Rambam: On the Three Types of Ra

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Rambam: On the Three Types of Ra

It is difficult to choose which chapters of the Rambam's Guide for the Perplexed (Moreh ha'Nevuchim) are the most important, from an objective standpoint. I can, however, say that this chapter (Section 3 Chapter 12) is one that has had the greatest impact on me, personally, in my day-to-day life. 

I teach this text as part of my Iyov curriculum. Truthfully, this chapter ought to be read within the context of the several chapters that precede and follow it. However, it can be read as a standalone text. I decided to present a full translation of this single chapter here, without commentary, so that I can more easily make reference to it in future blog posts. 

One important note on translation. The term "ra" (רע) in Hebrew is multifaceted, and is therefore difficult to render into a single English equivalent. Depending on the context, "ra" can be translated as the following nouns and adjectives:

• bad / badness
• (morally) evil
• displeasing / detestable
• detriment / detrimental
• harm / harmful
• loss / destruction / non-existence
• corruption / deterioration
• pain / suffering
• deficiency / lack / privation
• unhealthy
• inferior

Each usage must be inferred from its context. For example, when a pasuk describes Haman as "ra," it clearly means "evil," but when Hashem is described as "bringing ra upon Bnei Yisrael," it means "harm" or "loss" or "destruction." In Paroh's dream, the adjective "raos" used to describe the cows means "unhealthy" or "inferior." When Mishlei speaks of "ra" as a consequence, it means "detrimental" or "painful." 

In an attempt to preserve this omni-comprehensive use of the term "ra," I will keep it as a transliteration throughout this excerpt. The word "ra" will be used for the adjective or singular form of the noun, and "raos" will be used for the plural form of the noun. Accordingly, the transliterations "tov" and "tovos" will be used as a stand-in for "good" and "goods," and should be understood as the opposite of "ra" and "raos." 

The translation below is a fusion of the Friedlander, Pines, and Qafih translations, along with some of my own. The paragraph divisions and headings are my own as well. 

Rambam: Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:12

The Mistaken Assessment of the Ratio of Ra to Tov

Men frequently think that the raos in the world are more numerous than the tovos; many non-Jewish sayings and songs dwell on this idea. They say that tovos are found only exceptionally, whilst raos are numerous and lasting. Not only common people make this mistake, but even many who believe that they are wise. 

Al-Razi wrote a well-known book: On Metaphysics [or Theology]. Among other mad and foolish things, it contains also the idea, discovered by him, that there exists more ra than tov. For if the happiness of man and his pleasure in the times of prosperity be compared with the mishaps that befall him – such as grief, acute pain, defects, paralysis of the limbs, fears, anxieties, and troubles – it would seem as if the existence of man is a punishment and a great ra for him. This author commenced to verify his opinion by counting all the raos one by one; by this means he opposed those who hold the correct view of the tovos bestowed by God and His evident kindness – namely, that God is absolutely Tov, and that all that comes from Him is absolutely tov without a doubt.

The Cause of this Error and its Remedy

The origin of the error is to be found in the circumstance that this ignorant man – and his party among the common people – judge the whole universe by examining one single person. For an ignorant man believes that the whole universe only exists for him, as if nothing else required any consideration. If, therefore, anything happens to him contrary to his expectation, he at once concludes that the whole universe is ra. 

If, however, he would take into consideration the whole universe, form an idea of it, and comprehend what a small portion he is of the universe, he will find the truth. For it is clear that persons who have fallen into this widespread error as regards the multitude of raos in the world, do not find the raos among the angels, the stars and galaxies, the elements, and that which is formed of them, namely, minerals and plants, or in the various species of living beings, but only in some individual instances of mankind. They wonder that a person, who became leprous in consequence of bad food, should be afflicted with so great an illness and suffer such a misfortune; or that he who indulges so much in sensuality as to weaken his sight, should be struck with blindness, and the like. 

The Correct Perspective of Man's Place in the Universe

What we have, in truth, to consider is this: The whole mankind at present in existence, and likewise every other species of animals, form an infinitesimal portion of the permanent universe, as it is stated: “Man is like nothingness” (Tehilim 144:4); “How much less is man, [who is like] a maggot, and a mortal, [who is like a worm?” (Iyov 25:6); “Surely [He finds fault] with those who dwell in houses of clay” (ibid. 4:19); “Behold, all the nations are as a drop from a bucket” (Yishaya 40:15). There are many other passages in the books of the prophets expressing the same idea. 

It is of great advantage that man should know his station, and not erroneously imagine that the whole universe exists only for him. We hold that the universe exists because the Creator wills it so; that mankind is low in rank as compared with the uppermost portion of the universe, namely, with the planets and the stars. But as regards the angels, there cannot be any real comparison between man and angels, although man is the highest of all beings on earth – that is, of all beings formed of the four elements. 

Man's existence is nevertheless a wonderfully tov situation for him, and his distinction and perfection is a divine gift. The numerous raos to which individual persons are exposed are due to the defects existing in the persons themselves. We complain and seek relief from our own faults. We suffer from the raos which we, by our own free will, inflict on ourselves, and we ascribe them to God, Who is far from being connected with them, as it is stated: “Corruption is not His – the blemish is His children’s, a perverse and crooked generation” (Devarim 32:5). This is explained by King Solomon, who says: “A man’s foolishness corrupts his way, but his heart rages against Hashem” (Mishlei 19:3). 

I explain this theory in the following manner. The raos that befall man are of three kinds: 

Type #1: Inherent in Matter

(1) The first kind of ra is that which is caused to man by the circumstance that he is subject to genesis and destruction, or that he possesses a body. It is on account of the body that some persons happen to have great deformities or paralysis of some of the organs. This ra may be part of the natural constitution of these persons, or may have developed subsequently in consequence of changes in the elements, e.g., through bad air, or thunderstorms or landslips. We have already shown that, in accordance with the divine wisdom, genesis can only take place through destruction, and without the destruction of the individual members of the species the species themselves would not exist permanently. Thus the true kindness, and beneficence, and goodness of God is clear. 

He who thinks that he can have flesh and bones without being subject to any external influence, or any of the accidents of matter, unconsciously wishes to reconcile two opposites, namely, to be at the same time subject and not subject to change. If man were never subject to change there could be no generation: there would be one single being, but no individuals forming a species. Galen, in the third section of his book, The Use of the Limbs, says correctly that it would be in vain to expect to see living beings formed of an egg fertilized with sperm, who will not die, will never feel pain, or will move perpetually, or will shine like the sun. This statement of Galen is part of the following more general proposition: Whatever is formed of any matter receives the most perfect form possible in that species of matter; in each individual case the defects are in accordance with the defects of that individual matter. The best and most perfect being that can be formed of the egg and the sperm is the species of man, for as far as man's nature is known, he is living, rational, and mortal. It is therefore impossible that man should be free from this type of ra. 

