Shelach: Challah as a Consequence of the Cheit ha'Meraglim

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Shelach: Challah as a Consequence of the Cheit ha'Meraglim

The Cheit ha’Meraglim (Sin of the Spies) is recounted in Bamidbar Chapters 13 and 14. Chapter 15 interrupts the narrative to present a series of seemingly random and unrelated mitzvos. One of these is the mitzvah of hafrashas challah (separation of dough). We are obligated by Torah law in the Land of Israel to separate a portion of our dough “for Hashem” (Bamidbar 15:9) – that is, to give to the kohanim.

Sforno explains this sequencing of the chapters by positing that challah – indeed, all the mitzvos mentioned in Chapter 15 – only became necessary as a result of the Cheit ha’Meraglim. He writes:

After the Cheit ha’Meraglim, challah also became necessary in order for [the Israelites] to be worthy to receive blessing in their homes, as it is stated: “you shall give the first portion of your dough to the Kohen, to bring a blessing to rest upon your home” (Yechezkel 44:30).

Sforno’s comments raise two questions: (1) How does challah make us worthy to receive blessing in our homes? (2) Why did this necessity for challah only arise after the Cheit ha’Meraglim?

An answer to the first question is provided by the Sefer ha’Chinuch (Mitzvah #385):

At the root of this mitzvah lies the reason that since man’s sustenance is by food, and most of the world lives on bread, the Foundational Being wanted to make us meritorious through a constant mitzvah with our bread in order that blessing will dwell it in through the mitzvah and we will earn merit for our souls. As a result, the dough is nourishment for the body and nourishment for the soul. Additionally, [the purpose of the mitzvah] is so that the ministering servants of Hashem can live (i.e. be sustained) by it – those who are constantly engaged in His service, namely, the kohanim – without any toil at all. For with the terumah (i.e. the kohen’s portion) from the granary there is toil for them, to pass the grain through a sieve and to grind it, but here [in the case of challah] their allotted portion comes to them without difficulty at all.

The Ralbag (toeles #8) provides two similar explanations which differ slightly from the Sefer ha’Chinuch:

The first benefit that comes from [the mitzvah of challah] is to call attention to the fact that all good things come to us from Hashem; this is why He commanded that we give a portion to Hashem from the first of our dough in the Land of Israel, to teach us that Hashem gave us the Land which yields produce in abundance. The second benefit that comes from [this mitzvah] is common to all the priestly gifts, namely, that Hashem desires that the kohanim be free to be involved in Torah and to grasp its deepest ideas, so that they can teach His judgments to Jacob and His Torah to Israel; for this reason, He desired that their bread and water be provided in a dependable manner.

Although the major fault of the Israelites was their lack of trust in Hashem, they were also guilty of undervaluing the Land He intended to give them. This is clear from their outcry: “Why is Hashem bringing us into this Land … would it not be better for us to return to Egypt?” (Bamidbar 14:3), to which Yehoshua and Kalev responded: “the Land that we traversed to spy out is very, very good … it is a land flowing with milk and honey!” (ibid. 14:7-8). In other words, if the Israelites’ only problem was their fear that the inhabitants of the land would kill them, then Yehoshua’s and Kalev’s repeated assertions about the Land’s goodness would be irrelevant. Evidently, they did not adequately appreciate Hashem’s gift of the Land.

The mitzvah of challah is a reminder of the true value of the Land Hashem gave us. It reminds us that we depend upon Him for our physical sustenance, and it also reminds us of the purpose of our physical existence – to live a life devoted to His service. This necessary reminder makes us worthy of His blessings.

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Ki Teitzei: On the Merit of Giving Bad Explanations of Mitzvos

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Ki Teitzei: On the Merit of Giving Bad Explanations of Mitzvos

As a Torah educator, I am a strong proponent of teaching students the taamei ha’mitzvos (reasons for the commandments). This is especially relevant for teenagers and young adults, many of whom were raised without any real awareness that the mitzvos have rational reasons and were commanded for our benefit. Accordingly, it is a pet peeve of mine when I hear someone give a bad explanation for the taam of a mitzvah. Is there ever any justification for bad explanations of mitzvos? Shockingly, according to the Sefer ha’Chinuch, the answer is: yes.

In his introduction, the Sefer ha’Chinuch explains that he wrote his book so that his son and his son’s friends will accustom themselves to thinking about the mitzvos and seeking out their reasons. He then writes at length about how unqualified he is for this task, but why he didn’t let that stop him from writing. Here are some excerpts:

I do not think and proclaim that I will arrive at the ultimate truth. Who am I, “but a worm and not a man” who has not seen the lights of wisdom all the days, to raise my hand about that which exceedingly wise sages have not grasped? … However, I said: If only it would be that my thoughts be preoccupied with [taamei ha’mitzvos] all of the days … Are [the mitzvos] not all refined and pure – “every precious stone is their adornment”? And if there sometimes be sediment in that which is written in their explanation, the food should be separated from it for oil, and [sediment] returned to the house of the owners … And at the beginning of my words, I mention as a merit for me that which my teachers said: "All chatter is bad, [but] Torah chatter is good."

In Parashas Ki Teitzei, there are two instances in which the Sefer ha’Chinuch acknowledges the inadequacy of the taamei ha’mitzvos explanations he has provided. The first is regarding the prohibition “to offer up a harlot’s wage or the exchange-price of a dog on the altar” (Mitzvah #571). After giving a satisfactory taam for the first component of this mitzvah, the Sefer ha’Chinuch tackles the second with decidedly less confidence:

Now, it is known that dogs are arrogant in spirit. Perhaps, as a result of thinking about them and their tough nature, his spirit will grow tough and he will become stiff-necked, too stubborn to regret his sins, as is proper for him. However, my son, if these words [of mine] be childish, may you be aroused by them to acquire the reason of elders.

In other words: if you don’t like my explanation of the taam, may it inspire you to look for a better one. Similarly, after giving a basic taam ha’mitzvah for yibum (levirate marriage, Mitzvah #598), he writes:

Now, although I know that in this mitzvah lies a great principle and a true reason [known] by the mekubalim (i.e. those who have received the esoteric tradition), I will rely on what I wrote at the beginning of my work. There I set forth my justification for the fact that I would not restrain my pen from writing my entire mind on a simple, plain reason for the mitzvos, to stimulate the spirit of the youngsters to ask questions about them of their elders and teachers. Out of the preoccupation with them, perhaps the merit will come about through me to reveal the truth of their purposes, and I will gain merit in my place among them.

What emerges from these three excerpts is an insight about the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s approach. There are two reasons to offer explanations for the taamei ha’mitzvos: (1) to identify the actual reasons for the mitzvos, and (2) to strengthen our attachment to seeking taamei ha’mitzvos. In most cases, the Sefer ha’Chinuch maintains that his taamei ha’mitzvos are the real thing, but in cases where he is uncertain whether he has attained “the ultimate truth” of a mitzvah, he consoles himself by saying, “At least my thoughts and my chatter were preoccupied with mitzvos! Perhaps my inadequate explanations will prompt my students to discover the truth on their own.”

This approach should not be taken as a license to spout off dumb ideas, but for those who have sufficient intellectual humility, perhaps the Sefer ha’Chinuch will provide justification for sharing their half-baked thoughts.

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you. 

If you would like to sponsor an article, shiur, or podcast episode, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone. 

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast", "The Stoic Jew" Podcast, "Rambam Bekius" Podcast, "Machshavah Lab" Podcast, "The Tefilah Podcast"  For the full guide to all of my Torah content, click here. 

