The Harmful Notion of the "Jewish Soul"

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The Harmful Notion of the "Jewish Soul"

Disclaimer and Context

This is more of a "rant" than a strictly "lishmah" post. I have consciously chosen to write this post as more polemical than dialectical. For this reason, do not expect this to be a comprehensive treatment of the topic at hand, in which both sides of the issue are examined from a detached, analytical, non-judgmental perspective. Unlike most of the posts on this blog, which I strive to write from a neutral standpoint, this post has an agenda: to articulate why I object to the notion of "Jewish souls."

I think it would help to provide some context for how I came to write this post. Last week I was invited to join a new (secret) Facebook support group for gerim (converts). Hearing so many personal stories of discrimination and insensitivity towards gerim has caused me to revisit some of the ger-related topics which I hadn't thought about for a while.

In Friday's dvar Torah (Which Souls Were at Sinai?) I mentioned a pet peeve of mine: when born-Jews learn that I'm a ger (convert) and exclaim, "Oh, but you're such a good Jew! You CLEARLY must have been born with a Jewish soul!" or "You CLEARLY have a spark of Yiddishkeit in your soul!" or "You MUST have had a Jewish ancestor, and now your Yiddishe neshamah (Jewish soul) is just finding its way back home!" 

I am irked by comments like these for three reasons: (1) they are racist, in the sense of being "anti-goyim," (2) they minimize my journey to Judaism and my conversion, and (3) according to my understanding, the notion of a "Jewish soul" is false. 

We will now discuss each of these three reasons. 

Reason #1: Racism / Anti-Gentilism

I know that in most cases, born-Jews don't mean anything bad or malicious by such statements, but that doesn't change the anti-goyim undertones of their words. The underlying message I hear in their words is: "It simply cannot BE that you were once a GOY! Goyim can't POSSIBLY be part of the Jewish people! Therefore, you MUST have been a Jew SOMEHOW! Heaven FORFEND that a dirty goyishe neshamah could have found its way into our holy ranks!"

Now, before any of the born-Jews start "Jewsplaining" to me how I'm reading too much into statements like these, let's see if we can agree to the following four points: (1) there are born-Jews who say these things WITHOUT these intentions, even on an unconscious level; (2) there are born-Jews people who say these things who DO harbor such intentions, even though they aren't aware of them or don't mean anything bad by them; (3) there are geirim who are NOT bothered by such comments, and might even find them to be welcoming and affirming of their Jewish identity; (4) you, as a born-Jew, have never been on the receiving end of comments like these, and therefore, you have a different perspective than I do; you are certainly entitled to your opinion, but you cannot tell me how I feel. 

I've even had students who love my classes and have learned from me for years, but will nevertheless speak in my presence about "the disgusting goyim" and how "goyim don't have souls" or how "goyim were made to be our slaves." Whenever I hear such comments I usually respond, "You know, I used to be a 'disgusting goy.' Are you saying that I didn't have a soul? Was I born to be your slave" to which they respond, "No, Rabbi ______, I wasn't talking about YOU! Obviously YOU are different!" These kids are too young to realize the weaknesses of "the friend argument" (i.e. "I'm not racist! I have friends who are black!"), but that is essentially the argument they're trying to make.

It's no secret that Jewish tribalism and elitism has always "been a thing" in our nation, and has been reinforced by millennia of Antisemitism. This is understandable, and even excusable insofar as it is a natural defense mechanism which is (arguably) necessary for Jewish survival. But the historical reality of Antisemitism certainly does not validate anti-goyim beliefs or sentiments, nor does it justify making anti-goyim remarks in the presence of those of us who used to be goyim.

Reason #2: Minimization of Geirus (Conversion)

When you tell a ger (whether explicitly or implicitly) that he or she "was destined to be Jewish," be aware that you might be perceived by the ger to be minimizing the significance and/or hardship of his or her journey and conversion process. 

There are so many different types of paths that people take to Judaism, some of which are harder than others. I have heard horror stories from gerim that you wouldn't believe, filled with instances abuse, discrimination, and despicable behavior from Jewish laypeople and rabbis alike. Think about what it means to tell a person who has been through such a difficult journey, "Oh, that? Yeah. That wasn't your free will decision, and had nothing to do with your perseverance, or your love for Hashem and His Torah, or your sacrifices you made, or your trust in the truth of your convictions, or your courage. It was in your spiritual DNA. You were basically programmed to follow this path. It had to happen." 

Would you ever say something like this to a veteran who survived a war, or to someone who went through therapy, or to a person who is in recovery from an addiction? These may sound like "negative" comparisons to geirus, but they are apt analogies for those whose path to Judaism was fraught with challenges and hardships. 

Without knowing the full story of the ger to whom you are speaking, making statements such as these can easily stray into the territory of onaas ha'ger (abusing a convert).

Every day, those who are born Jewish make the berachah of "she'lo asani goy" ("Blessed are You, Hashem, King of the universe, Who did not make me a gentile"). I, as a ger, do not make that berachah because Hashem did make me a goy. [1] Let me say that again: Hashem made me a goy, and I chose to become a ger. Don't minimize my life and my decisions by telling me that my soul was already Jewish. 

