Parashas Balak: One Reason Why Women Should Learn Gemara

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Parashas Balak: One Reason Why Women Should Learn Gemara 

Two Like-minded Rebellions 

Zimri ben Salu, prince of the tribe of Shimon, staged a public rebellion against Moshe: 

Behold! A man from the house of Israel came and brought near a Midianite woman in the sight of Moshe and in the sight of the entire assembly of the Children of Israel, and they (i.e. Moshe and the Children of Israel) were crying at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. (Bamidbar 25:6) 

Rashi, citing a midrash in Sanhedrin 82a, fills in the details of Zimri’s public demonstration: 

[Zimi] seized [Cozbi, the Midianite woman] by her hair and brought her before Moshe. “Son of Amram,” he exclaimed, “is this woman forbidden or permitted? And if you say, ‘she is forbidden,’ then who permitted you [to marry] Yisro’s daughter [Tzipora]?” 

This isn’t the first time that a leader of Israel challenged Moshe by attempting to undermine his halachic authority. The most famous instance was the rebellion of Korach. The midrash Tanchuma fills in the details of Korach’s confrontation with Moshe: 

What did [Korach] do? He arose and gathered 250 heads of courts … and he dressed them in tallisos (prayer shawls) made entirely of techeiles (i.e. the blue threads which it is a mitzvah to incorporate into the tzitzis – white fringes – on every four-cornered garment). They came and stood before Moshe. They said to him, “A tallis made entirely of techeiles – is it obligated in tzitzis or exempt?” He said to them, “Obligated.” They began to laugh at him, [saying,] “Is it possible that [in the case of] a tallis is made entirely out of another [color of] material, a single thread of techeiles exempts it, [but] this [tallis] which is made entirely of techeiles will not exempt itself?” 

There are clear parallels between the rebellions of Zimri and Korach. Both were driven by personal motives: Zimri by his lust for non-Jewish women, and Korach by his jealousy over the leadership positions held by his cousins, Moshe and Aharon. Both Zimi and Korach staged public acts of defiance which aimed to discredit Moshe in the eyes of the assembly. Both sought to undermine Moshe’s authority by showing that halacha is ridiculous, and should therefore not be taken seriously. 

Anyone who has even a basic knowledge of halacha can see through the childish arguments made by Zimri and Korach. Why was Tziporah permitted to Moshe? Because they got married before Matan Torah (the Giving of the Torah), when there was no halacha prohibiting a Jew from marrying a non-Jew! In fact, before Matan Torah, there were no “Jews” in a technical sense. Both Moshe and Tziporah were halachically non-Jewish, and both became Jews at the same time as the rest of the Children of Israel, after the Torah was given and the covenant was made. Why does a tallis made entirely of techeiles still require a thread of techeiles? Because the halacha states that every four-cornered garment, no matter what color, is obligated in tzitzis and techeiles! Although Korach might be able to argue that there is no philosophical purpose to the thread of techeiles on a tallis made entirely of techeiles, this would have no bearing on the halachic requirements of the mitzvah, since we never make halachic rulings on the basis of philosophical considerations. 

Rationalization of “Going Off the Derech” (i.e. Becoming Irreligious) 

Every year, usually at springtime, I am asked to give a presentation to the 12th graders about how to retain and continue to develop their Orthodox Jewish identity after graduation, when they venture out into the secular world as young adults. One of the main points I make and stress is that the human being cannot tolerate cognitive dissonance for an extended period of time. If there is a contradiction between one’s beliefs, ideas, and values on the one hand, and one’s desires, actions, and habits on the other, the latter will tend to prevail. The most common means by which this will occur is theological rationalization. 

In other words, a person will not, in the long-run, be able to say, “I believe that the Torah is true and halacha is binding, but I don’t keep such-and-such halacha because I can’t help myself.” The cognitive dissonance and negative self-image will be too much for the psyche to bear for any prolonged period of time. Instead, she will rationalize her violation of halacha, coming up with spurious reasons as to why the halacha doesn’t make sense, or why it shouldn’t apply in her situation, or – in the most severe cases – why halacha as a whole is irrational. The individual will convince herself that her abandonment of halacha stems from her arguments, but in reality, the reverse is true: first she made the decision to abandon halacha, and only afterwards did she come up with arguments to retroactively justify her behavior. 

My decade of experience as a high school teacher, combined with my exposure to hundreds of “off-the-derech Jews” on the internet and social media platforms, have shown me countless examples of how flimsy these types of theological rationalizations tend to be. Every day online I encounter lapsed Jews making laughably fallacious and counterfactual lines of reasoning in support of their irreligious life choices. They think that their Clever, Enlightened, Superior minds have discovered a Truth which their religious brethren are too Dull-witted or Brainwashed to have spotted. They do not realize how ignorant, simplistic, and baseless their arguments are. 

[To be clear: I am not saying that anyone who goes off the derech is ipso facto a self-deceiving ignoramus whose arguments are all straw-men. I have encountered many Jews who do have knowledge of Judaism but have rejected it because of powerful questions and substantial philosophical arguments to which they could not find satisfactory answers. It just so happens that such individuals are rare, and tend not to be as vocal and militantly anti-religious on the internet. I also know Jews who went off the derech for personal reasons (e.g. tragedy, abuse, familial or martial relationship problems, etc.), and while these Jews may also engage in anti-religious rhetoric without substance, their situation ought to be viewed differently.] 

Rav Soloveitchik on Women Learning Gemara 

I will preface this next section with a disclaimer. The topic of whether women may or should learn Torah she’baal Peh (the Oral Torah) and Gemara (Talmud) is vast, nuanced, and fraught with difficulty. We will not even attempt to present an in-depth analysis or comprehensive overview of the topic in this article. Instead, the scope of this topic will be limited to a single statement of a single rabbinic authority: that of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik (a.k.a. “The Rav”). 

On May 27, 1953, the Rav wrote a letter to Rabbi Leonard Rosenfeld on the topic of teaching Torah she’baal Peh to girls in a coeducational Jewish day school. Here is the letter in its entirety; the underlined portions do not appear in the original, and were added by me for emphasis: 

Dear Rabbi Rosenfeld,

Please accept my apologies for not answering your letters sooner. The delay was due to my overcrowded schedule. As to your question with regard to a curriculum in a coeducational school, I expressed my opinion to you long ago that it would be a very regrettable oversight on our part if we were to arrange separate Hebrew courses for girls. Not only is the teaching of Torah she’baal Peh to girls permissible, but it is nowadays an absolute imperative. This policy of discrimination between the sexes as to subject manner and method of instruction which is still advocated by certain groups within our Orthodox community has contributed greatly to the deterioration and downfall of traditional Judaism. Boys and girls alike should be introduced into the inner halls of Torah she’baal Peh.

