Rambam: On the Reasons for Mitzvos

The following is a translation of a full chapter of the Guide for the Perplexed (3:26) in which the Rambam establishes some fundamental principles about the reasons for mitzvos. This post stands on its own, but is also the basis of tomorrow's post, entitled: "Are Mitzvos Arbitrary?" The paragraph divisions and headings are mine. 

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Rambam: On the Reasons for Mitzvos (Guide for the Perplexed 3:26)

All Mitzvos Have Reasons

Just as religious scholars are divided on the question of whether the actions of God are the result of His Wisdom, or only of His Will without being intended for any purpose whatsoever, so they are also divided as regards the purpose of the mitzvos which God gave us. 

Some of them hold that the commandments have no purpose at all and are only dictated by the whim of God. Others are of the opinion that all commandments and prohibitions are dictated by His wisdom and serve a certain aim. Consequently there is a reason for each one of the precepts: they are commanded because they are useful. 

All of us, the common people as well as the scholars, believe that there is a reason for every mitzvah, although there are mitzvos the reason of which is unknown to us, and in which the ways of God's wisdom are incomprehensible. This view is distinctly expressed in Scripture, as it is stated, "chukim (statutes) and mishpatim (judgments) of justice" (Devarim 4:8), “The mishpatim of Hashem are true and righteous altogether” (Tehilim 19:10). 

Even Chukim Have Reasons

There are mitzvos which are called chukim (statutes), such as the prohibition of wearing garments of wool and linen [mixed together] (shaatnez), boiling meat and milk together, and the sending of the goat [into the wilderness on Yom ha’Kippurim]. Regarding these the Sages said: “I, [Hashem,] have ordained these for you; you do not have permission to be suspicious of them, and the satan flings accusations on account of them, and the gentile nations argue against them” (Yoma 67b).

The multitude of Sages generally do not think that such mitzvos have no reason whatsoever and serve no purpose, for this would lead us to assume that God's actions are in vain. On the contrary, they maintain that even these chukim have a reason – that is to say, a specific, beneficial reason – even if it eludes us, owing either to the weakness of our intellect or the deficiency of our knowledge.

Consequently, the Sages are of the opinion that there are reasons for every mitzvah: every positive or negative precept serves a beneficial purpose. In some cases the usefulness is evident, for example, the prohibition of murder and theft; in others the usefulness is not so evident, for example, the prohibition of orlah (deriving benefit from the fruit of a tree in the first three years) or kilai ha’kerem (deriving benefit from the produce of a mixed-species vineyard). Those commandments whose purpose is generally evident are called mishpatim, and those whose purpose is not generally clear are called chukim.

Concealed Reasons

The Sages continually say: “ki lo davar reik hu mi’kem – for it is not an empty thing for you’ (Devarim 32:47) – and if you find it to be a davar reik (empty thing), it is mi’kem (lit. from you)” (Yerushalmi Peah 1:4). In other words, this mitzvah is not an empty thing without any beneficial purpose, and if it appears to you that any one of the mitzvos is like this, this is due to a deficiency in your understanding.

You certainly know the famous saying that the reasons for all of the mitzvos were known to Shlomo except that of the parah adumah (red heifer). Our Sages also said that Hashem concealed the reasons for the mitzvos lest people should make light of them, as Shlomo did in respect to three mitzvos, the reasons for which are clearly stated. All of [the Sages’] words follow this fundamental principle, and it is indicated by the text of the pesukim.

A Puzzling Statement

I have, however, found one utterance made by them in Bereishis Rabbah (Section 44) from which, at first glance, it would appear that some mitzvos have no other reason but the fact that they are commanded, and that no other objective is intended by them, and that they do not serve any real purpose. I mean the following passage: 

What difference does it make to Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu whether an animal is slaughtered by shechitah (cutting the front of the neck) or by nechirah ("poleaxing it" i.e. chopping the back of its neck)? Surely the mitzvos were only given in order to test human beings, as it is stated: "The word of Hashem is tested (lit. refined)" (Tehilim 18:31). 