Reason #3: Falsehood

Since the topic of "the soul" is extremely broad and deep, I will confine my remarks here to a general summary of my reasons for rejecting the notion of a "Jewish soul," and point the way to resources for further reading.

As far as I know, based on my own research and the research of academic scholars I have read on this matter, the idea of a "Jewish soul" is an entirely "Kabbalistic" [2] and/or Chasidic concept. The distinction between Jewish and non-Jewish souls cannot be found anywhere in the Written Torah, the Oral Torah, or in any of the non-"Kabbalistic" works of the Kadmonim [3]. Sure, it can be read into these sources - but if you learn through these classical sources on their own terms, without the influence of "Kabbalah" or Chasidus, you would not encounter any distinction between Jewish and non-Jewish souls. 

Does this lack of sources mean that this belief is false? Not necessarily. "Ee efshar l'beis midrash b'lo chidush - it is impossible to have a study hall without innovation" (Chagigah 3a). Nevertheless, whenever I see a concept which only appears in "Kabbalistic"/Chasidic sources with no basis in the Written Torah, the Oral Torah, or the writings of the non-"Kabbalistic" Kadmonim, then I am suspicious - especially if the concept in question is purported to be a fundamental of Judaism. If there is no evidence that Chazal and the Kadmonim were aware of a particular concept, then at the very least, this means that it is not an essential part of Judaism. At worst, this means that it is not part of Judaism at all. 

According to my understanding of the Written Torah, the Oral Torah, and the writings of the non-"Kabbalistic" Kadmonim, people only have one kind of soul: a human soul. This is the soul that the Torah refers to when it says: "And God said, 'Let us make man in our form (b'tzalmeinu), like our likeness (ki'dmuseinu)'" (Bereishis 1:26) and "God created man in His tzelem (form); in tzelem Elokim He created him; male and female He created them" (ibid. 1:27) and "Hashem-God formed the man of dust from the ground, and He blew into his nostrils nishmas chayim (the soul/breath) of life, and man became a nefesh chaya (living/speaking soul)" (ibid. 2:7).

According to all of the Kadmonim, the tzelem Elokim refers to the human intellect: man's capacity to apprehend and seek conceptual knowledge and understanding. There is no inherent difference between the tzelem Elokim of a Jew and that of a non-Jew. Frankly, I don't even know what it would mean to differentiate between a "Jewish intellect" and a "non-Jewish intellect." [4] 

The distinction between Jew and non-Jew is a legal one - not metaphysical one. In other words, "Jew" and "non-Jew" are halachic labels, indicating the particular system of Divine law by which one is legally bound. A Jew is someone who has entered into the covenant of Torah - whether by birth or by conversion - and is legally obligated to keep the system of Taryag mitzvos (613 Commandments). Non-Jews, on the other hand, are only obligated to keep the Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach (Seven Noahide Commandments), which have been binding on all humans since the time of Noach, and which were "renewed" with the giving of Torah at Sinai. [5] 

Maybe someday I'll write a post in which I compile sources from the Kadmonim which state these points explicitly, alongside a list of the "Kabbalistic"/Chasidic sources which assert a metaphysical distinction between the souls of Jews and non-Jews. However, as I pointed out in my disclaimer, this is a polemical post - not a dialectical one. Suffice it to say, the burden of proof is on the "Kabbalists"/Chasidim to show that their belief has its source in the Mesorah (or to show that their belief is valid despite not having a source in the Mesorah). 

[Incidentally, if you would like to peruse a fairly comprehensive list of sources from both sides, check out The Soul of a Jew and the Soul of a Non-Jew, by Hanan Balk, published in Hakirah. This article also does a great job of illustrating why I consider the belief in "Jewish souls" to be harmful, dangerous, and repugnant.]

There is only one of the Kadmonim who, at first glance, might seem to hold that Jews and non-Jews have different souls: R' Yehuda ha'Levi. In his famous work, "the Kuzari," R' Yehuda ha'Levi [6] writes that only Jews possess the "Inyan ha'Elohi" ("divine quality") - a metaphysical quality which allows Jews to become prophets. Non-Jews do not have the Inyan ha'Elohi. Not only that, but even gerim lack the Inyan ha'Elohi; our conversion doesn't endow our souls with this special quality that only born-Jews possess.

Much has been written about R' Yehuda ha'Levi's view on this matter, but for the purposes of this post we are only interested in one thing: Does this view of Inyan ha'Elohi imply that the souls of Jews and non-Jews are inherently different? The answer is: no. R' Yehuda ha'Levi clearly held that Jews are born with a special quality which non-Jews lack, but their souls are fundamentally the same. Professor Menachem Kellner expressed this eloquently in his book, Maimonides' Confrontation with Mysticism:

It is important to emphasize: Halevi does not affirm that Jews differ biologically from non-Jews, that Jews have special souls, or that Jews are a species apart. He does not hold that non-Jews are any less created in the image of God than are Jews. He maintains that Jews have a special property (the potential to become prophets) lacking in non-Jews. This property is in some fashion (never explained by Halevi) transmitted through lineage. 

