Showing posts with label Shechitah. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shechitah. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 20, 2017

"Are Mitzvos Arbitrary?" or "The Pillow Mashal"

Originally published in July 2013. It is recommended to read Rambam: On the Reasons for Mitzvos before reading this post.

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"Are Mitzvos Arbitrary?" or "The Pillow Mashal"

Summary of the Rambam's View

This post is about the Rambam's view of taamei ha'mitzvos (the reasons for the commandments), as stated in his Guide for the Perplexed 3:26. Although I posted the full translation of this chapter yesterday, I'll summarize it here and then state the central question/problem which will be the focus of this post.

According to the Rambam, Chazal unanimously held that all mitzvos have reasons and were commanded for our benefit - even chukim. The only thing preventing us from knowing these reasons is our own ignorance. 

However, there is one puzzling statement from Chazal which seems to imply that some mitzvos do not have reasons:
What difference does it make to Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu whether an animal is slaughtered by shechitah (cutting the front of the neck) or by nechirah ("poleaxing it" i.e. chopping the back of its neck)? Surely the mitzvos were only given in order to test human beings, as it is stated: "The word of Hashem is tested (lit. refined)" (Tehilim 18:31).
On the surface, this statement implies that there is no real reason for shechitah over nechirah. This would appear to undermine the otherwise unanimously accepted principle that all of the mitzvos have reasons.

The Rambam resolves this apparent contradiction by making a subdivision. He writes that 
the mitzvos have specific reasons as far as their general character is concerned, and were commanded for a specific purpose; but as regards to their particulars - that is where we say that they have no reason other than being commanded.
He then explains the aforementioned statement of Chazal on the basis of this distinction. The general character of shechitah has a reason (i.e. that we should kill an animal before eating it, instead of eating it while it is still alive), but the particular requirements of shechitah (e.g. cutting the windpipe and esophagus, sharpening the knife, etc.) have no reason other than the commandment itself.

The Question/Problem

The problem is that in the very next sentence, the Rambam asserts that there are reasons for such details! He writes that the specific requirements for shechitah (e.g. cutting the windpipe and esophagus) are designed to ensure an easy death for the animal, and requiring a sharp knife is more convenient than requiring something like a sword or an ax.

The Rambam then proceeds to fall into the same apparent contradiction, but in an even more extreme way. First he boldly states that anyone who spends time seeking reasons for the details of mitzvos is "chasing after a huge delusion," and "will increase difficulties rather than remove them," and "is as far from the truth as one who assume that the entire mitzvah is without any real purpose." But then, at the end of the chapter, he declares his intention to explain the reasons for all of the mitzvos, including "the reasons for many of the conditions and details, as far as these can be discovered"!

And the Rambam follows through on this promise. For example, in his explanation of korbanos, he first writes that "we cannot say why one korban should be a lamb whilst another is a ram, and why a fixed number of them should be brought" and supports this claim with a solid argument. Yet, in subsequent chapters, the Rambam provides philosophical reasons for these very details!

All of this leaves us wondering what the Rambam really holds. The bottom-line question is: Do the details of mitzvos have reasons, or are they arbitrary? If the former, then what does the Rambam mean when he emphatically states that the particulars of mitzvos have no reasons, and that it is delusional to look for such reasons. And if the latter, then how can the Rambam offer reasons for such details? And if some details do have reasons and others are arbitrary, how can we know which is which? 

And, at the end of the day, we are still left with the question: From a philosophical, non-halachic standpoint, does God care about shechitah (vs. nechirah) or not?

The Answer: the Three Tiers of Mitzvah Design

Here's the plan: First I will state my answer with the briefest of explanations. I will then elaborate on the answer by means of a detailed mashal (analogy). I will follow that up by showing how this answer plays out in another mitzvah (arbah minim). I will conclude by answering the question about shechitah.

Every* mitzvah is a complex structural system comprised of many particular halachos. When analyzing taamei ha'mitzvos - that is, engaging in a speculative philosophical analysis of the reasons for mitzvos, as opposed to a purely halachic (or Talmudic) analysis - these halachos can be divided into three groups. For the sake of brevity, we will henceforth refer to these groups as Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3. Here are their definitions:
Tier 1: halachos which are designed to directly facilitate the mitzvah's primary purpose
Tier 2: halachos which serve a secondary purpose - one which may or may not be related to the primary purpose of the mitzvah
Tier 3: halachos that are best described as "arbitrary technicalities" which have no purpose whatsoever, and only exist because of structural necessity
If at this point these distinctions are not clear, have no fear! The following mashal will (I hope) clear everything up.

