Showing posts with label Mussar. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mussar. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 27, 2022

Sefer Mishlei’s Jargon-Filled Introduction (Mishlei 1:1-6)

The Torah content for this week has been sponsored by Ellis and Janice Cohen in memory of Rabbi Moskowitz zt"l.

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Artwork: Secret Rendezvous, by Manuel Castañón



Sefer Mishlei’s Jargon-Filled Introduction (Mishlei 1:1-6)

The introduction of Sefer Mishlei (the Book of Proverbs) poses a unique difficulty for the beginner. To experience it yourself, read this:

The mashalim (proverbs, examples, allegories) of Shlomo, son of Dovid, king of Israel: la’daas (to know) chochmah (wisdom) and mussar (discipline), le’havin (to understand) statements of binah (understanding); lakachas (to take) mussar haskel (intelligent discipline), tzedek (righteousness), and mishpat (justice), and meisharim (uprightness); to give ormah (cunning) to pesaim (simpletons), to a naar (youth) daas (knowledge) and mezimah (scheming); a chacham (wise man) will hear and increase lekach (learning), and a navon (man of understanding) will acquire tachbulos (strategies); le’havin (to understand) mashal (parable) and melitzah (allegory), the words of the chachamim (wise) and their chidos (riddles).

The difficulty is that these pesukim are chock-full of Mishleic jargon! How is the beginner supposed to know what these terms mean? It is tempting to answer: “by making recourse to the commentators, who explain what each term means,” but that answer is problematic for several reasons. It is a stretch to assume that Shlomo ha’Melech intended for his words to only be understandable with the aid of commentaries, especially considering his explicit statement that this book is intended not only for a chacham (wise man) and a navon (man of understanding), but also for a pesi (simpleton) and a naar (youth). Furthermore, if you read through the commentaries, you’ll quickly see that there is no consensus on what these terms mean. Each commentator has his own set of definitions. How is the beginner to know on whom to rely? This also raises the question: How did the commentators, themselves, arrive at their own definitions? Presumably, by learning through the rest of the book to see how Shlomo uses these terms. But if these commentators were only able to decipher his terminology by learning through the entire book, then we’re back at square one: What does Shlomo expect the reader to do with this opening paragraph? Skip it, read the rest of the book, and then start from the beginning again? Unlikely.

Therefore, I would like to suggest that Shlomo’s intent was not for the novice to fully understand or precisely define these terms at this early stage of learning, but merely to identify them as desirable objectives and to be motivated on that basis to learn Mishlei as a means of achieving these objectives – despite not knowing exactly what they mean. For example, the average reader will not be able to define chochmah, but they’ll likely have an intuitive notion of what chochmah is and will know that it is a valuable asset. Tzedek and mishpat can be quite difficult to define – as Socrates demonstrated – yet, everyone knows that they are virtues. The beginner may not know exactly what type of tachbulos (strategies) are being promised, but he knows that having strategies is better than not having them, and if even a navon can learn strategies from this book, then it must be worth learning!

There is no other book of Tanach which explicitly states its goals from the get-go. Shlomo begins this way in order to convey to his readers that unlike the other books of Tanach, which contain a mix of theoretical and practical knowledge, Sefer Mishlei is primarily a practical book, and these are its practical objectives. As his readers make their way through the book, these explicitly stated objectives at the beginning will serve as beacons or goalposts which guide their learning, prompting them to search for chochmah, mussar, tzedek, ormah, etc. in every pasuk. Although they’ll begin with the most rudimentary grasp of these terms, their definitions will become clearer and clearer the more Mishlei they learn. Eventually, they’ll be able to develop working definitions of the terminology (as can be seen, for example, in my 2017 article The Mishleic Spectrum: A Glossary of Mishlei Personalities, which needs to be updated). Ultimately, they’ll formulate their own opinions, just as the commentators did.

And if this challenge proves too difficult, they may enlist the help of their teachers – whether living teachers or commentaries – and rely on their definitions as “training wheels” until they begin to form their own views.
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Friday, June 29, 2018

Parashas Balak: Bilam as a Teacher of Ethics

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Artwork: Skirsdag Flayer, by Austin Hsu