[For a detailed exposition and clarification of R' Yehuda ha'Levi's view, I recommend Professor Norman Strickman's article Misrepresenting Rabbi Judah Ha-Levi.]

The bottom line: I will continue to maintain that the Kadmonim did not recognize any difference between the soul of a Jew and that of a non-Jew, until someone shows me that I am incorrect. The only difference between a Jew and a non-Jew is obligation in mitzvos. Our souls are inherently the same. [7]

Jews and Non-Jews: A Common Soul, and a Common Path

I'd like to end this post on a more positive note.

Because Jews and non-Jews have the same human soul, we share a common path. As we said before, the Torah that Hashem gave through Moshe Rabbeinu was intended for Jews and non-Jews alike; the only difference is which system of mitzvos we are legally obligated to keep. According to Judaism, a righteous non-Jew has a portion in the World to Come. [8] Not only that, but a non-Jew is capable of reaching the same spiritual heights as a Jew. Adam ha'Rishon, Shem, Eiver, Chanoch, Noach, and Avraham Avinu were all non-Jews - yet, all of them were able to achieve high levels of closeness to God. The Gemara says (Sanhedrin 59a):

R' Meir says: How do we know that even a non-Jew who involves himself in the study of Torah is equal to a Kohen Gadol (High Priest)? As it is stated, "[You shall observe My decrees and My laws,] which man shall carry out and by which he shall live" (Vayikra 18:5) - it does not say, "Kohanim, Levites, and Israelites" but man. From here we learn that even a non-Jew who involves himself in the study of Torah is equal a Kohen Gadol.

The Rambam [9] codifies this principle at the end of his discussion about the special role of Shevet Levi (the Tribe of Levi). He writes:

Why didn’t the Tribe of Levi merit in the inheritance of the Land of Israel and its spoils along with their brethren? Because they are set aside to serve Hashem and to minister to Him and to teach His upright ways and righteous laws to the masses, as it is stated, “They shall teach Your laws to Yaakov and Your teachings to Israel” (Devarim 33:10). 

Therefore, they are separated from the ways of the world. They do not go to war like the rest of Israel, nor do they receive an inheritance, nor do they acquire for themselves with their bodily power, but rather, they are the legion of Hashem, as it is stated: “Bless, O Hashem, His legion” (ibid. 33:11), and He, Blessed is He, provides for them, as it is stated: “I Am your Portion and your Inheritance” (Bamidbar 18:20).  

Not only the Tribe of Levi, but each and every member of humanity whose spirit generously moves him and whose understanding of his knowledge [of all existing things causes him] to separate himself to stand before Hashem to minister unto Him and to serve Him in order to know Hashem, and to walk with uprightness as God made him, removing from his neck the yoke of the many calculations which people seek – he becomes sanctified as holy of holies. God will be His portion and heritage forever and ever, and He will provide what is sufficient for him in this world like He provides for the Kohanim and the Levites. And thus David declared: “Hashem is the lot of my portion; You are my cup; You support my lot” (Tehilim 16:5). 

This halacha is predicated upon the fact that Jews and non-Jews possess the same tzelem Elokim, and are drawn to the truth in the same way, as the Rambam [10] writes in Hilchos Teshuvah:

He instilled within them the capacity to learn and to understand - for this tendency is present in every man, that the more he is drawn after the ways of chochmah (wisdom) and tzedek (righteousness), the more he desires them and pursues them. 

Yes, it is true that our nation has a special status among the nations of the world. Nevertheless, our national identity as "the Chosen People" does not indicate any inherent superiority on our part, nor does it imply that Jews have different souls. Rather, it is a reference to our role in humanity: to be "a kingdom of priests and a holy nation" (Shemos 19:6), to teach mankind to fear and love Hashem. 

It is for this reason that the prophets promise that one day, all of humanity will be united by our pursuit of knowledge of Hashem, which stems from the tzelem Elokim within each and every human being. "For the earth will be filled with knowledge of Hashem, as water covers the sea bed" (Yeshayahu 11:9). "On that day, Hashem will be One and His Name will be One" (Zechariah 14:9).

[1] To my knowledge there is no non-"Kabbalistic" halachic view which maintains that a ger should make the berachah of she'lo asani goy. If anyone knows of such a view, please let me know.

[2] I have chosen to write the word "Kabbalistic" in quotation marks so as not to enter into the dicey analysis of which so-called "kabbalistic sources" are authentic, which are innovations, and which are fabrications. All I mean by "Kabbalistic" (with quotation marks) is that the proponents of these works consider them to be Kabbalistic. 

