Tishah b'Av 5777: Adam ha'Rishon and Tishah b'Av

This post is a sequel to yesterday's post: Tishah b'Av 5777: Hashem's Tzedakah and our Shame. Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Grove of the Burnwillows, by Cliff Childs

Tishah b'Av 5777: Adam ha'Rishon and Tishah b'Av

Review of Yesterday's Blog Post

In yesterday's post we attempted to understand Kinah #19, which is based on the pasuk: "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah (righteousness) and ours is the boshes ha'panim (shamefacedness)" (Daniel 9:7). 

First we defined the central terms of tzedakah and boshes ha'panim. "Tzedakah" refers to "providing a creature with its needs" and boshes ha'panim refers to the type of self-reflective shame which stems from a recognition of how foolishly we have acted. 

We explained the implication of saying that tzedakah "belongs" to Hashem. As the Creator, Hashem's tzedakah is fundamentally different from human tzedakah: He created all creatures, all resources, and determined how their needs are met, whereas we humans merely allocate the resources that Hashem created. We explained that our boshes ha'panim "belongs" to us because it is the result of our free will, which is caused entirely by ourselves. 

Lastly, we explained the theme of the kinah in light of this understanding. Throughout the history of Bnei Yisrael, Hashem has repeatedly provided us with tools and situations designed to facilitate our metaphysical development into a mamleches kohanim v'goy kadosh ("a kingdom of priests and a holy nation"). Not only have we neglected to avail ourselves of this divine assistance, but we have fled in the opposite direction - towards our detriment, rather than our betterment.

In today's blog post I would like to explore another way to learn our kinah - one which is far more speculative. There are two possibilities: either this idea is actually a deeper explanation of our kinah, or it has nothing to do with the kinah per se, but nevertheless provides a deeper insight into the events of Tishah b'Av as a whole. 

Alternative Approach to Question #4: Shamefacedness Belongs to Us

We asked the question: What does it mean that boshes ha'panim belongs to us? In what sense is boshes ha'panim uniquely ours? We answered this question by saying that since boshes ha'panim stems from our exercise of free will, and since free will is entirely self-caused, then the boshes ha'panim belongs exclusively to us, and cannot be attributed to Hashem in any way.

But there is another answer: boshes ha'panim was not part of Hashem's initial plan for creation, but only came about as a result of man. Before the cheit of Adam and Chava, human beings were incapable of feeling bushah (shame), as it is stated: "The two of them were naked, the man and his wife, and they were not ashamed" (Bereishis 2:25). But immediately after the cheit: "The eyes of both of them were opened and they realized that they were naked; and they sewed together a fig leaf and made for themselves aprons" (ibid. 3:7). 

It is in this sense that boshes ha'panim "belongs" to human beings. If Hashem "had His way" (so to speak), there would be no phenomenon of bushah and no condition of boshes ha'panim. We caused shamefacedness to come into being, and this is why it is "ours." 

The Nature of Bushah

In order to grasp the implications of this concept, we need to understand what it means to live in the post-cheit world of bushah. What is the difference between man before the cheit and man after the cheit?

Needless to say, this is a huge topic. We will only delve into it in order to answer the question stated above. The Rambam provides a full explanation of this in the second chapter of the Guide for the Perplexed, which we will now cite - but we will focus specifically on his explanation of bushah. 

The Rambam begins with a question that was posed to him:

Some years ago a learned man asked me a question of great importance. The problem and the solution which we gave in our reply deserve the closest attention … 

The objector said: “It would appear at first sight from the plain meaning of Scripture that man was originally intended to be perfectly equal to the rest of the animal creation – which is not endowed with intellect, reason, or power of distinguishing between good and evil – but that Adam’s disobedience to the command of God caused him to acquire that great perfection which is the uniqueness of man, that is, the power of distinguishing between good and evil – the noblest of all the faculties of our nature, the essential characteristic of the human race. It thus appears strange that the punishment for rebelliousness should be the bestowal of a perfection to which he had not attained previously, namely, the perfection of intellect. This is equivalent to saying that a certain man was rebellious and extremely wicked, wherefore his nature was changed for the better, and he was made to shine as a star in the heavens.” Such was the intent and subject of the question, though not in the exact words of the inquirer. 

The question was: How can the Torah say that man lacked knowledge, then disobeyed God, and was granted intellect as a "punishment"? Isn't this the greatest reward?

