Parashas Korach: Three Types of Machlokes

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Artwork: Abzan Ascendancy, by Mark Winters

Parashas Korach: Three Types of Machlokes

If I told you that there are three types of machlokes (disagreement) - one good, one less-than-ideal, and one REALLY bad - and I asked you which category Korach's machlokes fell into, which category would you guess that would be? I imagine you'd intuitively select "really bad," judging by what happened to Korach and his followers.

According to R' Yehoshua ibn Shbuib [1], this is not the case. Korach's machlokes certainly wasn't good, but it wasn't entirely bad either. 

The Ibn Shuib begins by citing the mishnah in Avos 5:17:

Any machlokes which is not l'shem shamayim (for the sake of heaven) will ultimately not persist, and [any machlokes] which is l'shem shamayim will ultimately persist. Which is [an example of] a machlokes l'shem shamayim? This is the machlokes of Hillel and Shammai. [And which is an example of a machlokes] which is not l'shem shamayim? This is the machlokes of Korach and all of his assembly.

The Ibn Shuib then provides a summary of why Korach's machlokes fits into the second category:

The Tanna called the machlokes of Korach "she'lo l'shem shamayim" to teach us that they didn't present themselves as though they were vying for the positions [of Moshe and Aharon] and challenging their appointments, but rather [they presented themselves] as though they desired to serve Hashem like them; [in reality] they were only trying to make themselves great, which is why it is called "she'lo l'shem shamayim."

Next, he sets forth the three types of machlokes and offers an unconventional explanation of why Korach's machlokes falls into the second category, rather than the third:

There are three types of machlokes. The first is a machlokes l'shem shamayim - those who disagree like Abayye and Rava, or Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and others. Their goal wasn't to elevate their status, but only to derive the true halacha and to arrive at the root of the mitzvah or the law - not to be victorious. And when they saw the words of the wise, they would admit to the truth, as it frequently says: "Beis Hillel retracted and conceded to Beis Shammai," "Rebbi Yochanan withdrew [his original statement]," "Rava retracted from it," and he said, "The things I said before you were an error on my part." And they commanded their students at the end of their days to retract and concede to those who disagreed with them, as we find in [the Gemara] Niddah [2] in the case of the machlokes between Rav and Shmuel with Shila bar Avina - and many [other instances] in the Talmud. 

The second type is a machlokes of false pretenses, [3] like the machlokes of Korach, who misled those in his generation by making it seem as though he was being zealous on behalf of the firstborns and on behalf of the entire assembly because "all of them are holy, and Hashem is among them" (Bamidbar 16:3), and [claiming that] Moshe and Aharon and the others were taking the [appointments of divine] service for themselves and that everyone else should be excluded; [Korach presented his argument in this manner] until [the other members of his assembly] were tricked to follow after him. 

The third type is a machlokes of dominance between people who instigate a dispute and battle for power in trivial matters which have no tzorech mitzvah (mitzvah-function). To the contrary, [these disputes] contain iniquity and transgression, and their intention is to defeat their opponents. This is the last type of machlokes which is not mentioned by the Tanna [of our mishnah in Avos], because it isn't worthy of being mentioned. It is [the type of machlokes] found among other types of animals - domesticated animals, wild beasts, and birds.  

But [the Tanna] did mention the machlokes of Korach because it contained a tzorech mitzvah, since they wanted to serve Hashem - although it wasn't l'shem shamayim like the chachamim who argue in matters of Torah, [whereas Korach and his followers] argued in order to prevail over their fellows and to make a name [for themselves] - and this is somewhat considered to be a mitzvah she'lo lishmah (a mitzvah that is not done for its own sake).  

Thus, machlokes can be divided into three [categories], just like other phenomena which have two divisions [corresponding to] two extremes. The machlokes of Hillel and Shammai and the others is at the extreme side of the good, and the machlokes of dominance is at the extreme side of the bad if it is not for a tzorech mitzvah, and in the middle is the machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim. The Tanna took the second machlokes (i.e. Korach's machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim) and left out the third (i.e. the machlokes of dominance),which contains no good or constructive purpose, but only iniquity, transgression, and great harm. 

I was astonished and intrigued by the Ibn Shuib's classification of Korach's machlokes in the "less-than-ideal" middle category, rather than the "absolutely evil" extreme category. I guess I was so accustomed to thinking of Korach as "the villain" that I automatically assumed the worst. I guess this just goes to show how important it is to evaluate a person's actions on their own terms, without letting one's judgment be clouded by preconceived notions.

