, and the principles of every pious individual – is how Yaakov Avinu chose maidens [based on] beauty.

Ibn Kaspi’s commentary follows in the footsteps of R’ Yosef Kara, minimalist pashtan par excellence, who writes: “the prophetic text was written complete, with its solution and everything it needs … lacking nothing in its place [to be fully understood], and there is thus no need to bring proof from another place nor from midrash” (I Shmuel 1:17). This is the minimalist pshat method: to read the text as conservatively as possible, and unflinchingly face whatever questions may arise. This approach is difficult and treacherous, which is why it is far less popular than the other two approaches. Nevertheless, it is part of our mesorah, and should not be dismissed or undervalued.

________________________________________________________________

If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Friday, November 25, 2022

Toldos: Does God Judge Our Prayers Based on Our Parents?

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Artwork: DALL-E responding to the prompt, "Van Gogh painting of Biblical Isaac in light and Rebecca in darkness"

Toldos: Does God Judge Our Prayers Based on Our Parents?

“Yitzchak entreated Hashem on behalf of his wife because she was barren” (Bereishis 25:21). Although the pasuk makes it sound like Yitzchak was the only one who prayed, Rashi (ibid.) clarifies that he was joined in tefilah (prayer) by Rivkah: “he stood in one corner and prayed while she stood in another corner and prayed” (B.R. 63:5). Why, then, does the pasuk go on to say: “Hashem answered him, and Rivka conceived.” Shouldn’t it have said them? The Gemara answers by deriving a principle: “the tefilah of a tzadik ben tzadik (a righteous offspring of a righteous parent) cannot be compared to the tefilah of a tzadik ben rasha (a righteous offspring of an evil parent)” (Yevamos 64a). Yitzchak and Rivkah were both tzadikim, but the pasuk tells us that Hashem responded to Yitzchak because his father was the righteous Avraham Avinu, whereas Rivkah’s was the wicked Besuel.

This is problematic. Why should parentage have an impact on whether one’s tefilah is answered? To the contrary – David ha’Melech teaches us that “Hashem is close to all who call Him, to all who call Him in truth” (Tehilim 145:18). Chazal teach us that “the Merciful One desires the heart” (Sanhedrin 106b) If Yitzchak and Rivka were both tzadikim and both engaged in sincere tefilah, why should the righteousness or wickedness of their respective fathers matter?

This principle shows up in halacha as well. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 53) lists the criteria that are taken into consideration when appointing a shatz – that is, the “official” shaliach tzibur (communal representative), who leads the congregational prayers. Some of these criteria pertain to the candidate’s perfection: his righteousness, his wisdom, his humility. Other criteria are based on perceptions: his reputation, his voice, his appearance. The Bach (OC 53:3) infers from our Gemara that if two people are equally fit to serve as the shatz, it is preferable to appoint the one who has yichus (a superior family pedigree) over the one who lacks yichus. The Taz (OC 53:3) disagrees and maintains that in a tiebreaker situation, we should appoint the shatz from an inferior family because, all things being equal, “it is better to draw near this person from an undistinguished family in order to bring this offspring closer to the shechinah (Divine presence),” as it is stated: “peace, peace to the far and the near” (Yeshayahu 57:11).

In order to make sense of the Gemara in Yevamos and explain the disagreement between the Bach and the Taz, I feel that it is necessary to make a daring move. When the Gemara says, “the tefilah of a tzadik ben tzadik cannot be compared to that of a tzadik ben rasha,” it is NOT speaking about the “likelihood” of the tefilah being answered. “Hashem is close to all who call Him, to all who call Him in truth,” full stop. Rather, the tefilah of a tzadik ben tzadik is superior for extrinsic reasons, because of how it is perceived. Indeed, when the Gemara asserts the superiority of Yitzchak’s tefilah, Rashi there does NOT say: “therefore, Hashem answered him [instead of Rivkah]” but rather, “therefore, the pasuk ascribes [the answering] to him.” In other words, the tefilos of Yitzchak and Rivkah were equally effective, but the Torah assigns the credit to Yitzchak. If the Torah had said, “Hashem answered her,” we would focus on Rivkah alone, as we do when we read about Chanah’s tefilah. If it had said, “Hashem answered them,” we’d focus on their plight as a couple. But when the Torah says, “Hashem answered him,” it frames the answering of Yitzchak’s tefilah as a furtherance of the legacy of righteousness initiated by his righteous father Avraham.