The Pillow Mashal 

Let us perform a thought-experiment. Imagine that you are an owner of a pillow factory, producing bed pillows for sleeping. You must draft a set of pillow-making regulations and procedures which will yield high-quality pillows.

Where should you begin? By defining the purpose of a bed pillow, of course. The purpose of a bed pillow is to provide support and comfort for the head while sleeping or lying down. (I'm sure someone can come up with a more precise formulation for the purpose of a pillow, but this is sufficient for the purposes of this mashal.) 

This definition of the pillow's function will serve as our guiding principle in pillow-making. If we produce an object which fails to serve this function, then then object is not a successful pillow. Moreover, the superiority and inferiority of our pillows will be measured by the extent to which they achieve this purpose.

Tier 1 Design Features

Basically, there are two structural components of a pillow: the pillowcase and the stuffing. Of the two, the latter is primary, since the pillowcase is only there to contain the stuffing, and would be completely dispensable if the stuffing could be self-contained.

The purpose of a pillow which we outlined above directly dictates the general character of what can and can't be used for stuffing. The general guideline may be stated as follows: in order for a pillow to fulfill its purpose, its stuffing must consist of a material which is soft. Examples of adequate materials are feathers, down, cotton, and certain synthetic materials. A pillow filled with sticks, stones, or shards of glass would not be suitable for the pillow's function.

This is an example of a "Tier 1" feature of the pillow's design, since the requirement of "softness" directly facilitates the primary purpose of the pillow. 

Tier 2 Design Features

But once we've narrowed the field down to "soft materials," this doesn't mean that anything goes. The material we use must possess other qualities which are not directly related to the primary function of the pillow. Some of these qualities might contribute to the primary function in an indirect manner, whereas others will serve secondary roles which are entirely unrelated to the pillow's primary function.

For example, the material we select must be non-perishable. A pillow stuffed with mashed bananas, beef tallow, or carrion might be comfortable, but it wouldn't last very long (and the resulting odor would preclude a comfortable sleep for olfactory reasons). Likewise, the material we select must be available for use. The feathers of the threatened Northern Spotted Owl, the now extinct North Island Giant Moa, or the prehistoric Archaeopteryx might make for a comfy pillow, but the unavailability these materials makes them impractical for pillow-making. The material we select must also be safe. A pillow made of asbestos might provide a satisfying sleep, but it will also shorten your lifespan; a pillow from Chernobyl is just as soft as a pillow from Albequerque, but is likely to produce undesirable effects. 

The need for our pillow-stuffing to be non-perishable, available, and safe are all "Tier 2" requirements. Each of these characteristics serves a purpose, but unlike the "Tier 1" requirement of softness, they do not directly serve the primary function of the pillow (i.e. to provide support and comfort for the head). 

As can be seen from these examples, Tier 2 considerations are often the basis of deciding among otherwise equal or viable Tier 1 candidates. For example, polyester and memory foam are both soft, but memory foam is more hygienic, and is therefore advantageous. Eiderdown and goose down are both soft, but although eiderdown makes for a more comfortable pillow, it is more costly, and might prove to be a disadvantage from a financial standpoint.

But there are other Tier 2 aspects of the design which must be determined even after we settle on the ideal stuffing. One example of this is the aesthetic qualities of the pillow. Sometimes the decisions we make about the appearance of the pillow might be indirectly related to the pillow's primary function. For example, it can be argued that the colors "pure white" and "sky blue" contribute to a greater sense of psychological comfort than "jaundice yellow" or "barf brown." Likewise, a pillow should appear inviting and evoke positive feelings. If a pillow's appearance triggered negative feelings, this might detract from the Tier 1 superiority of the pillow as an object of comfort.

All things being equal, most girls will prefer the pillow on the right based on Tier 2 considerations.

On the other hand, the pillow's appearance might be dictated by factors which have nothing to do with the primary function of the pillow. For example, colored pillows might be more expensive to produce than white pillows, or perhaps a certain color is preferable because it is more popular among a certain consumer population (e.g. pink for girls), or perhaps making pillows in a variety of colors will lead to greater brand exposure.

All of these Tier 2 features are important, and all Tier 2 design-decisions will be made on the basis of specific reasons, but none of these reasons are directly related to the primary function of the pillow.

