Showing posts with label Lying. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lying. Show all posts

Monday, July 16, 2018

Excessive Righteousness and Foolish Piety

Originally published in August 2012. This version has been toned down significantly.

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Excessive Righteousness and Foolish Piety

My Shul Rabbi's Message to Congregants 

When my family and I were on our journey to Orthodox Judaism, we were fortunate to find the perfect shul with the perfect rabbi. The shul was filled with Jews from across the spectrum - Chasidish, Modern Orthodox, Zionist, Yeshivish - and the majority of the congregation was, and still is, comprised of baalei teshuvah (non-observant Jews who became observant).

As you might imagine, it might be very daunting for a shul rabbi to please such a diverse crowd - but our shul rabbi is a master. He is completely non-judgmental, and makes everyone feel welcome. His shiurim (classes) and his conversation are filled with enough explanation to make baalei teshuvah feel welcome, and sufficient references to advanced material to please the scholarly crowd.

But there is one message that is often reiterated by our shul rabbi which (I believe) is intended equally for baalei teshuvah and yeshivish students alike: "Don't be too religious." Yes, he says this partially in jest, but usually does so when a congregant inquires about a halacha which is actually just a chumrah (stringency).

I used to think that our rabbi coined this phrase on his own. It wasn't until the first time I read Koheles that I realized he was borrowing the language of the pasuk: "Do not be overly righteous or excessively wise - why should you make yourself desolate?" (Koheles 7:16).

We'll return to this at the end of the post.

Blurry Glasses 

A few years ago my chavrusa (learning partner) brought a short article to my attention:
Soon, it will no longer be necessary for charedi men to walk around while covering their eyes with their hands to avoid seeing women.

Recently, a new start-up company has begun marketing and selling special glasses in charedi neighborhoods such as Meah Shearim. The purpose of the glasses is to prevent charedi men from seeing immodestly-dressed women.

The glasses contain blurry lenses that obscure the wearer’s vision and do allow men not to (sic) see more than three meters. For those who already wear glasses, the company has designed stickers that can be affixed to the existing pair of glasses which will obscure the vision.

Yedioth Ahronot reports that the glasses, designed for the charedi community, are intended for charedi men who must go to places where women will be present. The new patent cost the inventors only NIS 25. The patent includes non-prescription glasses and the obscuring stickers. The glasses with the blurry lenses contain perforations at the bottom of the lenses enabling charedi men to look down at the ground through the perforation and still see where they are walking.
My chavrusa pointed out that the subject of this article is straight out of a Gemara (Sotah 22b) we once learned. When sitting down to write this blog post, I found myself paralyzed by the numerous directions it might take. But I think I'll just content myself with citing the text of the Gemara, drawing the connection, and making a few observations here and there - without attempting any grand theories or explanations.

The Scourges of Prushim Ruin the World

In order to fully appreciate the Gemara, we'll need to see it in the context of the Mishnah, which appears on 20a. The last clause of the Mishnah reads:
[R' Yehoshua] used to say: a chasid shoteh (foolish pietist), a rasha arum (cunning evildoer), an ishah prushah, and the scourges of prushim - these are the ruiners [or alternatively: "destroyers"] of the world.
The Gemara explains that each of these terms refers to a personality-type which expresses itself in specific behaviors. For instance, "chasid shoteh" is a man who refuses to save a the life of a drowning woman because he doesn't want to gaze at women. "Rasha arum" is a person who explains his argument to the judge before his fellow litigant arrives, which the Meiri universalizes to mean "someone who strategically harms others for his own benefit in undetectable ways." An "ishah prushah" is the subject of a machlokes (disagreement), which we won't get into now. We will focus on the last item in the list: "scourges of prushim," which is somewhat related to the first. 

