The Month of Av: Unlucky or Misunderstood? (Part 2 of 2)

This is a sequel to The Month of Av: Unlucky or Misunderstood? (Part 1 of 2). I'm going to pick up right where I left off, without reviewing the facts or the questions.

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Artwork: Behold the Beyond, by Noah Bradley

The Month of Av: Unlucky or Misunderstood? (Part 2 of 2)

Three Disclaimers

Disclaimer #1: I realize now that I really should have written two other posts before tackling this "The Month of Av: Unlucky or Misunderstood?" series, in order to establish certain premises in a more efficient manner. As it stands, I'm too deep into the writing trenches now, so I'll just have to incorporate all of the ideas into this one post. As a result, my explanation is going to be a bit more round-about than my usual style, but I promise it'll come together at the end. 

Disclaimer #2: For the time being, I'm going to ignore the question about the "good mazal" during the month of Adar and focus exclusively on the "bad mazal" during the month of Av. If I succeed in clearly presenting my idea about Av, then you'll see what direction I would take in addressing the question about Adar. I just don't have it clear enough yet to write out. Maybe I'll take it up at Rosh Chodesh Adar later this year.

Disclaimer #3: I said this in Part 1 but it bears repeating here: this article is intended to be theoretical - not normative. Consult your rabbi before making any changes to your halachic practice. 

Diminishing Rejoicing, Avoiding Court Cases, and Bad Mazal

Let's start with the question: What does the Gemara mean when it says that the month of Av has "bad mazal"? The Ritva raises an objection to the premise of this question from the Gemara in Shabbos 156a which states: "there is no mazal for Israel." This would appear to contradict our Gemara in Taanis 29b, which indicates that the mazal of Av is bad for the Jews and the mazal of Adar is good for the Jews. 

The Ritva offers two resolutions to this contradiction: 

Even though "there is no mazal for Israel," that [statement] is only true of other days, but during these two months there is mazal, for such was decreed upon us from Heaven. Moreover, it is possible that [the term] "mazal" [in our Gemara about Av and Adar] is only a reference to the [Divine] decree, which is called "mazal" in common parlance. 

Both of the Ritva's answers explain that the special mazal of Av and Adar have to do with the Divine decree: either the mazal of Israel changes during these months because of the decree, or the decree itself is being called "mazal." 

The Baalei Tosafos on our Gemara agree with the Ritva's approach. They explain:

Rav Pappa said: Therefore, a Jew who has a court case with a non-Jew should avoid it during the month of Av, because its mazal is bad - the meaning of this is what was stated above: "liability is scheduled (lit. "rolled") for the day of liability" (Taanis 29a).

The Gemara cited by Tosafos addresses the question of how we know that both Batei ha'Mikdash (Holy Temples) were destroyed on the same day. After establishing that the first Mikdash was destroyed on the 9th of Av, the Gemara says:

From where do we know that the Second [Temple was also destroyed on the 9th of Av]? It was taught in a braisa: "merit is scheduled for the day of merit, and liability is scheduled for the day of liability."

According to Tosafos, "the mazal of Av is bad" doesn't have anything to do with the month being "unlucky," as we explained earlier. Rather, it means that Hashem decreed that the destruction of the second Mikdash should be scheduled for "the day of liability," the same day that the first Mikdash was destroyed. Thus, the statement "the mazal of Av is bad" simply means "Av was divinely ordained as a period of time designated for punishment." 

The question is: Why? What is the purpose or advantage of "scheduling" Klal Yisrael's punishments for a specific time period? The answer lies in the Rambam's opening remarks in Hilchos Taaniyos:

1:1 - It is a positive mitzvah of the Torah to cry out and to sound the trumpets on every tzarah (catastrophe) that befalls the community, as it is stated, “[When you wage war in your land] against the afflicter who afflicts you, you shall sound the trumpets, [and you shall be remembered before Hashem, your God, and you shall be saved from your enemies]” (Bamidbar 10:9), meaning to say: anything that afflicts you - such as drought, epidemic, locusts, and the like - cry out on them and sound [the trumpets].  

1:2 - This principle is one of the darchei teshuvah (ways of repentance), that at a time of the onset of an affliction, and [people] cry out and sound the trumpets, everyone will know that it was because of their evil conduct that this bad occurrence befell them, as it is written, “Your iniquities have turned away these things [to you], and your sins have withheld good from you” (Yirmiyahu 5:25), and this will cause them to remove the affliction from upon them.  

1:3 - But if they do not cry out and do not sound the trumpets, but instead say, “This is a natural event which befell us, and this affliction is a chance occurrence” - behold, this is a derech achzarius (way of cruelty), and will cause them to cling to their evil conduct, and [this] affliction and others will increase. This is what is written in the Torah, “[And if, with this, you do not listen to Me,] and you walk with me with chance, then I will walk with you in the fury of chance, [and I will also chastise you, seven times for your sins]” (Vayikra 26:26-28), meaning to say, when I bring an affliction upon you to cause you to do teshuvah, if you say that it is chance, then I will increase upon you the fury of that “chance.”

Chazal teach us that five tragedies happened on Tishah b'Av: (1) it was decreed that the generation of the Exodus would die in the Wilderness for their role in the Sin of the Spies, (2) the first Mikdash was destroyed, (3) the second Mikdash was destroyed, (4) the city of Beitar was besieged, and the Bar Kochba revolt led to many Jewish deaths, and (5) Jerusalem was razed to the ground. 

Since then, other terrible events have occurred on Tishah b'Av: the expulsion of Jews from England in 1290; the start of World War I in 1914, which directly led to World War II; the commencement of the Nazi's "Final Solution" in 1941; the start of the mass deportation of the Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto to Treblinka in 1942. If we take into consideration the entire month of Av, more tragedies can be added to the list: the beginning of the crusades on the 24th of Av in 1096; the expulsion of Jews from France on the 10th of Av in 1306; the expulsion of Jews from Spain on the 7th of Av in 1492; and more.

According to the Gemara cited by Tosafos, these misfortunes could have happened at different times of the year. However, if they did, it would be far easier for us to dismiss these catastrophes as "natural events" and "chance occurrences." Therefore, Hashem-Elokim - the One Who is merciful even when executing judgment - decreed that the month of Av should have "bad mazal." According to Tosafos, this means that He "scheduled liability for the day of liability," causing all of these tragedies to happen during the same time period. This is "merciful" because it makes it easier for us to recognize that these events were orchestrated by hashgachah (Divine providence), and this recognition will (ideally) motivate us to do national teshuvah, thereby ending our exile and our suffering.

This explanation sheds a new light on the obligation to "diminish rejoicing at the onset of Av." We are not obligated to diminish our rejoicing as an expression of natural mourning over the effects of these tragedies, but rather, this halacha aims to promote national bemoaning of the causes of those tragedies - namely, the "evil conduct which caused these events to befall us" - as a catalyst for national teshuvah. 

I believe this is where Rav Pappa's halacha comes in. The mishnah said that we should diminish rejoicing at the onset of Av, and Rav Pappa added: "therefore, a Jew who has a court appointment at a non-Jewish court should try to avoid it during the month of Av because it has a bad mazal (i.e. because Hashem scheduled our punishments for Av in order to awaken us to do teshuvah)." Why did he single out this specific activity of avoiding court appointments with non-Jews? Because avoiding court appointments with non-Jews frames our recognition of the month of Av as a time period in which the non-Jews have historically prevailed over the Jews, not because of nature or chance, but because of the midas ha'din shel ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu (the meting out of Divine Justice). 

In other words, without Rav Pappa's halacha, it would be easy for us to enter the month of Av and diminish our rejoicing purely as an expression of national mourning over the losses suffered by the Jewish people at the hands of non-Jews during this month throughout our history. But when Rav Pappa comes along and says, "How should we diminish our rejoicing? By avoiding court cases with non-Jews," he is framing our conception of the interaction between Jew and Gentile, Israel and the Nations of the World, not in terms of chance, not in terms of social or psychological dynamics, not in terms of geopolitical trends and world events, but in terms of midas ha'din. The focus on the theater of the beis din shel mata (earthly court) reminds us of the reality of the beis din shel maalah (heavenly court). Rav Pappa's institution underscores the fact that our fate as a nation is determined by our standing vis a vis God's justice, and our only salvation lies in teshuvah. 