Tier 3 Design Features

The Tier 3 features are necessary, but arbitrary in their specifics. For example, let's say we choose to make our pillows out of eiderdown because it is the softest material (Tier 1). We are willing to forego the cost (Tier 2) because we plan on marketing our pillows to wealthy consumers (Tier 2). We decide to use eiderdown from Iceland rather than China for political reasons (Tier 2) and we decide to go with "free range" eider ducks in order to make a public statement about animal cruelty (Tier 2), ensuring brand loyalty (Tier 2) among a subsection of our consumers.

But now we find ourselves at the eider duck farm in Iceland and it is time to choose which flock of ducks we will use for our first run of pillows. We will have to choose ducks of a certain a size and age in order to ensure the highest quality feathers (Tier 1), but out of the thousands of eider ducks within that large category, which particular ducks will we use? This decision is completely arbitrary (Tier 3). No matter how the decision is made - whether by the age of the ducks, or their size, or by a random lottery - it will be neither informed nor influenced by the primary function of the pillow, nor by any secondary considerations. Tier 1 and Tier 2 decisions must be based on reasons; Tier 3 decisions do not.

Consider another example: the exact size of the pillow. Of course, there will be a certain size-range which is determined based on Tier 1 considerations. Generally speaking, the pillow will need to accommodate an average-sized head. There are four basic pillow sizes: standard (20" by 26"), queen (20" by 30"), king (20" by 36"), and euro (26" by 26").

But why settle on 20" by 26" for a standard sized pillow? Why not 20" by 25.5" or 21" by 27"? The answer is that this aspect of the pillow's design is arbitrary. The range of sizes was set by Tier 1 considerations, but the specific dimensions within that range has absolutely no reason, other than the fact that some length had to be chosen.

One last example of a Tier 3 quality: the particular hue of the pillow's color. We've already mentioned that the color of the pillow is a valid Tier 2 consideration, but within each color, there are an infinite number of hues. There might be a Tier 2 difference between blue and red, and there might even be a Tier 2 difference between light blue and dark blue, but at some point, the choice between hues of blue is arbitrary.

There might be reasons for choosing between 01 and 20,
but the choice of 11 over 10 is arbitrary.

The Answer: Restated

By now I hope the analogy is clear. Just like there are three tiers in the design of pillows, so too, there are three tiers in the design of mitzvos. Certain features of a mitzvah's design are directly dictated by its primary purpose - just like the Tier 1 characteristic of a pillow (i.e. its soft stuffing) is directly dictated by the pillow's function (i.e. to provide support and comfort for the head while sleeping or lying down). Other features of a mitzvah's structure serve secondary purposes which may or may not be related to the primary reason - just like the Tier 2 design considerations of the pillow (e.g. its color, its cost, its durability, etc.). Last but not least, there are aspects of the mitzvah which are completely arbitrary from a taamei ha'mitzvos standpoint - just like the Tier 3 specifications of the pillow (i.e. which specific specimens its materials derive from, its exact dimensions, and its precise hue).

Some people find this last category difficult to accept. "How can a mitzvah contain something arbitrary, without any purpose? Isn't that an imperfection in the Torah? How can we believe that Hashem would command us in something for no reason?" I will repeat the Rambam's response to these types of objections:
It is important for you to know that chochmah demanded it - or, if you prefer, say that necessity dictated - that there should be parts [of the mitzvos] for which reasons are inapplicable; it is, as it were, inherently impossible for the mitzvah not to have something of this type.
Any mitzvah which involves physical phenomena will, of necessity, have quantifiable characteristics, such a length, height, volume, duration, number of components, etc. The Tier 1 and Tier 2 design-considerations will usually dictate a certain range of values for these quantities, but once you get down to a certain level of specificity, the final number will have to be arbitrary. This is what the Rambam meant when he said:
It is almost similar to the nature of a thing which can potentially receive different forms, but actually receives only one of them: we must not ask why it has this form and not another which is likewise possible, because we should have to ask the same question if instead of its actual form the thing had any of the other possible forms. Note this, and understand it.
We will now examine two examples from the mitzvah system - arbah minim and shechitah - in light of our answer.

