Showing posts with label Chacham (Wise Person). Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chacham (Wise Person). Show all posts

Wednesday, July 25, 2018

Mishlei 29:9 - The Fool's Dirty Debate Tactics

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Browbeat, by Chris Rahn


Mishlei 29:9 - The Fool's Dirty Debate Tactics

משלי כט:ט
אִישׁ חָכָם נִשְׁפָּט אֶת אִישׁ אֱוִיל וְרָגַז וְשָׂחַק וְאֵין נָחַת:

Mishlei 29:9
Raw Translation: A wise man who nishpat with a foolish man, and he rages and he laughs, and there is no satisfaction/rest.

I chose this pasuk for today's Mishlei post because it's a good example of how ambiguity in the wording can lead to multiple directions in the analysis. When I learned this pasuk with my Mishlei group this past Shabbos, we didn't have access to my mikraos gedolos (compendium of commentaries), and we were forced to work out the translation on our own. I'll include the difficulties in my list of questions on the pasuk:
(1) What does "nishpat" mean? The root SH.F.T. (ש.פ.ט.) typically denotes "to judge," but can also mean "to dispute" or "to argue." The use of the nifal (passive) form is also very strange. "is judged" makes sense, but "is disputed" or "is argued [with]" are also valid translations.
(2) Who "rages" and "laughs"? Is the chacham (wise man) raging and laughing at the eveel (foolish man), or is the eveel raging and laughing at the chacham
(3) What, exactly, is this "rage" and "laughter"? Is "rage" different than mere "anger"? Is the emphasis on his feeling of anger, or on his display of anger? The laughter is even vaguer than the rage. Is this talking about "laughter" that stems from humor? Is it laughter of mockery? Is it laughter of happiness and camaraderie? And why is this person raging and laughing? What is the relationship between the situation (i.e. arguing, disputing, or being judged) and these two reactions? Is it davka (specifically) these two reactions, or are these just examples from within a larger category?
(4) Who doesn't receive satisfaction - and why not? The answer to this question is dependent on the answer to Question #2, and maybe dependent on the answer to Question #3.
[Time to stop and think about the pasuk in light of these questions. Read on when ready.]

Before we can present the main idea of the pasuk, we need to settle on a translation. Here are the approaches taken by the various meforshim:
Rashi: A wise man who argues with a foolish man may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction [for the wise man].
Ralbag: When a wise man argues with a foolish man, [the fool] will rage and laugh, and there will be no rest [for the wise man].
Ibn Ezra: When a wise man is judged with a foolish man, [the fool] may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction [for the wise man].
Metzudas David: A wise man who is judged with a foolish man may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction [for the wise man]. 
As I mentioned, we didn't have access to meforshim when we learned this pasuk. The translation we came up with happens to be one that none of the meforshim explicitly say:
Our Translation: When a wise man is judged with a foolish man, [the fool] may rage and laugh, but he will have no satisfaction.
For those of you who appreciate charts, here are the five translations side by side:



The fact that none of the meforshim proposed this translation doesn't bother me. I am not aware of any grammatical or syntactical problems, and our translation reflects the most straightforward reading, both in terms of the use of the passive "nishpat" (which literally means "he is judged") and in the conservative reading of the ambiguous pronouns (i.e. "the fool may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction for the fool"). Plus, "raging" and "laughing" seem more like the actions of an eveel than the actions of a chacham, which is why we shied away from translating the pasuk like Rashi and Metzudas David.

Here is my four-sentence summary of the main idea:
When a chacham finds himself in a situation in which he is being judged alongside an eveel (e.g. two participants in a public debate, two businessmen competing for the same customers, two candidates vying for the same position), he should prepare himself to face the dirty tactics that the eveel will use. The fool will attempt to prevail by utilizing provocatively aggressive displays of emotion – such as rage and mocking laughter – in an effort to destabilize the chacham, and to make himself appear dominant in comparison. As long as the chacham remains visibly unshaken and unperturbed by the eveel's bombastic onslaught, and doesn’t give him the satisfaction of pushing his buttons, then these tactics will backfire. The audience (i.e. whoever is in a position to pass judgment) will observe the stark contrast between the chacham’s cool, levelheaded, objective disposition and the eveel’s heated, combative, immature bullying; this side-by-side comparison will simultaneously boost the ethos of the chacham and diminish that of the eveel. Chances are that the eveel, himself, will become frustrated with the chacham’s indifference to his assaults, which will destabilize him, making him feel even more frantic and less in control of himself; this, in turn, will make him appear desperate and pathetic in the eyes of the audience, thereby giving the chacham an edge - in addition to the substance of his arguments, which will inevitably be superior to the eveel's.
After we came up with this explanation, and I gained access to my meforshim, I saw that the Ri Nachmias gives a very similar explanation of our pasuk. The only difference is that he translates "nishpat" as "argues" instead of "is judged," like Rashi and Ralbag, in contrast to Ibn Ezra and Metzudas David. Nevertheless, he also learns - like we do - that there is an audience present in the situation, which practically means that the chacham and eveel are being judged. Here is the relevant excerpt from the Ri Nachmias's (much lengthier) explanation:
If a wise man who argues with a fool, [the fool] may rage and laugh ... Since this fool doesn't have much knowledge, he'll project self-images (oseh tzuros me'atzmo) to deceive the people who are there ... These are polemical techniques (darchei nitzuach) which [the eveel uses to] trick listeners [into thinking that he] knows what he doesn't [actually know].
The Ri Niachmias quotes a pasuk from elsewhere in Shlomo ha'Melech's writings which supports our interpretation: "The words of the wise are heard calmness (b'nachas) over the shouting of a ruler among fools" (Koheles 9:17). In the Rambam's description of how talmidei chachamim (Torah scholars) speak and behave, he borrows this phrase from Koheles:
A talmid chachamim shouldn't yell or shout when he speaks, like animals and wild beasts, nor should he raise his voice; rather, his speech with people should be calm. And when he speaks calmly, he should be careful not to distance himself, to the extent that he appears haughty.
In other words, this calmness in speech shouldn't be limited to situations involving a fool. Rather, "nachas" (in the sense of "calmness" rather than "satisfaction") should be the default mode of speech for talmidei chachamim.