[3] By "Kadmonim" I am referring to the Geonim, Rishonim, and early Achronim. These Kadmonim include, but are not limited to: Rambam, R' Avraham ben ha'Rambam, Rav Hai Gaon, Saadia Gaon, Ramban, Ibn Ezra, Ralbag, Rabbeinu Bachya ibn Paquda, Rif, Sforno, Rashba, Rashi, Baalei Tosafos, Ritva, Radak, Rashbam, R' Yosef Albo, R' Yehudah ha'Levi, Meiri, Avudarham, Raavad, Ran, Rabbeinu Yonah, Sefer Ha'Chinuch, Abravanel, Chazkuni, Rabbeinu Bachye ben Asher, Rosh, Tur, and more. See my post Neglecting the Thinkers of the Past for more details on this group.
[4] It can be argued that there are "Jewish types of thinking" (e.g. Talmudic analysis, Scriptural analysis in accordance with the principles of Torah she'baal Peh), and one can even try to argue that there are quantitative differences between the intellects of Jews and non-Jews (though I personally don't buy this), but these are a far cry from claiming that there is a qualitative difference between a Jewish intellect and a non-Jewish one.
[5] Taryag is a regimen designed to bring those who practice it properly to true human perfection, whereas the system of Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach is designed to keep mankind from descending to the level of animals, thereby granting them the opportunity to pursue human perfection on their own, or with the aid of the Torah regimen.

[6] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha'Levi, Kuzari 1:95

[7] There is also an ideological definition of Jew, as defined by the first mishnah in the 10th chapter of Sanhedrin, whose meaning and implications are heavily debated by the meforshim (commentators). This definition of Jew is even narrower than the halachic definition. In other words, there are a significant number of people who are halachic Jews (i.e. they are obligated to keep Taryag), but are not considered a part of the Jewish people (i.e. they do not hold by the foundational ideas that define the people "Israel"). This is a separate topic, but I thought it would be worthwhile to mention in passing.

[8] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Shoftim, Hilchos Melachim 8:11

[9] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Zeraim, Hilchos Shemitah v'Yovel 13:12-13

[10] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 6:4

Parashas Vaeschanan: Which Souls Were at Sinai?

In truth this is more of a dvar Torah on Parashas Nitzavim. I was going to save this for Parashas Nitzavim itself, but that time of year is usually occupied with other important ideas to write about, so I decided to go for it this week. 

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Artwork: Spectral Gateguards, by Wayne England

Parashas Vaeschanan: Which Souls Were at Sinai?

The Impetus for This Post

Earlier this week I participated in a Facebook discussion on the various forms of subtle discrimination against geirim (converts) which persist in the Jewish community. I mentioned that one of my personal pet peeves is when born-Jews hear that I am a ger and say something like, "Your neshamah (soul) was definitely at Sinai!" I casually remarked that I don't believe in "Jewish souls" (a topic I intend to write about next week), and even if I did, I don't believe that the souls of geirim were present at Maamad Har Sinai (the Revelation at Sinai).

In response to this statement someone asked, "So you don't believe that your soul was at Mt. Sinai with all the other Jewish souls (including those of geirim), when the Torah was given?" to which I replied with an emphatic: "No - nor do I believe that the souls of all Jews were at Sinai."

That's when I decided to write a blog post on this topic. 

Souls at Sinai

In Parashas Nitzavim the Torah says: 

"Not with you alone do I seal this covenant and this imprecation, but with whoever is here, standing with us today before Hashem, our God, and with whoever is not here with us today." (Devarim 29:13-14)

The Abravanel [1] raises a major question:

Who gave the Dor ha'Midbar (Generation of the Wilderness), who stood at Har Sinai, the power to obligate their children who would come after them by saying, "naaseh v'nishmah - we will do and we will obey" (Shemos 24:7), thereby causing [their offspring] to enter into the covenant with Hashem and making them swear upon their souls that they would not violate it forever, to the point where they obligated them in all the words of the Torah and the covenant which they sealed, and to punish their offspring after them?

My students often ask this question in a slightly different way: "Why don't we get a choice whether or not to be Jewish? How is it fair that our ancestors accepted the Torah for us?"

We will not take up the Abravanel's answer to this question in this post. My apologies for those who were interested in what he has to say. The only reason I brought up the Abravanel's question is so that I can quote his refutation of the incorrect answer he's heard. He writes: 

It is not proper to allow ourselves to be appeased by what the Early Sages (of blessed memory) said, that all of the souls who would ever exist until the end of all generations  - all of them were at Sinai, and all of them affirmed and accepted this covenant [upon themselves] with an imprecation and an oath. 

Why doesn't the Abravanel accept Chazal's answer at face value? He explains:

It is difficult for the intellect to believe this. How could there be souls [that were present at Sinai] without bodies? Mitzvos are only obligatory upon a soul combined with a body, which we refer to as "man," as it is stated: "that man should do [the mitzvos] and live by them" (Vayikra 18:5). And the dead are free [from obligation in mitzvos], because when their souls separate from their bodies, they are no longer "man." Moreover, mitzvos are a chovas ha'guf (obligation that is incumbent upon the person himself), and we cannot obligate someone who isn't present. 

It's also not enough to answer like the one who says that this group of 600,000 people included all [possible] forms and appearances and all possible [personality] dispositions, and from that point and onward, it is impossible to find a person in the latter generations whose appearance and form were not present [at Sinai] in body and in soul. This would not explain how any man could have sworn an oath at Har Sinai. 

It is difficult for the intellect to accept [these answers], and they are conceptually and inherently weak.