The Three Tiers of Arbah Minim

The mitzvah of the arbah minim is to pick up the four species of vegetation specified by the Torah, on the first day of the Chag ha'Sukkos. The Rambam states his theory about the purpose of this mitzvah in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:43:
It appears to me that the four species of the lulav are [an expression of] joy and gladness for going out from the Wilderness – which was a place “without seed, fig, vine, and pomegranate, and without any water to drink” (Bamidbar 20:5) – to a place of fruit-trees and rivers. Therefore, in order to remember this, we take the most beautiful of its fruits, and a fragrant [plant], and beautiful leaves, and the most beautiful of herbs – that is, the willows of the brook.
The Rambam then goes on to explain why these four species in particular (i.e. citron, date palm, myrtle, and brook-willow) were chosen:
These four species have three common denominators. First, they were plentiful in the Land of Israel at that time and everyone was able to obtain them. Secondly, they are exceedingly beautiful in their appearance and aesthetic qualities; some of them – namely, the citron and the myrtle – are fragrant, but the date palm and the willows have neither a good nor a bad smell. The third quality is that they retain their appearance for seven days, which is not the case with peaches, pomegranates, asparagus, nuts, and the like.
Note the difference between the Rambam's two explanations. The explanation in the first paragraph pertains to Tier 1 features, which relate directly to the primary reason for the mitzvah: we joyously pick up beautiful species of plants in order to express our gratitude to Hashem for taking us from the barren Wilderness into the fertile Land of Israel. In contrast, the explanations mentioned in the second paragraph all pertain to Tier 2 features of the mitzvah, and the reasons provided are secondary.

Allow me to spell out the implications of this. The Rambam implies that the mitzvah of arbah minim could have served its primary purpose if we had been required to pick up four species of, say, exotic orchids. The only problem is that orchids are not plentiful in Israel. Similarly, the mitzvah could have served its primary function if we had been commanded to pick up an oleander instead of a myrtle. However, the Gemara (Sukkah 32b) explains that the oleander - which is poisonous - would not be in line with the Torah's nature, as described by Shlomo ha'Melech: "its ways are ways of pleasantness" (Mishlei 3:17). Likewise, the Torah could have even used pomegranates and peaches were it not for the fact that their appearance dwindles in beauty and freshness over the seven day period.

As for Tier 3 features: the Rambam doesn't mention any, but they certainly exist. For example, a lulav must be at least four tefachim (handbreadths) long. The Gemara explains that it must be long enough to shake. Fine; we can understand why being long enough to shake is a Tier 1 or Tier 2 consideration - but why exactly four tefachim? Wouldn't five tefachim also be reasonable? What about 10 etzbaos (finger-breadths), or one amah

The same might be said for the requirement of four species. It would seem that the mitzvah could have fulfilled its primary purpose if three or five species were required. The same can be said for many of the detailed specifications of the halachic blemishes which disqualify the four species: once it became necessary to include blemishes within the structure of the mitzvah (due to Tier 1 reasons), halacha had to define these blemishes in a precise, quantifiable manner. At a certain level of detail, halacha had to draw the line at an arbitrary point, just like in any other legal system or design.

(Note: Some of you might be wondering, "Isn't it necessary for there to be these four specific species to teach us specific ideas, as explained by Chazal - like the four types of Jews, or the four parts of the body used in serving Hashem?" The Rambam maintains that these statements of Chazal are just drash, and don't have anything to do with the real purpose of arbah minim; read Pshat vs. Drash II for an elaboration on this point.)

The Three Tiers of Shechitah

Now we are finally ready to answer our original question: from a philosophical, non-halachic standpoint, does God care about shechitah? The answer is: "no" in a Tier 1 framework, and "yes" in a Tier 2 framework. Rambam explains the reasons for the mitzvah of shechitah in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:48:
It is prohibited to cut off a limb of a living animal and eat it, because such act would produce cruelty, and develop it; the gentile kings used to do this, and it was also done for avodah zarah – namely, they would cut a specific limb of an animal and eat it … The mitzvah concerning the killing of animals is necessary, because the natural food of man consists of vegetables and of the flesh of animals, and the best meat is that of animals permitted to be used as food; no doctor has any doubts about this. Since, therefore, the desire of procuring good food necessitates the slaughtering of animals, the Torah enjoins that the death of the animal should be the easiest, and prohibits us to torment the animal by cutting the throat in a crude manner, or by poleaxing, or by cutting off a limb whilst the animal is alive.
If we consider this excerpt in light of the previously cited excerpt on shechitah, it would seem that according to the Rambam the primary purpose of shechitah is to ensure that we eat the flesh of dead animals, and not living animals. Even non-Jews are prohibited from eating a limb from a living animal. From this Tier 1 perspective, God doesn't care whether we kill an animal by shechitah, nechirah, or bazooka.

