Parashas Chukas: Chukim - Decrees of Whim or Wisdom?

This week's dvar Torah covers a basic but fundamental issue: whether or not chukim have reasons. Enjoy!

Parashas Chukas: Chukim - Decrees of Whim or Wisdom

"This is the chukah (decree) of the Torah, which Hashem has commanded etc." (Bamidbar 19:2)

What are chukim? Rashi's most comprehensive answer can be found in Parashas Beshalach [1]:

[Chukim are] matters that are only the decree of the King, without any reason, and with which the yetzer ha'ra (evil inclination) finds fault, saying, “What [cause for] prohibition is there in these? Why were they prohibited?” Examples include [the prohibitions of] wearing shaatnez [a mixture of wool and linen] and eating pork, and the parah adumah (red heifer) and the like.

On the surface, Rashi would seem to maintain that chukim are mitzvos which have no reasons. He reiterates this definition several times throughout his commentary [2].

The Ramban doesn't accept this reading of Rashi. After quoting Rashi's definition of a chok as "a decree of the King for which there is no reason," Ramban proceeds to clarify what Rashi really meant [3]:

Their intention is not that a decree of the King of kings would have no reason, for “every word of God is refined” (Mishlei 30:5). Rather, chukim are like the decrees of a king which he enacts in his kingdom without revealing their beneficial purpose to the nation. [Consequently,] the masses do not take delight in them, but are critical of them in their hearts, and accept them out of the fear of the kingship. The same is true of the chukim of Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu: they are the esoteric matters which are contained in his Torah, which the masses – in their minds – do not delight in, like they do with the mishpatim. But [in truth] all of them have a good rationale and completely beneficial [reason].

According to the Ramban, Rashi didn't mean that the chukim of the Torah actually have no reason. Rather, Rashi was describing how the masses perceive the chukim. All mitzvos have reasons, but whereas the reasons for mishpatim are revealed, the reasons for the chukim are concealed. 

The Rambam is just as explicit as the Ramban in his rejection of the notion that chukim have no reasons [4]:

Just as theologians are divided on the question of whether the actions of God are the result of His Wisdom, or only of His Will without being intended for any purpose whatsoever, so they are also divided as regards the purpose of the mitzvos which God gave us. Some of them hold that the mitzvos have no purpose at all and are only dictated by the whim of God. Others are of the opinion that all commandments and prohibitions are dictated by His wisdom and serve a certain aim. Consequently there is a reason for each one of the mitzvos: they are commanded because they are beneficial.  

All of us, the masses as well as the elite individuals, maintain that there is a reason for every mitzvah, although there are mitzvos the reason of which is unknown to us, and in which the ways of [Divine] wisdom are not known. This view is distinctly expressed in Scripture, as it is stated, "chukim and mishpatim of justice" (Devarim 4:8), “The mishpatim of Hashem are true and righteous altogether” (Tehilim 19:10).

The Rambam then goes on to explain the difference between chukim and mishpatim:

There are mitzvos which are called chukim – such as the prohibitions of shaatnez and [cooking] meat and milk together, and the sending of the goat [into the wilderness on Yom ha’Kippurim] – about which the Sages said [5], “I, [Hashem,] have ordained these for you; you do not have permission to be suspicious of them, and the satan flings accusations on account of them, and the gentile nations argue against them.” 

The multitude of Sages do not think that such mitzvos have no reason whatsoever and serve no purpose, for this would lead us to assume that God's actions are in vain. On the contrary, they maintain that even these chukim have a reason – that is to say, an absolutely beneficial reason – even if it eludes us, owing either to the weakness of our intellect or the deficiency of our knowledge. 

Consequently, the Sages are of the opinion that there are reasons for every mitzvah: every positive or negative precept serves a beneficial purpose. In some cases the usefulness is evident, for example, the prohibition of murder and theft; in others the usefulness is not so evident, for example, the prohibition of orlah (deriving benefit from the fruit of a tree in the first three years) or kilai ha’kerem (deriving benefit from the produce of a mixed-species vineyard). Those mitzvos whose purpose is generally evident are called mishpatim, and those whose purpose is not generally clear are called chukim. 

The Sages [6] continually say: “'ki lo davar reik hu mi’kem – for it is not an empty thing for you’ (Devarim 32:47) – and if you find it to be a davar reik (empty thing), it is mi’kem (lit. from you).” In other words, this commandment is not an empty thing without any beneficial purpose, and if it appears to you that any one of the mitzvos is like this, it is due to a deficiency in your understanding. 

Elsewhere the Rambam articulates the underlying premise of those who believe that mitzvos have no reasons [7]: 

There are people who find it difficult to give a reason for any of the mitzvos, and who prefer not to analyze the commandments and prohibitions at all. They are led to adopt this approach by a certain disease in their soul, the existence of which they perceive, but which they are unable to describe or explain, namely, they imagine that if these mitzvos were beneficial in this [worldly] existence in any way whatsoever, and if they were commanded because of this benefit, then it would be as though they originated in the thought and reason of some intelligent being; but [if] these matters are not subject to rationality and do not bring about a benefit, they would undoubtedly be attributed to God, because no thought of man could have produced them.  

According to the theory of those weak-minded people, man is more perfect than his Creator, for what man says or does has a certain purpose, whereas the actions of God are different, for He commands us to do what is of no use to us, and forbids us to do what is harmless. May He be exalted and elevated above [this erroneous notion]!  

The exact opposite is true: the entire purpose [of the Torah] is to benefit us, as we have explained in that which is stated: “[Hashem commanded us to perform all these decrees, to fear Hashem, our God,] for our good, all the days, to give us life, as this very day” (Devarim 6:24). And it is stated: “[You shall safeguard them and perform them, for it is your wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the nations,] who shall hear all these decrees and who shall say, ‘Surely a wise and discerning people is this great nation!’” (ibid. 4:6). Thus, He clearly stated that even the individual chukim point to wisdom and understanding in the eyes of all the nations. But if no reason could be found for these chukim and if they did not yield benefit or remove harm, then why should he who believes in them and does them be [considered] wise, understanding, and excellent, and why should such an individual be a wonderment to all of the nations?  

The Rambam concludes with a rule of thumb for uncovering the reasons for chukim:

Rather, the matter is undoubtedly as we have said, namely, that every one of the 613 mitzvos serves to inculcate a true view or remove a false view, or to establish righteous conduct [in society] or remove an injustice, or to train us in a good character trait or to caution us against an evil character trait. Everything is dependent on these three things: hashkafos (our view of reality), middos (character traits), and actions which shape society … Thus, these three principles suffice for assigning a reason for each and every mitzvah.

It is possible that Rashi meant exactly what he wrote, and that the believes that chukim have no reasons. Nevertheless, the Ramban and the Rambam build a strong case for the argument that all mitzvos have reasons, and that Rashi would agree. 

[1] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak, Commentary on Sefer Shemos 15:26

[2] ibid. Commentary on Sefer Bereishis 26:5 and Sefer Vayikra 19:19

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 19:19

[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:26

[5] Talmud Bavli, Yoma 67b

[6] Talmud Yerushalmi, Peah 1:4

[7] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:31

Rambam: On the Reasons for Mitzvos

The following is a translation of a full chapter of the Guide for the Perplexed (3:26) in which the Rambam establishes some fundamental principles about the reasons for mitzvos. This post stands on its own, but is also the basis of tomorrow's post, entitled: "Are Mitzvos Arbitrary?" The paragraph divisions and headings are mine. 

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Rambam: On the Reasons for Mitzvos (Guide for the Perplexed 3:26)

All Mitzvos Have Reasons

Just as religious scholars are divided on the question of whether the actions of God are the result of His Wisdom, or only of His Will without being intended for any purpose whatsoever, so they are also divided as regards the purpose of the mitzvos which God gave us. 