Now mark our reply, which was as follows … The intellect which was granted to man as the highest endowment was bestowed on him before his disobedience. With reference to this gift the Torah states that “man was created in the form and like the likeness of God” (Bereishis 1:22). On account of this gift of intellect man was addressed and commanded by God, as it is said: “And Hashem-Elokim commanded Adam” (ibid. 2:16) – for no commandments are given to the animals or to those who are devoid of understanding. Through the intellect man distinguishes between the true and the false. This faculty Adam possessed perfectly and completely. However, the terms “good” and “bad” are terms used in the study of subjective values, not in that of objective truths. For it is not correct to say in reference to the proposition “the heavens are spherical,” that it is “good” or to declare the assertion that “the earth is flat” to be “bad,” but we say of the one “it is true,” of the other “it is false.” Similarly our language expresses the idea of true and false by the terms emes and sheker, and of the morally right and the morally wrong, by tov and ra. It is the function of the intellect to discriminate between the true and the false – a distinction which is applicable to all objects of intellectual perception. 

When Adam was yet in a state of innocence, and was guided solely by reflection and reason – on account of which it is said: “Thou hast made him (man) little lower than the angels” (Tehillim 8:6) – he was not at all able to follow or to understand the principles of subjective values, to the extent that the most obviously inappropriate thing – that is, to appear in a state of nudity – was not considered inappropriate; he could not comprehend why it should be so. 

After man's disobedience, however, when he began to give in to the desires which had their source in his imagination and to the gratification of his bodily appetites, as it is said, “And the woman saw that the tree was good for food and delightful to the eyes” (Bereishis 3:6), he consequently lost part of that intellectual faculty which he had previously possessed. He therefore transgressed a command with which he had been charged on account of his reason; and, having obtained knowledge of the subjective values, he become wholly absorbed in the study of what is “good” and “bad.” Then he fully understood the magnitude of the loss he had sustained, what he had forfeited, and in what situation he was thereby placed. 

Hence we read, “And you shall be like elohim, knowing good and bad,” and not “knowing” or “discerning the true and the false,” for in objective truths we can only apply the words “true and false,” but never “good and bad.” Furthermore observe the passage, “And the eyes of both were opened, and they knew they were naked” (ibid. 3:7): it is not said, “And the eyes of both were opened, and they saw,” for what the man had seen previously and what he saw after this circumstance was precisely the same: there had been no blindness which was now removed, but he received a new faculty whereby he found things wrong which previously he had not regarded as bad … 

In accordance with this interpretation, our text suggests that Adam, as he altered his intention and directed his thoughts to the acquisition of what he was forbidden, he was banished from Paradise. This was his punishment; it was measure for measure. At first he had the privilege of tasting pleasure and happiness, and of enjoying repose and security; but as his appetites grew stronger, and he followed his desires and fantasies, as we have already stated above, and partook of the food he was forbidden to taste, he was deprived of everything, was doomed to subsist on the meanest kind of food, such as he never tasted before, and this even only after exertion and labor, as it is said, “Thorns and thistles shall grow up for thee” (ibid. 3:18), “By the sweat of thy brow,” etc., and in explanation of this the text continues, “And Hashem-Elokim drove him from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground whence he was taken.” He was now with respect to food and many other requirements brought to the level of the lower animals: “Thou shalt eat the grass of the field” (ibid.). Reflecting on his condition, the Psalmist says, “Adam unable to dwell in dignity, was brought to the level of the dumb beast” (Tehillim 49:19). May the Almighty be praised, whose design and wisdom cannot be fathomed.

To summarize: before the cheit, man possessed a fully functioning intellect and operated totally within the world of objective truth (emes and sheker). He wasn't able to comprehend good and bad as subjective values (e.g. "and the woman saw that the tree was good for eating, and desirable to the eyes, and delightful as a means of intelligence"), but only as objective reality ("And God saw all that He had made, and behold! it was very good" e.g. "it is not good for man to be alone"). 

After the cheit, when man "followed his desires and fantasies," he became steeped in the world subjective values (tov and ra) which his mind imposed upon objective reality. It is no longer possible to simply know objective reality and seek out objective good and avoid objective bad. Instead, we must continually contend with our conscience, which labels things as "good" and "bad" based on its own set of criteria (desires, fantasies, upbringing, society, etc.). Since these labels do not necessarily correspond to reality, we must sift through them and sort out whether what we feel is good actually is good and whether what we feel is bad actually is bad. The conscience serves a valuable purpose of keeping the instinctual part of the yetzer ha'ra in check, but it also interferes with our perception of reality, which leads to a host of problems.