Vaeschanan: Avodah Zarah – Three Fundamental Premises

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Vaeschanan: Avodah Zarah – Three Premises

After recapping the event of the Revelation at Sinai, Moshe Rabbeinu warns Bnei Yisrael about the dangers of avodah zarah (idolatry): 

But you shall greatly beware for your souls, for you did not see any likeness on the day Hashem spoke to you at Horeb, from the midst of the fire, lest you act corruptly and make yourselves a carved image, a likeness of any shape; a form of a male or a female; a form of any animal on the earth; a form of any winged bird that flies in the heaven; a form of anything that creeps on the ground, a form of any fish that is in the water under the earth; and lest you raise your eyes to heaven and you see the sun, and the moon, and the stars – the entire legion of heaven – and you be drawn away and bow to them and worship them, which Hashem, your God, has apportioned to all the peoples under the entire heaven! … Beware for yourselves lest you forget the covenant of Hashem, your God, that He has sealed with you, and you make yourselves a carved image, a likeness of anything, as Hashem, your God, has commanded you. For Hashem, your God – He is a consuming fire – a jealous God. (Devarim 4:15-19, 23-24) 

It is difficult for the modern reader to relate to these severe warnings. We have a hard time understanding why our ancestors were tempted to make graven images, bow down to idols, and venerate the heavenly bodies. For this reason, the Torah’s campaign against avodah zarah can appear excessive, outdated, and irrelevant. It seems as though mankind has moved on, and the Torah’s hard-line anti-avodah zarah stance carries little to no meaning for most Jews today. 

The view of avodah zarah as irrelevant is incorrect. In this post I will present an overview of three fundamental premises about avodah zarah which, when considered together, demonstrate the central place that avodah zarah occupies in the Torah regimen. 

Fundamental Premise #1: Opposition to Avodah Zarah as the Essence of Torah 

There are 613 mitzvos. According to the Rambam, 51 of these mitzvos are thematically related to avodah zarah, the laws of which he codifies in Hilchos Avodah Zarah. Of these 51, only around 20 of them are practically relevant to most Jews today – and that’s a generous estimate. 

One might infer from the above that avodah zarah is merely an aspect or a component of Torah. This is inaccurate. In truth, the essential mission of the entire Torah is to uproot avodah zarah. There are many sources which express this concept. Here are a few: 

• Chazal [1] teach “anyone who believes [2] in avodah zarah is like one who denies the entire Torah, and anyone who denies avodah zarah is like one who believes in the entire Torah.” [3]
• Similarly, Chazal [4] say that “one who denies avodah zarah is called a Jew (Yehudi).” 
• The Rambam [5] states: “the purpose of the entire Torah and the center around which everything revolves is the removal and annihilation of every trace of avodah zarah.” 
• The Sefer ha’Chinuch [6] refers to the belief in Hashem’s existence as “the foundation of the religion,” but identifies avodah zarah as “the root of the entire Torah upon which all else depends.” 
• The Ramban [7] also calls avodah zarah “the root of all mitzvos.” 
• Halachically, a Jew who worships avodah zarah has the halachic status of non-Jew with regards to all matters. Likewise, a Jew who is an apostate to avodah zarah is considered to be an apostate to the entire Torah. [8]

It is clear from these statements that avodah zarah is not simply a part of Torah. Rather, opposition to avodah zarah is the essence of Torah. Thus, to say that avodah zarah is no longer relevant to our lives would be to say that the Torah, itself, has lost its relevance. 

Moreover, we see from here that in order to understand the centrality of avodah zarah, we must expand our definition of avodah zarah to encompass more than the limited set of halachically proscribed behaviors. This leads us to the second fundamental premise. 

Fundamental Premise #2: Philosophical vs. Halachic Avodah Zarah 

When Chazal and the Rishonim say that the Torah’s essential mission is to uproot avodah zarah, their comments not limited to the specific set of actions and beliefs halachically proscribed by the 51 mitzvos mentioned above, such as bowing down to idols, making offerings to other gods, believing in and worshipping other deities, etc. 

This brings us to the distinction between halachic avodah zarah and philosophical avodah zarah. Halachic avodah zarah refers to those acts which are legally prohibited within the technical parameters of the halachic system. In contrast, philosophical avodah zarah refers to any act which derives from the thoughts, feelings, and general worldview of avodah zarah. 

The easiest way to grasp this distinction is to consider cases which would not constitute halachic avodah zarah, but would still be considered philosophical avodah zarah. For instance, a person who passes all of his children through the ritual Molech-fire is not liable for violating the Torah’s prohibition of worshipping Molech. Why not? Because halachic avodah zarah is only prohibited if it was done b’derech avodasah (in the customary manner). For this reason a person is only halachically culpable for worshipping Molech if he passes some of his children through the ritual fire, since that is how Molech was customarily worshipped; passing all of one’s children through the fire was not a sanctioned practice in the cult of Molech, and would therefore not be prohibited according to Torah law. But is such a person culpable for philosophical avodah zarah? Absolutely! To believe in – and certainly to worship – any god other than Hashem constitutes philosophical avodah zarah, even if the worshipper’s actions would not qualify as halachic avodah zarah due to a technicality. 

Another example is Christianity. Some Rishonim, such as the Rambam [9], unequivocally maintain that Christianity is halachically avodah zarah on account of the doctrine of the Trinity. The god Christians worship is a triune deity, and is therefore not a legitimate form of monotheism – unlike Islam. Others, such as the Baalei Tosafos [10], classify the doctrine of the Trinity as shituf (“co-sovereignty”), which they maintain is not halachically prohibited for non-Jews. For this reason, the Baalei Tosafos hold that we do not treat Christians as idolaters. Nevertheless, despite this halachic disagreement, both the Rambam and the Baalei Tosafos would agree that the Christian worship of the Trinity constitutes philosophical avodah zarah, since they are worshipping a god other than Hashem. 

How is the distinction between halachic and philosophical avodah zarah relevant to our discussion? Because whereas halachic avodah zarah is confined to the 51 mitzvos in Hilchos Avodah Zarah and their technical laws, philosophical avodah zarah plays a role in a far broader range of mitzvos. For example: 

• Thematically and halachically, Shabbos is the antithesis of avodah zarah, as I wrote about in my article Shabbos, Avodah Zarah, and Skilah. 
• Yetzias Miztrayim (the Exodus from Egypt) was orchestrated as a polemic against the avodah zarah of Egypt, as I wrote about in my article Chametz – Why So Serious? Thus, every holiday which commemorates an aspect of Yetzias Mitzrayim and every mitzvah which reminds us of Yetzias Mitzrayim is, by extension, related to avodah zarah. 
• According to the Rambam [11], the entire avodah (divine service) in the Mikdash (Temple) was designed to uproot avodah zarah. 
• There are numerous chukim (mitzvos whose reasons are not obvious) which the commentators explain to be aimed at uprooting specific avodah zarah beliefs and practices. These include mitzvos pertaining to kashrus, arayos (prohibited sexual relations), kilayim (prohibited mixtures), and more. 

The more one delves into the taamei ha’mitzvos (the reasons or objectives of the commandments), the more one comes to realize the truth of the Ramban’s assertion that “avodah zarah is the root of all mitzvos” – but only if we understand this to be referring to philosophical avodah zarah, rather than halachic avodah zarah. 

And this is especially true in light of our third fundamental premise. 

Fundamental Premise #3: The Derech Avodah Zarah 

Avodah zarah has no basis in reality – that is, in the objective external world. Rather, it stems from the subjective internal world of the psyche. There are certain internal trends (instincts, feelings, beliefs, habits, urges, insecurities, neuroses) which give rise to both philosophical and halachic avodah zarah. These internal psychological trends may be characterized as the derech avodah zarah (literally, “the way of idolatry” or “idolatrous psychological tendencies”). 

For example, to attribute supernatural powers to a physical object is derech avodah zarah, even if one recognizes that such a belief is irrational and doesn’t act on it. To be frightened of the number 13 is derech avodah zarah, even if a person doesn’t change his or her decisions in order to avoid this “unlucky” number and knows that numbers can’t cause any harm. According to the Rambam, who maintains that all forms of magic, sorcery, and occult practices are false and ineffective, it would be the derech avodah zarah to believe that they are real, even if one doesn’t actually engage in such practices. 