The second thing I found interesting about this is that the Ibn Shuib regards Korach's campaign as "somewhat considered to be a mitzvah she'lo lishmah." I've periodically looked into the topic of "the limits of she'lo lishmah." How far afield can mitzvah-motives go and still be considered to be an "acceptable" level of she'lo lishmah? At what point do ulterior motives outweigh the goodness of the mitzvah itself? According to the Ibn Shuib it would seem that a machlokes can have tremendously destructive ulterior motives, but the very fact that these motives are in service of some tzorech mitzvah means that such a machlokes would fall within the "middle" category of she'lo l'shem shamayim, and not the "extremely bad" category of "an animalistic battle for dominance." 

The third thing I gained from this is a shift in my view of "politics" within Jewish communities. As we are all aware, machlokes is far too pervasive within the Jewish world, from shul politics, to conflicts between different factions of Jewry, to infighting that stems from the stances that Jews take in American or Israeli politics. Before encountering this Ibn Shuib I automatically divided all of these instances of machlokes into only two categories: noble l'shem shamayim disagreements and animalistic ego-battles. To my mind, the baal ha'bayis (layman) quarreling argumentatively with the shul president was no different than two drunk guys at a bar getting into a fight to prove who is more macho. As long as the motives were not l'shem shamayim, what difference would it make what they're arguing about? 

But according to the Ibn Shuib, there is a key question that must be asked about any machlokes which is not l'shem shamayim: Does this involve some tzorech mitzvah? If it does, then that alone is a positive quality which is significant enough to define the nature of the machlokes. Such an argument may be fueled by egos, and may even lead to great harm and destruction, but to characterize it as purely animalistic would be incorrect. That designation should be reserved for personal quarrels which have no tzorech mitzvah, like the incident of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza.

And lest you say about one of the parties in a machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim, "But how can you say that there is any redeeming quality in this machlokes? This person/group/institution is trying to undermine the very foundations of Judaism!" the Ibn Shuib would say: "Yep - just like Korach. And just as Korach's machlokes wasn't purely evil, since it involved a tzorech mitzvah, you shouldn't be so quick to condemn the machlokes of which you speak as purely evil as long as it involves a tzorech mitzvah as well." 

This just goes to show the importance of a mitzvah she'lo lishmah within the Torah system. Even though Korach was undoubtedly mistaken and wrong in his actions, beliefs, and motives, and even though Moshe's authority was threatened to the point where Hashem had to intervene with a miracle to put a stop to Korach's coup, nevertheless, his machlokes still contained a modicum of good. 

The implications of the Ibn Shuib's position deserve further thought, but that's all I have to say for now. So next time you see Jews fighting about something, remember that even if they are comparable to Korach, that doesn't mean that there are no redeeming qualities to their machlokes. 

[1] Rabbeinu Yehoshua ibn Shuib, Drashos Ibn Shuib: Parashas Korach; in case you haven't heard of the Ibn Shuib, he was a student of the Rashba and a colleague of the Ritva

[2] Talmud Bavli: Niddah 36b

[3] The Ibn Shuib uses the phrase "מחלוקת ההטעאה" which literally translates it as a "a disagreement of misleading [others]." I translated it as "a machlokes of false pretenses," since I thought this sounded less awkward and conveyed the meaning that the Ibn Shuib goes on to discuss.

Some Musings on Achdus (Jewish Unity)

Originally posted in July 2013

Some Musings on Achdus (Jewish Unity)

The term "achdus" (Jewish unity) often comes up in discussions about social and political issues concerning the Jewish community. This concept is often invoked with unspoken qualifiers, such as "absolute achdus" or "unconditional achdus" or "achdus irrespective of our differences." Such calls for achdus are often bolstered with statements such as "kol Yisrael areivim zeh la'zeh" ("Every Jew is responsible for one another") and "ve'ahavta l'reiecha kamocha" ("You shall love your fellow [Jew] as yourself"). Some go so far as to hurl accusations of sinas chinam (baseless hatred) at anyone whose views are perceived as a threat to this achdus.

There is a simple truth which could stand to be reiterated from time to time: there is good achdus and bad achdus. In order to achieve the former, we must be able to understand, identify, and avoid the latter. That is the topic of this blog post.

We can examine this distinction from many different angles, but in this post we will focus on the statement of Hillel in Avos 2:4: "Al tifrosh min ha'tzibur" ("Do not separate from the community"). The Rishonim take a number of different approaches on this mishnah. I will now present excerpts from the commentaries of three Rishonim. As you read through their explanations, see if you can spot the common denominator. 