According to this explanation, there is no reason to avoid other "risky" activities specifically during the month of Av. To the contrary - the effort to do so would detract from the framework set up by Rav Pappa's halacha, which highlights the theme of midas ha'din.

Ketev Meriri: the Scourge of the Three Weeks

We will now turn our attention to the second halacha we cited from the Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 551, which cautions us during the Three Weeks not to walk alone between the 4th and 9th hours of the day, and not to strike talmidim, all on account of the "Ketev Meriri." 

There are three questions we must answer: (1) What is the Ketev Meriri? (2) Why does the dominance of the Ketev Meriri during this time period make these specific activities hazardous? (3) Why is the danger of the Ketev Meriri present or increased during the Three Weeks?

The term Ketev Meriri is from Haazinu (Devarim 32:24). Here it is in context:

Hashem will see and be provoked by the anger of His sons and daughters, and He will say: "I shall hide My face from them and see what their end will be - for they are a generation of reversals, children whose upbringing is not in them. They provoked Me with a non-god, angered Me with their vanities; so shall I provoke them with a non-people, with a vile nation shall I anger them. For fire will have been kindled in My nostrils and blazed to the lowest depths. It shall consume the earth and its produce, and set ablaze what is founded on mountains. I shall accumulate evils against them, My arrows shall I use up against them; bloating of famine, battles of Reshef, Ketev Meriri, and the teeth of beasts shall I dispatch against them, with the venom of those that creep upon the earth. On the outside, the sword will bereave, while indoors there will be dread - even a young man, even a virgin, a suckling with the gray-haired man."

The word "ketev" means "cutting," and it is clear from the context that "Ketev Meriri" refers to some harmful and destructive phenomenon, but that's about all that's clear. Since this is the only place in Tanach where this phrase appears, the meforshim (commentators) struggle to understand what it means. Some associate it with a pasuk in Tehilim, which is the only other place in Tanach which uses this form of the word "ketev": "You shall not fear the terror of night, nor the arrow that flies by day, nor the pestilence that walks in gloom, nor the ketev yashud tzaharayim (the destroyer who lays waste at noon)" (91:5-6), but there is no clear indication of what the meriri is, or how it "cuts." 

There are two places in the aggadic midrashim which expound on the Ketev Meriri at length. I'm going to cite both sources in their entirety before commenting on either of them, beginning with the Gemara in Pesachim 111b, which appears within the context of a larger discussion about sheidim (demons). Although I usually translate the Gemara myself, I decided to rely primarily on Artscroll this time, due to the obscure terminology:

"ketev meriri" - There are two ketev demons: one [that lurks] before noontime, and one [that lurks] after noontime. The name of the one that lurks before noontime is Ketev Meriri, and it appears, in a jug of kamcha (or "kutach"- a dipping sauce made of sour milk, moldy bread crusts, and salt), as a whirling mixing spoon. The name of the one [that lurks] after noontime is Ketev Yashud Tzaharaim, and it appears amidst the horns of goats as a whirling sieve.

Abaye was once going along and Rav Pappa went on his right side and Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua on his left side. He saw a Ketev Meriri coming towards his left side. [Abaye] then switched Rav Pappa to his left side and Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua to his right side. Rav Pappa said to [Abaye], "Why am I different such that [you] do not concern yourself with me?" [Abaye] said to him, "For you, the times are propitious (Rashbam: you are wealthy and blessed with good fortune and will not be harmed by the demon)." 

From the time of the first of Tammuz until the 16th, [the ketev demons] are certainly prevalent. From then on, it is uncertain whether or not they are prevalent. And they are found in the shadows of a chatzuva (a type of grass) that did not grow a cubit, and in the shadows of the morning and evening that are not a cubit long. And [they are found] predominantly in the shadows of a lavatory.

The second extensive aggadic treatment is in Midrash Eichah Rabbah 1:29:

Another interpretation of "all her pursuers have overtaken her trapped between the metzarim" is "days of misfortune," which are between the 17th of Tammuz and the 9th of Av, for during that time Ketev Meriri is prevalent, as it is said: "[you shall not fear] the pestilence that goes forth in the dark, nor from the ketev which lays waste at noon." 

Rebbi Abba bar Kahana and Rebbi Levi [discussed ketev meriri]. Rebbi Abba bar Kahana said: "It cuts down (i.e. wreaks havoc) during the passage of the noontime hours, from the beginning of the 6th hour [of daylight] through the end of the 9th hour." Rebbi Levi said: "It cuts down during the passage of the daylight hours, from the end of the 4th hour to the beginning of the 9th hour." It does not travel in the sunlight, nor in the shade, but in the shade that is adjacent to the sunlight.

Rebbi Yochanan and Rebbi Shimon ben Lakish [also discussed ketev meriri]. Rebbi Yochanan said: "It is full of eyes, made up of layers upon layers, and hair upon hair." Rebbi Shimon ben Lakish said: "One eye is situated on its heart, and if anyone sees it, he dies."

Rebbi Abahu was sitting and teaching in a certain synagogue in his place in Caesarea. He saw a man holding a stick about to hit his fellow man. He saw a demon standing behind him, holding a metal rod. Rebbi Abahu rose up and screamed, saying to the man, "Why do you want to kill your fellow man?" [The man] asked, "With [a stick like] this someone can kill his fellow man?" [Rebbi Abahu explained:] "But there is a demon right behind you holding a metal rod. If you hit your fellow with this [stick,] he (i.e. the demon) will hit him (i.e. you) with that [rod] and he (i.e. you) will die.

Rebbi Yochanan used to demand that the Scripture teachers and Mishnah teachers not hold up the strap to the children [to punish them] during these days [when ketev meriri is rampant]. Rebbi Shmuel bar Nachmeini used to demand that the Scripture teachers and Mishnah teachers release the youngsters [from school] during the four hours [when the ketev is rampant]. 

Instead of veering off on a lengthy tangent about Judaism's view of demons, I'll just quote the Meiri's commentary on: “A fool will believe anything, but a clever person will understand every step” (Mishlei 14:15). The Meiri writes: 

A fool will believe everything he hears, whether it’s possible or impossible, probable or improbable. But a clever person – one who investigates with his own mind – will understand every step. For example, if he hears something, he will investigate it with his own mind to see whether it is possible or impossible, probable or improbable. The Sages of Musar said: “If the speaker is a fool, then the listener should be clever.” Even though this is common sense advice, nevertheless, it is befitting for every intelligent person to analyze with his mind which ideas are proper to believe in.

The Meiri then goes on to provide examples in matters of Torah and in matters science which we are obligated to investigate in this manner, and not just blindly accept. As one of his examples of "scientific matters which are not contingent on matters of [Torah] belief," the Meiri lists "the existence or non-existence of demons." In other words, there is no "theological obligation" to believe in demons. Rather, each person must "investigate [the subject] with his own mind to see whether it is possible or impossible, probable or improbable." Similarly, Rav Hirsch wrote in his Letters on Aggadah:

In my opinion, the first principle that every student of Chazal's statements must keep before his eyes is the following: Chazal were sages of God's law - the receivers, transmitters, and teachers of His toros, His mitzvos, and His interpersonal laws. They did not especially master the natural sciences, geometry, astronomy, or medicine - except insofar as they needed them for knowing, observing, and fulfilling the Torah. We do not find that this knowledge was transmitted to them from Sinai.

Nowadays too it is enough for the non-specialist to know about any of these areas of knowledge whatever contemporary experts teach that is generally accepted as true. This applies to the lawyer vis-à-vis all other areas, to the mathematician and the astronomer regarding the natural sciences, and to the expert on flora regarding all other areas. We expect none of them to seek out the truth and satisfy his inclinations in any field other than his own specialty.