One of my rabbeim described such superstitious thoughts and feelings as “the soil in which avodah zarah grows.” My Rosh ha’Yeshiva defined the derech avodah zarah as the tendency to “treat the products of the psyche as a reality.” In addition to eliminating halachic and philosophical avodah zarah, the Torah also endeavors to curb, uproot, and sublimate the derech avodah zarah. According to both the Rambam [12] and the Ramban [13], we are enjoined by Hashem to strive for this ideal in the statement: “tamim tihiyeh im Hashem Elokechah (you shall be whole with Hashem, your God)” (Devarim 18:13). This is a tall order – one which was asked of no less than Avraham Avinu: “He said to him, ‘I am E-l Sha-dai. Walk before Me and be whole” (Bereishis 17:1). The path to this state of temimus lifei Hashem (wholeness before Hashem) truly encompasses the entire Torah, with all of its mitzvos and teachings. 

It is for this reason that caution is needed with regards to the derech avodah zarah. Halachic avodah zarah is prohibited across the board. Philosophical avodah zarah is opposed in other ways. But the derech avodah zarah is so deeply rooted that it is not always addressed. Indeed, sometimes Chazal even sanctioned practices which are rooted in the derech avodah zarah. 

An example of this is given by the Meiri [14] in his explanation of Chazal’s treatment of zugos (literally “pairs”). In the olden days, people harbored superstitious feelings about doing things in “pairs.” This posed an obstacle to the mitzvah of the Four Cups on Pesach, since we drink the wine in pairs. The Gemara in Pesachim gives various reasons as to why drinking a pair of pairs of cups on Pesach will not result in harm (e.g. Pesach is described as “a night of guarding” in that it is guarded from harmful spirits; the fact that these cups have blessings recited over them negates the harm). The problem with these answers is that Chazal seem to be endorsing the derech avodah zarah! The Meiri answers this problem by explaining why they did this: 

In many places we have explained that in those days the people were drawn after folk superstitions, such as incantations and omens and folk practices. Anything which did not contain a habit of avodah zarah and darchei ha’Emori (“ways of the Amorites” – idolatrous customs which are prohibited by Torah), [the Sages] did not bother to uproot. Even more so regarding those matters which were accustomed to them. 

In other words, if a particular practice constituted actual avodah zarah, Chazal would have stopped it. But if people harbored superstitious feelings about something which was not actually avodah zarah, not only did Chazal refrain from uprooting them, but they even “catered” to them by providing explanations which indirectly validated the erroneous premises of these derech avodah zarah feelings. 

Nevertheless, one who seeks to attain the level of tamim tihiyeh will strive to understand the origins of avodah zarah within the human psyche, to develop a sensitivity to the derech avodah zarah in themselves, and to strive to counteract those derech avodah trends. 

Conclusion 

In light of these three premises we can see that the warnings about avodah zarah given by Moshe Rabbeinu before his death are relevant today just as they were 3,300 years ago. Avodah zarah is not an antiquated component of Torah, but its very foundation. Halachic avodah zarah may be limited in its scope, especially in a post-pagan era, but philosophical avodah zarah is alive and well. Overt acts of avodah zarah may be avoidable, but the derech avodah zarah is insidious, and continuous to plague us despite our sophistication. 

End Notes

[1] Sifre Devarim 11:28

[2] lit. “admits to” or “acknowledges [the validity of]” or “upholds.” 

[3] This statement is codified by the Rambam in Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 2:4 

[4] Talmud Bavli Maseches Megilah 13a 

[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Moreh ha’Nevuchim 3:37 

[6] Sefer ha’Chinuch Mitzvah #26 

[7] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Devarim 4:3 

[8] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 2:5 

[9] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Avodah Zarah 1:3; Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 9:4; Sefer Kedushah, Hilchos Maachalos Assuros 11:7 

[10] see Tosafos Sanhedrin 63b and Bechoros 2b; full disclosure – I have not learned Tosafos’s view firsthand. 

[11] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Moreh ha’Nevuchim 3:32 

[12] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 11:16 

[13] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Devarim 18:13 and Bereishis 17:1 

[14] Rabbeinu Menachem ben Shlomo Meiri, Beis ha’Bechirah Pesachim 109b

Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife?

This week’s dvar Torah is a digest of the answers given by the Rishonim [1] to a classic question, along with an original answer based on my understanding of Sefer Koheles. 

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Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife? 

The Question 

Parashas Bechukosai opens with a list of the blessings that Hashem promises to bestow “If you will follow My decrees and observe My commandments and perform them” (Vayikra 26:3). Among these blessings are: rain in its proper time, abundant produce, peace in the land, military success, flourishing of our population, and Divine favor. A similar list of blessings is stated in Parashas Ki Savo (Devarim 28:1-14). 

But there is a shocking omission from both lists of blessings: Olam ha’Ba (the “World to Come” or “afterlife”), the ultimate reward for a life of Torah and mitzvos. 

This is a famous problem. Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? In contrast, the Oral Torah and midrashic literature are replete with references to Olam ha’Ba, the most prominent of which is the Mishnah’s statement: “All of Israel has a portion in Olam ha’Ba” (Sanhedrim 10:1). 

This discrepancy between the Written and Oral Torahs has led modern academics to conclude that the entire notion of an afterlife was a Rabbinic invention, introduced long after the Biblical period. Those who wish to believe such conspiracy theories will not be convinced by any arguments, and I will not even attempt to address them here. Suffice it to say, our Mesorah (tradition) is clear on this point: belief in Olam ha’Ba has always been a unanimously accepted part of Judaism, despite the fact that it is not explicitly referenced in the 24 books of Tanach. 

But the question remains: Why does the Written Torah omit Olam ha’Ba from its lists of rewards? Why does it focus exclusively on the physical blessings? 

Seven Answers from the Rishonim 

The Abravanel [2] raises our question in his Chumash commentary and refers the reader to a book he wrote on the topic of Olam ha’Ba called Tzedek Olamim, in which he answers this question in full. Sadly, this book has been lost to history. Fortunately, the Abravanel provides a brief summary of six answers given to our question by his predecessors, followed by his own seventh answer. Here are my summaries of the Abravanel’s summaries: 

(1) Rambam [3]: The blessings and curses promised in the Torah are not the true reward and punishment for the mitzvos. The true reward is Olam ha’Ba, which is purely spiritual in nature. The reason why the Written Torah didn’t mention this reward is so that a person will follow Torah lishmah (for its own sake) – or, as the Abravanel puts it, “for the sake of perfection” – rather than for the sake of reward or out of fear of punishment. The role of the blessings and curses is to facilitate our pursuit of human perfection for its own sake: to the extent that we follow Hashem, He will provide us with physical goods and remove physical impediments from our lives so that we can continue in our pursuit of perfection without worrying about our material well-being; and to the extent that we neglect His will, He will withhold His blessings and we will be subject to these curses which will impede our pursuit of perfection. 

(2) Ibn Ezra [4]: The reward in Olam ha’Ba is a deep concept which is difficult for the average person to grasp. Since the Written Torah was given to the entire Jewish nation – not just the elite scholars – it was necessary to only mention the physical rewards and punishments, which can be understood by everyone. The sode (“secret” or esoteric concept) of Olam ha’Ba was relegated to the realm of the Oral Torah, thereby allowing every teacher to assess their student’s readiness for this concept on an individual basis, in accordance with that student’s level of development. 

(3) Ramban [5] / Sefer ha’Chinuch [6]: Belief in the eternality of the soul and its reward in Olam ha’Ba is a matter that can be rationally demonstrated by way of philosophical argument, and therefore did not need to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. In contrast, the blessings and curses are miraculous [7] phenomena which operate according to the principles of hashgachah (Divine providence) known only through nevuah (prophecy), which is why it was necessary for the Torah to spell them out in detail. 