Although the post-cheit transformation of human nature has a far-reaching impact on all of our knowledge and all of our emotions, the Torah expressed this entire change by focusing on one emotion: bushah. When the Torah says "the eyes of both of them were opened and they realized that they were naked," this is a shorthand way of saying all of the concepts the Rambam taught us about how the conscience affected our view of reality.

Before the cheit Adam and Chava were not ashamed of their nakedness. Why would they be? From an emes and sheker objective reality standpoint, there is nothing wrong with nakedness. Animals are naked and engage in reproduction to perpetuate their species, and humans should be no different. But after the cheit, when man's view of reality became clouded by the veils of his many desires, fantasies and imperfections, nudity became a source of shame, due to its association all of the strong desires and fantasies associated with sex. In a tov and ra framework, nudity is "bad," and therefore, shameful.

In this vein, when we say "ours is the boshes ha'panim" we are alluding to the fact that we live in a world of bushah, in which our perception of objective reality is warped by our subjective values, and that this is entirely our fault. Hashem created us without bushah, but we - through our cheit - brought the bushah upon ourselves.

Alternative Answer to Question #5: Hashem's Tzedakah vs. Our Shame

Rather than focusing on Hashem's acts of tzedakah in providing Bnei Yisrael with developmental tools and the boshes ha'panim of our free-will decisions to reject this tzedakah, we can now suggest a different theme. The subject of this kinah is the contrast between the objective reality of Hashem's tzedakah - which was intended to help Bnei Yisrael develop as a nation - and Bnei Yisrael's rejection of that tzedakah due to their corrupt subjective values. The boshes ha'panim refers to our recognition of how foolish we were to get caught up in our subjective worldview to the extent that we squandered all of the opportunities that Hashem gave us, for our benefit.

According to this approach, the emphasis of this kinah is not on the outcomes of Bnei Yisrael's behavior (i.e. national development vs. national regression) but on the causes of their transgressions (i.e. instead of recognizing the objective reality of Hashem's tzedakah and taking advantage of it, we turned away from that objective reality in our pursuit of subjective good and bad). 

Let's look at a few examples of the kinah in light of this new approach: 

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because God went out to redeem us as a people unto Himself; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because they [our forefathers] rebelled on the shore of the Sea of Reeds, the nation sinning against its God. 

As we recall every Pesach, Hashem redeemed us from physical and intellectual servitude. He saved us from the harsh and bitter slavery and granted us bodily freedom. He saved us from being enslaved to the avodah zarah (idolatry) of Egypt - which was built on falsehood, and fueled by fears and fantasies - and brought us to the das ha'emes ("religion of reality"). "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah." And how did we respond at the Sea of Reeds? By denying the redemptive nature of our liberation and yearning to return to Egyptian servitude: "What is it that you have done to us to take us out of Egypt? Is this not the statement that we made to you in Egypt, saying: 'Let us be, and we will serve Egypt' - for it is better that we should serve Egypt than that we should die in this wilderness!" (Shemos 14:11-12). So distorted was our view of tov and ra that we accused our Redeemer of bringing us from a better condition to a worse one. "ours is the boshes ha'panim."

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because You feed us [the mahn] that tasted like dough fried in honey; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because on the day [we made the Golden Calf], we brought it an offering of fine flour with oil and honey. 

Not only did Hashem miraculously provide sustenance for us in the Midbar (Wilderness), but He did so in a manner that satisfied our psychological need to enjoy our food. Moreover, He provided our food in a way that trained us in a lifestyle of kedushah (the ability to rise above our animalistic nature). "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah." And how did we respond? By making avodah zarah and attempting to appease it with offerings corresponding to our own palate. So distorted was our view of tov and ra that we turned away from the True God who fed us daily and served a god who was the product of our own psyche. "ours is the boshes ha'panim."

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because of [how You waged war for us with] Sichon and God and all the kings of Canaan; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because of Achan who appropriated for himself from the forbidden loot [of Jericho] and found no excuse [for his crime]. 