Likewise, the yichus of the shatz has no bearing on the likelihood of his tefilah being answered. Rather, the disagreement is about which middah of Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu we seek to reflect via our appointment of this candidate as shatz. According to the Bach, we appoint a tzadik ben tzadik to highlight Hashem’s support of righteous legacies: “Hashem is good, forever is His kindness, and His faithfulness is from generation to generation” (Tehilim 100:5). According to the Taz, we convey the idea that Hashem seeks “peace, peace for the far and the near” (Yeshayahu 57:11) by appointing someone from a “distant” family and drawing him close to the shechinah.

Regardless of whether this explanation is correct, I believe its methodology is sound. When faced with a perplexing midrash about tefilah, we should not discard our fundamental understanding of how tefilah works in order to explain it.

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Friday, November 18, 2022

Chayei Sarah: The Pshat of “Place Your Hand Under My Thigh”

This week's Torah content has been sponsored anonymously, in gratitude for making my Torah available and accessible to everyone. May Hashem send a refuah shleimah to Tzvi ha'Kohen ben Shoshanah Geylah.

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Artwork: DALL-E's response to the prompt: "abstract oil painting of Biblical Abraham sitting on his servant's hand" 



Chayei Sarah: The Pshat of “Place Your Hand Under My Thigh”

When Avraham Avinu charges Eliezer to find a wife for Yitzchak, he begins by saying: Place now your hand under my thigh, and I will have you swear by Hashem, God of heaven and God of earth, that you not take a wife for my son from the daughters of the Canaanites” (Bereishis 24:2). Similarly, when Yaakov is about to die, he tells Yosef: “Please – if I have found favor in your eyes, please place your hand under my thigh and do kindness and truth with me – please do not bury me in Egypt” (ibid. 47:29). The question is: What is the significance of this gesture?

Rashi (ibid. 24:2), citing Chazal’s drashah (Midrash Rabbah ibid.), maintains that “place your hand under my thigh” means “grab hold of the place of my bris milah.” He explains: “one who swears an oath needs to take a mitzvah object in hand, such as a Torah scroll or tefillin, and milah was the first mitzvah for [Avraham], and came to him through pain, and was beloved to him.” According to Rashi, the conduct of Avraham and Yaakov serves as a precedent for the halachic requirement to hold a mitzvah object when making certain types of oaths (see Talmud Bavli Shavuos 38b and Rashi’s commentary there). Rashi does not qualify his comments, nor does he cite any alternative views.


The majority of other Rishonim either oppose or qualify Rashi’s interpretation. The leader of the opposition is Ibn Ezra (Bereishis 24:2) who objects to the notion that Avraham swore by milah, and then offers his own take:

[The Sages] said that [the phrase “place your hand under my thigh”] refers to milah, but if this were so, he would have sworn by his milah and not by Hashem. The more likely explanation to me is that it was customary in those days for a person to place his hand under the thigh of the person who had mastery over him, meaning: “If you are under my dominion, place your hand under my thigh,” and the master would sit on the hand, [as if the servant were] saying: “Behold! My hand is under your dominion to do your will.” This custom is still followed in India today.

Ibn Ezra’s view is cited and endorsed by a number of other Rishonim, including Rashbam (ibid.), Bechor Shor (ibid.), Radak (ibid.), Chizkuni (ibid.), Rabbeinu Bachya (ibid.), Tur (peirush ha’aroch ibid.), Ralbag (ibid.), and Ibn Kaspi (ibid.). Other major commentators highlight the difficulties with Rashi. Abravanel (ibid. question #4) rejects Rashi’s approach as “extremely improbable, for a person cannot take an oath on any mitzvah [object,] like maakeh, sukkah, or lulav, and especially not on milah, which would be disgraceful.” The Rosh (Shavuos 6:1) finds the plain reading of Chazal’s drashah to be so halachically problematic that he relegates it to a mere asmachta (textual allusion) rather than a legitimate halachic source – unlike Rashi, who takes the drashah at its halachic face value.

In sum, Rashi is the minority position among the mainstream commentators who comment on this pasuk. Even those who cite both opinions characterize Rashi’s as “the midrashic approach” and Ibn Ezra’s as “pshat.”