(4) Ran [8] / Kuzari [9]: The majority of the people, in ancient and modern times, denied the reality of hashgachah pratis (individual Divine providence). This denial was rampant among the Jews as well. Were the Torah to only promise spiritual reward and punishment after death, then these misguided Jews would take this as a confirmation of their deistic worldview. Therefore, it was necessary for the Torah to reinforce the truth of hasghacha pratis by going into great detail about the physical blessings and curses that will transpire as a result of our adherence to Torah. As for the reality of the spiritual reward and punishment for the soul in Olam ha’Ba: this can be inferred from the physical blessings and curses in Olam ha’Zeh (the physical world). Once we see that God provides us with physical rewards, which relate to the lower part of our nature (i.e. the body), we will realize that certainly He must provide us with spiritual reward, to compensate the higher part of our nature (i.e. the soul). 

(5) Saadia Gaon [10]: The ovdei avodah zarah (idolaters) engaged in various behaviors which they believed would bring them material success and protection from physical harm. When Hashem prohibited these idolatrous practices, He didn’t want His people to think that they would lose out on these material benefits. Therefore, He promised us as part of His covenant that by keeping the Torah, we would enjoy rewards in the physical world greater than anything that the ovdei avodah zarah hoped for from their false gods, since Hashem is the true God of heaven and earth, Who has the ability to bestow such blessings as He sees fit. There was no need to mention spiritual rewards, since the promises of physical rewards were only included in the covenant to refute the false promise of physical blessings by the ovdei avodah zarah. (Apparently, the ovdei avodah zarah of that era did not yearn for spiritual rewards, which is why there was no need to mention them in the covenant.) 

(6) Kuzari [11] / Ran [12]: The afterlife of the soul is explicitly mentioned in the blessings promised by the Torah in such statements as: “I [Hashem] will walk among you” (Vayikra 26:12), “I will place My dwelling among you” (ibid. 26:11), “I will be God unto you” (ibid. 26:12). [The Abravanel then goes on to explain how, if the nature of this spiritual reward is properly understood, then even the promises of physical blessings will serve as a proof that the souls of the righteous will survive after death. However, I’m not 100% sure that I follow every step of his explanation, and I would rather omit it from my summary than risk misrepresenting this line of reasoning.] 

(7) Abravanel [13]: It would not be proper to mention Olam ha’Ba in the context of Bechukosai and Ki Savo, since these blessings are for the nation as a whole rather than for individuals, whereas the spiritual rewards of the afterlife are for individuals and not for the nation as a whole. If the Torah had mentioned Olam ha’Ba in its lists of blessings, this might lead to misconceptions about the nature of the reward in the afterlife. For example, one might mistakenly conclude that one’s portion in Olam ha’Ba is determined or affected by the righteousness and wickedness of the majority of nation, as is the case with the physical blessings and curses. 

An Eighth Answer 

Shlomo ha'Melech says: “Give a portion to seven but also to eight” (Koheles 11:2). While the seven of the aforementioned answers all have their merits, I would like to offer an eighth answer – one which lines up with that of the Rambam, but with a twist. 

The Rambam [14] devotes the final chapter of Hilchos Teshuvah to a discussion of the motives for serving Hashem. He opens his discussion by defining two levels of Divine service: 

A person should not say, “I will do the mitzvos of the Torah and involve myself in its wisdom in order to receive all of the blessings that are written in it,” or “in order that I will merit life in Olam ha’Ba” and “I will separate myself from the transgressions about which the Torah warns us, in order to escape from the curses written in the Torah” or “so that I will not be cut off from Olam ha’Ba.”  

It is not proper to serve Hashem in this manner, for one who serves Hashem in this manner is called “oveid mi’yirah” (“one who serves out of fear”). This is neither a virtue of the prophets nor of the wise. The only ones who should serve Hashem in this manner are the ignoramuses, the women, and the children, whom we train to serve out of fear until their minds develop and they serve out of love.  

An “oveid me’ahavah” (“one who serves out of love”) involves himself in Torah and mitzvos and walks on the paths of wisdom not because of anything in the world, neither out of fear of the bad nor out of a desire to inherit the good. Rather, he does what is true because it is true, and the good will come of its own accord … 

It is easy to understand why doing mitzvos in order to receive the blessings promised by the Torah is considered to be an inferior motive, but why should this apply to one whose service is motivated by the prospect of reward in Olam ha’Ba? Didn’t the Rambam write earlier [15] that Olam ha’Ba is the greatest good? 

The [ultimate] goodness which is hidden away for tzadikim is Olam ha’Ba. This is the life which has no death with it, and the good which has no bad. This is what is written in the Torah, “so that it will be good for you, and you will prolong your days” (Devarim 22:7). From the Oral Torah we learn: “so that it will be good for you” [refers] to the world which is entirely good, and “you will prolong your days” [refers] to the world which is entirely long – and this is Olam ha’Ba. 

If Olam ha’Ba is the ultimate good, why shouldn’t it motivate our observance of mitzvos? 

The answer lies in the fact that it is impossible for us to comprehend the true nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba. The Rambam [16] introduces this difficulty in his introduction to Perek Chelek. He writes: 

Know that just as a blind man cannot experience colors, nor can a deaf man experience sounds, nor can a eunuch [experience] sexual desire, so too, physical bodies cannot experience spiritual enjoyments. And just as a fish does not recognize the element of fire because it (i.e. the fish) is immersed in its opposite, so too, one cannot know the enjoyments of the spiritual world while one is in this physical world, for we have no enjoyment other than bodily enjoyments alone – [such as] the experiences of our senses in eating, drinking, and sex – and everything outside of these [physical enjoyments] is not experienced by us, nor can we recognize it, nor can we apprehend it in our initial analysis, but only after much investigation. This is because we are in a physical world and cannot apprehend anything other than its enjoyments, but enjoyments of the soul are constant and unceasing, and there is no relationship at all whatsoever between these and those. 

Similarly, the Rambam [17] writes in the Mishneh Torah: 

Regarding the great good which the soul will enjoy in Olam ha’Ba: there is no way in Olam ha’Zeh to comprehend it or know it, because we only know in Olam ha’Zeh the good of the body, and that is what we desire; but that good [in Olam ha’Ba] is exceedingly great, and there is no comparison among the goods of Olam ha’Zeh except by way of analogy. 

Indeed, a few paragraphs earlier the Rambam condemns those who harbor foolish notions about the nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba, writing: 

Maybe this good will seem trivial in your eyes, and you’ll imagine that the only reward for mitzvos and for being a person who is perfected in the ways of truth is to eat and drink good foods, have relations with beautiful figures, wear garments made of silk and woven fabrics, dwell in houses of marble, and use gold and silver utensils and other things like this – as is imagined by the foolish and idiotic Arabs who are steeped in lechery.

But the wise and those who possess knowledge know that all of these things are fantasy and nothingness, and there is no hope in them. They are only considered to be a great good for us in Olam ha’Zeh because we have bodies, and all of these things are bodily needs, and the soul only desires them and favors them because they are bodily needs, in order that its desires will be fulfilled and its health maintained. And when there is no body, all of these things will be found to be pointless. 

Having established all of these premises, I would like to propose my own answer to our original question: Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? Because since it is absolutely impossible to conceive of the spiritual enjoyments of Olam ha’Ba, then if we were to be motivated by the promise of such a reward, we would – by definition – be chasing a fantasy. In other words, whatever notion of Olam ha’Ba is driving our motivation must, of necessity, be false, since it is impossible for a physical being to conceive of non-physical enjoyments. 