Undoubtedly, the Abravanel's dismantling of this answer will be jaw-dropping for those who have been raised to take this midrash literally. This is a great example of how quick people are to unthinkingly embrace midrashic explanations which cater to the imagination. The difficulties raised by the Abravanel are obvious: How can souls be "present" without bodies? How can a bodiless soul accept mitzvos which were given to human beings? How could such an oath be halachically binding? Yet, these questions don't even occur to most people because the notion of all Jewish souls gathered at Sinai - past, present, and future - is so emotionally appealing.

Before we attempt to figure out what Chazal meant, let's review the major sources inside.

The Midrashim

As far as I can tell, there are three major sources of the notion that "all Jews were at Sinai" in the classic midrashic literature. The first two sources are very similar, and will be examined as one; the third midrash has a different focus, and will be addressed later.

The first source can be found in Shemos Rabbah 28:6:

"And God spoke all of these words, saying etc." (Shemos 20:1). R' Yitzchak said: Everything that neviim (prophets) would prophesy in future generations was received at Har Sinai, for Moshe said to Israel: "with whoever is here, standing with us today before Hashem, our God, and with whoever is not here with us today." It does not say "whoever is not standing here with us today," but "whoever is not with us today." These are the souls that would be created in the future, which do not have substance, and therefore cannot be said to "stand." Even though they were not present at that time, each and every one of them received what was his ... and even the chachamim (wise men) in each and every generation received what was his at Sinai.

A cursory reading might lead one to jump to conclusions: "Ha! You see? Even those souls who were yet to be created were present at Sinai, even though they didn't have bodies!" But upon careful reading we see that Chazal make a distinction: these unborn souls "were not present at that time," and yet, "each and every one of them received what was his" - just as all future neviim received their prophecies, and just as all future chachamim received their wisdom. This needs to be understood. What do Chazal mean? You're telling me that all nevuah and all chochmah was given at Sinai?

To further complicate things, there's a sparser version of this midrash in Midrash Tanchuma (Nitzavim 8) which states:

"not with you alone (Devarim 29:13) - but even the future generations to come were present [at Sinai], as it is stated, "with whoever is here, standing with us ... and with whoever is not here with us today." Why did it say "whoever is here" and "whoever is not here"? Because all souls were there, but the body [corresponding to each soul] had not yet been created; therefore, it didn't say "standing."

This is probably the source that the Abravanel was referring to, since it mentions the issue of souls without bodies. And this midrash explicitly states that all future souls were actually present at Sinai, without bodies.

Nevertheless, we see that this didn't stop the Abravanel from disagreeing. He didn't accept this midrash at face value, due to the difficulties he enumerated.

The question for us is: What do these midrashim mean? Unless you believe that unborn souls can float around at Har Sinai, accept mitzvos, and enter into legally binding oaths and covenants, then what idea are Chazal teaching us in these cryptic statements?

The Idea

I discussed this question with my Mishlei rebbi this morning. He said he'd have to think about it some more, but he gave me his first impression. He suggested that Chazal are teaching a fundamental idea: the basis for our acceptance of the Torah is the Revelation at Sinai, and this basis is open and accessible to all human beings. When Hashem told Moshe: "Behold! I will come to you in the thickness of the cloud, so that the people will hear as I speak to you, and they will also believe in you forever" (Shemos 19:9), He was acknowledging that the Revelation at Sinai would serve as a rational basis for accepting nevuas Moshe (Mosaic prophecy) for all people, in all future generations.

At first I dismissed this interpretation as being overly simple. I thought: "Really? These midrashim are just telling us that Sinai is for everyone? That's it?"

But then I realized the profound implications of this idea. In other religions, the basis of acceptance is only accessible to a select group. In some cases it is the individual priests or prophets who have a special relationship with the god(s) or spirits, and the average person can only connect to the divine through these elite leaders. In other cases the average person must undergo a special "spiritual experience" or attain a transcendental state to establish a foundation for their faith. 

In Judaism, however, the basis of our acceptance is open to everyone with a tzelem Elokim (intellect). There is no special spiritual experience, no listening to mystical inner voices, and no blind faith or divine grace - just the human mind. Using the same criteria by which we evaluate all secondhand knowledge and all historical events, we can rationally demonstrate the historicity of the Revelation at Sinai - and with it, all the contents of Torah.

This also explains what the midrash means when it says that all prophecies of the neviim and all wisdom of the chachamim was given at Sinai. The Rambam [2] and the Ramban [3] explain at length that the only reason we accept other people as neviim is because of the criteria spelled out in the Torah. In other words, we only accept someone as a navi because of the Revelation at Sinai. It is in this sense that all nevuah was "given" at Sinai, since Sinai is the only reason we accept any subsequent nevuah.

So too, the chochmas ha'Torah (Torah wisdom) that our chachamim possess is predicated upon the acceptance of the Revelation at Sinai. When the midrash says "chochmah" it's not talking about the type of chochmah that can be derived outside of Torah - as Chazal say: "If someone tells you that there is chochmah among the goyim, believe him" (Eichah Rabbah 2:13). Rather, the "chochmah" that our midrash is referring to is specifically chochmas ha'Torah, which we only accept because of Sinai. 