I do not find this to be problematic. However, there are those who find this conclusion to be deeply troublesome. A number of prominent rabbis, among them the Roshei Yeshiva of Beth Medrash Govoha (of Lakewood, NJ), have recently signed a ban on a popular edition of Chumash entitled Pshuto shel Mikra (LNN, 11/15/22). The ban alleges (among other things) that this Chumash constitutes “a stumbling block for the masses” because it presents other traditional commentaries as pshat instead of regarding Rashi as the definitive pshat.

My thoughts on this ban cannot be shared in the space of a 1-page article. Moreover, as of this morning, I have only read 24 pages of the 76-page Kuntress Vayivinu ba’Mikra which explicates the many reasons for the ban. Suffice it to say, as someone who favors the non-Rashi pshat commentators among the Rishonim, I am as disturbed by this ban as its promulgators are disturbed by the Chumash Pshuto shel Mikra. I can’t help but wonder what all the Rishonim cited above would say about this treatment of their Torah.

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Friday, November 11, 2022

Vayeira: Don’t Deviate from the Minhag: XTREME Edition

This week's Torah content has been sponsored anonymously. May Hashem grant a refuah shleimah to Rachel bas Rivka Chana.

Click here for a printer-friendly 1-page version of this article, and click here for an audio version.

Artwork: Divine Visitation, by Victor Adame Minguez; flavor text on the card reads: 
"The angels appreciated the offer, but declined to eat any birdseed."

Vayeira: Don’t Deviate from the Minhag: XTREME Edition

Parashas Vayeira opens with Avraham Avinu’s visitation by “three men” (Bereishis 18:2). While some take this description at face value (Ralbag and Bechor Shor) and others maintain that this entire episode took place in a prophetic vision (Rambam and Radak), the majority of commentators – including the Sages of the Talmud – understand these “men” to be angels (see the AlHaTorah Parashah Topics for all the views and sources).

Avraham receives his guests graciously and hastens to perform the mitzvah of hachnasas orchim. After preparing a lavish feast, the Torah tells us that “[Avraham] stood over them beneath the tree and they ate” (18:8). This poses a problem for the mainstream view: if, indeed, these were non-physical angels, how could they eat?

R’ Tanchum bar Chanilai (Bava Metzia 86b) addresses this question by deriving a lesson from their conduct: “a person should never deviate from the minhag, for when Moshe ascended on high [to receive the Torah], he didn’t eat food, [and] when the ministering angels descended below, they ate food.” Sensing that R’ Tanchum sidestepped the real issue, the Gemara asks: “But is it really possible to think that they ate bread?!” The Gemara answers: “Rather, say that they appeared as though they ate and drank.”

What are we to make of this midrashic statement? One approach is to attempt to explain the mechanics of how, exactly, these angels “appeared to eat.” For example, Midrash Rabbah (48:14) states that they “removed portions of food one at a time.” The Daas Zekeinim maintain that they incinerated the food, and that the term “vayocheilu” ought to be translated as “they consumed [with fire]” rather than “they ate.” Tanna d’Vei Eliyahu Rabbah (12) simply refuses to accept our Gemara’s conclusion, declaring:

Anyone who says that the ministering angels didn't eat with Avraham has said nothing! Rather, due to the righteousness of that tzadik and as a reward for his toil on their behalf, Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu opened their mouths and they ate. Thus, it was stated: "he stood over them under the tree and they ate."

But there is an alternative approach one can take here. Instead of assuming that the midrash is describing these events as they actually happened, one can read R’ Tanchum’s midrash homiletically – that he is teaching us a lesson which has nothing to do with the pshat. Indeed, this is the approach taken by Midrash Seichel Tov (18:8):

They appeared as though they ate, removing the food bit by bit. Why go this far? So [we can] learn derech eretz (proper interpersonal conduct), to conduct oneself in the city in accordance with the customs of its citizens. Behold! Moshe ascended on high and didn’t eat or drink, and went for 40 days and 40 nights without eating and drinking, and these [angels] who came to the human realm made themselves appear to eat and drink in order to beautify the character of Avraham, and so as not to withhold reward from its rightful recipients.

Reading the midrash in this manner obviates the need to engage in abstruse angelological acrobatics to work out how the angels appeared to eat. Moreover, this reading sidesteps the problematic claim that the reason why Moshe Rabbeinu abstained from eating and drinking for 40 days was because he didn’t want to deviate from the minhag of the angels (as opposed to a more metaphysically intrinsic reason, related to Mosaic prophecy).