The Ralbag would agree with the title of this post, but according to him, our pasuk focuses on a specific tactic used by the eveel in debates: interrupting the chacham. He translates our pasuk as: "When a wise man argues with a foolish man, [the fool] will rage and laugh, and there will be no rest [for the wise man]." Here is his explanation:
When a wise man argues with a foolish man, in a verbal back-and-forth, the eveel will not allow the chacham to speak and to finish his statements. Instead, sometimes he'll react angrily to what he hears the chacham say and will not allow him to complete his statements, and sometimes he'll laugh and mock what he hears [the chacham] say, and he will not give him a pause (nachas) which would enable him to complete what he intended to clarify. This pasuk is, as it were, a warning to the chacham not to argue with an eveel.
One of the best examples of our pasuk in action is the Canadian psychologist Jordan Peterson. I found a video which exemplifies all three interpretations - that of the Ralbag, the Ri Nachmias, and ours. I wanted to find a shorter video, but this is the best I could come up with.


It will not always be possible for a chacham to avoid debating with or being judged alongside an eveel. When such a situation arises, the chacham must keep the eveel's repertoire of tricks at the forefront of his mind, and not allow him to get the upper hand. 

Tuesday, July 17, 2018

Honoring Our Non-Jewish Elders

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Left: [Great] Uncle William, at the age of 4, in February 1921
Right: [Great] Uncle William, at the age of 101, in July 2018


Honoring Our Non-Jewish Elders

Uncle William

My brother and I recently returned from our annual trip to Hawaii, where our mom's side of the family has lived for several generations. My mom's father was one of thirteen siblings, the oldest of whom was born in 1902. Of those thirteen siblings, only one is still alive: [Great] Uncle William (whom we refer to as "Uncle William," even though he's my grandfather's brother). 

Uncle William was born on April 1st, 1917.

Yes, your math is correct: this past April 1st was his 101st birthday. 

Let's put Uncle William's personal timeline into perspective by using American history and American innovation as a basis of comparison. The year Uncle William was born, Woodrow Wilson was president (#28), and Liliuokalani, the last Queen of Hawaii, was still alive. Hawaii wouldn't become a state until 42 years later. Television wasn't invented until Uncle William was almost 10 years old. He was a teenager during the Great Depression, and in his mid-20's he witnessed the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. He still holds it against FDR for taking America off the gold standard in 1933. He was too old to be in the Korean War, which started in his mid-30's, and he was nearly 60 when the Vietnam War ended. He was 75 at the birth of the World Wide Web, and he was 84 on 9/11. 

Impressive, no?

Uncle William worked as a furniture repair man for most of his life, and only retired at the age of 95, when he started having a hard time getting up after sitting down on the floor to work. He remained active into his 90's, riding his bike into town, trading up his vehicle for a new one (because "the old car didn't fit my lifestyle"), and mowing his own lawn ("it takes me three days").

All the while, his mental faculties didn't dull in the slightest. While not a towering intellectual or even a deep thinker, Uncle William definitely has a reflective soul. Although he didn't go to college or graduate from high school (my grandfather was the only one of his siblings to do that), Uncle William was a reader - especially of newspapers. He followed the news to the point where we could ask him for his opinion on any current event, and he would have something thoughtful to say. (For the record: he didn't like Obama because he was a politician and didn't like Trump because "he's just a big mouth" and he thinks that America is going downhill because Democracy appeals to the lowest common denominator; when we asked him who America's last great leader was, he said, "Clinton was good ... the man - not the wife.")

Unfortunately, Uncle William had a prostate issue two years ago, and needed to start using a catheter, which slowed him down. Things started going downhill from there. He had made it to the age of 98 living on his own, but was finally forced to hire an attendant to help him. By the time we visited him this summer his vision and hearing had deteriorated, and he now has 24-hour care.

And yet, he's still mentally with it! We talked with him for about an hour, and said that we'd visit him next summer ("If I'm still around!").

After visiting Uncle William this summer, I found myself wondering: "What would Torah say? How would Judaism frame my interaction with a man of Uncle William's age?"

I decided I'd look into it. This is what I found.

The Halacha of Honoring Non-Jewish Elders

The "halachic address" of our topic is the mitzvas aseh (positive commandment) of "mipnei seivah takum," which is derived from the pasuk: "In the presence of old age you shall rise, and you shall honor the presence of a sage, and you shall revere your God - I am Hashem" (Vayikra 19:32). Here is the Sefer ha'Chinuch's [1] summary of the basic mitzvah:
[The 257th mitzvah is] to honor chachamim (the wise) and rise before them, as it is stated: "you shall rise up before seivah (lit. white hair)," which Onkelos translated as: "you shall rise up before one who knows Torah." Our Sages of blessed memory explained "and you shall honor the presence of a zakein (lit. elder)" as referring to none other than zeh she'kanah chochmah (one who has acquired wisdom). The reason why Scripture expresses "chacham" as "zakein" is because a young chacham has seen through his chochmah (wisdom) what an elder has seen through the multitude of his years.
While the primary form of this mitzvah is to honor chachamim, we follow the opinion of R' Issi ben Yehudah in the Gemara who says that "[this pasuk] implies all [types of] seivah" which even includes elders who are not chachamim. Here is the Rambam's [2] codification of this secondary component of the mitzvah, which includes the case at hand:
We stand in the presence of a zakein ha'muflag b'ziknah (an elder who is very advanced in age) even though he is not a chacham (wise man). Even a young chacham should stand in the presence of a zakein ha'muflag b'ziknah – though he is not obligated to stand to his full stature, but only enough to show respect to him. And even a non-Jewish elder we honor with words, and we lend him a supporting hand, as it is stated: “rise up in the presence of old age” – which implies old age in any sense of the term.
The Shulchan Aruch [3] brings down the Rambam's formulation almost verbatim. Although there is some debate as to what age would qualify someone as a zakein ha'muflag b'ziknah - with opinions ranging from 60, to 70, to 90 - I suspect everyone would agree that Uncle William's age of 101 years places him firmly within this halachic category.