Moreover, even in the area where one is an expert, it is neither possible for him nor expected of him to know everything through personal investigation and experience. Most of his knowledge rests upon the investigation of others. If they have erred it is not his fault. It is sufficient and praiseworthy if his knowledge encompasses all that is accepted as true at his time and place and generation. The greatness of his wisdom is in no way belittled if in a later generation it is discovered that some of the things he maintained or accepted on the authority of others are unreliable. The same is true for Chazal in these areas. The greatest of them knew all the wisdom and science of all the great non-Jewish scholars whose wisdom and teachings became famous in their generations.

Having said that, there are three ways to understand these aggadic statements about the Ketev Meriri:

Approach #1: These statements of the Sages indicate their belief that the Ketev Meriri was a real physical threat, and they were correct. 

Approach #2: These statements of the Sages indicate their belief that the Ketev Meriri was a real physical threat, but we now know that they were incorrect.

Approach #3: These statements of the Sages were intended to be taken allegorically, and were written to teach us lessons in ethics, philosophy, psychology, metaphysics, etc.; they were never intended by their authors to be taken literally, as statements of scientific fact about a physical threat.

In my opinion, Approach #3 is the least likely. I have yet to see any meforshim who explain the Ketev references in Haazinu or Tehilim 91 allegorically, and I think it would be difficult to take most of the aggadic explanations of the Ketev Meriri in Pesachim and Midrash Eichah as metaphors. The fact that the Shulchan Aruch and Rema codify these precautionary measures as halacha show that they certainly didn't take these statements allegorically.

Approach #1 is also unlikely, but is more plausible than Approach #3. Don't worry: I don't think there's any basis for worrying about a demon "filled with eyes" who will kill you if you look at the eye in its heart, nor do I think there is a single scientist who believes that whirling spoon demons can be seen in sour dipping sauce or whirling sieve demons appear between goat horns.

However, there are grounds for saying that a person should take certain precautions when walking outside during the Three Weeks between the 4th and 9th hours. After all, these are the hottest days of the year, and the hottest times of day. Lest you think I'm being facetious, a number of Rishonim take this approach in their commentary on the reference to Ketev Meriri in Haazinu. The Ibn Ezra explains that Ketev Meriri refers to the damage caused "by the bitterness of the air." Ibn Caspi says that it refers to the severe sickness that comes about on account of "the unusually excessive heat that occurs during the summer days." The Ralbag provides a lengthy meteorological account of Ketev Meriri - one which I can't even claim to translate accurately. He says something about how "meriri" refers to "the lethal air that sometimes comes up from the earth at times of extreme heat." He theorizes how this air is a product of "the heat of the sun and stars combined with the phenomena in the belly of the earth which cause this harmful vapor to ascend." He also repeatedly mentions something about "putrefaction" or "mustiness," but I couldn't follow what he was saying.

Whether or not these proto-scientific explanations of Ketev Meriri are any more accurate than the belief in a literal havoc-wreaking demon, one thing is clear: these Rishonim understood the Ketev Meriri to be a reference to a natural, physical, environmental phenomenon, rather than as a spiritual force or supernatural creature (as most people think of when they hear the word "demon"). Moreover, they had no qualms about rejecting the validity of the Sages' descriptions provided in the aggadic midrashim cited above. One might argue that they weren't rejecting these statements, but merely interpreting them non-literally. Personally, I doubt it. It's a stretch to read those vivid and specific statements as referring to "hot air" or "musty vapor."

To my mind, Approach #2 is the most reasonable of the three. The Sages believed in the physical threat of something they called Ketev Meriri, which they associated with the references in Haazinu and Tehilim 91. Whether they thought it was a spiritual entity or a meteorological phenomenon, they genuinely believed that it could cause harm. They also thought that they had enough of an understanding of the nature of this threat to be able to lay down guidelines for how to avoid this harm. But they were wrong. After all, the Meiri said that we must investigate the question of whether such demons exist and reach our conclusions based on our own understanding. As far as I know, there is no scientific basis for believing in the reality of anything matching the Sages' detailed description of Ketev Meriri today. And, as Rav Hirsch said, this is not an indictment of the Sages' authority or intelligence. They were merely relying on the information that was available to them at the time, just as contemporary rabbis rely on the scientific data available to them today, even though today's science might be regarded as laughably false tomorrow.

Whichever of the three approaches you take, one thing is abundantly clear, and was the most shocking of my findings: the threat of Ketev Meriri has absolutely nothing to do with Tishah b'Av and the Three Weeks! The Gemara in Pesachim says that the threat of the Ketev Meriri is specifically during the first sixteen days of Tammuz, and it is uncertain whether we need to take precautions against the Ketev Meriri during the time period from the 17th of Tammuz until the 9th of Av. There is nothing in that Gemara or Midrash Eichah which makes reference to anything having to do with Tishah b'Av, Three Weeks, the destruction of the Beis ha'Mikdash, the prophecies of Yirmiyahu, or even the halachos of mourning and diminishing our rejoicing. The sole exception to this trend is the phrase "bein ha'metzarim," which is likely just a textual hook in the Midrash. Certainly the Rishonim who understood Ketev Meriri to be an environmental threat that is common during the hottest days of the year would not tie their explanations to the halachic institutions of the Three Weeks and Tishah b'Av. They would caution all people, Jews and non-Jews, to take these precautions against the Ketev Meriri, even before Tishah b'Av was instituted as a halacha. Likewise, they would tell people who live in colder climates not to worry at all about these guidelines.

Another thing is clear: according to the Gemara in Pesachim and Midrash Eichah, no matter which of the three approaches you take, there is no reason to avoid other "risky" behaviors. The Ketev Meriri works in very specific ways. The Sages even go so far as to identify the specific types of shrubbery and shadows in which the Ketev Meriri can be found. There is simply no basis in this original source material for claiming that other dangerous activities should be avoided - except, perhaps, other outdoor activities which might put you at risk for heat exhaustion or dehydration.

Conclusion

We initially set out to answer the question: Is there a basis for the widespread practice to avoid risky endeavors during the Nine Days or the Three Weeks, out of precaution?  The answer to this question is a resounding and unequivocal: NO!

Our findings may be summarized as follows:

At the onset of Av we diminish rejoicing, and the specific activity we avoid is scheduling court appointments with non-Jews. According to our explanation, this reinforces the proper teshuvah-framework (midas ha'din) for reflecting on the causes of the national tragedies which were scheduled to befall us during the month of Av.

Between the 17th of Tammuz and the 9th of Av, we refrain from walking alone outdoors between the halachic hours of 4 and 9, and we also avoid striking students - not because of anything having to do with the Three Weeks, the Nine Days, and Tishah b'Av, but because of the threat of the Ketev Meriri - a physical threat that is either real but limited to very specific parameters, or is not real at all.

Although I have stated in my disclaimer that this post is not intended to be normative, I can tell you that if you are the type of person who determines your halachic practice based on the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema, then feel free to schedule your wisdom-teeth surgery during this time period without worrying about increasing your risk for harm. There's no need to further diminish your joy on account of baseless fear. 

How I Teach Maaseh Bereishis - Part 2 of 2

This post is a continuation of How I Teach Maaseh Bereishis - Part 1 of 2. It is recommended that you read that post before reading this one.

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How I Teach Maaseh Bereishis - Part 2 of 2

Reminder: The term “Maaseh Bereishis” in this post refers specifically to the text of Bereishis Perek 1 (Genesis Chapter 1). It does not refer to the pesukim after the first perek, nor does it refer to the event of the creation – just the pesukim. 

Kass's Approach to Maaseh Bereishis 

We left off with the following question: if the pesukim of Bereishis Perek 1 were never intended to be taken literally, and the true meaning was only intended for the elite chachamim, then what purpose do these pesukim serve for the masses? What is the average Jew supposed to get out of a literal reading of Maaseh Bereishis? Why didn't the Torah simply state the fact that Hashem created the universe in Six Days in a single pasuk and leave the detailed account to Torah she'baal Peh, as the Ramban suggested?

