Leo Tolstoy, Eishes Chayil, and Caring What Others Think

This week's Torah content has been sponsored by Naomi Mann in honor of Rabbi Moskowitz zt"l, whose shloshim is this week.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this article, and click here for an audio version.

Leo and Sophia Tolstoy

Leo Tolstoy, Eishes Chayil, and Caring What Others Think

The following quotation is attributed to Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy: "If you care too much about being praised, in the end you will not accomplish anything serious ... Let the judgments of others be the consequence of your deeds, not their purpose.” This advice bears a striking resemblance to the final pasuk of Eishes Chayil at the conclusion of Sefer Mishlei. Here is that pasuk in context:

Her children arise and laud her; her husband, and he praises her, [saying]: “Many daughters have been successful, but you surpass them all.” Popularity is false and beauty is fleeting, but a woman who fears Hashem, she should be praised. Give her of the fruit of her hands, and let her actions praise her in the gates. (Mishlei 31:28-31)

Shlomo ha’Melech’s “give her of the fruit of her hands, and let her actions praise her in the gates” corresponds precisely to Tolstoy’s “Let the judgments of others be the consequence of your deeds.”

There are people who are obsessed with what others think. These are the people who, in Tolstoy’s words, “Let the judgments of others be … their purpose.” These are the same people whom Shlomo ha’Melech warns about the falsehood of popularity and the temporary nature of beauty. There are other people who have reached such a high level that they don’t care at all what people think. They are the ones whom the Rambam characterizes as “serving Hashem out of love,” who “act in line with truth because it is true” (Rambam, Laws of Teshuvah 10:2). They are neither elated by praise nor are they distraught by disapproval.

Tolstoy and Shlomo are both allowing their audience to care about what people think, provided they do so in a healthier way. This is why Tolstoy warns against “[caring] too much about being praised,” and permits his audience to attend to the judgments of others, as long as those judgments aren’t the purpose of their actions. Likewise, Shlomo is talking to a woman who values praise, and whose children and husband regularly praise her. He merely warns her not to fall for the criteria of praise held by most women, but instead, to value being praised as God-fearing (i.e. one who acts based on wisdom), allowing the long-term benefits of her actions to speak for themselves rather than clamoring for approbation in the present.

This is a realistic approach. Caring too much about praise is guaranteed to end in disaster but attempting to quit one’s addiction to praise “cold turkey” is equally foolhardy. As social animals, we are hardwired to care what others think. Any attempt to override this by sheer force of will is bound to backfire. The transition to lishmah (doing what is good for its own sake) must come about gradually and organically. The trick is to find middle-ground strategies to facilitate that transition. Another excellent example of this can be seen in the words of Socrates to his student, Crito, who was concerned with his own reputation:

But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the many? … We must not regard what the many say of us: but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error when you advise that we should regard the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable.

Socrates doesn’t tell Crito, “You shouldn’t care what anyone thinks!” nor does he say, “Just do what’s right and ignore everything else!” Instead, he invites Crito to imagine truth, goodness, and justice in the form of an actual person’s opinion – a “man who has understanding of just and unjust” – and urges him to care about what that person would say. The Torah accomplishes the same thing by personifying Hashem and urging us to care about how we appear in His eyes rather than in the eyes of man. Such is the way of Torah: not to quash the yetzer ha’ra (evil inclination), but to channel it and direct it towards a higher end.

___________________________________________________________________________________

If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast", "The Stoic Jew" Podcast, "Rambam Bekius" Podcast, "Machshavah Lab" Podcast, "The Tefilah Podcast"  

The Madness of Lishmah

Today’s Torah content is sponsored by Avygayl Zucker in honor of the 90th birthday of her grandfather, Yedidyah Halimi, whose dedication to Torah and mitzvos continues to be an inspiration. May Hashem grant him many more years of health and happiness!

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this article, and click here for an audio version.

Artwork: Infuriate, by Benjamin Ee

The Madness of Lishmah

From time to time, I am asked whether I have any interest in pursuing a PhD, an Ed. D, or any other professional achievements beyond simply teaching. The earliest conversation of this nature I can remember took place years ago, while I was still learning in yeshiva and hadn’t even started grad school yet. I was speaking with a highly successful professional who also happened to have the credentials of a professional philosopher. He asked me what I was up to, and I said, “I’m learning in yeshiva and earning my bachelor’s degree in psychology.” He asked, “To what end?” I said, “The only reason I’m getting a bachelor’s degree is so that I can apply to grad school.” He asked, “To what end?” I said, “I’m only getting a master’s degree in Jewish Education because I’ve been told it’s necessary to get a good job as a high school teacher. I just want to teach high school.” He asked, “To what end?” I repeated my answer: “I just want to teach high school.” “Nothing more?” “Nothing more.” He then shot me a look of horrified disbelief, which he followed with a rather audacious question. I don’t remember his words, but his sentiment was something like, “And you’re just going to let all of that intelligence go to waste?” Clearly, this man and I differed in our views about learning and teaching.

This weekend I read a poem by Rumi entitled, The Sheikh Who Played With Children, which reminded me of that conversation. The poem opens with a young seeker looking for wisdom: “I need to find a wise person. I have a problem.” A bystander says, “There’s no one with intelligence in our town except that man over there playing with the children, the one riding the stick-horse. He has a keen, fiery insight and vast dignity like the night sky, but he conceals it in the madness of child’s play.” (I was amused by the parallels to Rav Chaim Soloveitchik – a real-life genius who was also known for playing horsey with the local schoolchildren.) The young man approaches the sheikh and presses him for relationship advice, which he reluctantly gives. As the sheikh is about to gallop away, the seeker asks him about the life he has chosen: "What is this playing that you do? Why do you hide your intelligence so?" The sheikh responds:

"The people here want to put me in charge. They want me to be judge, magistrate, and interpreter of all the texts. The knowing I have doesn't want that. It wants to enjoy itself. I am a plantation of sugarcane, and at the same time I'm eating the sweetness."

Knowledge that is acquired is not like this. Those who have it worry if audiences like it or not. It's a bait for popularity. Disputational knowing wants customers. It has no soul. Robust and energetic before a responsive crowd, it slumps when no one is there. The only real customer is God.

Chew quietly your sweet sugarcane God-Love, and stay playfully childish.

Your face will turn rosy with illumination like the redbud flowers.

In his introduction to Perek Chelek the Rambam says about learning lishmah (lit. “for its own sake”): “ein tachlis ha’emes ela l’daas she’hu emes – the only purpose of the truth is to know that it is true.” Rambam mentions that most people will not be able to grasp the concept of lishmah. To them, learning is only a means to other ends. They cannot grasp what it means to seek knowledge for its own sake. They view any pursuit of something as an end in and of itself as foolish. They will never stop asking, “To what end?”

Perhaps this is why Rumi depicted the true sage in this manner. In the eyes of the world, those who learn lishmah appear as mad as a sheikh playing horsey.

___________________________________________________________________________________

If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you. 

If you would like to sponsor an article, shiur, or podcast episode, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone. 

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast", "The Stoic Jew" Podcast, "Rambam Bekius" Podcast, "Machshavah Lab" Podcast, "The Tefilah Podcast"  For the full guide to all of my Torah content, click here. 

Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife?

This week’s dvar Torah is a digest of the answers given by the Rishonim [1] to a classic question, along with an original answer based on my understanding of Sefer Koheles. 

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Honor's Reward, by Izzy

Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife? 

The Question 

Parashas Bechukosai opens with a list of the blessings that Hashem promises to bestow “If you will follow My decrees and observe My commandments and perform them” (Vayikra 26:3). Among these blessings are: rain in its proper time, abundant produce, peace in the land, military success, flourishing of our population, and Divine favor. A similar list of blessings is stated in Parashas Ki Savo (Devarim 28:1-14). 

But there is a shocking omission from both lists of blessings: Olam ha’Ba (the “World to Come” or “afterlife”), the ultimate reward for a life of Torah and mitzvos. 

This is a famous problem. Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? In contrast, the Oral Torah and midrashic literature are replete with references to Olam ha’Ba, the most prominent of which is the Mishnah’s statement: “All of Israel has a portion in Olam ha’Ba” (Sanhedrim 10:1). 