Some of them hold that the commandments have no purpose at all and are only dictated by the whim of God. Others are of the opinion that all commandments and prohibitions are dictated by His wisdom and serve a certain aim. Consequently there is a reason for each one of the precepts: they are commanded because they are useful. 

All of us, the common people as well as the scholars, believe that there is a reason for every mitzvah, although there are mitzvos the reason of which is unknown to us, and in which the ways of God's wisdom are incomprehensible. This view is distinctly expressed in Scripture, as it is stated, "chukim (statutes) and mishpatim (judgments) of justice" (Devarim 4:8), “The mishpatim of Hashem are true and righteous altogether” (Tehilim 19:10). 

Even Chukim Have Reasons

There are mitzvos which are called chukim (statutes), such as the prohibition of wearing garments of wool and linen [mixed together] (shaatnez), boiling meat and milk together, and the sending of the goat [into the wilderness on Yom ha’Kippurim]. Regarding these the Sages said: “I, [Hashem,] have ordained these for you; you do not have permission to be suspicious of them, and the satan flings accusations on account of them, and the gentile nations argue against them” (Yoma 67b).

The multitude of Sages generally do not think that such mitzvos have no reason whatsoever and serve no purpose, for this would lead us to assume that God's actions are in vain. On the contrary, they maintain that even these chukim have a reason – that is to say, a specific, beneficial reason – even if it eludes us, owing either to the weakness of our intellect or the deficiency of our knowledge.

Consequently, the Sages are of the opinion that there are reasons for every mitzvah: every positive or negative precept serves a beneficial purpose. In some cases the usefulness is evident, for example, the prohibition of murder and theft; in others the usefulness is not so evident, for example, the prohibition of orlah (deriving benefit from the fruit of a tree in the first three years) or kilai ha’kerem (deriving benefit from the produce of a mixed-species vineyard). Those commandments whose purpose is generally evident are called mishpatim, and those whose purpose is not generally clear are called chukim.

Concealed Reasons

The Sages continually say: “ki lo davar reik hu mi’kem – for it is not an empty thing for you’ (Devarim 32:47) – and if you find it to be a davar reik (empty thing), it is mi’kem (lit. from you)” (Yerushalmi Peah 1:4). In other words, this mitzvah is not an empty thing without any beneficial purpose, and if it appears to you that any one of the mitzvos is like this, this is due to a deficiency in your understanding.

You certainly know the famous saying that the reasons for all of the mitzvos were known to Shlomo except that of the parah adumah (red heifer). Our Sages also said that Hashem concealed the reasons for the mitzvos lest people should make light of them, as Shlomo did in respect to three mitzvos, the reasons for which are clearly stated. All of [the Sages’] words follow this fundamental principle, and it is indicated by the text of the pesukim.

A Puzzling Statement

I have, however, found one utterance made by them in Bereishis Rabbah (Section 44) from which, at first glance, it would appear that some mitzvos have no other reason but the fact that they are commanded, and that no other objective is intended by them, and that they do not serve any real purpose. I mean the following passage: 

What difference does it make to Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu whether an animal is slaughtered by shechitah (cutting the front of the neck) or by nechirah ("poleaxing it" i.e. chopping the back of its neck)? Surely the mitzvos were only given in order to test human beings, as it is stated: "The word of Hashem is tested (lit. refined)" (Tehilim 18:31). 

Although this passage is exceedingly strange and has no parallel in the writings of our Sages, I will explain it - as you shall soon hear - in such a manner that I do not stray at all from their words and do not depart from the unanimous fundamental principle, namely, that all mitzvos serve a real, beneficial objective, [as it is stated:] "for it is not an empty thing for you," and as it is stated:"I did not tell the descendants of Yaakov to seek Me for nothing; I am Hashem, Who speaks righteousness" (Yeshayahu 45:19). 

Resolution of the Difficulty

I will now tell you what all people with sound minds ought to maintain in this respect, namely, that all of the mitzvos have specific reasons as far as their general character is concerned, and were commanded for a specific purpose; but as regards to their particulars - that is where we say that they have no reason other than being commanded. 

For example: killing animals for the purpose of obtaining nutrition is clearly beneficial, as we intend to show (see 3:48). However, that the killing should not be performed by nechirah but by shechitah (cutting the neck), and by dividing the esophagus and the windpipe in a certain place - these regulations and the like are nothing but tests for man. In this sense you will understand the example quoted by our Sages [that there is no difference] between killing the animal by shechitah or by nechirah. 

I give this instance only because it has been mentioned by our Sages, but in reality [there is some reason for these regulations:] once it has become necessary to eat the flesh of animals, it was intended by the above regulations to ensure an easy death and to effect it by suitable means; while decapitation requires a sword or a similar instrument, shechitah can be performed with any instrument; and in order to ensure an easy death our Sages insisted that the knife should be well sharpened.

Another Example

A better example of the point we made about [reasons for] the particulars of mitzvos is korbanos (sacrifices). The law that korbanos should be brought is tremendously beneficial, as will be shown by us (see 3:46), but we cannot say why one korban should be a lamb whilst another is a ram, and why a fixed number of them should be brought. Those who trouble themselves to find reasons for any of these details are chasing after a huge delusion - one which not only fails to remove any difficulties, but increases them. Anyone who believes that these [details of the laws] have a purpose is as far from the truth as one who assumes that the entire mitzvah is without any real purpose. 

It is important for you to know that chochmah (wisdom) demanded it - or, if you prefer, say that necessity dictated - that there should be parts [of the mitzvos] for which reasons are inapplicable; it is, as it were, inherently impossible for the mitzvah not to have something of this type.

That this cannot be avoided may be seen from the following: You ask, "Why must a lamb be sacrificed and not a ram?" But the same question would be asked why a ram had been commanded instead of a lamb - so long as one particular kind is required. The same is to be said as to the question why were seven lambs sacrificed and not eight: the same question might have been asked if there were eight, ten, or twenty lambs - so long as some definite number of lambs were sacrificed. It is almost similar to the nature of a thing which can potentially receive different forms, but actually receives only one of them: we must not ask why it has this form and not another which is likewise possible, because we should have to ask the same question if instead of its actual form the thing had any of the other possible forms. Note this, and understand it. 

The repeated assertion of our Sages that there are reasons for all mitzvos, and the tradition that Solomon knew them, refers to the general purpose of the mitzvos, but one should not inquire about their details.

Rambam's Plan for Explaining Mitzvos

This being the case, I find it convenient to divide the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos into a number of classes: each class will include many mitzvos of the same kind, or related to each other by their character. I will [first] explain the reason of each class, and show its undoubted and undisputed benefit; then I shall discuss each mitzvah in the class, and expound its reason. Only very few will be left unexplained, the reason for which I have been unable to trace unto this day. I have also been able to comprehend in some cases even the reasons for many of the conditions and details, as far as these can be discovered. You will hear all this later on. But in order to fully explain these reasons I must preface this with several chapters; in these I will discuss principles which form the basis of my theory. I will now begin these chapters.

Parashas Chukas: The Reason for Parah Adumah

Originally posted in July 2013.

Parashas Chukas: The Reason for Parah Adumah

Parashas Chukas begins with the mysterious mitzvah of the parah adumah (red heifer). We are commanded to sacrifice and burn a parah adumah so that its ash should be available for anyone who needs to be purified from tumas meis (halachic impurity resulting from coming in contact with a corpse). This parah must meet a highly specific list of requirements in order to be eligible for the mitzvah. For example: it must be completely red; it must be tamim (“perfect”) without any physical blemishes; it must be purchased using communal funds – not the general "Sanctuary maintenance" funds; and it must never have borne a yoke on its neck or performed any labor. [1] The aim of this short dvar Torah is to explain one of the basic reasons for the parah adumah.