I think it will be beneficial to read the Rambam's commentary on this Mishnah, since he gives us a better idea of the types of people we are talking about. The Rambam [1] first explains the term "chasid shoteh":
The Talmud explains that this refers to an individual who exhibits an exaggerated level of [halachic or pseudo-halachic] precaution and scrupulousness to the point where he becomes disgusting in the eyes of people, and he does actions which are not obligatory. It is as if the Mishnah said that he is "shoteh b'chasiduso" ("foolish in his piety"). The Sages said in the Gemara Yerushalmi that anyone who is exempt from something and does it anyway is considered a hedyot (ignoramus, probably related to the Greek idiōtēs).
Similarly, the Meiri [2] defines the chasid shoteh as "a person who makes himself excessively pious in a manner which causes harm, either to himself or to others." He adds a few more examples of this type of behavior: "someone who fasts every day ... someone who sees a baby drowning in a river and says, 'Let me take off my tefillin first' [before he jumps in to save him]."

Next, the Rambam addresses the ambiguity of the term "prushim" (lit. "those who are separated"). The difficulty is that "Prushim" (with an uppercase "P") refers to the Phraisees who opposed the Sadducees during the era of the second Beis ha'Mikdash, whereas "prushim" (with a lowercase "p") means "ascetics." The Rambam first explains the origin of the term and then how it is used in our Mishnah and the accompanying Gemara:
The Sages, of blessed memory, called themselves “Prushim” on account of their separating themselves from vices, abominations, and the pursuit of the phenomena of Olam ha'Zeh (This World) which preoccupy the rest of mankind; instead, they turn towards life in Olam ha'Ba (The World to Come) and lofty matters.

However, there is another type of person who decorates himself with these things and makes himself appear in other people’s eyes that he has separated himself from these lowly and abominable things, while at the same time, these very same things permeate his character, and he only separates himself from them on account of some worldly motive.

This is what the Sages are referring to when they say, “there are seven prushim [who ruin the world],” and they enumerate anyone who makes himself seem pious, due to one of these worldly motivations – for example, so that people should honor him, or that Hashem shouldn’t cause him to lose his money and bring harm to him. In the opinion of the Sages, there is no true parush except for one who serves God out of love, like Avraham Avinu; the other six are despicable, since they add onto their preexisting obligations and exaggerate their external superficialities in order to deceive people.

Therefore, because they add to the Torah and make it despicable, they are nicknamed “scourges” and the Sages refer to them as “the scourges of the prushim.” The Sages said that they are the “destroyers of the world (mechalei olam)” or “ruiners of the world (mevalei olam)” because these things are harmful to man’s existence. 
It should be noted that the Mishnah and Gemara are only condemning those "prushim" whose piety is a sham - not to those who have truly reached the true virtue of prishus, who are praised by Chazal and looked upon with favor in the eyes of Hashem. We'll refer to these as "bad prushim."

The Seven Types of Bad Prushim 

Now we are ready for the Gemara in Sotah 22b, which begins by quoting the braisa referenced by the Rambam above:
The Rabbis have taught in a Braisa: There are seven types of [bad] prushim: (1) the Shechemite Parush, (2) the Scuffed Parush, (3) the Bloodletting Parush, (4) the Pestle Parush, (5) the “What-is-my-obligation-that-I-may-do-it!” Parush, (6) the Parush out of Love, and (7) the Parush out of Fear.
The Gemara then goes on to define each of these terms. I will include the text of the Gemara, followed by Rashi's commentary [3] in brackets:
(1) the Shechemite Parush is one who does an act of Shechem. [Rashi: they circumcised themselves not for the sake of heaven; likewise, this parush's actions are for his own gratification - so that people should honor him - and they are not for the sake of heaven.]

(2) the Scraped Parush: he is the one who knocks his feet together. [Rashi: he walks in a lowly manner, heel to toe, and he doesn't lift his eyes from the ground; as a result of this, he scrapes his toes against the rocks.]