It is for this reason that the Torah promises physical blessings to those who obey Hashem. The individual whose avodah (Divine service) is motivated by these physical blessings and the individual whose avodah is motivated by Olam ha’Ba are both engaged in avodah she’lo lishmah (not for its own sake), but the former individual is on a higher level because at least he’s being motivated by a reality, whereas the latter is being motivated by a fantasy. 

Make no mistake: Olam ha’Ba itself is a reality, but the version of Olam ha’Ba as a motivator is a fantasy. The vision of Olam ha’Ba in our minds and imaginations, to which our psyche attaches value, and which acts as the proverbial carrot (paired with the proverbial stick) – that notion of Olam ha’Ba has no basis in reality whatsoever. In contrast, “rains in their proper time,” “eating bread in satiety,” “peace in the land” and all of the other physical blessings exist as motivators in our imaginations which do correspond to their physical reality. 

This sheds light on the Divine wisdom in relegating Olam ha’Ba to the Oral Torah. In Hashem’s “Plan A” (so to speak), students would not be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba until they were developmentally ready, as the Rambam [18] describes: 

Therefore, when we teach the children, women, and general populace of laymen, we should only teach them to serve out of fear and in order to receive reward, until their minds mature and they gain additional wisdom; we should reveal this secret to them bit by bit, and accustom them to this concept with pleasantness, until they apprehend it and know it and serve out of love. 

Parents and teachers would motivate their children and students to serve Hashem for the she’lo lishmah motive of obtaining the blessings mentioned in the Written Torah. As they reached the requisite level of psychological and intellectual maturity, they would be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba, which would click into its proper intellectual place as a truth about reality, rather than as a motivator for avodah. In this manner, they would bypass the stage of being motivated by a fantasy notion of Olam ha’Ba altogether. 

Ultimately, we cannot know why Hashem chose not to mention Olam ha’Ba explicitly in His lists of rewards, but these eight theories allow us to appreciate the fact that this was done with reason, and with wisdom. 

[1] This is a general remark, but I might as well mention it here. The line between Rishonim and Achronim is a matter of debate. Some distinguish between the two periods based on dates (e.g. the Rishonim are those who wrote in the 11th century to the 15th century, and the Achronim are post-15th century) or by specifying a cutoff point (e.g. all commentators who came before the composition of the Shulchan Aruch were Rishonim, and all who came after are Achronim). Personally, I don’t like either of these approaches. I prefer to define the two groups by their time period AND their relationship to their predecessors and/or their style. For example, I classify the Abravanel (1437 – 1508) as a Rishon because he argues with his predecessors as a contemporary, rather than a disciple. I classify the Sforno (1475 – 1550) as a Rishon because of his commentary’s style and commentary. 

[2] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 26:3 

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1); Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 9 

[4] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer Devarim 32:39; it should be noted that the Ibn Ezra’s answer to this question parallels his answer to R’ Yehuda ha’Levi’s question on the first of the Aseres ha’Dibros: Why does Hashem introduce Himself to the Jewish people by saying “Who took you out from the land of Egypt” instead of “Who created the heavens and the earth”? See the Ibn Ezra’s long commentary on Shemos 20:2. 

[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 18:29 

[6] Sefer ha’Chinuch: Introduction. The Abravanel doesn’t actually quote the Sefer ha’Chinuch with reference to this view, but since it was the first place I encountered it in my own learning, and since the Sefer ha’Chinuch expands upon this view even more than the Ramban, I decided to attribute this view to him in my list. Moreover, the Abravanel attributes this view to “Rabbeinu Bachya ha’Zaken, as mentioned by the Ibn Ezra” but according to the Warsaw manuscript and H. Norman Strickman, the name mentioned by the Ibn Ezra is actually “Rabbeinu Hai.” This possible misattribution is yet another reason why I opted to label this under the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s name. 

[7] According to the Ramban, as the Abravanel himself points out. 

[8] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran #1 

[9] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi (Kuzari) 1:104-117 

[10] Rabbeinu Saadia Gaon, Emunos v’Deos 9:2 

[11] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi 1:115 

[12] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran, end of #3 

[13] The Abravanel credits the Ramban for this approach, based on the latter’s Commentary on Sefer Devarim 29:20; he also cites the Sefer ha’Ikkarim 4:40, chastising him for citing this answer in his own name rather than in the name of the Ramban. 

[14] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 10:1-2 

[15] ibid. 8:1 

[16] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1) 

[17] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 8:6 

[18] Ibid. 10:5

Parashas Emor: Does Hashem Hate Unibrows?

Does Hashem hate unibrows? No, of course not! But then why does the Torah ban a Kohen with a unibrow from serving in the Beis ha’Mikdash? In this dvar Torah we will examine the nature of these physical disqualifications and consider their implications within the Torah system as a whole.

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Parashas Emor: Does Hashem Hate Unibrows? 

Parashas Emor introduces the prohibition for a physically blemished Kohen to perform avodah (service) in the Beis ha’Mikdash (Holy Temple): “Any man from among the offspring of Aharon the Kohen who has a blemish shall not approach to offer the fire-offerings of Hashem” (Vayikra 21:21). This parallels the prohibition to offer blemished animals as offerings, which is also discussed in this parashah: “Any [animal offering] in which there is a blemish you shall not offer, for it will not be favorable for you” (ibid. 22:20). 

The pesukim (verses) specify a number of examples of both categories of blemishes which are expanded upon in great detail by Torah she’baal Peh (the Oral Torah). There are a total of 140 physical blemishes that disqualify a Kohen from avodah, 90 of which are unique to human beings, and 50 of which are common to Kohanim and animals. The halacha classifies these 140 blemishes by their location on the body. In order to appreciate the nature and scope of these blemishes, here are a few examples from each category: 

• head (misshapen skull, various forms of baldness)
• neck (too short, too long)
• ears (blindness, too small, asymmetrical in size) 
• eyebrows (unibrow, asymmetrical in appearance)
• eyelids (no eyelashes, too squinty)
• eyes (abnormal positioning, abnormal shape, abnormal size)
• nose (abnormal positioning, abnormal shape, abnormal size)
• lips (over/under-bite, cracked lips, frequent spittle)
• belly (swollen, "outie" navel)
• back (crooked spine, hunchback)
• hands (abnormal number of fingers, webbed fingers, left-handed person)
• reproductive organs (abnormal size, injured scrotum, missing testicle)
• legs (bowlegged, abnormal number of toes, clicking ankles)
• stature (disproportionate trunk, abnormal height)
• skin (albino, very red skin, any type of mole, scarring)
• miscellaneous (deaf, epileptic, suffering from tremors on account of sickness or old age, suffering from severe depression, bad body odor) 

The major question here is: Why should these blemishes disqualify a Kohen from avodah? Does Hashem have something against physically blemished individuals? Does He find clicking ankles to be annoying? Does He regard albinos as subhuman? Does bad B.O. spoil the “fragrant aroma” (Vayikra 1:9) of the burnt offerings? Indeed, some modern readers may find these laws to be not only questionable, but morally reprehensible, and accuse the Torah of stoking the flames of certain forms of discrimination, such as ableism, ageism, and other prejudices. 

Before offering an answer, we will briefly respond to the types of charges against Torah mentioned in the aforementioned paragraph. Renowned pathologist Dr. J. Beckwith begins his historical essay, Congenital Malformations: from Superstition to Understanding, as follows: 

Throughout most of human history, congenital anomalies were perceived as omens, portents, or punishments of supernatural origin. This concept is reflected in the term “monster,” probably derived from the Latin verb monstrare (to show or reveal). Other explanations for congenital abnormalities included witchcraft, astrological configurations, or emotional experiences of the pregnant mother. 

Individuals suffering from physical deformities and bodily abnormalities were feared, shunned, and ostracized in many cultures, especially in ancient times. Dr. Beckwith elaborates on this phenomenon, citing an example from a neighboring ancient civilization to ours: 

Birth defects were interpreted as omens or portents in many early cultures. For example, Babylonian–Assyrian cuneiform tablets include an extensive catalog of anomalies believed to represent omens, some of which are clearly based upon observation of actual cases. 