We will begin with the commentary of Rabbeinu Yonah:

When the community is involved with a mitzvah, this a crown for the Life of Worlds and an honor for His entire dominion, for when the multitude of the nation gathers to fulfill His mitzvos, it is a "glory for the King" (Mishlei 14:28), and it isn't right to separate from them, as it is stated, "He became King over Yeshurun when the numbers of the nation gathered - the tribes of Israel in unity" (Devarim 33:5). 

All of this applies to when the congregation is following a good path and is gathered to do mitzvos. But when the congregation turns to a bad path and their actions are corrupt, it is not right to join with them, and one who separates from them is praiseworthy. Concerning this, Yirmiyahu ha'Navi said: "If only someone would give me a travelers' lodge in the wilderness, then I would forsake my people and leave them, for they are all adulterers, a band of traitors" (Yirmiyahu 9:1). 

Next, the Meiri:

There are those who explain "do not separate from the community" in reference to their customs (i.e. a person shouldn't deviate from the customs of the community). This isn't a valid interpretation, for if [their customs] are good, then the same would apply even to an individual (i.e. one shouldn't deviate from the good customs of even a single person), but if they are bad, it is proper to rebuke them and to guide him on the straight path - that is, if he is worthy [to rebuke them]. But if he is not worthy [to rebuke them] or if they don't listen to him, then it is definitely proper to separate from them, and even to distance oneself from them exceedingly, in order to be saved from their companionship - even if he is their relative or close friend, as it was stated, "Go for yourself, from your land and from your birthplace" (Bereishis 12:1). And if he doesn't do this, he should be fearful for his soul, lest he perish on account of the sin of the city (cf. Bereishis 19:15). 

Lastly, the Rashbatz:

When the actions of the community are corrupt, one who separates from them is praiseworthy. Concerning this, Yirmiyahu ha'Navi said: "If only someone would give me a travelers' lodge in the wilderness, then I would forsake my people and leave them, for they are all adulterers etc." (Yirmiyahu 9:1). And David said: "I hated the gathering of evildoers, and I did not sit with the wicked" (Tehilim 26:5). And Yeshaya said: "Don't talk about a 'unified group,' for everything this people speaks of is a 'unified group'" (Yeshaya 8:12, translated according to Metzudas Tzion). And the Torah says: "Do not go after the majority for evil" (Shemos 23:2). 

But if their actions aren't too corrupt, you shouldn't separate from them ... 

Did you figure it out? That's right. Although these three Rishonim differ in their interpretation Hillel's statement, they are unanimous in their rejection of "absolute achdus," "unconditional achdus," and "achdus irrespective of our differences." 

Achdus Yisrael is beneficial for society and brings glory to God, but only when that achdus is harmonious with His ratzon. Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar expressed this point when he said: "Any congregation which is for the sake of heaven will ultimately prevail, but one which isn't for the sake of heaven will ultimately not prevail" (Avos 4:11). No matter how this mishnah, it is clear that he is not advocating unconditional achdus.

Artwork: False Peace, by Zina Saunders

To my mind, one of the best depictions of the good type of achdus Yisrael is the Rosh ha'Shanah edition of the third brachah of the shemoneh esreh:

You are kadosh (transcendent) and Your Name is kadosh, and kedoshim praise You every day, forever. And so, too, O Hashem, our God, instill Your awe upon all Your works, and Your dread upon all that You have created. Let all works fear You and all creatures prostrate themselves before You. Let them all become a single society, to do Your will wholeheartedly. For as we know, Hashem, our God, that the dominion is Yours, might is in Your hand and strength is in Your right hand, and Your Name inspires awe over all that You have created. 

The natural question is: How can this achdus be achieved?  On the surface, it would seem that this is an unanswerable question. The question of how to achieve peace has plagued every society since the dawn of mankind. The problem is so multifaceted and daunting that it doesn't even seem worthwhile to ask the question.

Thankfully, Judaism provides a clear answer to this question. How can true achdus be achieved? Through knowledge. I can't express this point any better than the Rambam in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:11, so I'll just quote him in full (with my own paragraph breaks):

All the great evils which men cause to each other because of certain intentions, desires, opinions, or religious principles, are likewise due to non-existence, because they originate in ignorance, which is absence of wisdom. 

A blind man, for example, who has no guide, stumbles constantly, because he cannot see, and causes injury and harm to himself and others. In the same manner, various classes of men, each man in proportion to his ignorance, bring great evils upon themselves and upon other individual members of the species. 