(3) the Bloodletting Parush: he is the one who causes his blood to flow against the walls. [Rashi: he makes himself like one who closes his eyes so as not to look at women, and as a result of this, he crashes his head into the wall and draws blood.]

(4) the “Pestle” Parush: Rabbah bar Shila said that he is one [whose head is] bowed like [a pestle in] a mortar. [Rashi: he walks hunched over.]

(5) the “What-is-my-obligation-that-I-may-do-it!” Parush: [Rashi explains this question to mean: "Teach me what my obligation is and I will do it."] 
[Based on this initial definition, the Gemara asks:] But isn't this is a virtue?! [The Gemara answers:] No, for this person says, “What further obligation is there for me, that I may do it?” [Rashi: "What more can I do that I haven't done?" - and he makes himself appear as though he has fulfilled everything.] 
(6) the Parush out of Love [Rashi: out of love of the reward of the mitzvos, but not out of love for the mitzvos of the Creator] 
(7) the Parush out of Fear [Rashi: out of fear of punishment; rather, what is incumbent upon a person? - To do the mitzvos of Hashem, blessed is He, out of love, as Hashem, our God, commanded us, and the reward will ultimately come.]
It would be very interesting to define all seven prushim and to understand the mentality of each personality type. It would be also be interesting to identify the modern day correlatives. Perhaps we'll do this in a subsequent post, if I can figure all of them out.

It seems clear which category our blurred-glasses-wearing brethren have stumbled into: the "Bloodletting Parush" category. Rashi's description fits perfectly: "he makes himself like one who closes his eyes so as not to look at women." I wonder whether Rashi's use of this somewhat awkward wording ("makes himself like one who closes his eyes") implies that type of parush only pretends to close his eyes. 

Either way, Rashi seems to learn the Gemara's criticism of Bloodletting Prushim to have something to do with the physical harm they bring upon themselves by their misguided attempts to eschew (what they regard to be) situations of sin. True, halacha must be followed no matter what the cost, but if a person's adherence to halacha routinely leads to physical injury, then one must wonder whether that person is actually keeping halacha, or if it is his yetzer ha'ra masquerading under the guise of religiosity. 

Lo Lishmah Exceptions

After mentioning the last two categories of prushim (i.e. the Parush out of Love and the Parush out of Fear), the Gemara comments:
Abaye and Rava said to the tanna [who was reciting the braisa:] “Do not mention the Parush out of Love and the Parush out of Fear [in the list of bad prushim], for Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: A person should always involve himself in Torah and mitzvos even she’lo lishmah (not for their own sake), because from she’lo lishmah, he will come to involvement lishmah (for their own sake).” 
According to Abaye and Rava, it was a mistake to include a Parush out of Love and a Parush out of Fear along with the other five individuals mentioned in the braisa. They argued that although it is not ideal to keep halacha out of love of reward or fear of punishment, these are nevertheless valid she'lo lishmah motivations which may lead a person to eventually keep Torah and mitzvos lishmah.

What I find interesting is that Abaye and Rava did not say this about the other five types of prushim. Apparently, their motivations for keeping halacha are not she'lo lishmahs which can lead to lishmah. What is the basis for this distinction? I do not yet have an answer for this. We'll leave it as a question.

Pious Garb

The last point we will consider in this post is about the retribution for this type of prushim behavior, which our Gemara goes on to state:
Rav Nachman ben Yitzchak said: “That which is hidden is hidden and that which is revealed is revealed, but the Great Beis Din will punish those who wrap themselves in gundei.” 
Rashi explains "gundei" to refer to taleisim (plural of "tallis" or "prayer shawl"). He explains the Gemara as follows:
That which is hidden is hidden from people and that which is revealed is revealed [to people]; nevertheless, to the Great Beis Din (i.e. the Heavenly Tribunal), everything is revealed, and it will exact retribution from those who wrap themselves in taleisos and make themselves appear to be prushim when they really are not prushim.
The Aruch, [4] however, learns that the word "gundei" refers to black cloaks. Apparently, even in the time of the Gemara, these types of "bad prushim" wore black in order to appear pious.

