Mishlei 16:1 - The Illusion of Communication Control

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Mishlei 16:1 - The Illusion of Communication Control

משלי טז:א

לְאָדָם מַעַרְכֵי לֵב, וּמֵיְיָ מַעֲנֵה לָשׁוֹן:

Mishlei 16:1
To man belong the arrangements of [thoughts in] the heart, but from Hashem comes the tongue’s reply.

The questions on this pasuk are as follows:

(1) What does it mean by "the arrangements of [thoughts in] the heart"? What is included in this category? The description is both strange and vague - especially due to the use of the ambiguous term "heart," which can mean "mind" or "emotions."

(2) What does it mean that "the arrangement [of thoughts in] the heart" belong to man? Thoughts aren't a physical object that can be possessed, nor do they constitute an entity with monetary value that can be owned (ignoring, for the moment, modern intellectual property laws). 

(3) What does Mishlei mean by "from Hashem comes the tongue's reply"? On the surface, this sounds like a denial of free will - that Hashem controls what we say. Obviously this cannot be what the pasuk means. In addition to being intrinsically problematic, it would render all of the speech-related mitzvos in the Torah moot. For example, how can we be held responsible for lashon ha'ra if the statement comes from Hashem? How can we be rewarded for the mitzvah of tefilah if Hashem is making us speak? How can we be held accountable for nedarim (vows) if we're not the ones who caused them to be uttered?

(4) Why does the pasuk say "reply"? Why not something broader, like "the speech of the tongue" or "the words of the mouth"? The pasuk starts off speaking in universals, but "reply" is a very specific type of speech. 

[This is where you may pause to think before reading on.]

It might come as no surprise to you that yesterday's Mishlei methodology post was a lead-in to today's idea. Here is my four-sentence summary of the main idea:

We tend to (or would like to) feel that we are completely in control of our ability to communicate, but in truth, we are not. All we can control is our thoughts and feelings, but when we try to express our thoughts to another person, we often do not succeed in the manner we envisioned. Even when we manage to clearly formulate and express our thoughts, our words can be misheard, misunderstood, and distorted due to factors beyond our control. Thus, the wise man will bear in mind how little control he has over the success of his attempts at communication; he will take the necessary precautions to ensure maximum communicative efficacy, and he will follow up his attempts at communication to make sure he was successful.

This is a great example of yesterday's interpretive principle: "from Hashem comes the tongue's reply" means "the tongue's reply can be influenced by numerous factors that are outside of our control." I don't know whether Shlomo ha'Melech is using this phrase in the general sense described by the Meiri ("all things that come about through nature are ascribed to Him") or in the specific sense described by the Rambam (i.e. the fact that our pasuk makes it sound like Hashem is speaking for us, and "speech" is one of the Rambam's five terms - though in this case, the pasuk doesn't actually say that Hashem is speaking). Either way, I am convinced that this is a valid interpretation of the pasuk.

Although we all must contend with the problem of having our words misconstrued, I suspect that we teachers are keenly aware of this phenomenon to a greater degree than many other professionals, since we continually and deliberately assess our students to check for understanding. I can tell you that in my teaching experience there have been plenty of cases in which I was perfectly clear in what I taught, but a student walked away with exactly the opposite conclusion that I intended. Sometimes this is due to mistakes on my part, and sometimes it is due to factors totally beyond my control. 

For example, we once had a student who didn't tell ANYONE in the school that she had a hearing impairment. How was I to know that my words were being misheard? Then there's the classic case where a student thinks that a certain well-known Hebrew word or phrase - which we expected her to have known since grade school - means something TOTALLY different from what it actually means. How was I to know that the student had an anomalous gap in her elementary school education?

As for the question about "reply," I think that Shlomo ha'Melech used this term because it implies communication. In other words, "reply" points to two parties - the speaker and the listener - whereas a more general term, like "speech" doesn't. 

Mishlei 12:19 - The Temporary Nature of Lies

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Mishlei 12:19 - The Temporary Nature of Lies

משלי יב:יט

שְׂפַת אֱמֶת תִּכּוֹן לָעַד וְעַד אַרְגִּיעָה לְשׁוֹן שָׁקֶר:

Mishlei 12:19

True lips are established forever, but a false tongue is only for moment.