The best answer to this question I’ve encountered can be found in Leon Kass’s commentary on Sefer Bereishis, entitled, The Beginning of Wisdom: Reading Genesis (2003). Kass is a secular philosopher [1] whose commentary utilizes what he refers to as “a wisdom-seeking approach” to the text of the Bible (see this post for an elaboration). Though I cannot endorse his entire book, both because I haven’t read it all and I didn’t agree with everything I did read, his approach to Maaseh Bereishis certainly opened my eyes, and inspired the direction I take in teaching this unit. 

Here is Kass’s commentary on the first pasuk of Bereishis. I’ve underlined the passages which led me to develop the approach I use when teaching this to my students: 

Unfortunately for those who demand clear pictures, the text’s account of the very beginning is shrouded in mystery:

In beginning, God [’elohim] created the heavens and the earth. 

The first sentence of Genesis majestically summarizes the entire story and states its main theme and thesis: creation, by God, and creation by God. Yet there is much in this verse that is hard to understand: in beginning of what? (Of time? Of everything? Of God’s creative activities?) What is “creating”? And who or what is this creating being, God? To some of these difficulties – especially creation – we shall return. But even now, with our incomplete understanding, we grasp a major point: the assertion of creation by God emphatically denies important competing alternatives. Right from its beginning, Genesis, by speaking about the origins of heaven and earth, denies the eternity and, a fortiori, the divinity of the visible universe: neither the heavens – the lofty celestial vault with its sun, moon, stars – nor the earth, the fertile, teeming source of life, are gods. They are, rather, creatures, creations of God. Perhaps more important, Genesis denies the alternative of generative beginnings: the sky did not beget upon the earth; our world is not the result of sexual (or warring) activities of gods and goddesses. In denying that the world comes to be through giving birth – that is, in rejecting cosmogony and, all the more so, theogony – Genesis begins by rejecting the necessity of polytheism. The coming into being of our world does not imply or demand more than one god.  

The Bible does not polemicize against these alternatives. As Umberto Cassuto remarks, “the controversial note is heard indirectly, as it were, through the deliberate, quiet utterances of Scripture, which sets the opposing views at naught by silence or by subtle hint.” Still, one cannot exaggerate the importance the Bible attaches to rejecting these alternatives. Numerous people of the ancient Near East – and elsewhere – regarded the heavenly bodies as divine. In the course of Genesis, we shall meet – as alternative and rejected ways of life – the Babylonians, who looked up to the heavens, and the Egyptians, who worshipped the sun and other nature gods. Because every people (and also every person) is defined ultimately by what it (or he or she) admires and reveres, the Bible wastes no time in denying the standing of other peoples’ candidates for the divine. The reason for this urgent rejection is a matter to which we will return. 

Skipping a few paragraphs, here’s another part of Kass’s commentary which highlights his approach: 

The account, though comprehensive, has an earth-centered focus. Though it speaks about what we call, in nonbiblical language, the universe or the cosmos, it addresses us, as terrestrial beings and as seeing beings, looking around and, especially, up. It begins with what we recognize and trust: the visible world we see above and about us. It shows us the articulated world of our native experience, as it manifests itself to sight.

All the beings mentioned are known to us in ordinary experience: There are no mythical beasts and no gods and goddesses. The main regions of our world are present – land, sea, and air – with their appropriate inhabitants, divided into recognizable kinds or species. And the overarching, star-studded, watery blue vault of heaven that beckons our gaze is present almost from the start, preceded only by light, in the absence of which nothing at all could be distinguished or gazed upon. By addressing human beings exactly as they experience the world, especially through sight, Genesis begins with what is both familiar and first for us, and for all mankind at all times.

But in the course of appealing first to our familiar point of view, the story in fact calls that viewpoint into question. Although addressed to our experience, the account of Genesis 1 does not simply accord with our experience; indeed, some of the peculiarities of the account induce perplexities about the way we ordinarily encounter the world. 

To review, our question is: What purpose is served by the literal pshat of Maaseh Bereishis, as read and understood by the masses? Based on the approach set forth by Kass, we may answer our question as follows: Maaseh Bereishis is intended to be a philosophical primer for healthy development as a tzelem Elokim (truth-seeking intellect). Specifically, its purpose is twofold: (1) to establish the foundations of a worldview which helps the masses develop a philosophically mature way of relating to the world around them, and (2) to steer these readers away from competing worldviews which would otherwise arrest their philosophical maturation. 

This may seem like a radical move on the Torah’s part, but in truth, it is merely a specialized instance of dibra Torah ki’lshon bnei adam (“the Torah speaks in the language of man”). Rather than stating the “raw truth” explicitly, in a manner that would be incomprehensible and/or detrimental to the majority of readers, the Torah presents the truth in a manner which is accessible to the average readers on their level, in terms they can easily relate to. This “watered down” version of the truth is designed as a developmental primer. In other words, the literal interpretation is not intended to remain as the reader’s permanent understanding, like a classical myth; it is meant to temporarily frame the reader’s conception and lay the groundwork for the next step in his or her understanding. As the reader continues to develop intellectually and psychologically, he or she will delve deeper into the true meaning underlying the external sense of the pesukim and come to terms with the truth at his or her own pace. The Torah uses this approach when speaking about Hashem; the Neviim and Kesuvim use this approach with many subjects; Chazal use this approach in midrashim. It shouldn’t surprise us that the Torah uses this approach when discussing the profound subject of Maaseh Bereishis.

Before expanding on this approach, I'd like to anticipate and address an objection. Our instinctive reaction as "modern readers" is to compare and contrast the Torah’s account with our modern scientific understanding of cosmogony. If we do this, we will surely be disappointed. The Torah's geocentric narrative of the Six Days of Creation pales in comparison to the current theoretical model of the Big Bang and the unfolding of the entire universe. Some might even consider the Torah's account to appear childish in comparison. 

But we must remember that the Torah was not addressing itself to "scientifically enlightened" readers in the 21st century. Rather, as Kass pointed out, the Torah's narrative was competing with pre-scientific and non-scientific creation mythology - and rightly so, for it is these myths which have dominated mankind's conception of the heavens and earth for millennia. If the Torah had been written specifically for the 21st century, for an audience that already has a basic grasp of scientific thinking, or for readers immersed in a world where secular atheism is the competing worldview with Torah monotheism, I'm sure that the pesukim of Maaseh Bereishis would look quite different. 

It is this realization that the Torah was aimed at combating myths which prompted me to use an out-of-the-box method in presenting this to my students. 

Comparing Maaseh Bereishis to Creation Myths of Other Religions 

Rather than spoon-feeding this reading of Maaseh Bereishis to my students or having them read the relevant excerpts from Kass’s book, I try to have them derive it on their own. I found a site called www.BigMyth.com. The home page shows a map of the world with 25 dots identifying regions on six of the seven continents. If you hover your mouse over a dot, the name of the nation, culture, or religion will pop up (e.g. Egyptian, Chinese, Maori, Inuit, Inca, etc.). Once you make your selection, you’ll be taken to an early 2000’s era “flash animation” which depicts that group’s creation story, complete with cheesy sound effects and narration. 

I show my students the first couple of minutes of around 5-7 of these animations, then encourage them to watch more at home prior to doing their assignment. Their assignment is to identify the major differences between the Torah’s account of creation and the creation myths of these groups. I tell them to focus on how each account of creation might impact the way that these people view the human race, God (or gods), and the universe as a whole. 

