When to Dance Between Two Opinions

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When to Dance Between Two Opinions

Earlier this week I referenced a book I’m reading called Already Free: Buddhism Meets Psychotherapy on the Path of Liberation. The author is Bruce Tift, a practicing psychotherapist and Buddhist. In the foreword of the book, the publisher recounts her first meeting with Tift in which she asked him how he reconciles these two disparate and often irreconcilable approaches. He replied: “I alternate between a Buddhist approach and a psychotherapeutic approach without any hope of resolution.” That caught my attention.

The author outlines three possible models of “dialogue” between the two views:

#1: Simplistically, we might assume there is just one truth, and the dialogue is a way to test our theories in order to discover which is true. #2: Or we might assume that most theories are useful approximations of what's true in some ways but that they have their own limitations in other ways; so the point of the dialogue is to come up with a synthesis or integration that combines the best of both. #3: Perhaps an even more interesting use of dialogue is to investigate our experience of standing in the middle, with no fantasy of resolution. What is it like to have no ground to stand on, no theory to identify with? To use theories for practical purposes rather than as positions to take?

The author eventually settles on the last option, noting the advantages of the resulting mindset:

We develop the capacity not to take refuge in any one position. As a result, we end up in this open middle ground where there's no support for personal identity and no objective confirmation that we're ever doing anything the "right way." Obviously, from an egoic point of view, this can be quite disturbing, especially at first. But the benefit is that we are able to just show up without a preconceived formula about how to live our lives. We begin to experience the reality that every moment is fresh. It's open. We don't know what's going to happen, and we don't know the right way to do this or that.

The most important shiur I gave last year was Of Wolves, Men, and Methodology. The main point of the shiur was to highlight the pitfalls of unwarranted reductionism - the attempt to take a complex phenomenon and to reduce it to an oversimplified thing, believing this to be The Truth.

Even though I gave this shiur and reference it constantly, I didn’t realize until I read Tift’s words that I was still falling prey to a reductionist way of thinking. I now see that I’ve been clinging to approaches #1 and #2 in my conception of what truth-seeking looks like, and that I was blind to #3. It never even occurred to me that there may be merit in “[investigating] our experience of standing in the middle, with no fantasy of resolution.” I had viewed “standing in the middle” as a necessary evil en route to one of two outcomes: either eliminating one view as false or arriving at a synthesis. I didn’t consider the possibility that deliberately not seeking a conclusion, or even an integration, might bring us the closest to truth.

There are certainly times when the desire to hold on to two mutually exclusive views inhibits our truth-seeking. In such situations we must goad ourselves to keep moving forward in our investigation, asking ourselves: “How long will you dance between two opinions?” (I Melachim 18:21). But I am now beginning to realize that there are also times when our need for certainty, identity, and other forms of psychological security push us towards unwarranted reductionism under the guise of intellectual diligence. In those situations, we must resist the impulse for security, allowing ourselves to remain in the space in between, with all the discomfort of doubt and uncertainty. A wise woman said: “Any fool can engage in action, but only the wise man can wait.” Any fool can force a conclusion, but only the wise man can wait.

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you. 

If you would like to sponsor an article, shiur, or podcast episode, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone. 

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast", "The Stoic Jew" Podcast, "Rambam Bekius" Podcast, "Machshavah Lab" Podcast, "The Tefilah Podcast"  For the full guide to all of my Torah content, click here. 

The Insidious Nature of Metaphysical and Epistemological Premises

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The Insidious Nature of Metaphysical and Epistemological Premises

I recently started reading a book called Already Free: Buddhism Meets Psychotherapy on the Path of Liberation. The author is Bruce Tift, who has worked as a psychotherapist and has lived as a practicing Buddhist for over 40 years. The back cover of the book reads: “Buddhism and Western psychotherapy seek to provide freedom from suffering, yet each offers a completely different approach for reaching this goal. How can we know which one will help us the most?”