You will, nevertheless, find that the raos of the above kind which befall man are very few and rare; for you find countries that have not been flooded or burned for thousands of years; there are thousands of men in perfect health; deformed individuals are a strange and exceptional occurrence; or say few in number if you object to the term exceptional; they are not one-hundredth, not even one-thousandth part of those that are perfectly normal. 

Type #2: Interpersonal 

The second class of raos comprises such raos as people cause to each other, when, for example, some of them use their strength against others. These raos are more numerous than those of the first kind, and their causes are numerous and known. They likewise originate in ourselves, though the sufferer himself cannot avert them. 

This kind of ra is nevertheless not widespread in any country of the whole world. It is of rare occurrence that a man plans to kill his neighbor or to rob him of his property by night. Many persons are, however, afflicted with this kind of ra in great wars, but these are not frequent, if the whole inhabited part of the earth is taken into consideration. 

Type #3: Self-Inflicted 

(3) The third class of raos comprises those which every one causes to himself by his own action. This is the largest class, and is far more numerous than the second class. It is especially of these raos that all men complain, only few men are found that do not sin against themselves by this kind of ra. Those that are afflicted with it are therefore justly blamed in the words of the prophet: “This was brought about by your own hand” (Malachi 1:9); the same is expressed in the following passage: “A destroyer of his own soul will do this” (Mishlei 6:32). In reference to this kind of ra, Solomon says: “A man’s foolishness corrupts his way, but his heart rages against Hashem” (Mishlei 19:3). In the following passage he explains also that this kind of ra is man's own work: “But, see, this I did find: God has made man upright, but they have sought out many scheming calculations” (Koheles 7:29), and these scheming calculations bring the raos upon him. The same subject is referred to in Iyov: “For affliction does not emerge from the dust, nor does misery grow from the earth” (Iyov 5:6). These words are immediately followed by the explanation that man himself is the author of this class of raos: “For man is born to trouble” (Iyov 5:7). 

This class of raos originates in man’s flaws, such as excessive desire for eating, drinking, and sex; indulgence in these things in undue measure, or in improper manner, or partaking of unhealthy food. This course brings diseases and afflictions upon body and soul alike. The sufferings of the body in consequence of these raos are well known. 

Those of the soul are twofold: First, such raos of the soul as are the necessary consequence of changes in the body, insofar as the soul is a force residing in the body; it has therefore been said that the properties of the soul depend on the condition of the body. 

Secondly, the soul, when accustomed to superfluous things, acquires a strong habit of desiring things which are neither necessary for the preservation of the individual nor for that of the species. This desire is without a limit, whilst things which are necessary are few in number and restricted within certain limits; but what is superfluous is without end. 

For example, you desire to have your vessels of silver, but golden vessels are still better; others have even vessels of sapphire, or perhaps they can be made of emerald or rubies, or any other substance that could be suggested. Those who are ignorant and perverse in their thought are constantly in trouble and pain because they cannot get as much of superfluous things as a certain other person possesses. They, as a rule, expose themselves to great dangers, for example, by sea voyage, or service of kings, and all this for the purpose of obtaining that which is superfluous and not necessary. 

Blaming God for Self-Inflicted Harm

When they thus meet with the consequences of the course which they adopt, they complain of the decrees and judgments of God; they begin to blame the time, and wonder at the lack of justice in its changes; that it has not enabled them to acquire great riches, with which they could buy large quantities of wine for the purpose of making themselves drunk, and numerous concubines adorned with various kind of ornaments of gold, embroidery, and jewels, for the purpose of driving themselves to sexual indulgence beyond their capacities – as if the whole universe existed exclusively for the purpose of giving pleasure to these low people. 

The error of the ignorant goes so far as to say that God's power is insufficient, because He has given to this universe the properties which they imagine cause these great ra, and which do not help all ra-disposed persons to obtain the ra which they seek, and to bring their ra souls to the aim of their desires, though these, as we have shown, are really without limit. 

The virtuous and wise, however, see and comprehend the wisdom of God displayed in the universe. Thus David says: “All of the ways of Hashem are kindness and truth, to those who guard His covenant and His testimonies” (Tehilim 25:10). For those who observe the nature of the universe and the commandments of the Torah, and know their purpose, see clearly God's kindness and truth in everything; they seek, therefore, that which the Creator intended to be the aim of man, namely, pursuit of knowledge. Forced by the claims of the body, they seek also that which is necessary for the preservation of the body – “bread to eat and garment to clothe” (Bereishis 28:20), and this is very little; but they seek nothing superfluous. With very slight exertion man can obtain it, so long as he is contented with that which is necessary. 

"You open Your hand and satisfy the desire of every living thing" (Tehilim 145:16)

All the difficulties and troubles we meet in this respect are due to the desire for superfluous things. When we seek unnecessary things, we have difficulty even in finding that which is necessary. For the more we desire to have that which is superfluous, the more we meet with difficulties; our strength and possessions are spent in unnecessary things, and are lacking when required for that which is necessary. 

Observe how nature proves the correctness of this assertion. The more necessary a thing is for living beings, the more easily it is found and the cheaper it is; the less necessary it is, the rarer and dearer it is. For example, air, water, and food are necessary to man. Air is most necessary, for if man is without air a short time he dies, whilst he can be without water a day or two. Air is also undoubtedly found more easily and cheaper [than water]. Water is more necessary than food, for some people can be four or five days without food, provided they have water; water also exists in every country in larger quantities than food, and is also cheaper. The same proportion can be noticed in the different kinds of food; that which is more necessary in a certain place exists there in larger quantities and is cheaper than that which is less necessary. No intelligent person, I think, considers musk, amber, rubies, and emerald as very necessary for man except as medicines – and they, as well as other like substances, can be replaced for this purpose by herbs and minerals. 

This shows the kindness of God to His creatures, even to us weak beings. His righteousness and justice as regards all animals are well known; for in the transient world there is among the various kinds of animals no individual being distinguished from the rest of the same species by a peculiar property or an additional limb. On the contrary – all physical, psychical, and vital forces and organs that are possessed by one individual are found also in the other individuals. If anyone is somehow different, it is by accident, in consequence of some exception, and not by a natural property; it is also a rare occurrence. There is no difference between individuals of a species in the due course of Nature; the difference originates in the various dispositions of their substances. This is the necessary consequence of the nature of the substance of that species: the nature of the species is not more favorable to one individual than to the other. It is no wrong or injustice that one has many bags of finest myrrh and garments embroidered with gold, while another has not those things, which are not necessary for our maintenance; he who has them has not thereby obtained control over anything that could be an essential addition to his nature, but has only obtained something illusory or deceptive. The other, who does not possess that which is not wanted for his maintenance, does not miss anything indispensable. “Whoever took more had nothing extra and whoever took less was not lacking; everyone according to what he eats had they gathered” (Shemos 26:18). This is the rule at all times and in all places; no notice should be taken of exceptional cases, as we have explained. 