Parashas Balak: Bilam as a Teacher of Ethics

Earlier this week I made the following comment on Facebook: "We all have our least-favorite parshiyos, and Balak is mine." A friend of mine, no doubt trying to appeal to my interests, replied that he views Balak as one of the "Mishlei parshiyot, illustrating archetypes of various, mostly negative, character traits." His comment got me thinking. I associated to a mishnah in Avos 5:19 (or 22):
Whoever has the following three traits is among the students of Avraham Avniu, and [whoever has] three different traits is among the students of the wicked Bilam. Those who have an ayin tovah (good eye), a ruach nemuchah (humble spirit), and a nefesh shefalah (lowly soul) are among the students of Avraham Avinu. Those who have an ayin raah (bad eye), a ruach gevohah (arrogant spirit), and a nefesh rechavah (greedy soul) are among the students of the wicked Bilam. 
How are the students of Avraham Avinu different from the students of the wicked Bilam? The students of Avraham Avinu enjoy [the fruits of their good deeds] in Olam ha'Zeh (This World) and inherit Olam ha'Ba (the World to Come), as it is stated: "To cause those who love Me to inherent [an everlasting] possession (i.e. Olam ha'Ba), and I will fill their storehouses (in Olam ha'Zeh)" (Mishlei 8:21). But the students of the wicked Bilam inherit Gehinom and descend into the Be'er Shachas (the Well of Destruction), as it is stated: "And You, O God, shall lower them into the well of destruction, men of bloodshed and deceit shall not live out half their days; but as for me, I will trust in You" (Tehilim 55:54).
The Rambam [1] provides a full elucidation of this mishnah:
We have already explained several times that "ayin tovah" means histapkus (contentedness with what one has) "nefesh shefalah" refers to prishus (separation from sexual indulgence), and "ruach nemuchah" refers to anavah mufleges (excessive humility), as has been explained in the previous chapter. 
The three [other traits mentioned by the mishnah] are the opposite: lehitus ha'mamon (craving after money), which is "ayin raah," taavas ha'mishgal (sexual lust) is "nefesh rechavah," and gaavah (haughtiness) is "ruach gevohah." 
The three [aforementioned] virtues are widely known to be associated with Avraham Avinu. Therefore, anyone who has these three virtues is called "a student of Avraham," since he conducts himself with [Avraham's] traits. Likewise, anyone who has these three vices is "a student of Bilam," since he conducts himself with [the latter's] traits. 
I will now mention the places in which these virtues are explained in relation to Avraham Avinu and these vices in relation to Bilam - all of which are pesukim in the Torah
Avraham Avinu's ayin tovah is [reflected] in his statement to the King of Sedom: "Neither a thread nor a shoelace will I take from anything that is yours" (Bereishis 14:23), for this is the utmost degree of histapkus, for he gave up a huge amount of money and didn't profit from it even in the slightest degree. "Prishus" we see from his statement to Sarah when he came to Egypt: "Behold! Now I know that you are a woman of beautiful appearance" (ibid. 12:11), and the [Oral Torah's] explanation comes [and explains] that he had never fully gazed at her beauty before that day, which is the utmost degree of prishus. It also said regarding Hagar, after he married her: "Behold! Your maidservant is in your hand" (ibid. 16:6), which implies that he had no involvement in enjoying her or behaving flirtatiously with her [prior to then]; and when Sarah asked to send her away with Yishmael, the pasuk testifies that it this was only difficult for him because of the matter of Yishmael alone, in order to clear him of the suspicion that he was sexually inclined towards [Hagar] - all of these are signs of prishus - as it was stated, "and the matter concerning Avram's son greatly displeased him" (ibid. 21:11). As for humility - this is [reflected] in his statement: "I am dust and ashes" (ibid. 18:27)
Bilam's craving for money was publicized when he came from Aram Naharayim on account of the money with which he was hired to harm Israel, as it is stated: "and because he hired Bilam ben Beor from Pesor in Aram Naharayim to curse you" (Devarim 23:5). The sexual lust [of Bilam] is reflected in how he advised Balak to set loose the [Midianite] women to engage in promiscuity with Israel and to be harlots; were it not for this disposition of sexual lust in his soul - which the matter was pleasing and desirable to him - he wouldn't have commanded [them] to do this, for a person's commandments are the reflection of his mind, since good people do not command others to do bad things, but to avoid them. The pasuk says: "Behold! - they caused Bnei Yisrael, by the word of Bilam, to commit a betrayal against Hashem regarding the matter of Peor" (Bamidbar 31:16), and the Sages said: "Bilam would have sexual relations with his donkey" (Sanhedrin 105a). Without a doubt, someone whose thoughts were this way would have [engaged in such] actions. But his haughtiness is [reflected] in the statement "The words of the one who hears the sayings of God [and knows the knowledge of the Supreme One, who sees the vision of Shaddai, while fallen and with uncovered eyes" (Bamidbar 24:16).
My friend's statement about the contents of Parashas Balak is correct: Chazal's interpretation of Parashas Balak is quite Mishleic indeed!

But this raises a question: Why did Chazal in Avos even need to explain these virtues and vices through Avraham and Bilam? Why couldn't the mishnah have just said: "Anyone who has these three traits is praiseworthy ... anyone who has these three vices is worthy of condemnation," or something like that? Why did Chazal frame these ethical teachings in terms of specific individuals?

The Ralbag [2] answers this question in his explanation of the Torah regimen and its parts:
The second part [of the Torah regimen] encompasses ethical-political wisdom in those areas in which commandment and prohibition are not possible, due to the improbability of attaining perfection of this nature among the masses of people to the same degree as it is possible [to attain perfection] in the realm of Torah-mitzvos. 
For example, if the Torah commanded us to only get angry over something that is worth getting angry about, and in the proper measure, and in the proper place, and at the proper time; or to only be happy about what is worthy of being happy about, and in the proper measure, and in the proper place, and at the proper time; and to only overpower someone who is proper to overpower, and in the proper measure, and at the proper place, and at the proper time; and likewise with all of the other traits and dispositions – [if the Torah did this,] all people would be in a continual state of sin, with the exception of an extreme minority. 
Matters of this nature are not fitting to be subject to command and prohibition, for this will bring people to be more lax in their fulfillment of the other mitzvos, once they see that it is impossible to fulfill many mitzvos of the Torah. For this reason, the Torah teaches us about these matters by telling us stories of our predecessors, who were widely known for their perfection of behavior, in order to guide us to follow in their footsteps and to emulate their behavior. And [the Torah] also told us stories of some of the despicable actions they did, and the harmful consequences that came from them, in order that we avoid doing these actions
According to the Ralbag, Hashem could have legislated ethical-political middos-development through halacha - that is, He could have commanded us in laws regulating anger and joy which were as detailed as the laws regulating kashrut and Shabbos - but He didn't do this. Why not? Because it would be impossible for people to adhere to this degree of self-control in their emotions, reactions, and dispositions, and they would inevitably sin. And because people would violate these laws constantly, and be in a constant state of sin, the observance of Torah as a whole would suffer, since people would begin regarding the other areas of halacha with greater laxity and less diligence out of sheer hopelessness.

In order to solve this problem, Hashem incorporated ethical-political development into the Torah regimen through role-models, both good and bad. There are several advantages to this method of inculcating ethics:
(1) This allows for a more flexible, personalized, circumstances-dependent path of ethical-political development for each individual, rather than the rigid, uniform, exacting medium of halachic legislation.
(2) By embedding these ethical-political guidelines in concrete cases involving actual people, it becomes much easier for students of all levels to learn from the behavior of these role models on a variety of levels. Instead of learning abstract principles about humility and haughtiness, the students of Torah can look at people like Avraham, Moshe, Bilam, and Haman, and derive developmentally appropriate lessons from the concrete examples, all in accordance with the developmental level of the student. 
(3) Psychologically there are a number of advantages to learning proper and improper middos from role models - too many to specify in this blog post. Perhaps the best proof of this is that the Torah commandment which obligates to develop good middos is "ve'halachta bi'drachav" - "you shall walk in His ways" (Devarim 28:9). Hashem didn't simply say, "Get good middos!" but rather, "Emulate My ways." Hashem was even willing to compromise the presentation of His Oneness by exponentially multiplying the number of anthropomorphic descriptions of Him in the Torah. That is how important it was to Him (so to speak) to utilize this method of ethical instruction in His Torah. 
This sheds a new light on why the Rambam devoted so much space to bringing proofs from the pesukim to show how the three virtues and three vices are reflected in the Torah's accounts of Avraham and Bilam. His objective isn't just to bring proofs for the mishnah's contentions, but to direct our attention to read the Scriptural narratives about these two people through the ethical lens provided by the mishnah.

According to the Ralbag, we should read ALL of the narratives in the Torah about ALL of the main figures through this ethical lens. Indeed, the Ralbag follows this approach in his Nach commentaries. At the end of every section, he identifies toaliyos b'middos (ethical lessons) that we learn from the behavior and decisions of the Torah's tzadikim (righteous people) and reshaim (wicked people).