I’ve been interested in psychology for a long time but have only recently begun to explore meditation, mindfulness, and the other Eastern practices that have been recognized as beneficial by Western psychotherapists. My intellectual disposition makes me wary when it comes to investigating other religions, but that’s what makes Buddhism and Taoism so frustrating for a “Westerner” such as myself: it’s hard to tell which elements are “religious” and which are simply chochmah (wisdom). That’s why this book intrigued me: I hoped that the author would help me to clarify the distinction.

I’m only two chapters in, but towards the beginning of the book the author addresses my concern:

It’s said that the Buddha was asked about what happens when we die, whether other beings exist in other realms, and questions about the nature of reality. The Buddha responded: “If a man has been shot with an arrow and the doctor is called, does that doctor ask him who shot the arrow, what his motives were, what he was wearing, and so on? No. The doctor’s job is to remove the arrow and help the patient heal. My teachings are about the relief from unnecessary suffering. I teach about liberation, not about the nature of reality.”

This is a seductive anecdote. It promises practical results without theoretics. But is it really that simple? Are there not metaphysical and epistemological premises embedded within the anecdote itself? This anecdote presupposes that “liberation” has nothing to do with “the nature of reality.” It presupposes that neither the art of the doctor nor the art of the teacher need be concerned with anything but the experience of suffering. It presupposes that one can distinguish between “necessary” and “unnecessary” suffering without knowledge of reality. All of these presuppositions are made with subtlety.

This serves as a reminder about the insidious nature of metaphysical and epistemological premises. It is far too easy to pledge allegiance to such premises without even realizing it. This reminder is especially important for people such as me, who regularly read and learn non-Torah sources, both in order to better understand and practice Judaism, and in order to gain insight into the chochmah outside of Torah.

There are those who say that the risk is not worth the reward. They argue that it would be far safer to close ourselves off from all non-Torah sources of wisdom, for fear of “contamination.” This was the position of Rav S.R. Hirsch, as expressed in Letter #18 of the Nineteen Letters. He lambasted the Rambam for being influenced by foreign ideas, and advocated for a model of “developing Judaism from within” – an approach he ascribes to the Ramban, to R’ Yehuda ha’Levi, and to himself.

I hear where this approach is coming from. My response, in a nutshell, is: that ship has sailed. The belief that we can learn “pure Torah” by hermetically sealing ourselves off from foreign influences is a pipe dream. This may have been possible at various points in our history, but not today. The Ramban, who villainized Aristotle, was influenced by his ideas, as is evident from his commentary. Rav Hirsch thought and wrote like a German. The best hope we have is to “accept the truth from whoever says it” (Rambam, Intro to Perek Chelek) while striving to be aware of and to question our premises on a continual basis.

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you. 

If you would like to sponsor an article, shiur, or podcast episode, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone. 

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast", "The Stoic Jew" Podcast, "Rambam Bekius" Podcast, "Machshavah Lab" Podcast, "The Tefilah Podcast"  For the full guide to all of my Torah content, click here. 

Tishah b’Av 5781: An Approach to the Blasphemy in Eichah and Kinnos

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Tishah b'Av 5781: An Approach to the Blasphemy in Eichah and Kinnos

“[Hashem] has drawn back His right hand from before the enemy” (Eichah 2:3) “[Hashem] has bent His bow like an enemy, with His right hand set like a tormentor” (ibid. 2:4) “My Lord was like an enemy” (ibid. 2:5)

First Hashem is described as withdrawing His protective right hand, allowing the enemy to attack. Then He is depicted as taking up arms and joining our enemy in its assault. Finally, Hashem, Himself, is identified as our enemy. What insight do these pesukim offer? What is the significance of this progression?

The answer is that this is actually a regression. The first pasuk is the accurate perspective: when we turn away from Hashem, He withdraws His protection, leaving us vulnerable to our enemies. The second pasuk reflects a warped view of Hashem, in which He is characterized as committing treason against His own people. The third pasuk is the worst distortion of them all, in which Hashem is the enemy of the Jews.

Why would Eichah cater to distorted portrayals of Hashem? The same may be asked about the kinnos (liturgical lamentations), which are replete with harsh, inappropriate, even blasphemous statements of this nature. How are we to make sense of such statements? What are we to think when reciting them?