In these two ways you will see the mercy of God toward His creatures, how He has provided that which is required, in proper proportions, and treated all individual beings of the same species with perfect equality. In accordance with this correct reflection the chief of the wise men says: “All His ways are justice” (Devarim 32:4). David likewise says: “All of the ways of Hashem are kindness and truth”; he also says explicitly: “Hashem is good to all; His mercies are on all His works” (Tehilim 145:9), for it is an act of great and perfect goodness that He gave us existence; and the creation of the controlling faculty in animals is a proof of His mercy towards them, as has been shown by us.

How Thomas Paine Forgot Sinai

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Artwork: Portrait of Thomas Paine, by Laurent Dabos

How Thomas Paine Forgot Sinai

In 1794 Thomas Paine published his pro-Deism anti-religion book, The Age of Reason. Quite early on in the book he sets forth his refutation of "Divine revelation." He begins by affirming the centrality of revelation in the three major religions. 

Every national church or religion has established itself by pretending some special mission from God, communicated to certain individuals. The Jews have their Moses; the Christians their Jesus Christ, their apostles and saints; and the Turks their Mahomet, as if the way to God was not open to every man alike. 

Each of those churches show certain books, which they call revelation, or the word of God. The Jews say, that their word of God was given by God to Moses, face to face; the Christians say, that their word of God came by divine inspiration: and the Turks say, that their word of God (the Koran) was brought by an angel from Heaven. Each of those churches accuse the other of unbelief; and for my own part, I disbelieve them all. 

So far, so good. Next, he defines the term "revelation" and, on the basis of this definition, states that something can only be considered a "revelation" by the direct recipient of the communication.

As it is necessary to affix right ideas to words, I will, before I proceed further into the subject, offer some other observations on the word revelation. Revelation, when applied to religion, means something communicated immediately from God to man. 

No one will deny or dispute the power of the Almighty to make such a communication, if he pleases. But admitting, for the sake of a case, that something has been revealed to a certain person, and not revealed to any other person, it is revelation to that person only. When he tells it to a second person, a second to a third, a third to a fourth, and so on, it ceases to be a revelation to all those persons. It is revelation to the first person only, and hearsay to every other, and consequently they are not obliged to believe it. 

It is a contradiction in terms and ideas, to call anything a revelation that comes to us at second-hand, either verbally or in writing. Revelation is necessarily limited to the first communication — after this, it is only an account of something which that person says was a revelation made to him; and though he may find himself obliged to believe it, it cannot be incumbent on me to believe it in the same manner; for it was not a revelation made to me, and I have only his word for it that it was made to him.

Also good. This is why we reject the authority of any religion based on one, two, or several individuals who claim to have received a divine revelation. There is no way to verify such a claim, and no reason to trust those who make it.

But then he makes an egregious factual error about Judaism's revelation claim:

When Moses told the children of Israel that he received the two tables of the commandments from the hands of God, they were not obliged to believe him, because they had no other authority for it than his telling them so; and I have no other authority for it than some historian telling me so. The commandments carry no internal evidence of divinity with them; they contain some good moral precepts, such as any man qualified to be a lawgiver, or a legislator, could produce himself, without having recourse to supernatural intervention.

Thomas Paine completely missed the one claim which sets Judaism apart from all other religions: the claim of public revelation - that the entire nation of Israel heard God speak to Moshe at Sinai. 

The Torah explicitly makes this claim in a number of places:

Hashem said to Moshe, "Behold! I will come to you in the thickness of the cloud, in order that the people hear when I speak with you, and they will also believe in you forever." (Shemos 19:9)

Only beware for yourself and greatly beware for your soul, lest you forget the things that your eyes have beheld and lest you remove them from your heart all the days of your life, and make them known to your children and your children’s children – the day that you stood before Hashem, your God, at Horeb, when Hashem said to me, “Gather the people to Me and I shall let them hear My words, so that they shall learn to fear Me all the days that they live on the earth, and they shall teach their children” So you approached and stood at the foot of the mountain, and the mountain was burning with fire up to the heart of heaven, darkness, cloud, and thick cloud. Hashem spoke to you from the midst of the fire; you were hearing the sound of words, but you were not seeing a likeness, only a sound. He told you of His covenant that He commanded you to observe, the Ten Declarations, and He inscribed them on two stone Tablets. (Devarim 4:9-13) 

For inquire now regarding the early days that preceded you, from the day when God created man on the earth, and from one end of heaven to the other end of heaven: Has there ever been anything like this great thing or has anything like it been heard? Has a people ever heard the voice of God speaking from the midst of the fire as you have heard, and survived? Or has any god ever miraculously come to take for himself a nation from amidst a nation, with challenges, with signs, and with wonders, and with war, and with a strong hand, and with an outstretched arm, and with greatly awesome deeds, such as everything that Hashem, your God, did for you in Egypt before your eyes? You have been shown in order to know that Hashem, He is the God! There is none beside Him! From heaven He caused you to hear His voice in order to teach you, and on earth He showed you His great fire, and you heard His words from the midst of the fire, because He loved your forefathers, and He chose his offspring after him, and took you out before Himself with His great strength from Egypt; to drive away from before you nations that are greater and mightier than you, to bring you, to give you their land as an inheritance, as this very day. (ibid. 4:32-37) 

These words Hashem spoke to your entire congregation on the mountain, from the midst of the fire, the cloud, and the thick cloud – a great voice, never to be repeated – and He inscribed them on two stone Tablets and gave them to me. It happened that when you heard the voice from the midst of the darkness and the mountain was burning in fire, that you – all the heads of your tribes and your elders – approached me. They said, “Behold! Hashem, our God, has shown us His glory and His greatness, and we have heard His voice from the midst of the fire; this day we saw that Hashem will speak to a person and he can live. But now, why should we die when this great fire consumes us? If we continue to hear the voice of Hashem, our God, any longer, we will die! For is there any human that has heard the voice of the Living God speaking from the midst of the fire, as we have, and lived? You should approach and hear whatever Hashem, our God, will say, and you should speak to us whatever Hashem, our God, will speak to you – then we shall hear and we shall do.” (ibid. 5:19-23)

So I made an Ark of cedarwood and I carved out two stone Tablets like the first ones; then I ascended the mountain with the two Tablets in my hand. He inscribed on the Tablets according to the first script, the Ten Statements that Hashem spoke to you on the mountain from the midst of the fire, on the day of the congregation, and Hashem gave them to me. I turned and descended from the mountain, and I placed the Tablets in the Ark that I had made, and they remained there as Hashem had commanded me. (Devarim 10:3-5) 

This was my first reading of Paine's The Age of Reason, and I must say that he severely undermined his own credibility by not even bothering to do a fact-check on the source-text of the religion he intends to debunk! He even stated earlier that "the Jews say, that their word of God was given by God to Moses, face to face." Apparently, he didn't believe that we take our own claim seriously!