This discrepancy between the Written and Oral Torahs has led modern academics to conclude that the entire notion of an afterlife was a Rabbinic invention, introduced long after the Biblical period. Those who wish to believe such conspiracy theories will not be convinced by any arguments, and I will not even attempt to address them here. Suffice it to say, our Mesorah (tradition) is clear on this point: belief in Olam ha’Ba has always been a unanimously accepted part of Judaism, despite the fact that it is not explicitly referenced in the 24 books of Tanach. 

But the question remains: Why does the Written Torah omit Olam ha’Ba from its lists of rewards? Why does it focus exclusively on the physical blessings? 

Seven Answers from the Rishonim 

The Abravanel [2] raises our question in his Chumash commentary and refers the reader to a book he wrote on the topic of Olam ha’Ba called Tzedek Olamim, in which he answers this question in full. Sadly, this book has been lost to history. Fortunately, the Abravanel provides a brief summary of six answers given to our question by his predecessors, followed by his own seventh answer. Here are my summaries of the Abravanel’s summaries: 

(1) Rambam [3]: The blessings and curses promised in the Torah are not the true reward and punishment for the mitzvos. The true reward is Olam ha’Ba, which is purely spiritual in nature. The reason why the Written Torah didn’t mention this reward is so that a person will follow Torah lishmah (for its own sake) – or, as the Abravanel puts it, “for the sake of perfection” – rather than for the sake of reward or out of fear of punishment. The role of the blessings and curses is to facilitate our pursuit of human perfection for its own sake: to the extent that we follow Hashem, He will provide us with physical goods and remove physical impediments from our lives so that we can continue in our pursuit of perfection without worrying about our material well-being; and to the extent that we neglect His will, He will withhold His blessings and we will be subject to these curses which will impede our pursuit of perfection. 

(2) Ibn Ezra [4]: The reward in Olam ha’Ba is a deep concept which is difficult for the average person to grasp. Since the Written Torah was given to the entire Jewish nation – not just the elite scholars – it was necessary to only mention the physical rewards and punishments, which can be understood by everyone. The sode (“secret” or esoteric concept) of Olam ha’Ba was relegated to the realm of the Oral Torah, thereby allowing every teacher to assess their student’s readiness for this concept on an individual basis, in accordance with that student’s level of development. 

(3) Ramban [5] / Sefer ha’Chinuch [6]: Belief in the eternality of the soul and its reward in Olam ha’Ba is a matter that can be rationally demonstrated by way of philosophical argument, and therefore did not need to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. In contrast, the blessings and curses are miraculous [7] phenomena which operate according to the principles of hashgachah (Divine providence) known only through nevuah (prophecy), which is why it was necessary for the Torah to spell them out in detail. 

(4) Ran [8] / Kuzari [9]: The majority of the people, in ancient and modern times, denied the reality of hashgachah pratis (individual Divine providence). This denial was rampant among the Jews as well. Were the Torah to only promise spiritual reward and punishment after death, then these misguided Jews would take this as a confirmation of their deistic worldview. Therefore, it was necessary for the Torah to reinforce the truth of hasghacha pratis by going into great detail about the physical blessings and curses that will transpire as a result of our adherence to Torah. As for the reality of the spiritual reward and punishment for the soul in Olam ha’Ba: this can be inferred from the physical blessings and curses in Olam ha’Zeh (the physical world). Once we see that God provides us with physical rewards, which relate to the lower part of our nature (i.e. the body), we will realize that certainly He must provide us with spiritual reward, to compensate the higher part of our nature (i.e. the soul). 

(5) Saadia Gaon [10]: The ovdei avodah zarah (idolaters) engaged in various behaviors which they believed would bring them material success and protection from physical harm. When Hashem prohibited these idolatrous practices, He didn’t want His people to think that they would lose out on these material benefits. Therefore, He promised us as part of His covenant that by keeping the Torah, we would enjoy rewards in the physical world greater than anything that the ovdei avodah zarah hoped for from their false gods, since Hashem is the true God of heaven and earth, Who has the ability to bestow such blessings as He sees fit. There was no need to mention spiritual rewards, since the promises of physical rewards were only included in the covenant to refute the false promise of physical blessings by the ovdei avodah zarah. (Apparently, the ovdei avodah zarah of that era did not yearn for spiritual rewards, which is why there was no need to mention them in the covenant.) 

(6) Kuzari [11] / Ran [12]: The afterlife of the soul is explicitly mentioned in the blessings promised by the Torah in such statements as: “I [Hashem] will walk among you” (Vayikra 26:12), “I will place My dwelling among you” (ibid. 26:11), “I will be God unto you” (ibid. 26:12). [The Abravanel then goes on to explain how, if the nature of this spiritual reward is properly understood, then even the promises of physical blessings will serve as a proof that the souls of the righteous will survive after death. However, I’m not 100% sure that I follow every step of his explanation, and I would rather omit it from my summary than risk misrepresenting this line of reasoning.] 

(7) Abravanel [13]: It would not be proper to mention Olam ha’Ba in the context of Bechukosai and Ki Savo, since these blessings are for the nation as a whole rather than for individuals, whereas the spiritual rewards of the afterlife are for individuals and not for the nation as a whole. If the Torah had mentioned Olam ha’Ba in its lists of blessings, this might lead to misconceptions about the nature of the reward in the afterlife. For example, one might mistakenly conclude that one’s portion in Olam ha’Ba is determined or affected by the righteousness and wickedness of the majority of nation, as is the case with the physical blessings and curses. 

An Eighth Answer 

Shlomo ha'Melech says: “Give a portion to seven but also to eight” (Koheles 11:2). While the seven of the aforementioned answers all have their merits, I would like to offer an eighth answer – one which lines up with that of the Rambam, but with a twist. 

The Rambam [14] devotes the final chapter of Hilchos Teshuvah to a discussion of the motives for serving Hashem. He opens his discussion by defining two levels of Divine service: 

A person should not say, “I will do the mitzvos of the Torah and involve myself in its wisdom in order to receive all of the blessings that are written in it,” or “in order that I will merit life in Olam ha’Ba” and “I will separate myself from the transgressions about which the Torah warns us, in order to escape from the curses written in the Torah” or “so that I will not be cut off from Olam ha’Ba.”  

It is not proper to serve Hashem in this manner, for one who serves Hashem in this manner is called “oveid mi’yirah” (“one who serves out of fear”). This is neither a virtue of the prophets nor of the wise. The only ones who should serve Hashem in this manner are the ignoramuses, the women, and the children, whom we train to serve out of fear until their minds develop and they serve out of love.  

An “oveid me’ahavah” (“one who serves out of love”) involves himself in Torah and mitzvos and walks on the paths of wisdom not because of anything in the world, neither out of fear of the bad nor out of a desire to inherit the good. Rather, he does what is true because it is true, and the good will come of its own accord … 

It is easy to understand why doing mitzvos in order to receive the blessings promised by the Torah is considered to be an inferior motive, but why should this apply to one whose service is motivated by the prospect of reward in Olam ha’Ba? Didn’t the Rambam write earlier [15] that Olam ha’Ba is the greatest good? 

The [ultimate] goodness which is hidden away for tzadikim is Olam ha’Ba. This is the life which has no death with it, and the good which has no bad. This is what is written in the Torah, “so that it will be good for you, and you will prolong your days” (Devarim 22:7). From the Oral Torah we learn: “so that it will be good for you” [refers] to the world which is entirely good, and “you will prolong your days” [refers] to the world which is entirely long – and this is Olam ha’Ba. 

If Olam ha’Ba is the ultimate good, why shouldn’t it motivate our observance of mitzvos? 