This also explains the midrashic sources which use our pasuk in Nitzavim to explain the inclusion of geirim in the acceptance of Torah. For example, the Tosefta (Sotah 7:5) says:

We only [have a proof that] "you [Jews]" accepted Torah. How do we know that the generations that will come after you and convert are also included? Because it is stated: "Not with you alone [do I seal this covenant]" but "with whoever is not here with us today."

One can imagine a religion in which native born Jews are considered to have a special connection to Hashem because their ancestors stood at Sinai, but geirim are relegated to a lower status. That is not how our religion works. When it comes to the Revelation at Sinai and the acceptance of the Covenant, the Jew and the ger are on equal footing.

While this doesn't answer the Abravanel's question about how our ancestors could have accepted the Torah to obligate future generations, it does provide a good explanation for the notion that "all future generations of Jews were present at Maamad Har Sinai."

Snake at Sinai

Another midrash about who was present at Sinai appears in several places in the writings of Chazal (Yevamos 103b, Avodah Zarah 22b, Yalkut Shimoni Bereishis 28, and more). The most complete version can be found in Shabbos 145b-146a:

Why are idolaters mezuhamim (lustful / sexually unrestrained)? Because they didn't stand at Har Sinai, for at the time that the nachash (snake) approached Chava it injected zuhamah (lustfulness / lack of sexual restraint) into her. As for the Jews who stood at Sinai - their zuhamah departed; as for the idolaters who did not stand at Sinai - their zuhamah did not depart. Rav Acha the son of Rava asked Rav Ashi: "What about the geirim?" He responded: "Even though they weren't there, their mazalos (lit. "constellations" or "natural forces") were there, as it is written: 'with whoever is here, standing with us today before Hashem, our God, and with whoever is not here with us today' (Devarim 29:14)."

Note that this midrash differentiates between Jews who WERE at Sinai (or whose ancestors were at Sinai), and geirim, who were NOT at Sinai. If it were true that geirim have Jewish souls, or that the souls of geirim were at Sinai, then the midrash wouldn't need to say that the mazalos of geirim were at Sinai (whatever that means). Either the Gemara wouldn't have mentioned geirim at all (since they would be included with the rest of the Jews), or it would have simply said that the neshamos (souls) of geirim were at Sinai.

The interesting thing about this midrash is that it isn't dealing with the topic of kabbalas ha'mitzvos (acceptance of the commandments), or Hashem's covenant with the Jews. Rather, the midrash is dealing with the difference in dispositions between Jews and idolaters insofar as sexual immorality is concerned. The version of this midrash in Avodah Zarah 22b follows it up by listing deviant sexual practices which were common among idolaters but not found among the Jewish people. It is in this context that the Gemara raises the question about geirim: What about people who descended from idolaters, but have joined the Jewish people? Do they partake of this strain of zuhamah or not - and if not, then how did they remove it? What idea is this midrash teaching us?

The premise of this midrash is that zuhamah has been a part of human nature ever since the cheit of Adam and Chava. [4] When the midrash says that the nachash injected zuhamah into Chava, this is a reference to the transformation of human nature which occurred as a result of the cheit (sin), as I wrote about in Adam ha'Rishon and Tishah b'Av. As a result of this transformation, human beings became encumbered by an overpowering sexual taavah (lust), which was strengthened by the desires and fantasies that resulted from the cheit. 

On the basis of this understanding, a friend of mine suggested the following interpretation:

Jews have an inherent edge over non-Jews in controlling taavah because of the impact Torah has on our lives by bringing us an awareness of God (I think that's what it means "who stood at Har Sinai"). The Gemara is trying to figure out how it is possible that geirim even exist. How is it possible that some people are drawn to Torah without having the structure of Torah built into the fabric of their family lives (i.e. Mesorah) like we do?

The answer to this question must be that God made it that even non-Jews were endowed with a faculty that can be attracted to truth. So although they didn't "stand at Har Sinai" themselves and are not the direct beneficiaries of a built in system of Torah, they were given a faculty that has the potential to be attracted to Torah. Maybe that's it means that their mazal was there - mazal as in constellation/nature.

I don't know whether this is a valid interpretation of "mazal" (since I understood "mazal" to refer to specific external conditions which affect human behavior, rather than the nature of man as a tzelem Elokim), but I definitely like the approach.

Conclusion

The misguided belief that "all Jewish souls - even the souls of geirim - were at Sinai" is as prevalent (if not more prevalent) than knowledge of what the pesukim say happened at Sinai. I find this to be very sad. This belief perpetuates false ideas about the soul, solidifies harmful prejudices against geirim, and sets students up for midrashic betrayal. Worst of all, it dilutes the potency of Maamad Har Sinai by infusing the Torah's historical account with a mythological aura. The more the popular conception of Maamad Har Sinai deviates from the account stated in the pesukim, the more endangered the proof of Torah mi'Sinai becomes.

Some popular midrashim do little harm, and should be left alone. Not this one. Even if we don't understand what Chazal were teaching in these midrashim, the Abravanel's objections should be popularized to counteract the prevailing view.

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Devarim: Questions on Parashas Nitzavim

[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah Chapter 8

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Devarim 13:2-4

[4] It is interesting to note that according to this midrash, the zuhamah was injected into Adam and Chava before she ate from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Bad. This fits in with our understanding of the cheit, and how it affected mankind.

