Parashas Chukas: Three Types of Reasons for Mitzvos

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Artwork: Ring of Three Wishes, by Mark Winters

Parashas Chukas: Three Types of Reasons for Chukim

There is a well-known midrash which states that Shlomo ha'Melech understood the reasons for all of the chukim (statutes) except for the Parah Adumah (Red Heifer) in this week's parashah. [1] We have written on numerous occasions about how this midrash has been misunderstood. Even chukim have reasons, though they may not be obvious. In today's post I would like to explore what it means to "find a reason" for a chok. 

Buried deep within the Mishneh Torah of the Rambam, [2] at the very end of Hilchos Me'ilah, at the very end of Sefer Avodah, is a miniature treatise on understanding the reasons for mitzvos which begins with the following injunction:

It is proper for a person to contemplate the laws of the Holy Torah and to know their ultimate idea (sof inyan), according to his ability. If he doesn't find a reason (taam) and doesn't know a cause (ilah) of something, it should not be lighter in his eyes, nor should he break forth to ascend to Hashem lest He burst forth against him, nor should he think of it as a mundane matter. 

The Rambam begins by urging us to understand the sof inyan (ultimate idea) of every mitzvah. This phrase is somewhat vague. But in the very next sentence he clarifies what he meant by describing what it looks like to fall short of this ideal, saying that "he didn't find a taam (reason)" and "he didn't know an ilah (cause)." The question is: What does the Rambam mean by taam and ilah?

The Rambam [3] provides us with a clue at the end of Hilchos Temurah: 

Even though all of the chukim of the Torah are [Scriptural] decrees, as we explained at the end of Hilchos Me'ilah, it is proper to contemplate them; anything for which you can give a taam (reason), you should give a taam. The Early Sages said that Shlomo ha’Melech understood the majority of taamim for all of the chukim of the Torah.

There are several noteworthy subtleties about the Rambam's phrasing in both sources. First of all, whereas in Hilchos Me'ilah he speaks about all mitzvos - including mishpatim - in Hilchos Temurah he only talks about chukim. Secondly, when discussing the ilah (cause) of a mitzvah he uses the verb "to know," as opposed to when discusses the taam of a mitzvah, in which case he uses the verbs "to find," "to give," and "to understand." Even stranger is his statement "anything for which you can give a taam, give a taam," which almost sounds like he's talking about a subjective form of apologetics, rather than a genuine analysis of the mitzvah in an attempt to uncover its meaning. Lastly, in Hilchos Temurah, the Rambam says that Shlomo understood "the majority of taamim for all the chukim of the Torah," which implies that chukim have multiple taamim. Indeed, 

On the basis of these observations, I would like to suggest the following. The term "ilah" refers to the final cause of the mitzvah - the reason why the mitzvah exists, and without which, the mitzvah would not exist. In contrast, the taam of a mitzvah refers to a benefit which emerges from the mitzvah, but is not necessarily the reason why the mitzvah came into existence in the first place. 

For example, the Rambam famously held that korbanos (sacrifices) were only commanded by Hashem as a means of curtailing, limiting, and uprooting avodah zarah (idolatry) from the nation. From his explanation we have every reason to believe that the Rambam meant exactly what he wrote: had mankind done teshuvah shleimah (complete repentance) from avodah zarah prior to the time that the Torah was given, there would be no korbanos. The uprooting of avodah zarah is the ilah (cause), and all of the mitzvos involving korbanos are the alul (effect). 

Does this mean he holds that there are no other benefits or perfections to be gained from any of the korbanos? Of course not! It's hard to imagine that the Rambam would deny, for example, the Ramban's [4] explanation of how the sacrificing of the animal facilitates teshuvah by bringing us to the recognition that by midas ha'din (absolute justice) standards, we forfeit our right to exist by acting contrary to God's will. Nor would the Rambam deny the Sefer ha'Chinuch's [5] explanation, that when we slaughter the animal as part of our teshuvah process, we are acknowledging that we only came to sin because we allowed our animalistic nature to gain the upper hand. The Rambam would merely say that these explanations reflect taamim, though not the true ilah, of korbanos.