The answer lies in the fact that it is impossible for us to comprehend the true nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba. The Rambam [16] introduces this difficulty in his introduction to Perek Chelek. He writes: 

Know that just as a blind man cannot experience colors, nor can a deaf man experience sounds, nor can a eunuch [experience] sexual desire, so too, physical bodies cannot experience spiritual enjoyments. And just as a fish does not recognize the element of fire because it (i.e. the fish) is immersed in its opposite, so too, one cannot know the enjoyments of the spiritual world while one is in this physical world, for we have no enjoyment other than bodily enjoyments alone – [such as] the experiences of our senses in eating, drinking, and sex – and everything outside of these [physical enjoyments] is not experienced by us, nor can we recognize it, nor can we apprehend it in our initial analysis, but only after much investigation. This is because we are in a physical world and cannot apprehend anything other than its enjoyments, but enjoyments of the soul are constant and unceasing, and there is no relationship at all whatsoever between these and those. 

Similarly, the Rambam [17] writes in the Mishneh Torah: 

Regarding the great good which the soul will enjoy in Olam ha’Ba: there is no way in Olam ha’Zeh to comprehend it or know it, because we only know in Olam ha’Zeh the good of the body, and that is what we desire; but that good [in Olam ha’Ba] is exceedingly great, and there is no comparison among the goods of Olam ha’Zeh except by way of analogy. 

Indeed, a few paragraphs earlier the Rambam condemns those who harbor foolish notions about the nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba, writing: 

Maybe this good will seem trivial in your eyes, and you’ll imagine that the only reward for mitzvos and for being a person who is perfected in the ways of truth is to eat and drink good foods, have relations with beautiful figures, wear garments made of silk and woven fabrics, dwell in houses of marble, and use gold and silver utensils and other things like this – as is imagined by the foolish and idiotic Arabs who are steeped in lechery.

But the wise and those who possess knowledge know that all of these things are fantasy and nothingness, and there is no hope in them. They are only considered to be a great good for us in Olam ha’Zeh because we have bodies, and all of these things are bodily needs, and the soul only desires them and favors them because they are bodily needs, in order that its desires will be fulfilled and its health maintained. And when there is no body, all of these things will be found to be pointless. 

Having established all of these premises, I would like to propose my own answer to our original question: Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? Because since it is absolutely impossible to conceive of the spiritual enjoyments of Olam ha’Ba, then if we were to be motivated by the promise of such a reward, we would – by definition – be chasing a fantasy. In other words, whatever notion of Olam ha’Ba is driving our motivation must, of necessity, be false, since it is impossible for a physical being to conceive of non-physical enjoyments. 

It is for this reason that the Torah promises physical blessings to those who obey Hashem. The individual whose avodah (Divine service) is motivated by these physical blessings and the individual whose avodah is motivated by Olam ha’Ba are both engaged in avodah she’lo lishmah (not for its own sake), but the former individual is on a higher level because at least he’s being motivated by a reality, whereas the latter is being motivated by a fantasy. 

Make no mistake: Olam ha’Ba itself is a reality, but the version of Olam ha’Ba as a motivator is a fantasy. The vision of Olam ha’Ba in our minds and imaginations, to which our psyche attaches value, and which acts as the proverbial carrot (paired with the proverbial stick) – that notion of Olam ha’Ba has no basis in reality whatsoever. In contrast, “rains in their proper time,” “eating bread in satiety,” “peace in the land” and all of the other physical blessings exist as motivators in our imaginations which do correspond to their physical reality. 

This sheds light on the Divine wisdom in relegating Olam ha’Ba to the Oral Torah. In Hashem’s “Plan A” (so to speak), students would not be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba until they were developmentally ready, as the Rambam [18] describes: 

Therefore, when we teach the children, women, and general populace of laymen, we should only teach them to serve out of fear and in order to receive reward, until their minds mature and they gain additional wisdom; we should reveal this secret to them bit by bit, and accustom them to this concept with pleasantness, until they apprehend it and know it and serve out of love. 

Parents and teachers would motivate their children and students to serve Hashem for the she’lo lishmah motive of obtaining the blessings mentioned in the Written Torah. As they reached the requisite level of psychological and intellectual maturity, they would be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba, which would click into its proper intellectual place as a truth about reality, rather than as a motivator for avodah. In this manner, they would bypass the stage of being motivated by a fantasy notion of Olam ha’Ba altogether. 

Ultimately, we cannot know why Hashem chose not to mention Olam ha’Ba explicitly in His lists of rewards, but these eight theories allow us to appreciate the fact that this was done with reason, and with wisdom. 

[1] This is a general remark, but I might as well mention it here. The line between Rishonim and Achronim is a matter of debate. Some distinguish between the two periods based on dates (e.g. the Rishonim are those who wrote in the 11th century to the 15th century, and the Achronim are post-15th century) or by specifying a cutoff point (e.g. all commentators who came before the composition of the Shulchan Aruch were Rishonim, and all who came after are Achronim). Personally, I don’t like either of these approaches. I prefer to define the two groups by their time period AND their relationship to their predecessors and/or their style. For example, I classify the Abravanel (1437 – 1508) as a Rishon because he argues with his predecessors as a contemporary, rather than a disciple. I classify the Sforno (1475 – 1550) as a Rishon because of his commentary’s style and commentary. 

[2] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 26:3 

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1); Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 9 

[4] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer Devarim 32:39; it should be noted that the Ibn Ezra’s answer to this question parallels his answer to R’ Yehuda ha’Levi’s question on the first of the Aseres ha’Dibros: Why does Hashem introduce Himself to the Jewish people by saying “Who took you out from the land of Egypt” instead of “Who created the heavens and the earth”? See the Ibn Ezra’s long commentary on Shemos 20:2. 

[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 18:29 

[6] Sefer ha’Chinuch: Introduction. The Abravanel doesn’t actually quote the Sefer ha’Chinuch with reference to this view, but since it was the first place I encountered it in my own learning, and since the Sefer ha’Chinuch expands upon this view even more than the Ramban, I decided to attribute this view to him in my list. Moreover, the Abravanel attributes this view to “Rabbeinu Bachya ha’Zaken, as mentioned by the Ibn Ezra” but according to the Warsaw manuscript and H. Norman Strickman, the name mentioned by the Ibn Ezra is actually “Rabbeinu Hai.” This possible misattribution is yet another reason why I opted to label this under the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s name. 

[7] According to the Ramban, as the Abravanel himself points out. 

[8] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran #1 

[9] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi (Kuzari) 1:104-117 

[10] Rabbeinu Saadia Gaon, Emunos v’Deos 9:2 

[11] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi 1:115 

[12] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran, end of #3 

[13] The Abravanel credits the Ramban for this approach, based on the latter’s Commentary on Sefer Devarim 29:20; he also cites the Sefer ha’Ikkarim 4:40, chastising him for citing this answer in his own name rather than in the name of the Ramban. 

[14] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 10:1-2 

[15] ibid. 8:1 

[16] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1) 

[17] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 8:6 

[18] Ibid. 10:5

Lishmah and l'Kanter

This can be read as a standalone post, provided that you're familiar with the basic terminology of learning lishmah (for its own sake) and she'lo lishmah (not for its own sake), as explained by the Rambam in his Introduction to Perek Chelek. 

I'll also state a disclaimer here. The subject of lishmah and she'lo lishmah is both deep and broad. The topic is multifaceted, and there are many views within the Mesorah on each facet. The purpose of this post is to analyze one answer to one question - not to serve as a comprehensive overview of the entire subject.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Calculated Dismissal, by Karl Kopinski

Lishmah and l'Kanter

The Question

The Gemara in Pesachim 50b states:

Rava brought up a contradiction: "It is written: 'for Your mercy is great unto the heavens' (Tehilim 57:11) and it is [also] written: 'for Your mercy is great above the heavens' (ibid. 108:5). 

How [can this contradiction be resolved]? [The pasuk which describes His mercy as above the heavens] refers to those who act lishmah, [whereas the pasuk which describes His mercy as merely reaching the heavens] refers to those who act she'lo lishmah."  

[This teaching of Rava] accords with what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: "a person should always engage in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah, because mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah (from she'lo lishmah one will come to lishmah)."

According to the statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav, learning she'lo lishmah is praiseworthy, insofar as it brings a person to lishmah. The Gemara also implies that those who engage in Torah and mitzvos she'lo lishmah merit a high level of Divine mercy, albeit not quite as high as that attained by those who act lishmah.