The source of the Rambam's halacha is the Gemara in Kiddushin (33a), which states:
R’ Yochanan would rise up in the presence of a non-Jewish elder, saying: “How many experiences he has endured!” Rava would not rise up, but he would show him honor. Abaye would lend his hand to [such] elders.
The Rambam paskins (halachically rules) in accordance with Rava and Abaye that although we do not stand up for a zakein goy (non-Jewish elder) as we would for a zaken Yisrael (Jewish elder), we show him honor in other ways: verbally and by providing assistance.

Although the Rambam's citation of our pasuk and subsequent explanation might seem to imply that he holds that honoring a zakein goy is part of the mitzvah de'oraisa (Biblical obligation), it is pretty clear that this isn't what he actually holds. If it were, then there would be no differentiation between a zakein goy and a zakein Yisrael. Rather, showing honor to a zakein goy is either a mitzvah mi'de'rabbanan [4] (Rabbinic mitzvah), or something we do out of darchei shalom [5] ("ways of peace," intended to maintain peace between Jews and non-Jews). This explains why we differentiate between a zakein goy and a zakein Yisrael - to show that the two acts of giving kavod do not share the same halachic nature.

The Philosophy Behind the Halacha

The Sefer ha'Chinuch offers the following reason for this mitzvah as a whole (i.e. to honor chachamim):
At the root of this mitzvah lies the reason that the main purpose of man's having been created in the world is for the sake of chochmah, so that he will recognize his Creator, therefore, it is fitting for people to honor one who has attained this. As a result, others will be inspired about it. It is based on this reason that Issi ben Yehudah said in the Gemara Kiddushin that even an uneducated elder - i.e. one who is not wise - is included in this mitzvah, for it is befitting to honor him because in his multitude of years he has seen and recognized some of the works and wonders of Hashem, and this is worthy of honor. This is why Rebbi Yochanan said there in the Gemara Kiddushin: "the halacha is in accordance with Issi ben Yehudah" - on the condition that [the elder] is not a confirmed sinner, in which case, he has deprived himself of honor.
Even though we have established that the obligation of honoring a zakein goy is not a part of the mitzvah de'oraisa, the reason behind this act of honor is definitely related. As stated above, R' Yochanan explained his reason for standing in the presence of a zakein goy, saying: "How many (harpatkei) experiences he has endured!" Rashi [6] explains the unusual term "harpatkei":
harpatkei [means] experiences and troubles; and they have seen many miracles and wonders.
According to Rashi, we honor a zakein goy not for any type of specialized chochmah that he may or may not have. Rather, we honor him for the chochmah that he has gained from his life-experience and the wondrous phenomena he has had the opportunity to witness. This would certainly apply to non-Jew elders, no matter where they're from.

Rav Hirsch [7] provides a similar explanation, differentiating between the two reasons for honoring an elder, which he relates to the two words used to denote "old age" (i.e. seivah and ziknah):
He who honors seivah honors experience; that is, he honors the natural human perception that matures through the repeated events of life and nature. He who honors ziknah honors wisdom; that is, he honors the understanding of life and nature that is obtained from God's Word. For God's Word reveals the Divine source and purpose of life and nature, and their significance for our mission. We must pay tribute to both: the clear and circumspect human intellect, which matures through experience; and the spirit of God, which proceeds from the Torah. And whenever we find them, in the aged and in the wise, we are to show our homage by rising and honoring.  
The Ralbag [8] seems to learn our pasuk as teaching two separate mitzvos: "in the presence of old age you shall rise" commands us to honor elders, regardless of their wisdom, and "honor the presence of a sage" commands us to honor chachamim. He explains the first mitzvah very similarly to the Sefer ha'Chinuch, but throws in a Gersonidean twist at the end:
"in the presence of old age you shall rise" is a mitzvas aseh to rise up in the presence of every aged person, in order to honor him. There is a benefit in this: on account of this, those who are young in days will listen to the words of the aged, and their words will be precious to them, and they will behave in accordance with their discipline. For the aged, due to the multitude of worldly events that they have witnessed, will come to know by way of experience many principles of decision-making and ethics. Thus, one who listens to these words will be saved from many afflictions that would have befallen him, were it not for the advice of the aged. Furthermore, [one who honors the aged] will take it to heart to give great honor to Hashem, Who is Eternal - Who never didn't exist, and will never depart [from existence]. 
In other words, this mitzvah operates on two levels. On a practical level, the mitzvah facilitates the bequeathal of valuable life lessons from the older generation to the younger. On a philosophical/psychological level, this mitzvah trains us to have reverence for existence, which - according to the Ralbag - will ultimately strengthen our reverence for Hashem, Whose Existence is Eternal.

Ibn Ezra, [9] however, has a radically different take on this mitzvah:
The meaning of "in the presence of old age you shall rise" is on account of a dead person, because an elder is close to death, since his body is considered to be as though it is dead ... the meaning of "you shall fear your God" is that He will punish you in the days of old age.
According to the Ibn Ezra, we stand up in the presence of the elderly not to show them honor, but to remind ourselves of our impending death!

Concluding Thoughts

As is often the case with taamei ha'mitzvos (reasons for mitzvos), it is entirely possible for multiple explanations to be correct. All of these explanations ring true based on the time I've spent with Uncle William.

Have my encounters with Uncle William led me to value and revere the unique type of wisdom he has attained as a result of his long life? Yes. Am I more inclined to listen closely to his words than I would if I heard them from someone closer to my age? Yes. When I see him, do I become more cognizant of the finitude of my own life, and the eventuality of my own eventual death? Definitely.

And guess what? I even got to perform the mitzvah this trip by lending him a helping hand when he wanted to move to a different chair!

I realize that this blog post didn't break new ground or anything. I just think that it's a great example of how halacha enriches every area of my life, and I wanted to share that example with you.