Parashas Shelach: Unity in Israel and in the Written Torah

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Artwork: Plains (THS), by Steven Belledin

Parashas Shelach: Unity in Israel and in the Written Torah

The Questions

If you ask some average parashah-conscious Jews: "What happens in Parashas Shelach?" they'll likely respond: "The Cheit ha'Meraglim (Sin of the Spies)." They might add: "It also tells the brief story about the mekoshesh eitzim (guy who desecrated Shabbos in public by gathering wood)" or "It concludes with the paragraph about tzitzis - the third paragraph of the Shema." But what they probably will NOT say is: "This week's parashah teaches us the laws of menachos (meal-offerings) and nesachim (wine libations), the mitzvah of challah, and the equality of the ger (convert) with the ezrach (native-born Jew)." 

That's right. Immediately after the account of the Cheit ha'Meraglim and before the mekoshesh eitzim and parashah of tzitzis, the Torah takes a seemingly random detour to the laws of menachos and nesachim (Bamidbar 15:1-13), followed by a brief discourse about the equality of the ger (ibid. 15:14-16), followed by the mitzvah of challah (ibid. 15:17-21). [1] 

Three questions arise from this non-sequitur:

1. Why does the Torah present these topics here? The halachos of menachos and nesachim really belong in Sefer Vayikra, with the other laws about the korbanos (sacrifices). The laws of challah seem to have nothing to do with the Meraglim. Why were these mitzvos discussed here, of all places?

2. What is being added by the Torah's discussion of the ger? The Torah has already equated the ger with the ezrach on numerous occasions earlier in the Chumash. Is this message being repeated here for emphasis, or is there a specific reason for its reiteration?

3. Why is the the treatment of this topic so repetitive? The pesukim devote a whopping twenty-three extra words to express this point:

When a ger sojourns with you or one who is among you throughout your generations and he shall prepare a fire-offering, a satisfying aroma to Hashem - as you do, so shall he do. For the congregation - the same decree shall be for you and for the ger who sojourns, an eternal decree for your generations; like you like the ger shall it be before Hashem. One Torah and one judgment shall be for you and for the ger who sojourns among you. (Bamidbar 15:14-16).

To paraphrase the Abravanel's statement of this question: "We get it, we GET it! The ger and the ezrach are equal. Why go on at such length - especially about something we already know?"  

The Answers

The Abravanel [2] answers all three questions - and in doing so, teaches us an important principle of Torah she'bi'Chsav methodology. He writes:

The meforshim (commentators) have already explained why this section was juxtaposed with the topic of the Meraglim. Moshe (peace be upon him) had promised the people of the Midbar (Wilderness) that their children would enter and inherit the land, but [the members of the generation of the Midbar] were afraid and said, "Who knows what will happen in 40 years? Maybe our children will also sin?" 

Therefore, Hashem (blessed is He) saw fit to comfort them and to speak to their hearts, commanding them in the mitzvos of the Land, so they would know that it is evident before Him that they will enter the land. It is for this reason that he [3] commanded them in the nesachim, since they weren't obligated in this in the Midbar, as it is stated in Sifrei (15:2). I think this is because they also didn't offer the Olas Tamid (continual burnt offering) in the Midbar, due to the dearth of animals, flour, oil, and wine ... Through this He promised them that they would, upon entering the land, have many animals - cattle and sheep - and wheat-flour, and oil with which to mix, and wine, and they wouldn't lack anything. 

Likewise, for the same reason, he commanded them afterwards in the mitzvah of challah, to promise them that Hashem would give them the land, despite the fact that their fathers didn't merit it because of their sin ... This is why he said, "When you will come into the Land of your dwelling places that I give you" (Bamidbar 15:2), because this was His promise to them that they would inherit it.

The Abravanel has answered our first question. The members of the Dor ha'Midbar (Generation of the Wilderness) were disheartened by the punishment for the Cheit ha'Meraglim. Although Hashem promised them that their children would inherit the Land, they here hesitant to believe this, since they feared that another national cheit on the scale of the Meraglim might delay them in the Midbar even longer - or worse, a cheit on the scale of the Eigel ha'Zahav (Golden Calf) or Korach's Rebellion might result in the entire nation being annihilated. 

To allay these fears, Hashem chose this as the time to command them in menachos, nesachim, and challah - mitzvos which were not observed in the Midbar, due to the scarcity of resources, but which would be observed in the Land of Israel. By commanding the Dor ha'Midbar in these mitzvos at this time, Hashem was reassuring them that their children would enter the Land on schedule, and enjoy its bounty. 

Next, Abravanel explains the inclusion of the passage about the ger. 

It was necessary to command them regarding the nesachim and menachos of gerim because it was explained in Emor that we don't accept any [korbanos] from goyim except for an olah (burnt-offering) ... However, when the goy offers an olah, he would not bring nesachim; only the ezrach (native-born Jew) would be obligated to bring them with his korbanos - not the goy. 

For this reason the pasuk needed to say, "Every ezrach shall do so with them etc. When a ger sojourns with you etc." In other words ... don't think that [a ger] is exempt from nesachim, as he was before he converted, when he was a goy, and that he would bring a korban without nesachim. This is not so. Rather, "as you do" with korbanos and nesachim "so shall he (i.e. the ger) do" - without any difference at all.