The questions on this pasuk are as follows:

(1) In what sense are true lips "established forever"? Is this actually true? Truths are certainly not automatically "established"; there can be tremendous resistance to the truth, and it is often neglected and not established at all. And even when it is established, it doesn't necessarily last forever. 

(2) What does it mean that a false tongue is "only for a moment"? It would seem that this false. Lies can persist for a lifetime - or even beyond a lifetime. Consider, for instance, all of the anti-Semitic lies that have been spread about Jews throughout the ages; they've certainly lasted for longer than "a moment." 

(3) Why does the pasuk use "lips" in reference to the truth and "tongue" in reference to falsehood? In our pasuk good speech is associated with the lips and bad speech with the tongue, but in other pesukim the association is flipped. For example: "There is one who speaks like the piercings of a sword, but the tongue of the wise heals" (Mishlei 12:19), "The tongue of the righteous is like choice silver, but the heart of the wicked is minute" (ibid. 10:20) "Lips of falsehood are an abomination to Hashem, but He favors those who act with integrity" (ibid. 12:22), "The lawless man contemplates evil, and it is as if there is a burning coal on his lips" (ibid. 16:27).

(4) What practical decision-making idea does this pasuk teach us? As I have mentioned before, this question ought to be asked about every pasuk. Like Shlomo ha'Melech, the best way to make this question into a habit is through repetition. 

[Okay, it's time to stop and think! Continue reading when you're ready for the main idea.]

Here is my four-sentence (with liberal use of semi-colons) summary of the main idea:

Whereas truth, by its very nature, is stable and exists independently of what human beings say, think, or do, lies are intrinsically unstable and exist on a tenuous and contingent basis. 

Since lies are cover-ups of reality, liars – unlike truth-tellers – constantly face the threat of exposure; lies can only continue to exist as long as they are maintained by the people who espouse them, perpetuate them, and believe in them, whereas the truth is anchored in reality itself. 

Moreover, since liars know the truth, they carry with them the potential to topple their own lies; in this sense, the liar is his own greatest enemy, since the slightest slip-up can bring down his entire web of falsehood. 

Thus, by telling the truth, a person endows his words with the same quality of permanence as reality itself, and doesn’t have to worry about “being found out,” since truth is not a cover-up operation; in contrast, one who tells a lie must continually manage the upkeep of his lies, and take strenuous and stressful efforts to prevent them from being exposed by reality, by other people, and by his own carelessness.

This idea is a good example of Mishlei's general approach to the subject of falsehood, lies, and deceit: it's not a good idea (a) because of the risk that you'll be caught, and (b) because it is simply not worthwhile to commit yourself to the responsibility of keeping tabs on your lies. 

This pasuk is also a good example of the power of mashal (metaphor). Notice that the emphasis of this pasuk is not on the consequences of lying or the benefits of truth-telling. Rather, Shlomo ha'Melech's aim is to convey a sense of the permanent nature of true speech and the transient nature of false speech. When the student of Mishlei internalizes this idea, and is subsequently faced with an opportunity to solve a problem or obtain an advantage by telling a lie, he will naturally dismiss this option because he will view the lie as nothing more than a temporary band-aid which is destined to fall off, and cost him dearly - both before and after his lie is exposed. 

In other words, the ideas I wrote about in my summary are there to provide rational support for the emotional attitude that Shlomo ha'Melech intended to impart - namely, the feeling that "lies are temporary" and "truth is permanent." The goal is to get to the point where you've reviewed these ideas so many times and have thought about so many examples that you can relate to the emotional affect of this pasuk without consciously reasoning through all of the steps. 

One last methodology point: you'll notice that my explanation didn't answer Question #3. That's totally fine. On every pasuk there are major and minor questions. Minor questions tend to stem from the specific wording of the pasuk. The only one of the meforshim I know who cares about explaining every subtlety of the text is the Malbim. Everyone seems content to just get the main idea. If you can bring out a nuance in the main idea from a nuance in the text, that's great. If not, it doesn't matter. As long as you get the main idea. 