[1] Sefer ha'Chinuch: Parashas Kedoshim, Mitzvah #257
[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Talmud Torah 6:9
[3] Rav Yosef Karo, Shulchan Aruch: Yoreh Deah 244:7
[4] Rav Yoel Sirkis (Bach), Bayis Chadash: Yoreh Deah 244
[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Yaakov (Semag), Sefer Mitzvos Gadol: Aseh #13
[6] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Talmud Bavli: Kiddushin 33
[7] Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, Commentary on Vayikra 19:32
[8] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on Vayikra 19:32
[9] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Vayikra 19:32

Wednesday, June 14, 2017

The Mishleic Spectrum: A Glossary of Mishlei Personalities

If you are interested in Mishlei methodology, I highly recommend that you read Saadia Gaon's Introduction to MishleiHow to Learn Mishlei: a Step by Step Guide, and Mishlei Methodology: Meiri - Nigleh and Nistar. Those three posts, together with this one, constitute my online "Mishlei 101" class. 

Click here for a printer friendly version of this blog post. It is recommended to print this in color.

The terms on this chart will be translated, defined, and explained in the post below - after an introduction. 


The Mishleic Spectrum: A Glossary of Mishlei Personalities

What This Is, and What This Is Not

Several years ago my Mishlei rebbi and I sat down to write a book on Mishlei. Our goal was to write a "Mishlei Primer" comprised of three parts: (1) a methodological "How to Learn Mishlei" guide, and (2) a Mishlei Glossary, in which we would provide definitions for the many terms and personalities of Mishlei, and (3) a "sampler" of pesukim and their explanations, in accordance with our method.

We decided to begin our research with two of the most obscure Mishleic personalities: the bogeid ("Traitor") and the bliyaal ("Lawless Person"). We ended up spending the whole summer trying to define those two personalities, and we didn't get any further. The following year we tackled the atzel ("Lazy Person"), and spent the whole summer working on that. Suffice it to say, writing a Mishlei glossary was more difficult than we thought at the outset. We shelved the project and haven't returned to it since.  

In retrospect, I think that the standard we established for ourselves was too high. We set out to define each of these terms to the best of our understanding, with the greatest degree of certainty we could muster. This led to a continual revision, re-revision, and re-re-revision of our definitions. For instance, we ended up learning through every pasuk in Mishlei about laziness a total of six times; we started with the first pasuk, then moved on to the second, and so on - but by the time we got to the final pasuk, we felt the need to relearn all of the pesukim again in light of our updated understanding. This was great in terms of our own learning, but not great in terms of our project.

Perhaps what we should have done is to try to figure out working definitions instead of absolute definitions. Our goal should have been to provide definitions which were clear to enable the beginner to get started, but without aiming to definitively proclaim, "This is Mishlei's definition of tzadik" or "This is what Shlomo ha'Melech meant by chochmah." 

This more realistic goal is what I intend to accomplish here, in my rough draft of a "Mishleic Glossary." My goal is to provide working definitions - NOT absolute, authoritative, definitive definitions - of primary, secondary, and some tertiary Mishleic personalities. This definitions in this dictionary should be clear enough to consult and use in case you get stuck on a pasuk and need to "plug in" a definition to work with until you are able to arrive at your own understanding.

Understanding Mishleic Labels

It should be noted that Mishlei speaks in absolutes. Shlomo ha'Melech will say things like, "The ksil (fool) does such-and-such, but the chacham (wise man) does such-and-such" - as if "the ksil" and "the chacham" are living, breathing individuals whom you might run into one day on the street. 

In reality, this isn't the case. Real human beings are complex, and don't fit neatly into Mishleic labels. It is entirely possible for the same individual to be a chacham in his business dealings, an atzel when it comes to Torah study, a rasha in his relationships, and a chasid in halacha. To an extent, we all have elements of ALL Mishleic characteristics within ourselves, in different proportions. 

Mishlei's labels should be thought of as archetypes or paradigms. From a pedagogical standpoint, it is much easier for Shlomo ha'Melech to teach the reader how to become a chacham and avoid the pitfalls of a fool by describing "pristine" decision-making scenarios involving a prototypical chacham character and a prototypical fool character as his foil. 

Sources (or Lack Thereof)

Each of the meforshim (commentators) on Mishlei has his own understanding of the terms we are about to discuss. Some meforshim state their definitions explicitly and bring support from other pesukim or Chazal. Other meforshiim simply explain the pesukim in accordance with their understanding, and the reader of Mishlei must infer their implicit definitions. 

The definitions in this post reflect my current "working definitions" as of June 13th, 2017. Some of these can be traced back to explicit statements provided by pesukim, statements of Chazal, and other meforshim; other definitions I have inferred from their commentaries, some of these definitions are from my Mishlei rebbi, and some are the result of my own Mishleic knowledge and intuition (which I have been cultivating over the past 16 years of uninterrupted Mishlei learning). 

Likewise, the arrangement of these Mishleic personalities on a spectrum is the result of my own analysis, synthesized from a number of different meforshim. There is no unanimous agreement as to where each personality falls out on the spectrum. For example, some (like myself) view the tzadik as a further development of the yashar; others flip the two. 

I have chosen not to cite any sources for these definitions, since this would be a herculean task which I am not up to at the moment. Instead, I will now identify my "go to" meforshim from which these definitions were drawn. The five meforshim I used the most, in order, are: Meiri, Rabbeinu Yonah, Saadia Gaon, Metzudas David,  and Ralbag. These are the five meforshim who, along with my Mishlei rebbi, gave me a derech (method) of Mishlei, and have shaped my development of my own derech.

Color Code

I've decided to color-code the labels in my spectrum, to add a layer of clarity:



Without further ado, here are sixteen Mishleic personalities - presented in the most suitable conceptual order. 

A Glossary of Mishleic Personalities

Primary Mishleic Personalities: these are the ones I focus on in my introductory Mishlei classes, since they are the most basic; all other personalities are subdivisions within these. 

1. נער - Naar ("Youth"): the average person who hasn't learned Mishlei. The term "youth" isn't a reference to age, but to wisdom - just as the Torah uses zakein ("elder") in reference to someone who has acquired much wisdom, regardless of his age. The naar has had enough life experience to form his own views, personality, and habits, but for the most part, he has no major flaws which stand in the way of Mishlei learning and Mishleic development. The naar is one of the audience members for whom Shlomo ha'Melech intended his book, as it is stated: "to [provide] the naar with knowledge and intelligent planning" (Mishlei 1:4).