I hope to prepare in the near future a halakhic brief on the problem which will exhaust the various aspects of the same. In the meantime I heartily endorse a uniform program for the entire student body.

With kindest personal regards, I remain
Sincerely yours,
Joseph Soloveitchik 

The Rav is unequivocal in his endorsement of women learning Torah she’baal Peh in exactly the same manner as men. Practically speaking, this means that girls should study Gemara and be trained in the rigors of Talmudic analysis to the same extent and following the same methods and curriculum as boys. Although the Rav was addressing a coed school, there is no reason to believe that he would hold differently about an all-girls school or seminary. 

The only part of the Rav’s letter which is unclear is his statement that “This policy of discrimination between the sexes as to subject manner and method of instruction … has contributed greatly to the deterioration and downfall of traditional Judaism.” The question is: How so? How does teaching women Torah she’baal Peh and Talmud prevent this deterioration? 

Halachic Thinking and Assimilation 

I don’t know how the Rav would answer this question, but I do have my own answer. The failure to train Jewish girls and women in the highest levels of Torah she’baal Peh and Talmud renders them susceptible to the specious arguments used to denigrate and delegitimize halacha. 

A well-trained yeshiva bochur (a young man engaged in post-high school Torah study in a rabbinic seminary) should be able to spot the flaws in anti-halachic sophistry with relative ease, due to the depth and breadth of his halachic knowledge, as well as the critical thinking skills he has acquired from his Talmudic training. But what about bas Yisrael (Jewish woman) who is only familiar with halacha on a simple level? How would she respond to an accusation of halachic hypocrisy, like Zimri’s, or a pseudo-halachic polemical protest, like Korach’s? Ask her a question about a detail of halachic practice and she may know the answer, but present a critique of Torah as a system which is rhetorically engineered to make halacha seem foolish, outdated, or unreasonable, and what is she supposed to do? How can we expect her to know what to say or think in response? 

This, I believe, is why neglecting to teach young women Torah she’baal Peh and Talmud “contributes greatly to the deterioration and downfall of traditional Judaism.” Women who do not have a firm grasp of the inner-workings of halacha and the nature of halachic thinking are particularly vulnerable to the false claims about halacha and false critiques of its validity. 

If this was true in the 1950’s when the Rav penned his letter to Rabbi Rosenfeld, then it is even truer in today’s world. Almost every Modern Orthodox girl has unfettered access (via the internet and social media) to all of the anti-halacha arguments under the sun. Teenagers and young adults are already at an age that is prone to rebellion and experimentation. Combine this with the dwindling numbers of religious people in general, and the increase in anti-religious sentiment on college campuses – both of which will make her a minority amid a hostile majority – and how can we expect her religiosity to survive intact through the crucible of her college years? Even if she remains religious, her internal conviction in Judaism will undoubtedly suffer due to the questions and doubts that have been raised and gone unanswered. 

This is one of the main reasons why I believe that girls should learn Gemara just like boys. This is also one of the long-term objectives in my own introductory Gemara course. Many of the girls in my class have never learned Gemara before, so the responsibility lies with me to give them a strong foundation. I don’t particularly care whether my female students retain knowledge of the details of what we learn. If they graduate from high school with enough Talmudic experience to appreciate halacha as a system, to be able to differentiate between the taamei ha’mitzvos (philosophical reasons for the commandments) and the technical halacha itself, and to have begun to realize that halacha operates based on its own internal principles and halachic reasoning rather than common sense, then I have done my job. 

And if I have done my job successfully, then perhaps I will have helped stem the tide of assimilation, thereby giving the next generation of Orthodox Jews a better chance to survive and thrive in Torah.

Parashas Korach: Three Types of Machlokes

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Parashas Korach: Three Types of Machlokes

If I told you that there are three types of machlokes (disagreement) - one good, one less-than-ideal, and one REALLY bad - and I asked you which category Korach's machlokes fell into, which category would you guess that would be? I imagine you'd intuitively select "really bad," judging by what happened to Korach and his followers.

According to R' Yehoshua ibn Shbuib [1], this is not the case. Korach's machlokes certainly wasn't good, but it wasn't entirely bad either. 

The Ibn Shuib begins by citing the mishnah in Avos 5:17:

Any machlokes which is not l'shem shamayim (for the sake of heaven) will ultimately not persist, and [any machlokes] which is l'shem shamayim will ultimately persist. Which is [an example of] a machlokes l'shem shamayim? This is the machlokes of Hillel and Shammai. [And which is an example of a machlokes] which is not l'shem shamayim? This is the machlokes of Korach and all of his assembly.

The Ibn Shuib then provides a summary of why Korach's machlokes fits into the second category:

The Tanna called the machlokes of Korach "she'lo l'shem shamayim" to teach us that they didn't present themselves as though they were vying for the positions [of Moshe and Aharon] and challenging their appointments, but rather [they presented themselves] as though they desired to serve Hashem like them; [in reality] they were only trying to make themselves great, which is why it is called "she'lo l'shem shamayim."

Next, he sets forth the three types of machlokes and offers an unconventional explanation of why Korach's machlokes falls into the second category, rather than the third:

There are three types of machlokes. The first is a machlokes l'shem shamayim - those who disagree like Abayye and Rava, or Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and others. Their goal wasn't to elevate their status, but only to derive the true halacha and to arrive at the root of the mitzvah or the law - not to be victorious. And when they saw the words of the wise, they would admit to the truth, as it frequently says: "Beis Hillel retracted and conceded to Beis Shammai," "Rebbi Yochanan withdrew [his original statement]," "Rava retracted from it," and he said, "The things I said before you were an error on my part." And they commanded their students at the end of their days to retract and concede to those who disagreed with them, as we find in [the Gemara] Niddah [2] in the case of the machlokes between Rav and Shmuel with Shila bar Avina - and many [other instances] in the Talmud. 

The second type is a machlokes of false pretenses, [3] like the machlokes of Korach, who misled those in his generation by making it seem as though he was being zealous on behalf of the firstborns and on behalf of the entire assembly because "all of them are holy, and Hashem is among them" (Bamidbar 16:3), and [claiming that] Moshe and Aharon and the others were taking the [appointments of divine] service for themselves and that everyone else should be excluded; [Korach presented his argument in this manner] until [the other members of his assembly] were tricked to follow after him. 

The third type is a machlokes of dominance between people who instigate a dispute and battle for power in trivial matters which have no tzorech mitzvah (mitzvah-function). To the contrary, [these disputes] contain iniquity and transgression, and their intention is to defeat their opponents. This is the last type of machlokes which is not mentioned by the Tanna [of our mishnah in Avos], because it isn't worthy of being mentioned. It is [the type of machlokes] found among other types of animals - domesticated animals, wild beasts, and birds.  