But it gets better! In the next chapter Paine sets up an argument about the evidence needed to believe in miracles. As we'll see, if he applied this line of reasoning to what Judaism actually claims, this would lead him to the conclusion that the Torah was given at Sinai. Paine writes:

When I am told that the Koran was written in Heaven and brought to Mahomet by an angel, the account comes too near the same kind of hearsay evidence and second-hand authority as the former. I did not see the angel myself, and, therefore, I have a right not to believe it. 

When also I am told that a woman called the Virgin Mary, said, or gave out, that she was with child without any cohabitation with a man, and that her betrothed husband, Joseph, said that an angel told him so, I have a right to believe them or not; such a circumstance required a much stronger evidence than their bare word for it; but we have not even this — for neither Joseph nor Mary wrote any such matter themselves; it is only reported by others that they said so — it is hearsay upon hearsay, and I do not choose to rest my belief upon such evidence ... 

The wretched contrivance with which this latter part is told exceeds every thing that went before it. The first part, that of the miraculous conception, was not a thing that admitted of publicity; and therefore the tellers of this part of the story had this advantage, that though they might not be credited, they could not be detected. They could not be expected to prove it, because it was not one of those things that admitted of proof, and it was impossible that the person of whom it was told could prove it himself. 

But the resurrection of a dead person from the grave, and his ascension through the air, is a thing very different as to the evidence it admits of, to the invisible conception of a child in the womb. The resurrection and ascension, supposing them to have taken place, admitted of public and ocular demonstration, like that of the ascension of a balloon, or the sun at noon-day, to all Jerusalem at least. A thing which everybody is required to believe, requires that the proof and evidence of it should be equal to all, and universal; and as the public visibility of this last related act was the only evidence that could give sanction to the former part, the whole of it falls to the ground, because that evidence never was given. Instead of this, a small number of persons, not more than eight or nine, are introduced as proxies for the whole world, to say they saw it, and all the rest of the world are called upon to believe it. But it appears that Thomas did not believe the resurrection, and, as they say, would not believe without having ocular and manual demonstration himself. So neither will I, and the reason is equally as good for me, and for every other person, as for Thomas. 

It is in vain to attempt to palliate or disguise this matter. The story, so far as relates to the supernatural part, has every mark of fraud and imposition stamped upon the face of it. Who were the authors of it is as impossible for us now to know, as it is for us to be assured that the books in which the account is related were written by the persons whose names they bear; the best surviving evidence we now have respecting that affair is the Jews. They are regularly descended from the people who lived in the times this resurrection and ascension is said to have happened, and they say, it is not true. It has long appeared to me a strange inconsistency to cite the Jews as a proof of the truth of the story. It is just the same as if a man were to say, I will prove the truth of what I have told you by producing the people who say it is false.

To summarize, Paine's criteria for believing in a miraculous phenomenon are three in number:

(1) the miracle would have to be publicly visible ("admitting to public and oracular demonstration ... like that of the ascension of a balloon, or the sun at noon-day") 

(2) it would have to have been witnessed by a large group of people (not "a small number of persons, not more than eight or nine ... introduced as proxies for the whole world" and "to all Jerusalem at least") 

(3) these witnesses would have to be identifiable (not "impossible for us to now know"), so that their testimony could be corroborated by non-witnesses 

Paine even acknowledges that the descendants of the alleged witnesses to a public miracle would be sufficient to establish its historicity, writing that "[the Jews] are regularly descended from the people who lived in the times this resurrection and ascension is said to have happened, and they say it is not true" - implying that if they did say that these miracles happened, then we would believe them.

Guess which miraculous event meets these three criteria? The Giving of the Torah at Sinai! If you haven't yet read the entitled Torah from Sinai, then I recommend you drop everything and read it as soon as possible. For those who have read it, I will quote the passage that speaks most directly to Thomas Paine:

We are now in a position to determine what [sort of miraculous] event could be performed that would retain its validity for future generations. Since future generations cannot observe the event directly, it would have to be an event that rules out in its process of communication the causes of doubt due to the ignorance of the communicators and due to fabrication. A simple event grasped easily by the senses that occurs before a mass of people who later attest to its occurrence would fulfill the requirements. Such an event would have all the credibility of the most accepted historical fact. If we doubt either a simple event attested to by masses of people or a complex event attested to by qualified individuals, we would ipso facto have to doubt almost all the knowledge we have acquired in all the sciences, all the humanities, and in all the different disciplines existing today. Moreover we would have to desist from consulting with physicians, dentists, lawyers, mechanics, plumbers, electricians, or specialists in any field who work from an accepted body of knowledge. 

The event at Sinai fulfills the above requirements. The events witnessed as described were of a simple perceptual nature so that ordinary people could apprehend them. The event at Sinai was structured with the same built-in ingredients that cause us to accept any historical fact or any kind of secondhand knowledge ...

Someone may ask how we know that these events were as described in the Torah, clearly visible, and that they transpired before the entire nation. Perhaps this itself is a fabrication? The answer to this question is obvious. We accept a simple fact attested to by numerous observers because we consider mass conspiracy absurd. For the very same reason no public event can be fabricated, for we would have to assume a mass conspiracy of silence with regard to the occurrence of that event. If someone were to tell us that an atomic bomb was detonated over New York City fifty years ago, we would not accept it as true because we would assume that we would have certainly heard about it, had it actually occurred. The very factors which compel us to accept as true an account of an event of public proportion safeguards us against fabrication of such an event. 

Were this not so all of history could have been fabricated. Had the event at Sinai not actually occurred anyone fabricating it at any point in time would have met with the stiff refutation of the people, "had a mass event of that proportion ever occurred we surely would have heard of it." Fabrication of an event of public proportion is not within the realm of credibility. 

History corroborates this point. In spite of the strong religious instinct in man, no modern religion in over two thousand years has been able to base itself on public revelation. A modern religion demands some kind of verifiable occurrence in order to be accepted. For this reason the two major Western religions, Christianity and Islam, make recourse to the revelation at Sinai. Were it not for this need and the impossibility of manufacturing such evidence, they certainly would not have based their religions on another religion's revelation. 

[I cannot emphasize this enough: if you haven't read the aforementioned essay - or this version of the same argument, or this one - then I urge you to do so.]

This isn't the first time we've seen a great mind spell out the Torah mi'Sinai argument step by step, only to stop short of the logical conclusion which follows. Several years ago we wrote about how Sigmund Freud did just that in his Introductory Letters on Psychoanalysis (1916). Just this summer we wrote about how Mortimer Adler also glossed over Judaism's unique revelation claim in his Truth in Religion (1992).

I guess this just goes to show that just because someone is great thinker who lives in The Age of Reason and advocates for a Life of Reason doesn’t necessarily mean that he will reach the conclusions dictated by Reason.