What idea is Rav Nachman ben Yitzchak teaching us in this statement? I can't say for certain, but I will take one speculative step. Why do Chazal need to reassure us that a certain aveirah will not go unpunished? Because it must be that on some level we feel that this aveirah will go unpunished. Why might we feel this way about prushim?

Perhaps the answer is simple: we are easily swayed by appearances. If we weren't easily swayed by appearances, everyone would easily see through the facades of these "bad prushim." Even those who know that wearing a black hat and a white beard has absolutely nothing to do with the state of a person's soul vis-a-vis God, it can sometimes be difficult to really feel that this is true. Perhaps this is why Rav Nachman ben Yitzchak emphasizes must tell us that our view is only partial: we only see the outward actions of these people, but not their inner state, and it is their inner state - their knowledge and their true values - which are the real basis of the Divine judgment.

Concluding Thoughts

There you have it: Chazal's diagnosis of "the scourges of prushim." There is much left to think about. But if there's one point that we walk away with, I think it should be this: that these are not new problems. The same personalities we see in the world around us were also walking around in Chazal's time. Chazal knew about them, discussed them, and recorded their thoughts in writing. If we, as a nation, ever hope to remove these ills from our society, we would be wise to understand their teachings on these matters.

And yet, for all of the insights yielded by Chazal's analysis, my shul rabbi's quip ("Don't be too religious") packs a pithier punch. Like Shlomo ha'Melech's warning ("Don't be overly righteous"), his statement prompts us to look at ourselves and examine what we mean by "religious." I'm sure Chazal would approve.

[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah, Sotah 3:4
[2] Rabbeinu Menachem ha'Meiri, Beis ha'Bechirah, Sotah Chapter 3
[3] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Talmud Bavli: Sotah
[4] Rabbeinu Nosson ben Yechiel (ha'Aruch), Sefer ha'Aruch

Wednesday, June 6, 2018

Mishlei 17:8 - Blinded by Bribes

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Artwork: Lion's Eye Diamond, by Lindsey Look


Mishlei 17:8 - Blinded by Bribes


משלי יז:ח
אֶבֶן חֵן הַשֹּׁחַד בְּעֵינֵי בְעָלָיו אֶל כָּל אֲשֶׁר יִפְנֶה יַשְׂכִּיל:

Mishlei 17:8

A bribe is a charming gem in the eyes of its owner; wherever he turns he will succeed. 

The major questions on this pasuk are:
(1) In what sense is a bribe considered to be "a charming gem in the eyes of its owner? This is clearly a mashal (metaphor). What is the nimshal (i.e. what does the metaphor represent)? And why does the pasuk specify "in the eyes of its owner"? Why not just say"a bribe is a charming gem"?
(2) Who is "its owner"? The term "owner" can refer either to the giver of the bribe or to the recipient of the bribe. 
(3) How can Shlomo ha'Melech say "wherever he turns he will succeed"? Regardless of whether this is referring to the giver or receiver of the bribe, the statement is patently false. Just do a search on Google news for the term "bribery" and you'll see countless examples of individuals whose success was cut short because of their involvement in bribery. Moreover, even if Shlomo's statement were true, is he advocating bribery? Doesn't the Torah prohibit and condemn bribery, saying: "you shall not accept a bribe, for the bribe will blind the eyes of the wise and corrupt principles of justice" (Devarim 16:19)?
[Time to think! You'll get way more out of this blog post if you work on the pasuk yourself before reading what I have to say. Read on when ready.]