To this one might object: “How is that even possible? I was taught that nobody knows the reason for the parah adumah – not even Shlomo ha’Melech!” This is partially correct, but not entirely. It is true that Shlomo ha’Melech understood the reasons for all 613 mitzvos except for the parah adumah, as was taught in the Midrash Tanchumah. [2] However, that very same midrash teaches: “The Holy One, blessed is He, told Moshe: ‘To you I will reveal the reason for the parah, but not to others.’” [3] Upon reflection, this makes sense: Moshe Rabbeinu was on the highest level of knowledge, and was taught the entire Torah by Hashem. Of course he understood the reasons for all of the mitzvos!

Not only that, but the same midrash goes on to state that the hidden reasons for all of the mitzvos, including parah adumah, were understood by R’ Akiva and his colleagues. Although the midrash appears to contradict itself, one thing is clear: the reason for the parah adumah may be difficult to grasp, but it can be understood, and has been, by a number of chachamim.

But wait – there’s more! Rashi, himself, provides an explanation for parah adumah in his Chumash commentary, and that is what we will focus on here. Rashi begins by explaining why this korban must be a female, whereas all other communal korbanos are male:

This can be compared to the son of a maidservant who soiled the king’s palace. They said, “Let this mother come and clean up the mess!” Similarly, let the parah come and atone for the [Golden] Calf. [4]

This is the crux of Rashi’s approach: the parah adumah was designed as a kaparah (atonement) for the Cheit ha’Eigel (Sin of the Golden Calf). Rashi then goes on to explain each requirement of the parah adumah in accordance with this theory.

The color red represents sin, as it is stated, “If [your sins] have become as red as crimson, they will become [white] as wool.” [5] The physical perfection of the parah is an allusion to Bnei Yisrael, who were “perfect” until they became “blemished” by the Cheit ha’Eigel. The requirement to purchase the parah from communal funds parallels the fact that Bnei Yisrael donated their own jewelry to make the Eigel. The requirement that the parah must never have borne a yoke alludes to the fact that Bnei Yisrael cast off the Ole Shamayim (Yoke of Heaven) when they worshiped the Eigel. Rashi goes on to explain all of the other requirements of the parah adumah in this manner.

We have only scratched the surface of understanding the reasons behind parah adumah according to Rashi’s theory. However, what is (perhaps) more important than Rashi’s particular ideas is his overall approach to chukim. In spite of our tradition that only a few individuals throughout history understood the reason for parah adumah, Rashi nevertheless analyzed the subject with his own mind. By analyzing the major structural components of the mitzvah as taught in Torah she’baal Peh (the Oral Torah), and drawing upon his knowledge of clues in Torah she’bi’Chsav (the Written Torah), Rashi was able to arrive at his own theory about the intended purpose of this enigmatic mitzvah.

Rashi’s approach to the parah adumah may serve as a model for how we approach all chukim. The Rambam writes: “Even though all of the chukim of the Torah are decrees … it is proper to think into them and to provide reasons for them wherever you are able to do so.” [6] If we seek to understand the chukim of our Torah, we must analyze them with our own minds through the lenses of Torah she’bi’Chsav and Torah she’baal Peh, guided by the Talmudic traditions of Chazal – just as Rashi, Rebbi Akiva, and Shlomo ha’Melech did.

May we all merit to discover reasons for all of the chukim, so that we may reap the full benefits intended by the One Who commanded them!

[1] Sefer Bamidbar 19:1-22

[2] Tanchumah: Chukas 6; Bamidbar Rabbah 19:3; Koheles Rabbah 7:23; Psikta d’Rav Kahana 4.

[3] Tanchumah: Chukas 8; Bamidbar Rabbah 19:6; Psikta d’Rav Kahanah ibid.

[4] Rabbeinu Shlomo Yitzchaki (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 19:22; the midrashim which are the basis for Rashi’s explanation can be found in the Midrash Aggadah and Tanchuma 8, as well as in Bamidbar Rabbah 19:8.

[5] Sefer Yeshayahu 1:18

[6] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Korbanos, Hilchot Temurah 4:14

Parashas Chukas: Three Types of Reasons for Mitzvos

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Artwork: Ring of Three Wishes, by Mark Winters

Parashas Chukas: Three Types of Reasons for Chukim

There is a well-known midrash which states that Shlomo ha'Melech understood the reasons for all of the chukim (statutes) except for the Parah Adumah (Red Heifer) in this week's parashah. [1] We have written on numerous occasions about how this midrash has been misunderstood. Even chukim have reasons, though they may not be obvious. In today's post I would like to explore what it means to "find a reason" for a chok. 

Buried deep within the Mishneh Torah of the Rambam, [2] at the very end of Hilchos Me'ilah, at the very end of Sefer Avodah, is a miniature treatise on understanding the reasons for mitzvos which begins with the following injunction:

It is proper for a person to contemplate the laws of the Holy Torah and to know their ultimate idea (sof inyan), according to his ability. If he doesn't find a reason (taam) and doesn't know a cause (ilah) of something, it should not be lighter in his eyes, nor should he break forth to ascend to Hashem lest He burst forth against him, nor should he think of it as a mundane matter. 

The Rambam begins by urging us to understand the sof inyan (ultimate idea) of every mitzvah. This phrase is somewhat vague. But in the very next sentence he clarifies what he meant by describing what it looks like to fall short of this ideal, saying that "he didn't find a taam (reason)" and "he didn't know an ilah (cause)." The question is: What does the Rambam mean by taam and ilah?

The Rambam [3] provides us with a clue at the end of Hilchos Temurah: 

Even though all of the chukim of the Torah are [Scriptural] decrees, as we explained at the end of Hilchos Me'ilah, it is proper to contemplate them; anything for which you can give a taam (reason), you should give a taam. The Early Sages said that Shlomo ha’Melech understood the majority of taamim for all of the chukim of the Torah.

There are several noteworthy subtleties about the Rambam's phrasing in both sources. First of all, whereas in Hilchos Me'ilah he speaks about all mitzvos - including mishpatim - in Hilchos Temurah he only talks about chukim. Secondly, when discussing the ilah (cause) of a mitzvah he uses the verb "to know," as opposed to when discusses the taam of a mitzvah, in which case he uses the verbs "to find," "to give," and "to understand." Even stranger is his statement "anything for which you can give a taam, give a taam," which almost sounds like he's talking about a subjective form of apologetics, rather than a genuine analysis of the mitzvah in an attempt to uncover its meaning. Lastly, in Hilchos Temurah, the Rambam says that Shlomo understood "the majority of taamim for all the chukim of the Torah," which implies that chukim have multiple taamim. Indeed, 

On the basis of these observations, I would like to suggest the following. The term "ilah" refers to the final cause of the mitzvah - the reason why the mitzvah exists, and without which, the mitzvah would not exist. In contrast, the taam of a mitzvah refers to a benefit which emerges from the mitzvah, but is not necessarily the reason why the mitzvah came into existence in the first place. 

For example, the Rambam famously held that korbanos (sacrifices) were only commanded by Hashem as a means of curtailing, limiting, and uprooting avodah zarah (idolatry) from the nation. From his explanation we have every reason to believe that the Rambam meant exactly what he wrote: had mankind done teshuvah shleimah (complete repentance) from avodah zarah prior to the time that the Torah was given, there would be no korbanos. The uprooting of avodah zarah is the ilah (cause), and all of the mitzvos involving korbanos are the alul (effect). 

Does this mean he holds that there are no other benefits or perfections to be gained from any of the korbanos? Of course not! It's hard to imagine that the Rambam would deny, for example, the Ramban's [4] explanation of how the sacrificing of the animal facilitates teshuvah by bringing us to the recognition that by midas ha'din (absolute justice) standards, we forfeit our right to exist by acting contrary to God's will. Nor would the Rambam deny the Sefer ha'Chinuch's [5] explanation, that when we slaughter the animal as part of our teshuvah process, we are acknowledging that we only came to sin because we allowed our animalistic nature to gain the upper hand. The Rambam would merely say that these explanations reflect taamim, though not the true ilah, of korbanos.