Mortimer Adler's Kryptonite

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Mortimer Adler and his wife with Pope Paul VI

Mortimer Adler's Kryptonite

Readers of this blog will be aware of my love and admiration of Mortimer J. Adler (1902 - 2001). To him I owe my knowledge and familiarity with a host of philosophical ideas. Not only did he introduce me to the fundamentals, but he also steered me away from some pretty severe philosophical mistakes. He taught me how to read a book, and introduced me to The Great Books of the Western World. He greatly influenced my writing style, and his essay on learning and teaching became the foundation of my approach to teaching. 

And yet, like all superheroes, Adler had his weakness. Unfortunately, that weakness was religion. Specifically, Thomistic Catholicism.

This post is not intended to be a comprehensive treatment of Adler's views on Catholicism, or on theology in general. If that is of interest to you, read his book Truth in Religion: The Plurality of Religions and the Unity of Truth (1992), which will be discussed later in this blog post.

Instead, in this post I will present an email which I wrote to one of my rabbeim (whom we'll refer to as RJM) ten years ago, at the height of my Adler odyssey, inquiring about Adler's fall into Catholicism. 

Here is my email and RJM's response, minimally edited for publishing on this blog. Links and transliterations were added by me.

[Note: even though I say so clearly in my email, I want to emphasize that the third question was not asked by me, but by one of the younger yeshiva guys; I, myself, would have phrased the question differently - in a decidedly less "Christian" manner.]

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Kol ha'Seridim to RJM

Dear [RJM],

As a fellow reader of Mortimer J. Adler, I have three question about Adler and religion that I'd like to hear your thoughts (or opinions) on.

Question #1: What's up with his conversion to Christianity? I was just rereading the passage at the end of his second autobiography, which details his conversion: 

In March of 1984, after a trip to Mexico in February, I fell ill, probably from a virus that I had picked up there. The illness was protracted. I was in the hospital for five weeks and, after leaving the hospital, was in bed at home for several months or more. Though I underwent all the diagnostic tests and procedures that the physicians could think of, the illness was never adequately diagnosed; and the cure, when it finally came, involved numerous antibiotics and two blood transfusions that brought my red corpuscle blood counts back to normal.  

During this long stay in the hospital, I suffered a mild depression, and often when Caroline visited me I would, unaccountably, burst into tears. Father Howell, the Rector of Saint Chrysostom's Church, also visited me, and once when, at my bedside, he prayed for my recovery, I choked up and wept. The only prayer that I knew word for word, was the Pater Noster. On that day and in the days after it, I found myself repeating the Lord's Prayer, again and again, and meaning every word of it. Quite suddenly, when I was awake one night, a light dawned on me, and I realized what had happened without my recognizing it clearly when it first happened.  

I had been seriously praying to God. But had I not said at the end of How to Think About God, that no one who understood the God of the philosophers as well as I thought I did, would worship that God or pray to him. Only if, by the gift of grace, one made the leap of faith across the chasm to the God of religious Jews and Christians, would one engage in worship and prayer, believing in a morally good, loving, just, and merciful God.  

Here after many years of affirming God's existence and trying to give adequate reasons for that affirmation, I found myself believing in God and praying to Him ...

In your opinion, is this just another example of an otherwise rational mind being overcome by a powerful religious emotion at a time of insecurity and proximity to death? Or did Adler himself commit a severe philosophical mistake - no doubt originating in his preoccupation with Thomas Aquinas - of which we he was unaware? At the end of this chapter in the autobiography, Adler makes some statements about "the mystery of the Trinity." I find it baffling that the same mind who wrote How to Think About God can simultaneously embrace faith in the Christian doctrine, all on the basis of "grace" which was "received" during a bout of illness and a period of depression. 

Again, perhaps this is just another example of how we humans can compartmentalize, shutting off our minds in certain areas of our lives, no matter how rational we are in everything else. 

Question #2: What about the Torah mi'Sinai argument? From How to Think About God, it appears that Adler was completely unaware of the Sinai argument: 

A third point to be noted follows directly on what has just been said. In the three monotheistic religions of the West - Judaism, Christianity, and Islam - the proposition that God exists is not an article of faith or religious belief. The first article of faith in all three religions is that God has revealed himself to us in Holy Writ or Sacred Scripture. This, of course, entails the affirmation that God has revealed himself to us in Holy Writ or Sacred Scripture. This, of course, entails the affirmation that the God who has revealed himself exists. But it goes far beyond that proposition to something that can never be proved, or even argued about, something that is always and only an article of faith or religious belief: namely, the fact of Divine revelation ... 

It is in no way improper to argue about whether belief in God's existence can be established by reason alone, or at least thereby made reasonable. But it would be quite improper to argue about the reasonableness of the first article of religious faith, that Sacred Scripture represents God's revelation of himself to us. That belief can be neither proved nor disproved, nor is it really a proper subject of argument pro and con. 

Did he just not encounter Torah mi'Sinai in his reading? Does he have some argument against Torah mi'Sinai of which I am unaware? If so, I would love to hear it.

Question #3: What is the state of Adler's soul? This is a question that one of the other guys in yeshiva asked me. I don't really know enough about the soul to be certain that I understand the question, which is why I have turned to you. 

Any thoughts on these questions would be most appreciated. 

- [Kol ha'Seridim]

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RJM to Kol ha'Seridim

Dear [Kol ha'Seridim],

Great to hear from you. I hope you are well.

Response to Question #1: I think Adler had an unusual attitude to religion, inasmuch as he accepted the Thomistic distinction between matters of faith and matters of reason. He seems to have systematically excluded theological doctrines from genuine philosophical scrutiny, because of his assumption that their acceptance or denial is premised on faith and not rational analysis alone.

Adler has a whole book on the subject of religion, called "Truth in Religion", which, in my opinion, is the worst volume he ever produced, poorly reasoned and very obviously a "set up" designed to lead the interested person to the "leap of faith" into Catholic Christianity.

The book starts out rationally, seeking to demonstrate that we must reject relativism and seek objective truth even in the realm of religion. Nowadays, this is a major point that needs to be stressed, so kol ha'kavod to him for making it clear. He summarily dismisses polytheistic religions for good reason, but these are about the only meritorious aspects of the text. It is all downhill from there.

Adler argues, for example, that the mysteriousness of a religion is evidence for its veracity, because a purely rational religion wouldn't require revelation for its establishment. In these passages he is clearly arguing in favor of Christianity and against Judaism, although he is never so explicit. All in all, it is not an objective I don't recommend the book, although I am confident that you would not come to any harm in reading it ...

By the way, it is well known that a disproportionate number of Adler's Jewish students in the University of Chicago converted to Catholicism after studying Aquinas with him, although he waited till much later to do so.

Response to Question #2: I doubt if he was aware of the argument. Most philosophers aren't. For example, David Conway (ironically, a student of Antony Flew) authored a book called "The Rediscovery of Wisdom", in which he argues that the ultimate goal of philosophy should be the contemplation of God, and that generations of philosophers have been misled by the gross distortions of later thinkers. He basically shows that the purpose of philosophy was classically understood as a process of achieving yediat Hashem (knowledge of God) and ahavat Hashem (love of God), and also argues that many of the supposed "debunkings" of proofs for God's existence are fatally flawed and should never have gained the currency they now have in academia. He therefore reestablishes the existence of God as a fact and the goal of knowledge of God as the raison d'etre of all rational creatures.