Torah society stands in stark contrast to these prevailing views and attitudes in the ancient world. Judaism does not regard individuals with physical abnormalities to be inferior in any way to any other person. There is no discrimination when it comes to their religious observance nor are there any limitations to their roles in the community (with the sole exception of Kohanim in Mikdash). These individuals were never regarded as “cursed” or “harbingers of evil” or anything that even remotely negative. Indeed, the Sages decreed that a blessing should be recited upon seeing such an individual: “Blessed are You, Hashem, our God, King of the universe, Who makes creations different.” In other words, physical abnormalities are not viewed as negative, but are regarded positively as expressions of the wisdom and magnificence of the Creator. Moreover, the Torah clearly states that the essence of the human being is the tzelem Elokim (truth-seeking intellect) – not the physical body. Thus, there are no grounds for the assumption that a person should have lesser value in the eyes of God simply because his or her body looks different.

Of course, this only strengthens our question! These laws of Kohanim’s blemishes are an anomaly – the only Torah laws which, on the surface, seem to stigmatize physical imperfections. 

The Sefer ha’Chinuch (Mitzvah #275) answers this question as follows: 

At the root of this mitzvah lies the reason that the majority of people’s actions are favorable to the hearts of those who see them in accordance of the eminence of those who do them. For when a man is distinguished in his appearance and good in his actions, he “will find favor and good success” (Mishlei 3:4) in everything he does in the eyes of all who observe him. If, however, he is the opposite of this – inferior in his form or peculiar in his limbs – then even if he is straight in his ways, his activities will not be so attractive to the heart of those who see him. 

It is therefore truly fitting that the messenger (i.e. the Kohen), on whom atonement depends, should be a man of grace, handsome in appearance and fair in features, and pleasing in all his ways – that the minds of men may be drawn to him. And in addition to this, it is possible that in the perfection of his form lies an intimation of matters through which, as a man’s thoughts dwell on them, his spirit will be cleansed and exalted. 

It is therefore not right in any way that there should be in him [the Kohen] any deviation in any of his forms whatsoever, lest the spirit of the contemplator be distracted on account of the peculiarity and stray from the desired goal. 

According to the Sefer ha’Chinuch, physically blemished Kohanim were not barred from performing the avodah on account of any inherent deficiency or inadequacy on their part. Rather, as we say nowadays, it was all about “the optics.” The Beis ha’Mikdash is meant to be an awe-inspiring place, as the Sefer ha’Chinuch describes (Mitzvah #95): 

Hashem desired the good for human beings, as we have stated. Therefore He commanded us to establish a location that should be pure and clean to the ultimate degree of cleanliness, to purify there the thoughts of people and to rectify and perfect their hearts towards Him. 

Indeed, it is a mitzvah to be in awe of Mikdash, as the Sefer ha’Chinuch writes (Mitzvah #254): 

[He commanded us] to have a reverent awe of the Sanctuary: in other words, that we should regard and establish it in our souls as the place of awe and veneration, so that our hearts will be moved when we come there to pray or to bring offerings, as it is stated: “and you shall revere My Sanctuary” (Vayikra 19:30). 

The Sefer ha’Chinuch’s explanation of the Kohanim’s blemishes is built upon this idea, namely, that in order to produce the proper degree of awe, reverence, and inspiration in those come to the Beis ha’Mikdash, the Kohanim had to be flawless in their appearance. Anything less would detract from the intended effect of the Sanctuary, which was to inspire the visiting Jews to emulate the priestly models of avodah who ministered therein. 

A modern example of this phenomenon can be drawn from the world of fashion. Clothing companies know that in order to sell their products, they must use flawlessly attractive models, in ads and in clothing stores. These companies know that the vast majority of individuals will never live up to the beauty standards of these models, but will nevertheless purchase this clothing hoping that they will partake of some level of attractiveness, like these models. 

Just as attractive models enhance the attractiveness of the clothing they wear and cause the onlookers to aspire to this level of attractiveness, the same is true of the Kohanim. These are individuals who have devoted their lives to Hashem, to learning and teaching Torah, and to giving up their private civilian roles in order to live a life apart as models of avodas Hashem. They are intended to be the equivalent of Hollywood celebrities, epitomizing the life of chochmah (wisdom) and divine service rather than the life of fame and glamour. We are meant to look up to them and want to be like them, knowing full well that their lifestyle will likely be outside of our reach. When a Jew makes a pilgrimage to the Beis ha’Mikdash and sees Kohanim in action, he should be filled with a sense of awe and admiration. If that Kohen were blemished in any way, this would shatter the illusion and dilute the effect, thereby impeding the fundamental mission of Mikdash. 

This is why physical blemishes only disqualify Kohanim from their role in avodah, and do not invalidate any other Jew from doing any other mitzvah. Only Kohanim in the awe-inspiring Mikdash occupy this celebrity status in Judaism. There are other classes of individuals who are to be admired and emulated – such as talmidei chachamim (Torah scholars), tzadikim (righteous people), chasidim (pious people) – but none of these individuals function in the same capacity as the Kohanim of Mikdash. “For the lips of the Kokhen should safeguard knowledge, and people should seek teaching from his mouth, for he is an angel of Hashem, Master of Legions” (Malachi 2:7). Just as the true “angels of Hashem” are pristine in their metaphysical purity, so must their earthly counterparts be pristine in their physicality. 

I believe that this gives us some insight into the Torah’s general approach in mitzvos. The Rambam (Moreh ha’Nevuchim 3:32), in his famous explanation of korbanos (sacrifices), writes: 

Many commandments in our Torah are the result of a similar course adopted by the same Director, for it is impossible to go suddenly from one extreme to the other; therefore, it is impossible for man – according to human nature – to suddenly discontinue everything to which he has been accustomed. 

The Rambam applies this to korbanos, explaining that it would have been too much for Hashem to completely abolish a mode of worship to which the people had become so attached. He cites an example of Hashem using this approach in a non-mitzvah area: 

There occurs in the Torah a passage which contains exactly the same idea; it is the following: “God did not lead them by way of the land of the Philistines, even though it was near, for God said, ‘lest the people change their mind when they see war, and return to Egypt;’ but God led the people around, by way of the wilderness of the Sea of Reeds” (Shemos 13:17). Here Hashem led the people around, away from the direct road which He originally intended, because He was concerned that they might meet on that way with hardships too great for their ordinary strength; He took them by another road in order to obtain thereby His original goal. In the same manner Hashem refrained from commanding what the people by their natural disposition would be incapable of obeying, and gave the aforementioned commandments as a means of accomplishing His primary goal– namely, knowledge of Him, and the rejection of avodah zarah. 

The disqualifying blemishes of the Kohanim are another example of this phenomenon. On the one hand, the Torah does not assign any inherent value to physical attractiveness. At the same time, the Torah recognizes that it is human nature to care about physical appearances. The Torah can emphasize time and again that the essence of a human being is the tzelem Elokim and that true success lies in the pursuit of knowledge rather than beauty, but at the end of the day, the average Jew will still look askance at a Kohen with a unibrow, will be distracted by a Kohen who is an albino, and will be put off by a Kohen with bad body odor. 

In other words, the Torah must walk a fine line between its idealistic goal of perfecting human beings and the pragmatic realities of catering to human nature. That line can only be drawn by the Creator of man, “the God of the spirits of all flesh” (Bamidbar 16:22). Shlomo ha’Melech said: “Train the youth in accordance with his way (i.e. his nature), and even when he is old, he will not deviate from it” (Mishlei 22:6), and the same pedagogical tactic is employed by the Giver of Torah.