Elsewhere, however, Chazal make other statements which imply that learning she'lo lishmah is undesirable. For example, the Gemara in Berachos 17a states:

Rava was wont to say: "The objective of wisdom is teshuvah and good deeds, that a person shouldn't read and learn yet spurn his father, and his mother, and his teacher, and one who is greater than he in wisdom and in number, as it is stated, 'the beginning of wisdom is fear of Hashem, a good intellect to all who do them' (Tehilim 111:10) - it is not stated 'to those who do' but rather it is stated 'to those who do them' - [that is,] to those who act lishmah, but not to those who act she'lo lishmah. And anyone who acts she'lo lishmah - it would be better if he hadn't been created.

Another statement which deprecates she'lo lishmah can be found in Taanis 7a:

It was taught in a braisa that R' Benaah would say: "Anyone who engages in Torah lishmah, it becomes an elixir of life for him, as it is stated: 'it is a tree of life to those who grasp it' (Mishlei 3:18), and it says: 'it shall be health to your navel' (ibid. 3:8), and it says: 'for whoever finds me finds life" (ibid. 8:35). And anyone who engages in Torah she'lo lishmah, it will be an elixir of death for him, as it is stated: 'My teaching shall drop [yaarof] like rain' (Devarim 32:2) and arifah means nothing other than killing, as it is stated: 'they shall break the heifer's neck (arefu) there in the valley' (Devarim 21:4)."

Perhaps the most shocking anti-she'lo lishmah statement can be found in Kallah Rabbasi 5:1:

Rebbi Akiva says: "Whoever studies she'lo lishmah, he would have been better off if he had been smothered by his afterbirth."

Broadly stated, the central question that emerges from these and similar sources is: How can Chazal's anti- she'lo lishmah statements be reconciled with their pro- she'lo lishmah statements? If those who learn she'lo lishmah are better off if they were never created, or if their Torah is an elixir of death, or if they should have been smothered by their afterbirth, then how can Chazal encourage us to engage in Torah and mitzvos she'lo lishmah and say that we will be the recipients of Hashem's mercy "unto the heavens"?

[Note: While it's true that aggadic (non-legal) statements were authored by different sages, and don't necessarily have to be reconciled, the commentators by and large seem to assume that these statements about lishmah and she'lo lishmah ought to be. Perhaps this is the assumption here because it would be strange for there to be a genuine disagreement on a topic that is so fundamental as this.]

Tosafos's Answer

Tosafos state their resolution to this difficulty in several places. Although there are nuanced differences between their different formulations of their answer, they mostly boil down to the same thing. I'll cite the most straightforward formulation, which can be found on Taanis 7a:

"and anyone who engages in Torah she'lo lishmah, it will be an elixir of death for him" - This is difficult, for don't we say that "a person should always be involved in Torah even though it's not lishmah because from she'lo lishmah one will come to lishmah"? 

The answer is that there are two types of she'lo lishmah. When we say "a person should always be involved in Torah even she'lo lishmah," this is referring to a case in which [he learns] in order to be called "rabbi" or so that people will honor him, but that which is stated here, [that] "anyone who is involved in Torah she'lo lishmah it becomes an elixir of death for him" - this refers to someone who learns l'kanter.

The term "l'kanter" is a bit tricky to translate. I usually translate it as "to counter" or "to be contrarian." Jastrow translates it as "to chide." I've also seen it translated as "to antagonize," "to provoke," "to break down," "to rebut," "to vanquish," and other similar terms. In their other statements of this answer, the Baalei Tosafos provide some additional clues. On Berachos 17a they use the phrase "l'kanter chaveirav" which implies that l'kanter is an act committed against someone else. On Pesachim 50b they say: "le'hisyaher (to be haughty), l'kanter (to counter), and le'kapeach (to overpower) his fellows in halacha."

Regardless of which translation we use, the general answer provided by Tosafos is clear: there are two types of she'lo lishmah. When Chazal endorse she'lo lishmah learning, they are referring to motives such as seeking honor and wanting to be called "rabbi," and when they speak against she'lo lishmah, they are referring to l'kanter.

Understanding Tosafos's Answer: Approach #1

The main question on Tosafos's answer is: What is the basis of this subdivision within she'lo lishmah? What makes l'kanter different from other she'lo lishmah motives?

The most common answer I've heard to this question is based on the reasoning Chazal used in their endorsement of learning she'lo lishmah. They said: "a person should always engage in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah, because from she'lo lishmah one will come to lishmah." If l'kanter doesn't fall into this category, then it must be because l'kanter does not bring a person to lishmah.

I have two problems with this approach. The first is that I don't understand why l'kanter cannot bring a person to lishmah. At the end of the day, learning l'kanter doesn't seem to be fundamentally different than learning l'kavod. Some people want the kavod of being called "rabbi," some want the kavod of being knowledgeable in every area of Torah, and the person who learns l'kanter wants the kavod of winning arguments. It's all kavod, and just as the child in the Rambam's parable will eventually "grow out of" his kavod motive and become attached to the learning itself, the same is true for the person who learns l'kanter. 

My second problem with this approach is that it's empirically false. I know a number of people whose initial attachment to learning was as a tool to break other people down - usually parents, teachers,  or community rabbis with whom they disagreed - and many of these individuals eventually came around to learning lishmah. Yes, it's possible to take any of my examples and argue that the individual in question wasn't really learning l'kanter, or that this person had other legitimate she'lo lishmah motives as well, but this type of apologetic navel-gazing quickly strays into the fallacious "no true Scotsman" territory. 

The only basis on which I might be open to accepting this understanding of Tosafos's answer is if l'kanter referred specifically to someone who engages in sophistry, fabrication of sources, intellectual dishonesty, or anything which involves a distortion of truth. The Sefer Chasidim (#294) seems to characterize l'kanter this way, speaking of "[one who learns] l'kanter and to provoke and looks to bring false proofs to undermine your words." If that is what l'kanter means, then I can see how it wouldn't lead to lishmah.

The problem is that I don't see any basis for positing that this is Tosafos's definition of l'kanter. I haven't seen any indications in Tosafos that their concept of l'kanter involves any form of intellectual malfeasance. If this were the essence of their definition of l'kanter, one would expect them to mention it, or at least hint at it. 

At the end of the day, the two aforementioned problems prevent me from accepting this approach to understanding Tosafos: (1) I haven't yet heard a convincing explanation of why l'kanter precludes lishmah, and (2) this distinction clashes with my experience. 

Understanding Tosafos's Answer: Approach #2

I asked our question to my Mishlei rebbi and he had a much more elegant - and, in my opinion, truer - answer. He explained that according to Tosafos, all she'lo lishmah learning leads to lishmah, but despite that, Chazal discouraged learning l'kanter because of its destructive effects. In other words, there is no difference between l'kanter and any other she'lo lishmah motive insofar as "mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah" is concerned. The only reason why Chazal singled out l'kanter (according to Tosafos) is because they wanted to voice their disapproval of forms of learning which lead to bad middos (personality traits) and cause strife in the Beis Midrash or in Klal Yisrael.

To clarify the difference between these two approaches, consider the following analogy. A music teacher makes two statements about the practicing piano: (1) "practice makes perfect" and (2) "don't practice all day - remember to go out and play!" It would be possible to reconcile these two statements in the manner of Approach #1 by saying that in general, "practice makes perfect," but practicing all day without going outside to play will not "make perfect." (They say that Chopin forbade his students to practice more than 3-4 hours a day, believing that excess practice is detrimental to musicality.) Alternatively, one can reconcile these two statements by saying that indeed, all practice makes perfect; however, those who only practice but don't go outside to play will suffer additional harm, outside of their musicality, and for that reason it is not advisable to practice all day.

My Mishlei rebbi's approach addresses both of the problems I had with Approach #1. According to this approach, we don't need to grope in the dark for reasons why l'kanter can't lead to lishmah; all we need to do is acknowledge that the harmful effects of l'kanter warranted harsh condemnation by Chazal. Secondly, this approach explains the real-world cases I was referring to earlier: there have been many students who have learned l'kanter and who have arrived at lishmah, even as they wreaked havoc in their middos and communities in the process.