Hashem helped the small nation of former slaves defeat the mighty kings and armies of Canaan. The odds were against us, but Hashem waged war for us. All we had to do was follow Yehoshua's instructions not to take any of the spoils, which were to be consecrated for Hashem. "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah." And how did we respond? By lusting after "a lovely Babylonian garment" (Yehoshua 7:21) and some silver and gold. So distorted was Achan's view of tov and ra that he prioritized riches over the lives of his Jewish brethren. "ours is the boshes ha'panim."

The other stanzas can be learned in a similar fashion. This approach compliments, rather than contradicts, our last approach. I believe that it also yields a greater insight into the underlying causes of these chataim, and puts us in a better position to do teshuvah.

Support for this Approach

After this approach occurred to me I was bothered by a nagging doubt. I wondered: "Maybe I've taken this too far. After all, Tishah b'Av is entirely about the Jewish people - not humanity as a whole. Why am I going all the way back to Adam ha'Rishon, who predated even the Avos? Our kinah doesn't even mention Adam ha'Rishon! It may be true that the cheit of Adam and Chava was historically where boshes ha'panim came from, but should our explanation of this kinah rely so heavily on an understanding of the bushah that resulted from the cheit of Adam and Chava? That seems like a real stretch."

I decided to see if I could find any support in the mesorah for this thematic connection between the cheit of Adam and Chava and the cheit of Bnei Yisrael. I figured that if I was making a valid connection between the cheit of Adam and Chava and the chataim of Bnei Yisrael, then surely someone would have mentioned it.

Eventually I stumbled upon a lead. The first half of the first pask in Eichah reads: "Eichah! The city sits in solitude. The one that was great with people has become like a widow" (Eichah 1:1). The Targum [1], which weaves midrashim into the translation of the text, "translates" this pasuk as follows: 

How can it have been decreed upon Yerushalayim and upon the congregation to be punished with exile and to eulogize them with, "Eichah" - just as Adam and Chava were judged and kicked out of Gan Eden, and ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu eulogized them with, "Eichah"?

"Hmm," I thought, "interesting that the Targum midrashically associates the sin and punishment of Yerushalayim with the sin and punishment of Adam and Chava." But I still wasn't convinced that had a real support for my approach .... until I stumbled upon a midrash in Eichah Rabbah.

First, a little bit of background. The authors of the midrashim didn't limit themselves to offering midrashic explanations on individual pesukim. Additionally, they gave "pesichtos" ("proems" or "prefatory midrashic explanations") on the entire sefer. These pesichtos usually take the form of drashos on pesukim from other sefarim, which the authors use to develop an idea or theme that is intended to serve as a framework for reading the entire sefer at hand. 

The following midrash is a pesichta on Megilas Eichah. It was intended to provide an approach for understanding the entire sefer. Here is what the midrash says:

R' Abahu began [his discussion of Eichah by citing the pasuk:] "They are like a man (k'adam) who has broken a covenant" (Hoshea 6:7). [R' Abahu expounded:] This refers to Adam ha'Rishon. Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu said, "I brought him into the Gan Eden, I commended him, he violated My commandment, and I sentenced him to being cast out and sent out, and I lamented over him, "Eichah."  

[R' Abahu then cites Scriptural evidence for each of these claims:] "I brought him into Gan Eden, as it is stated: 'Hashem-Elokim took the man and placed him in Gan Eden' (Bereishis 2:15), and He commanded him, as it is stated: 'Hashem-Elokim commanded the man, saying, "From every tree of the garden [you may freely eat, but of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Bad you must not eat from]"' (ibid. 2:16-17), and he violated His commandment, as it is stated: 'Have you eaten of the tree from which I commanded [you not to eat]?' (ibid. 3:11), and I sentenced him to being cast out, as it is stated: 'He cast out the man' (ibid. 3:24), and I sentenced him to being sent out, 'Hashem sent them out from Gan Eden' (ibid. 3:23), and I lamented 'Eichah?' over them, as it is stated: 'And He said to him, 'Where are you? (אַיֶּכָּה)'  (ibid. 3:9) - which is written as 'Eichah?' (אֵיכָה). 

"The same [happened] with the children [of Adam ha'Rishon:] I brought them into Eretz Yisrael, as it is stated: 'I brought them into a fruitful land' (Yirmiyahu 2:7), and I commanded them, as it is stated: 'Command Bnei Yisrael' (Vayikra 24:2), and they violated My commandment, as it is stated: 'All of Israel violated Your Torah' (Daniel 9:11), and I sentenced them to being cast out, 'I will cast them out from My house' (Hoshea 9:15), and I sentenced them with being sent out, as it is stated: 'Send [them] away from My presence, ad let them go!' (Yirmiyahu 15:1), and I lamented 'Eichah?' over them: 'How can she sit in solitude' (Eichah 1:1)."