2. חכם - Chacham ("Wise Person"): one who makes decisions based on long-term consequences. Chazal express this definition in the dictum: "Who is a chacham? One who sees the consequences [of his decisions]" (Tamid 32a). The chacham wants to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. He realizes that in order to do this, he must make decisions using his intellect and not just act based on his feelings and whims. When faced with a decision the chacham will weigh the long-term benefits/pleasures against the short-term pain/harm, and the long-term painful/harmful consequences against the short term pleasures/benefits. Shlomo ha'Melech also intended Mishlei to be learned by chachamim, who are still developing in their chochmah towards becoming tzadikim, as it is stated: "the chacham will hear [the words of Mishlei] and increase his learning" (Mishlei 1:4).

3. אויל - Eveel ("Foolish Person"): one who seeks immediate gratification. The eveel is the opposite of the chacham. He is so caught up in his single-minded pursuit of immediate gratification that he will choose short-term pleasure/benefit even if this brings about long-term pain/harm, and he will forego long-term pleasure/benefit if the price is short-term pain/harm. This severely limits the perspective of the eveel, restricting his view of reality to a superficial level. Although it might be possible to reach the eveel through Mishlei, this is an uphill battle. For this reason, the eveel is not included in Shlomo ha'Melech's intended readership.

NOTE: Mishleic fools (i.e. eveel, ksil, pesi, arum, etc.) should NOT be thought of as "stupid" in the sense of having a low IQ, nor should they be thought of as bumbling imbeciles. In Mishlei "foolishness" refers to a flawed pattern/habit of decision-making - not a lack of intelligence. It is possible to be extremely smart but still be classified as a "fool" according to Mishlei. 

4. כסיל - Ksil ("Fool"): one who is addicted to immediate gratification to the extent that he unconsciously expects reality to align itself with his desires. The ksil is similar to the eveel in his superficial outlook on reality and his focus on immediate gratification - so similar, in fact, that many of the meforshim seem to regard the two terms as synonyms. But to my mind, there is one important difference: the ksil has an arrogance which the eveel lacks. The eveel's resistance to chochmah stems from his dim recognition that chochmah threatens his mindless pursuit of immediate gratification. In contrast, the ksil is attached to a worldview with himself at the center; his resistance to chochmah stems from his vested interest in this egocentric worldview. Unlike the chacham, who recognizes that he must align himself with reality to get what he wants, the ksil expects reality to yield to his will. The difference between the eveel and the ksil might seem minor, but it is this modicum of arrogance which allows the ksil to develop into something worse (i.e. leftward on the Mishleic spectrum), whereas the eveel will usually remain locked in place. Furthermore, the ksil displays a degree of stubbornness and close-mindedness which the eveel lacks. To use an analogy: if chochmah is the father, the eveel is the kid being dragged to the school bus kicking and screaming, whereas the ksil is the kid with crossed arms and an angry face who has firmly planted himself behind the locked doors of his bedroom.

5. צדיק - Tzadik ("Righteous Person" or "Person of Justice"): one who makes decisions based on the good of the system, as a whole, of which he is a part. The tzadik may be thought of as "the finished product" of the Mishlei Program. Like the chacham, the tzadik thinks long-term, but whereas the chacham's long-term thinking is linear - and therefore, limited - the tzadik's is systemic. For those who think visually, perhaps this diagram will clarify what I mean by "linear" vs. "systemic":

Here is the explanation of this diagram:

  • The perspective of the eveel is limited in two ways: (a) his thinking is extremely short-term, and (b) when he does think ahead, he can only think in a linear fashion ("If I do A, then B will happen.") 
  • The perspective of the chacham is broader: (a) his thinking is long-term, but (b) it is also limited to a linear perspective.
  • The perspective of the tzadik is even broader than that: (a) his thinking is long-term, but extends beyond the long-term thinking of the chacham because (b) he thinks systemically ("If I do A, this will have an impact on the entire system, which will bring about B, C, D, etc."). 
To further clarify, here are three examples to illustrate the differences between the decision-making of an eveel, a chacham, and a tzadik.

SCENARIO #1: LOST OBJECT
  • When an eveel encounters a lost object, he will either take it for himself, if he wants it (seeking of short-term pleasure), or he will leave it there and move on if he doesn't want it (avoidance of short-term pain).
  • A chacham would make an effort (short-term pain) to return the lost object to its owner knowing that this might yield long-term benefits (e.g. a reward, goodwill, being owed a favor, increasing the likelihood that the owner of the lost object will look out for the chacham's lost objects, being viewed as an honest and caring person, etc.). 
  • A tzadik would also return the lost object; he is aware of the long-term benefits that motivated the chacham, but he will think beyond those benefits and consider how his action will impact the system of which he is a part. The tzadik knows that by returning this lost object, he will contributing to a society (e.g. school, workplace, neighborhood, etc.) in which people care about each other's possessions. Such a society is beneficial for all of its members - including the tzadik himself. For this reason, the tzadik - unlike the chacham - will return the lost object even if there is no chance of a direct personal benefit which will result from his efforts. He views the short-term cost of returning the lost object as an investment in the greater long-term benefits of shaping his society for the better.
SCENARIO #2: STEALING
  • An eveel will have no problem cheating or stealing. The prospect of immediate gain will overshadow the consequences that he might suffer as a result. He is likely to either not think about the possibility of getting caught, or hastily convince himself that he won't get caught.
  • A chacham will refrain from cheating and stealing. He knows that the consequences of getting caught far outweigh the short-term gains. He knows that even if he doesn't get caught this time, it will be extremely difficult to limit himself after stealing just one time. That initial crime will make it easier for him to rationalize stealing again, and again, and again. Eventually, he will get sloppy, or take too big of a risk, and he will get caught and suffer the consequences. Moreover, this will tarnish his reputation, which will make it even harder to make an honest profit in the future.
  • A tzadik will factor in all of the pros and cons considered by the chacham, but he will also think about how his actions will impact the system of which he is a part. For example, if he steals a pen from his colleague in the office, this might lead his colleague to feel that it is okay to do the same thing. Not only would this put his own pens in danger from being stolen by that colleague, but it would push the entire office one step closer to being a society in which people don't respect each other's ownership. This disregard for personal property might extend to other areas as well (e.g. failing to clean up after themselves in the cafeteria, not pulling their weight in shared responsibilities, not being willing to cover for each other in extenuating circumstances). This might seem like a slippery slope type argument, but the tzadik knows that this is how systems devolve: one self-centered decision at a time. "No snowflake in an avalanche ever feels responsible."
SCENARIO #3: EATING
  • An eveel will eat foods which yield short-term pleasure and will shun foods which would bring him short-term displeasure - even if these eating habits leads to harmful consequences in the long run (e.g. health problems, image problems, financial costs) and the withholding of long-term benefits (e.g. living longer, being able to enjoy old age, being able to continue eating the foods that he has become accustomed to enjoy).
  • A chacham will eat foods which yield long-term benefit/pleasure and enable him to avoid long-term pain/harm - exactly the opposite of the eveel.
  • A tzadik shares all of the chacham's motives, but his concern will extend beyond these personal, linear benefits to the entirety of system of which he is a part. For example, if he is a father in a household with a wife and kids, he will eat healthy for his own sake and for the sake of his family as well. Maintaining his long-term health will increase the chances of him being there for his family in the future. If he and his wife eat healthy, their kids will grow up eating healthy as well. Not only will they benefit from the diet itself, but they will have grown up with parents who regularly exercised self-control in the realm of the appetitive. Not only that, but if he and his wife eat healthy, and their kids eat healthy, then this increases the likelihood of healthy progeny all the way down the line. 
I hope the diagram and scenarios clarified these three terms. Back to the glossary.