And this brings us back to my initial feelings about Parashas Balak. Not only was my friend correct to point me to the Mishleic nature of this parashah, but in doing so, he reminded me that this framework can and should be applied to ALL of the Torah's narrative accounts.

Apparently, Parashas Balak is more interesting than I realized! I just needed the right approach.

[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Avos Chapter 5
[2] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on the Torah: Introduction

Wednesday, June 20, 2018

Mishlei 12:9 - Investing in Kavod

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Mishlei 12:9 - Investing in Kavod

משלי יב:ט
טוֹב נִקְלֶה וְעֶבֶד לוֹ מִמִּתְכַּבֵּד וַחֲסַר לָחֶם:

Mishlei 12:9
Better to be a degraded laborer than to maintain your honor and lack bread. 

[Note: the phrase "eved lo" is ambiguous and grammatically awkward; my translation as "degraded laborer" follows the approach of Rabbeinu Yonah and Ralbag.]

The major questions on this pasuk are:
(1) "Better" in what sense? This is the first question one should ask on any pasuk which says "X is better than Y." By what metric or value are we measuring "better"?
(2) "Degraded" in what sense? There are many forms of degradation, and "degraded laborer" is rather vague.
(3) What does it mean by "one who maintains his honor"? The reflexive "miskabed" implies that this person is actively the cause of his own kavod. What does this mean?
(4) Why would we think otherwise? In other words, what decision-making mistake does this pasuk come to remove, and how does it do so? Specifically, how can this person insist on "maintaining his honor" if he "lacks bread"? Isn't this an obviously bad prioritization?
[You know what time it is: thinking time! Stop here to think about the pasuk and the questions on your own. When you're ready, read on.]

Here's my four-sentence summary of the main idea:
Everyone seeks kavod (honor or dignity) and tries to avoid degradation. However, the chacham (wise man) recognizes that it may be necessary to forego kavod in the short run and temporarily endure degradation if this will ultimately lead to a long-term kavod which is stable; for example, he will be willing to do menial labor if this is necessary for supporting himself and his family, knowing that this will allow him to maintain his dignity in the long run. The fool, on the other hand, will strive to artificially maintain or increase his kavod in the short term, even if this will result in a much greater degradation in the long run; for example, he will refuse to do jobs which he considers to be "beneath him" in a vain attempt to preserve his kavod, not thinking about how much kavod he will ultimately lose when he hits rock bottom in his poverty. There are at least three factors which contribute to the fool’s mistake: (1) viewing kavod as a real and inherent attribute of himself rather than a relational circumstance which is subject to change; (2) his unwillingness to face the fact that his kavod might not last, since this realization would interfere with his ability to enjoy his kavod; and (3) the fool's natural tendency to be preoccupied with immediate pleasure rather than long-term consequences.
Like much of Mishlei's content, this idea is simple - and yet, people make this mistake all the time. There are countless stories of highly qualified professionals who remain "unemployed" for years, telling themselves that "they can't find work," when in actuality, they would be better off temporarily taking "an inferior job" to make ends meet until they can find a better job which is more suited to their qualifications or aspirations. There are Jewish families who go on expensive vacations and throw lavish bar mitzvahs and weddings, and then apply for tuition assistance for their kids' private school education because they "can't afford full tuition." There are people who are deep in credit card debt, but continue to spend money they don't have in order to "maintain appearances." There are people who lack a skill or area of knowledge but fake it for the kavod, until eventually their ignorance is exposed and they suffer a greater level of shame than they would have if they admitted their shortcomings from the start.

So while our pasuk's idea is simple, it is also necessary. The mind can recognize the truth of an idea, but that doesn't mean that it's real to the emotions. Mishlei's approach to this dilemma is to go over these simple ideas again, and again, and again - each time from a slightly different angle, in order to have a slightly different impact on the emotions. Eventually, over time, these ideas will become real to the emotions, and will begin to affect one's decision-making.

This pasuk is also a great example of Mishlei's "should-less" approach to mussar (character development). Shlomo ha'Melech doesn't say, "You shouldn't care about kavod!" nor does he say, "You should get a job in order to sustain your family instead of your dignity!" He knows that this kind of mussar is useless. Instead, he says: "Look - you know and I know that you want kavod and don't want degradation. That's totally fine. I'm not going to try to dissuade you from seeking kavod or avoiding degradation. But I'll warn you: if you try to maintain your kavod in the short run by refusing to do work which you deem to be 'beneath you,' you are ultimately going to suffer a much bigger loss of kavod than you might realize, and that degradation will make you suffer big time. Instead, I advise you to temporarily take a lower job until you can get back onto your feet and earn enough money to be restored to the social status that you desire. Yes, this will involve a sacrifice of kavod in the short-run, but think of it as an investment: it is better for you to invest in kavod now for the sake of a long-term stable 'kavod profit' than to splurge on short-term kavod at the cost of major degradation." 

The problem with so much the mussar that's out there today is that it aims to change character by trying to alter our desires directly. Mishlei's approach is indirect and non-confrontational. It works with the emotions instead of against them. It takes the desires we have and shows us how to satisfy them using chochmah, and shows us that if we don't use chochmah, we'll get the opposite of what we desire. Over time, if we continue to apply this type of mussar to our everyday decision-making, our desires will naturally evolve without us ever trying to force the change. 

Tuesday, June 21, 2016

Walk-through of Mishlei 15:5

I thought it might be a good idea to follow up yesterday's How to Learn Mishlei: a Step by Step Guide post with an example of the method in action. I was going to write up a new blog post when I remembered that I wrote a walk-through of a Mishlei pasuk back in 2012. I reread it, concluded that it has withstood the test of time, and decided to edit it for re-posting today. Enjoy!

Artwork: Despise, by Todd Lockwood


Walk-through of Mishlei 15:5

Introduction

This post is intended as a sample analysis of an "average" pasuk in Mishlei, using the five-step method outlined in How to Learn Mishlei: a Step by Step Guide. I say "average" because in truth, there is no average pasuk in Mishlei. Each pasuk is a little, unique, self-contained world of insight. I hope that this post succeeds in giving you a sample of that flavor. 

Without further ado, let us commence with the first phase!

Phase #1: Reading and Translation

Here is the text of our pasuk:

משלי טו:ה
אֱוִיל יִנְאַץ מוּסַר אָבִיו וְשֹׁמֵר תּוֹכַחַת יַעְרִם:

I'll begin by translating the unequivocal terms into English, but I'll leave the ambiguous phrases as transliterations for now. Here is the first attempt at translation:
An eveel will despise the discipline of his father, but a shomer-rebuke will gain ormah.
If I had to settle on a working translation at this point, it would probably look something like this:
A fool will despise the discipline of his father, but one who guards rebuke will become cunning.
But we must remember that this is only a working translation. It is important to remain flexible as we proceed through our analysis, and constantly revisit the original Hebrew to modify our translation. 