Likewise, the Rambam would undoubtedly agree that the ilah of the Pesach is to remember Yetzias Mitzrayim (the Exodus from Egypt) and that the ilah of Sukkos is "in order that your generations will know that I caused Bnei Yisrael to dwell in Sukkos when I took them out from Egypt" (Vayikra 23:43). Yet, in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim [6] he says that the moadim (holidays) are "appointed for rejoicing and for such pleasant gathering as people generally need; they also promote the good feeling that men should have to each other in their social and political relations." 

I believe this explains all of the anomalies we pointed out. It explains his use of the words "ilah" and "taam." It explains why the Rambam uses the verb "to know" in relation to the ilah, since the ilah is an objective fact that can be discovered through knowledge, whereas it makes more sense to use the verbs "to find," "to give," and "to understand" in relation to the taamim, due to the more speculative nature of that type of inquiry. This is also why the Rambam tells us "anything for which you can give a taam, you should give a taam," since the goal is to find as many ways to benefit from our observance of the mitzvos as possible, even if we don't understand the true ilah. This also explains how Shlomo could have understood "the majority of taamim for all of the mitzvos." In other words, if you asked him, he could give you a taam for every single mitzvah - including Parah Adumah - but he would acknowledge that there are taamim that he hasn't yet uncovered.

That takes care of two types of reasons for mitzvos. But as the title of this post implies, there is a third. In the Rambam's terminology, this third type of reason is called a "remez" (allusion). The Rambam provides two examples of this in the Mishneh Torah. The first is his explanation [7] of the remez in shofar:

Even though the sounding of the shofar on Rosh Ha'Shanah is a Scriptural decree, it contains a remez: it is as if it is saying, "Wake up, wake up you sleepers from your sleep, and you slumberers from your deep slumber! Analyze your actions, return in teshuvah, and remember your Creator" - these are the people who forget reality, due to the empty illusions of the times, and whose entire year is steeped in fantasy and emptiness which neither benefits them nor saves them - "Look into your souls and improve your ways and your actions. Each and every one of you: abandon your evil way and your scheming that is not good!" 

The second example is his explanation [8] of the remez in mikvah:

It is a clear and evident thing that tumah (halachic impurity) and taharah (halachic purity) are a Scriptural decree; they are not matters which are dictated by common sense, but are included in the chukim. Likewise, tevilah (ritual immersion) from tumah is included in the chukim, since tumah isn’t mud or excrement such that it would be removed by water, but is a Scriptural decree, and is a matter which is dependent on the intention of the heart. Therefore, the Sages said that if a person immersed but didn’t intend to purify himself, it is as if he didn’t immerse. Nevertheless, there is a remez in it: just as one who intended in his heart to be purified, and once he immersed he became purified, even though nothing changed in his body, so too, one who intends to purify his soul from spiritual impurity – namely, thoughts of iniquity and bad character traits – once he resolves in his mind to separate from those counsels, and brings is soul into the waters of knowledge, he becomes pure. This is as it says: “I will sprinkle pure waters on you and you will become purified; from all of your impurities and from all of your filth I will purify you” (Yechezkel 36:25).

According to the Rambam, a "remez" is a metaphorical or symbolic interpretation of a mitzvah. The remez differs from the taam in the same way that midrash differs from pshat - that is, the remez explanation is imposed onto the mitzvah from without, whereas the taam explanation highlights a benefit which naturally emerges from within the structure of the mitzvah. 

Now that we are aware of these three types of reasons one can give for the mitzvos, it behooves us to classify accordingly the explanations we encounter or discover. There are many people who believe they are giving a taam when it is merely a remez; sometimes we might mistake a taam for an ilah; and sometimes an ilah might be missed because we are too busy looking for a remez. 

This classification scheme can be very helpful when learning the reasons for mitzvos given by meforshim (commentators). Ask yourself which type of reason the commentator intended to give. In some cases, the commentator might have believed he was giving one type of reason, but another commentator will disagree and say he's giving a different type.

Is it possible that the definitions stated here are not what the Rambam intended by his use of these terms? Yes. But even if that is the case, I am convinced that this classification scheme will help us to follow the Rambam's advice and strive to understand the sof inyan of every mitzvah. 

[1] Bamidbar Rabbah 19:3
[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Avodah, Hilchos Me'ilah 8:8
[3] ibid. Sefer haKorbanos, Hilchos Temurah 4:13

[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 1:9

[5] Sefer ha'Chinuch, Parashas Terumah: Mitzvah #95

[6] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:32

[7] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 3:4

[8] ibid. Sefer Taharah, Hilchos Mikvaos 11:12

Naso: Twelve Identical Offerings

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Naso: Twelve Identical Offerings

The Question 

Without a doubt, the strangest section of Parashas Naso is its conclusion. Bamidbar Chapter 7 begins by establishing the narrative context: 

And it happened on the day Moshe finished setting up the Mishkan (Tabernacle) that he anointed it and consecrated it and all its furnishings, and he anointed them and consecrated them. And the leaders of Israel – the heads of their fathers’ houses, they are the leaders of the tribes, they are the ones who stand over the reckoning – brought forward and set their offering before Hashem … And the leaders brought forward the dedication offering of the altar on the day it was anointed, and the leaders brought forward their offering for the dedication of the altar. And Hashem said to Moshe: “One leader each day, one leader each day, shall offer his offerings for the dedication for the altar.” (Bamidbar 7:1-2,10-11) 

The first of these offerings is then described in detail: 

And the one who brought forward his offering on the first day was Nachshon ben Aminadav of the tribe of Yehudah. And his offering was one silver bowl, a hundred thirty shekels its weight, one silver basin, seventy shekels by the sanctuary shekel, both of them filled with fine flour mixed with oil for a grain offering. One golden ladle of ten shekels filled with incense. One bull from the herd, one ram, one yearling lamb for the burnt offering. One goat for an offense offering. And for the communion sacrifice two oxen, five rams, five he-goats, five yearling lambs. This is the offering of Nachshon ben Aminadav. (ibid. 7:12-17) 

And that’s when things start to get repetitive. The Torah goes on to describe the offering brought on the second day by the second tribal leader, Nesanel ben Tzuar. It is exactly the same offering, and its contents are spelled out in exactly the same words. The Torah continues in this manner with the third, fourth, and fifth identical offerings – all the way up to the twelfth. Each tribal leader brings exactly the same offering, which the pesukim describe in exactly the same way. It is as if Moshe Rabbeinu took these same six pesukim, with the same 66 words, and copied and pasted them eleven more times, then went back and changed the name of the tribal leader and in the ordinal designation of the day for each. 

This seemingly gratuitous repetition has astounded medieval and modern commentators alike. The Abravanel [1] raises this question explicitly: 

Why did the text here mention the offering of each leader in elaborate detail, considering that their offerings were exactly equal without any variation? It would have been enough for it to say about the first of them “this was the offering of Nachshon ben Aminadav” as an example, and afterwards for each and every day, “and likewise, so-and-so offered on the such-and-such day” – as opposed to writing the same thing twelve times, which is excessively repetitive and is a very strange thing. 

The modern translator and commentator, Robert Alter [2], notes how anomalous this section is: 

This is the one single instance in the entire Bible of extensive verbatim repetition without the slightest variation … Biblical narrative, as we have had many occasions to see, characteristically deploys significant swerves from verbatim repetition as it approximately repeats strings of phrases and whole clauses and sentences. This passage, however, is manifestly not narrative, but a kind of epic inventory. 