Support from the Rambam

I believe that my Mishlei rebbi's approach to understanding Tosafos is supported by a letter from the Rambam (Sheilat edition p.160). R' Pinchas ha'Dayan had asked the Rambam about the contradictory implications of Chazal's statements about she'lo lishmah. The Rambam answered as follows:

Those two statements regarding one who engages in Torah lishmah and she'lo lishmah do not contradict each other. From both of them we learn that it is only proper to be involved in Torah lishmah, and lishmah is the essence, and we were only commanded to be involved [in Torah] lishmah, and one who is involved [in Torah] she'lo lishmah is better off having never been created. 

Nevertheless, it is better to be involved [in Torah] she'lo lishmah than to not be involved in it at all, because this person who is involved in it inappropriately will, because of his involvement she'lo lishmah, come to lishmah. 

Unlike the Baalei Tosafos, who resolve the contradiction by subdividing she'lo lishmah into two categories, the Rambam doesn't differentiate between l'kanter and other she'lo lishmah motives. He regards all she'lo lishmah motivations as being equally inferior and equally capable of leading to lishmah.

The proponents of Approach #1 are free to maintain that there is a machlokess (disagreement) between Tosafos and the Rambam on whether l'kanter precludes lishmah, but according to Approach #2, there's no need to posit this. One can simply say that the Rambam and Tosafos are in complete agreement that all she'lo lishmah learning can potentially lead to lishmah, but whereas the Rambam held that these statements of Chazal were intended to convey their views about she'lo lishmah in general, the Baalei Tosafos maintained that they were intended to single out a specific she'lo lishmah motive for condemnation.

Concluding Thoughts

I am curious as to your thoughts on Tosafos's distinction between l'kanter and other she'lo lishmah motives. If you agree with Approach #1 and would like to explain to me why, contrary to the real-world cases I've observed, l'kanter cannot lead to lishmah, then I'm all ears! Alternatively, if you think there's a problem with Approach #2 or if you have a third approach, I'd like to hear that as well. Lastly, if there are other interesting sources, ideas, or questions you'd like to share on the topic of lishmah and she'lo lishmah, please do share!

The Limits of she'Lo Lishmah

This post is predicated on a basic familiarity with the two levels of doing a mitzvah or learning Torah: lishmah (for its own sake) and she'lo lishmah (not for its own sake). The Rambam defines these two terms in his introduction to Perek Chelek. If you haven't yet read his discourse on this topic, or if you need a refresher, I advise you to check out the translation I posted here before reading this post.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Seedtime, by Rebecca Guay
(I used this here because it's how I picture "the pampered women of Machoza")

The Limits of she'Lo Lishmah

The Question

The highest level of learning Torah and doing mitzvos is lishmah. Nevertheless, Chazal urged us to be involved in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah. Why? Because "mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah - from she'lo lishmah, one will come to lishmah." [1]

A couple of years ago my chavrusa and I took up the question: What are the limits of she'lo lishmah? How far removed from "the ideal motives" for Torah and mitzvos would still be considered she'lo lishmah such that the aforementioned statement of Chazal would apply?

The examples of she'lo lishmah in the Rambam's parable are fairly straightforward:

• learning Torah in order to get a piece of candy or a fig
• learning Torah in order to get a fancy pair of shoes or item of clothing
• learning Torah in order to get money
• learning Torah in order to become a rabbi who receives honor from other people

In all four cases the student is learning Torah in order to obtain some good other than the learning itself. Presumably, the child is aware that he is learning Torah, and that learning Torah is a mitzvah, but he is simply not motivated by the learning itself. It's easy to see how this type of she'lo lishmah might naturally lead to lishmah, especially when it comes to learning. Doing mitzvos she'lo lishmah is bit trickier, but it's still conceivable that a mitzvah she'lo lishmah would lend itself to development towards lishmah.

But how far can this principle be extended? Compare the Rambam's examples with the following questionable cases:

• Case #1: a person is forced to do a mitzvah without any awareness at all about the nature of what he is doing. For example, imagine an immigrant from a repressive regime who is forced by a Chabad emissary to put on tefillin, and has no idea what's going on because he doesn't speak English and he's neither seen nor heard of tefillin in his life. [Note: for the purposes of this example, and this post, I am assuming we hold "mitzvos ein tzrichos kavanah" ("mitzvos do not require intention") from a halachic standpoint.]
• Case #2: a person has a completely warped notion of the nature of what he's doing. For instance, imagine a person who shakes a lulav believing that he's drawing upon spiritual earth-energy in order to "realign his chakras," or a person who avoids eating non-kosher food because he thinks it will literally kill him. These individuals definitely fulfill their halachic obligations, but will they naturally come to lishmah in the same way as the child in the Rambam's example?
• Case #3: a person does a mitzvah in an entirely incidental or accidental manner, with absolutely no intention for the mitzvah at all. For example, it would be entirely possible for someone who is allergic to gluten to neither eat nor own chametz on Pesach by default, without taking any special effort to do so for mitzvah reasons. It's even easier to observe mishpatim (i.e. mitzvos whose reasons are obvious) out of sheer common sense, without any mitzvah motives whatsoever. Building a maakeh (parapet) around one's roof so people don't fall and injure themselves, helping an elderly person cross the street, using accurate weights and measures, refraining from murder, kidnapping, and lying under oath - there are dozens of mitzvos that people keep every day without any awareness that they're observing halacha. 

Are these cases still within the scope of "mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah" or would we say that although these individuals might fulfill a technical halachic obligation, they would not fall within this category? 

The Indolent Women of Machoza

In searching for an answer to this question, my chavrusa and I stumbled upon an important Gemara which sheds a great deal of light on the topic. The Mishnah in Pesachim 4:1 (50a) states:

In a place where [the people] were accustomed to work on Erev Pesach (Passover eve) until midday, one may do so. In a place where the people were accustomed not to work, one may not do so. 

The Gemara (50b) discusses the parallel halachos (laws) which pertain to the eves and conclusions of other special days:

One who performs labor on Erev Shabbos (Sabbath eve) or Erev Yom Tov from minchah-time onward, and on Motzai Shabbos (the conclusion of the Sabbath), on Motzai Yom Tov, or Motzai Yom ha'Kippurim ... [such a person] will never see a sign of blessing [from this work].

The Gemara then classifies the types of people who receive this aforementioned blessing and those who don't:

The Sages taught [in a Tosefta]: "There is one who is diligent and rewarded; and there is one who is diligent but suffers a loss; there is one who is indolent but rewarded; and there is one who is indolent and suffers a loss. [How so?] 'Diligent and rewarded' is one who works the entire week and does not work on Erev Shabbos. 'Diligent but suffers a loss' is one who works all week and works on Erev Shabbos. 'Indolent but rewarded' is one who does not work the entire week and does not work on Erev Shabbos. 'Indolent and suffers a loss' is one who does not work the entire week and works on Erev Shabbos." 

Rava said: "With regard to those women of Machoza, even though they do not work on Erev Shabbos, it is due to excessive pampering, because they don't work on any other day [either]. Even so, we call them 'indolent but rewarded.'"

Rava brought up a contradiction: "It is written: 'for Your mercy is great unto the heavens' (Tehilim 57:11) and it is [also] written: 'for Your mercy is great above the heavens' (ibid. 108:5). How [can this contradiction be resolved]? [The pasuk which describes His mercy as above the heavens refers to a case where] one does [a mitzvah] lishmah, [whereas the pasuk which describes His mercy as merely reaching the heavens refers to a case where] one does [a mitzvah] she'lo lishmah."  

[This teaching of Rava] accords with what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: "a person should always engage in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah, because from she'lo lishmah one will come to lishmah."

The salient point here is Rava's statement about the women of Machoza. These "pampered" women never work, and yet the Gemara places them in the category of "indolent but rewarded" for their abstaining from work on Erev Shabbos.

