Thursday, July 10, 2014

Aliens, Soccer Balls, and the Brisker Derech

I have decided to reserve Thursdays for reposting old posts. Today's post was originally published in January of 2008. Although I don't have any interest in the World Cup, I figured this would be an appropriate time to repost this.



Aliens, Soccer Balls, and the Brisker Derech

My Gemara rebbi presented an excellent analogy which he used to illustrate the difference between "good science" and "bad science," and the difference between good Talmudists and bad Talmudists. The analogy is from a book about particle physics by Leon Lederman called The God Particle (1993). Here is the analogy as written by Lederman, with my own emphases in bold:
The Invisible Soccer Ball

Imagine an intelligent race of beings from the planet Twilo. They look more or less like us, they talk like us, they do everything like humans - except for one thing. They have a fluke in their visual apparatus. They can't see objects with sharp juxtapositions of black and white. They can't see zebras, for example. Or shirts on NFL referees. Or soccer balls. This is not such a bizarre fluke, by the way. Earthlings are even stranger. We have two literal blinds plots in the center of our field of vision. The reason we don't see these holes is because our brain extrapolates from the information in the rest of the field to guess what should be in these holes, then fills it in for us. Humans routinely drive 100 miles per hour on the autobahn, perform brain surgery, and juggle flaming torches, even though a portion of what they see is merely a good guess.

Let's say this contingent from the planet Twilo comes to earth on a goodwill mission. To give them a taste of our culture, we take them to see one of the most popular cultural events on the planet: a World Cup soccer match. We, of course, don't know that they can't see the black-and-white soccer ball. So they sit there watching the match with polite but confused looks on their faces. As far as the Twiloans are concerned, a bunch of short-pantsed people are running up and down the field kicking their legs pointlessly in the air, banging into each other, and falling down. At times an official blows a whistle, a player runs to the sideline, stands there, and extends both his arms over his head while the other players watch him. Once in a great while, the goalie inexplicably falls to the ground, a great cheer goes up, and one point is awarded to the opposite team.

The Twiloans spend about fifteen minutes being totally mystified. Then, to pass the time, they attempt to understand the game. Some use classification techniques. They deduce, partially because of the clothing, that there are two teams in conflict with one another. They chart the movements of the various players, discovering that each player appears to remain more or less within a certain geographical territory on the field. They discover that different players display different physical motions. The Twiloans, as humans would do, clarify their search for meaning in World Cup soccer by giving names to the different positions played by each footballer. The positions are categorized, compared, and contrasted. The qualities and limitations of each position are listed on a giant chart. A major break comes when the Twiloans discovery that symmetry is at work. For each position on Team A, there is a counterpart position on Team B.

With two minutes remaining in the game, the Twiloans have composed dozens of charts, hundreds of tables and formulas, and scores of complicated rules about soccer matches. And though the rules might all be, in a limited way, correct, none would really capture the essence of the game. Then one young pipsqueak of a Twiloan, silent until now, speaks his mind. "Let's postulate," he ventures nervously, "the existence of an invisible ball."

"Say what?" reply the elder Twiloans.

While his elders were monitoring what appeared to be the core of the game, the comings and goings of the various players and the demarcations of the field, the pipsqueak was keeping his eyes peeled for rare events. And he found one. Immediately before the referee announced a score, and a split second before the crowd cheered wildly, the young Twiloan noticed the momentary appearance of a bulge in the back of the goal net. Soccer is a low-scoring game, so there were few bulges to observe, and each was very shortlived. Even so, there were enough events for the pipsqueak to note that the shape of each bulge was hemispherical. Hence his wild conclusion that the game of soccer is dependent upon the existence of an invisible ball (invisible, at least, to the Twiloans).

The rest of the contingent from Twilo listen to this theory and, weak as the empirical evidence is, after much arguing, they conclude that the youngster has a point. An elder statesman in the group observes that a few rare events are sometimes more illuminating than a thousand mundane events. But the real clincher is the simple fact that there must be a ball. Posit the existence of a ball, which for some reason the Twiloans cannot see, and suddenly everything works. The game makes sense. Not only that, but all the theories, charts, and diagrams compiled over the past afternoon remain valid. The ball simply gives meaning to the rules.

This is an extended metaphor for many puzzles in physics, and it is especially relevant to particle physics. We can't understand the rules (the laws of nature) without knowing the objects (the ball) and, without a belief in a logical set of laws, we would never deduce the existence of all the particles.
The young Twiloan’s theory of the invisible ball is an example of “good science.” Of course, collecting and quantifying data is an absolute necessity. Without the charts, tables, and formulae of the elder Twiloans, the young one couldn’t have made his discovery. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between the findings of the elder Twiloans and those of the young one. The formulae of the elder Twiloans are merely descriptions. They might be precise, and they might enable the elder Twiloans to predict the actions of the players with great accuracy, but they do not help them to understand what they see. The “invisible ball” theory of the younger Twiloan, on the other hand, imbues the phenomena with meaning. Without his theory, the actions were meaningless, but in light of the theory, the Twiloans can understand what is going on: "That’s a kick-off!" "That's a pass!" "He just scored a goal!" Without the theory of a ball, all they would have is a whole lot of meaningless (albeit well-organized) quantitative data.