Likewise, the Rambam would undoubtedly agree that the ilah of the Pesach is to remember Yetzias Mitzrayim (the Exodus from Egypt) and that the ilah of Sukkos is "in order that your generations will know that I caused Bnei Yisrael to dwell in Sukkos when I took them out from Egypt" (Vayikra 23:43). Yet, in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim [6] he says that the moadim (holidays) are "appointed for rejoicing and for such pleasant gathering as people generally need; they also promote the good feeling that men should have to each other in their social and political relations." 

I believe this explains all of the anomalies we pointed out. It explains his use of the words "ilah" and "taam." It explains why the Rambam uses the verb "to know" in relation to the ilah, since the ilah is an objective fact that can be discovered through knowledge, whereas it makes more sense to use the verbs "to find," "to give," and "to understand" in relation to the taamim, due to the more speculative nature of that type of inquiry. This is also why the Rambam tells us "anything for which you can give a taam, you should give a taam," since the goal is to find as many ways to benefit from our observance of the mitzvos as possible, even if we don't understand the true ilah. This also explains how Shlomo could have understood "the majority of taamim for all of the mitzvos." In other words, if you asked him, he could give you a taam for every single mitzvah - including Parah Adumah - but he would acknowledge that there are taamim that he hasn't yet uncovered.

That takes care of two types of reasons for mitzvos. But as the title of this post implies, there is a third. In the Rambam's terminology, this third type of reason is called a "remez" (allusion). The Rambam provides two examples of this in the Mishneh Torah. The first is his explanation [7] of the remez in shofar:

Even though the sounding of the shofar on Rosh Ha'Shanah is a Scriptural decree, it contains a remez: it is as if it is saying, "Wake up, wake up you sleepers from your sleep, and you slumberers from your deep slumber! Analyze your actions, return in teshuvah, and remember your Creator" - these are the people who forget reality, due to the empty illusions of the times, and whose entire year is steeped in fantasy and emptiness which neither benefits them nor saves them - "Look into your souls and improve your ways and your actions. Each and every one of you: abandon your evil way and your scheming that is not good!" 

The second example is his explanation [8] of the remez in mikvah:

It is a clear and evident thing that tumah (halachic impurity) and taharah (halachic purity) are a Scriptural decree; they are not matters which are dictated by common sense, but are included in the chukim. Likewise, tevilah (ritual immersion) from tumah is included in the chukim, since tumah isn’t mud or excrement such that it would be removed by water, but is a Scriptural decree, and is a matter which is dependent on the intention of the heart. Therefore, the Sages said that if a person immersed but didn’t intend to purify himself, it is as if he didn’t immerse. Nevertheless, there is a remez in it: just as one who intended in his heart to be purified, and once he immersed he became purified, even though nothing changed in his body, so too, one who intends to purify his soul from spiritual impurity – namely, thoughts of iniquity and bad character traits – once he resolves in his mind to separate from those counsels, and brings is soul into the waters of knowledge, he becomes pure. This is as it says: “I will sprinkle pure waters on you and you will become purified; from all of your impurities and from all of your filth I will purify you” (Yechezkel 36:25).

According to the Rambam, a "remez" is a metaphorical or symbolic interpretation of a mitzvah. The remez differs from the taam in the same way that midrash differs from pshat - that is, the remez explanation is imposed onto the mitzvah from without, whereas the taam explanation highlights a benefit which naturally emerges from within the structure of the mitzvah. 

Now that we are aware of these three types of reasons one can give for the mitzvos, it behooves us to classify accordingly the explanations we encounter or discover. There are many people who believe they are giving a taam when it is merely a remez; sometimes we might mistake a taam for an ilah; and sometimes an ilah might be missed because we are too busy looking for a remez. 

This classification scheme can be very helpful when learning the reasons for mitzvos given by meforshim (commentators). Ask yourself which type of reason the commentator intended to give. In some cases, the commentator might have believed he was giving one type of reason, but another commentator will disagree and say he's giving a different type.

Is it possible that the definitions stated here are not what the Rambam intended by his use of these terms? Yes. But even if that is the case, I am convinced that this classification scheme will help us to follow the Rambam's advice and strive to understand the sof inyan of every mitzvah. 

[1] Bamidbar Rabbah 19:3
[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Avodah, Hilchos Me'ilah 8:8
[3] ibid. Sefer haKorbanos, Hilchos Temurah 4:13

[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 1:9

[5] Sefer ha'Chinuch, Parashas Terumah: Mitzvah #95

[6] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:32

[7] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 3:4

[8] ibid. Sefer Taharah, Hilchos Mikvaos 11:12