But [the Tanna] did mention the machlokes of Korach because it contained a tzorech mitzvah, since they wanted to serve Hashem - although it wasn't l'shem shamayim like the chachamim who argue in matters of Torah, [whereas Korach and his followers] argued in order to prevail over their fellows and to make a name [for themselves] - and this is somewhat considered to be a mitzvah she'lo lishmah (a mitzvah that is not done for its own sake).  

Thus, machlokes can be divided into three [categories], just like other phenomena which have two divisions [corresponding to] two extremes. The machlokes of Hillel and Shammai and the others is at the extreme side of the good, and the machlokes of dominance is at the extreme side of the bad if it is not for a tzorech mitzvah, and in the middle is the machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim. The Tanna took the second machlokes (i.e. Korach's machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim) and left out the third (i.e. the machlokes of dominance),which contains no good or constructive purpose, but only iniquity, transgression, and great harm. 

I was astonished and intrigued by the Ibn Shuib's classification of Korach's machlokes in the "less-than-ideal" middle category, rather than the "absolutely evil" extreme category. I guess I was so accustomed to thinking of Korach as "the villain" that I automatically assumed the worst. I guess this just goes to show how important it is to evaluate a person's actions on their own terms, without letting one's judgment be clouded by preconceived notions.

The second thing I found interesting about this is that the Ibn Shuib regards Korach's campaign as "somewhat considered to be a mitzvah she'lo lishmah." I've periodically looked into the topic of "the limits of she'lo lishmah." How far afield can mitzvah-motives go and still be considered to be an "acceptable" level of she'lo lishmah? At what point do ulterior motives outweigh the goodness of the mitzvah itself? According to the Ibn Shuib it would seem that a machlokes can have tremendously destructive ulterior motives, but the very fact that these motives are in service of some tzorech mitzvah means that such a machlokes would fall within the "middle" category of she'lo l'shem shamayim, and not the "extremely bad" category of "an animalistic battle for dominance." 

The third thing I gained from this is a shift in my view of "politics" within Jewish communities. As we are all aware, machlokes is far too pervasive within the Jewish world, from shul politics, to conflicts between different factions of Jewry, to infighting that stems from the stances that Jews take in American or Israeli politics. Before encountering this Ibn Shuib I automatically divided all of these instances of machlokes into only two categories: noble l'shem shamayim disagreements and animalistic ego-battles. To my mind, the baal ha'bayis (layman) quarreling argumentatively with the shul president was no different than two drunk guys at a bar getting into a fight to prove who is more macho. As long as the motives were not l'shem shamayim, what difference would it make what they're arguing about? 

But according to the Ibn Shuib, there is a key question that must be asked about any machlokes which is not l'shem shamayim: Does this involve some tzorech mitzvah? If it does, then that alone is a positive quality which is significant enough to define the nature of the machlokes. Such an argument may be fueled by egos, and may even lead to great harm and destruction, but to characterize it as purely animalistic would be incorrect. That designation should be reserved for personal quarrels which have no tzorech mitzvah, like the incident of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza.

And lest you say about one of the parties in a machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim, "But how can you say that there is any redeeming quality in this machlokes? This person/group/institution is trying to undermine the very foundations of Judaism!" the Ibn Shuib would say: "Yep - just like Korach. And just as Korach's machlokes wasn't purely evil, since it involved a tzorech mitzvah, you shouldn't be so quick to condemn the machlokes of which you speak as purely evil as long as it involves a tzorech mitzvah as well." 

This just goes to show the importance of a mitzvah she'lo lishmah within the Torah system. Even though Korach was undoubtedly mistaken and wrong in his actions, beliefs, and motives, and even though Moshe's authority was threatened to the point where Hashem had to intervene with a miracle to put a stop to Korach's coup, nevertheless, his machlokes still contained a modicum of good. 

The implications of the Ibn Shuib's position deserve further thought, but that's all I have to say for now. So next time you see Jews fighting about something, remember that even if they are comparable to Korach, that doesn't mean that there are no redeeming qualities to their machlokes. 

[1] Rabbeinu Yehoshua ibn Shuib, Drashos Ibn Shuib: Parashas Korach; in case you haven't heard of the Ibn Shuib, he was a student of the Rashba and a colleague of the Ritva

[2] Talmud Bavli: Niddah 36b

[3] The Ibn Shuib uses the phrase "מחלוקת ההטעאה" which literally translates it as a "a disagreement of misleading [others]." I translated it as "a machlokes of false pretenses," since I thought this sounded less awkward and conveyed the meaning that the Ibn Shuib goes on to discuss.

Parashas Korach: What Happened to Korach?

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Parashas Korach: What Happened to Korach?

Introduction

“What happened to Korach?” It’s a simple question, and one might would assume it has a simple answer. I’d wager that if you took a poll, most Jews would respond: “Hashem made a miracle, causing the earth to swallow Korach and his followers alive.” That’s what I thought until I actually looked into the issue and realized that the answer isn’t so simple. 

Review of the Facts

First, let’s review the sequence of events. As you read this summary, be on the lookout for an answer to our question: 

Korach, Dasan and Aviram, Ohn ben Peles, and 250 leaders stand up in opposition to Moshe Rabbeinu and Aharon, saying, “It is too much for you, for the entire assembly – all of them are holy. Why do you exalt yourselves over the congregation of Hashem?” (Bamidbar 16:3). [Note: Many meforshim say that these 250 leaders were firstborns who were bitter about the fact that their role of serving in the Mikdash was taken away and given to the Leviim and Kohanim; that’s why they joined Korach in his attempt to “take back” the kehunah (priesthood) from the Kohanim.]

Moshe responds, “Tomorrow Hashem will make known who is His own and the holy one, and He will him draw close, and whomever He will choose, He will draw close to Himself” (ibid. 16:5). Moshe instructs these men to take fire-pans and bring ketores (incense) before Hashem, Who will make known His choice through His acceptance or rejection of the ketores. 

Moshe rebukes Korach. He calls him out on his populist campaign and exposes his true motive: the desire to seize the kehunah gedolah (high priesthood) from Aharon, which Korach felt was his birthright. 

Moshe attempts to reason with Dasan and Aviram; they spurn him, insult him, challenge his authority, and accuse him of despotism. Moshe is angry, and turns to Hashem. 

The next day, Korach and his 250 followers congregate in front of the Ohel Moed (Tent of Meeting); Korach assembles the rest of Bnei Yisrael to witness what will happen, with Dasan and Aviram and their followers standing nearby. 

Hashem declares His intent to destroy ALL of Klal Yisrael. Moshe intercedes on their behalf. Hashem responds by telling Moshe to urge Bnei Yisrael to distance themselves from around the tents of Korach, Dasan, and Aviram, and not touch anything of theirs, “lest they perish because of all their sins” (ibid. 16:26). 