In simple terms the question is: Why did the Torah repeat the list of these twelve identical offerings verbatim when it only needed to list them once? 

The Simple Answer 

The most straightforward answer is given by several commentators, namely, that the Torah wanted to stress the absolute equality of the leaders and their offerings, for them and for us. The Bechor Shor [3] states that this was the reason why each leader was given his own day and why his offering was spelled out in detail, despite it being identical with the others: 

“one leader each day” – in order to give honor to the leaders, that each one would have his day; so too, a section [describing the offering] was written for each one of them, so that they would not become jealous of one another – for it could have written the first section and then said, “Thus did so-and-so, and thus so-and-so.” 

The Ramban [4] offers a similar explanation: 

The best reason for Scripture [stating each leader’s offering separately] is that Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu apportions honor to those who fear Him, as it was said: “for I honor those who honor Me” (I Shmuel 2:30). Now, all the leaders brought on the same day this offering upon which they agreed together, but it was impossible that one should not precede his fellow [in the actual offering. Therefore, Hashem] honored those that had precedence in the arrangement [of the camp] with precedence in the days [of offering,] but He wanted to mention them by name and their offerings in detail and to mention each one’s day, rather than [simply] mentioning and honoring the first one, [saying:] “This is the offering of Nachshon ben Aminadav” and [then] saying: “And so the leaders offered, each man on his day,” since that would have been an affront to the others’ honor. And afterwards He went and combined them [by stating the total quantities of the offerings] to teach that all of them were equal before Him, blessed is He. And thus [the Sages] said there in Sifrei: “Scripture teaches that just as [the leaders] were all equal with regard to the idea [of these offerings,] so were they equal with regard to the merit.” 

Alter [5] also favors this approach, depicting the Torah’s intended rhetorical effect as follows: 

Each of the tribes, here accorded absolutely equal status before the sanctuary without political hierarchy, brings exactly the same offering. One can readily imagine that the members of each tribe in the ancient audience of this text would be expected to relish the sumptuousness of its own tribal offering exactly equal to all the others, as it hears the passage read. 

Yet, as reasonable as this objective may be, was it really necessary to “waste” 726 needless words simply in order to demonstrate the equality of the tribal leaders? Surely the Torah could have found a more verbally efficient way to convey the same sentiment. For example, Chazal [6] interpret the Torah’s extremely concise statement: “and the sons of Yaakov were twelve” (Bereishis 35:22) “to teach that all of them are equal.” Likewise, on the pasuk: “they are Aharon and Moshe” (Shemos 6:26), Rashi [7] observes that “in some places Moshe precedes Aharon and in other places Aharon precedes Moshe in order to convey their equality.” So too here: the Torah could have stated the contents of the identical offerings and framed them in a manner which would have conveyed the equality of the tribal leaders. 

Two Midrashic Approaches 

The Abravanel notes that there are two categories of answers given in the midrashic literature: 

In [the midrashic collection] Bamidbar Sinai Rabbah (13:14) they expound “and his offering” in a different manner, saying: “Why did the leaders see fit to bring their offerings in this manner? The Rabbis say: even though their offerings were the same, each one brought them [in order to allude] to great principles, each and every one in accordance with his own intent.” Likewise, Rebbi Shimon (ibid.) expounded: “Why does the pasuk say, ‘from the leaders of Israel’? This teaches that they donated of their own accord.” Consequently, each one’s offering was equal in its value, its quantity, and its weight. In other words, each and every one was motivated by himself to offer these items mentioned in the pasuk in accordance with his own intention, in order to allude to the concepts in his own mind … 

The midrash then proceeds to expound on the symbolism of each leader’s offering in accordance with a specific theme. For example, the tribe of Yehuda is the tribe of malchus (Kingship), and its tribal leader intended each detail of his offering to allude to different ideas about malchus. The tribe of Yissachar was known for its prowess in Torah, and its tribal leader intended each detail of his offering to allude to concepts about Torah. And so on for each of the other ten tribes. After paraphrasing [8] the themes of each of these offerings based on this midrash, the Abravanel concludes: 

The general thrust of this view is that each of the leaders made his offering in accordance with his own intentions which differed from the intentions of the other leaders. Thus, their offerings were the same, but their intentions were different. 

Next, the Abravanel cites an opposing view stated in the same midrash: 

However, Rebbi Pinchas ben Yair held that all of the leaders had a single intention and a single allusion in mind, namely, [that their offerings] correspond to the generations from Adam ha’Rishon until the Mishkan. 

For example, the first item in the offering was “one silver bowl (kaaras kesef), a hundred and thirty shekels its weight.” The phrase “kaaras kesef” has a numerical value of which is 930, which represents Adam ha’Rishon who lived for 930 years. The fact that there was only one such bowl represents Chava, since she was created from him. Its weight of 130 shekels represents the 130 years that Adam separated from Chava before they reunited and had their third son. The second item in the offering was “one silver basin (mizrak echad), seventy shekels by the sanctuary shekel.” The phrase “mizrak” (from Z.R.Q., meaning “to throw”) represents Noach, who was “thrown out” of the Generation of the Flood. Its weight of 70 shekels corresponds to the 70 nations that emerged from him. And so on. 

Even though I tend to favor pshat, I find that both of these approaches provide a more satisfactory answer to our question than the pshat explanations cited above. If these offerings were intended to convey ideas through the symbolism of their particulars, then the Torah going out of its way to emphasize these particulars is a great way to draw the mind. According to the first midrashic approach, each offering is restated in full because each detail has its own ideational content. According to the second midrashic approach, each offering is restated in full in order to underscore the unanimity of the tribal leaders in their common intent. 

The Methodological Underpinnings of These Midrashic Approaches 

No matter how appealing these symbolic interpretations may be, one cannot help but wonder: “How did the authors of these midrashim know what the tribal leaders intended to symbolize in their offerings?” 

For those who believe that midrashim were given at Sinai, along with the rest of Torah she’baal Peh (the Oral Torah), the answer is simple: mesorah (an oral tradition). But for those who follow the mainstream approach, [9] maintaining that midrashim reflect the views of their authors, the answer is even simpler: the authors of these midrashim didn’t know the intentions of the tribal leaders. Rather, these midrashim reflect their own speculative theories which may or may not correspond to what the tribal leaders actually intended. 

This attempt to find meaning in the details of the leaders’ offerings is reminiscent of an approach mentioned by the Rambam. The Rambam states that it is incumbent upon every person to seek out the reasons for the mitzvos of the Torah. This injunction applies to both categories of mitzvos: to mishpatim, those mitzvos whose reasons are evident, and to chukim, the mitzvos whose reasons are hidden. At the end of Hilchos Me’ilah the Rambam [10] writes: 

It is proper for a person to contemplate the laws of the Holy Torah and to know their ultimate concepts according to his ability. If he doesn't find a reason and doesn't know a cause of something, it should not be less in his eyes, nor should he break forth to ascend to Hashem lest He burst forth against him, nor should he think of it as a mundane matter … a person should not kick against them just because he doesn’t know their reasons, nor should he ascribe matters which are not true onto Hashem, nor should he think about them as he thinks about mundane matters. It was stated in the Torah: “And you shall guard all of my chukim (statutes) and all of my mishpatim (judgments) and you shall do them” (Vayikra 19:37; 20:22). The Sages said that we should apply shmirah (guarding) and asiyah (doing) to chukim in the same manner as mishpatim. The [meaning of] “asiyah” is evident: namely, that we should do the chukim. The [meaning] of “shmirah” is that we must be careful with them and not imagine that they are less than mishpatim. The mishpatim are the mitzvos whose benefits in this world are evident, such as the prohibitions of stealing and murder, and honoring one's father and mother. And the chukim are the mitzvos whose reasons are not evident. The Sages said: “[These are] the statutes that I have inscribed for you, and you do not have permission to be suspicious about them, and man’s yetzer (inclination) confronts him regarding them, and the nations of the world dispute them.” Examples include the prohibition of [eating] pork, meat and milk, the decapitated calf, the red heifer, and the goat which is sent away. 