Why would R’Tanchum express this derech eretz lesson in such dramatic terms? Perhaps he did so the sake of the rhetorical impact. Many of us experience tremendous resistance when asked to change our own conduct to conform to the norms of others. R’ Tanchum framed his teaching this way to speak directly to this resistance: “Even if conforming to the minhag goes against your grain – even if it goes against your very nature – you still must not deviate. Moshe was a physical being – and yet, he abstained from eating and drinking to uphold the custom. The angels were non-physical beings – and yet, they ate so as not to upset their host. And even if you literally can’t bring yourself to adapt the minhag, then at least do a convincing job of pretending to conform.

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Friday, October 28, 2022

Noach: Shadal’s Radical Application of Dibrah Torah ki’Lshon Bnei Adam

This week's Torah learning has been sponsored by Vanessa, the first person who offered to cover the costs of my Zoom account for the year. Thank you, Vanessa! 

Click here for a printer-friendly 1-page version of this article, and click here for an audio version.

Artwork: DALL-E's response to the prompt, 
"painting in the style of Van Gogh of Noah bringing an animal sacrifice"

Noach: Shadal’s Radical Application of Dibrah Torah ki’Lshon Bnei Adam

Parashas Bereishis features a handful of “extreme” anthropomorphisms: “Let Us make man in Our Image” (1:26), “They heard the sound of Hashem-God walking in the garden” (3:6), and “Hashem regretted having made man on earth, and He was pained to His heart” (6:6). Another example can be found in Parashas Noach. After Noach emerges from the Ark and brings burnt-offerings to Hashem, we are told that “Hashem smelled the soothing fragrance” (8:21), then declared that He would no longer curse the earth or smite all living creatures. Shadal (R’ Shmuel David Luzzatto, 1800-1865), quoting Johannes Coccejus (1603-1669), explains that this anthropomorphism “signifies a sacrifice brought to make God forget His anger.” Shadal continues:

(translated from the Italian by Dani Klein, with my own underlining for emphasis) 

This expression, of course, is merely an anthropomorphism suited to the popular understanding of the generation in which the Prophet (i.e. Moshe Rabbeinu) lived (על דרך דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם לפי מצב בינת אנשי הדור שהנביא עומד בו). At this point it is well to consider that the prophet Samuel told Saul, "Has the Lord as great delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the Lord? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice." [I Samuel 15:22]. From then on, we find this concept widespread in Israel; David said: – "For You delight not in sacrifice" [Psalms 51:18]; – "If I were hungry [for sacrifices], I would not tell you" [ibid. 50:12]; – "Burnt offering and sin offerings have You not required" [ibid. 40:7]. All the prophets of the Monarchic period, moreover, expatiated at length on this subject. Hence it should be clear as day that the Torah could not have been written during the Monarchic period, or from the time of Samuel onward, for the Torah speaks the language of people who were on a far lower intellectual plane than that of the Israelites of the Monarchic period (כי התורה דברה כלשון בני אדם אשר שכלם עומד במצב שפל מאוד ממצב ישראל בימי המלכים). 

Before we discuss the “radical” part, let us appreciate Shadal’s main point. Shadal wrote his commentary in the wake of the Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment), in which the Torah’s authority was challenged from all sides. Maskilim (the so-called “enlightened Jews”) claimed that the Torah was composed during the Monarchic period – specifically, during the reign of Yoshiyahu in the 7th century B.C.E. Shadal argues that if the Torah were composed during this later era, the text would evince a negative attitude towards korbanos, as we see from numerous statements made by national leaders, such as Shmuel, David, Yeshayahu, and Yirmiyahu. Shadal concludes that this positive characterization of God’s response to korbanos is a concession to the lower intellectual level of the Jews in the pre-Monarchic period, and therefore serves as evidence of the Torah’s antiquity. 

It is Shadal’s opening and closing statements (underlined above) which intrigue me the most. I’m not troubled by Shadal’s assertion that the Jews in Moshe’s time were “on a far lower intellectual plane than that of the Israelites of the monarchic period.” The Jews who left Egypt had been steeped in the paganistic Egyptian culture for over two centuries. The Korban Pesach (lit. “sacrifice of skipping”) is predicated on the fact that the Jews were identical with their Egyptian masters in nearly every way and therefore needed to differentiate themselves by rejecting avodah zarah in order to merit redemption. The narratives that follow the Exodus are rife with examples of how attached Bnei Yisrael were to the Egyptian culture from whence they came. Likewise, I am not troubled by the notion that the Torah catered to the earlier generations’ attachment to korbanos. Indeed, this is the basis of the Rambam’s entire theory that korbanos as a whole are (as it were) a concession to the Jews’ attachment to the modes of worship that were ubiquitous at the time the Torah was given (see Moreh 3:32).