Moshe announces that a test will be done to establish “that Hashem sent me to perform all these acts, that it was not from my heart.” If these men die a normal death, then Moshe’s status as shliach (messenger) of Hashem is a sham – but if Hashem miraculously causes the earth to swallow up these men and their possessions, “then it will be known that these men provoked Hashem” (ibid. 16:30). 

Immediately, “the earth opened its mouth and swallowed them and their households, and all the people who were with Korach, and the entire wealth; they and all that was theirs descended alive to the pit; the earth covered them over and they were lost from the congregation” (ibid. 16:32-33). 

Bnei Yisrael flee, fearing that the earth will swallow them as well. 

The chapter ends with the fate of Korach’s group: “A flame came forth from Hashem and consumed the 250 men who were offering the incense” (ibid. 16:35).

Ambiguity in the Torah she'bi'Chsav’s Account

Notice anything? The pesukim never explicitly say what happened to Korach. In fact, there is a great deal of textual ambiguity. On the one hand, the pesukim imply that Korach was among “those wicked men” (ibid. 16:26) who were swallowed up with Dasan and Aviram. If Korach’s followers, household, and wealth were swallowed, it is certainly reasonable to assume that Korach himself was swallowed. On the other hand, the pesukim state that Korach was trying to prove that he deserved to be the kohen gadol, and Moshe’s whole test of offering the ketores was seemingly designed around Korach’s challenge. On that basis, it would be reasonable to assume that Korach was among the 250 men who offered the ketores and he was burned in the fire, like they were.

The three other accounts of the Korach Rebellion in Tanach only add layers to this ambiguity. Later on in Sefer Bamidbar (Parashas Pinchas) the Torah states: 

Dasan and Aviram [were the ones] who were summoned by the assembly, who contended against Moshe and Aharon among the assembly of Korach, when they contended against Hashem. Then the earth opened its mouth and swallowed them and Korach with the death of the assembly, when the fire consumed the 250 men – and they became a sign. But the sons of Korach did not die (Bamidbar 26:9-11).

It seems clear from here that Korach did get swallowed up along with Dasan and Aviram, and was not burned in the fire with the 250 men. Yet, in Sefer Devarim, when Moshe lists the miraculous events that occurred in Yetzias Mitzrayim (the Exodus from Egypt) and in the Midbar (Wilderness), he says: 

[Remember] what He did to Dasan and Aviram, the sons of Eliav ben Reuven, when the earth opened its mouth wide and swallowed them, and their households, and their tents, and all the fortunes at their feet, in the midst of all Israel (Devarim 11:6).

No mention of Korach whatsoever. Similarly, when David ha’Melech is going over the miraculous events of Yetzias Mitzrayim and the Midbar in Sefer Tehilim, he writes:

They were jealous of Moshe in the camp, and of Aharon, Hashem’s holy one. The earth opened and swallowed Dasan, and covered over the company of Aviram. And a fire burned amid their company, a flame set the wicked ablaze (Tehilim 106:15-17).

Again, there is no mention of Korach being swallowed up in the earth – or being burned in the fire, for that matter. Only Dasan and Aviram are identified as being swallowed up, and the pasuk doesn’t specify which “wicked” people were burned. 

Chazal’s Answer

As we might expect, Chazal noted these difficulties and offered two possible answers to our question – neither of which is what we would expect. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 10a states:

… Rebbi Yochanan said: Korach was not among those who were swallowed [by the earth] NOR was he among those who were burned. He wasn’t among those who were swallowed, as it is written: “All of the people who belonged to Korach” – [which implies them] but not Korach. He wasn’t among those who were burned, as it was written: “when the fire consumed the 250 men” – [which implies that the fire consumed them] but not Korach. 

It was taught in a Braisa: Korach was among those who were burned AND he was among those who were swallowed. He was among those who were swallowed, as it is written: “and the earth swallowed them and Korach.” He was among those who were burned, as it is written: “a fire went forth from before Hashem and consumed the 250 men” – and Korach was with them [since he, too, was vying for the kehunah].

Neither R’ Yochanan nor the author of the Braisa maintain that Korach was only swallowed up or only burned. Either he was swallowed AND burned, or he was neither. 

A couple of factual loose ends remain. According to R’ Yochanan, how did Korach die? Rashi [1] explains:

he was not among those who were swallowed nor was he among those who were burned – rather, he died in the plague. 

According to Rashi, R’ Yochanan holds that Korach died in the plague described in the next chapter, in which 14,000 of Bnei Yisrael died as a punishment for complaining against Moshe and Aharon and accusing them of killing the 250 leaders who offered the incense. 

And according to the Braisa, how is it possible that Korach was burned to death AND swallowed alive? Rashi explains:

He was among those who were burned and he was among those who were swallowed – his soul was burned (i.e. the fire killed him) but his body was still intact, and afterwards [his body] rolled to the place of those who were swallowed, and it was swallowed, as it is written in Parashas Pinchas: “and it swallowed them, and Korach with them” … and Korach was with them. [the Braisa cites a proof] from that which was written: “and it consumed the 250 men who offered the incense” – and Korach was among those who offered the incense, as it is written: “250 fire-pans – and you, and Aharon, each man with his fire-pan.”

The Significance of this Machlokes

The very existence of this machlokes, combined with the fact that both views are defensible from a textual standpoint, indicates that nobody actually knows for sure what happened to Korach. Each of the sides is speculating and citing textual evidence for support. 

The question for us is: What is this machlokes really about? What is the crux of the machlokes? Surely R’ Yochanan and the author of the Braisa would concede that the text is ambiguous. That being said, what non-textual argument would each side bring to support his view? 

[Methodological reminder: this is a midrash we're dealing with here, and the purpose of midrashim is to teach ideas - not history. That's why we're interested in what we learn from this midrash rather than what actually happened.]

Maharal’s Explanation of the Braisa

The Maharal [2] provides a solid explanation of the Braisa:

It is important for you to know that Dasan and Aviram, who quarreled with Moshe, did not seek the kehunah at all; they were just sinful and evil men who wanted to quarrel with Moshe. 

However, the 250 men did seek the kehunah, as is clear from the pasuk: “the 250 men who offered incense.” Therefore, Dasan and Aviram were swallowed … but the 250 men were not swallowed, but burned … for this is what is befitting for someone who seeks [a position of] greatness and distinction which is not appropriate for him. Their intent was not for the sake of opposing [Moshe’s authority], but because they wanted the prominence and distinction of the kehunah. All of this is evident from the pesukim, and there is no need to go on at length about it. 

Korach was the cause of the quarrel [with Moshe] and he was the cause of the 250 men wanting the kehunah … in the Braisa it was taught that both [punishments befell] him, since both sins were found in him.