On the day after the assignment is due, we go through the students’ findings and discuss them. I conclude the unit by presenting what I see as the key differences between the Torah’s account of creation and the common features of these creation myths. Here are a few examples. 

anthropomorphic creator(s) vs. non-anthropomorphic Creator: Other religions depict their god(s) in highly anthropomorphic ways. The Torah does not. The only verbs it uses are verbs which do not evoke strong anthropomorphic imagery (e.g. creating, speaking, seeing, separating, calling, making, placing etc.) as opposed to the gross anthropomorphisms found throughout the rest of the Torah (e.g. body parts, such as eyes, ears, hand, arm, or emotions such as anger, sadness, regret, mercy, love). It is as though the Torah wants our introduction to Hashem to be as devoid of physicality as possible, so as not to not lead us to associate the physical universe as proceeding from a physical creator – especially one that resembles ourselves. All of this prepares our minds to seek out the non-physical causes of nature, which will ultimately lead us to the non-physical First Cause.

multiple creators vs. One Creator: Many other creation stories involve multiple creators and/or divinities. According to the Torah, Hashem was the sole cause of the universe. A person who believes that the universe is the product of multiple gods will have no impetus to seek a unity of design underlying the diverse particulars of the universe. Why should he, if different parts of the universe belong to different gods? But according to the Torah, there is only One Architect of the universe with one law that governs His entire domain.

“scientific” account of creation vs. “magical” account of creation: Other religions’ creation stories are mythological and fantastical. Many of them involve a multiplicity of divine beings (e.g. spirits, angels, demons, demi-gods), supernatural objects with mystical properties, and magical generative processes. In contrast, Maaseh Bereishis is scientific in its character. It describes an orderly creation process involving things we see in the world around us: no otherworldly beings or supernatural things – just earthly phenomena that we observe around us every day. Even the actions of the Creator are not described in miraculous terms. It is easy to see how this orientation towards the world lends itself to a value system which promotes scientific inquiry, rather than imaginative mythos and primitive superstiion.

yeish me’yesh (creation out of something) vs. yeish me’ayin (creation out of nothing): Many other creation stories begin with something that already exists, and everything emanates or is created from that. According to the Torah – as understood by the majority of the meforshim – Hashem created the universe out of nothing. Therefore, He is truly the First Cause, and nothing can be compared to Him in His eternality. In other words, there is nothing in the Torah’s account that occupies the “throne” of eternality other than Hashem.

universe as divinity vs. universe as creation: Other religions maintain that the universe itself is divine, or has divine qualities. The Torah makes it clear that the entire universe is a creation. This rules out the possibility of worshipping the universe or parts of the universe (e.g. sun, moon, stars, planets) as gods, or having godly qualities. It can be argued that this is the essential difference between a primitive outlook and a scientific one. So long as a society perceives nature as a panoply of divinities, each with its own independent will that must be appeased, the gates of scientific inquiry will be barred and concealed.

creation process as melachah (intelligent design) vs. creation as non-melachah: Other religions’ creation stories involve accidents, mistakes, and automatic generative processes. According to the Torah, the entire work of creation is characterized as “melachah” – a deliberate creative process in which matter is transformed in accordance with intelligent design – and the sequence of days follows a logical, hierarchical order. Moreover, it is clear that our Creator knows what He is doing: at each step of the way, he declares what He intends to do, He does it, and He perceives that it is good. At the end of the Six Days of Creation, He deems the entire creation as “very good” – that is, produced in complete accord with His plan. It is easy to see how this analogy of melachah would radically alter a person’s view of the universe. Are we living in a universe which is an expression of wisdom, with an underlying lawfulness and order that can be discerned by the truth-seeking human intellect, or was the universe a fluke, a blunder, or the result of blind forces acting without any objective or blueprint.

no motives are given for creation vs. creation is a result of human motives: In the creation stories of other religions, motives are given for the actions of the gods. Usually these motives are petty: because the god is lonely, because the god is angry, because the god wants to be worshipped, etc. In stark contrast, the Torah says nothing about why Hashem created the universe. This underscores the Torah’s view that we cannot know the purpose of the universe, because we cannot know Hashem’s Mind, which is identical with His unknowable Essence. 

These aren’t the only differences between Maaseh Bereishis and the creation myths of other religions, but I hope they illustrate how a literal reading of the pesukim paves the way for the development of the scientific and philosophical worldview that is the ultimate objective of the Torah regimen. At the very least, I hope these fundamental distinctions highlight how being raised with the creation myths of other religions makes it extremely difficult for scientific truth-seeking thinkers to arise from their ranks. 

Conclusion 

So that concludes my overview of Unit 1: Maaseh Bereishis. I tweak it from year to year, and emphasize different things based on my students and their questions, but the core presentation has remained the same. If the only thing my students walk away with is an awareness that the pesukim of Maaseh Bereishis were never intended to be taken literally, and that that the literal meaning of the pesukim was designed to promote a scientific, philosophically mature worldview, then I have done my job. But I am always looking for ways to improve, so if you have any questions, objections, or suggestions about what I have presented here, then please do share!

[1] According to his Wikipedia page, he is “an American physician, scientist, educator, and public intellectual, best known as proponent of liberal education via the ‘Great Books,’ as an opponent of human cloning, life extension and euthanasia, as a critic of certain areas of technological progress and embryo research, and for his controversial tenure as chairman of the President's Council on Bioethics from 2001 to 2005. Although Kass is often referred to as a bioethicist, he eschews the term and refers to himself as ‘an old-fashioned humanist. A humanist is concerned broadly with all aspects of human life, not just the ethical.’” 

How I Teach Maaseh Bereishis - Part 1 of 2

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How I Teach Maaseh Bereishis – Part 1 of 2 

Note: Throughout this post, the term “Maaseh Bereishis” (lit. “the work of In the Beginning”) is used in reference to the pesukim of Sefer Bereishis Perek 1 (the Book of Genesis Chapter 1). Although this term can refer to the first several chapters of Bereishis – including the second account of the creation of Adam and Chava in Gan Eden, their sin, their banishment, Kayin and Hevel, and the first generations – I teach Bereishis Perek 1 as its own unit, and this post is about that unit specifically. I intend to write another post about how I teach about Adam and Chava in Gan Eden, but that has nothing to do with the Maaseh Bereishis of this unit. 

Introduction 

I have taught Sefer Bereishis to 12th graders for the past seven years. One might think that Bereishis Perek 1 would be relatively easy to teach, since the “storyline” of Maaseh Bereishis is familiar to most students. I, however, have found that the task of teaching this perek is far from easy, due to the questions and problems which have arisen since the dawn of the scientific age. 

Students are aware that Maaseh Bereishis clashes with the modern scientific account of how the universe came to be. Some students are bothered by this conflict, and others are not. Of the former, some take the Torah’s account at face value and look askance at science; others embrace the scientific account and are troubled by how the Torah’s account could possibly differ. My approach to teaching Maaseh Bereishis aims to address all of these students, no matter where they are coming from, while upholding the truth of both Torah and science. Suffice it to say, this is easier said than done. 

There are additional difficulties in teaching this particular perek. Many of the meforshim (commentators) explain the pesukim using outdated Aristotelian physics, much of which has little meaning to offer my students. Even the meforshim who prioritize the pshat (straightforward meaning) of the pesukim exhibit this trend. The midrashic literature is rich in its content, but does very little to address the pshat of the pesukim. There is also the time constraint: during most years, we have a very limited number of days in September before we break for the moadim (holidays), which means that this unit has to be fairly quick. 

This post is about how I teach Maaseh Bereishis to my students. I am not claiming that this is the only way – or even the best way – to present this topic. I am aware that my approach is somewhat radical, and some may even find it objectionable, but at the present time, I think it represents my best efforts to teach this difficult material to the types of students I tend to have. I will now walk you through my actual lesson plan, explaining what I do and why I do it. 

Maaseh Bereishis was Never Meant to Be Taken Literally 

My first step is to show my students that the Torah’s account of the creation was never intended to be taken literally. I put the emphasis on “never” because I want to make it clear that this approach should not be dismissed as “apologetics” (i.e. interpretations aimed at upholding the truth of Scripture which only arose after these scientific questions came to light). Rather, the non-literal reading of Maaseh Bereishis has always been part of our mesorah (oral tradition), going back to the giving of the Torah at Sinai. 

I support my contention by drawing upon the words of “two trustworthy witnesses, pillars of the world, great Sages of understanding and refined intellects who are the recipients of the secrets of Torah,” [1] namely, the Rambam and the Ramban. 