What I find both radical and compelling is Shadal’s application of dibrah Torah ki’lshon bnei Adam (Torah speaks in the language of man). This principle is typically invoked to explain the Torah’s use of anthropomorphisms: since it is impossible for the human intellect to have any positive knowledge of God, we are forced to speak of Him in terms which are, strictly speaking, inaccurate. Shadal takes this one step further by claiming that in some cases (at least) the Torah’s specific anthropomorphisms are tailored to the developmental level of the audience to which it was given. This methodological move has enormous implications, which I will leave the reader to consider.  
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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Thursday, July 21, 2022

My Rejected Kiruv Article on the Purpose of Life

The Torah content for these two weeks has been sponsored by Judah and Naomi Dardik in loving memory of Rabbi Moskowitz zt''l, who taught his students to pursue truth by asking questions, who modeled love of Torah and learning, and who exemplified living a life of the mind.

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Artwork: Lifelink , by Terese Nielsen


My Rejected Kiruv Article on the Purpose of Life

Foreword                                                                                                                     

I was planning on just posting the article I wrote and leaving it at that. But the more I thought about it, the more I deemed it important to provide the background information about why and for whom I wrote this article, to tell you how it was received, and to share my thoughts on its rejection. I think it’s especially important to provide this context because I’d really like to hear your feedback on the article.

Here's the backstory. A few months ago, I was contacted by two editors from a kiruv (Jewish outreach) organization. After introducing themselves, they told me about their new project:

We are looking for credentialed philosophers to write one or two articles from the following seven themes (or another if you prefer):

Is there a God? Where did the Universe come from? What is the meaning of life? What happens to us after we die? What is consciousness? Is there free will? and What are good and evil?

They specified the following criteria, in this language:

  1. Length: 800-1200 words
  2. Audience: Mostly millennials but accessible to all who have never studied philosophy
  3. Style: Deals directly with the issue in a universal way (no proofs from any scripture), must use examples from contemporary culture
  4. Tone: Serious, but fun and a bit sassy (70/20/10)

Despite my personal stance on kiruv and my not being a “credentialed philosopher,” I told them with genuine excitement that this project sounds right up my alley, and that I’d be delighted to write an article or two in July. 

I chose “What is the meaning of life?” as the subject for my first article because it's a topic I’ve addressed on many occasions throughout my high school teaching career, but I hadn’t yet written it up in any form. I welcomed the somewhat restrictive assignment specifications because it would be way too easy to let an article like this to get out of hand if I had the freedom to write it as I saw fit.

Below is the final draft of the article. The only difference between this and the version I submitted is the presence of a single paragraph in brackets towards the end – a paragraph which they liked but felt would be better saved for the sequel. I chose to include that paragraph here because, as you might have inferred from the title of this blog post, a sequel will not likely be forthcoming.

After you read the article, I’ll tell you how it was received. I'll share my own thoughts on the feedback I received and then I'll ask you for your feedback.


The Purpose of Life (According to Maimonides)

Introduction

All religions are expected to answer the question: “What is the purpose of life?” It should come as no surprise that this question is taken up by Maimonides (a.k.a. Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon, or Rambam, 1138-1204 C.E.), in his Guide for the Perplexed. [1]

For those who have only heard the “traditional” Jewish answers to this question, Maimonides’s answer might come as a shock. Best to sit down and buckle up!

The Purpose of the Universe

Maimonides’s treatment of this topic takes place in the context of an even larger question: What is the purpose of the universe as a whole?

He begins by challenging the notion that the universe was created for the sake of human beings. He argues that the universe is far too vast to be necessary for the human species, which is like a mere drop in the sea. (See the recent images taken by the Webb telescope released by NASA in July 2022.) And if a person claimed that all the planets, stars, and galaxies in the universe aren’t necessary for humans but nonetheless benefit us, the burden of proof would be on that person to explain how. (If Maimonides were playing chess, this is the first place he’d say, “Check.”)

Next, he refutes the common religious answer to our initial question, namely, that the purpose of man is to serve God. He writes: “Even if the universe existed for man's sake and man existed for the purpose of serving God, as has been mentioned, the question remains: What is the purpose of serving God? God does not become more perfect if all His creatures serve Him and comprehend Him as far as possible, nor would He lose anything if nothing existed beside Him.” In other words, God is perfect and has no needs; therefore, the purpose of the universe and of man cannot possibly be for His sake. (“Check again.”)

