Parashas Korach: Three Types of Machlokes

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Artwork: Abzan Ascendancy, by Mark Winters

Parashas Korach: Three Types of Machlokes

If I told you that there are three types of machlokes (disagreement) - one good, one less-than-ideal, and one REALLY bad - and I asked you which category Korach's machlokes fell into, which category would you guess that would be? I imagine you'd intuitively select "really bad," judging by what happened to Korach and his followers.

According to R' Yehoshua ibn Shbuib [1], this is not the case. Korach's machlokes certainly wasn't good, but it wasn't entirely bad either. 

The Ibn Shuib begins by citing the mishnah in Avos 5:17:

Any machlokes which is not l'shem shamayim (for the sake of heaven) will ultimately not persist, and [any machlokes] which is l'shem shamayim will ultimately persist. Which is [an example of] a machlokes l'shem shamayim? This is the machlokes of Hillel and Shammai. [And which is an example of a machlokes] which is not l'shem shamayim? This is the machlokes of Korach and all of his assembly.

The Ibn Shuib then provides a summary of why Korach's machlokes fits into the second category:

The Tanna called the machlokes of Korach "she'lo l'shem shamayim" to teach us that they didn't present themselves as though they were vying for the positions [of Moshe and Aharon] and challenging their appointments, but rather [they presented themselves] as though they desired to serve Hashem like them; [in reality] they were only trying to make themselves great, which is why it is called "she'lo l'shem shamayim."

Next, he sets forth the three types of machlokes and offers an unconventional explanation of why Korach's machlokes falls into the second category, rather than the third:

There are three types of machlokes. The first is a machlokes l'shem shamayim - those who disagree like Abayye and Rava, or Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and others. Their goal wasn't to elevate their status, but only to derive the true halacha and to arrive at the root of the mitzvah or the law - not to be victorious. And when they saw the words of the wise, they would admit to the truth, as it frequently says: "Beis Hillel retracted and conceded to Beis Shammai," "Rebbi Yochanan withdrew [his original statement]," "Rava retracted from it," and he said, "The things I said before you were an error on my part." And they commanded their students at the end of their days to retract and concede to those who disagreed with them, as we find in [the Gemara] Niddah [2] in the case of the machlokes between Rav and Shmuel with Shila bar Avina - and many [other instances] in the Talmud. 

The second type is a machlokes of false pretenses, [3] like the machlokes of Korach, who misled those in his generation by making it seem as though he was being zealous on behalf of the firstborns and on behalf of the entire assembly because "all of them are holy, and Hashem is among them" (Bamidbar 16:3), and [claiming that] Moshe and Aharon and the others were taking the [appointments of divine] service for themselves and that everyone else should be excluded; [Korach presented his argument in this manner] until [the other members of his assembly] were tricked to follow after him. 

The third type is a machlokes of dominance between people who instigate a dispute and battle for power in trivial matters which have no tzorech mitzvah (mitzvah-function). To the contrary, [these disputes] contain iniquity and transgression, and their intention is to defeat their opponents. This is the last type of machlokes which is not mentioned by the Tanna [of our mishnah in Avos], because it isn't worthy of being mentioned. It is [the type of machlokes] found among other types of animals - domesticated animals, wild beasts, and birds.  

But [the Tanna] did mention the machlokes of Korach because it contained a tzorech mitzvah, since they wanted to serve Hashem - although it wasn't l'shem shamayim like the chachamim who argue in matters of Torah, [whereas Korach and his followers] argued in order to prevail over their fellows and to make a name [for themselves] - and this is somewhat considered to be a mitzvah she'lo lishmah (a mitzvah that is not done for its own sake).  

Thus, machlokes can be divided into three [categories], just like other phenomena which have two divisions [corresponding to] two extremes. The machlokes of Hillel and Shammai and the others is at the extreme side of the good, and the machlokes of dominance is at the extreme side of the bad if it is not for a tzorech mitzvah, and in the middle is the machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim. The Tanna took the second machlokes (i.e. Korach's machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim) and left out the third (i.e. the machlokes of dominance),which contains no good or constructive purpose, but only iniquity, transgression, and great harm. 

