Seltzer Theories vs. Jam Theories

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Seltzer Theories vs. Jam Theories

Say what you will about Sigmund Freud, but one thing is clear: he was a thinker. Not only was he a thinker, but he had a particular knack for writing about one of my favorite subjects: methodology. Freud's writings are brimming with methodological insights, which have helped me in all areas of learning.

One of my favorite methodology points can be found in New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Lecture #30: Dreams and Occultism. Freud takes up the question as to whether there is any legitimacy to "occult phenomena," such as telepathy, fortune tellers, and prophetic dreams: 

We propose to proceed with these things as we do with any other scientific material: first of all to establish whether such events can really be shown to occur, and then and only then, when their factual nature cannot be doubted, to concern ourselves with their explanation.

But Freud notes that we are confronted by difficulties even before we begin our investigation:

It cannot be denied, however, that even the putting of this decision into action is made hard for us by intellectual, psychological and historical factors. The case is not the same as when we approach other investigations.

He then presents a key methodological insight (the paragraph-breaks are my own):

Let us suppose that the question at issue is the constitution of the interior of the earth. We have, as you are aware, no certain knowledge about it. We suspect that it consists of heavy metals in an incandescent state. Then let us imagine that someone puts forward an assertion that the interior of the earth consists of water saturated with carbonic acid - that is to say, with a kind of soda-water. 

We shall no doubt say that this is most improbable, that it contradicts all our expectations and pays no attention to the known facts which have led us to adopt the metal hypothesis. Nevertheless it is not inconceivable; if someone were to show us a way of testing the soda-water hypothesis we should follow it without objecting. 

But suppose now that someone else comes along and seriously asserts that the core of the earth consists of jam. Our reaction to this will be quite different. We shall tell ourselves that jam does not occur in nature, that it is a product of human cooking, that, moreover, the existence of this material presupposes the presence of fruit-trees and their fruit, and that we cannot see how we can locate vegetation and human cookery in the interior of the earth. 

The result of these intellectual objections will be a switching of our interest: instead of starting upon an investigation of whether the core of the earth really consists of jam, we shall ask ourselves what sort of person this must be who can arrive at such a notion, or at most we shall ask him where he got it from. 

The unlucky inventor of the jam theory will be very much insulted and will complain that we are refusing to make an objective investigation of his assertion on the ground of a pretendedly scientific prejudice. But this will be of no help to him. We perceive that prejudices are not always to be reprobated, but that they are sometimes justified and expedient because they save us useless labor. In fact they are only conclusions based on an analogy with other well-founded judgements. A whole number of occultist assertions have the same sort of effect on us as the jam hypothesis; so that we consider ourselves justified in rejecting them at sight, without further investigation.

There you have Freud's subdivision. In summary, there are three types of theories:

1. Heavy Metal Theory: There are theories which are natural extensions of - or, at least, do not contradict - our current empirical data and our theoretical framework. These are the theories to which we are most willing to devote our time and energy to clarify and develop, and to eventually verify or falsify.
   
2. Seltzer Theory: Then there are theories which strike us as improbable or counter-intuitive. Sometimes this is because these theories would require much more or much different data than we presently have. Sometimes it is because the framework of the proposed theory is so radically different from the current theory that it seems unlikely to be true. We would need a compelling reason to devote our time and energy to researching a seltzer theory (e.g. if the theory were proposed by someone in whom we have emunas chachamim, or if a theory were badly needed for a practical reason and all heavy metal theories had already been tested).
   
3. Jam Theory: Finally, there are the theories which strike us not only as improbable, but impossible, inconceivable, or absurd. Everything we know indicates that this theory can't be true, and therefore, it is not worth our while to devote time and energy into determining its validity.

In my opinion, this subdivision is entirely a matter of practicality. If we had infinite time and resources, we would investigate every theory. However, since our time and resources are limited, we must pick and choose which theories warrant a serious investigation and which do not. This three-fold rubric is a good tool for making such a decision.

Nevertheless, Freud - in his typical intellectual honesty - raises a problem with our rejection of jam theories:

But all the same, the position is not so simple. A comparison like the one I have chosen proves nothing, or proves as little as comparisons in general. It remains doubtful whether it fits the case, and it is clear that its choice was already determined by our attitude of contemptuous rejection. Prejudices are sometimes expedient and justified; but sometimes they are erroneous and detrimental, and one can never tell when they are the one and when the other. 

The history of science itself abounds in instances which are a warning against premature condemnation. For a long time it was regarded as a senseless hypothesis to suppose that the stones, which we now call meteorites, could have reached the earth from outer space or that the rocks forming mountains, in which the remains of shells are embedded, could have once formed the bed of the sea. Incidentally, much the same thing happened to our psycho-analysis when it brought forward its inference of there being an unconscious. 

Thus we analysts have special reason to be careful in using intellectual considerations for rejecting new hypotheses and must admit that they do not relieve us from feelings of antipathy, doubt and uncertainty.

Freud warns us that even jam theories might have merit, and that the theory-sorting rubric outlined above is not infallible. But where does this leave us? The fact remains that the vast majority of jam theories are bogus. How do we know when to research a jam theory and when to reject it at the outset?

The answer, I believe, is that we have no choice but to follow the rubric and reject jam theories at the outset. Even though this might lead us to reject theories which later prove to be valid, Freud's method is still the most rational and consistent approach we can take.

Needless to say, we must never close our minds to a jam theory, and if someone shows us evidence or compelling arguments for such a theory, then we should be intellectually honest enough to retract our decision and change our minds.