This week's dvar Torah focuses on an important methodological rule of thumb regarding the proper place of aggadic midrashim (i.e. the non-halachic teachings of Chazal). Enjoy! (For those who wanted the type of dvar Torah that can be "said over" at a Shabbos table - sorry for letting you down. This one is more like a regular blog post which happens to utilize something from the parashah.)
Parashas Balak: On Citing Midrash as Proof
"Bilam was as great of a navi (prophet) as Moshe Rabbeinu."
"WHAT?"
"It's true."
"Nonsense. The pasuk says, 'Never again has there arisen in Israel a prophet like Moshe, whom Hashem had known face to face' (Devarim 34:10). Moreover, the Rambam [1] maintains that belief in the uniqueness and superiority of Moshe's nevuah is one of the ikkarim (fundamentals). Anyone who claims that Bilam was equal to Moshe is an apikores. End of story!"
"Oh, so you're calling Chazal apikorsim?"
"Wait a minute - what do you mean?"
"Chazal explicitly equate Bilam with Moshe. In fact, the very pasuk you cited is the basis of their statement."
"I don't believe you. Prove it."
The plaintiff pulls out the Torah Temimah, opens it to Devarim 34:10, and reads the version [2] of the midrash stated there:
"Never again has there arisen in Israel a prophet like Moshe" - [a prophet like Moshe] didn't arise in Israel, but [such a prophet] did in the nations of the world. Who was this? This was Bilam ben Beor. To what can this be compared? To the royal chef, who knows how much the king spends on his meals.
"Well? What do you have to say to THAT? Are you going to argue with Chazal's explanation? Are you going to accuse them of denying the yesodei ha'Torah?"
The defendant is dumbfounded.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Midrashim are a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they contain the deepest ideas. At the same time, they are frequently misunderstood in ways which lead to terrible distortions of Judaism.
It is my belief that the three leading causes of such misunderstandings are: (1) confusion as to what midrashim are, (2) ignorance as to the proper method of learning midrashim, and (3) a widespread misunderstanding of the proper place of midrashim in the study of Torah.
The aim of this dvar Torah is not to explain the meaning of the aforementioned midrash about Bilam and Moshe; if you are interested in an explanation, I refer you to the Ramban [3] and the Sefer ha'Ikkarim [4]. Rather, the purpose of this dvar Torah is to present the approach taken by the Geonim and Rishonim when faced with midrashic "proofs" for problematic notions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the Disputation at Barcelona, Friar Paul posed a similarly troublesome question to the Ramban. The Ramban [5] recounts:
I arose and said: "Listen, all you peoples! Friar Paul asked me if the moshiach (messiah), about whom the neviim (prophets) spoke, has already arrived. I answered that he has not arrived. He then brought a book of aggadah which stated that on the day the Beis ha'Mikdash (Holy Temple) was destroyed, the moshiach was born.
The problem presented to the Ramban by this midrash is clear: if the moshiach is to bring about the ultimate redemption, as the neviim repeatedly state, then how can it be true that the moshiach was born over a thousand years ago? And if this was stated in a midrash, how can the Ramban disagree? Here is the Ramban's response:
I responded that I don't believe in this [midrash]. Know that we have three types of books.
(1) The first is the Biblia (a.k.a. "the Bible"), which all of us believe with complete conviction.
(2) The second is called "Talmud," which is an explanation of the mitzvos of the Torah, for there are 613 mitzvos in the Torah and not a single one of them is unexplained in the Talmud, and we believe in it (i.e. the Talmud) in its explanation of the mitzvos.
(3) We also have a third book called "midrash" or sermones (a.k.a. "sermons") - for example, when a clergyman gets up and delivers a sermon, and it is deemed to be good by one of the people who hears it, and he writes it down. Regarding [the contents of] this third book: if one believes in it, that is good; but if one doesn't believe in it, then it will not harm him. We have Sages who wrote that the moshiach will not be born until close to the end of times, when he comes to bring us out of exile. Therefore, I don’t believe in what this book says that he was born from the day of the destruction.
In short, the Ramban's answer was: "If your only 'proof' is a midrash, then there is nothing compelling me to believe it - especially when there are other midrashim which contradict it."
The Ramban's approach to midrashim has its roots in the writings of the Geonim. Here are the words of three of the most prominent Geonim:
Rav Hai Gaon [6]: "Know that divrei agadah are not like teachings from Torah she’baal Peh. Rather, each one expounded on what occurred to his own mind; [they were stated] in the manner of “it is possible that” or “one might say” – not as a clear-cut matter. Therefore, we don’t rely on them."