To my mind, THIS is a proof that my approach has merit - if not in relation to Kinah #19, then certainly for understanding the destruction of the Beis ha'Mikdash. According to R' Abahu, Eichah should be read with the comparison between Adam's cheit and Bnei Yisrael's cheit at the forefront of our minds.

When we think about it, this fits in perfectly with our understanding of the kinah. Hashem's placement of Adam ha'Rishon in Gan Eden was an act of tzedakah. Adam was given everything he needed: delicious and abundant fruit to eat, a natural world rich with chochmah to learn, a wife for companionship (and procreation), a task with which they were charged to improve the world, and a mitzvah to keep them on the right path. But by giving in to the world of subjective tov and ra, Adam and Chava lost that beneficial tzedakah-setup, and were exiled into a world in which developing their tzelem Elokim would be an uphill battle.

So too, Bnei Yisrael were given everything they needed: a fruitful land to supply their physical needs, a Torah rich with chochmah to learn, a nation descended from the Avos with whom to build a society, a task with which they were charged to improve the world, and a regimen of 613 mitzvos to develop their tzelem Elokim to its greatest potential. But by giving in to the world of subjective tov and ra time after time after time - as detailed by the paytan in our kinah - we lost our Beis ha'Mikdash and were exiled out of our Land into a world in which developing our tzelem Elokim is an extremely difficult uphill battle.

Still, what do we gain from this comparison? Why did R' Abahu feel the need to frame Bnei Yisrael as Bnei Adam ha'Rishon in order to understand Eichah? What do we gain from reading the kinah from this perspective?

I'd like to suggest one possible answer. There are innumerable benefits of the Torah regimen, and there is no question that we desperately need it. However, there are also challenges that come from the fact that the Torah is a regimen. One of these challenges is "losing sight of the forest for the trees" - namely, getting so caught up in the details of the regimen that we forget the purpose of the regimen.

It isn't enough to ask ourselves, "What aveiros (transgressions) have we done, and how can we meet the halachic standards that are expected of us?" This type of teshuvah may be beneficial, but it stops short of the essence. Full teshuvah requires us to examine and correct the distorted subjective views of tov and ra which led us to sin in the first place. In other words, we must approach teshuvah not only from the perspective of Torah, but from the perspective of Adam ha'Rishon.

For example, if a person decides to do teshuvah on speaking lashon ha'ra, it's not enough to inquire, "What are the halachos of lashon ha'ra and what steps can I take to stop myself from speaking it?" This type of teshuvah is lacking because it doesn't even touch the underlying values of tov and ra which lead us to speak lashon ha'ra in the first place. It addresses the symptoms, but not the causes. Instead, one must ask, "What warped notion of tov and ra leads me to believe that engaging in malicious speech about my fellow Jew is not ra? What messed up ideas of tov and ra do I have which allows me to excuse my own lashon ha'ra but condemn the lashon ha'ra that is spoken about me? Why do I believe that public opinion matters at all? Why do I think it's okay to use another human being as a source of amusement in conversation at his expense?"

R' Abahu frames the tragedy of the churban as a repetition of the tragedy of Gan Eden in order to help us realize that Bnei Yisrael's sins stemmed from a more underlying problem: their subjective values of tov and ra. It is only from this perspective that we, as a nation, can do complete teshuvah and merit the ultimate redemption.

Conclusion

This is all I have to say about Kinah #19 and R' Abahu's pesichta. As I said before, these two sources may or may not be related. Perhaps yesterday's interpretation of Kinah #19 is correct, and today's post is merely an explanation of R' Abahu's midrash. Either way, I hope you gained some insight into the nature of man, the sins of Bnei Yisrael, and our path to teshuvah.

I will conclude with the words of Yeshayahu ha'Navi which echo R' Abahu's comparison:

"For Hashem will comfort Tzion, He will comfort all her ruins; He will make her wilderness like Eden and her wasteland like a garden of Hashem; joy and gladness will be found there, thanksgiving and the sound of music." (Yeshayahu 51:3)

May we merit the restoration of Yerushalayim speedily, in our days.