[Reminder: when I say that “Maaseh Bereishis was never meant to be taken literally,” I am referring to how we interpret the pesukim of Maaseh Bereishis. Obviously, the phenomenon of God creating the universe was meant to be taken literally.]

Rambam on the Non-Literalness of Maaseh Bereishis

The Rambam expresses this in several places throughout the Moreh ha’Nevuchim, but I’ll content myself with citing a single passage from 2:29: 

Not everything mentioned in the Torah’s Maaseh Bereishis was intended to be taken literally, as the masses imagine. For if this were the case, then those who know [the true interpretation] wouldn’t have taken so much care to conceal it, and Chazal wouldn’t have tried to keep it secret and prevented people from talking about it in the presence of the masses. The literal meaning of the words [of the pesukim in Maaseh Bereishis] might lead us to form false ideas and false opinions about Hashem, or even to totally deny and reject the foundations of Torah. Therefore, it is proper to refrain from explaining this subject based on our empty imaginations which come from ignorance of science. In contrast, there are ignorant darshanim (i.e. people who give Torah lectures to the masses) and meforshim who imagine that wisdom consists in knowing the explanation of the words [in the pesukim], and that greater excellence is attained by using more words and longer speech. Rather, the proper understanding can only be attained after acquiring complete knowledge of the substantiated sciences and the sodos (esoteric truths) of the Prophets. 

The Rambam offers two arguments as to why the pesukim of Maaseh Bereishis shouldn’t be taken at face value. His first argument is that if Maaseh Bereishis were intended to be taken literally, then why did Chazal take such strict measures to conceal it and restrict its teaching? The Rambam is referring to the numerous restrictions on how and by whom Maaseh Bereishis ought to be learned and taught. The source of these restrictions is the mishnah in Chagigah 2:1 (Talmud Bavli, Chagigah 11b): 

One may not expound on arayos (sexual prohibitions) with three [people], nor Maaseh Bereishis with two, nor Maaseh Merkavah (the Work of the Chariot) with one, unless he is wise and intuitively understands with his own mind. Anyone who contemplates four things – it would be better for him if he didn’t come into the world: that which is above, that which is below, that which came before, and that which will come after. Anyone who does not have mercy on the glory of his Creator – it would be better for him not to have come into the world. 

The Rambam explains the restrictions on Maaseh Bereishis in his commentary on this mishnah: 

He said nor Maaseh Bereishis with two – and certainly not with more than two. The Sages said [on the pasuk] “When you inquire of the early days” – one may inquire, but two may not inquire. We have already explained the reason for this in our introduction to this composition, namely, that it is impossible for the masses to understand these concepts; [hence] they were only transmitted from individual to individual. The Sages were cautious with them because the masses would be able to understand very little. When the fool hears them, his beliefs will become confused and he would think that they contradicted the truth, though they are [actually] true … [For this reason the mishnah] spoke in an intimidating manner concerning one who applies his thoughts to Maaseh Bereishis without the prerequisites, saying, “anyone who contemplates four things etc.” 

Likewise, [the mishnah] intimidates the one who applies his thoughts and simple imagination to metaphysics without first having ascended the rungs of the sciences, saying, “anyone who does not have mercy on the glory of his Creator, it would be better for him not to have come into the world.” The explanation of this is that it would be better for [the totality of] existence if this individual were negated from humanity and were a different species of animal instead, for he desires to know in a manner contrary to his developmental course and contrary to his nature. The only one who imagines that he can know what is above and what is below is a person who is utterly ignorant regarding matters of truth. When a person who is devoid of all knowledge desires to comprehend in order to know what is above the heavens and what is under the earth by using his faulty imagination (for he imagines [the heavens] to be like the upper story of a house) and likewise, that which preceded the creation of the heavens and what will be after the cessation of their existence – such a person will certainly fall into madness and desolation. [2]

Going back to the Rambam’s statement in the Moreh ha’Nevuchim: if Maaseh Bereishis could be understood from a literal reading of the pesukim, then why would – or how could – Chazal place such a high barrier of entry around the subject matter? Rather, it is clear from their cautionary words and restrictions on how the subject is studied and taught that the true interpretation of Maaseh Bereishis is esoteric, and cannot be understood by the masses from the pesukim in the Torah. 

The Rambam’s second argument is that a literal reading of Maaseh Bereishis would lead to conclusions which are heretical, foolish, or both. We are in an even greater position than the Rambam to recognize the extent to which a belief in the literal understanding of the pesukim would lead to a denial of the truths arrived at through empirical science. It’s no coincidence that those Jews and Christians who insist on taking Maaseh Bereishis literally are invariably anti-science in their general outlook. 

For more on the Rambam's non-literal approach to Maaseh Bereishis, see the Moreh ha'Nevuchim 2:29-30.

Ramban on the Non-Literalness of Maaseh Bereishis

The Ramban (in his commentary on Bereishis 1:1) is just as firm in his assertion that Maaseh Bereishis should not be taken literally. The context of these comments is the Ramban’s analysis of the tanna R’ Yitzchak’s suggestion that the Torah could have started with the mitzvah of Rosh Chodesh in Sefer Shemos, and that there was no need for the entirety of Sefer Bereishis: 

Since Maaseh Bereishis is a sode amok (deep esoteric truth) which cannot be understood merely by reading the pesukim, and cannot be known with clarity except through the kabbalah ish mi’pi ish (the special oral tradition going back from mouth to mouth) from Moshe Rabbeinu who heard it from Hashem, and even the people who know this tradition are obligated to conceal it, therefore, R’ Yitzchak said that there was no need for the beginning of the Torah to include “In the beginning, God created etc.”, or the account of what was created on the first day and what was made on the second day and other days, or the lengthy story of Adam and Chava and their sin and punishment, or the story of the Garden of Eden and Adam’s banishment from it – for all of this cannot be fully understood by merely reading the pesukim. All the more so is this true for the story of the Generation of the Flood and the Generation of the Dispersion, which are not of such great necessity. It would have been enough for the followers of Torah without these pesukim, and they would believe in the general statement concerning the Six Days of Creation in the Decalogue: “For in six days Hashem made the heavens and the earth, the sea and all that is in them, and He rested on the seventh day” (Shemos 20:11), and the specialized knowledge of the Six Days of Creation could have been left for the yechidim (highly qualified individuals) as a halacha l’Moshe mi’Sinai (an authoritative tradition given directly to Moshe at Sinai), together with the rest of Torah she’baal Peh (the Oral Torah). 

Like the Rambam, the Ramban explicitly states that the pesukim of Maaseh Bereishis were never intended to be taken literally. Also like the Rambam, the Ramban says that Chazal concealed the true interpretation from the masses. He even goes so far as to entertain the possibility that the first several chapters of Sefer Bereishis could have been omitted from the Written Torah altogether, and relegated to the Oral Torah, where they could be understood properly by those individuals who are qualified to grasp the subject without distortion. [3] But unlike the Rambam, who maintains that our path to understanding Maaseh Bereishis is to study the empirical sciences and the esoteric ideas alluded to by the Prophets, the Ramban believes that the correct understanding can only be attained by a direct line of tradition going back to Moshe Rabbeinu – a mesorah that is part of the subject commonly referred to as “Kabbalah.” 

The question of what the true understanding of Maaseh Bereishis is will have to be left for another time. The point I intended to extract from the Rambam and the Ramban is clear: Maaseh Bereishis, as stated in the pesukim, was never intended to be taken literally. Chazal have always regarded the true interpretation to be among the “secrets of Torah” that have been concealed, and only taught to those who are ready. The Baalei Mesorah (transmitters of the Oral Tradition) have always viewed Maaseh Bereishis this way, even before science demonstrated that a literal reading of the pesukim was untenable. 

A New Question 

Although this “solves” the problem Maaseh Bereishis vs. science, it raises a new question: if the true interpretation of Maaseh Bereishis was only intended for the elite chachamim (wise men), then what purpose does it serve for the masses? What is the average Jew supposed to get out of a literal reading of the pesukim? 