Here's my four-sentence summary of the main idea:
When a bribe is effective, it allows a person to sidestep or shortcut the system in order to obtain a benefit or avoid a consequence or cost. Ironically, the bribe-giver can easily become charmed and blinded by his own bribe – charmed into thinking he can succeed wherever he turns, and blinded to the true probabilities of success and failure. The more he relies on bribes to fuel his rise to “success,” the more reckless he will be in using them. Ultimately, the habitual bribe-giver will fall prey to the very types of systemic consequences he seeks to avoid. 
This pasuk utilizes a stylistic maneuver which Shlomo ha'Melech utilzes from time to time, namely, stating the fool's perspective as if it is reality. It is as if our pasuk says: "A bribe is a charming gem in the eyes of its owner [in that it causes him to believe that] wherever he turns he will succeed." I'd quote more examples of this from elsewhere in Mishlei, but I don't want to spoil future Mishlei posts.

The last time I taught this pasuk in class, a student of mine came up with another way to read this pasuk which leads to the same idea. She moved the asnachta (i.e. the semi-colon) so that the pasuk reads: "A bribe is a charming gem; in the eyes of its owner, wherever he turns he will succeed." I thought this was an elegant interpretive solution.

Wednesday, July 12, 2017

Mishlei 12:19 - The Temporary Nature of Lies

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Mishlei 12:19 - The Temporary Nature of Lies

משלי יב:יט
שְׂפַת אֱמֶת תִּכּוֹן לָעַד וְעַד אַרְגִּיעָה לְשׁוֹן שָׁקֶר:

Mishlei 12:19
True lips are established forever, but a false tongue is only for moment.

The questions on this pasuk are as follows:
(1) In what sense are true lips "established forever"? Is this actually true? Truths are certainly not automatically "established"; there can be tremendous resistance to the truth, and it is often neglected and not established at all. And even when it is established, it doesn't necessarily last forever. 
(2) What does it mean that a false tongue is "only for a moment"? It would seem that this false. Lies can persist for a lifetime - or even beyond a lifetime. Consider, for instance, all of the anti-Semitic lies that have been spread about Jews throughout the ages; they've certainly lasted for longer than "a moment." 
(3) Why does the pasuk use "lips" in reference to the truth and "tongue" in reference to falsehood? In our pasuk good speech is associated with the lips and bad speech with the tongue, but in other pesukim the association is flipped. For example: "There is one who speaks like the piercings of a sword, but the tongue of the wise heals" (Mishlei 12:19), "The tongue of the righteous is like choice silver, but the heart of the wicked is minute" (ibid. 10:20) "Lips of falsehood are an abomination to Hashem, but He favors those who act with integrity" (ibid. 12:22), "The lawless man contemplates evil, and it is as if there is a burning coal on his lips" (ibid. 16:27).
(4) What practical decision-making idea does this pasuk teach us? As I have mentioned before, this question ought to be asked about every pasuk. Like Shlomo ha'Melech, the best way to make this question into a habit is through repetition. 
[Okay, it's time to stop and think! Continue reading when you're ready for the main idea.]

Here is my four-sentence (with liberal use of semi-colons) summary of the main idea:
Whereas truth, by its very nature, is stable and exists independently of what human beings say, think, or do, lies are intrinsically unstable and exist on a tenuous and contingent basis. 
Since lies are cover-ups of reality, liars – unlike truth-tellers – constantly face the threat of exposure; lies can only continue to exist as long as they are maintained by the people who espouse them, perpetuate them, and believe in them, whereas the truth is anchored in reality itself. 
Moreover, since liars know the truth, they carry with them the potential to topple their own lies; in this sense, the liar is his own greatest enemy, since the slightest slip-up can bring down his entire web of falsehood. 
Thus, by telling the truth, a person endows his words with the same quality of permanence as reality itself, and doesn’t have to worry about “being found out,” since truth is not a cover-up operation; in contrast, one who tells a lie must continually manage the upkeep of his lies, and take strenuous and stressful efforts to prevent them from being exposed by reality, by other people, and by his own carelessness.
This idea is a good example of Mishlei's general approach to the subject of falsehood, lies, and deceit: it's not a good idea (a) because of the risk that you'll be caught, and (b) because it is simply not worthwhile to commit yourself to the responsibility of keeping tabs on your lies. 