This explanation is quite intuitive. There were really two chataim (sins) here: quarreling with Moshe, and seeking the kehunah. Those who sinned by starting up with Moshe (i.e. Dasan and Aviram) were punished by being swallowed by the earth; those who sinned by illicitly offering the ketores because they wanted the kehunah (i.e. the 250 men) were punished by being burned; and since Korach led both groups, and partook of both chataim, he received both punishments. 

Maharal’s Explanation of R’ Yochanan

This leaves us with R’ Yochanan. Why, according to R’ Yochanan, should Korach have suffered neither punishment, and instead, died in the subsequent plague, along with the 14,000 other members of Bnei Yisrael who didn’t have an active role in either of the two groups of sinners? 

The Maharal offers an answer along the lines of his explanation of the Braisa:

If Korach had been swallowed, he wouldn’t have received the punishment that was befitting of the 250 men who sought the kehunah – and if he had been burned, he wouldn’t have received the punishment that was befitting for him because of his quarrel, for he did join with Dasan and Aviram. Therefore [R’ Yochanan] said that he wasn’t among those who were swallowed nor was he among those who were burned; instead, death [simply] came to him, and by dying a regular death, it was equal to both [of the other punishments].

According to the Maharal, since Korach was in an awkward position of deserving both punishments, he simply died, so as not to detract from either of the two punishments by subjecting him to the other one. 

Moreover, it would seem that unlike Rashi, who holds that Korach died in the plague sent by Hashem to kill Bnei Yisrael, the Maharal holds that he died a regular “natural” death. 

Difficulties with the Maharal’s Answer

In my humble opinion, this answer is difficult, and feels a bit forced – especially in light of the Braisa’s intuitive account. The punishment received by each group was midah kneged midah (measure for measure). The 250 men who brought a “strange fire” were burned in a fire sent by Hashem, “a God Who is like a consuming fire” (Devarim 4:42). According to the Abravanel [3], Dasan and Aviram’s punishment was midah kneged midah because “just as they opened their mouths without restraint to damage Moshe Rabbeinu’s authority and lower his status in the eyes of the nation, Hashem caused the earth to open its mouth and cause them to descend to the utmost depths.” 

Considering the educational midah kneged midah nature of these punishments, it doesn’t seem satisfying to say, “Korach deserved both punishments, but since he couldn’t get both, he just died a regular death.” 

Furthermore, the author of the Braisa would object to the premise of R’ Yochanan’s position, saying: “What do you mean ‘he couldn’t get both punishments’? Hashem burned his soul and then caused his body to be swallowed by the earth. What’s so difficult about that?”

Chasam Sofer’s Explanation of R’ Yochanan

The Chasam Sofer [4] offers a different explanation for R’ Yochanan, which hinges on an often overlooked aspect of Korach’s punishment that we glossed over in the pesukim:

… the earth opened its mouth and swallowed them and their households, and all the people who were with Korach, and the entire wealth; they and all that was theirs descended alive to the pit; the earth covered them over and they were lost from the congregation.

The Chasam Sofer writes:

Korach was one of the wealthiest people; everyone honored him, and the 250 princes of Israel followed after his counsel. But now, in a single moment, he found himself standing naked as the day he was born, deprived of all his tremendous wealth without a single thing remaining, for everything – even a sewing-needle – was swallowed in the earth, and all of his relatives and friends were either swallowed or burned; even his sons did teshuvah and distanced themselves from him. There is no greater degradation than this. Its taste is far more bitter than death, and worse than being swallowed or burned. 

According to the Chasam Sofer, Korach’s punishment was midah kneged midah. He sinned by staging a coup to seize the kehunah gedolah for the sake of personal glory, and he was punished by having every last vestige of personal glory taken away from him. This, to my mind, is a more satisfying explanation of R’ Yochanan’s view. 

The Crux of the Machlokes

In light of the Chasam Sofer’s explanation, it turns out that the machlokes is really more unified than it initially seemed. Both the Braisa and R’ Yochanan agree (a) that there were two groups of sinners, (b) that each group’s punishment was midah kneged midah, (c) that Korach was leading cause of both chataim, and (d) that Korach’s punishment was also midah kneged midah. 

The machlokes between the Braisa and R’ Yochanan centers on the question: As the cause of both chataim, what form would Korach’s midah kneged midah punishment take? 

According to the Braisa, Korach simply received both midah kneged midah punishments. In contrast, R’ Yochanan maintained that the combination of these two midah kneged midah punishments would result in some deficiency – either because the message would be diluted, as the Maharal implied with his explanation, or because Korach’s sin as the leader was more severe than that of his followers, or because there was some superadded element within Korach’s sin which was not present in either of the two groups of his followers. Either way, Korach’s midah kneged midah punishment took on a form specific to him – one which singled him out from both groups, removed him from the community at large, and most importantly, stripped him of all the glory and power he so desperately sought, leaving him with absolutely nothing – “a fate worse than death” for a man of Korach’s ambitions.

Conclusion

That’s all I’ve got at this point. Perhaps someone can sharpen the definition of the machlokes. 

Either way, I think this is a great example of how we shouldn’t rely on our “elementary school level” recollection of the classic episodes in Torah, but should always read the text with fresh eyes and a fresh mind – and when we find “new” problems, we should search for answers and insights from the baalei Mesorah who preceded us and blazed these trails of understanding.

[1] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sanhedrin 110a

[2] Rav Judah Loew ben Bezalel, Chidushei Agados l’Maharal on Sanhedrin 110a

[3] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Bamidbar 16:30

[4] Rav Moshe Schreiber, Toras Moshe: Parashas Korach, cited in Daf al Daf to Sanhedrin 110a

Parashas Korach: Lessons in Hashgachah

Originally published in June, 2012. God willing, there will be a new dvar Torah for Parashas Korach on Friday.

Artwork: Yawning Vissure, by Veronique Meignaud

Parashas Korach: Lessons in Hashgachah

Preface

Many of my students seem to feel that they more or less know the particulars of how Hashem is involved in the lives of individuals. They feel comfortable making statements about how Hashem operates in their own lives, and in the lives of those who are close to them. I attribute this to the popular view of hashgachah pratis (individual providence), and I do my best to present to my "the classical view" of hashgachah pratis, as taught by the Rishonim.

Oftentimes, this provokes the opposite reaction. Students feel that they can't know anything about how Hashem operates. They feel completely in the dark about hashgachah pratis and conclude that they will never be able to understand anything about how Hashem relates to them. Consequently, they either feel that hashgachah pratis is not real, or that it is out of reach, or that it is arbitrary - for, in the darkness of ignorance, unknown lawfulness and pure arbitrariness are often indistinguishable. This reaction is also not good. 

I see only one solution to this problem: to show my students that we can gain some understanding (however minute) of hashgachah pratis by learning from the occurrences of hashgachah throughout Tanach. This is easier said than done, but I can testify that the more I learn about hashgachah, the more real it is to me.