However, once God saw fit (so to speak) to obligate us to kill an animal before eating it, He legislated a specific method of killing the animal with specific requirements. Some of these requirements are in line with the primary purpose (i.e. distancing us from animalistic behavior and cruelty), some requirements serve secondary purposes (i.e. the ease of the method and the availability of the slaughtering instrument), and other requirements have no specific purpose at all. From this Tier 2 perspective, there is a big difference between killing an animal through shechitah vs. nechirah, and God does care about that difference. 

Conclusion

I have heard people summarize the Rambam's view by saying, "Rambam holds that the details of mitzvos are arbitrary" or "Rambam holds that there are no reasons for the majority of halacha." There is even a well-known acharon who lambasted the Rambam for this point. 

In my opinion, the Rambam's view is far more nuanced than these crude summaries make it out to be. I believe that if we understand the Rambam's explanation in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim - especially regarding Tier 3 - then the objections raised against his view fall away. I also believe that a number of objections raised by people against mitzvos - in general or in particular - can be easily resolved if one understands the three-tiered nature of mitzvah-design. 

I hope this explanation has clarified the subject of taamei ha'mitzvos, and enhanced your appreciation of the chochmah of the Torah system. 


* This only applies to what Rabbeinu Bachya ibn Paquda refers to as chovos ha'eivarim ("duties of the limbs") - that is to say, mitzvos which involve actions. 

Monday, June 19, 2017

Rambam: On the Reasons for Mitzvos

The following is a translation of a full chapter of the Guide for the Perplexed (3:26) in which the Rambam establishes some fundamental principles about the reasons for mitzvos. This post stands on its own, but is also the basis of tomorrow's post, entitled: "Are Mitzvos Arbitrary?" The paragraph divisions and headings are mine. 

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Rambam: On the Reasons for Mitzvos (Guide for the Perplexed 3:26)

All Mitzvos Have Reasons

Just as religious scholars are divided on the question of whether the actions of God are the result of His Wisdom, or only of His Will without being intended for any purpose whatsoever, so they are also divided as regards the purpose of the mitzvos which God gave us. 

Some of them hold that the commandments have no purpose at all and are only dictated by the whim of God. Others are of the opinion that all commandments and prohibitions are dictated by His wisdom and serve a certain aim. Consequently there is a reason for each one of the precepts: they are commanded because they are useful. 

All of us, the common people as well as the scholars, believe that there is a reason for every mitzvah, although there are mitzvos the reason of which is unknown to us, and in which the ways of God's wisdom are incomprehensible. This view is distinctly expressed in Scripture, as it is stated, "chukim (statutes) and mishpatim (judgments) of justice" (Devarim 4:8), “The mishpatim of Hashem are true and righteous altogether” (Tehilim 19:10). 

Even Chukim Have Reasons

There are mitzvos which are called chukim (statutes), such as the prohibition of wearing garments of wool and linen [mixed together] (shaatnez), boiling meat and milk together, and the sending of the goat [into the wilderness on Yom ha’Kippurim]. Regarding these the Sages said: “I, [Hashem,] have ordained these for you; you do not have permission to be suspicious of them, and the satan flings accusations on account of them, and the gentile nations argue against them” (Yoma 67b).

The multitude of Sages generally do not think that such mitzvos have no reason whatsoever and serve no purpose, for this would lead us to assume that God's actions are in vain. On the contrary, they maintain that even these chukim have a reason – that is to say, a specific, beneficial reason – even if it eludes us, owing either to the weakness of our intellect or the deficiency of our knowledge.

Consequently, the Sages are of the opinion that there are reasons for every mitzvah: every positive or negative precept serves a beneficial purpose. In some cases the usefulness is evident, for example, the prohibition of murder and theft; in others the usefulness is not so evident, for example, the prohibition of orlah (deriving benefit from the fruit of a tree in the first three years) or kilai ha’kerem (deriving benefit from the produce of a mixed-species vineyard). Those commandments whose purpose is generally evident are called mishpatim, and those whose purpose is not generally clear are called chukim.

Concealed Reasons

The Sages continually say: “ki lo davar reik hu mi’kem – for it is not an empty thing for you’ (Devarim 32:47) – and if you find it to be a davar reik (empty thing), it is mi’kem (lit. from you)” (Yerushalmi Peah 1:4). In other words, this mitzvah is not an empty thing without any beneficial purpose, and if it appears to you that any one of the mitzvos is like this, this is due to a deficiency in your understanding.

You certainly know the famous saying that the reasons for all of the mitzvos were known to Shlomo except that of the parah adumah (red heifer). Our Sages also said that Hashem concealed the reasons for the mitzvos lest people should make light of them, as Shlomo did in respect to three mitzvos, the reasons for which are clearly stated. All of [the Sages’] words follow this fundamental principle, and it is indicated by the text of the pesukim.