In this excerpt the Rambam speaks of "finding" the “cause” of the chukim – the actual reasons why they were commanded. In contrast, at the end of Hilchos Temurah [11] he writes: 

Even though all of the chukim of the Torah are [Divine] decrees, as we explained at the end of Hilchos Meilah, it is proper to contemplate them; anything for which you can give a reason, you should give a reason. The Early Sages said that Shlomo ha’Melech understood the majority of reasons for all of the chukim of the Torah. 

All of these matters [in Hilchos Temurah] are to subdue man’s inclination and to correct his character traits. And the majority of the laws of the Torah are but counsels from afar, from the Great Counselor, to correct [our] character traits and to make all [of our] actions upright. Likewise, it is written: “Surely, I have written for you extremely noble things, with counsel and knowledge, to teach you the veracity of true words, so that you may answer words of truth to those who send word to you” (Mishlei 22:20-21). 

Here the Rambam does not speak about finding the “cause” of the chukim. Instead, he states, “anything for which you can give a reason, you should give a reason.” In other words, in contrast to the approach of Hilchos Me'ilah, the approach of Hilchos Temurah is not to attempt to find the actual reason why Hashem commanded us to keep this mitzvah in all of its particulars. Rather, the objective is to ascribe meaning to the structure of this mitzvah in order to transform it from an incomprehensible ritual into “counsels from afar, from the Great Counselor, to correct our character traits and make all of our actions upright.” Whether or not our explanations correspond to the Divine intent is irrelevant. What matters is that our explanation renders the mitzvah into a vehicle for perfection. 

If we were to interpret Chazal’s explanations of the offerings of the tribal leaders as the type of analysis advocated by Hilchos Me’ilah, we would have ample grounds for suspicion. How could the authors of the midrashim know with such precision what the tribal leaders had in mind? But if we understand these midrashim in the sense of Hilchos Temurah, then the ingenuity of these symbolic interpretations becomes a feature, rather than a bug. The more ideas of human perfection we can associate with the details of these chukim and the stronger the association, the better.

These two methods for understanding taamei ha’mitzvos (the reasons for the commandments) ought to be kept in mind whenever one encounters a theory about why the structure of a mitzvah is the way it is. It is easy to dismiss an “explanation” of a mitzvah on the grounds of being speculative if one assumes that the explanation is being offered as a theory about the cause of the mitzvah, in the vein of Hilchos Me’ilah. But if one allows for Hilchos Temurah type explanations, then homiletic creativity is a boon.

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar, Introduction to Chapter 7, Question #8 

[2] Robert Alter, The Five Books of Moses: A Translation with Commentary (2004), pp. 716-717 

[3] Rabbeinu , Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 7:11 

[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 7:13 

[5] ibid. Alter adds another explanation: “It is also well to remember that lists and the repetitions they entail constitute an established literary form with its own aesthetic pleasures – as, for example, in the catalogue of the ships in the Iliad or in the cumulative repetitive structures of songs like Had Gadya (‘An Only Kid’) and, more apposite to this catalogue of gifts, ‘On the Twelve Days of Christmas.’” 

[6] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Bereishis 35:22, paraphrasing Shabbos 55b. 

[7] ibid. Commentary on Sefer Shemos 6:26 

[8] In case you’re wondering about the themes of each tribe, here is the Abravanel’s summary: Zevulun’s is about his partnership with Yissachar, Reuven’s is about saving Yosef, Shimon’s is about the order of the Mishkan, Gad’s is about Amram and his descendents, Ephraim’s is about Yaakov’s blessings of Yosef’s sons, Menashe’s is about Yaakov’s transfer of the bechorah status from Reuven to Yosef, Binyamin’s is about the offspring of Rachel, Dan’s is about Shimshon, Asher’s is about Israel as Hashem’s Chosen People, Naftali’s is about the Avos and Imahos; as you can see, some of these themes are directly connected to the identity of the tribe, whereas others are only loosely connected, or are not apparently connected at all. 

[9] See https://kolhaseridim.blogspot.com/2014/07/parashas-balak-on-citing-midrash-as.html

[10] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Avodah, Hilchos Me’ilah 8:8

[11] ibid. Sefer ha'Korbanos, Hilchos Temurah 4:14

"Are Mitzvos Arbitrary?" or "The Pillow Mashal"

Originally published in July 2013. It is recommended to read Rambam: On the Reasons for Mitzvos before reading this post.

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"Are Mitzvos Arbitrary?" or "The Pillow Mashal"

Summary of the Rambam's View

This post is about the Rambam's view of taamei ha'mitzvos (the reasons for the commandments), as stated in his Guide for the Perplexed 3:26. Although I posted the full translation of this chapter yesterday, I'll summarize it here and then state the central question/problem which will be the focus of this post.

According to the Rambam, Chazal unanimously held that all mitzvos have reasons and were commanded for our benefit - even chukim. The only thing preventing us from knowing these reasons is our own ignorance. 

However, there is one puzzling statement from Chazal which seems to imply that some mitzvos do not have reasons:

What difference does it make to Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu whether an animal is slaughtered by shechitah (cutting the front of the neck) or by nechirah ("poleaxing it" i.e. chopping the back of its neck)? Surely the mitzvos were only given in order to test human beings, as it is stated: "The word of Hashem is tested (lit. refined)" (Tehilim 18:31).

On the surface, this statement implies that there is no real reason for shechitah over nechirah. This would appear to undermine the otherwise unanimously accepted principle that all of the mitzvos have reasons.

The Rambam resolves this apparent contradiction by making a subdivision. He writes that 

the mitzvos have specific reasons as far as their general character is concerned, and were commanded for a specific purpose; but as regards to their particulars - that is where we say that they have no reason other than being commanded.

He then explains the aforementioned statement of Chazal on the basis of this distinction. The general character of shechitah has a reason (i.e. that we should kill an animal before eating it, instead of eating it while it is still alive), but the particular requirements of shechitah (e.g. cutting the windpipe and esophagus, sharpening the knife, etc.) have no reason other than the commandment itself.

The Question/Problem

The problem is that in the very next sentence, the Rambam asserts that there are reasons for such details! He writes that the specific requirements for shechitah (e.g. cutting the windpipe and esophagus) are designed to ensure an easy death for the animal, and requiring a sharp knife is more convenient than requiring something like a sword or an ax.

The Rambam then proceeds to fall into the same apparent contradiction, but in an even more extreme way. First he boldly states that anyone who spends time seeking reasons for the details of mitzvos is "chasing after a huge delusion," and "will increase difficulties rather than remove them," and "is as far from the truth as one who assume that the entire mitzvah is without any real purpose." But then, at the end of the chapter, he declares his intention to explain the reasons for all of the mitzvos, including "the reasons for many of the conditions and details, as far as these can be discovered"!

And the Rambam follows through on this promise. For example, in his explanation of korbanos, he first writes that "we cannot say why one korban should be a lamb whilst another is a ram, and why a fixed number of them should be brought" and supports this claim with a solid argument. Yet, in subsequent chapters, the Rambam provides philosophical reasons for these very details!

All of this leaves us wondering what the Rambam really holds. The bottom-line question is: Do the details of mitzvos have reasons, or are they arbitrary? If the former, then what does the Rambam mean when he emphatically states that the particulars of mitzvos have no reasons, and that it is delusional to look for such reasons. And if the latter, then how can the Rambam offer reasons for such details? And if some details do have reasons and others are arbitrary, how can we know which is which? 

