Conversations with non-Jewish English Teachers

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Yes, I am aware that "Judaism" is not a legal Scrabble word, since it is a proper noun.
However, "English" IS a legal Scrabble word, since it is a verb which means
"to cause a billiard ball to spin around its vertical axis."

Conversations with non-Jewish English Teachers

Last week I attended a week-long professional development program for English teachers. Over the course of the week I found myself confronted with a number "culture clash" moments, in which I was confronted by the stark differences between by the intellectual world of my Torah learning and the world inhabited by these non-Jewish, highly educated, predominantly white, "coastal elite" group of English teachers. I'd like to write about three of the insights I had.

Ideas vs. People

One of the in-class exercises we did involved reading and analyzing the claims and arguments made by Michael Levin in his article, "The Case for Torture." I was paired with two other teachers. One of the teachers suggested that we look up when the article was written in order to get a better idea of the rhetorical situation. We agreed that this was a good idea. The other teacher looked up Michael Levin on Wikipedia to find the answer. As he scrolled down to find information about the article, this is what he saw:

After skimming the Wikipedia entry, this teacher huffed: "Oh, so he was a capitalist, misogynistic homophobe." Because I wasn't exactly sure where he was going with this, I hesitantly asked: "But ... we're not factoring that into our analysis of his arguments, right?" to which the teacher replied with a seriously baffled expression on his face: "Why not?" 

What I wanted to say was: "Why not? Because these things have nothing to do with his arguments on torture! Not only that, but all you did was read these wiki-sourced summaries. You haven't even bothered to understand his arguments and you've already labeled him as 'an enemy' and are poised to interpret the ideas in his article based on that label!"

Before I could respond, the other teacher chimed in and agreed with me, saying: "I could understand if we found out that this author worked for the CIA or if he somehow profited off of his position on torture, since these facts might actually be relevant to our analysis of his argument, but I don't see what his positions on feminism, economics, or homosexuality have to do with his position on the use of torture." I bit my tongue and nodded in agreement. 

This conversation reminded me of the Rambam's famous adage: "kabel ha'emes mi'mi she'omro [1] - accept the truth from whoever says it" (which I wrote about extensively in my article: Rambam: On Not Citing Sources). I was also reminded of Rav Soloveitchik's view [2] on the designation of mach'chish magideha [3] - those who repudiate the baalei Mesorah (transmitters of the Oral Tradition). The Rav suggested that this label applies not only those who actively challenge the halachic authority of the baalei Mesorah, but even extends to those who insinuate that the views of the baalei Mesorah were the products of their emotions, their personalities, or their circumstances, rather than their knowledge and understanding of Torah.

These guiding principles of methodology are really two sides of the same coin. Both emphasize the importance of analyzing ideas based on their merit, rather than treating them as the byproducts of "influences on people" (as I wrote about in Musings on the Academic Approach). This isn't to say that human beings can't be influenced by other factors. However, to make such an assumption about the statements of Chazal is to undermine their wisdom, understanding, and knowledge.

Don't get me wrong: I'm not equating the likes of Rebbi Akiva and the Rambam with a columnist writing about torture in the 1980's. My point is that those who are trained in the authentic methods of talmud Torah (Torah learning) would never make a move like this English teacher did, recognizing that this line of reasoning would shift the inquiry towards people, and away from ideas. This might be relevant in a history class, but not a class which purports to analyze ideas and arguments.

Rogerian Argument

One of the popular methods for analyzing certain types of non-fiction texts is the "Rogerian Argument" framework. The textbook The Language of Composition (2018 edition) summarizes this approach as follows:

Another approach to argument is known as the Rogerian method, named for twentieth-century psychologist Carl Rogers, who stressed the importance of replacing confrontational argument tactics with ones that promote negotiation, compromise, and cooperation. Rogerian argumentation is particularly appropriate and useful for arguments on controversial subjects that for some are matters of belief - such as the death penalty, abortion, gun control, or the place of prayer or the teaching of evolution by natural selection in schools. Rogerian arguments are based on the assumption that having a full understanding of an opposing position is essential to responding to it persuasively and refuting it in a way that is accommodating rather than alienating. The key component of the Rogerian approach is finding common ground on which the speaker and an audience that holds opposing beliefs can both stand. The speaker must show that he or she has everyone's interest in mind, and thus be sympathetic to the audience's point of view. Ultimately, the goal is not necessarily to win the argument, but to reach a compromise through which both speaker and audience will feel that they have gained ground.

As my non-Jewish colleagues voiced the difficulties they've had with getting their students to grok this approach, I thought to myself, "This is what we do every day!" When learning Gemara, halacha, and even Tanach, we approach any machlokes (disagreement) with the premise that both disputants are chachamim (wise), and each of them has a logical, conceptual, insightful view derived from the common pool of data which was known and accepted by both parties. When we analyze a machlokes, we first try to understand wherein the two sides agree, and we assume that they share more in common than they disagree on. Although we differ from the Rogerian model in that we aren't trying to reach a "compromise," we are, in most cases, more interested in understanding both sides than determining who "won" the argument - at least, in matters of theoretical understanding, if not practical application.