A Puzzling Statement

I have, however, found one utterance made by them in Bereishis Rabbah (Section 44) from which, at first glance, it would appear that some mitzvos have no other reason but the fact that they are commanded, and that no other objective is intended by them, and that they do not serve any real purpose. I mean the following passage: 
What difference does it make to Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu whether an animal is slaughtered by shechitah (cutting the front of the neck) or by nechirah ("poleaxing it" i.e. chopping the back of its neck)? Surely the mitzvos were only given in order to test human beings, as it is stated: "The word of Hashem is tested (lit. refined)" (Tehilim 18:31). 
Although this passage is exceedingly strange and has no parallel in the writings of our Sages, I will explain it - as you shall soon hear - in such a manner that I do not stray at all from their words and do not depart from the unanimous fundamental principle, namely, that all mitzvos serve a real, beneficial objective, [as it is stated:] "for it is not an empty thing for you," and as it is stated:"I did not tell the descendants of Yaakov to seek Me for nothing; I am Hashem, Who speaks righteousness" (Yeshayahu 45:19). 

Resolution of the Difficulty

I will now tell you what all people with sound minds ought to maintain in this respect, namely, that all of the mitzvos have specific reasons as far as their general character is concerned, and were commanded for a specific purpose; but as regards to their particulars - that is where we say that they have no reason other than being commanded. 

For example: killing animals for the purpose of obtaining nutrition is clearly beneficial, as we intend to show (see 3:48). However, that the killing should not be performed by nechirah but by shechitah (cutting the neck), and by dividing the esophagus and the windpipe in a certain place - these regulations and the like are nothing but tests for man. In this sense you will understand the example quoted by our Sages [that there is no difference] between killing the animal by shechitah or by nechirah

I give this instance only because it has been mentioned by our Sages, but in reality [there is some reason for these regulations:] once it has become necessary to eat the flesh of animals, it was intended by the above regulations to ensure an easy death and to effect it by suitable means; while decapitation requires a sword or a similar instrument, shechitah can be performed with any instrument; and in order to ensure an easy death our Sages insisted that the knife should be well sharpened.

Another Example

A better example of the point we made about [reasons for] the particulars of mitzvos is korbanos (sacrifices). The law that korbanos should be brought is tremendously beneficial, as will be shown by us (see 3:46), but we cannot say why one korban should be a lamb whilst another is a ram, and why a fixed number of them should be brought. Those who trouble themselves to find reasons for any of these details are chasing after a huge delusion - one which not only fails to remove any difficulties, but increases them. Anyone who believes that these [details of the laws] have a purpose is as far from the truth as one who assumes that the entire mitzvah is without any real purpose. 

It is important for you to know that chochmah (wisdom) demanded it - or, if you prefer, say that necessity dictated - that there should be parts [of the mitzvos] for which reasons are inapplicable; it is, as it were, inherently impossible for the mitzvah not to have something of this type.

That this cannot be avoided may be seen from the following: You ask, "Why must a lamb be sacrificed and not a ram?" But the same question would be asked why a ram had been commanded instead of a lamb - so long as one particular kind is required. The same is to be said as to the question why were seven lambs sacrificed and not eight: the same question might have been asked if there were eight, ten, or twenty lambs - so long as some definite number of lambs were sacrificed. It is almost similar to the nature of a thing which can potentially receive different forms, but actually receives only one of them: we must not ask why it has this form and not another which is likewise possible, because we should have to ask the same question if instead of its actual form the thing had any of the other possible forms. Note this, and understand it. 

The repeated assertion of our Sages that there are reasons for all mitzvos, and the tradition that Solomon knew them, refers to the general purpose of the mitzvos, but one should not inquire about their details.

Rambam's Plan for Explaining Mitzvos

This being the case, I find it convenient to divide the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos into a number of classes: each class will include many mitzvos of the same kind, or related to each other by their character. I will [first] explain the reason of each class, and show its undoubted and undisputed benefit; then I shall discuss each mitzvah in the class, and expound its reason. Only very few will be left unexplained, the reason for which I have been unable to trace unto this day. I have also been able to comprehend in some cases even the reasons for many of the conditions and details, as far as these can be discovered. You will hear all this later on. But in order to fully explain these reasons I must preface this with several chapters; in these I will discuss principles which form the basis of my theory. I will now begin these chapters.