At this point, it would seem there is only one move left for the religious individual to make: the universe exists for us, we exist to serve God, and our service of God is not for His sake, but for our sake. Maimonides serves this view up, then smacks it down: “It might perhaps be replied that the service of God is not intended for God's perfection, but for our own perfection; it is good for us and perfects us. But then the question might be repeated: What is the purpose of our perfection?” (“Check yet again.”)

And this is where he drops the M-bomb (short for “Maimonides bomb”). Ready for it? According to Maimonides, life has no purpose. (“Checkmate.” Mic drop.)

The Purpose of Life (or Lack Thereof)

Many of us were taught that each person was given a special mission to accomplish which is their purpose in life, but Maimonides doesn’t buy that. Nor does he buy the other common answers, such as “God created the universe because He wanted to bestow His kindness” or “God created us in order to reward our service,” both of which run into the problems mentioned above.

But before you tip over your king and careen into the nihilistic void, allow me to unpack Maimonides’s nuanced position.

Think about how we relate to the question, “What is the purpose of X?” We ask this question when the utility of an entity is not readily apparent. Consider the following scenario. You see me holding an unfamiliar gadget. You ask me, “What is that for?” and I answer: “Oh, this? This thing has no purpose.” You might reply, “Then what’s the point? What good is it?” In other words, you assume that if it has no purpose, then it is not good.

But that conclusion isn’t necessarily warranted. In truth, there are two possibilities for why (or how) something “has no purpose.” One possibility is that the entity is, indeed, useless. Its existence lacks justification. It is a means to no end whatsoever. The other possibility is that its existence is an end in and of itself. It doesn’t need any purpose outside of itself to justify its own existence because its existence is intrinsically good

That is the sense in which Maimonides would say that life has no purpose: because existence is good, in and of itself. 

The Basis in Torah

This view is borne out in the opening chapter of Genesis. The phrase “and God saw that it was good” appears six times in the account of creation. If the Torah had withheld this declaration of goodness until after the creation of man, one might be justified in concluding that man is the purpose of the universe. But that's not what the Torah says. God creates light and deems it "good." He separates the seas and dry land and deems this "good." He creates vegetation and trees and deems them "good." And the luminaries, and the fish, and the birds, and so on.

Maimonides understands this to mean that each and every component of the universe is good simply by virtue of its existence. And when the account of creation ends with “God saw everything that He had made and behold! it was exceedingly good” (Genesis 1:31), this means that the universe has no purpose outside of itself. According to Judaism, existence in accordance with the will and wisdom of the Creator is the only standard by which goodness is measured. [2]

Now we can rephrase the answer to our original question in a more uplifting way. What is the purpose of life? To exist! To live! Life is inherently good! You don’t need any special, personalized mission to imbue your life with value because your life has intrinsic value!

And that is the end of the story … almost.

The Anomaly of Humanity

On Day Six, God creates the land animals and declares them to be good. Then He creates man and woman but does not declare them to be good. Why not? The answer lies in the essential difference between humans and all other phenomena in the universe. What is that difference? Free will.

We are the only creations that have free will and who can choose to disobey God. The Sages express this in the Tamludic dictum: “Everything is in the hands of heaven except for the fear of heaven” (Berachos 33b), which Maimonides explains to be a reference to free will. All other creations in the universe are “programmed” to exist in line with the will and wisdom of the Creator, without any possibility of deviation, and are therefore good “by default.” We humans can deviate. We can choose to live like animals, neglecting our unique capacity for abstract intellection, or we can attempt to live like angels, neglecting our physical and psychological needs. Both paths run contrary to our design, and therefore lead to self-destruction.

Rather, we humans must choose to live in line with the will and wisdom of the Creator. God does not declare man and woman to be good because this goodness isn’t guaranteed. The sociologist, Eric Hoffer, wrote: “Animals can learn, but it is not by learning that they become dogs, cats, or horses. Only man has to learn to become what he is supposed to be.” We must learn what it means to be human, and to consciously align ourselves with that ideal to the greatest extent possible in order to thrive.