Although this passage is exceedingly strange and has no parallel in the writings of our Sages, I will explain it - as you shall soon hear - in such a manner that I do not stray at all from their words and do not depart from the unanimous fundamental principle, namely, that all mitzvos serve a real, beneficial objective, [as it is stated:] "for it is not an empty thing for you," and as it is stated:"I did not tell the descendants of Yaakov to seek Me for nothing; I am Hashem, Who speaks righteousness" (Yeshayahu 45:19). 

Resolution of the Difficulty

I will now tell you what all people with sound minds ought to maintain in this respect, namely, that all of the mitzvos have specific reasons as far as their general character is concerned, and were commanded for a specific purpose; but as regards to their particulars - that is where we say that they have no reason other than being commanded. 

For example: killing animals for the purpose of obtaining nutrition is clearly beneficial, as we intend to show (see 3:48). However, that the killing should not be performed by nechirah but by shechitah (cutting the neck), and by dividing the esophagus and the windpipe in a certain place - these regulations and the like are nothing but tests for man. In this sense you will understand the example quoted by our Sages [that there is no difference] between killing the animal by shechitah or by nechirah. 

I give this instance only because it has been mentioned by our Sages, but in reality [there is some reason for these regulations:] once it has become necessary to eat the flesh of animals, it was intended by the above regulations to ensure an easy death and to effect it by suitable means; while decapitation requires a sword or a similar instrument, shechitah can be performed with any instrument; and in order to ensure an easy death our Sages insisted that the knife should be well sharpened.

Another Example

A better example of the point we made about [reasons for] the particulars of mitzvos is korbanos (sacrifices). The law that korbanos should be brought is tremendously beneficial, as will be shown by us (see 3:46), but we cannot say why one korban should be a lamb whilst another is a ram, and why a fixed number of them should be brought. Those who trouble themselves to find reasons for any of these details are chasing after a huge delusion - one which not only fails to remove any difficulties, but increases them. Anyone who believes that these [details of the laws] have a purpose is as far from the truth as one who assumes that the entire mitzvah is without any real purpose. 

It is important for you to know that chochmah (wisdom) demanded it - or, if you prefer, say that necessity dictated - that there should be parts [of the mitzvos] for which reasons are inapplicable; it is, as it were, inherently impossible for the mitzvah not to have something of this type.

That this cannot be avoided may be seen from the following: You ask, "Why must a lamb be sacrificed and not a ram?" But the same question would be asked why a ram had been commanded instead of a lamb - so long as one particular kind is required. The same is to be said as to the question why were seven lambs sacrificed and not eight: the same question might have been asked if there were eight, ten, or twenty lambs - so long as some definite number of lambs were sacrificed. It is almost similar to the nature of a thing which can potentially receive different forms, but actually receives only one of them: we must not ask why it has this form and not another which is likewise possible, because we should have to ask the same question if instead of its actual form the thing had any of the other possible forms. Note this, and understand it. 

The repeated assertion of our Sages that there are reasons for all mitzvos, and the tradition that Solomon knew them, refers to the general purpose of the mitzvos, but one should not inquire about their details.

Rambam's Plan for Explaining Mitzvos

This being the case, I find it convenient to divide the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos into a number of classes: each class will include many mitzvos of the same kind, or related to each other by their character. I will [first] explain the reason of each class, and show its undoubted and undisputed benefit; then I shall discuss each mitzvah in the class, and expound its reason. Only very few will be left unexplained, the reason for which I have been unable to trace unto this day. I have also been able to comprehend in some cases even the reasons for many of the conditions and details, as far as these can be discovered. You will hear all this later on. But in order to fully explain these reasons I must preface this with several chapters; in these I will discuss principles which form the basis of my theory. I will now begin these chapters.