According to the Abravanel, the topic of the ger's equality is introduced to refute a hava amina (mistaken initial assumption) that one might have after learning the halachos of menachos and nesachim. After learning that goyim are exempt from nesachim, one might mistakenly assume that gerim are also exempt from nesachim, since gerim were once goyim. For this reason, the pasuk teaches us that the ger is subject to the same halacha as the ezrach, and is not equal to the goy. This answers our second question.

The Abravanel answers our third question by providing a reason for each of the Torah's seeming repetitions of the equivalence between the ger and the ezrach:

The Torah gave three reasons for why gerim and ezrachim are equally and uniformly obligated in all of the mitzvos: (1) on account of the congregation, because Israel is one nation in the Land; that being said, how could the ger be obligated in [a] different [set of] mitzvos? (2) on account of God, Who is One, Unique, and unchanging; likewise, those who believe in Him should be completely unified; (3) on account the Torah, which is one regimen and one law, and is [therefore] fitting that it should be equal for all those who believe in it. [4]

Regarding the first reason, on account of the congregation, the pasuk said: "the same decree should be for you and for the ger." Regarding the second reason, on account of Hashem, it said: "an eternal decree for your generations; like you like the ger it shall be before Hashem" - in other words, before Him there is no difference between you and the ger. Regarding the third reason, on account of the unity of the religion and the Torah, it said: "one Torah and one judgment it shall be for you and for the ger who sojourns among you."

The Abravanel's answer to our third question may be summed up as follows. After the Torah equates the ger and the ezrach in their obligation of nesachim, it goes on to provide three reasons why the laws are the same for the ger and the ezrach in all mitzvos. Each of these three reasons is reflected in the nuances of the Torah's repetition.

A Lesson in Torah she'bi'Chsav Methodology

We have now answered all three of our questions. But that's not the end of our journey. I mentioned earlier that there is an important methodological lesson we can glean from the Abravanel's answers. 

When my chavrusa and I began working on this area, we were looking for a singular insight which would answer all three questions. We assumed that if we managed to define the underlying theme of this entire section, a unified concept would present itself and resolve all difficulties. 

After learning the Abravanel, we realized that this isn't the case. According to the Abravanel, the placement of these three topics - nesachim, ger vs. ezrach, and challah - does not emerge from a single underlying cause; rather, the sequencing of these topics is associative - not conceptual. The associative sequence is as follows:

• A. The Torah records the events of the Cheit ha'Meraglim and its aftermath. 
• B. Because the members of the Dor ha'Midbar were so dejected, Hashem commanded them in mitzvos that are dependent on the Land of Israel: nesachim, menachos, and challah.
• C. One of the halachos we learn is that a goy is exempt from bringing nesachim.
• D. After learning this halacha, we might mistakenly assume that a ger is also exempt from nesachim, since the ger was once a goy. The Torah therefore teaches us that the ger is equal to the ezrach - in this mitzvah, and in all others.
• E. Once it became involved in the topic of the ger's equality, the Torah completes its treatment of this topic by stating the reasons why the ger is equal to the ezrach.

In other words, my chavrusa and I were looking for an underlying Theory "T" as a common denominator, which would explain A, B, C, D, and E - just as a scientific theory is a universal which explains a number of particulars. According to the Abravanel, there is no such theory in this case. Rather, A led to B, B led to C, C led to D, and D led to E.

This associative sequencing is reminiscent of the style of Talmud Bavli. Anyone who has learned Gemara is familiar with how the Gemara will start Topic A, get bogged down in a discussion about sub-Topic B, resolve the issue by moving to Topic C, and while it's there, throw in a midrash about Topic D, which leads to a chain of other midrashim by Rabbi E, and so on. 

My chavrusa and I learned two things from this: (1) Torah she'bi'Chsav might juxtapose topics for associative reasons, rather than conceptual ones; (2) this is yet another example of why we shouldn't harbor preconceived notions about what an answer is "supposed" to look like - lest we miss out on answers which do not conform to our predefined parameters. 

[1] The topic after that is korbanos for the unintentional worship of avodah zarah (idolatry), which is then followed by the mekoshesh eitzim. I didn't include this in my questions because the relationship between these two topics is clear, due to the strong relationship between Shabbos and avodah zarah. I wrote about this connection in Parashas Shelach: Shabbos, Avodah Zarah, and Skilah.

[2] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 15:13-16

[3] I'm fairly certain that this should be a lowercase "he," in reference to Moshe Rabbeinu, because a few sentences later the Abravanel says: "Likewise, for the same reason, he commanded them afterwards in the mtizvah of challah, to promise them that Hashem would give them the land" - and in that sentence it would be a stretch to read the "he" as referring to Hashem.

[4] Personally, I liked the Ralbag's statement of this explanation even better, despite the fact that he was answering a different question: "The Torah is a single, perfect regimen aimed at one objective; as such, it is impossible to add or subtract from it - and for this reason, it would be impossible [for someone] to accept only part of this regimen" (Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 15:15).