In this post I hope to provide an example of that. Even if you disagree with what I write, I hope this post can provide an illustration of the derech of learning about hashgachah pratis from the dvar Hashem.

The Facts

In the midst of the Torah's account of the Korach rebellion we are confronted with a short but troubling exchange between Hashem and Moshe Rabbeinu:

Hashem spoke to Moshe and Aharon, saying, "Separate yourselves from amid this assembly (i.e. Bnei Yisrael), and I shall destroy them in an instant!" They fell on their faces and said, "O God, God of the spirits of all flesh, shall one man sin, and You be angry with the entire assembly?" (Bamidbar 16:20-22).

Apparently, their tefilah (prayer) did the trick. Immediately thereafter ...

Hashem spoke to Moshe saying, "Speak to the assembly, saying, 'Get yourselves up from all around the dwelling places of Korach, Dasan, and Aviram.'" So Moshe stood up and went to Dasan and Aviram, and the elders of Israel followed him. He spoke to the assembly, saying, "Turn away now from near the tents of these wicked men, and do not touch anything of theirs, lest you perish because of all their sins." So they got themselves up from near the dwelling of Korach, Dasan, and Aviram, from all around. Dasan and Aviram went out brazenly at the entrance of their tents, with their wives, children, and infants (ibid. 23-27).

We know what happens next. Moshe Rabbeinu announces that if Hashem creates a miraculous phenomenon, causing the earth to swallow up the evildoers, then it will be manifestly clear to everyone that"these men provoked Hashem," and that Moshe Rabbeinu is truly Hashem's emissary. Sure enough ...

When he finished speaking all these words, the ground that was under them split open. The earth opened its mouth and swallowed them and their households, and all the people who were with Korach, and the entire wealth. They and all that was theirs descended alive to the pit; the earth covered them over and they were lost from among the congregation (ibid. 31-33).

Korach and his followers are punished, Moshe Rabbeinu's authority is reinstated, and Bnei Yisrael are safe (for now, at least).

The Questions

The story of Korach’s rise and fall is so enthralling; it's easy to gloss over the fact that Hashem would have destroyed the entire Jewish nation were it not for Moshe’s tefilah! Not only does Hashem’s initial decree seem unjust, but as soon as Moshe points out the injustice, Hashem relents and changes His plans. 

In order to understand this sequence of events, we will ask and attempt to answer four questions:

1. What was the basis of Hashem's initial decree? Hashem is the Melech ha'Mishpat (King of Justice), and we maintain that kol derachav mishpat (all of His ways are just). What insight into mishpat Hashem are we lacking which would explain how it is in line with justice to wipe out an entire nation on account of a few evildoers?
   
2. How, exactly, did Moshe Rabbeinu's tefilah address Hashem's position? Moshe Rabbeinu's tefilah intuitively makes sense to us. However, this intuitive understanding must - of necessity - be incomplete. If we do not understand the basis of Hashem's decree, then we cannot possibly understand Moshe Rabbeinu's tefilah, since his tefilah was formulated specifically as a response to that decree.
   
3. What is the meaning of, "God of the spirits of all flesh" and why did Moshe choose to address Hashem in this manner? This is a very unusual way to address Hashem. What do these terms mean, and why does Moshe Rabbeinu choose to utilize this appellation in his tefilah?
   
4. What do we learn from this? Here we have an instance of mishpat Hashem, a tefilah of Moshe Rabbeinu, and a miraculous onesh (punishment). All of this provides us with a valuable opportunity to increase our knowledge of Hashem. What general principles can we derive from this incident? Moreover, what practical insights can we gain from this new understanding? How does this knowledge affect the way we live, or the way we view ourselves? 

Thankfully, Ralbag provides us with an enlightening interpretation of these pesukim which, if understood correctly, unlocks the answers to all of our questions.

Step #1: The Law of Collective Hashgachah

Ralbag begins by explaining the basis of Hashem's initial decree. Hashgachah pratis (individual providence), like hashgachah klalis (laws of nature), operates in accordance with a lawful system. The laws of nature are not arbitrary or capricious, and neither are the laws of hashgachah pratis. Even when Hashem intervenes in human affairs with a miracle, His intervention is governed by systematic principles - exactly like the laws of thermodynamics and the laws of motion. In other words, hashgachah pratis is not an exception to lawfulness, but an expression of lawfulness.

Ralbag explains one of these laws of hashgachah pratis as follows: if a unified group of people (e.g. a nation, a city, an army) merits a certain level of hashgachah pratis, then that hashgachah will relate to the entire group as a single entity. Consequently, if even one member of that group sins, then the entire group will lose its hashgachah pratis and will either be subject to hashgachic onesh (Divine punishment) or abandoned to the laws of nature, depending on the circumstances and the individuals involved. For the sake of brevity, we will refer to this phenomenon as "The Law of Collective Hashgachah."

To illustrate this concept, Ralbag uses the following mashal: a unified group of people can be compared to a single body, and a chotei (sinner) within that group can be compared to a diseased organ. That diseased organ will impair the function of the entire body, simply by virtue of the fact that they are all part of the same entity. So too, the cheit (sin) of a single individual is likened to an infection within the collective body of the group, and the hashgachah over the entire group will be affected by that one cheit.

Ralbag cites an example from Sefer Yehoshua. Yehoshua led an army of Bnei Yisrael to invade and conquer the city of Ai. Bnei Yisrael's army consisted of several thousand men. Much to Yehoshua's surprise, these thousands of men fled from before the inhabitants of Ai, who pursued them and began killing them off. That night, Yehoshua - perplexed at the apparent lack of hashgachic protection - entreated Hashem, saying: "Alas, Hashem-Elokim, why have You brought this entire people over the Yarden to deliver us into the hands of the Emori, to destroy us! Would that we had been content and dwelt beyond the Yarden!" (Yehoshua 7:7). Hashem responded:

Israel has sinned; they have also violated My covenant that I commanded them; they have also taken from the consecrated property; they have also stolen; they have also denied; they have also placed it in their vessels. The Children of Israel will not be able to stand before their enemies; they will turn the back of their necks to their enemies because they have become worthy of destruction. I will not continue to be with you if you do not destroy the transgressor from your midst (ibid. 7:11-12).

Hashem condemned Israel as a group, but concluded by acknowledging that there is only one transgressor who has made them all worthy of destruction. In strict accordance with the "Law of Collective Hashgachah," the entire army lost its hashgachic protection on account of the cheit of a single man. So too, at the incident of Korach, the entire congregation of Klal Yisrael became liable for destruction on account of Korach and his small group of followers.