Amazingly, he brings Judaism into this, looking at the varied interpretations of Maimonides and Spinoza vis a vis the purpose of mitsvot. Conway concludes that the Torah's objective is indeed what Maimonides states - the same as the objective of philosophy, to enable the Jewish nation to dedicate their lives to the contemplation of God. Keep in mind that this guy is a secular academic, so this is all pretty amazing already.

The problem emerges when he compares the relative merits of philosophy and Judaism, and questions the basis for belief in the revelation claim. He literally totally misreads the story and misrepresents the tradition, claiming that Jews themselves believe that the events were not written down until hundreds of years after the fact, etc. He doesn't even mention the mass revelation component because, as he states in the text, his impression is that Moses went up onto a mountain by himself to receive the laws!!! (I tried to contact and correct him, but I was unsuccessful and kind of gave up).

BTW, I also penned a letter to M.J. Adler, which he received and which was read to him, literally days before his death. The response I got from his assistant was that matters of religion are very personal. But I did argue for the rationality of belief in Judaism as opposed to Christianity quite passionately. Perhaps he had hirhurei teshuva (thoughts of repentance) before he died.

Response to Question #3: Ultimately, I don't think anyone but the Ribbono Shel Olam (Master of the Universe) can know the answer to this question in a definitive manner. We have no access to the recesses of anyone's soul, how they truly conceive of God, etc. So speculation is all we have.

Adler accepted an idolatrous religion but his sophisticated version of that religion precluded him from the gross philosophical materialism, emotionalism and infantile God-concept normally associated with it. So it would seem that the possibility exists that Adler's soul was sufficiently actualized and thus distinct from matter such that it could have survived his physical death. And from the standpoint of halakha he was certainly a tinoq shenishba (a "captured baby" i.e. a Jew who was raised without knowledge of Judaism) par excellence, so a halakhically mandated karet (spiritual excision) wouldn't be an issue. Plus, the remote chance exists that he may have recognized his error and repented in his last moments of life.

On the other hand, it is possible that his conception of God (the foundation of his understanding of reality) was not sufficiently purified of its material elements and thus his soul remained imprisoned in the shackles of physicality and perished.

In the end, whatever he was zocheh (meritorious) to, we can be sure he received it! 

I hope this speedily composed response is helpful. Feel free to continue the correspondence as you see fit.

Best Regards,

RJM

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I found RJM's response to be enlightening, since it provided a greater context for Adler's theological misstep. I was particularly intrigued by RJM's attempt to contact Adler on his deathbed, and the latter's response (via his assistant) that "matters of religion are very personal" - an uncharacteristic response from a man who was so committed to truth and precision in thinking.

In writing this blog post I came across an article by Deal Hudson about Adler's conversion, entitled The Great Philosopher Who Became Catholic. Hudson writes:

The more we talked the more I realized Mortimer really wanted to be a Roman Catholic, but issues like abortion and the resistance of his family and friends were keeping him away. I tried to show him that his own Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics of act-potency led him to understand the necessity of protecting unborn life. But just at that moment, Mortimer would uncharacteristically mutter, "It's all too complicated," and change the subject. But I knew that he knew he was being inconsistent. I didn't have to press him – because I knew he knew, and it was only a matter of time before he acquiesced.

At several of our seminars was the Catholic prelate of San Jose, Bishop Pierre DuMaine. The bishop and I would sometimes tag-team the philosopher on the Catholic Church, and we would all end up laughing about how Mortimer deflected the inevitable conclusion.

These reports of inconsistency and evasiveness on Adler's part in matters of religion are consistent with RJM's testimony about Adler's response to his letter. 

It would be easy to pass judgment on Adler and condemn him for this severe intellectual / philosophical / epistemological shortcoming. Indeed, when I first learned of this truth, I held it against him, and was almost angry at him for this failing. I felt: "How could MY Adler, whose views on all philosophical matters are backed by airtight reasoning and solid arguments - how could he hold such a stupid view? Arriving at a false conclusion through a mistake in reasoning is one thing, and I realize that no human being is infallible, but to accept an irrational belief system on the basis of an irrational 'faith experience'? That is unforgivable." 

Looking back at my reaction, I am reminded of one of my favorite passages from John Steinbeck's East of Eden:

When a child first catches adults out - when it first walks into his grave little head that adults do not always have divine intelligence, that their judgments are not always wise, their thinking true, their sentences just - his world falls into panic desolation. The gods are fallen and all safety gone. And there is one sure thing about the fall of gods: they do not fall a little; they crash and shatter or sink deeply into green muck. It is a tedious job to build them up again; they never quite shine. And the child's world is never quite whole again. It is an aching kind of growing.

Now, ten years after this email exchange, with an additional decade's worth of learning, maturity, and self-knowledge under my belt, my judgment of Adler has softened considerably. I have come to realize that we ALL have our blind-spots. Some people go through their entire lives without becoming aware of their blind-spots. Others, like Adler, actively resist the distortion in thinking which arise from these hidden biases, but ultimately succumb in moments of weakness. None of us is immune to this type of blindness, and we can never be sure that we won't succumb. 

Now I am at the point of maturity where I realize that it is possible to acknowledge that a great thinker can make a childish error, without this diminishing the emunas chachamim I have when reading his works, "for there is no man so wholly righteous on earth who does [only] good and never sins" (Koheles 7:20).

Every superhero has his kryptonite. 

A Visual Representation of Science and Torah

Disclaimer: In my high school classes, I strive to craft my lessons to fit the minds of the particular students I'm teaching. When I learn one-on-one with a student, my lessons are extremely tailor-made. 

Since this blog post originated in one-on-one learning with a student, I wasn't sure whether it would be worthwhile to write it up, since I designed it specifically for that student. Ultimately, I decided that it would be good to write it out for the sake of my own clarity, and once I was doing that, I figured I might as well share it as a blog post. Maybe others will find it valuable.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

A Visual Representation of Science and Torah

I recently had a discussion with a science-savvy student of mine who asked the following question - in more or less these words:

In science, when scientists find something that doesn't make sense based on their current understanding of the world, they keep thinking about it and theorizing and experimenting; eventually they realize that they need to either modify or abandon their prior theory and come up with a new theory in order to solve the problem. 

In Torah, however, we don't do this. Even if we see something that seems crazy, irrational, or morally objectionable, we don't reject Torah or Judaism. Why not? What's the difference between Judaism and science? And how many problems in the Torah would you have to see in order to conclude that the whole thing is false?