Now that we've read and translated our pasuk, it's time for the real analysis to begin!

Phase #2: Questions 

For the sake of thoroughness, I am going to spell out all of the questions in as much detail as I can. In addition to formulating the questions concisely (in bold), I will elaborate on all of them and try to explain the import of each one. As I see it, there are seven major questions: 
  1. What is an "eveel"? Shlomo ha'Melech is the taxonomist of fools par excellence. His book features a whole cast of fool-characters, each plagued by a different type of foolishness: eveel, pesi, leitz, ksil, boor, chasar leiv, naar, atzel etc. Sometimes these terms are used in a technical sense with a specific definition; other times they are used generically and interchangeably. Sometimes the definition can (and should) be derived from the specific context; other times it must be derived from elsewhere in Mishlei. Sometimes it is absolutely necessary to know the definition of the fool in order to understand the main idea of the pasuk; other times, the fool is just being used to highlight one of his specific features (e.g. a particular habit he has, or an action he does, or an emotion he experiences), and it is not necessary to understand his nature in order to get the main idea of the pasuk. As you can see, there are no rules for how to approach this type of question. Follow your intuition, and hone it over time.
  2. Why does the pasuk focus on the eveel's rejection of mussar av (his father's discipline), specifically? The second half of the pasuk seems to be talking about all rebuke, not just rebuke from one's father. If so, why does the first half of the pasuk zero in on rebuke from such a specific source?
  3. What is the meaning of "shomer tochachah"? The word "shomer" means "to guard," "to keep," and "to watch over." It is an unusual term to use in relation to rebuke. One would expect the pasuk to say something like, "one who listens to rebuke" or "one who accepts rebuke." 
  4. What is ormah? Just as Shlomo ha'Melech classifies fools, each according to their particular type of foolishness, he also classifies chachamim (wise people) according to their intellectual virtues. There are as many words for chachamim in Mishlei as there are for fools: chacham, navon, meivin, ish tevunos, yashar, arum, ish mezimos, etc. The "sometimes" and "other times" guidelines stated above (in Question #1) apply to these terms as well. In our pasuk, however, it seems that the meaning of ormah is central to the main idea, and we will need to precisely define what it means.
  5. How does being a shomer-tochachah cause a person to gain ormah? Our pasuk posits a cause-and-effect relationship: if a person is a shomer-tochachah, he will gain ormah. How does this work? For example, let's say you rebuke me for being a reckless driver or for waiting until the last minute to study for tests. I can see how I would benefit from such a rebuke, but that benefit would be in terms of avoiding traffic accidents and bad grades - not in terms of "gaining ormah," which seems to be a much broader quality.
  6. How is a shomer-tochachah the opposite of an eveel who rejects his father's discipline? This brings us to a huge methodology principle in Mishlei. The vast majority of Mishlei pesukim are to be viewed as a contrast in opposites; the content of the first half of the pasuk will, in some sense, be the opposite of the content of the second half. Sometimes it is obvious how the two halves are opposites, but in other cases, it seems that the two halves are slightly "off." In some cases, the first half seems to have absolutely nothing to do with the second half. When this happens, our goal is to figure out how to understand the pasuk such that we can grasp the oppositional symmetry. In our case, we can assume that the shomer-tochachah who gains ormah is the opposite of the eveel who rejects his father's discipline. The question is: How?
  7. What is the subject of the pasuk? Every pasuk is about a specific subject, and unless you can identify that subject, you will not fully understand the pasuk. In this case, it is clear that the subject has something to do with rebuke, but it is unclear whether the subject is more specific than that. (Oftentimes the subject of the pasuk will emerge from thinking about how the two halves of the pasuk are opposites, but it's still a good idea to ask this question separately.) 
There is an eighth question that some people might wonder about: What is the difference between tochachah and mussar? I won't say that this is a bad question per se, but it's not the type of question I concern myself with. Almost all meforshim disregard such questions. The only exception is the Malbim, whose entire derech hinges on such subtleties of the pasuk's language. The other meforshim have no trouble with the notion that Shlomo ha'Melech employed synonyms, since that's the way normal people talk (a la dibrah Torah ki'lshon bnei adam - "the Torah speaks in the language of man"). For this reason, I don't treat questions like this as "major questions," nor do I assume that the main idea will emerge from scrutinizing such subtleties. Instead, I keep these types of questions in the back of my mind while I learn the pasuk. If they trigger my intuition, so be it. If not, no problem. If, after arriving at the main idea, I can see an added dimension reflected in the subtlety of the lashon, then that's great. If I can't, it doesn't bother me in the slightest. 

[At this point in the original blog post I wrote a blurb about Mishlei methodology. I wish I had remembered this blurb when writing yesterday's post, since yesterday's post covered much of the same material. In order to spare the regular readers of my blog from redundancy, I took this part out. If you're interested in reading it, I've included it as an addendum at the end of this post.]

Phase #3: Thinking

Much of this step is intuitive, which makes it hard to capture in writing. I will do my best to share the steps I took in my analysis of this pasuk to arrive at the main idea.

Three out of the seven questions we raised are "definition questions" (#1, #3, and #4), and since it is impossible to understand what the pasuk is saying until we understand what it is talking about, it seems like these questions are the logical place to start. 

I knew that out of all of Mishlei's terms for fools, "eveel" (lit. "fool") is the most generic. I sensed that for our purposes we wouldn't need to define the nature of the eveel. All we would need to know about the eveel is that he despises all discipline - a fact which is clear from many pesukim in Mishlei. For example: "Fear of Hashem is the beginning of knowledge, but eveelim scorn wisdom and discipline" (1:7) and "The way of the eveel is upright in his own eyes, but one who listens to counsel is wise" (12:15). Notice how this strengthens our Question #2. Considering the fact that the eveel, by definition, despises all discipline, then why does the pasuk specifically refer to his rejection of his father's discipline? 

The next step was to define "ormah" (lit. "cunning" or "cleverness") which I had done previously in my Mishlei learning. My working definition of "ormah" means knowledge and awareness of how emotions distort thinking. How did I arrive at this conclusion? By inferring the meaning of "ormah" and "arum" from their opposites: "pesayus" and "pesi," which refer (respectively) to a specific type of foolishness and the fool it characterizes, respectively. Let's do a quick overview of this type of foolishness.