Adler: On Animal Speech and Animal Intelligence

In my recent post, Do Babies Have Souls? (Ibn Ezra), I presented the Ibn Ezra's idea that man's soul (i.e. his ability to think rationally) and his ability to speak are correlated; as one develops, so does the other. A friend of mine asked me whether the Ibn Ezra was referring specifically to the ability to speak, or to the ability to communicate? When I answered that it was the latter, he asked me about animals that can communicate (e.g. monkeys who have been taught sign language). 

I thought that this might be a good time to (re)post three excerpts from the writings of Mortimer J. Adler, in which he addresses the differences between animal speech and human speech, as well as animal thought and human thought. These excerpts were originally published as two separate blog posts in June and August of 2007.

Artwork: Connection, by Yuumei

The Difference of Man and the Difference it Makes (1967, 1993)

Chapter 9: The Pivotal Issue: Language and Thought, p.136-138

The second critical point made by these contemporary philosophers, and by such scientists as Crichtley and White, turns on their making a sharp distinction between perceptual and conceptual thought. This distinction is implicit in the observation that animal thinking is confined to the perceptual present, whereas human thinking transcends the immediate environment and extends not only to objects in the remote past and the remote future but also to objects that have no temporal locus whatsoever. Precisely because they are incapable of conceptual thought, animals, these writers contend, are not only (1) incapable of sentence-making that includes statements about the past and future, (2) unable to fabricate tools for remote future use, (3) devoid of a cumulative cultural inheritance that constitutes a long historical tradition, but they are also (4) incapable of any behavior that is not rooted in the perceptually apprehended present situation.

Animals can certainly think, in the sense of learning from experience, generalizing, discriminating, and abstracting, solving problems by trial and error or by insight, and even, as Price, following Hume, points out, making inductive inferences from empirically learned cues or signals. The evidence is both plain and ample that they can think in all these ways. But it is equally plain from the observations of their behavior, in the laboratory or in the field, that they cannot think in any of the following ways: they cannot think about objects that are not perceptually present as well as about those that are; and with regard to objects of thought, present or absent, they cannot make judgments or engage in reasoning (i.e., think that such and such is or is not the case, or think that if such and such is the case, then so and so is not) ...

Bennett argues that animal learning and problem-solving, whether by trial and error or by insight, does not involve any of the steps that constitute human reasoning from experience - the process whereby human beings either establish an empirical conclusion or refute one. Since that always involves the separate acknowledgment of a timeless universal, on the one hand, and of particular instances of past occurrence, on the other, animals, whose apprehensions are limited to the immediate perceptual present, cannot possibly engage in the kind of thinking that consists in giving reasons pro and con. And, Bennet further contends, behavior that involves giving or receiving reasons cannot be causally explained by reference to empirical sequences. In his view, there can be no behavioristic account of human rational behavior, as there can be of animal learning and problem-solving, in terms of causal connections between stimuli and responses or by reference to the causes at work in the formation of the conditioned responses or the imprintings that represent the modifications of animal behavior through repeated experience ...

Ten Philosophical Mistakes (1985)

Chapter 2: The Intellect and the Senses, p.50-53

Since Darwin’s day, experimentation with animals in psychological laboratories has turned up much additional evidence that has been regarded as reinforcing this conclusion [namely, that man differs from animal only in degree, not in kind]. It has been interpreted as showing that other animals have concepts as well as percepts, even if they do not have intellects in the traditional sense of that term. Accompanying this attribution of conceptual intelligence to other animals has been the attribution to them of linguistic performances that are said to differ only in degree from the human use of language.

... I will concentrate here on the misinterpretation of the evidence that is supposed to show that other animals have concepts that enable them to deal with generalities as well as particulars.

To put the matter briefly, the experimental evidence does show that other animals, under laboratory conditions, can learn to discriminate between different kinds of perceived objects. They learn to react in one way to squares and in another to circles, for example; or to eat what is placed on a green surface and to avoid what is placed on a red surface. Such discriminations indicate that they are able to generalize, and this is made the basis for attributing concepts as well as percepts to them.