I immediately recognized the flawed premises of this student's reasoning, and I almost responded with the first answer that popped into my head. But I caught myself. I sensed that this student was touching upon something important - and that if I could extract that kernel of truth AND show him where his analogy fell short AND answer his question, then he would emerge with a clearer understanding of both Torah and science. 

I spent a few days thinking about how to approach this student's question and finally - while I was proctoring my Gemara final - I had an epiphany. I realized that if I could come up with a visual depiction of how science works and compare it side-by-side with a visual depiction of how Torah works, then I could show him (a) how these two ways of gaining knowledge of reality are far more similar than he realized, and (b) I can answer his question in a way that would satisfy his scientific mind. 

A Visual Depiction of Science

Here's what I came up with for science. I'll walk you through it below:

Here's what each part means:

Reality: at the top of the diagram we have "reality" (i.e. that which exists), which is what we are trying to know and understand through science; strictly speaking, the "reality" part in the science diagram should say "physical reality" since science doesn't go beyond the physical - but for the sake of consistency, I labeled this part as "reality" on both diagrams

Horizon of Ignorance: this represents the gap between our understanding of reality and reality itself, - a gap which science continually strives to diminish and eventually close.

The Senses / The Mind: at the very bottom of the diagram we have "the senses" (the five senses of sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste according to the traditional count, plus some or all of the non-traditional senses according to our modern understanding) and "the mind" (i.e. our ability to think logically and rationally); these constitute the epistemological foundation of the scientific method; if one maintained that either the senses or the mind were incapable of giving us knowledge about reality, then all scientific knowledge would be null and void. 

Empirical Data: from the day we are born, we are bombarded with loads of sensory data, but this empirical information is only a surface-level knowledge of reality.

Scientific Thinking: the scientist is the one who seeks out the lawfulness underlying the myriad particulars; instead of attempting to write an entire discourse on scientific thinking, I'll just quote from my Gemara rebbi's eloquent explanation in his essay on Scientific and Halachic Thought:

In the scientific method every particular is viewed as an expression of a universal principle - not as a separate localized reality. An apple falling from a tree to the ground is not an apple-ground phenomenon but an interaction between their underlying substances. We look for the simplest explanations of the widest range of events, not for a complex patchwork of explanations each fitting a single event. Thus explanations based on the particulars of apple and earth are rejected in favor of explanations based on the universal matter each possesses. This method naturally leads to simpler principles that unify more and more particular cases. As Einstein and Infeld state in the Evolution of Physics, (which is an excellent book on the subject of scientific thought and methodology), "[The scientist] certainly believes that, as his knowledge increases, his picture of reality will become simpler and simpler and will explain a wider and wider range of his sensuous impressions (P. 31).” ... 

What is the basis for this approach? It is the belief that all of the universe is composed of fundamental building blocks under the influence of fundamental forces with all of the observable phenomena being their various expressions. It is this search for what lies beneath that demands a universal law of nature, the law of the fundamentals, with each advance striking deeper. ... 

The scientific process is one of moving from the concrete to the abstract, from the particular to the universal, from a strange chaotic world to a system of laws governing outcomes in a clearly predictable way.  

This is what I mean by "scientific thinking" - not the particular theories about the universe that are developed in each successive generation of scientists, but the general way of thinking about the universe which gives rise to those theories. 

Scientific Theories: these are the particular theories that emerge from scientific thinking and aim to explain reality, in whole or in part; there "macro theories" which attempt to explain the foundations of the universe (e.g. Newtonian "classical mechanics," Einstein's theory of relativity, Planck's quantum mechanics) as well as the "micro theories" which aim to explain localized phenomena (e.g. Kepler's laws of planetary motion, Darwin's theory of natural selection, the theory of climate change).

Conceptual Understanding: the aim of these theories is to give us a conceptual understanding of reality, thereby pushing back the Horizon of Ignorance and bringing us closer to objective truth.

New Empirical Data: in many cases, these scientific theories will also help us discover new empirical facts and/or new methods of uncovering more new empirical facts.

New Questions and Difficulties: while these scientific theories enlighten our minds, solve problems, and push back the Horizon of Influence, they (along with the new empirical data) raise new questions and difficulties of which we were previously unaware; at first, scientists will attempt to solve these problems within their current theoretical framework, but eventually ...

Scientific Life-cycle: ... these questions and difficulties will prompt scientists to come up with new theories, and the entire cycle will begin again. My Gemara rebbi described this process as follows:

Something interesting occurs near the end of a philosophic regime. The idea that was an intellectual boon to science at its inception, allowing for new freedoms of thought, can become in its decline an intellectual shackle forcing every phenomenon to conform to its terms. To the conventional thinkers it is no longer a tool of new insights and fresh ideas rather it becomes an ideology of its own. The loyal rally around it and craft creative if not brilliant ways of fitting the unruly phenomena into the old terms no matter how tenuous or far fetched. Ironically, this is the opposite approach of the methodology that spawned the very idea they are defending. Whereas the original breakthrough started with a set of problems from which were derived a new universal, this method starts with a universal and insist on particular kinds of solutions which are in line with the philosophy. Eventually a new breakthrough is needed to once again reduce the complexity created.

The questions and difficulties which prompt this rethinking of the prevailing scientific theories will also, in many cases, lead to a reconsideration of the empirical data, since scientists will realize that their perception of that data was biased or clouded by the reigning scientific framework. For example, when it was believed that the earth was the center of the solar system, all empirical observations of the heavens were tainted by this bias; when people believed in spontaneous generation, their empirical observations supported their belief that maggots were generated out of putrid flesh. These beliefs were eventually disproved, and when that happened, the empirical data had to be reconsidered in light of the new theoretical model.

Step #1 of My Answer: The statements on the left and right of the diagram constitute Step #1 (out of 3) of my answer to the question asked by my student:

• Questions and difficulties compel us to modify or eliminate the very scientific theories which yielded them in the first place, thereby continuing the life-cycle of scientific understanding.
• Although these questions and difficulties will force us to reject particular scientific theories, they do NOT cause us to doubt or deny the general approach of scientific thinking as a whole.

For example, classical mechanics was dethroned as "a theory of everything" by the theory of relativity; the limitations of the theory of relativity were brought to light by quantum - but at no point did the problems with these particular scientific theories cause scientist to doubt or question the validity of scientific thinking as a whole. To the contrary - the fact that scientific thinking led to the discovery of these theories AND the questions and difficulties AND enabled new theories to arise is evidence of the validity of scientific thinking.

And that is my visual depiction of science. I'm sure there are imperfections with my diagram, but it served my purposes just fine.

A Visual Depiction of Torah

Here's what I came up with for Torah:

Here's what each part means:

Reality: at the top of the diagram we have "reality" - not just physical reality, but metaphysical reality as well.

Horizon of Ignorance: see explanation above; according to the Ralbag, this Horizon of Ignorance exists in our understanding of Torah in the same way that it does in science; I wrote about this at length in The Limits of Our Understanding of Torah.