6. חסיד - Chasid ("Pious Person"): one who goes beyond what is required. This definition is intentionally vague because it deals with a subject matter outside of Mishlei; its usage will differ based on the framework and context in which it is used. For example, in Tehilim the term "chasid" has to do with one's relationship to Hashem - going beyond what is required and acting in accordance with His design and His plan. In Pirkei Avos, the term "chasid" denotes lifnim mi'shuras ha'din (going "beyond the letter of the law") within the system of Taryag Mitzvos. In the Rambam's Hilchos Deos, the term "chasid" refers to an extra degree of vigilance and management in one's own ethical development. The common denominator is that a chasid's actions are characterized by chesed ("excess"), going beyond what is required. I only included the term in this glossary to show that it is barely dealt with in Mishlei. 

7. רשע - Rasha ("Evil Person"): one who seeks to impose his own system onto reality in order to achieve power and greatness. The rasha is the opposite of the tzadik. The tzadik strives to understand the system of which he is a part, and to facilitate the good of that system as a whole. In contrast, the rasha wishes to dominate others and to emerge on top as the greatest and most powerful being. He will do whatever it takes to force this design upon the existing circumstances. Since this is an artificial scheme, rooted in a fantasy-driven megalomania, it will inevitably clash with what is good for the other members of the system, and many people will be trampled and harmed in the rasha's rise to power. The rasha's personality is best exemplified by people like Paroh, Haman, and Hitler (shem reshaim yirkav) - all of whom sought to subjugate others in an attempt to reshape the world into a shrine for their own glory. Ultimately, the rasha is doomed to fail when his delusional master plan clashes with reality. For Paroh, this failure was brought about by Hashem; for Haman, it was orchestrated by Mordechai and Esther; for Hitler, it resulted from his overambitious attempts to extend his reign beyond what was possible (e.g. his failed attempt to invade the Soviet Union).

NOTE: For the most part, each term on the right-hand side of the spectrum builds upon, and includes, the qualities of the previous level. For example, the tzadik includes all the characteristics of the navon, who includes all the features of the chacham. But on the left-hand side of the spectrum, this isn't necessarily true. The ksil embodies all the qualities of the eveel, but the rasha doesn't share the features with either of them. In fact, in order to be a rasha, one must possess the long-term thinking of the chacham. Consider Hitler. He certainly wasn't an eveel or a ksil. Hitler needed to think long-term - and even forego immediate pleasure and endure immediate pain - in order to realize his ego-maniacal vision. The only area in which the rasha is a ksil is when it comes to the end-game. The rasha is blind to the fact that his grand vision is built upon a foundation of falsehood fueled by a denial of reality (i.e. refusal to acknowledge that he is a limited, finite particular within a natural system - not an omnipotent god-like ruler of a self-glorifying system of his own design).

Secondary Mishlei Personalities: these show up with near-equal frequency, but represent variations on - and transitional phases between - the basic personality types. 

8. פתי - Pesi ("Naive Simpleton"): one who is easily "seduced" (mispateh) by his own emotions. The pesi is extremely subject to external influences. The principle which drives his life may be summed up as follows: if it feels true then it is true, and if it feels good then it is good; likewise it feels bad then it is bad, and if it feels false then it is false. The pesi shares qualities with the eveel and the naar. He resembles the eveel in that he views reality in a superficial way. He resembles the naar in that he can be positively influenced by Mishlei. The eveel and the ksil are "locked" into their flawed ways of thinking. The pesi, thanks to his malleable mind, can be guided towards the good by chachamim and tzadikim. For this reason, Shlomo ha'Melech included the pesi in his intended audience - something he didn't do for any other Mishleic fool - as it is stated: "to provide pesaim with cunning" (Mishlei 1:4).

9. ערום - Arum ("Cunning Person"): one who has a working knowledge of how emotions influence decision-making. You'll notice that the arum appears in two places on the spectrum: slightly to the right of the naar (on "the good side") and on the borderline of the group of the evildoers (on "the bad side"). The reason for this is simple: the arum's cunning (i.e. his working knowledge of the psyche and its capacity to influence behavior) is a tremendous gift which can aid his development into a chacham or be used in the pursuit of foolish or wicked ends. The arum has a leg up over the naar because he is keenly aware of how much his own thinking might be influenced by his emotions; if he is wise, this will give him pause in his decision-making - and if he makes this into a habit, then he will be well on his way to becoming a chacham. On the other hand, the arum is also in the perfect position to manipulate others for sinister purposes - as the Torah itself states, "The snake was more cunning than all the other beasts of the field" (Bereishis 3:1). This type of cunning is a valuable tool in the rasha's arsenal, and is essential for his success. In short, the arum is a potential chacham and a potential rasha.