Shlomo ha'Melech begins his book by stating that Mishlei is designed "to provide pesa'im with ormah" (1:4). Likewise, "When the scoffer is struck, the pesi gains ormah" (19:25). Throughout Mishlei, the pesi is contrasted with the arum. For example: "A pesi believes everything, but an arum understands every step" (14:15) and "An arum sees evil and hides, but the pesa'im transgress and are punished" (22:3). It is reasonable to conclude that by understanding who the pesi is and the type of knowledge/intelligence he lacks, we will understand ormah and what it means to become an arum.

Rabbeinu Yonah (on Mishlei 1:4), paraphrasing Chazal (Eiruvin 19a), defines pesi (lit. "one who is seduced") as "one who is mispateh b'yitzro" (lit. "seduces himself with his own inclination"). In other words, a pesi is someone whose convictions are heavily influenced by his emotions. To a pesi, what feels good is good, and what feels true is true. He is "seduced" by his psyche into thinking that his feelings and first impressions reflect reality, and he is oblivious to how his emotions distort his thinking. Rabbeinu Yonah (on Mishlei 1:22) says that if the pesi were aware of the distortion-capacity of his own emotions, he would not be so quick to jump to conclusions, and he would be much more careful in his thinking.

Thus, if "ormah" is what a pesi lacks and if an arum is the opposite of a pesi, it follows that ormah refers to knowledge and awareness of how emotions distort one's thinking. This quality of ormah can be used for the good, as it is throughout Mishlei, or it can be used for evil, as in the case of the snake in Gan Eden: "and the snake was more arum than all the beasts of the field" (Bereishis 3:1). The nachash used its ormah - its knowledge of how human emotions distort thinking - to lure Chavah into eating from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. 

Back to our pasuk. The most mysterious phrase here is "shomer tochachah." I thought about the clues I discovered when formulating the questions, namely: 
  • We'd expect Mishlei to say "listens to rebuke" or "accepts rebuke," so "shomer tochachah" must mean something above and beyond that. (Question #3)
  • Whatever "shomer tochachah" means, it must somehow lead to ormah. (Question #5)
  • The shomer-tochachah who gains ormah is the opposite of the eveel who despises his father's discipline. (Question #6)
  • If the eveel despises all rebuke, why does the pasuk focus on his rejection of mussar av (his father's discipline) in particular? (Question #2)
It was then that I had my "EUREKA!" moment - like the "click" on a luggage combination-lock - and the main idea rapidly unfolded from there. 

I realized that mussar av evokes a different type of emotional resistance than all other mussar, due to the special place that a father holds in a one's psyche. (I don't feel the need to support this with evidence or explanation; anyone who has been rebuked by his father knows what I'm talking about.) The eveel is oblivious to the uniqueness of this emotional reaction. Even though he reacts much harsher to his father's discipline than anyone else's, he will give no thought to this difference. Why? Because he lacks awareness of his own emotions - or, in Mishlei terminology, he lacks ormah. I realized that that is the subject of the first half of the pasuk: not the eveel's rejection of mussar in general, but rather, the eveel's lack of ormah as evidenced by the nature of his rejection of his father's mussar in particular. (Yeah, ya might want to read that sentence a few times.)

It follows, then, that the shomer-tochachah is someone who does have an awareness of his own emotions. A good sign that we are correct is that this is exactly what the pasuk says: "The shomer-tochachah will become an arum." In other words, the shomer tochachah will gain self-awareness and knowledge of own his emotions and their power to distort his thinking. This is when I knew I was on the right track.

I realized I was now in a position to define "shomer tochachah." How can a person relate to tochachah in a manner that will gain him an increased awareness of his own emotions? It must be by watching over his own emotional reactions to the tochachah he receives. By monitoring his inner world, he will gain knowledge and awareness of his own emotions (i.e. ormah). In other words, the shomer-tochachah doesn't just look to the tochachah as a way to improve his life in the localized area of decision-making which was the subject of the tochachah. Rather, he looks at the tochachah as a tremendous opportunity to learn about himself by analyzing his own reactions to being rebuked. This type of knowledge will benefit him in all areas of decision-making; awareness of his own emotions will help him to guard against distortions in his thinking, and he'll be more in tune with his own psychological needs and will be able to know what to pursue in his decision-making, thereby leading to healthier and more realistic decisions. 

I then realized that the root SH.M.R. here is not being used in the sense of "guard," "protect," or "keep," but in the sense of "examine," "watch over," or "monitor," as in "ve'haya lachem l'mishmeres ad arbah asar yom la'chodesh ha'zeh" (Shemos 12:6) which means "[The Pesach lamb] shall be yours for examination until the fourteenth day of this month." Thus, I decided to translate "shomer tochachah" as "one who monitors rebuke," meaning, "one who monitors, examines, and analyzes his own emotional response to the rebuke that he receives."

This is when the subject of the pasuk came clearly into focus. The subject of this pasuk is: rebuke as an opportunity for self-knowledge. The fool misses out on this opportunity, in addition to missing out on the benefit of listening to the rebuke itself. In contrast, the shomer-tochachah seizes this opportunity, in addition to implementing the rebuke in action. 

Phase #4: The Main Idea

Now we are in a position to concisely formulate the main idea. In this phase I try to do what I ask all of my students to do: state the main idea in 1-4 clear sentences. Here is my post-analysis translation of the pasuk, and my summary of the main idea, which became clearer once I began formulating it:
Mishlei 15:5: A fool rejects the discipline of his father, but one who monitors rebuke will become cunning.  
In order to successfully heed rebuke, one must approach it from two angles: (1) practicality (i.e. figuring out how to correct your actions and/or decision-making) and (2) psychology (i.e. continually monitoring and managing your emotional reaction to the rebuke in order to overcome the internal resistances to accepting it and implementing it). One who places the emphasis on the practical dimension of the rebuke will improve his life in that specific area of decision-making, but one who goes beyond that and focuses on the psychological dimension rebuke will gain the additional benefit of becoming cunning; that is to say, he will gain self-awareness and knowledge of his own psyche, which will benefit him in all areas of decision-making. In contrast, the fool not only “scorns [all] wisdom and discipline” (Mishlei 1:7), but he is so out of touch with his own emotions that he fails to recognize the nature of his own psychological resistances, as evidenced by the especial disdain he harbors towards his father’s discipline in particular. Consequently, he will suffer the localized consequences of ignoring the rebuke, as well as the widespread consequences of his lack of cunning. 
Now, if we stopped here, we would - at the very least - have a nice idea. But our goal is not only to learn nice ideas, but to learn from the teachings of Shlomo ha'Melech. In order to make sure we've accomplished this goal, we must conclude our analysis with the final phase.