The good scientists are the ones who go beyond the quantification of empirical data. They do not content themselves with precise descriptions of how things behave but seek to understand what things are. Take Einstein, for instance. His revolutionary discoveries in physics didn't magically emerge from the data. Einstein only arrived at his theories by thinking about basic, fundamental questions, such as “What is time?” and “What is space?” The theory of special relativity isn't simply a new quantitative scheme, but a whole new concept of space and time.

What is true in natural science is also true in the science of Talmud. There are certain Talmudists who, like the elder Twiloans, believe that the essence of learning is the quantification of halachic data. The practitioners of these darchei ha’limud (methods of learning) content themselves with identifying “patterns” or “trends” in the various sugyos throughout Shas. They may even sharpen their findings with analytical labels (such as “cheftza” and “gavra”) and formulate the various patterns using the chakirah method of presentation. Unfortunately, such Talmudists have missed the boat. They become so preoccupied with detecting halachic patterns that they begin to think that the patterns are the ideas – that their descriptions are definitions.

Like the charts and formulae of the elder Twiloans, the explanations of these Talmudists are useful and necessary, but they are not the essence. The true Talmudists go beyond the quantification of halachic data and seek the invisible ball – the conceptual theory that gives meaning to the halachos. They will collect and organize halachic data and they will attempt to see patterns and trends, but only as a means of discovering the underlying concepts. Any analytical jargon they utilize will only be used to clarify their understanding of the underlying ideas; the analytical terms will only be employed to facilitate thinking, never to replace it.

8 comments:

  1. Do you think it would change anything if the young fellow posited the existence of the ball without first seeing the bulge in the back of the net? Would it still be good science? Or excellent science? Or speculative science? Something else?

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    1. Tough question! I don't know. On the one hand, every scientific theory requires an "intuitive leap," and can either be supported or refuted in light of new data. From that standpoint, positing a ball before noticing the bulge would be in the realm of "good science."

      On the other hand, I sense that there ought to be a distinction between someone who posited the existence of the ball without observing the bulge (a) in light of a rigorous examination of ALL available data, and (b) based on no data whatsoever. If a person did the latter, he might be lucky, but he wouldn't be a scientist.

      But this inevitably leads to the question: What about everything in between? What if this guy theorized on the basis of a single "piece of data"? What about two? What about "half"? Is this quantitative distinction even valid, insofar as the question is concerned?

      Alternatively, was Aristotle a scientist? Is our current definition of "scientist" the measure of all scientists, or do Aristotle and Einstein represent particular stages or manifestations of a definition of "science" which is broader than the alien analogy is acknowledging?

      I don't know, but I like the questions!

      What do you think?

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    2. This question touches on what is, in my opinion, one of the trickiest points in the derech: when is a theory sufficiently justified by the facts and when is it too speculative? I don't know of a concrete rule to determine this. As far as I know, it can only be assessed by intuition on a case by case basis.

      Regarding the soccer example: the bulge in the goal seems like a gimme. Maybe it is based upon my familiarity with soccer and sports, but it seems to me that the data before the bulge should have been sufficient evidence for good scientists to deduce and support the existence of a ball.

      I don't think that most svaras or scientific theories are as simple as noticing the bulge in the back of the net. I assume that Lederman would agree that this example is an oversimplification, but I think that his analogy would work better without the bulge.

      While a part of the derech is picking up on subtleties like the bulge, I don't think it's the essence. Einstein didn't discover the special theory of relativity by noticing a bulge, but by finding a compelling way to conceptualize space and time which explained all the known facts, and solved the open problems.

      So too in learning gemara. The challenge begins with good fact finding, questioning, and clue seeking. But that sets the stage for the conceptual formulation of a theory which emerges from the facts, questions and clues, and which truly gives meaning to the sugya (as the soccer game explains the data).

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  2. Nice post. Sort of inspired by the comment from REF/RAZ: Was the youngster not also collecting data, except that the "quality" of his data (seeing a bulge in the net) was such that he was inspired to postulate the idea of the ball? Would the other Twiloans have been similarly inspired had they instead looked for rare events rather than what was in front of them. If that is the case, is the "good science" performed by somehow "knowing what to look for" (as in having an ability to observe things that will inspire a conceptual theory rather than the noise) or is the ability to independently come up with good postulations (such as REF/RAZ suggests) what is important. Or is it some combination of both (and are they related)?

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    1. See my response to REZ/RAF above. I do think that part of "good science" is having an intuition of "knowing what to look for" - that is, where to look for data in order to arrive at a theory, and where to look for data that would support or disprove one's theory. I also think that part of "good science" is being able to conceive of a good theory, which is also related to intuition.

      As for the precise "mixture" (don't take that term seriously) of what makes a good scientist . . . that's something I'm going to have to think about. I do plan on posting more excerpts on this topic in the near future. We'll see where that leads, though I am awaiting a response from REF/RAZ to his own question.

      (Perhaps we'll even be lucky enough to get a response from RAZ/REF, though I don't know if he's reading this comment thread.)

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  3. Can you give a one-sentence summary of the Brisker derech in light of this post?

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    1. My "non-answer" answer is: The Brisker derech is nothing more than the application of the scientific method to halachic data.

      I call that a "non-answer" answer because it is meaningless without a definition of the scientific method. I'd have to think about my own answer to that question, but I can give you my Gemara rebbi's answer: "The essence of the scientific methodology is to view the particulars as an expression of universals." If you are interested in reading an essay he wrote on that topic, email me (kolhaseridim at gmail) and I'll send you the link - but only if you tell me who you are first.

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  4. Can you provide a talmudic example to illustrate the point in this post?

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