Parashas Chukas: Chukim - Decrees of Whim or Wisdom?

This week's dvar Torah covers a basic but fundamental issue: whether or not chukim have reasons. Enjoy!

Parashas Chukas: Chukim - Decrees of Whim or Wisdom

"This is the chukah (decree) of the Torah, which Hashem has commanded etc." (Bamidbar 19:2)

What are chukim? Rashi's most comprehensive answer can be found in Parashas Beshalach [1]:

[Chukim are] matters that are only the decree of the King, without any reason, and with which the yetzer ha'ra (evil inclination) finds fault, saying, “What [cause for] prohibition is there in these? Why were they prohibited?” Examples include [the prohibitions of] wearing shaatnez [a mixture of wool and linen] and eating pork, and the parah adumah (red heifer) and the like.

On the surface, Rashi would seem to maintain that chukim are mitzvos which have no reasons. He reiterates this definition several times throughout his commentary [2].

The Ramban doesn't accept this reading of Rashi. After quoting Rashi's definition of a chok as "a decree of the King for which there is no reason," Ramban proceeds to clarify what Rashi really meant [3]:

Their intention is not that a decree of the King of kings would have no reason, for “every word of God is refined” (Mishlei 30:5). Rather, chukim are like the decrees of a king which he enacts in his kingdom without revealing their beneficial purpose to the nation. [Consequently,] the masses do not take delight in them, but are critical of them in their hearts, and accept them out of the fear of the kingship. The same is true of the chukim of Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu: they are the esoteric matters which are contained in his Torah, which the masses – in their minds – do not delight in, like they do with the mishpatim. But [in truth] all of them have a good rationale and completely beneficial [reason].

According to the Ramban, Rashi didn't mean that the chukim of the Torah actually have no reason. Rather, Rashi was describing how the masses perceive the chukim. All mitzvos have reasons, but whereas the reasons for mishpatim are revealed, the reasons for the chukim are concealed. 

The Rambam is just as explicit as the Ramban in his rejection of the notion that chukim have no reasons [4]:

Just as theologians are divided on the question of whether the actions of God are the result of His Wisdom, or only of His Will without being intended for any purpose whatsoever, so they are also divided as regards the purpose of the mitzvos which God gave us. Some of them hold that the mitzvos have no purpose at all and are only dictated by the whim of God. Others are of the opinion that all commandments and prohibitions are dictated by His wisdom and serve a certain aim. Consequently there is a reason for each one of the mitzvos: they are commanded because they are beneficial.  

All of us, the masses as well as the elite individuals, maintain that there is a reason for every mitzvah, although there are mitzvos the reason of which is unknown to us, and in which the ways of [Divine] wisdom are not known. This view is distinctly expressed in Scripture, as it is stated, "chukim and mishpatim of justice" (Devarim 4:8), “The mishpatim of Hashem are true and righteous altogether” (Tehilim 19:10).

The Rambam then goes on to explain the difference between chukim and mishpatim:

There are mitzvos which are called chukim – such as the prohibitions of shaatnez and [cooking] meat and milk together, and the sending of the goat [into the wilderness on Yom ha’Kippurim] – about which the Sages said [5], “I, [Hashem,] have ordained these for you; you do not have permission to be suspicious of them, and the satan flings accusations on account of them, and the gentile nations argue against them.” 

The multitude of Sages do not think that such mitzvos have no reason whatsoever and serve no purpose, for this would lead us to assume that God's actions are in vain. On the contrary, they maintain that even these chukim have a reason – that is to say, an absolutely beneficial reason – even if it eludes us, owing either to the weakness of our intellect or the deficiency of our knowledge. 

Consequently, the Sages are of the opinion that there are reasons for every mitzvah: every positive or negative precept serves a beneficial purpose. In some cases the usefulness is evident, for example, the prohibition of murder and theft; in others the usefulness is not so evident, for example, the prohibition of orlah (deriving benefit from the fruit of a tree in the first three years) or kilai ha’kerem (deriving benefit from the produce of a mixed-species vineyard). Those mitzvos whose purpose is generally evident are called mishpatim, and those whose purpose is not generally clear are called chukim. 

The Sages [6] continually say: “'ki lo davar reik hu mi’kem – for it is not an empty thing for you’ (Devarim 32:47) – and if you find it to be a davar reik (empty thing), it is mi’kem (lit. from you).” In other words, this commandment is not an empty thing without any beneficial purpose, and if it appears to you that any one of the mitzvos is like this, it is due to a deficiency in your understanding. 

Elsewhere the Rambam articulates the underlying premise of those who believe that mitzvos have no reasons [7]: 

There are people who find it difficult to give a reason for any of the mitzvos, and who prefer not to analyze the commandments and prohibitions at all. They are led to adopt this approach by a certain disease in their soul, the existence of which they perceive, but which they are unable to describe or explain, namely, they imagine that if these mitzvos were beneficial in this [worldly] existence in any way whatsoever, and if they were commanded because of this benefit, then it would be as though they originated in the thought and reason of some intelligent being; but [if] these matters are not subject to rationality and do not bring about a benefit, they would undoubtedly be attributed to God, because no thought of man could have produced them.  

According to the theory of those weak-minded people, man is more perfect than his Creator, for what man says or does has a certain purpose, whereas the actions of God are different, for He commands us to do what is of no use to us, and forbids us to do what is harmless. May He be exalted and elevated above [this erroneous notion]!  

The exact opposite is true: the entire purpose [of the Torah] is to benefit us, as we have explained in that which is stated: “[Hashem commanded us to perform all these decrees, to fear Hashem, our God,] for our good, all the days, to give us life, as this very day” (Devarim 6:24). And it is stated: “[You shall safeguard them and perform them, for it is your wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the nations,] who shall hear all these decrees and who shall say, ‘Surely a wise and discerning people is this great nation!’” (ibid. 4:6). Thus, He clearly stated that even the individual chukim point to wisdom and understanding in the eyes of all the nations. But if no reason could be found for these chukim and if they did not yield benefit or remove harm, then why should he who believes in them and does them be [considered] wise, understanding, and excellent, and why should such an individual be a wonderment to all of the nations?  

The Rambam concludes with a rule of thumb for uncovering the reasons for chukim:

Rather, the matter is undoubtedly as we have said, namely, that every one of the 613 mitzvos serves to inculcate a true view or remove a false view, or to establish righteous conduct [in society] or remove an injustice, or to train us in a good character trait or to caution us against an evil character trait. Everything is dependent on these three things: hashkafos (our view of reality), middos (character traits), and actions which shape society … Thus, these three principles suffice for assigning a reason for each and every mitzvah.

It is possible that Rashi meant exactly what he wrote, and that the believes that chukim have no reasons. Nevertheless, the Ramban and the Rambam build a strong case for the argument that all mitzvos have reasons, and that Rashi would agree. 

[1] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak, Commentary on Sefer Shemos 15:26

[2] ibid. Commentary on Sefer Bereishis 26:5 and Sefer Vayikra 19:19

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 19:19

[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:26

[5] Talmud Bavli, Yoma 67b

[6] Talmud Yerushalmi, Peah 1:4

[7] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:31