One might read Rava's remark about the women of Machoza as pertaining solely to the passage that preceded it, regarding the fourfold classification of people who are diligent, indolent, rewarded, and who suffer a loss. Rashi, however, connects the women of Machoza case to the statements that follow, regarding the virtue of learning and doing mitzvos she'lo lishmah. Rashi explains:

"indolent but rewarded" is one who didn't work all week and also [didn't work] on Erev Shabbos - and even though they didn't intend [to abstain from work] for the sake of a mitzvah, it is nevertheless a mitzvah she'lo lishmah, as they say later on: "a person should always be involved in a mitzvah even she'lo lishmah."

The Ran echoes this reading of the Gemara in his comments on Rava's explanation of the contradiction in Tehilim:

If you'll pose a challenge from Rav Yehuda himself who said in the Perek Haya Korei (Berachos 17a) about anyone who engages [in a mitzvah] she'lo lishmah that it's better if they were never created. [How can we reconcile Rav Yehuda's condemnation of she'lo lishmah with Rava's approbation of she'lo lishmah in our Gemara?] 

The answer is: there are many types of she'lo lishmah. [Rav Yehuda's statement condemning she'lo lishmah] pertains to those who engage in Torah in order to be contrarian and to provoke: since his intention is for an aveirah (transgression), then it would be better if he were never created. [2] [In contrast, Rava's statement in our Gemara] is dealing with a case in which his intention is neither for a sinful matter nor for a mitzvah, and instead is like that of the indolent person who is rewarded [and thus, like the women of Machoza]. 

According to Rashi and the Ran, the "indolent but rewarded" individuals who abstain from working on Erev Shabbos have absolutely no intention whatsoever to fulfill any mitzvah, but because their laziness just "happens" to result in the observance of a mitzvah [3], then they are rewarded for their she'lo lishmah observance. In other words, the women of Machoza fit perfectly into the Case #3 scenario mentioned above: their actions incidentally align with a mitzvah, even though their motives have nothing to do with Torah whatsoever. Rashi even goes so far as to explicitly state that their she'lo lishmah observance will (or at least can) lead to lishmah.

The question is: How can this be?! Is it really true that these lazy women of Machoza will eventually come around to refraining from work on Erev Shabbos lishmah simply because they kept this mitzvah by default, due to their pampered lifestyle?

Consider, as a sort of thought experiment, two groups within the women of Machoza: those who are Jewish and those who are non-Jewish. The women in both groups are indolent and pampered. Neither group does any work during any day of the week. They just sit there, lounging around, drinking their "Machoza Mimosas" [4] and gossiping about their fancy jewelry and fancy drinking-water. And yet, the Jewish women of Machoza are rewarded for their indolence simply because their lazy behavior coincides with a halacha. How does that make any sense?

A Possible Answer

If memory serves, my chavrusa and I initially arrived at the conclusion that the Gemara must have been assuming that the women of Machoza had at least some awareness of the fact that their abstention from work qualified as a mitzvah. Otherwise, how would it be possible to say that they'd be rewarded for their behavior?

When I revisited the question this year while writing this blog post I realized that our assumption wasn't warranted. We posited this because we felt compelled to by the strength of the question, but a straightforward reading of the Gemara wouldn't naturally lead to this conclusion.

Instead, I would like to answer as follows: even the she'lo lishmah behavior of the women of Machoza can lead to lishmah insofar as it contributes to the observance of that mitzvah as a behavioral habit. Allow me to explain.

My answer was inspired by the Rambam's approach to character development, as presented in Hilchos Deos (Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada). A full treatment of the Rambam's view is beyond the scope of this blog post. Here is the particular halacha I had in mind:

1:7 - How does a person habituate himself to these character traits until they are firmly established in him? He should do the actions which correspond to these “middle character traits” again, and again, and again, and repeat them constantly until these actions become easy for him without there being any burden in them, and they become firmly established in his soul. 

For example, if a person wants to develop the trait of generosity, he should force himself to repeatedly do acts of generosity (e.g. giving tzedakah to the poor, volunteering at a soup kitchen, donating clothing to those in need) until these actions become second-nature to the point where he can do them naturally, without experiencing any emotional conflict or resistance.

Does the Rambam hold that this is the highest level of ethical development? Not at all. Someone who gives tzedakah lishmah is certainly superior to one who gives tzedakah she'lo lishmah, even though acts of generosity come "easily" for both of them. But from a strictly behavioral standpoint, both of them will be able to do acts of generosity in a manner which is "easy" for them, "without any burden."

This point is even clearer when we consider ethical development in children. Let's use the example of the virtue of gratitude. Imagine two children: one who was raised to say, "Thank you" as soon as she learns to speak, and another who wasn't. At such a young age, it is doubtful whether these children are even capable of understanding what gratitude is. And yet, when these children mature to the point where they can understand what it means to be grateful, which one will have an easier time doing actions which express gratitude? Clearly the child who has already acquired the behavioral habit of demonstrating gratitude by saying, "Thank you." The other child will have to face an uphill battle to become a grateful person even if she intellectually recognizes the value in acquiring that particular virtue.

It is on this basis that I would like to answer the question on our Gemara. The reason why even the women of Machoza's low level she'lo lishmah abstention from work can still be characterized as leading to lishmah is because it contributes to their potential for a lishmah observance. Even though their motives and intentions have nothing to do with the mitzvah, they are nevertheless practicing behavior which is in line with the mitzvah, thereby paving the way for a lishmah observance of the mitzvah by making that observance easier to keep.

Consider another thought experiment: an "indolent but rewarded" woman of Machoza who doesn't work during the week and doesn't work on Erev Shabbos, and a "diligent but suffers a loss" woman of Manhattan who works during the week and works on Erev Shabbos. Imagine that both women decide to become more religious and wish to take on the meritorious practice of not working on Erev Shabbos. Which woman will have an easier time doing so? Clearly the woman of Machoza! Her habit of not working on Erev Shabbos will be a boon for her, even though this habit was initially established out of laziness, and had nothing to do with Torah and mitzvos!

If I am correct, then we need to tweak our understanding of "mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah." This statement does not mean that doing a mitzvah she'lo lishmah will naturally develop a person towards doing that mitzvah lishmah. Rather, it can also mean that doing a mitzvah she'lo lishmah will facilitate the move to lishmah in any way - whether by contributing to a person's development in an active way, or by removing an impediment to their lishmah development.

Thus, the immigrant who is forced to put on tefillin without any knowledge of what he's doing, the lulav-shaking chakra realigner, the person who is allergic to gluten - all three types of cases fit into the category of mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah, insofar as they pave the way for lishmah by removing the behavioral impediments to a lishmah observance of the mitzvah. I like to imagine that the Ran had this in mind when he waved his hand, shook his head, and answered his own question by saying, "Don't worry: there are many types of she'lo lishmah."

Conclusion

I'm sure there is more to explore on this topic, but I think that this idea stands on its own. The take-away lesson is this: don't underestimate the impact of behavioral conditioning in the pursuit of ethical and intellectual perfection. It would be very easy to look down on the women of Machoza - or on the immigrant being wrapped in tefillin [5] without knowledge, or on the lulav-waving chakra charger, or the gluten-free chametz avoider - but according to our Gemara, even these low-level she'lo lishmah types of mitzvah observance lead to lishmah, and should be encouraged and looked upon favorably. Similarly, one should never dismiss or discourage anyone from keeping halacha even if their motives have nothing to do with halacha. Lastly, one should not view this type of she'lo lishmah observance as beneath our own standards, and use this reasoning to rationalize not keeping a particular halacha. No matter how far removed from the Torah's ideals we are, we should always involve ourselves in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah, because mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah.

When we bear these points in mind, having mercy on the human condition and recognizing how every step forward is significant, no matter how small, we are aligning our own perspective with that of Hashem, "[Whose] mercy is great unto the heavens."