When we suffer a horrific catastrophe – whether the destruction of the Beis ha’Mikdash, or the Holocaust, or even a personal tragedy – there are parts of us which feel that Hashem is like a malicious enemy. This is false, “for He does not afflict maliciously, nor cause the hearts of men to suffer” (ibid. 3:33). It is tempting to think that knowledge alone is the solution – that we can simply supplant falsehood with truth. This approach will not succeed. If we neglect to address these misguided parts of ourselves on their own terms, we will succeed only in driving them underground, where they will continue to affect our minds and hearts in an even more insidious manner. Instead, we must acknowledge that we have these parts of ourselves. We must give expression to them, allowing them to say what they think and feel what they feel. Only when they feel seen and heard will they be receptive to truth. Only then can the healing begin.

Anthony de Mello’s analogy in Awareness: the Perils and Opportunities of Reality illustrates this point:

This reminds me of this fellow in London after the war. He’s sitting with a parcel wrapped in brown paper in his lap; it’s a big, heavy object. The bus conductor comes up to him and says, “What do you have on your lap there?” And the man says, “This is an unexploded bomb. We dug it out of the garden and I’m taking it to the police station.” The conductor says, “You don’t want to carry that on your lap. Put it under the seat.”

The distorted conceptions of Hashem carried by our inner parts are like bombs we carry on our laps. To uncritically embrace these false views as true would be to detonate the bombs. We must seek knowledge of Hashem, led by our tzelem Elokim (intellect) and guided by Torah. But that is not enough. If we dismiss, deny, or “exile” the parts of ourselves that harbor these false views of Hashem, all we’re doing is taking the unexploded bombs and putting them under our seats. This is worse than keeping them on our laps, insofar as we convince ourselves that we’ve eliminated the threat when all we’ve done is hidden it. All it takes is for the bus to be jostled in the wrong way, and these hidden bombs will explode.

There is a third option: to acknowledge the bombs we are carrying, to accept our precarious state, and from that place of awareness, apply our knowledge to diffuse them. This is the intent of Eichah and kinnos: to make us aware of and feel the distorted perspectives we harbor, to accept and feel the precarious metaphysical danger we are in, and from that place of visceral intellectual recognition, to help us “unburden” these misguided parts of ourselves through knowledge and teshuvah and the light of truth.

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle/Chase QuickPay and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you. 

If you would like to sponsor an article, shiur, or podcast episode, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone. 

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast", "The Stoic Jew" Podcast, "Rambam Bekius" Podcast, "Machshavah Lab" Podcast, "The Tefilah Podcast"  For the full guide to all of my Torah content, click here. 

The Induction of Metaphysical Trauma

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The Induction of Metaphysical Trauma

This morning I read the following idea from Rav Soloveitchik about the uniquely Jewish phenomenon of aveilus yeshanah (mourning a past tragedy), as opposed to aveilus chadashah (mourning a present loss):

A Jew lives with a unique time consciousness. He experiences time not in the standard tripartite division of past, present, and future; rather, all three dimensions converge into a single integrated existence. This unique orientation toward time enables a Jew to pre-experience events of the distant future and to relive occurrences of the ostensibly dead past … A Jew has the unique capacity to relive past tragedies and to experience them anew as if the wounds were still fresh. As a result, the abiding sentiments of grief, the resulting sense of void, and the hopeless feelings of groping in the dark are felt just as powerfully when mourning for past events.

I am in the middle of reading The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma, by Bessel van der Kolk, M.D. One of the key characteristics of trauma is the reexperiencing of past events as though they are happening in the present. Van der Kolk writes: “Long after the actual event has passed, the brain may keep sending signals to the body to escape a threat that no longer exists.”