10. נבון - Navon ("Understanding Person"): an abstract thinker (i.e. one who can inductively derive new universal principles from particulars and deductively apply universals to new particulars). This is one of the few definitions which all of the meforshim agree upon. The question is: How does he fit into this spectrum? I'm not entirely clear on that point. Descriptively, the navon represents the transitional stage between the chacham and the tzadik. The chacham must be able to do more than see the long-term consequences of a particular decision. He must be able to uncover universal principles of decision-making from his day-to-day situations, which will allow him to expand his chochmah to new scenarios. Abstract thinking is also necessary to break out of the linear thinking of the chacham and to view things systemically like the tzadik. The navon is also mentioned as a primary audience of Mishlei, as it is stated: "[through Mishlei] a navon will acquire strategies" (Mishlei 1:4).

11. לץ - Leitz ("Scoffer"): an egotistical person who is malicious in speech (but not in action). This definition comes directly from a pasuk in Mishlei: "The arrogant malicious one - 'leitz' is his name" (21:24). The leitz has a massively inflated ego which stems from a deep-seated feeling of deficiency and inferiority. Instead of dealing with his flaws through chochmah, he denies his imperfections and degrades others to artificially boost his self-esteem. His self-confidence is so low that he doesn't even take proactive measures to boost his own standing, but instead takes the cowardly approach of speaking rechilus (gossip), lashon ha'ra (negative speech), and hotzaas shem ra (slander) behind people's backs. The leitz is the school bully - not the one that beats kids up and steals their lunch money, but the one who cuts them with hurtful words and makes fun of them in public. The best and worst thing about the leitz is that he is all talk, and no action. This is good in the sense that one don't have to worry about him causing physical damage to oneself or to one's possessions. This is bad in that the leitz can cause a LOT of harm through speech.

Tertiary Mishleic Personalities: these don't appear too often, and this isn't an exhaustive list. Like the secondary personalities, they are variations on the basic types, or transitional phases between developmental milestones.

12. תם - Tam ("Evenly Keeled Person"): one who has no extreme emotions pulling him in either direction. The tam is a "beginning personality" like the naar, but has a huge advantage over the latter. In all probability, the naar is likely to be a mixed bag. While he doesn't have any outstanding flaws in his way of operating (like the eveel and the ksil), he is bound to have certain weaknesses and deficiencies in his middos/personality. He might have a short temper, or be prone to jealously, or have problem managing his money, or be overly timid or overly reckless, or overly competitive or not competitive enough, etc. In contrast, the tam is balanced. His emotions are fluid, and provide little to no resistance. If the situation calls for him to save money, he'll be able to do it. If the situation calls for him to spend money, he will spend it without any conflict. If he needs to be self-assertive, he'll be self-assertive. If he needs to remain in the background, this will not cause him any conflict. Although it is possible to become a tam through the proper training, some people are fortunate to naturally be tamim. We all know certain individuals who are calm, cool, and collected, and don't seem to be disturbed or agitated by anything. Chances are that such an individual is a natural tam. The next step for such a person is to learn how to think like a chacham, which will be much easier for him to do without personality-obstacles and emotional resistances. 

13. ישר - Yashar/Yosher ("Upright" Person): one whose inclinations and intuition draw him towards tzedek (what is good for the system), but without a working understanding of the system. Out of the sixteen terms on this chart, this is the one I understand the least. Descriptively, this is a navon on his way to becoming a tzadik. He frequently makes the same decisions that a tzadik would make, but not in the systematic manner of the tzadik. The tzadik consciously does what is best for the system, with forethought and full understanding. The yashar intuitively acts this way, but he hasn't taken that final developmental step to make tzedek his modus operandi. 

14. עצל - Atzel ("Lazy Person"): one who compulsively attempts to avoid all immediate pain and conflict. Like the eveel, the atzel is locked into the superficial world of immediate pain and pleasure. But unlike the eveel, who seeks immediate gratification above all, the atzel is paralyzed by the compulsive need to avoid immediate pain. In Scenario #1 (about the lost object), the atzel will usually just leave the object where it is, since it's too much work to take it. In Scenario #2 (about stealing) the atzel wouldn't steal in a proactive effort to increase profits, but he might steal if it helps him to avoid work or conflict. In Scenario #3 (about food) the atzel won't necessarily go for the most pleasurable food; he'll just eat whatever takes the least effort, even if he doesn't really like it as much.

15. בוגד - Bogeid ("Traitor" or "the Mishleic Jerk"): one who repays good with bad and impulsively "lashes out" at reality when things don't go his way. This is also a difficult personality to understand. In a sense, the bogeid is as the opposite of the yashar. The yashar's intuition is in line with reality (i.e. tzedek, or "the system"), but the bogeid's intuition routinely brings him in conflict with reality. In the social realm he has no intuitive sense of justice or basic decency, and will act like a jerk even to those who benefit him and treat him kindly. Deep down, he has an anthropomorphic view of reality (i.e. he relates to reality as though it were a person); consequently, he takes reality personally, and will vent his frustration by complaining and acting out when he feels "victimized." Both the bogeid and the ksil have a strong sense of entitlement, but whereas the ksil's sense of entitlement causes him to walk around with a false sense of security leading to proactive self-sabotage, the bogeid's sense of entitlement causes him to throw frequent tantrums and engage in reactive self-sabotage.