The Senses / The Mind: the senses and the mind constitute the epistemological foundation of Torah - the same as in science; this point is explained very clearly in the essay Torah from Sinai.

Contents of Torah: for the sake of simplicity, we will say that "Contents of Torah" refers to the Torah she'bi'Chsav (Written Torah) and Torah she'baal Peh (Oral Torah) that were given to Moshe at Sinai, plus the Neviim (Prophets) and Kesuvim (Writings); in truth, there is more included here than just that, but we'll stick with this definition to avoid complications.

The Revelation at Sinai: our basis for accepting the Contents of Torah as Divinely authored is the historicity of the Revelation at Sinai; our acceptance of this event is based on a rational argument that was best explained in the essay Torah from Sinai; Rabbi Dovid Gottlieb also wrote a version of this argument in Living Up to the Truth: Chapter 6 and Rabbi Lawrence Kelemen wrote an essay version of this entitled A Rational Approach to the Torah's Divine Origin, in addition to his book Permission to Receive.

Rational/Scientific Thinking: in the same way that scientific thinking is applied to empirical data to generate scientific theories, so too, rational thinking is applied to the "data" of the Torah's contents to generate Torah theories; I refer to this as "rational/scientific thinking" to emphasize that the type of conceptual understanding we are looking for is similar to that in science.

Torah Theories: by "Torah theories" I am referring to a conceptual understanding of reality that is arrived at via the contents of Torah; I refer to these as "theories" because they are the product of human thinking, which is fallible and incomplete (again, I refer you to my post: The Limits of Our Understanding of Torah).

Conceptual Understanding: as is the case in science, our goal in learning Torah is to arrive at the most accurate conceptual understanding of reality that is humanly possible.

New Understanding of Torah's Contents: here we see a major difference between science and Torah; in science new theories lead to the discovery of brand new facts, but in Torah, there are no "new facts"; however, our new understanding sometimes leads to a total reevaluation of the Torah's contents, to the point where the factual data we once worked with is completely reinterpreted.

A great example of this is the Ramban's interpretation of the rainbow in Parashas Noach. He acknowledges that a literal reading of the pesukim would lead us to believe that rainbows weren't created until after the flood. But then he says:

But we are compelled to believe the words of the Greek [scientists] that rainbows are a natural phenomenon resulting from the sun’s rays passing through moist air, for in [any] container of water that is [set] before sunlight there can be seen something that resembles a rainbow.

The Ramban then goes and reinterprets the pesukim in light of our "updated" understanding of how rainbows work. To my mind, this is an example of how the "facts" of Torah are not set in stone, but are still subject to change in light of advances in our understanding of reality. We will never receive new pesukim or new Torah she'baal Peh from Hashem, but our understanding of what He gave us continues to evolve as our knowledge of Torah and the universe continues to grow.

New Questions and Difficulties: our new understanding of reality and the contents of Torah will raise new questions and difficulties - just as in science; in some cases we will be able to answer these by developing our current Torah theories, but in other cases ...

Life-cycle of Torah Understanding: ... these questions and difficulties will prompt us to go back to the proverbial drawing board, and come up with new theories which address the problems. Unlike in the scientific community, where this life-cycle plays out on a community-wide level with a very small percentage of individuals pioneering new major theories, the life-cycle of Torah understanding plays out on a community-wide AND individual level. The great baalei Mesorah have made contributions of Torah theories which have shaped all of Klal Yisrael's understanding of Torah - but at the same time, each individual Jew goes through his or her personal odyssey of understanding Torah as well.

Step #2 of My Answer: The statements on the left and right of the diagram constitute Step #2 (out of 3) of my answer to the question asked by my student:

• Questions and difficulties might compel us to modify or eliminate parts of our theoretical understanding of Torah and its content.
• Although these questions and difficulties will force us to reject particular Torah theories, they do NOT cause us to doubt or deny the basis of the Revelation at Sinai or the veracity of the Torah's contents. 

This is the crux of my answer. For example, let us say that a person was bothered by the story of Adam and Chava in Gan Eden. A few hundred years ago, there would be no problem saying that the first human beings were Adam and Chava, that they were the progenitors of the human species, and they lived 5,777 years ago. However, in light of what we now know about anthropology and evolution, it is difficult to accept the Torah's account at face value.

In the premise of my student's question, he voiced the possibility that a problem like this would cause us to doubt or deny the authenticity of the Torah as a whole. I disagree. At most, this difficulty would cause us to modify or reject our current theoretical understanding of those pesukim in the Torah - perhaps even going so far as to say (like some Rishonim who shall remain unnamed) that the Gan Eden story is a mashal. But this problem would not shake or undermine the basis of our acceptance of Torah, which is the Revelation at Sinai. 

Step #3 of My Answer: I happened to have been sitting near my Gemara rebbi when I made these diagrams. I showed them to him and asked what he would change or add. He approved of my diagram and explanation, but added an important point. 

Generally speaking it's true that the questions and difficulties which emerge from scientific advancements will not undermine scientific thinking as a whole. However, on rare occasions, thinkers will come to the realization that there are problems with the paradigm of scientific thinking as a whole. This will lead to a total revolution in the way we approach science. When this happens, nearly all of the knowledge and understanding that was arrived at through the former paradigm will be rendered invalid. 

For example, Aristotelian thought dominated science (a.k.a. "natural philosophy") for over a thousand years. The way that Aristotle and the other "natural philosophers" thought about the world and the types of theories they came up with bear almost no resemblance to the scientific theories of the scientific thinkers after the scientific revolution. The Aristotelian paradigm was so off base that we now reject all of this theories about the physical world as non-scientific. If Aristotle was right about anything in science, it was by accident. 

What would be the equivalent of this type of "scientific revolution" in Torah? As we said, it wouldn't come about through particular questions or difficulties in our theoretical understanding of the Torah's contents. Rather, such a revolution could only stem from problems with the rational basis of our acceptance of the Revelation at Sinai itself. If one had a valid reason for rejecting the historicity of the Revelation at Sinai, then this would undermine the validity of all our Torah knowledge. 

This is one of the reasons why I favor the Torah from Sinai version of this "proof of Torah mi'Sinai" over the others, since the author demonstrates that if we deny the historicity of the Revelation at Sinai, we would ipso facto have to deny all of historical knowledge - and indeed, all secondhand knowledge as well. In my opinion, he makes a valid argument.

Summary and Conclusion

My student asked why we don't reject Judaism when we encounter problems in the same way that we reject scientific theories when we encounter problems with them. My answer essentially boils down to the fact that there is a distinction between scientific thinking and scientific theories; problems only cause us to reject scientific theories - but we do not reject the scientific way of thinking which enabled us to come up with those theories. So too in Torah: problems may cause us to reject particular Torah theories, but they would not cause us to reject the historicity of the Revelation at Sinai, which is the basis of our acceptance of the Torah. 

My student was satisfied with this answer. I hope you found value in it as well!