The Month of Av: Unlucky or Misunderstood? (Part 1 of 2)

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Artwork: Drown in Sorrow, by Noah Bradley

The Month of Av: Unlucky or Misunderstood? (Part 1 of 2)

Introduction

There seems to be a fairly prevalent belief that the month of Av is an "unlucky time." People rearrange their plans, pushing off certain "risky" endeavors until after the month of Av (or, at least, until after Tisha b'Av). They avoid things like traveling, surgery, and business ventures because they feel that undertaking these activities during the month of Av is dangerous and ill-fated. I have seen a number of English articles which refer to the month of Av as an "inauspicious" (read: "unlucky") time of the year for Jews. 

The position taken in this article is that the month of Av is not unlucky, but merely misunderstood. Although we will start with the halacha as codified in the Shulchan Aruch, this article is intended to be theoretical - not normative. In other words, always consult your rabbi before making any changes to your halachic practice. 

Why the Misconception is a Misconception

Even before we look at any of the relevant sources, let us first establish why it is halachically inadvisable for the month of Av to be treated as "unlucky." 

One of the 613 mitzvos is a lo taaseh (Biblical prohibition) called "meonein." Since there's no adequate English translation of the term "meonein," we'll stick with the Hebrew. The Sefer Ha'Chinuch (Mitzvah #250) provides the following definition of meonein, based on the words of the Sages: 

The explanation of this subject is as it was given in the Midrash Sifra: [the Hebrew verb, te'oneinu, denotes] the sense of onah, a designated time - i.e. that we should not determine set times, to say that this hour is "good" for doing that activity in it, and whoever does it at that time will succeed, and whoever does it at this other time will not succeed - as the deluding masters of sorcery say. 

The Rambam, in the Mishneh Torah (Laws of Idolatry and the Statutes of the Gentiles 11:9), elaborates on this prohibition of "designating times," and mentions additional examples: one who says that a specific day is a "good" or "bad" day for doing a particular activity, or a particular year, or a particular month. 

In other words, meonein is the prohibition to designate a period of time as "good" or "bad" (i.e. auspicious or inauspicious, lucky or unlucky, blessed or cursed) for certain activities. According to Torah law, a person who does an action in accordance such a designation is liable for the penalty of whiplashes. For example, if a person were to believe that Friday the 13th is unlucky and decided not to take his driver's test on that day, believing that he'd fail, or if a person thought that his birthday was lucky and decided to buy a lottery ticket on that day, believing that he'd win, then he would be in violation of the Torah prohibition of meonein. 

The most well-known form of meonein is astrology. One who consults horoscopes or astrologers and acts on the basis of their counsel transgresses the Torah prohibition of meonein. According to the Sefer Ha’Chinuch’s definition, not only astrology but any designation of a time period as "good" or "bad" for a certain activity for any reason falls within the scope of this prohibition.

Thus, the problem with the popular belief about Av is is clear. If a Jew believes that the month of Av is an “unlucky time,” thinking that this is what the Gemara meant, and avoids certain activities based on this belief, then there are grounds to say that he would be in violation of the Biblical prohibition of meonein according to the Sefer ha'Chinuch and the Rambam.  

Thus, whatever sources we encounter in the course of our investigation, we cannot understand them to be indicating that a certain time period is auspicious or inauspicious. 

The Source of the Misconception

My guess is that the most common source of this widespread misconception is a pair of halachos that are brought down in the Shulchan Aruch: Orach Chayim Siman 551. One of these halachos pertains to the month of Av as a whole, and the other pertains to the period of time known as "the Three Weeks," though the two are often conflated:

551:1 - From the beginning of Av we diminish rejoicing, and a Jew who has a court appointment with a non-Jew should avoid it [during this time], because its mazal is bad.  

551:18 - One must be careful from the 17th of Tammuz until the 9th of Av to not walk alone from four [halachic] hours until nine [halachic] hours - Rema: because Ketev Meriri is prevalent - and they should not strike students during these days. 

It is easy to see how a superficial glance at these halachos might seem to support the popular belief. Why else would we be cautioned to avoid non-Jewish courts during the month of Av if not for the fact that Av is an bad time for the Jews? Even more significant is the explanation "its mazal is bad,” which seems to indicate that the month of Av is "unlucky." The second halacha goes even further, cautioning us to avoid certain dangerous activities during the Three Weeks on account of the Ketev Meriri - which, as we'll see later, is the name of a havoc-wreaking demon.

But as is often the case, things are not so simple when we examine them closely and critically. First of all, "its mazal is bad" cannot mean that the month of Av is unlucky, as we have explained based on the prohibition of meonein. Secondly, these two halachos do not caution us against all hazardous activities. Indeed, there are only three activities mentioned in these halachos, and all of them have specific parameters: (1) all Jews should avoid court appointments with non-Jews during the month of Av, (2) all people should avoid walking alone between the halachic hours of 4 and 9 during the Three Weeks, and (3) teachers should avoid striking their students during the Three Weeks.

In other words, based on the halachos - according to the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema, at least - there is absolutely no basis for avoiding anything during these time periods except for these three specific activities. There are no other activities we are cautioned to avoid for similar reasons as these.

The Original Source of the Misconception About Av

We will begin by looking up the original source of the first halacha cited in the Shulchan Aruch above, leaving aside the second one for later. The mishnah on Taanis 26b states: "at the onset of the month of Av, we diminish our rejoicing." The Gemara (Taanis 29a-b) explains:

At the onset of the month of Av, we diminish our rejoicing: Just as we diminish rejoicing at the onset of the month of Av, so too, at the onset of the month of Adar (Rashi: which were days of miracles for Israel, Purim and Pesach) we increase rejoicing. 

Rav Pappa said: Therefore, a Jew who has a court appointment at a non-Jewish court should try to avoid it during the month of Av because it has a bad mazal, but he should be present in court during the month of Adar because it has a good mazal.

The key term here is: "therefore a Jew who has a court appointment etc." In other words, the Gemara is not saying:"since the month of Av has bad mazal, therefore we diminish rejoicing and avoid court appointments with non-Jews," which is the intuitive way to conceive of this cause-and-effect relationship. Rather, the Gemara is saying: "since we are obligated to diminish rejoicing during the month of Av, therefore we should avoid court appointments with non-Jews during the month of Av, on account of its bad mazal." Stated differently, the month of Av generates a halachic obligation to diminish rejoicing, and it is on account of this obligation that we avoid court appointments with non-Jews.

Questions to Be Answered

There are several basic questions on the Gemara here:

1. What is special about the month of Av, such that we diminish rejoicing? Yes, we know that the first and second Beis ha'Mikdash were destroyed, and a number of other tragedies happened, but is this why we diminish joy? 
2. Why does this requirement to diminish joy express itself in an obligation to avoid court cases with non-Jews? This seems awfully specific, and not directly related to any of the tragedies that happened during the month of Av?
3. What does the Gemara mean when it says that the month of Av has "bad mazal"?
4. How would we answer these same questions with regards to the obligation to increase joy at the onset of the month of Adar? The fact that there isn't a corresponding superstition which regards the month of Adar as "lucky" is telling. Clearly, symmetry of this Av / Adar halacha isn't as intuitive as the Gemara seems to take it. What is the reasoning behind the parallel halacha regarding the onset of the month of Av?

This seems like a good place to end this blog post. Next time we'll attempt to answer these questions, and shed some light on the halacha in the Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 551:18 regarding our cautionary conduct during the Three Weeks.

Click here for Part 2:

Parashas Masei: Leviim as Role Models of Tolerance

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Artwork: Answered Prayers, by Seb McKinnon

Parashas Masei: Leviim as Role Models of Tolerance

The United States of America in the year 2019 is a curious place. For all of its "progressive" emphasis on compassion, inclusivity, and acceptance of intentional lifestyle choices, it is shockingly intolerant and unforgiving when it comes to unintentional offenses.