One of the first methodology books on how to learn Talmud was Darchei ha'Talmud, written by R' Yitzchak Kanpanton in the 14th century. Compare this excerpt to the aforementioned description of Rogerian Argument:

At the outset of your analysis assume, as the premise of your thought, that each of the speakers - whether the one asking a question or the one giving an answer - is an intelligent person, and that all of his words were stated with wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, and contain nothing that is twisted or crooked. Thus we say, "Are we dealing with fools?!" (Shevuos 48b). Therefore, you should analyze all of their words to see whether they are statements of reason, healthy and "as strong as a molten mirror" (Iyov 37:18), or whether they are "bland food eaten without salt," (ibid. 6:6) and weak statements, or whether they are statements which draw close to the intellect, or distance themselves from it. You must strive to bring near their words and to correct them in such a manner that they are pleasant, acceptable, and intellectually amenable, and you must not ascribe to them the iniquity and guilt of a dubious or weak explanation, because none of their words should fall to the ground, since all of them are divrei Elokim chayim (words of the living God) ... and in general, for every statement of the Oral Torah, you must analyze and know what they agree upon which unifies their view, and on what they differ.

This is just a great example something that the non-Jewish world views as an innovation (reminder: Carl Rogers came up with his "Rogerian" approach in 1970!) which we've been practicing for millennia.

Talmudic Reading

Speaking of Talmudic methodology, I was reminded once again how many analytical skills are needed simply to read the text of the Talmud. My Gemara students are working with a text that has no vowels, punctuation, or paragraphs. The text is written in a language (Aramaic) that operates according to mysterious "rules" which only kinda parallel the other foreign language they're learning (Hebrew). The text assumes that they already have a tremendous breadth of background knowledge about diverse, often unrelated subjects. With each step they take, they have to figure out how to parse the phrases, to identify whether the phrase they're reading is a statement, proof, question, answer, difficulty, or resolution, etc. They must understand how the statement performs that function and fits into the larger give-and-take of the discussion. The discussion, itself, involves a high level of intellectual dexterity, involving every form of inference, derivation, induction, deduction, comparison, distinction, contradiction, refutation, identification of the premise, extrapolation to similar cases, etc., etc., etc. And all of this is necessary for a basic reading of the Talmud! We're not even talking about higher level types of Talmudic study!

This came up in the professional development session when we were learning another framework for analyzing argument, typically referred to as "the Toulmin model." This method was named after its innovator, the ancient sage Stephen Toulmin (1922 - 2009). Basically, you can take any argument and break it down into its component parts, in the following form:

Because (evidence as support), therefore (claim), since (assumption), on account of (backing), unless (reservation).

In diagram form, it looks like this:

This might seem abstract until you apply it to a simple example. Let's say you're planning on leaving your house, and you suddenly realize, "Hey - it's raining! I should take my umbrella!" This realization is an argument, although we don't typically think of it as such. When analyzed using the Toulmin model, the argument looks like this:

Basic Form: Because it is raining, therefore, I should take my umbrella, since it will keep me dry. 

Full Form: Because it is raining, therefore I should probably take my umbrella, since it will keep me dry on account of its waterproof material, unless, of course, it has a hole in it.

In diagram form, it looks like this:

No doubt the reason why my fellow English teachers have had so much difficulty teaching this type of analysis to their students is because their students have never thought like this before! What reading or intellectual activity would they do in the normal course of their teenage lives which would demand such analytical rigor? Perhaps only those students who are on the debate team, or who devote their time and energy to debating in the comment sections on various parts of the Internet and social media.

In contrast, my own students will have practiced this type of thinking for several years by the time they enter my class. This type of analysis is Gemara 101, and even though they'll have to get used to the terminology, the mental moves will already be familiar to them.

Concluding Thoughts

In every weekday tefilah (prayer) we say: "You are the One Who graciously endows man with wisdom, and teaches man understanding." The question is: Why does it use the verb "graciously endow" when describing Hashem giving man wisdom, but "teaches" when describing His giving of understanding?

I don't have a complete answer to this question, but I know one thing for sure: God "teaches man understanding" by giving us the Torah, with its intellectually demanding system of halacha, and commanding us to learn it and master it. The skills of understanding gained through the basic study of Talmud places Jewish students far ahead of the average American citizen in their ability to think and understand.