Rav Sherira Gaon [7]: "These statements which are expounded from pesukim and are called “midrash” and “aggadah” are theories. Some of them are true [in a literal sense] … but many of them are not … Therefore, we don’t rely on divrei aggadah. The valid ones are those which are supported by rationality and Scripture. There is no end or limit to aggados."
Rav Saadia Gaon [8]: "We don’t rely on, nor do we bring proof, from any divrei aggadah, nor do we raise objections based on divrei aggadah."
Likewise, the Rishonim invoke this principle when confronted with midrashim which undermine well-established truths. For instance:
Shmuel ha'Naggid [9]: "'Hagadah' (a.k.a. 'aggadah' or 'aggadic midrash') is any explanation from the Talmud on a non-mitzvah topic - this is hagadah, and we only learn from it that which makes sense. It is incumbent upon you to know that established by the Sages as halacha regarding any mitzvah was received by Moshe Rabbeinu who received it from the Almighty, and we should not add to it nor subtract from it. But as for all of the explanations of the Scriptural verses - each of the Sages explained according to the ideas which occurred to him and what he saw with his mind. We should only learn from these explanations that which makes sense, and the rest we should not rely upon."
Ibn Ezra [10]: "The sum of the matter is what the Geonim said about drash: we don't raise objections against it, or from it."
Ramban [11]: "We don't bring objections based on divrei aggadah."
Rashba [12]: "These are only divrei aggadah, and we don't bring objections based on them."
Ritva [13]: "How could we abandon all of these statements that were stated as halacha on account of that which was stated as divrei aggadah? ... Rather, it is certain that since these are divrei aggadah, and we don't bring objections based on them."
The approach of these Geonim and Rishonim is clear: we do not bring objections from midrashim, nor do we rely on them for proof; there is no obligation to believe midrashim, and we only learn from midrashim ideas that are adequately supported by evidence and reason.
At the same time, we mustn't go to the opposite extreme and ignore or dismiss every midrash which appears problematic to us at first glance. Rather, we should strive for the ideal stated by the Rambam [14]:
When you encounter a statement of Chazal which seems to conflict with reason, pause and consider it, and realize that this utterance must be a riddle or a parable. Sleep on it, trying anxiously to grasp its logic and its expression, so that you may find its genuine intellectual intention and lay hold of a genuine concept, as Scripture says: “To find out words of delight, and that which was written uprightly, even words of truth” (Koheles 12:10).
Last, but not least, we must heed the Rambam's [15] other piece of advice for those who wish to understand the wisdom hidden in Chazal's midrashim:
The only thing a person can do in addition to learning and striving in his involvement in Torah, is to direct his heart to Hashem and pray before Him and request that He graciously grant him knowledge and help him by revealing for him the secrets which are concealed in the Holy Writings, as we find that David did, as it is stated, "Unveil my eyes that I may perceive wonders from Your Torah" (Tehilim 119:18).
[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah, Sanhedrin Chapter 10
[2] Ha'Rav Baruch HaLevi Epstein, Torah Temimah on Sefer Devarim 34:10. The full version of the midrash can be found in Sifrei: Devarim, Piska 357:10, and Bamidbar Rabbah 14:20. These versions of the midrash are substantially different, in that they go on to enumerate the differences between nevuas Moshe and nevuas Bilam, thereby avoiding the problem altogether. Nevertheless, I have chosen to write about the Torah Temimah's version of the midrash because (a) this was the first version I encountered, and which bothered me for years until I looked up the original sources; and (b) because I wanted to write about this methodology point, and the Torah Temimah's version of this midrash made for a good conversation starter. And while we're discussing the Torah Temimah, I should note that he offers a nice interpretation of this midrash as well.