We’ll leave that question for the next installment. 

[1] The adulation quotation comes from the Sefer ha’Chinuch: Parashas Ki Teitzei, Mitzvah #545. Not only do I love this description of the Rambam and the Ramban, but I also like the Sefer ha'Chinuch's approach of turning to these two Rishonim specifically when he wants to demonstrate that a certain idea is unanimous or mainstream.

[2] Even though I am trying to avoid discussing Maaseh Merkavah here, and I considered omitting the part of the Rambam’s commentary in which he discusses that part of the mishnah, I ultimately decided to retain it, since what he says about “one who applies his thoughts and simple imagination to metaphysics without first having ascended the rungs of the sciences” is equally relevant to those who attempt to approach Maaseh Bereishis based on their simple imagination without knowledge of science, as the Rambam excplicitly stated in the excerpt from the Moreh ha’Nevuchim. 

[3] The Ramban goes on to explain why these passages were included in the Written Torah, but his answer is irrelevant to our question, since the Ramban was not addressing conflicts between science and Torah. 

A Visual Representation of Science and Torah

Disclaimer: In my high school classes, I strive to craft my lessons to fit the minds of the particular students I'm teaching. When I learn one-on-one with a student, my lessons are extremely tailor-made. 

Since this blog post originated in one-on-one learning with a student, I wasn't sure whether it would be worthwhile to write it up, since I designed it specifically for that student. Ultimately, I decided that it would be good to write it out for the sake of my own clarity, and once I was doing that, I figured I might as well share it as a blog post. Maybe others will find it valuable.

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A Visual Representation of Science and Torah

I recently had a discussion with a science-savvy student of mine who asked the following question - in more or less these words:

In science, when scientists find something that doesn't make sense based on their current understanding of the world, they keep thinking about it and theorizing and experimenting; eventually they realize that they need to either modify or abandon their prior theory and come up with a new theory in order to solve the problem. 

In Torah, however, we don't do this. Even if we see something that seems crazy, irrational, or morally objectionable, we don't reject Torah or Judaism. Why not? What's the difference between Judaism and science? And how many problems in the Torah would you have to see in order to conclude that the whole thing is false?

I immediately recognized the flawed premises of this student's reasoning, and I almost responded with the first answer that popped into my head. But I caught myself. I sensed that this student was touching upon something important - and that if I could extract that kernel of truth AND show him where his analogy fell short AND answer his question, then he would emerge with a clearer understanding of both Torah and science. 

I spent a few days thinking about how to approach this student's question and finally - while I was proctoring my Gemara final - I had an epiphany. I realized that if I could come up with a visual depiction of how science works and compare it side-by-side with a visual depiction of how Torah works, then I could show him (a) how these two ways of gaining knowledge of reality are far more similar than he realized, and (b) I can answer his question in a way that would satisfy his scientific mind. 

A Visual Depiction of Science

Here's what I came up with for science. I'll walk you through it below:

Here's what each part means:

Reality: at the top of the diagram we have "reality" (i.e. that which exists), which is what we are trying to know and understand through science; strictly speaking, the "reality" part in the science diagram should say "physical reality" since science doesn't go beyond the physical - but for the sake of consistency, I labeled this part as "reality" on both diagrams

Horizon of Ignorance: this represents the gap between our understanding of reality and reality itself, - a gap which science continually strives to diminish and eventually close.

The Senses / The Mind: at the very bottom of the diagram we have "the senses" (the five senses of sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste according to the traditional count, plus some or all of the non-traditional senses according to our modern understanding) and "the mind" (i.e. our ability to think logically and rationally); these constitute the epistemological foundation of the scientific method; if one maintained that either the senses or the mind were incapable of giving us knowledge about reality, then all scientific knowledge would be null and void. 

Empirical Data: from the day we are born, we are bombarded with loads of sensory data, but this empirical information is only a surface-level knowledge of reality.

Scientific Thinking: the scientist is the one who seeks out the lawfulness underlying the myriad particulars; instead of attempting to write an entire discourse on scientific thinking, I'll just quote from my Gemara rebbi's eloquent explanation in his essay on Scientific and Halachic Thought:

In the scientific method every particular is viewed as an expression of a universal principle - not as a separate localized reality. An apple falling from a tree to the ground is not an apple-ground phenomenon but an interaction between their underlying substances. We look for the simplest explanations of the widest range of events, not for a complex patchwork of explanations each fitting a single event. Thus explanations based on the particulars of apple and earth are rejected in favor of explanations based on the universal matter each possesses. This method naturally leads to simpler principles that unify more and more particular cases. As Einstein and Infeld state in the Evolution of Physics, (which is an excellent book on the subject of scientific thought and methodology), "[The scientist] certainly believes that, as his knowledge increases, his picture of reality will become simpler and simpler and will explain a wider and wider range of his sensuous impressions (P. 31).” ... 

What is the basis for this approach? It is the belief that all of the universe is composed of fundamental building blocks under the influence of fundamental forces with all of the observable phenomena being their various expressions. It is this search for what lies beneath that demands a universal law of nature, the law of the fundamentals, with each advance striking deeper. ... 

The scientific process is one of moving from the concrete to the abstract, from the particular to the universal, from a strange chaotic world to a system of laws governing outcomes in a clearly predictable way.  

This is what I mean by "scientific thinking" - not the particular theories about the universe that are developed in each successive generation of scientists, but the general way of thinking about the universe which gives rise to those theories. 

Scientific Theories: these are the particular theories that emerge from scientific thinking and aim to explain reality, in whole or in part; there "macro theories" which attempt to explain the foundations of the universe (e.g. Newtonian "classical mechanics," Einstein's theory of relativity, Planck's quantum mechanics) as well as the "micro theories" which aim to explain localized phenomena (e.g. Kepler's laws of planetary motion, Darwin's theory of natural selection, the theory of climate change).

Conceptual Understanding: the aim of these theories is to give us a conceptual understanding of reality, thereby pushing back the Horizon of Ignorance and bringing us closer to objective truth.

New Empirical Data: in many cases, these scientific theories will also help us discover new empirical facts and/or new methods of uncovering more new empirical facts.

New Questions and Difficulties: while these scientific theories enlighten our minds, solve problems, and push back the Horizon of Influence, they (along with the new empirical data) raise new questions and difficulties of which we were previously unaware; at first, scientists will attempt to solve these problems within their current theoretical framework, but eventually ...

Scientific Life-cycle: ... these questions and difficulties will prompt scientists to come up with new theories, and the entire cycle will begin again. My Gemara rebbi described this process as follows:

Something interesting occurs near the end of a philosophic regime. The idea that was an intellectual boon to science at its inception, allowing for new freedoms of thought, can become in its decline an intellectual shackle forcing every phenomenon to conform to its terms. To the conventional thinkers it is no longer a tool of new insights and fresh ideas rather it becomes an ideology of its own. The loyal rally around it and craft creative if not brilliant ways of fitting the unruly phenomena into the old terms no matter how tenuous or far fetched. Ironically, this is the opposite approach of the methodology that spawned the very idea they are defending. Whereas the original breakthrough started with a set of problems from which were derived a new universal, this method starts with a universal and insist on particular kinds of solutions which are in line with the philosophy. Eventually a new breakthrough is needed to once again reduce the complexity created.

The questions and difficulties which prompt this rethinking of the prevailing scientific theories will also, in many cases, lead to a reconsideration of the empirical data, since scientists will realize that their perception of that data was biased or clouded by the reigning scientific framework. For example, when it was believed that the earth was the center of the solar system, all empirical observations of the heavens were tainted by this bias; when people believed in spontaneous generation, their empirical observations supported their belief that maggots were generated out of putrid flesh. These beliefs were eventually disproved, and when that happened, the empirical data had to be reconsidered in light of the new theoretical model.