Phase #5: Testing the Main Idea

Here is where we do our final check-over to see if we have actually understood the pasuk
  • Does the idea make sense? Check. Not only does it make sense, but it resonates with my real-world experience, as all true ideas (ideally) should. 
  • Did I answer all of the major questions? Check. 
  • Does the pasuk read smoothly according to this idea, in a manner that expresses the idea without feeling forced? Check. 
Conclusion

And that, my friends, is a walk-through of a typical Mishlei pasuk! I hope this was helpful not only in understanding how I arrived at this particular idea, but in demonstrating my approach to Mishlei in general. Let me know what you thought of this idea, and the "walk-through" format of this blog post. If this is something people want, maybe I'll do more in the future!


Addendum: Methodology - How to Learn Mishlei

Before we analyze our pasuk, I'd like to state a brief preface about methodology in Mishlei. My Mishlei rebbi once told me that the purpose of methodology serves two purposes: (1) to set up the facts prior to thinking, and (2) to avoid logical mistakes in thinking. However, when it comes time for the actual thinking itself, "You should think as though there is no method." In other words, your mind should be totally free to explore and to be creative. In The Evolution of Physics, Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld describe the transition from the stage of fact gathering to the stage of thinking: 
In nearly every detective novel since the admirable stories of Conan Doyle there comes a time where the investigator has collected all the facts he needs for at least some phase of his problem. These facts often seem quite strange, incoherent, and wholly unrelated. The great detective, however, realizes that no further investigation is needed at the moment, and that only pure thinking will lead to a correlation of the facts collected. So he plays his violin, or lounges in his armchair enjoying a pipe, when suddenly, by Jove, he has it! Not only does he have an explanation for the clues at hand, but he knows that certain other events must have happened. Since he now knows exactly where to look for it, he may go out, if he likes, to collect further confirmation for his theory.
That is exactly how I experience the learning of Mishlei. First comes the fact-gathering step, in which the focus is on understanding how to read the words in the pasuk. This is followed by a question step, in which the major questions and problems are identified and clearly articulated. Sometimes these steps are sequential, and sometimes they overlap, but both are necessary at the beginning, before the analysis can commence. Otherwise, one runs the risk of projecting preconceived notions onto the pasuk and missing out on what Shlomo ha'Melech is trying to teach. Also, if you don't take the time to articulate your questions in advance, you run the risk of getting so caught up in your idea that you fail to realize that you've neglected to answer a glaring problem in the pasuk

After the initial steps of "the facts" and "the questions" are done, now comes the period of thinking. How the thinking and analysis plays itself out is unpredictable and highly individualized, based on the intuition of each thinker. Once your mind sees a possible idea or approach, explore that idea freely and see where it leads. If it helps, you can think about the idea in conjunction with the pasuk. Personally, I find that it's best to temporarily forget about the pasuk and develop the idea on its own terms.

Once your mind is on the trail of an idea and you've found a good possibility or even a partial possibility (a "kernel" or a "glimmer of an idea," as I sometimes say), you can then return to the pasuk to see whether you have, indeed, figured out what Shlomo ha'Melech is teaching in the pasuk. At this point, it is beneficial to see which of your major questions you have answered and which remain to be answered. You may also find that you'll need to rework the facts in light of your idea. Be prepared to change the entire manner in which you initially read the pasuk

The interplay between facts, questions, thinking, and testing can go up and back and around in cycles. That's totally natural and fine. The main thing is to make sure that you've covered all four bases: that your facts are solid, your questions are precise and answered, your idea is clear and makes sense, and that it flows from the words in the pasuk without being forced.

Once you have succeeded in arriving at a clear idea which naturally flows from the pasuk and answers your major questions AND you can clearly see the application and relevance of this idea to real-world decision-making (which is the subject of Mishlei), then you can say: "I understand this pasuk." And if you can clearly summarize your interpretation of the pasuk in four sentences or less and provide an actual real-world example, then you would receive an "A" in my high school Mishlei class!

Tuesday, August 4, 2015

Mussar without "Should"s and "Shouldn't"s



Mussar without "Should"s and "Shouldn't"s

"Don't should on me" is an aphorism which my Mishlei rebbi is fond of saying in response to people using the word "should." This saying is consistent with his general approach to Mishlei, to mussar, and to life. 

Unlike many approaches to mussar, which involve many "should"s and "shouldn't"s, there is only one "should" in my Mishlei rebbi's derech: "you should learn." His derech is built upon a simple but powerful premise: chochmah changes people. And not just any chochmah, but the type of chochmah that Chazal were referring to when they said, "Who is a chacham? One who sees the consequences of his actions" (Tamid 32b). The type of chochmah which is the subject of the book of Mishlei.

My rebbi's theory is that if you gain knowledge of consequences, and you keep reviewing that knowledge from as many angles as you can until it is crystal clear, that knowledge will eventually start to become real to you. And once it is real to the point where you not only "know" the consequences, but really "see" them, then that knowledge will begin to change your emotions, your behavior, and your decision-making. All you need to do is keep learning and keep reviewing. Over time, your chochmah will become real to you, and will transform you into a different person. 

In this derech, there is no need for "should"s and "shouldn't"s. To the contrary, "should"s and "shouldn't"s can be harmful, since they threaten to supplant chochmah with "authority" (i.e. "superego" or "conscience") as the motivating factor in one's behavior. 

My Mishlei rebbi always reminds us that he has a terrible memory when it comes to sources. Oftentimes, when we ask him about the source of an idea that he quoted, he'll just say, "I got it from learning Mishlei. I can't be more specific than that." I must admit that when I first started learning with him, these attributions to Mishlei didn't sit well with me. I couldn't help but wonder: "Is this really what Mishlei teaches, or is this just my rebbi's idea which he sees in Mishlei, but which I might not?" But the more I learned with him, the more I gradually came to realize how many of his ideas were explicitly stated right there in Mishlei and in its meforshim

My rebbi's approach to mussar which I described above made sense to me from an early age. The more I learned Mishlei, the more convinced I became that my rebbi was correct, and that this derech of mussar was, indeed, the derech of Shlomo ha'Melech himself. Still, it bothered me that I never saw this approach explicitly spelled out in Mishlei or its meforshim