This pasuk is also a good example of the power of mashal (metaphor). Notice that the emphasis of this pasuk is not on the consequences of lying or the benefits of truth-telling. Rather, Shlomo ha'Melech's aim is to convey a sense of the permanent nature of true speech and the transient nature of false speech. When the student of Mishlei internalizes this idea, and is subsequently faced with an opportunity to solve a problem or obtain an advantage by telling a lie, he will naturally dismiss this option because he will view the lie as nothing more than a temporary band-aid which is destined to fall off, and cost him dearly - both before and after his lie is exposed. 

In other words, the ideas I wrote about in my summary are there to provide rational support for the emotional attitude that Shlomo ha'Melech intended to impart - namely, the feeling that "lies are temporary" and "truth is permanent." The goal is to get to the point where you've reviewed these ideas so many times and have thought about so many examples that you can relate to the emotional affect of this pasuk without consciously reasoning through all of the steps. 

One last methodology point: you'll notice that my explanation didn't answer Question #3. That's totally fine. On every pasuk there are major and minor questions. Minor questions tend to stem from the specific wording of the pasuk. The only one of the meforshim I know who cares about explaining every subtlety of the text is the Malbim. Everyone seems content to just get the main idea. If you can bring out a nuance in the main idea from a nuance in the text, that's great. If not, it doesn't matter. As long as you get the main idea. 

Friday, July 8, 2016

Parashas Korach: Clinton, Trump, and Korach's Followers


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Parashas Korach: Clinton, Trump, and Korach's Followers

Clinton and Trump are both liars, but in different ways. Clinton lies like a duplicitous and conniving rasha (evildoer). Trump lies like an eveel (fool), or a petulant toddler. Both are willing to lie in the face of the evidence, but whereas Clinton uses cunning and smokescreens in an attempt to mask her corruption, Trump openly denies his lies by crafting and pushing audacious alternative narrative. 

As we witness these politicians repeatedly lie and get caught again and again, the question arises: "How did they possibly think they would get away with this?" It is for this question that we turn to our parashah for an answer.

Moshe Rabbeinu responds to Korach's rebellion by proposing a test:
He spoke to Korach and to his entire assembly, saying, "In the morning Hashem will make known to the one who is His own and the holy one, and He will draw him close to Himself, and whomever He will choose, He will draw close to Himself. Do this: Take for yourselves fire-pans - Korach and his entire assembly - and put fire in them and place incense upon them before Hashem tomorrow. Then the man whom Hashem will choose - he is the holy one" (Bamidbar 16:5-7).
The men do as they are told. And guess what happens? "A flame came forth from Hashem and consumed the two hundred and fifty men who were offering the incense" (ibid. 16:36). Aharon ha'Kohen is proven to be the chosen one.