[This is where the Torah comes into the picture. Gersonides (a.k.a. Ralbag, 1288-1344 C.E.) defines Torah as “a God-given regimen that brings those who practice it properly to true success.” Perhaps it would be more accurate to translate “true success” as “true human flourishing” – to find fulfillment by living in line with our true nature as truth-seeking beings devoted to seeking knowledge and practicing kindness, righteousness, and justice on earth, in harmony with ourselves and our fellow human beings. How the Torah serves this function is a topic for another article …]

The Purpose of Your Life

And this is where the notion of individual purpose finds its place. According to Maimonides, there is no extrinsic purpose to any individual’s life as an individual. We all share a common mission: to live in a manner which actualizes the human potential inherent in our nature. However, this actualization will play out differently based on our strengths, weaknesses, and individual differences, as determined by nature and nurture.

For example, Moses, Rabbi Akiva, and I belong to the same species and aspire to the same standard of human “goodness,” but since each of us possesses a different set of potentialities and lives in a different set of circumstances, each of us will have a different path of “goodness” to follow.

Here the maxim “know thyself” takes on additional significance: to live a “good life” we must know ourselves as humans, but we must also know ourselves as individuals, so that we can actualize our individual potentialities in accordance with the blueprint of universal human nature. 

Conclusion

Let us conclude with a summary of the main points. What is the purpose of life? According to Maimonides, life has no purpose – not because it is pointless, but because existence in line with the will and wisdom of the Creator is inherently good. This is true for everything in the universe, including for us, but unlike the other creations, we must learn what it means to be human and deliberately choose to live that way in order to live good lives. And because each of us is different, we must acquire enough self-knowledge to actualize our individual human potentialities, thereby making each of our lives worth living.

[1] Although the main ideas presented in this article can be found in Maimonides’s Guide for the Perplexed 3:13, I have incorporated insights and examples gleaned from various other texts and teachers.

[2] Some might object to this entire line of reasoning, saying: “The whole notion of ‘intrinsically good’ is a cop-out! You can’t just say that something is good for no purpose. If a thing is good, then it must be good for something – not in and of itself!” To this objection I would reply by pointing out that ALL value systems, Jewish and non-Jewish, religious and secular, right and wrong, must have at their foundation something which is regarded as an intrinsic good. The alternative is an infinite regression of desire: a series of means with no end. For example, if you ask the average person, “Why is it good to go to school?” they might say, “So I can get a job.” “Why is getting a job good?” “So I can make money.” “Why is money good?” “So I can buy things.” “Why is buying things good?” and so on, until eventually, you will reach something which is regarded as good in and of itself. In some societies, that intrinsic value might be pleasure. In others, it might be accomplishment. In others, it might be status. No one answers these “Why?” questions with infinite “so that”s all the way down; everyone’s answer will have a terminus, and that terminus will be conceived of as an intrinsic good. Mortimer J.Adler observed that one of the most common answers in our society is “happiness,” which is deemed to be intrinsically good. Adler supported this observation by pointing out that it is impossible to complete the sentence: “I want to be happy because _____.” To sum it up: this answer is not a cop-out because everyone will have something which occupies the slot of intrinsic value. According to Maimonides’s understanding of Judaism, that intrinsic value is “existence in line with the will and wisdom of the Creator.”

Afterword

After sending in my rough draft, I received an email from one of the editors (who is a rabbi) saying, “Thank you very much for this excellent article.” I asked a few questions about matters of style, which he answered. The only suggestion he had about the substance of the article was to omit the paragraph about the role of Torah, saying that “a separate piece on ‘What is Judaism?’ would do very well.” I made these cosmetic changes and then submitted my final draft. 

After not hearing back from either of my contacts for a week, I emailed them to ask whether there are other changes I should make. The editor who initially contacted me apologized for the delay (explaining that her response had been sitting in her draft folder), and then went on to say:

Even though we personally enjoyed it, our editor in chief flagged it and shared the piece with the Rosh HaYeshiva and they got back to us and said that they feel the article is "confusing and misleading." Unfortunately the whole approach doesn't work for them.  We do sincerely thank you for your time and effort and will of course be remunerating you for it.

I would have appreciated it if the editor in chief and/or the Rosh HaYeshiva had elaborated on what they meant by “confusing and misleading,” but I wouldn’t expect them to take the time to provide detailed feedback to a total stranger about a piece they decided not to use. Of course, this left me with two options: (1) to speculate about what they might have meant, and (2) to solicit feedback from other people.

My speculations are straightforward: I suspect they deemed the article “misleading” because they fundamentally disagree with what I wrote, and they called it “confusing” because since they couldn’t openly denounce the Rambam for his views, they instead placed the blame on my presentation of his views.