[1] Sanhedrin 105b, Pesachim 50b, Nazir 23b, Sotah 22b and 47a, Horiyos 10b, Erachin 16b - and probably more
[2] An analysis of what it means to learn “lekanter” and why this is an exception to the rule is beyond the scope of this blog post. I have an explanation, but including it would distract us from the topic at hand.[3] Ordinarily I am reticent to broadly apply the term "mitzvah" to all behavior that is sanctioned or encouraged by halacha, and instead prefer to treat it as a technical term referring to a specific commandment from the Torah or the Rabbis. I've decided to make an exception in this case, since the Gemara itself uses the term "mitzvah" to describe what is actually just a meritorious custom, rather than an actual Biblical or Rabbinic commandment.
[4] Let me be the first to reveal the official "Machoza Mimosa" recipe: In a champagne flute, combine 1/3 cup chilled sparkling wine, 1/3 cup chilled orange juice, 1 tablespoon of honey and 1 tablespoon of absinthe, as a kiyum in: "For the lips of a strange woman drop honey, and her mouth is smoother than oil - but her end is bitter as wormwood, sharp as a two-edged sword" (Mishlei 5:3-4). Yeah, I know that our Gemara doesn't condemn the women of Machoza, and not even Shlomo ha'Melech would consider them to fall into the category of "the strange woman" of Mishlei, but I still think that their "end is bitter as wormwood."
[5] "force-phylacteried" would be the appropriate verb

Rambam: On Lishmah and she'Lo Lishmah

I started writing a blog post about doing mitzvos lishmah (for their own sake) and she'lo lishmah (not for their own sake), and was shocked to discover that I haven't yet posted a translation of the Rambam's discourse on this topic anywhere on my blog. I decided to rectify that by posting my translation without any commentary, since it is something that every student of Torah should read. The paragraph divisions are my own.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Frantic Search, by Mitchell Malloy

Rambam: On Lishmah and she'Lo Lishmah

You, the thoughtful reader, should contemplate the following parable which I will present to you, and then pay attention to understand my words on this entire topic. 

A young child is brought to an educator to learn Torah. This is a tremendous good for him, because of the perfection he will attain from it. However, due to his young age and the deficiency of his mind, he will not understand the value of that good, nor [will he understand the value] of the perfection he will gain. Thus, necessity compels the teacher – who is more perfected than the child – to motivate him to learn by using something which is beloved to him, because of his young age. [The teacher] will say, “Learn and I will give you nuts and figs!” or “I will give you a piece of candy!” Then the student will learn and strive not for the learning itself, whose value he doesn’t know, but in order to attain that piece of food. The eating of that food is more important to him and more beneficial [from his perspective], without a doubt. Therefore, he will consider the learning to be a toil and exertion which he must work at in order to attain that desirable objective – that single nut or piece of candy. 

When the child grows and his intellect is strengthened, and that thing which he used to value becomes less important in his eyes and he goes go on to value other things, we motivate him with that which is even more important in his eyes. The teacher will say to him, “Learn and I will buy these fancy shoes for you” or “an article of clothing with such-and-such an appearance.” Then he will strive not for the learning itself, but for that article of clothing, because that article of clothing will be more valuable to him than the learning, and it will be the objective of the learning. 

When his mind becomes more perfected and that thing becomes less significant in his eyes, we motivate him with something greater than this. His teacher will say to him, “Learn this section or this chapter and I will give you a dollar or two.” Then he will learn and strive in order to earn that money, and the earning of that money will be more significant to him than the learning, for the purpose of learning – to him, at this time – is the earning of the money that was promised to him. 

When he becomes more cognizant and this thing [he once valued] becomes less significant in his eyes and he knows that it is a thing of inferior worth, we motivate him with something that is more important to him. We say to him, “Learn in order to become a rabbi and a judge. People will honor you; they will stand up in your presence; your words will be established and your reputation will grow during your lifetime and after your death, like so-and-so.” Then he will learn and strive in order to achieve that level of distinction, and the ultimate objective – to him – will be that people should honor him, exalt him, and praise him. 

All of this is despicable – yet, it is necessary for us, due to the deficiency of the human psyche (or mind), which causes him to make the purpose of learning something other than the learning [itself]. He will say, “Why should I learn this?” – only in order to achieve something which, in truth, is but a fantasy. This is what the Sages referred to as she’lo lishmah (lit. “not for its own sake”). In other words, he fulfills the mitzvos and does them and learns and strives not for the sake of that thing itself, but for the sake of something else. The Sages (peace be upon them) cautioned us, saying, “Do not make them (i.e. matters of Torah) a crown through which to glorify yourself, nor an axe to chop with” (Avos 4:5). They are alluding to that which I have explained to you, that one should not make the purpose of his learning that people should honor him, nor the acquisition of wealth, nor should he make Hashem’s Torah into a livelihood. 

The purpose of his learning should be nothing other than knowledge itself; likewise, the only purpose of truth is to know that it is true; the mitzvos are true, and therefore, their purpose is their fulfillment. It is prohibited for a perfected person to say, “If I do these good things and if I refrain from these bad things which Hashem prohibited to me, what will be my reward?” For this is like what the child says: “If I learn, what will I be given?” And they say to him, “Such-and-such a thing,” for when we see the deficiency of his mind – that he doesn’t understand the value of this thing, and he seeks out a purpose for the purpose – we answer him in accordance with the degree of his foolishness, [as it is stated,] “answer a fool according to his foolishness” (Mishlei 26:5). 

The Sages already warned us about this – namely, that a person shouldn’t make the purpose of his avodah (service) and his fulfillment of the mitzvos any of these things – in the statement of the pious man who grasped the truth, Antignos of Socho: “Do not be like servants who serve the master with the intention of receiving a prize; rather, be like servants who serve their master with the intention not to receive a prize.” By this they mean that one should believe in truth for the sake of the truth itself. This is what [the Sages] referred to as “oved me’ahavah” (“one who serves out of love”). They said, “he desires His mitzvos exceedingly” (Tehilim 112:1). R’ Elazar said: “His mitzvos” and not “the reward of His mitzvos” (Avodah Zarah 19a). How great is this proof and how clear it is, for this is a clear proof to our preceding words! Even greater than this is the statement of the Sages in Sifrei: “Perhaps a person will say, ‘I will learn Torah so that I can become rich’ or ‘so that I will be called “rebbi”’ or ‘so that I will receive reward in the World to Come’ – but the pasuk says, ‘to love Hashem, your God’; everything you do, you should only do out of love” (Eikev: Devarim 11:13). 

It has been explained and made clear that this is the goal of the mitzvos and the foundation of our Sages’ belief. The only person who will be oblivious to this is a fool and a naïve simpleton who has already been corrupted by crazy, fantastical, imaginary and degenerate notions. This [high level of lishmah] is the level of Avraham Avinu, who was oved me’ahavah (Sotah 31a), and this is the path which we are obligated to strive for. 

But the Sages (of blessed memory) knew that this was a very difficult concept which not every person can grasp. Even if he does grasp it, it will not seem correct at first glance, and it will not seem like a true opinion, since man’s nature is to not do an action unless it will bring him some benefit or enable him to avoid some harm, and if it does neither of these, then the act would be pointless. How is it possible to say to a Torah-observant Jew, “Do these actions and don’t do these,” not out of fear of Hashem’s punishment and not out of a hope for reward? This is very difficult, for not all people grasp the truth and will be like Avraham Avinu. 

Therefore, they permitted the masses to remain in accordance with their mentality, to do the good out of hope for reward and to avoid the bad out of fear of punishment. They encouraged them in this, and strengthened their thoughts about it, until the apprehender apprehends and knows the truth and knows what the perfected path is – just like the youth at the time of learning, according to the aforementioned analogy. They were critical of Antignos of Socho for publicizing among the masses what he publicized, saying, “Sages – be careful with your words! etc.” as we explained in Avos. The masses do not lose out completely by fulfilling the mitzvos out of fear of reward and hope of punishment; they are just not perfected. But it is better for them to do this in order for them to acquire the disposition and preparation for fulfilling Torah, so that they will [eventually] move on to the truth and serve out of love. This is what the Sages (of blessed memory) said: “A person should always be involved in Torah even she’lo lishmah, for from she’lo lishmah he will come to lishmah” (Sanhedrin 105b, Pesachim 50b, Nazir 23b, Sotah 22b and 47a, Horiyos 10b, Erachin 16b).

The Implications of Chazal's "Godless Kiruv" Approach

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Godless Shrine, by Cliff Childs

The Implications of Chazal's "Godless Kiruv" Approach

A few years ago, while perusing Midrash Eichah, I came across a statement made by Chazal about how to get people to return to Torah - a statement which, were it not for the fact that Chazal said it, I would have been reluctant to even consider it as a possibility. 