That changed today. I had been learning Chapter 13 of Mishlei with my Mishlei rebbi, and we stumbled upon a little paragraph in the Meiri's commentary to Mishlei 13:5. The Meiri writes:
We have already explained above (Mishlei 6:12) that teaching someone that something bad is bad is half of the rebuke. Likewise, teaching someone that something good is good is half of the motivation [to improve oneself]. Therefore, the majority of Shlomo ha'Melech's statements do not contain any direct commands; rather, [his statements convey] knowledge about something good that it is good, in order to motivate a person to do it, and knowledge about something bad that it is bad, to motivate a person to refrain from it.
The Meiri referred us to an earlier place in his commentary, where he states this principle in different terms and explains how it works:
The wise man said, "Knowledge that a thing is bad is half of teshuvah, and teaching someone that a thing is bad is half of a rebuke." In other words, once a person knows that something is bad, it will be easier for him to subdue his emotions and to do teshuvah from it. That being said, once the chacham informs someone that it is bad, and is the action of scoundrels, that is like a rebuke and a warning not to do it.
The Meiri stated exactly what my Mishlei rebbi has been saying for all of these years. Shlomo ha'Melech's approach to mussar doesn't involve telling us "you should do such-and-such" or "you shouldn't do such-and-such." Rather, Shlomo ha'Melech merely teaches us the benefits and consequences of good and bad decisions, and that knowledge itself changes our emotions and decisions, without any need for explicit commands. 

It is important to note that Shlomo ha'Melech could have easily conveyed this knowledge and ALSO formulated his teachings as "should"s and "shouldn't"s -- but he didn't. Why not? Perhaps because of what I wrote earlier, that "should"s and "shouldn't"s are fueled by the superego, making it harder for the chochmah itself to influence our behavior. Or perhaps because he didn't want us to fall into the trap of labeling certain actions as inherently good or inherently bad. Or maybe it was because he didn't want to limit our application of his lessons to the particular case. 

Whatever the reason, the fact remains that Mishlei - despite its identity as a book of mussar - contains very few "should"s and "shouldn't"s. In my opinion, the Meiri and my Mishlei rebbi give a very compelling explanation for why this is the case. Should you accept this answer? That is something for you to decide yourself.

Thursday, July 23, 2015

Mishlei 13:1 - Listening to Authority

משלי יג:א
בֵּן חָכָם מוּסַר אָב וְלֵץ לֹא שָׁמַע גְּעָרָה:

Mishlei 13:1

A wise son [listens to] the discipline of his father, but a scoffer does not listen to rebuke.

Questions / Difficulties
  1. Why does the pasuk emphasize the ben chacham (wise son) listening to the discipline of his father, specifically? Wouldn't the ben chacham listen to discipline from anyone? Moreover the second half of the pasuk talks about how the leitz (scoffer) reacts to any rebuke - not just the rebuke of his father. Why the asymmetry?
  2. Why does the pasuk have to tell us that the leitz doesn't listen to rebuke? This is part of his very definition! There are many pesukim in Mishlei which highlight this quality of the leitz: "One who chastises the leitz acquires shame for himself" (Mishlei 9:7), "Do not rebuke a leitz, lest he hate you" (ibid 9:8), "A leitz does not like being reproved; he will not go to the wise" (ibid. 15:12), and more. What does our pasuk add? 
  3. Why does the pasuk us the word "gaarah" for rebuke? Usually I'm not bothered by such nuances in the words, but in this case, it's strange. Ordinarily, Mishlei would use more conventional terms, like "tochahah" or "mussar" or even "eitzah." The weird thing about the word "gaarah" is that it means "rebuke" but it also means "shouting" or "shrieking." What does this mean? 

Four-sentence Summary of the Main Idea
All human beings harbor a certain degree of resistance to authority. The ben chacham is able to rise above this resistance even when being disciplined by his father - the supreme psychological authority - and learn from what he has to offer. In contrast, the leitz's psychological resistance is so pronounced that he hears all rebuke as if the rebuker is yelling at him; consequently, his mind will be completely closed to criticism. The only way to get through to the leitz is to bypass his psychological resistance and get him to see the consequences of his actions with his own mind; as long as these consequences are framed in practical terms rather than superego terms (e.g. "bad" "sinful" "evil"), there is at least a remote possibility that he will listen.

Wednesday, July 1, 2015

The Perfect Piña Colada (Doesn't Exist)

Originally posted in September 2009


The Experience

We recently came back from a trip to Hawaii. It was a short trip, but I managed to get in some solid relaxation time on the beach. On one particularly beautiful day I saw people walking around sipping piña coladas from hollowed out pineapple shells, like the one in this picture. It was such a hot and sunny day and those piña coladas looked so cool and refreshing that I decided to buy one for myself. 

I went over to the bar and asked how much a piña colada costs. The bartender responded, "$13". My first reaction was "!!!" but then I told myself, "What the heck. I'm on vacation," and placed my order. He handed me my cocktail and I eagerly went back to my beach chair to enjoy it. 

It was the perfect piña colada ... for about 30 seconds. Then reality kicked in. 

First of all, the thing was massive. Technically speaking I could hold it in one hand, but it was so big and unwieldy that I was afraid I would drop it, so I held it with both hands instead. This severely compromised my bodily position, making it difficulty to recline in my beach chair and drink at the same time. I was forced to hunch forward in my chair while holding the pineapple in both hands. So much for the drinking-while-luxuriating.

Shortly thereafter I began to get annoyed by the freezing temperature of the shell. You see, it would be inefficient to hollow out a fresh pineapple on the spot for every customer, so instead, all of the pineapple shells are hollowed out ahead of time and then frozen until an order is placed. When I first got my piña colada, the pineapple shell was actually encrusted with ice. This made my grip even harder to tolerate.

Then the pineapple started to thaw. If I were drinking from an ordinary glass, I would just get a little bit of condensation-water on my hands, which wouldn't be a big deal, but this was not an ordinary glass; it was a natural fruit co-opted for an unnatural purpose. As the shell thawed, the pineapple juice began dripping onto my hands. That alone wouldn't have been so bad, but as it continued to thaw, the juice ran down my arms, reaching my elbows and quickly drying into a sticky residue.

That wasn't the only ill effect of the melting fruit. As I continued to sip the piña colada, I started to detect the taste of old, freezer-burned pineapple. Apparently, these fruits were not frozen that morning, but were prepared days or weeks in advance. I suddenly realized that the thawing pineapple put me on a clock: the slower I drank, the more my piña colada would be polluted by freezer-taste, but the faster I drank, the less I would enjoy it. It was a lose-lose situation.

Then there was the act of drinking, itself. If I were drinking from an ordinary glass, a straw would have facilitated drinking, but this was not an ordinary glass. The bottom of the hollowed-out pineapple shell was uneven and chunky with shredded pineapple flesh. As I got towards the bottom of my drink, my straw started to get clogged by strands of pineapple, making it necessary for me to periodically cleanse my straw by forcefully and repeatedly expelling air. This became a task in and of itself: to maximize the liquid intake and minimize the pineapple blockage in each sip. Eventually, I realized that I was so caught up in the tedium of this chore that I wasn't even enjoying my drink anymore; I become so preoccupied with the means of drinking that the end became meaningless.