What, exactly, do I think they found so disagreeable? It could be any of several points: that the universe wasn’t created for man, that man doesn’t exist to serve God, that God doesn't need us for anything, that God did not create the universe in order to bestow His kindness to man, that the Torah is “merely” a means of making us good rather than the standard by which goodness is measured, that Olam ha’Ba isn’t mentioned anywhere in the article, that no distinction is made between Jews and non-Jews, that I say nothing about spirituality, etc.

But if I had to bet money on which sentence they found to be the most objectionable, it would be this: “Many of us were taught that each person was given a special mission to accomplish which is their purpose in life, but Maimonides doesn’t buy that.” Since I was writing for an audience of laypeople, I didn’t refer to this notion by its commonly used Hebrew term “tafkid” or by the related term “tikkun.” I cannot definitively say how, from where, or when this belief originated, but I do know that it was popularized by the Hasidic movement to the point where it can now be described as “mainstream.” For example, here’s an excerpt from the book “The Garden of Emunah” (2006) by Rabbi Shalom Arush, a Breslov Hasid, translated into English by Rabbi Lazer Brody:

Each of us comes to this earth for the express purpose of fulfilling a mission. Longevity depends on the task we have to complete. One’s death – even in a sudden tragedy or accident – is always the result of Hashem’s personal decision. Some live for twenty years and others for one hundred years, but we all eventually leave this earth at the precise moment that Hashem decides. A mind-boggling set of Divine considerations influences the circumstances of a person’s life and longevity – the person’s deeds, former lives, public edicts, and other criteria that defy our understanding.

Some souls come to this earth for a short and specific tikkun, and then return to the upper worlds. Such souls are usually remarkably special people, with little or no evil inclination, gentle, kind, and pleasant. Therefore, don’t be surprised when you hear of young upright people that die suddenly; they’ve simply completed their tikkun – their soul correction and mission on earth. (p.44)

As you can see from just this short excerpt – and certainly from the rest of the book – the notion of a Divinely ordained mission in life is inextricably bound up with many other fundamental doctrines: hashgachah pratis (individual Divine providence), sachar v’onesh (reward and punishment), tzadik v’ra lo (“Why do bad things happen to good people?”), bitachon (trust in God), and more. To question, challenge, or deny the notion of an individual purpose in life is to threaten these foundational beliefs. And that’s essentially what I did by presenting the Rambam’s view in the manner that I did.

Of course, I knew I was doing this when I wrote the article. I knew that their readership would be unlikely to hear this idea from anyone else, and I know how powerful this idea can be. In fact, the first time I heard this answer given in this exact way was at a Q&A with high school students held by my Rosh ha’Yeshiva. I still remember the feeling that reverberated through the room when he said, “life has no purpose,” and then went on to explain the ideas in this article. (You can listen to the recording by clicking here and skipping to 24 minutes; note that my Rosh ha’Yeshiva had laryngitis at the time.) I wanted to replicate that experience as much as I could in my article because I know that it will resonate with others the same way it resonated with me and with all the other students who were present at that Q&A.

This is also why I left the reader “an out” by underscoring that this is the view of Maimonides. I did not claim that this view is unanimous. I included the phrase “according to Maimonides” in the title. I repeatedly stressed throughout the article that this is all “according to Maimonides.” I did this so that if someone felt threatened, they could dismiss it by saying, “That’s just the Rambam's view.”

And this is why I think it is misleading to call my article “misleading.” It would be misleading if I misrepresented the Rambam’s view. To my knowledge, I didn’t do that. I could be wrong, though, which is why I’m sharing this article and the feedback publicly. If I’ve misunderstood the Rambam’s position, then I’d like to know how – especially on such a fundamental issue as the purpose of life. 

To reiterate: I can see how a person might consider this article “misleading” if they felt it would lead the reader astray from (what they maintain is) the truth. But “confusing”? I thought I did a decent job of presenting this idea clearly, which is another reason I’d like feedback. I would especially like to hear feedback from someone who says: “I completely understand what you are saying and you presented these ideas very clearly, but I think you are 100% incorrect.” At least that way I’ll know that the reader isn’t biased by their agreement with what they've read. 

And so, my readers and listeners, what do you think? Do you find this article to be confusing and/or misleading? If so, why? What other thoughts, questions, and critiques do you have? I'm all ears.

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