The midrash is based on a phrase from a pasuk in Yirmiyahu, which I will present in context: 

And it shall be that when you tell all these things to this people, they will say to you, "Why has Hashem spoken all this great evil against us? What is our iniquity, what is our transgression that we have transgressed before Hashem our God?" 

And you shall say to them, "It is because your forefathers have abandoned Me" - the word of Hashem - "and they went after other gods and served them and bowed down to them, and they abandoned Me and they didn't keep My Torah" (Yirmiyahu 16:10-11).

The midrash (Eichah Rabbah: Pesichta 2) says:

R' Huna and R' Yirmiyah said in the name of R' Chiyya bar Abba: It is written, "they abandoned Me and they did not keep My Torah" - if only they had abandoned Me but kept My Torah, because they involved themselves in it, the illumination within it would have returned them to the good.

Rav Huna said: Learn Torah, even she'lo lishmah (not for its own sake), because from she'lo lishmah, one will come [to learn it] lishmah (for its own sake).

According to the midrash, the tragedy of Churban ha'Bayis (the destruction of the Temple) and galus (exile) only happened because Bnei Yisrael abandoned Hashem and didn't learn [1] His Torah, but if they only abandoned Hashem but continued to learn Torah, then the "light of Torah" would have ultimately brought them back. 

There are two major questions on this midrash: 

(1) What does it mean by "abandoning Hashem"? Is this talking about violating halacha? Is it talking about worshiping other gods? Is it talking about atheism?

(2) How does "the illumination of Torah" bring people back to the good? This question must be answered specifically with regards to people who have "abandoned Hashem." 

To answer the first question it would make sense to consult the meforshim on the phrase "they have abandoned Me" in the pasuk on which our midrash is based. Unfortunately, the answers they provide aren't so clear.

• The Targum Yonasan [2] strips the phrase of its anthropomorphic implications by rendering "abandoned Me" as "abandoned My worship." 
• The Metzudas David [3] explains it to mean "they didn't believe in Me in their hearts," which we can't take at face value because the pasuk right before it says that Bnei Yisrael will ask: "Why has Hashem spoken all this great evil against us? What is our iniquity, what is our transgression that we have transgressed before Hashem our God?" Clearly Bnei Yisrael at least professed belief in Hashem, and seems to have believed in Him on a conscious level. Does the Metzudas David mean that their emunah (conviction) in God was flawed or insufficient? If so, how? 
• According to the Malbim, [4] the phrase "abandoned Me" refers to the fact that prior generations forgot Torah, and therefore they didn't know Hashem. This reading poses its own difficulties when we consider what the midrash might mean when it contemplates the possibility of Bnei Yisrael abandoning Hashem but still learning Torah; this would seem to be worse than abandoning both of them, due to forgetting Torah. 

So the answer to our first question is ... unclear. We'll just have to work on the second question, and then extrapolate as much as we can about the first. 

The answer to the second question, I believe, can be found in a statement of the Rambam. [5] In Chapter 6 of Hilchos Teshuvah the Rambam gives his interpretation of the pesukim: "Good and upright is Hashem; therefore He guides sinners on the path. He leads the humble with justice and teaches His way to the humble" (Tehilim 25:7-8). He explains:

This means that Hashem has sent prophets to them, who teach them the ways of Hashem and help them to return in teshuvah. Moreover, He instilled within them the capacity to learn and to understand - for this tendency is present in every man, that the more he is drawn after the ways of chochmah (wisdom) and tzedek (righteousness), the more he desires them and pursues them. This is what the Sages meant by "ha'ba l'taher, mesayin oso" ("one who comes to be purified is assisted") - in other words, he will find himself assisted in the matter [by the aforementioned natural tendency].

I believe the answer to our second question is that if a person is learning Torah with the correct approach, then his internal draw towards chochmah and tzedek will increase his attachment to Torah-learning, and will ultimately "return him to the good." Probably not in every case, but enough for the midrash to be able to make its generalization. 

What leads me to believe that this interpretation is correct? Because I have witnessed it with my own eyes. I'm speaking both as a teacher and as a student of Torah. I've seen many cases involving my own students - or my fellow talmidim (students) in high school and in yeshiva - who were atheists, agnostics, or irreligious. At first they displayed emotional resistance to certain Jewish topics, but were nevertheless drawn to the chochmas ha'Torah (the wisdom of Torah). Over the course of several years of learning, their natural desire for chochmah and tzedek was awakened and strengthened, and they wanted more. Eventually, their learning led them to embrace Torah as a system, at which point, it can be said that they have "returned to the good." 

Can this happen on a national level, as it would seem from the context [6] of the pesukim? We might be inclined to say "no," but far be it for us to underestimate the transformative power of the chochmas ha'Torah - especially when presented by a good teacher. 

Now, you may be wondering why the title of this post is: "The Implications of Chazal's Godless Kiruv Approach." Other than clickbait reasons, my intent was to open up the discussion about how the principle in this midrash might be implemented in kiruv (Jewish outreach). 

Disclaimer: I have already written about my personal stance on kiruv. To sum it up: I'm generally not in favor of kiruv. At the same time, we live in an era where "kiruv" and "regular Torah education" overlap in many ways. It is far more common nowadays to encounter students from Orthodox Jewish homes in Orthodox Jewish Day Schools whose Jewish education is sorely lacking, and who - most likely due to the Internet - have numerous questions, doubts, and problems with Judaism which have not been adequately addressed by their teachers.

The standard approach that is often taken with these students is to try making them into "believers." There is a lot of emphasis placed on "curing" them of their atheism or agnosticism. In my personal and professional opinion, this approach is not fruitful, and often backfires.

Instead, I prefer the approach implicit in this midrash. The priority should be exposure to "the illumination of Torah" - namely, providing students with high quality exposure to the chochmah and tzedek of Torah. This doesn't mean that topics about Hashem should be avoided (God forbid!), but rather, that the emphasis should be on the involvement in the learning itself - not in "converting" students to belief in Hashem. The goal should be attachment to Torah learning. If that goal is achieved, then the rest will follow.

This course is fraught with dangers as well. One must be careful not to present an “Orthopraxy” version of Judaism, which downplays (or outright objects to) the role of belief in the practice of Torah. Similarly, one must not fall into the trap of “the bad Academic Approach,” which reduces Torah to a mere cultural repository of ancient beliefs, rather than a regimen designed to develop a truth-seeking mind.

I'm not saying that this is a simple solution. There are many complexities that need to be worked out on paper, and even more which need to be addressed in the classroom. Each and every student is different, and it isn't realistic to hope for a one-size-fits-all approach.

Nevertheless, I think that this midrash is expressing a powerful model of kiruv which should be considered in the present age of Torah education. Tzarich iyun (this requires further analysis).

[1] Last year a chavrusa of mine challenged my reading of the phrase "kept My Torah." He wanted to read "keeping Torah" in this midrash to mean "keeping halacha" rather than "learning Torah." I think such a reading is extremely forced. First of all, the midrash uses the phrase מתוך שהיו מתעסקים בה ("because they involved themselves in it"), and "עוסק בתורה" always refers to learning Torah - not keeping halacha. Secondly, our midrash is followed immediately by Rav Huna's statement, which is about learning Torah - not keeping halacha. Lastly, if you do a search for meforshim who cite our midrash in their commentary, you'll find that they understand it to be talking about learning Torah - not keeping halacha. See Metzudas David on Yirmiyahu 9:12 and Tehilim 119:104; Rabbeinu Yonah in Shaarei Teshuvah 697; Ha'amek Davar on Devarim 32:47; Derech Hashem 4:2.

[2] Targum Yonasan on Yirmiyahu 16:12

[3] Rav David Altschuler (Metzudas David), Commentary on Sefer Yirmiyahu 16:11

[4] Rav Meir Leibush ben Yechiel Michel (Malbim), Commentary on Sefer Yirmiyahu 16:11

[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 6:4

[6] at least, if we take this midrash as an actual interpretation, and not just a drashah