Step #1 of My Answer: The statements on the left and right of the diagram constitute Step #1 (out of 3) of my answer to the question asked by my student:

• Questions and difficulties compel us to modify or eliminate the very scientific theories which yielded them in the first place, thereby continuing the life-cycle of scientific understanding.
• Although these questions and difficulties will force us to reject particular scientific theories, they do NOT cause us to doubt or deny the general approach of scientific thinking as a whole.

For example, classical mechanics was dethroned as "a theory of everything" by the theory of relativity; the limitations of the theory of relativity were brought to light by quantum - but at no point did the problems with these particular scientific theories cause scientist to doubt or question the validity of scientific thinking as a whole. To the contrary - the fact that scientific thinking led to the discovery of these theories AND the questions and difficulties AND enabled new theories to arise is evidence of the validity of scientific thinking.

And that is my visual depiction of science. I'm sure there are imperfections with my diagram, but it served my purposes just fine.

A Visual Depiction of Torah

Here's what I came up with for Torah:

Here's what each part means:

Reality: at the top of the diagram we have "reality" - not just physical reality, but metaphysical reality as well.

Horizon of Ignorance: see explanation above; according to the Ralbag, this Horizon of Ignorance exists in our understanding of Torah in the same way that it does in science; I wrote about this at length in The Limits of Our Understanding of Torah.

The Senses / The Mind: the senses and the mind constitute the epistemological foundation of Torah - the same as in science; this point is explained very clearly in the essay Torah from Sinai.

Contents of Torah: for the sake of simplicity, we will say that "Contents of Torah" refers to the Torah she'bi'Chsav (Written Torah) and Torah she'baal Peh (Oral Torah) that were given to Moshe at Sinai, plus the Neviim (Prophets) and Kesuvim (Writings); in truth, there is more included here than just that, but we'll stick with this definition to avoid complications.

The Revelation at Sinai: our basis for accepting the Contents of Torah as Divinely authored is the historicity of the Revelation at Sinai; our acceptance of this event is based on a rational argument that was best explained in the essay Torah from Sinai; Rabbi Dovid Gottlieb also wrote a version of this argument in Living Up to the Truth: Chapter 6 and Rabbi Lawrence Kelemen wrote an essay version of this entitled A Rational Approach to the Torah's Divine Origin, in addition to his book Permission to Receive.

Rational/Scientific Thinking: in the same way that scientific thinking is applied to empirical data to generate scientific theories, so too, rational thinking is applied to the "data" of the Torah's contents to generate Torah theories; I refer to this as "rational/scientific thinking" to emphasize that the type of conceptual understanding we are looking for is similar to that in science.

Torah Theories: by "Torah theories" I am referring to a conceptual understanding of reality that is arrived at via the contents of Torah; I refer to these as "theories" because they are the product of human thinking, which is fallible and incomplete (again, I refer you to my post: The Limits of Our Understanding of Torah).

Conceptual Understanding: as is the case in science, our goal in learning Torah is to arrive at the most accurate conceptual understanding of reality that is humanly possible.

New Understanding of Torah's Contents: here we see a major difference between science and Torah; in science new theories lead to the discovery of brand new facts, but in Torah, there are no "new facts"; however, our new understanding sometimes leads to a total reevaluation of the Torah's contents, to the point where the factual data we once worked with is completely reinterpreted.

A great example of this is the Ramban's interpretation of the rainbow in Parashas Noach. He acknowledges that a literal reading of the pesukim would lead us to believe that rainbows weren't created until after the flood. But then he says:

But we are compelled to believe the words of the Greek [scientists] that rainbows are a natural phenomenon resulting from the sun’s rays passing through moist air, for in [any] container of water that is [set] before sunlight there can be seen something that resembles a rainbow.

The Ramban then goes and reinterprets the pesukim in light of our "updated" understanding of how rainbows work. To my mind, this is an example of how the "facts" of Torah are not set in stone, but are still subject to change in light of advances in our understanding of reality. We will never receive new pesukim or new Torah she'baal Peh from Hashem, but our understanding of what He gave us continues to evolve as our knowledge of Torah and the universe continues to grow.

New Questions and Difficulties: our new understanding of reality and the contents of Torah will raise new questions and difficulties - just as in science; in some cases we will be able to answer these by developing our current Torah theories, but in other cases ...

Life-cycle of Torah Understanding: ... these questions and difficulties will prompt us to go back to the proverbial drawing board, and come up with new theories which address the problems. Unlike in the scientific community, where this life-cycle plays out on a community-wide level with a very small percentage of individuals pioneering new major theories, the life-cycle of Torah understanding plays out on a community-wide AND individual level. The great baalei Mesorah have made contributions of Torah theories which have shaped all of Klal Yisrael's understanding of Torah - but at the same time, each individual Jew goes through his or her personal odyssey of understanding Torah as well.

Step #2 of My Answer: The statements on the left and right of the diagram constitute Step #2 (out of 3) of my answer to the question asked by my student:

• Questions and difficulties might compel us to modify or eliminate parts of our theoretical understanding of Torah and its content.
• Although these questions and difficulties will force us to reject particular Torah theories, they do NOT cause us to doubt or deny the basis of the Revelation at Sinai or the veracity of the Torah's contents. 

This is the crux of my answer. For example, let us say that a person was bothered by the story of Adam and Chava in Gan Eden. A few hundred years ago, there would be no problem saying that the first human beings were Adam and Chava, that they were the progenitors of the human species, and they lived 5,777 years ago. However, in light of what we now know about anthropology and evolution, it is difficult to accept the Torah's account at face value.

In the premise of my student's question, he voiced the possibility that a problem like this would cause us to doubt or deny the authenticity of the Torah as a whole. I disagree. At most, this difficulty would cause us to modify or reject our current theoretical understanding of those pesukim in the Torah - perhaps even going so far as to say (like some Rishonim who shall remain unnamed) that the Gan Eden story is a mashal. But this problem would not shake or undermine the basis of our acceptance of Torah, which is the Revelation at Sinai. 

Step #3 of My Answer: I happened to have been sitting near my Gemara rebbi when I made these diagrams. I showed them to him and asked what he would change or add. He approved of my diagram and explanation, but added an important point. 

Generally speaking it's true that the questions and difficulties which emerge from scientific advancements will not undermine scientific thinking as a whole. However, on rare occasions, thinkers will come to the realization that there are problems with the paradigm of scientific thinking as a whole. This will lead to a total revolution in the way we approach science. When this happens, nearly all of the knowledge and understanding that was arrived at through the former paradigm will be rendered invalid. 

For example, Aristotelian thought dominated science (a.k.a. "natural philosophy") for over a thousand years. The way that Aristotle and the other "natural philosophers" thought about the world and the types of theories they came up with bear almost no resemblance to the scientific theories of the scientific thinkers after the scientific revolution. The Aristotelian paradigm was so off base that we now reject all of this theories about the physical world as non-scientific. If Aristotle was right about anything in science, it was by accident. 

What would be the equivalent of this type of "scientific revolution" in Torah? As we said, it wouldn't come about through particular questions or difficulties in our theoretical understanding of the Torah's contents. Rather, such a revolution could only stem from problems with the rational basis of our acceptance of the Revelation at Sinai itself. If one had a valid reason for rejecting the historicity of the Revelation at Sinai, then this would undermine the validity of all our Torah knowledge. 

This is one of the reasons why I favor the Torah from Sinai version of this "proof of Torah mi'Sinai" over the others, since the author demonstrates that if we deny the historicity of the Revelation at Sinai, we would ipso facto have to deny all of historical knowledge - and indeed, all secondhand knowledge as well. In my opinion, he makes a valid argument.

Summary and Conclusion

My student asked why we don't reject Judaism when we encounter problems in the same way that we reject scientific theories when we encounter problems with them. My answer essentially boils down to the fact that there is a distinction between scientific thinking and scientific theories; problems only cause us to reject scientific theories - but we do not reject the scientific way of thinking which enabled us to come up with those theories. So too in Torah: problems may cause us to reject particular Torah theories, but they would not cause us to reject the historicity of the Revelation at Sinai, which is the basis of our acceptance of the Torah. 

My student was satisfied with this answer. I hope you found value in it as well!