If men possessed wisdom, which stands in the same relation to the form of man as the sight to the eye, they would not cause any injury to themselves or to others: for the knowledge of truth removes hatred and quarrels, and prevents mutual injuries. 

This state of society is promised to us by the prophet in the words: “The wolf will live with the sheep [and the leopard will lie down with the kid; and a calf, a lion whelp, and a fatling together, and a young child will lead them.] A cow bear will graze and their young will lie down together; [and a lion, like cattle, will eat hay.] A suckling child will play by a viper’s mouth; [and a newly weaned child will stretch his hand toward an adder’s lair” (Yeshaya 11:6-8). 

The prophet also points out what will be the cause of this change, for he says that hatred, quarrel, and fighting will come to an end, because men will then have a true knowledge of God. “They will neither injure nor destroy in all of My holy mountain; for the earth will be as filled with knowledge of Hashem as water covering the sea bed” (ibid. 11:9). Note it.

The key to achdus Yisrael is knowledge: knowledge of ourselves, knowledge of Torah, knowledge of the world - all in the framework of knowledge of Hashem. "But let him that glorify himself glory in this: understanding and knowing Me, that I am Hashem, Who does kindness, justice, and righteousness on the earth, for in these is My desire – the word of Hashem" (Yirmiyahu 9:23).

Of course, the Rambam does not mean to suggest that all we need to do is learn Torah 24/7 and everything will automatically take care of itself. People are complicated, and the problems we make for ourselves and for each other are equally complicated. Rather, the Rambam is saying that since ignorance is the root of all problems bein adam l'chaveiro, then all efforts to solve those problems must be based upon, guided by, and move towards knowledge. 

There is one last point I'd like to raise in this post - and this is where it gets tricky. The quest for knowledge must, of necessity, involve disagreement. It must also involve opposition to falsehood - opposition in in mind, in speech, and in action. In an ideal world, this would take place in the spirit of mutual respect and truth-seeking, untainted by ego and other negative emotions. The mishnah in Avos 5:17 points to the disagreements of Hillel and Shammai as the paradigm of "good disagreement" (a.k.a. "machlokes l'shem shamayim" or "disagreement for the sake of heaven").

Unfortunately, we do not live in an ideal world. Our world is filled with people who are intellectually and emotionally immature. We, ourselves, are intellectually and emotionally immature in comparison to others - and even the greatest thinkers are prone to bouts of immaturity. This makes things a lot more contentious and difficult. "Machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim" ("disagreement not for the sake of heaven") prevails, and threatens to disrupt "the good achdus" at every step of the way.

How are we to conduct ourselves in a world divided by machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim? Generally speaking, there are only two directions in which we, as members of Jewish society, can move in seeking a solution: either we can move towards knowledge, or away from it.

There is a trend among those who promote "unconditional achdus" to point out all of the ugliness that is generated by machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim. On this score, they are correct: it can get quite ugly, and cause many problems. 

The mistake, however, is the solution that "unconditional achdus" proponents tend to adopt: they tend to believe that shalom can only be achieved by uncritically embracing and/or tolerating all beliefs and opinions as equally valid. Their approach is founded on a lack of basic epistemological yesodos and an erroneous understanding of concepts like shivim panim l'Torah and eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim chayim. They fail to realize that this approach leads away from knowledge, down the road of ignorance, and - according to the Rambam cited above - to increased harm and suffering.

It would behoove us to remember the example set by Korach and his assembly, in their rebellion against Moshe Rabbeinu. Their machlokes with Moshe is identified by the mishnah in Avos as a machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim - and yet, we do not see Moshe tolerating their views as "equal." The same is true of all the neviim and chachamim throughout Tanach. No matter how steeped in falsehood their society was, they never abandoned their commitment to defending knowledge and truth against the voices of ignorance and falsehood. Ahavas Yisrael they had, but not to the point where it compromised their ahavas Hashem, which is inextricably bound up with their ahavas ha'emes. 

The endeavor to treat all opinions as equally valid will, at best, only achieve a superficial and short-lived achdus - one which will erode the true foundations of true achdus. The only way to secure long-term achdus Yisrael is through the continual and communal pursuit of knowledge. If only we could overlook our differences to the point where we could all engage in an honest and open pursuit of knowledge without validating all opinions. It is possible to treat others with respect, compassion, and genuine empathy without compromising one's commitment to truth-seeking.

I sincerely hope and pray that we all live to see the true achdus in the fulfillment of Tzfania's prophecy: "For then I will change the nations [to speak] a pure language, so that they all will proclaim the Name of Hashem, to worship Him with a unified resolve" (Tzfania 3:9).