The Abravanel [1] raises a glaring question:
How did Korach and his assembly agree to the test of the incense? Did they not remember the wonders that they had seen? Didn't they know that Nadav and Avihu were burned when they brought incense (Vayikra 10:2)? How did [these men] not fear for their lives? 
He then provides the following answer:
Without a doubt, if Moshe had explained to them the reality of this test, and how it would be - namely, that the chosen one would live and the incense would be accepted from him, and the others would die and be burned - perhaps they wouldn't have agreed to the matter. But he didn't explain to them the outcome of being chosen or not being chosen. Also, they - in their foolishness - didn't ask him about it. They thought that the fire would come down from the heavens onto the chosen incense, and they would all stand very close together, so that each one of them could say that the fire descended upon his [offering]. 
This is similar to what happened to the priests of Baal with Eliyahu. When Eliyahu proclaimed to them the test of the fire, they responded: "The proposal is good!" (Melachim I 18:24) because they thought that they would make their altars and their sacrifices together with the altar of Eliyahu. [They reasoned that] inevitably, either the fire would neither descend upon his nor upon theirs, and they would all be equal, or else the fire would descend, and they would say, "The fire descended for us!" and Eliyahu would say, "It descended for me!" and the matter would remain in doubt [in the eyes of the people] and Eliyahu's words would not be verified. 
Eliyahu saw that this was their plan. After they had agreed and accepted upon themselves this test, he said to them, "Choose for yourselves one bull and prepare it first, for you are the many" (ibid. 18:25). In other words, [he told them] that they would not be doing all of their offerings together, but the prophets of Baal would do it first. Through this, their evil was exposed, for the fire did not descend upon their offering. And that is what happened. Afterwards, Eliyahu did [his offering] and the fire descended upon his altar. 
The same exact thing happened to Moshe Rabbeinu with Korach and his assembly.
The Abravanel answers his question by explaining that the men of Korach's assembly knew that Hashem would not accept their incense, just as the prophets of Baal knew that their offerings would not be miraculously consumed. So why did both parties agree to the test? Because they relied on the prospect of manipulating the results of the test in their favor

But as Shlomo ha'Melech said, "Pride goeth before the fall" (cf. Mishlei 16:18). They were so confident in their ability to trick the populace that they walked right into the trap of letting their "opponents" (i.e. Moshe Rabbeinu and Eliyahu ha'Navi) set up the terms and conditions of the test, thereby precluding the possibility of their devious schemes. 

One of the more amusing examples of this mistake is The Amazing Randi's debunking of famous "psychics" and practitioners of the occult. Randi's One Million Dollar Paranormal Challenge promises $1,000,000 to anyone who can demonstrate paranormal powers under predetermined scientific criteria.

According to Wikipedia, over a thousand people have applied for this challenge, but no one has succeeded. Some of the applicants have gone so far as to be "tested" by Randi on live TV. For example, James Hydrick claimed to be able to move everyday objects (e.g. a pencil, and the pages of a telephone book) using only the power of his mind. Here is the clip of him demonstrating his "powers" without Randi's conditions, followed by a second attempt under Randi's conditions. Note that this is back when the challenge was only worth $10,000:


For those who skipped the video: Randi theorized that Hydrick was moving the objects by clandestinely blowing on them. To test this theory, Randi sprinkled foam packaging peanuts around the telephone book and asked Hydrick to repeat the demonstration of his powers. Under these conditions, Hydrick would be unable to move the objects without also revealing that he was blowing the peanuts.

Surprise surprise, Hydrick couldn't do it. In fact, he tried for an hour and a half (!) but didn't succeed. At the time, he blamed his failure on static electricity generated by the foam and the lights. But this excuse didn't fool anyone. He was exposed as a fraud, and his career as a psychic came to an abrupt end. Randi similarly debunked the even more famous psychic Uri Geller on The Today Show in 1973.

To the clear-thinking observer, it seems like a ludicrous move for Hydrick and Geller to submit themselves to a test with the conditions set by a professional skeptic. And yet, they agreed, and put their careers on the line. Why? Because they were seduced by their pride into believing that they could hoodwink the observers with their trickery, and they believed they were immune to failure.

The same is true of Korach's followers and the prophets of Baal. They knew that their claims were bogus, and they knew that Moshe Rabbeinu and Eliyahu ha'Navi were the real deal. But they still managed to delude themselves into believing that they could pull a fast one, and spin the test results in their favor.

It appears that the same is true for Clinton and Trump. The only difference is that they haven't yet gotten themselves into a big enough "test" situation. But if Shlomo ha'Melech's profiles of the rasha and the fool are correct, then it is only a matter of time before they do this, and destroy themselves with their lies.

Let us hope that this happens at a time when the damage done to America is minimal, and there is someone who is better qualified to take the place of the fallen Queen or King.

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 18:6