Finally, after resigning myself to the fact that it wasn't worth it to try to get the rest of the liquid, I decided that I was done. But could I then sit back in my chair and resume my relaxation? No sir. My hands and arms were covered with sticky pineapple juice, remember? I had to go and find water to wash them off. As I got and tossed the emptied shell into the trash, I kept on asking myself, "Was this worth $13?"

The Insight

Later on that day, I remembered the piña colada ordeal and decided to reflect on it to see what I could learn from the experience. I recalled the Rambam's definition of imagination (koach ha'dimayon or "the imaginative faculty") as stated in the first chapter of Shemoneh Perakim: 
The imagination encompasses the capacity to retain impressions of sensory experiences when they have vanished from the senses involved, and to combine some and separate others. It is the capacity that enables a person to combine certain experiences he has had along with others he never had nor ever could grasp - for example, to imagine an iron ship sailing [translator's note: sailing, not flying!] in the air, or an individual whose head is in the heavens while his feet are on the ground, or an animal with a thousand eyes, as well as many other such impossible things that are remembered when the imagination combines things and produces a fantasy.
Rabbi Yoni Sacks once compared the imaginative faculty to computer imaging software, like Adobe Photoshop. Photoshop allows you to take an image and manipulate it at will. You can turn it this way and that. You can crop the image, blocking out the parts you don't want to see. You can enlarge one part and make the image sharper while diminishing and blurring another part. You can even import other images from your memory and combine those images with this one to produce new creations. But unlike the images edited on Photoshop, which we know to be false, the images produced by our imaginative faculty can seem very real - so real, that we often mistake them for reality itself.

My experience with the piña colada - well, I should say, my fantasy of the piña colada prior to the actual experience - is a perfect example of the imaginative faculty in action. Rewind to beginning of the story. There I was, happily relaxing in the sun, when I saw people drinking piña coladas out of pineapple shells. These sense impressions were recorded and preserved in my memory as raw material for my imaginative faculty, which then proceeded to select only those images which I found pleasing, ignoring the unpleasant details. My imagination conjured up a tantalizing fantasy, in which I was the one relaxing and sipping my piña colada - an experience which, in my fantasy-world, only enhanced my relaxation without adding any pain or conflict.

But this fantasy was just that: a fantasy - a nonexistent product of the imagination. Had I subjected this fantasy (or the initial sensory data) to the light of reason, I could have easily detected the inevitable, unpleasant aspects of purchasing the piña colada. I could have foreseen the consequences of the decision, weighed them against the pleasure to be gained, and made an informed, reality-based decision. [I'm not saying that the decision to buy the piña colada was intrinsically bad. I might have even concluded that the piña colada would have been worth it, but I would have at least known what I was getting myself into: that in paying $13 for a tasty drink, I was also buying the experience of cold fingers, sticky hands, a frustrating straw, and a time-limit on my enjoyment.]

The Principle

What is true for piña coladas is true for all pleasures. Human beings are driven to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. The Rishonim refer to the source of this drive as the koach ha'misorer ("the emotive faculty) or the koach ha'misaveh ("the appetitive faculty"). If the appetitive faculty only drove us to seek real pleasures, that would be difficult enough to contend with. Unfortunately, most of the pleasures we seek are not really existing experiences, but fantasies - figments of our imagination. Not only do these fantasies greatly exaggerate the amount of pleasure to be gained, but they gloss over all of the painful details and harmful consequences and present the imagined experience as flawless, as my piña colada fantasy illustrates.

At the same time, we mustn't forget that the imaginative faculty is not intrinsically bad, and that without our imagination, the pursuit of human perfection would be impossible. The imaginative faculty is what allows us to recall sensory data which we can analyze in order to gain knowledge and understanding. Without the imaginative faculty, learning would be impossible; the rational faculty would have nothing to work with. Without the imaginative faculty I would not have been able to learn anything from the piña colada episode. I would have had the experience and immediately forgotten it. The same imaginative faculty which produced the fantasies that led me away from reality also functioned as a tool used by my mind to gain insight into reality.

The Ralbag summarizes all of these points in his introduction to the story of Gan Eden:
It has already been explained in On the Soul (3:7) that the imaginative faculty and the emotive faculty are the causes of motion in animals, be it moving towards an object or away from it. This occurs when the imaginative faculty generates a certain image of a perceptible thing, which causes the appetitive faculty to move the animal towards this image or to flee from it. Since it is in this manner that a person can be drawn after the physical pleasures, which remove him from his proper course of human development, the appetitive faculty is the yetzer ha’ra ("evil inclination"), and the imaginative faculty is its guide. It is therefore clear that the imaginative faculty can function in two separate frameworks: either as an instrument utilized in man’s development, or as an instrument which removes him from his path of proper development.
Sforno (Bereishis 3:1), citing a pithy allegory of the Sages, explains this idea in reference to the nachash (snake) in Gan Eden
"The Satan, the yetzer ha'ra, [and the malach ha'maves] are one and the same" (Bava Basra 16a) ... The yetzer ha'ra which causes one to sin is called "nachash," since it resembles a snake, which yields minimal benefit, causes great harm, and is almost completely unseen. The Sages said that Samael rides on top of it (Pirkei de'Rebbi Eliezer 12). [In other words,] the appetitive faculty causes one to sin by means of the imaginative faculty, which incites it with fantasies of physical pleasures, causing one to deviate from the path of perfection intended by God, Blessed is He. The appetitive faculty, along with the fantasies of physical pleasures which incite it, commands the bodily powers and causes them to stray from the objective and from the will of God, Blessed is He, unless the rational faculty stands firm against it and opposes it. Accordingly, the Sages say, "The eyes and the heart are the agents of sin" (Talmud Yerushalmi, Berachos 1:8). Concerning this, the Torah warns us, "And you shall not stray after your hearts and after your eyes" (Bamidbar 15:39).
The Sages refer to the imaginative faculty as "Samael" (suma + El) - that which blinds us to God's reality, or deceives us into believing that God is blind. The snake-like appetitive faculty, or yetzer ha'ra, is allegorically described as a nachash. Samael rides on top of the nachash and steers it in its pleasure-seeking with alluring fantasies. Together, they cause us to sin. The internal forces which moved me to seek out that piña colada are the same forces which cause all sin.

So in the end, considering all of the insight I gained, was the piña colada worth the $13? You bet. Every cent, and infinitely more.