16. בליעל - Bliyaal ("Lawless Person"): one who cannot tolerate being subjugated to any authority. The word bliyaal is a compound of bli (without) + ole (yoke). The essence of his personality is that he does not want to feel controlled, ruled, or dominated by anyone. He is anti-authoritarian - not in a philosophical way, but in a "wild animal" or "stubborn child" way. Like the bogeid, the bliyaal has an anthropomorphic view of reality, to the extent that when reality "obligates" him to do something, he rebels. For example, he won't plant his field during the planting season because he unconsciously feels: "How DARE they make me plant! Nobody is gonna tell ME what to do!" Like the leitz, the bliyaal derives enjoyment from causing destruction and harm - not because he shares the leitz's sadism and malice, but because wreaking havoc in this manner makes him feel independent and unrestrained. The only authority to whom the bliyaal will pledge his loyalty is the rasha, so long as the rasha gives him an outlet for his lawlessness. It is for this reason that you will see examples of bliyaal in the second tier of criminal hierarchies (e.g. mafia strongmen, gang members who do the dirty work for gang leaders, Nazis who were given outlets for their sadism by being assigned positions of authority in concentration camps).

Conclusion (for Now)

I repeat: these definitions are not authoritative, nor are they set in stone. These are working definitions intended to aid the beginning in learning Mishlei until he or she forms his or her own understanding.

There are more personalities in Mishlei that I haven't even touched upon here: the ish mezimos ("scheming person"), the meivin ("discerning person"), the ben meivish ("embarrassing son"), the charutz ("diligent person"), the ish chamas ("violent person"), the chasar lev ("one who lacks an understanding mind"), and more. Perhaps I will define these in the next edition of the Mishleic Glossary.

For now, I hope you find this guide to be useful in your own Mishlei learning! 

Monday, July 4, 2016

Descartes' Take on Diversity



Descartes' Take on Diversity

A good friend of mine is currently traveling in East Asia. He made the following observation to me in an email:
As a generality, travelers are the nicest and friendliest people you come across. But once you talk to them, you see that niceness express itself in a standard of no judgement or pursuit of objective truth. In the traveler's culture, everyone's views are equally valid and interesting. Questioning it is rude. No one is interested in pursuing the truth. 
This reminded me of some thoughts I had on the topic of diversity, which - apparently - I had never expressed in a blog post. 

"Diversity" has become an increasingly popular value in the post-modern age. This has its pros and cons. The major benefit that a society which values diversity lends itself to the mentality of, "Eizehu chacham? ha'lomed mi'kol adam - Who is wise? He who learns from everyone" (Avos 4:1). More exposure to diverse ideas and values yields more opportunities for learning new ideas. 

However, Western society's embrace of diversity has also lent strength to the trends of pluralismsubjectivism, moral equivalency, and the like. There are many people who feel that tolerating all views necessitates accepting all views as equally valid. Knowing the regular readers of this blog, I'm sure I don't think I have to elaborate on the falsity of that epistemological stance. Suffice it to say, this is an ugly side effect.

Years ago I started reading Descartes' Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Science. I came across a short excerpt which put a different spin on the value of diversity. Descartes writes about the value of travel, saying:
It is useful to know something of the manners of different nations, that we may be enabled to form a more correct judgment regarding our own, and be prevented from thinking that everything contrary to our customs is ridiculous and irrational, a conclusion usually come to by those whose experience has been limited to their own country.
In other words, we tend to have a supreme confidence in the correctness of our own customs and cultural mores. By default, we view the ways of others as "ridiculous and irrational." Descartes is pointing out that by exposing ourselves to different people from different cultures, we will come to realize that they have exactly the same degree of confidence in the correctness of their lifestyle as we do in ours. This, in turn, will bring us to the realization that this entire feeling of correctness is totally subjective, and provides absolutely no indication about objective truth.

Now, a subjectivist would use this as a jumping-off point to say, "See? We're ALL deluding ourselves! Nobody really knows what's going on!" But Descartes took the opposite approach, saying that this realization of our own self-delusion will "[enable us] to form a more correct judgment regarding our own [way of life]." The first step in clearing away the sanctimonious haze that surrounds us to become aware of it, and a good way to become aware of it is to recognize it in others.

To sum up the main point: not only can diversity help us to learn from others who are right, but it can also help us to appreciate just how many people think they're right about their derech in life, but are actually wrong; hopefully, this will help us to spot this same way of thinking in ourselves, and better enable us to correct our mistaken ways of thinking.

Thursday, July 23, 2015

Mishlei 13:1 - Listening to Authority

משלי יג:א
בֵּן חָכָם מוּסַר אָב וְלֵץ לֹא שָׁמַע גְּעָרָה:

Mishlei 13:1

A wise son [listens to] the discipline of his father, but a scoffer does not listen to rebuke.

Questions / Difficulties
  1. Why does the pasuk emphasize the ben chacham (wise son) listening to the discipline of his father, specifically? Wouldn't the ben chacham listen to discipline from anyone? Moreover the second half of the pasuk talks about how the leitz (scoffer) reacts to any rebuke - not just the rebuke of his father. Why the asymmetry?
  2. Why does the pasuk have to tell us that the leitz doesn't listen to rebuke? This is part of his very definition! There are many pesukim in Mishlei which highlight this quality of the leitz: "One who chastises the leitz acquires shame for himself" (Mishlei 9:7), "Do not rebuke a leitz, lest he hate you" (ibid 9:8), "A leitz does not like being reproved; he will not go to the wise" (ibid. 15:12), and more. What does our pasuk add? 
  3. Why does the pasuk us the word "gaarah" for rebuke? Usually I'm not bothered by such nuances in the words, but in this case, it's strange. Ordinarily, Mishlei would use more conventional terms, like "tochahah" or "mussar" or even "eitzah." The weird thing about the word "gaarah" is that it means "rebuke" but it also means "shouting" or "shrieking." What does this mean? 

Four-sentence Summary of the Main Idea
All human beings harbor a certain degree of resistance to authority. The ben chacham is able to rise above this resistance even when being disciplined by his father - the supreme psychological authority - and learn from what he has to offer. In contrast, the leitz's psychological resistance is so pronounced that he hears all rebuke as if the rebuker is yelling at him; consequently, his mind will be completely closed to criticism. The only way to get through to the leitz is to bypass his psychological resistance and get him to see the consequences of his actions with his own mind; as long as these consequences are framed in practical terms rather than superego terms (e.g. "bad" "sinful" "evil"), there is at least a remote possibility that he will listen.