This category of "offenses" is not limited to criminal infractions, but includes any speech or behavior which inadvertently results in emotional pain or personal offense to others. Even the innocent act of expressing an unpopular opinion may be labeled an "attack" or an "act of aggression" by those who feel "victimized" by hearing sentiments with which they disagree.

There is a growing list of public figures - actors, comedians, artists, authors, politicians, celebrities - who have been guilty of such missteps and have been called out for their "crimes." As a result, these people are publicly shamed, boycotted, blacklisted, canceled, and subjected to verbal abuse or even physical threats, usually over social media. In many cases, even when they apologize and express genuine regret, they are not absolved or forgiven by the public. Instead, their transgressions are considered unpardonable and the perpetrators irredeemable. 

There is a mitzvah in this week's parashah which may shed some light on the Torah's view of this phenomenon. Upon entering the Land of Israel, Bnei Yisrael were commanded to establish 48 cities. These cities serve two functions: (1) all 48 cities are to be the residence of the Leviim (Levites), who do not own any other portion in the Land, and (2) six of these are to be designated as cities of refuge for unintentional murderers to flee from the goel ha'dam (blood avenger) where they will remain protected until their release upon the death of the Kohen Gadol.

The Sefer ha'Chinuch refers to this as "the mitzvah upon Israel to provide cities to the Leviim to dwell therein" (Mitzvah #408). In his explanation of "the root of the mitzvah" (i.e. the benefits or objectives of the mitzvah), he addresses the fact that these cities were to be inhabited by two very different groups of people. The distinguished scholar-class of the Leviim are to live side by side with the criminal-class of the unintentional murderers. The Torah could have set up the cities of refuge in the territories of the other tribes. Why send the unintentional murderers to live exclusively with the Leviim?

The Sefer ha'Chinuch provides two answers to this question, the second of which is as follows:

There is another reason for the matter: Since they (i.e. the Leviim) were men of [good] heart, renowned for the eminent worth of their character traits and their noble wisdom, it was evident to all that they would not detest the murderer who took refuge with them, and would not harm him, even if he killed one of their good friends or avenging blood relations (i.e. relatives whose kinship would cause them to avenge the victim's murder), since he killed them suddenly (i.e. unintentionally), without enmity. About this chosen tribe it is stated, "who said of his father and mother, 'I have not seen him'" (Devarim 33:9). In other words, they would do nothing in the world that was not in accordance with the upright path and in line with the truth, and their heart would not be swayed by the love of any person - not even love for a father and mother, brothers and sons, whose love is necessitated and compelled by nature - and all the more certainly not love for any other human beings. I wrote another argument about this subject in the eleventh negative mitzvah in Sidrah Behar.

The Sefer ha'Chinuch's comments in Behar pertain to the mitzvah "not to alter the open land around the cities of the Leviim or their fields" (Mitzvah #342). There he writes:

At the root of this mitzvah lies the reason that the cities of the Leviim were prepared for the needs of all the other tribes. For this was the tribe chosen for avodas Hashem (the service of Hashem), and their entire occupation was with chochmah (wisdom), since they were not burdened with the affairs of agricultural labor like the other tribes of Israel. Of them it was said, "They will teach Yaakov Your ordinances, and Israel Your Torah" (Devarim 33:10). And because of the fact that there was wisdom among them, all the Israelites always had dealings with them, apart from the fact that among their cities were the cities of refuge for an unintentional killer. As a result, the eyes of all Israel were on their cities, "for a man never knows what a day may bring forth" (Mishlei 27:1).

It was therefore only right that those cities, in which all had an equal interest, with which the heart of all was concerned, should have a perfection of beauty and attractiveness. It would be to the praise and advantage of the entire people of Israel. Therefore, the order was given about them that nothing in their arrangement was to be changed. For the Sovereign Ruler of all founded and constructed them and set their boundaries, and He saw that it was good. Then any alteration beyond His words would be nothing but a detraction and a disgrace. 

There are several important lessons to be gleaned from this explanation.

Lesson #1 - Unintentional Murderers Deserve Compassion: By "compassion" I mean that they are to be treated "in accordance with the upright path," like any other Jew or human being, and not "harmed" or even "detested" by their neighbors. Although this level of compassion wouldn't necessarily extend to intentional* murderers, who committed their crimes "with enmity," it should be noted that those who seek refuge in one of these cities are not entirely blameless. If a death came about as a result of a totally freak accident, then the murderer wouldn't be exiled to a city of refuge, since he wouldn't be liable at all. The only murderer who lives in the cities of refuge is one who killed another person as a result of harmful actions on his part which he should have foreseen and prevented. In other words, he is guilty of lethal negligence, and is at fault for the loss of life he caused. Nevertheless, the Torah expects him to be treated in a kind and civil manner, and to not to be stigmatized in any way for his crime. This is true even if he hasn't done teshuvah.

Lesson #2 - The Torah Has High Expectations for Such Compassion: The Sefer ha'Chinuch makes it clear that the Torah expects the inhabitants of the cities of refuge to treat these murderers with this level of compassion no matter what - even if the murder victim was a close friend or relative. This is an exceedingly high level. The Sefer ha'Chinuch even says that one's feelings towards the murderer shouldn't be swayed by the natural love for one's own family. One might think that it would be impossible to achieve this level of personal clemency - and yet, the Torah considers it possible.

Lesson #3 - The Torah Does Not Expect This of All People: Nevertheless, the Torah's expectations are only this high for Leviim, whose lives are devoted to avodas Hashem and chochmah. The Torah does not have such high expectations for average Jews. According to the Sefer ha'Chinuch, this is why there are no cities of refuge in the territories of the other tribes. If there were, the murderers who lived there would be mistreated and resented because of the crimes they committed. Only Leviim can be relied upon to not give in to the natural human inclination to vilify and marginalize those who have committed manslaughter. 

Lesson #4 - The Torah Expects Us to Aspire to This Level: Even though average Jews are not expected to reach the level of the Leviim, we are expected to look up to them as role models. As the Sefer ha'Chinuch stated, "the eyes of all Israel were on their cities," knowing how and with whom the Leviim live, and being inspired by their virtues - including their tolerance and compassion towards the murderers in their midst.

These insights provide a new perspective on the prevalent attitude in America towards public figures who inadvertently cause offense through their words or actions. Bear in mind that we are not talking about terrorists, serial killers, school shooters, rapists, pedophiles, white collar criminals, corrupt politicians, or anyone else who knowingly and intentionally commits wrongful acts. We are talking about those who caused harm or hurt through mistakes - unintentional speech or behavior which could have been seen and prevented, but was not, due to negligence on the part of the perpetrator.

The major take-away from the Sefer ha'Chinuch's explanation of this mitzvah may be stated as follows: If the Torah maintains that a person who mistakenly kills another human being through  negligence deserves compassion and protection from maltreatment, then certainly this would be true of a person who unintentionally caused emotional offense or hurt feelings. 

Does the Torah expect all Jews to be able to rise above the natural tendency to malign the wrongdoers in our midst? No. This is a difficult task and an uphill battle. Yet, the Torah does expect us to recognize "the upright path," and to acknowledge that it is possible for some of us to reach an exceedingly high level of compassion even towards those who committed the worst crime - taking another human life - provided that they didn't intend to cause harm.

Clearly there is a lot more to be discussed on the topic of how we ought to treat and feel about various types of wrongdoers and criminals. The best approach is to learn whatever we can from each Torah law, and strive to incorporate these lessons into the way we live. And even if we can't live up to the lofty ideals conveyed through these mitzvos, we should still take these lessons to heart to the degree that we are able, and continually aspire to better ourselves in accordance with the Torah's value system. 

* There are other mitzvos and other sources in the Torah which enlighten us as to how we should treat and feel about intentional murderers and other reshaim (evildoers). This topic is multifaceted, and is beyond the scope of this blog post.