And, at the end of the day, we are still left with the question: From a philosophical, non-halachic standpoint, does God care about shechitah (vs. nechirah) or not?

The Answer: the Three Tiers of Mitzvah Design

Here's the plan: First I will state my answer with the briefest of explanations. I will then elaborate on the answer by means of a detailed mashal (analogy). I will follow that up by showing how this answer plays out in another mitzvah (arbah minim). I will conclude by answering the question about shechitah.

Every* mitzvah is a complex structural system comprised of many particular halachos. When analyzing taamei ha'mitzvos - that is, engaging in a speculative philosophical analysis of the reasons for mitzvos, as opposed to a purely halachic (or Talmudic) analysis - these halachos can be divided into three groups. For the sake of brevity, we will henceforth refer to these groups as Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3. Here are their definitions:

Tier 1: halachos which are designed to directly facilitate the mitzvah's primary purpose
Tier 2: halachos which serve a secondary purpose - one which may or may not be related to the primary purpose of the mitzvah
Tier 3: halachos that are best described as "arbitrary technicalities" which have no purpose whatsoever, and only exist because of structural necessity

If at this point these distinctions are not clear, have no fear! The following mashal will (I hope) clear everything up.

The Pillow Mashal 

Let us perform a thought-experiment. Imagine that you are an owner of a pillow factory, producing bed pillows for sleeping. You must draft a set of pillow-making regulations and procedures which will yield high-quality pillows.

Where should you begin? By defining the purpose of a bed pillow, of course. The purpose of a bed pillow is to provide support and comfort for the head while sleeping or lying down. (I'm sure someone can come up with a more precise formulation for the purpose of a pillow, but this is sufficient for the purposes of this mashal.) 

This definition of the pillow's function will serve as our guiding principle in pillow-making. If we produce an object which fails to serve this function, then then object is not a successful pillow. Moreover, the superiority and inferiority of our pillows will be measured by the extent to which they achieve this purpose.

Tier 1 Design Features

Basically, there are two structural components of a pillow: the pillowcase and the stuffing. Of the two, the latter is primary, since the pillowcase is only there to contain the stuffing, and would be completely dispensable if the stuffing could be self-contained.

The purpose of a pillow which we outlined above directly dictates the general character of what can and can't be used for stuffing. The general guideline may be stated as follows: in order for a pillow to fulfill its purpose, its stuffing must consist of a material which is soft. Examples of adequate materials are feathers, down, cotton, and certain synthetic materials. A pillow filled with sticks, stones, or shards of glass would not be suitable for the pillow's function.

This is an example of a "Tier 1" feature of the pillow's design, since the requirement of "softness" directly facilitates the primary purpose of the pillow. 

Tier 2 Design Features

But once we've narrowed the field down to "soft materials," this doesn't mean that anything goes. The material we use must possess other qualities which are not directly related to the primary function of the pillow. Some of these qualities might contribute to the primary function in an indirect manner, whereas others will serve secondary roles which are entirely unrelated to the pillow's primary function.

For example, the material we select must be non-perishable. A pillow stuffed with mashed bananas, beef tallow, or carrion might be comfortable, but it wouldn't last very long (and the resulting odor would preclude a comfortable sleep for olfactory reasons). Likewise, the material we select must be available for use. The feathers of the threatened Northern Spotted Owl, the now extinct North Island Giant Moa, or the prehistoric Archaeopteryx might make for a comfy pillow, but the unavailability these materials makes them impractical for pillow-making. The material we select must also be safe. A pillow made of asbestos might provide a satisfying sleep, but it will also shorten your lifespan; a pillow from Chernobyl is just as soft as a pillow from Albequerque, but is likely to produce undesirable effects. 

The need for our pillow-stuffing to be non-perishable, available, and safe are all "Tier 2" requirements. Each of these characteristics serves a purpose, but unlike the "Tier 1" requirement of softness, they do not directly serve the primary function of the pillow (i.e. to provide support and comfort for the head). 

As can be seen from these examples, Tier 2 considerations are often the basis of deciding among otherwise equal or viable Tier 1 candidates. For example, polyester and memory foam are both soft, but memory foam is more hygienic, and is therefore advantageous. Eiderdown and goose down are both soft, but although eiderdown makes for a more comfortable pillow, it is more costly, and might prove to be a disadvantage from a financial standpoint.

But there are other Tier 2 aspects of the design which must be determined even after we settle on the ideal stuffing. One example of this is the aesthetic qualities of the pillow. Sometimes the decisions we make about the appearance of the pillow might be indirectly related to the pillow's primary function. For example, it can be argued that the colors "pure white" and "sky blue" contribute to a greater sense of psychological comfort than "jaundice yellow" or "barf brown." Likewise, a pillow should appear inviting and evoke positive feelings. If a pillow's appearance triggered negative feelings, this might detract from the Tier 1 superiority of the pillow as an object of comfort.

All things being equal, most girls will prefer the pillow on the right based on Tier 2 considerations.

On the other hand, the pillow's appearance might be dictated by factors which have nothing to do with the primary function of the pillow. For example, colored pillows might be more expensive to produce than white pillows, or perhaps a certain color is preferable because it is more popular among a certain consumer population (e.g. pink for girls), or perhaps making pillows in a variety of colors will lead to greater brand exposure.

All of these Tier 2 features are important, and all Tier 2 design-decisions will be made on the basis of specific reasons, but none of these reasons are directly related to the primary function of the pillow.

Tier 3 Design Features

The Tier 3 features are necessary, but arbitrary in their specifics. For example, let's say we choose to make our pillows out of eiderdown because it is the softest material (Tier 1). We are willing to forego the cost (Tier 2) because we plan on marketing our pillows to wealthy consumers (Tier 2). We decide to use eiderdown from Iceland rather than China for political reasons (Tier 2) and we decide to go with "free range" eider ducks in order to make a public statement about animal cruelty (Tier 2), ensuring brand loyalty (Tier 2) among a subsection of our consumers.

But now we find ourselves at the eider duck farm in Iceland and it is time to choose which flock of ducks we will use for our first run of pillows. We will have to choose ducks of a certain a size and age in order to ensure the highest quality feathers (Tier 1), but out of the thousands of eider ducks within that large category, which particular ducks will we use? This decision is completely arbitrary (Tier 3). No matter how the decision is made - whether by the age of the ducks, or their size, or by a random lottery - it will be neither informed nor influenced by the primary function of the pillow, nor by any secondary considerations. Tier 1 and Tier 2 decisions must be based on reasons; Tier 3 decisions do not.

Consider another example: the exact size of the pillow. Of course, there will be a certain size-range which is determined based on Tier 1 considerations. Generally speaking, the pillow will need to accommodate an average-sized head. There are four basic pillow sizes: standard (20" by 26"), queen (20" by 30"), king (20" by 36"), and euro (26" by 26").

But why settle on 20" by 26" for a standard sized pillow? Why not 20" by 25.5" or 21" by 27"? The answer is that this aspect of the pillow's design is arbitrary. The range of sizes was set by Tier 1 considerations, but the specific dimensions within that range has absolutely no reason, other than the fact that some length had to be chosen.

One last example of a Tier 3 quality: the particular hue of the pillow's color. We've already mentioned that the color of the pillow is a valid Tier 2 consideration, but within each color, there are an infinite number of hues. There might be a Tier 2 difference between blue and red, and there might even be a Tier 2 difference between light blue and dark blue, but at some point, the choice between hues of blue is arbitrary.

There might be reasons for choosing between 01 and 20,
but the choice of 11 over 10 is arbitrary.