I was astonished and intrigued by the Ibn Shuib's classification of Korach's machlokes in the "less-than-ideal" middle category, rather than the "absolutely evil" extreme category. I guess I was so accustomed to thinking of Korach as "the villain" that I automatically assumed the worst. I guess this just goes to show how important it is to evaluate a person's actions on their own terms, without letting one's judgment be clouded by preconceived notions.

The second thing I found interesting about this is that the Ibn Shuib regards Korach's campaign as "somewhat considered to be a mitzvah she'lo lishmah." I've periodically looked into the topic of "the limits of she'lo lishmah." How far afield can mitzvah-motives go and still be considered to be an "acceptable" level of she'lo lishmah? At what point do ulterior motives outweigh the goodness of the mitzvah itself? According to the Ibn Shuib it would seem that a machlokes can have tremendously destructive ulterior motives, but the very fact that these motives are in service of some tzorech mitzvah means that such a machlokes would fall within the "middle" category of she'lo l'shem shamayim, and not the "extremely bad" category of "an animalistic battle for dominance." 

The third thing I gained from this is a shift in my view of "politics" within Jewish communities. As we are all aware, machlokes is far too pervasive within the Jewish world, from shul politics, to conflicts between different factions of Jewry, to infighting that stems from the stances that Jews take in American or Israeli politics. Before encountering this Ibn Shuib I automatically divided all of these instances of machlokes into only two categories: noble l'shem shamayim disagreements and animalistic ego-battles. To my mind, the baal ha'bayis (layman) quarreling argumentatively with the shul president was no different than two drunk guys at a bar getting into a fight to prove who is more macho. As long as the motives were not l'shem shamayim, what difference would it make what they're arguing about? 

But according to the Ibn Shuib, there is a key question that must be asked about any machlokes which is not l'shem shamayim: Does this involve some tzorech mitzvah? If it does, then that alone is a positive quality which is significant enough to define the nature of the machlokes. Such an argument may be fueled by egos, and may even lead to great harm and destruction, but to characterize it as purely animalistic would be incorrect. That designation should be reserved for personal quarrels which have no tzorech mitzvah, like the incident of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza.

And lest you say about one of the parties in a machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim, "But how can you say that there is any redeeming quality in this machlokes? This person/group/institution is trying to undermine the very foundations of Judaism!" the Ibn Shuib would say: "Yep - just like Korach. And just as Korach's machlokes wasn't purely evil, since it involved a tzorech mitzvah, you shouldn't be so quick to condemn the machlokes of which you speak as purely evil as long as it involves a tzorech mitzvah as well." 

This just goes to show the importance of a mitzvah she'lo lishmah within the Torah system. Even though Korach was undoubtedly mistaken and wrong in his actions, beliefs, and motives, and even though Moshe's authority was threatened to the point where Hashem had to intervene with a miracle to put a stop to Korach's coup, nevertheless, his machlokes still contained a modicum of good. 

The implications of the Ibn Shuib's position deserve further thought, but that's all I have to say for now. So next time you see Jews fighting about something, remember that even if they are comparable to Korach, that doesn't mean that there are no redeeming qualities to their machlokes. 

[1] Rabbeinu Yehoshua ibn Shuib, Drashos Ibn Shuib: Parashas Korach; in case you haven't heard of the Ibn Shuib, he was a student of the Rashba and a colleague of the Ritva

[2] Talmud Bavli: Niddah 36b

[3] The Ibn Shuib uses the phrase "מחלוקת ההטעאה" which literally translates it as a "a disagreement of misleading [others]." I translated it as "a machlokes of false pretenses," since I thought this sounded less awkward and conveyed the meaning that the Ibn Shuib goes on to discuss.