This is the first step in answering our first question and understanding the basis of Hashem's decree. Although we haven't yet understood how the Law of Collective Hashgachah is in line with justice, we at least know that such a law exists. We have answered the "What?" question ("What was the basis of Hashem's decree?") but we still need to answer the "Why?" question ("Why does Hashem's hashgachah relate to the group as a whole?"). That question will be answered later. First, let's understand Moshe Rabbeinu's side of the story.

Step #2: Moshe Rabbeinu's Tefilah

Moshe Rabbeinu's tefilah was formulated as a response to the Law of Collective Hashgachah. He began by invoking Hashem as "God of the spirits of all flesh." Ralbag interprets this as follows:

You, Hashem, are the God Who has particular knowledge of each and every human being and extends His hashgachah pratis to every individual, based on his intellect, in accordance with that individual righteousness and wickedness. In light of this, how can You decree punishment upon the entire congregation when only a few of them sinned?

In effect, Moshe Rabbeinu appealed to Hashem to switch mishpat (justice) frameworks: instead of judging Klal Yisrael as a group - as a unified entity, subject to the Law of Collective Hashgachah - He should judge Klal Yisrael as individuals, based on the zechuyos (merits) and avonos (iniquities) of each and every person.

We see from Moshe Rabbeinu's tefilah that the "Law of Collective Hashgachah" is not the only framework for mishpat. There is also a "Law of Individual Hashgachah." We know from the Torah's accounts of tzadikim (e.g. Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov) that hashgachah pratis can and does relate to the individual, irrespective of his society.

However, this reveals one major insight into Divine justice: apparently, the "Law of Collective Hashgachah" is the default framework for mishpat. It is for this reason that Hashem decreed destruction upon the entire Jewish nation. Were it not for Moshe Rabbeinu's intercession to judge Klal Yisrael as individuals, Hashem would have judged them as a collective, because that is how the hashgachah operates.

We have answered the question of, "How, exactly, did Moshe Rabbeinu's tefilah address Hashem's position?" but we are now confronted with a more pressing question: "Why does the Law of Collective Hashgachah take precedence over the Law of Individual Hashgachah? What accounts for the fact that it is the default framework for mishpat?" Although we have begun to build a case for Hashem's mishpat (as it were), it is still difficult to see His decrees as justice. In order to do this, we must take one more step.

Step #3: Hashem's Response

This is where things begin to get interesting. Hashem accepted Moshe's tefilah and didn't wipe out all of Klal Yisrael. However, He didn't "simply" punish Korach and his followers, as it might seem at first glance. Instead, He instructed Moshe to tell Bnei Yisrael to remove themselves from the vicinity of the reshaim (evildoers) and to be careful not to touch any of their belongings, lest they be destroyed. Only then did He cause the earth to open and swallow up Korach and his followers.

This is problematic for at least two reasons. First of all, why were the non-sinning members of Bnei Yisrael required to distance themselves from the reshaim? One might be tempted to respond, "This was a practical measure to ensure that none of the innocent members of Klal Yisrael were destroyed along with the reshaim." This answer is difficult. We know that Hashem is fully capable of "targeted onesh." This was demonstrated in Mitzrayim, when many of the makkos afflicted only the Egyptians and not the Jews. The greatest instance of targeted onesh was makkas bechoros, in which Hashem struck down every individual firstborn, but spared all others. That being said, why did Hashem command Bnei Yisrael to move away from the reshaim? Why didn't He simply "zap" Korach and his followers on the spot?

Secondly, why did the non-sinning members of Bnei Yisrael have to be warned, "do not touch anything of theirs, lest you perish because of all their sins"? Didn't Moshe Rabbeinu's tefilah succeed in achieving a shift in mishpat frameworks from Collective Mishpat to Individual Mishpat? One would think that the decree of destruction upon the non-sinners was revoked - yet, if that's the case, then why are they still in danger of "perishing" on account of the sins of Korach and his followers? And why is this threat of perishing contingent on touching the belongings of the reshaim? It is difficult to understand how a person can be liable for death simply for touching the possessions of a sinner.

Ralbag gives a very interesting answer. He explains that Hashem could not carry out Moshe's request to judge Bnei Yisrael as individuals unless they severed their identity as part of the group. In order to do this, they needed to physically separate themselves from the group, and to cut off any remaining connection with the members of that group. Even to retain possession of a material object belonging to the group would be to preserve one's identification with the group. So long as that identification is maintained, Hashem cannot judge that person as an individual, and his or her fate would be bound to the fate of the group.

This explanation answers the last two questions we raised, but it presents us with an even bigger problem, which will be the final - and key - question in our investigation: Why didn't Hashem simply judge the members of Bnei Yisrael as individuals in their present state? Why was it necessary for them to break their connection with the group?

In answering this question, we will gain a fundamental insight not only into hashgachah pratis and mishpat Hashem, but into how we live our daily lives.

Step #4: Insight into Hashgachas Hashem

The answer to our last question can be found in a principle set forth by the Rambam in Hilchos Deos 6:1:

Man, by nature, is influenced in his character traits and his actions by his friends and colleagues, and behaves in the manner of the members of his society. Therefore, it is incumbent on man to befriend tzadikim (men of justice) and to continually sit near chachamim (wise men) so that he will learn from their actions, and he should distance himself from reshaim (men of injustice) who walk in darkness so that he will not learn from their actions. This is what Shlomo says: "One who walks with the wise will become wise, but one who befriends ksilim (fools) will be broken" (Mishlei 13:20); and [David] says: "Fortunate is the man [who has not walked in the counsel of the wicked, nor has stood in the path of sinners, nor sat in the seat of the scornful]" (Tehilim 1:1). 

According to this halacha in the Rambam, most people - by nature - are products of their society. If you dwell among tzadikim and chachamim, your character traits and actions will be influenced by them; you will learn from them and become like them. The reverse is also true: if you dwell among reshaim and ksilim, your character traits and actions will be influenced by them, and you will learn from them and become like them.

This law of human nature is so overwhelmingly powerful that the Rambam prescribes a seemingly austere command in the very next paragraph:

Likewise, if a person finds himself in a society whose behavior is bad and whose members do not walk on the upright path, he should move to a location whose members are tzadikim and who conduct themselves on the path of the good. And if all of the societies he knows and has heard about conduct themselves in a path which is not good (as is the case in the present time) or he is unable to go to a society whose conduct is good - on account of the bands of thieves or for health reasons - he should dwell alone and in seclusion, as it is stated, "Let him sit alone and be silent" (Eichah 3:28). And if [the members of all societies] are bad people and sinners, who do not allow him to live in the society unless he mingles with them and participates in their bad behaviors, then he should go out to caves, thickets, and deserts rather than behave in the manner of sinners, as it is stated, "Who will give me a lodging place for wayfarers in the desert" (Yirmiyahu 9:1). 

Leaving aside the question of how this halacha ought to be implemented in practice, one thing is clear: the Torah has a grim outlook on the ability of an individual to rise above his or her society. To put it bluntly: the average human being does not, by default, exist as an individual, but only as a member of the group. 