[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Avos (a.k.a. Shemoneh Perakim), Preface; see also Mishneh Torah: Sefer Zmanim, Hilchos Kiddush ha'Chodesh 17:25
[2] I have only heard this interpretation cited baal peh (orally), and do not know of a written source.
[3] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 3:8

How to Explain the Oral Torah to the Uninitiated

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Artwork: Jüdische Szene, by Carl Schleicher

How to Explain the Oral Torah to the Uninitiated

Whenever I get into Torah discussions with non-Jews or unaffiliated Jews, I often find it necessary to introduce them to one of the fundamental premises of the Jewish religion - namely, that Hashem gave us two Torahs at Sinai: Torah she'bi'Chsav (the Written Torah) and Torah she'baal Peh (the Oral Torah). Although I have successfully explained this premise on a number of occasions, I'm always on the lookout for clearer, more efficient explanations.

It's difficult enough to explain this to someone who has no background, but it is even harder to explain this to someone who has preconceived notions and biases which impede clarity. I'm referring to those who might say things like: 

• "Oh, so you're telling me that when the Torah says 'don't do work on the Sabbath,' that means I can't turn on the light, or carry change in my pocket, or sign my name on a receipt? C'MON! The Rabbis CLEARLY made that up!" 
• "Are you saying that just because the Torah repeated a word or used an extra letter in this verse, I'm supposed to believe that this is teaching us a dozen laws? That is CLEARLY ridiculous! C'MON!" 
• "You think that 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth' only refers to monetary payments? That is CLEARLY post-hoc apologetics. C'MON!"

Of course, if someone is really saying things like "CLEARLY" and "C'MON" in all caps, then he or she probably isn't really interested in the truth. But if someone raises these objections from a place of healthy skepticism and is open to hearing an explanation, then we had better be prepared to provide a clear and convincing answer!

I'd like to offer two analogies that might prove to be useful in explaining Torah she'baal Peh to the uninitiated. In my opinion, the second analogy is superior to the first.

Lesser Analogy: Humpty Dumpty

For my high school students I used to use the analogy of Humpty Dumpty. For those who aren't familiar, Humpty Dumpty is a popularly known English nursery rhyme that goes something like this:

Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall,

Humpty Dumpty had a great fall.

All the king's horses and all the king's men

Couldn't put Humpty together again.

Ask any child who is familiar with this song, "Who or what is Humpty Dumpty?" and the response you'll get is: "He's an egg!" But the fact remains: nowhere in the text does it explicitly state that Humpty Dumpty is an egg! For all we know, he could be a vase, a Christmas ornament, a human being with a case of osteogenesis imperfecta (a.k.a. "brittle bone disease"), or any other fragile entity.

So how do we know he's an egg? Because the written text of the nursery rhyme is accompanied by an oral tradition which informs us that Humpty Dumpty is an egg. Is it possible to interpret the text differently? Of course. But although such interpretations would be feasible, they would be wrong, since they contradict the authoritative interpretation that has been passed down through the ages as part and parcel of the nursery rhyme. 

Although this analogy works well for high school students, it is clearly an imperfect one. Unlike our actual Oral Torah, there is no unbroken chain of transmission for the "correct interpretation" of Humpty Dumpty. 

Greater Analogy: Short Notes on a Scientific Lecture

I came across a superior analogy made by Rav Hirsch in his commentary on Chumash [1] on this very topic. He writes. 

The Written Torah is to be to the Oral Torah in the relation of short notes on a full and extensive lecture on any scientific subject. For the student who has heard the whole lecture, short notes are quite sufficient to bring back afresh to his mind at any time the whole content of the lecture. For him, a word, an added mark of interrogation, or exclamation, a dot, the underlining of a word etc. etc., is often quite sufficient to recall to his mind a whole series of thoughts, a remark etc. For those who had not heart he lecture from the Master, such notes would be completely useless. If they were to try to reconstruct the scientific contents of the lecture literally from such notes, they would of necessity make many errors. Words, marks, etc. which serve those scholars who had heard the lecture as instructive guiding stars to the wisdom that had been taught and learnt, stare at the uninitiated as unmeaning sphinxes. The wisdom, the truths, which the initiated reproduce from them (but do not produce out of them) are sneered at by the uninitiated, as being merely a clever or witty play of words and empty dreams without any real foundation. 

To anyone who has received a typical high school or college education, this analogy ought to ring true and provide a familiar intuitive category for understanding the relationship between the Written Torah and the Oral Torah. Of course it would be impossible to reconstruct an entire 90 minute scientific lecture from 10 pages of personal notes in shorthand! Of course the meaning of the underlined phrase or the abbreviated annotation or the parenthetical question mark can only be accurately expounded by the person who heard the lecture and took the notes, and would be cryptic or meaningless to others! Of course it would be ludicrous to treat the notes as the primary document and judge the entire scientific lecture on that basis alone! 

Anyway, I find these two analogies to be helpful in explaining Torah she'baal Peh to the uninitiated, and I hope you will as well. And if you have your own ways of explaining this topic, please share them in the comments!

[1] Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, Commentary on Sefer Shemos 21:1