The error here consists in thinking that to be able to discriminate between different kinds of objects is tantamount to being able to understand distinct kinds and their differences. To regard an animal’s ability to discriminate between perceived similarities and dissimilarities as evidence of conceptual thought on the animal’s part involves an equivocal use of the word “concept.”

Strictly used, concepts are (a) acquired dispositions to recognize perceived objects as being of this kind or of that kind, and at the same time (b) to understand what this kind or that kind of object is like, and consequently (c) to perceive a number of perceived particulars as being the same in kind and to discriminate between them and other sensible particulars that are different in kind.

In addition, concepts are acquired dispositions to understand what certain kinds of objects are like both (a) when the objects, though perceptible, are not actually perceived, and (b) also when they are not perceptible at all, as is the case with all the conceptual constructs we employ in physics, mathematics, and metaphysics.

There is no empirical evidence whatsoever that concepts, thus precisely defined, are present in animal behavior. Their intelligence is entirely sensory. Its operations are limited to the world of perceptual objects and imaginable ones. What lies beyond perception and imagination is totally beyond the powers of the animal mind or intelligence. Only animals with intellects, only members of the human species, have the conceptual powers that enable them to deal with the unperceived, the imperceptible, and the unimaginable ...

Chapter 3: Words and Meanings (Section 6)

In their study of the evidence of animal communication, [animal psychologists and behavioral scientists] seldom if ever note the difference between signs that function merely as signals and signs that function as designators – as names that refer to objects. Almost all of the cries, sounds, gestures, that animals in the wild, and domesticated animals as well, use to express their emotions and desires, serve as signals, not as designators. It is only in the laboratory and under experimental conditions, often with very ingeniously contrived special apparatus, that such higher mammals as chimpanzees and bottle-nosed dolphins appear to be communicating by using words as if they were names, and even to be making sentences by putting them together with some vestige of syntax.

The appearance is then misinterpreted by the scientists as a basis for asserting that the only difference between animal and human language is one of degree, not of kind – a difference in the number of name words in an animal’s vocabulary and difference in the complexity of the utterances that are taken to be sentences.

This misinterpretation arises from the neglect or ignorance, on the part of the scientists, of the difference between perceptual and conceptual thought. That, in turn, stems from their failure to acknowledge the difference between the senses and the intellect or their denial that the difference exists ... 

While there is evidence that chimpanzees under experimental conditions do use artificially contrived signs to designate or name things, the things they name are all perceptual objects. There is not a single piece of evidence showing their ability to use signs to designate what is not perceived through their senses or what lies totally beyond the sensible realm and is intrinsically imperceptible ...

The animal’s behavior manifests different reactions to objects that are different in kind. But the kinds of things that animals appear to differentiate are all kinds of which there are perceptual instances in the animal’s experience. Humans differentiate kinds or classes of which there either are no perceptual instances in their experience or of which there cannot be any. This is the distinguishing characteristic of conceptual thought and the irrefutable evidence of the presence of intellect in man and of its absence in brutes.

One further observation, if it were made by the animal psychologists, might open their eyes to the difference in kind, not degree, between human language and the acquirement by animals of signs that appear to function as designative names. It involves the distinction, already made, between a word acquiring its designative meaning through direct perceptual acquaintance with the object named and the acquirement of meaning by means of a verbal description, as when a child learns the meaning of the word “kindergarten” by being told that it is a place where children get together to play and learn.

In all the experimental work done on animals, there is no instance where a sign that an animal uses gets is meaning from a collocation of other signs that purport to express its meaning. In every case, a new sign that is introduced into the animal’s vocabulary becomes meaningful through being attached to a perceptual object with which the animal has direct acquaintance.

If the students of animal behavior had engaged in their observations and experiments with a recognition of the difference between perceptual and conceptual thought, and with an acknowledgment that humans have intellect as well as senses, whereas animals lack intellects, they would not be so prone to ignore or deny the difference in kind between the human and animal use of signs as names or designators.