I am not going to explain what I mean by that. Instead, I will clarify what I mean by quoting a beautiful and profound excerpt from Halakhic Man, by R' Yosef Dov Soloveitchik in which he explains the basis and implications of the Rambam's view of hashgachah pratis; I've underlined certain parts for emphasis:

The gist of Maimonides' view is that man occupies a unique position in the kingdom of existence and differs in his ontological nature from all other creatures. With reference to all other creatures, only the universal, not the particular, has a true, continuous existence; with respect to man, however, it is an everlasting principle that his individual existence also attains the heights of true, eternal being. Indeed, the primary mode of man's existence is the particular existence of the individual, who is both liable and responsible for his acts. Therefore, it is the individual who is worthy of divine providence and eternal life. Man, in one respect, is a mere random example of the biological species - species man - an image of the universal, a shadow of true existence. In another respect he is a man of God, possessor of an individual existence. The difference between a man who is a mere random example of the biological species and a man of God is that the former is characterized by passivity, the latter by activity and creation. The man who belongs solely to the realm of the universal is passive to an extreme - he creates nothing. The man who has a particular existence of his own is not merely a passive, receptive creature but acts and creates. Action and creation are the true distinguishing marks of authentic existence. 

However, this ontological privilege, which is the peculiar possession of the man who has a particular existence of his own, a privilege that distinguishes him from all other creatures and endows him with individual immortality, is dependent upon man himself. The choice is his. He may, like the individual of all the other species, exist in the realm of the images and shadows, or he may exist as an individual who is not part of the universal and who proves worthy of a fixed, established existence in the world of the "forms" and "intellects separate from matter" [Maimonides, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 4:9]. Species man or man of God, this is the alternative which the the Almighty placed before man. If he proves worthy, then he becomes a man of God in all the splendor of his individual existence that cleaves to absolute infinity and the glorious "divine overflow." If he proves unworthy, then he ends up as one more random example of the biological species, a turbid and blurred image of universal existence ...

Man, at times, exists solely by virtue of the species, by virtue of the fact that he was born a member of that species, and its general form is engraved upon him. He exists solely on account of his participation in the idea of the universal. He is just a member of the species "man," an image of the universal. He is just one more example of the species image in its ongoing morphological process (in the Aristotelian sense of the term). He himself, however, has never done anything that could serve to legitimate his existence as an individual. His soul, his spirit, his entire being, are all grounded in the realm of the universal. His roots lie deep in the soil of faceless mediocrity; his growth takes place solely within the public domain. He has no stature of his own, no original, individual, personal profile. He has never created anything, never brought into being anything new, never accomplished anything. He is receptive, passive, a spiritual parasite. He is wholly under the influence of other people and their views. Never has he sought to render an accounting, either of himself or of the world; never has he examined himself, his relationship to God and his fellow man. He lives unnoticed and he dies unmourned. Like a fleeting cloud, a shadow, he passes through life, and he is gone. He bequeaths nothing to future generations, but dies without leaving a trace of his having lived. Empty-handed he goes to the grave, bereft of mitzvah performances, good deeds, and meritorious acts, for while living he lacked any sense of historical responsibility and was totally wanting in any ethical passion. He was born involuntarily, and it is for this reason and this reason alone that he, involuntarily, lives out his life (a life which, paradoxically, he has "chosen!") until he dies involuntarily. This is man as the random example of the biological species. 

But there is another man, one who does not require the assistance of others, who does not need the support of the species to legitimate his existence. Such a man is no longer a prisoner of time but is his own master. He exists not by virtue of the species, but solely on account of his own individual worth. His life is replete with creation and renewal, cognition and profound understanding. He lives not on account of his having been born but for the sake of life itself and so that he may merit thereby the life in the world to come. He recognizes the destiny that is his, his obligation and task in life. He understands full well the dualism running through his being and that choice which has been entrusted to him. He knows that there are two paths before him and that whichever he shall choose, there must he go. He is not passive but active. His personality is not characterized by receptivity but by spontaneity. He does not simply abandon himself to the rule of the species but blazes his own individual trail. Moreover, he, as an individual, influences the many. His whole existence, like some enchanted stream, rushes ever onward to distant magical regions. He is dynamic, not static, does not remain at rest but moves forward in an ever-ascending climb. For, indeed, it is the living God for whom he pines and longs. This is the man of God. 

The fundamental of providence is here transformed into a concrete commandment, an obligation incumbent upon man. Man is obliged to broaden the scope and strengthen the intensity of the individual providence that watches over him. Everything is dependent on him; it is all in his hands. When a person creates himself, ceases to be a mere species man, and becomes a man of God, then he has fulfilled that commandment which is implicit in the principle of providence.

The Rav said it all, and I have nothing to add.

Now we can understand Hashem's response to Moshe's tefilah on a deeper level. Hashem's commandment to Bnei Yisrael to physically move away from Korach and his followers was not merely a practical way to distance them from the disaster zone, nor was it only a means of breaking their identification with the sinners. Rather, Hashem was giving each member of Bnei Yisrael an opportunity to actualize himself as an individual, thereby enabling the hashgachah to relate to him.

Since, as the Rav said, "it is the individual who is worthy of divine providence," and since Bnei Yisrael were, at the time, a single group whose identity had been tainted by its sinful faction, the only way the non-sinning members would be saved through hashgachah pratis is if they used their bechirah (free will) and chose to act as individuals. This is why Hashem couldn't judge Bnei Yisrael as individuals in their present state: they did not exist as individuals in their present state. The only way to judge them as individuals was to enable them to actualize themselves as individuals, which is exactly what He did.

Concluding Summary

Now the dialogue between Hashem and Moshe makes perfect sense. To summarize:

• Man, by nature, is a component and a product of his society. This is why Hashem's default mode of mishpat is the Law of Collective Hashgachah.
• Therefore, when a significant number or significant members of a society sin, the hashgachic status of the entire group is affected. For this reason, Hashem decreed destruction upon the entire nation in response to the sin of Korach and his followers.
• Moshe Rabbeinu appealed to Hashem, asking Him to judge Klal Yisrael as individuals, not as members of the group.
• Hashem responded by saying that He could only judge Klal Yisrael as individuals if they actually became individuals.
• In His mercy, He facilitated this by commanding every member of Klal Yisrael to make an individual decision whether to remain associated with Korach's group or to redefine themselves as separate from that camp. This process of separation was completed by physically distancing themselves from the camp and not maintaining any connection - even by holding on to their property.
• Bnei Yisrael seized this opportunity, and were saved from Hashem's wrath.

In addition to having gained a valuable insight into what it means to live as a human being, I hope this post has shown that there is a way to gain insight into the ways of hashgachas Hashem, even if that insight is small.