[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Bamidbar 24:1-2
[4] Rabbeinu Yosef Albo, Sefer ha'Ikkarim 3:20
[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Ha'Vikuach
[6] Rav Hai Gaon, Otzar ha'Geonim l'Maseches Chagigah 67
[7] Rav Sherira Gaon, cited in Sefer ha’Eshkol, Hilchos Sefer Torah 60a
[8] Rav Saadia Gaon, Otzar ha’Geonim l'Maseches Chagigah, Miluim (p.65)
[9] Shmuel ha'Naggid, Mevo ha'Talmud
[10] Rabbeinu Avraham ben Ezra (ibn Ezra), Short Commentary on Sefer Shemos 2:9
[11] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Chiddushim: Maseches Yevamos 61b
[12] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Aderet (Rashba), Chiddushim: Maseches Megilah 15a
[13] Rabbeinu Yom Tov ben Avraham Asevilli (Ritva), Chiddushim: Maseches Shabbos 65b
[14] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah, Sanhedrin Chapter 10
[15] ibid. Introduction
Wow. Quite the line up of sources, very impressive.
ReplyDeleteI'd like to thank Rav Hirsch, Wikipedia, and Bar-Ilan - without whom, this would not be possible. I'm just glad to contribute (what I believe to be) the first English translation of these sources to the Internet.
DeleteNice post!
ReplyDeleteI appreciate the discussion regarding Midrash and find it enlightening. However, if I find myself in a discussion about Torah with a person who makes this statement:
ReplyDelete"Anyone who claims that Bilam was equal to Moshe is an apikores. End of story!" I would find it difficult to learn anything from them. Perhaps it can be argued that in this case the strength of damnation is justified. However, the most interesting conversation in Judaism is occurring at this moment between rationalists and mystics. That is, when they aren't busy calling each other apikorim with little grounds.
I agree: ending the discussion by pulling the "Apikores! End of story!" card is just as unproductive as ending the conversation by pulling the "Chazal said it! End of story!" card. That's why I included the citations from the Rambam at the end.
DeleteAs I type this, I am reminded of Chazal's statement: "Know what to answer to an apikoros," which implies that a person should continue engaging someone in conversation even after it is clear that he is an apikoros. Many people know this statement from Pirkei Avos (2:14). However, people aren't as familiar with the follow-up statement from the Gemara: "Rebbi Yochanan said: This statement was only made with regards to a non-Jewish apikoros, but regarding a Jewish apikoros [one should not respond, since] he will become even more heretical" (Sanhedrin 38b). There is much to be investigated here, especially the question of which type of apikoros are we talking about. My point in citing this is to show that there is a situation where the response of "Apikoros - end of story!" is appropriate, according to Chazal
Very nice. I actually posted an interpretation of the chazal about Bilam on my blog: yehudathoughts.blogspot.com After reading your post I looked at the Torah Temima and he actually has a beautiful interpretation of this aggadah.
ReplyDeleteYou're right - I read the Torah Temimah's interpretation, but I totally forgot to cite it in the footnote! I liked the mashal he used from R' Chaim of Volozhin. I'll update the footnotes.
DeleteThank you for the much-needed explication. You laid it out clearly.
ReplyDeleteIf chazal were so smart (evidenced by their astute halakhik analysis in the gemara) how would they teach so many midrashim that are so tenuous? (I realize that the rambam directs us to think deeply into it before disregarding it, but that certainly does not answer the difficulty that so many geonim and reshonim clearly set out an approach that midrashim can be disregarded.)
ReplyDeleteWho says that midrashim are tenuous? As far as I know, the ideas in midrashim are as cogent and compelling as all other chochmah from Chazal. Yes, it's true that one cannot demand the same TYPE of certainty from hashkafah as one can in halacha, but the same holds true with science vs. mathematics - and BOTH are equally chochmah. To quote Aristotle:
Delete"And we must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth.
In other words, truth in halacha and truth in midrash should both be clear and precise, but in different ways, in account of the different subject matter and methods.
Furthermore, I think you are misunderstanding the message of this post when you say "that so many geonim and reshonim clearly set out an approach that midrashim can be disregarded." Saying that "we only learn from midrashim what makes sense" and "we don't bring proofs from midrashim" doesn't mean that they should be "disregarded." It means that they SHOULD be regarded, but only in the way that their authors INTENDED them to be regarded - namely, as deep wellsprings of knowledge which can only be approached by those who are on the level to appreciate them. For this reason, our Baalei Mesorah average Jews to not rely on quotations from midrashim as their hashkafic bread and butter, since it is likely that they will miss the true intent of the authors. The "only learn from midrashim what makes sense" is a good guideline, because it trains the student to rely on his mind rather than on the superficial meaning of the text.
Bottom line: the ideas taught in midrashim are extremely valuable, but must be approached in the proper manner by one who has sufficient training to analyze them properly; to disregard them would be a mistake, but to save them until after one has undergone the proper training would be wise.