The Answer: Restated

By now I hope the analogy is clear. Just like there are three tiers in the design of pillows, so too, there are three tiers in the design of mitzvos. Certain features of a mitzvah's design are directly dictated by its primary purpose - just like the Tier 1 characteristic of a pillow (i.e. its soft stuffing) is directly dictated by the pillow's function (i.e. to provide support and comfort for the head while sleeping or lying down). Other features of a mitzvah's structure serve secondary purposes which may or may not be related to the primary reason - just like the Tier 2 design considerations of the pillow (e.g. its color, its cost, its durability, etc.). Last but not least, there are aspects of the mitzvah which are completely arbitrary from a taamei ha'mitzvos standpoint - just like the Tier 3 specifications of the pillow (i.e. which specific specimens its materials derive from, its exact dimensions, and its precise hue).

Some people find this last category difficult to accept. "How can a mitzvah contain something arbitrary, without any purpose? Isn't that an imperfection in the Torah? How can we believe that Hashem would command us in something for no reason?" I will repeat the Rambam's response to these types of objections:

It is important for you to know that chochmah demanded it - or, if you prefer, say that necessity dictated - that there should be parts [of the mitzvos] for which reasons are inapplicable; it is, as it were, inherently impossible for the mitzvah not to have something of this type.

Any mitzvah which involves physical phenomena will, of necessity, have quantifiable characteristics, such a length, height, volume, duration, number of components, etc. The Tier 1 and Tier 2 design-considerations will usually dictate a certain range of values for these quantities, but once you get down to a certain level of specificity, the final number will have to be arbitrary. This is what the Rambam meant when he said:

It is almost similar to the nature of a thing which can potentially receive different forms, but actually receives only one of them: we must not ask why it has this form and not another which is likewise possible, because we should have to ask the same question if instead of its actual form the thing had any of the other possible forms. Note this, and understand it.

We will now examine two examples from the mitzvah system - arbah minim and shechitah - in light of our answer.

The Three Tiers of Arbah Minim

The mitzvah of the arbah minim is to pick up the four species of vegetation specified by the Torah, on the first day of the Chag ha'Sukkos. The Rambam states his theory about the purpose of this mitzvah in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:43:

It appears to me that the four species of the lulav are [an expression of] joy and gladness for going out from the Wilderness – which was a place “without seed, fig, vine, and pomegranate, and without any water to drink” (Bamidbar 20:5) – to a place of fruit-trees and rivers. Therefore, in order to remember this, we take the most beautiful of its fruits, and a fragrant [plant], and beautiful leaves, and the most beautiful of herbs – that is, the willows of the brook.

The Rambam then goes on to explain why these four species in particular (i.e. citron, date palm, myrtle, and brook-willow) were chosen:

These four species have three common denominators. First, they were plentiful in the Land of Israel at that time and everyone was able to obtain them. Secondly, they are exceedingly beautiful in their appearance and aesthetic qualities; some of them – namely, the citron and the myrtle – are fragrant, but the date palm and the willows have neither a good nor a bad smell. The third quality is that they retain their appearance for seven days, which is not the case with peaches, pomegranates, asparagus, nuts, and the like.

Note the difference between the Rambam's two explanations. The explanation in the first paragraph pertains to Tier 1 features, which relate directly to the primary reason for the mitzvah: we joyously pick up beautiful species of plants in order to express our gratitude to Hashem for taking us from the barren Wilderness into the fertile Land of Israel. In contrast, the explanations mentioned in the second paragraph all pertain to Tier 2 features of the mitzvah, and the reasons provided are secondary.

Allow me to spell out the implications of this. The Rambam implies that the mitzvah of arbah minim could have served its primary purpose if we had been required to pick up four species of, say, exotic orchids. The only problem is that orchids are not plentiful in Israel. Similarly, the mitzvah could have served its primary function if we had been commanded to pick up an oleander instead of a myrtle. However, the Gemara (Sukkah 32b) explains that the oleander - which is poisonous - would not be in line with the Torah's nature, as described by Shlomo ha'Melech: "its ways are ways of pleasantness" (Mishlei 3:17). Likewise, the Torah could have even used pomegranates and peaches were it not for the fact that their appearance dwindles in beauty and freshness over the seven day period.

As for Tier 3 features: the Rambam doesn't mention any, but they certainly exist. For example, a lulav must be at least four tefachim (handbreadths) long. The Gemara explains that it must be long enough to shake. Fine; we can understand why being long enough to shake is a Tier 1 or Tier 2 consideration - but why exactly four tefachim? Wouldn't five tefachim also be reasonable? What about 10 etzbaos (finger-breadths), or one amah? 

The same might be said for the requirement of four species. It would seem that the mitzvah could have fulfilled its primary purpose if three or five species were required. The same can be said for many of the detailed specifications of the halachic blemishes which disqualify the four species: once it became necessary to include blemishes within the structure of the mitzvah (due to Tier 1 reasons), halacha had to define these blemishes in a precise, quantifiable manner. At a certain level of detail, halacha had to draw the line at an arbitrary point, just like in any other legal system or design.

(Note: Some of you might be wondering, "Isn't it necessary for there to be these four specific species to teach us specific ideas, as explained by Chazal - like the four types of Jews, or the four parts of the body used in serving Hashem?" The Rambam maintains that these statements of Chazal are just drash, and don't have anything to do with the real purpose of arbah minim; read Pshat vs. Drash II for an elaboration on this point.)

The Three Tiers of Shechitah

Now we are finally ready to answer our original question: from a philosophical, non-halachic standpoint, does God care about shechitah? The answer is: "no" in a Tier 1 framework, and "yes" in a Tier 2 framework. Rambam explains the reasons for the mitzvah of shechitah in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:48:

It is prohibited to cut off a limb of a living animal and eat it, because such act would produce cruelty, and develop it; the gentile kings used to do this, and it was also done for avodah zarah – namely, they would cut a specific limb of an animal and eat it … The mitzvah concerning the killing of animals is necessary, because the natural food of man consists of vegetables and of the flesh of animals, and the best meat is that of animals permitted to be used as food; no doctor has any doubts about this. Since, therefore, the desire of procuring good food necessitates the slaughtering of animals, the Torah enjoins that the death of the animal should be the easiest, and prohibits us to torment the animal by cutting the throat in a crude manner, or by poleaxing, or by cutting off a limb whilst the animal is alive.

If we consider this excerpt in light of the previously cited excerpt on shechitah, it would seem that according to the Rambam the primary purpose of shechitah is to ensure that we eat the flesh of dead animals, and not living animals. Even non-Jews are prohibited from eating a limb from a living animal. From this Tier 1 perspective, God doesn't care whether we kill an animal by shechitah, nechirah, or bazooka.

However, once God saw fit (so to speak) to obligate us to kill an animal before eating it, He legislated a specific method of killing the animal with specific requirements. Some of these requirements are in line with the primary purpose (i.e. distancing us from animalistic behavior and cruelty), some requirements serve secondary purposes (i.e. the ease of the method and the availability of the slaughtering instrument), and other requirements have no specific purpose at all. From this Tier 2 perspective, there is a big difference between killing an animal through shechitah vs. nechirah, and God does care about that difference. 

Conclusion

I have heard people summarize the Rambam's view by saying, "Rambam holds that the details of mitzvos are arbitrary" or "Rambam holds that there are no reasons for the majority of halacha." There is even a well-known acharon who lambasted the Rambam for this point. 

In my opinion, the Rambam's view is far more nuanced than these crude summaries make it out to be. I believe that if we understand the Rambam's explanation in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim - especially regarding Tier 3 - then the objections raised against his view fall away. I also believe that a number of objections raised by people against mitzvos - in general or in particular - can be easily resolved if one understands the three-tiered nature of mitzvah-design. 

I hope this explanation has clarified the subject of taamei ha'mitzvos, and enhanced your appreciation of the chochmah of the Torah system. 

* This only applies to what Rabbeinu Bachya ibn Paquda refers to as chovos ha'eivarim ("duties of the limbs") - that is to say, mitzvos which involve actions.