In this sense, aveilus yeshanah is metaphysical trauma. It is “trauma” in that it is a reexperiencing of a painful event from the remote past as though it were happening in the present. It is “metaphysical” in that its aim is the perfection of the soul, as opposed to psychological or neurological functions. This aim is reflected in the Rambam’s statement about the purpose of all national fast days in Hilchos Taaniyos 5:1:

There are days on which all of Israel fasts because of the catastrophes that occurred on them, in order to awaken the hearts [of the people] and to open the paths of teshuvah (repentance). This will be a remembrance of our corrupt actions and the corrupt actions of our fathers that were like our actions today, which ultimately reached the point that [these corrupt actions] caused these catastrophes for them and for us. Through the remembrance of these matters we will return to do good, as it stated: “they will confess their sins and the sins of their fathers” (Vayikra 26:40).

This Rambam underscores a key point: the metaphysical trauma of aveilus yeshanah must be artificially induced. In aveilus chadashah, which is triggered by the death of a close relative, grief is a natural reaction which is then harnessed and directed within the framework of the laws of mourning. In aveilus yeshanah, the natural reaction of grief is no longer extant; the catastrophic events we mourn happened so long ago that they have faded from our national consciousness. Instead, the mourning customs and laws we observe during The Three Weeks, The Nine Days, and Tishah b’Av are designed to awaken, generate, and cultivate a sense of tragic loss. It is from those “abiding sentiments of grief, the resulting sense of void, and the hopeless feelings of groping in the dark” that the real work of national teshuvah can begin.

This is another feature which makes aveilus yeshanah a uniquely Jewish phenomenon. The world views trauma in an entirely negative light. Trauma is something to be avoided or gotten rid of at any cost. Who in their right mind would seek out trauma? Ironically, the answer is: one who seeks to be in their right mind. Only the Jew, who lives not for the body but for the soul, will artificially induce a painful state of trauma each year for the sake of teshuvah. Only the Jew sees teshuvah as essential for the life of mind.

[1] excerpted from the Reshimot of Rabbi Menachem Genack in the appendix of The Koren Mesorat HaRav Kinot

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle/Chase QuickPay and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you. 

If you would like to sponsor an article, shiur, or podcast episode, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone. 

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast", "The Stoic Jew" Podcast, "Rambam Bekius" Podcast, "Machshavah Lab" Podcast, "The Tefilah Podcast"  For the full guide to all of my Torah content, click here. 

Haftarah of Mattos / Masei: Divine Love as the Foundation of Rebuke

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Haftarah of Mattos / Masei: Divine Love as the Foundation of Rebuke

Sefer Yirmiyahu is filled with messages of rebuke, catastrophe, and tragedy. Yet, the very first prophecy Yirmiyahu is sent to deliver has a markedly different character from the rest of the book:

Go and call out in the ears of Yerushalayim, saying: “Thus said Hashem: I recalled for you the kindness of your youth, the love of your wedding [ceremony], your following after Me in the Wilderness, into an unsown land. Israel is holy to Hashem, the first of His crop; all who consume it will be held guilty; harm shall befall them - the word of Hashem” (Yirmiyahu 2:2-3).

Rav Hirsch (Commentary on Haftaroth) notes this thematic discrepancy:

The first Word which the young prophet has to bring to his people in the name of God, as the beginning of his mission, is no stern rebuke, no prophecy of the impending disaster, but a message of love, of encouragement, a Word that looks beyond all the precipices, pierces through all the dark clouds of the gloomy fate, to the bright outlook on the ultimate sun-bathed goal of the undying People at the zenith of their destiny intimately united with their God. No more intimate or more glorious Word has ever flowed from the lips of any prophet. A Word which embraces the most distant past with the most distant future, and thereby demonstrates the wonderful continuity of the Thought of God which comes to be developed in Jewish history.

Why does Yirmiyahu preface his prophecies of rebuke with this message of love? I would like to suggest an answer based on the words of the Rambam (Moreh ha’Nevuchim 3:28) and a quotation cited by Bessel van der Kolk, M.D. in The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma (2015).

The Rambam maintains that the doctrines taught by the Torah fall into two categories. The first is “beliefs through which the ultimate perfection may be attained,” including “the belief in Hashem’s Existence (exalted is He), His Oneness, His Omniscience, His Omnipotence, His Will, and His Eternality.” The second category is comprised of “beliefs which are necessary for the sake of societal welfare, such as our belief that He (may He be exalted) is violently angry with those who disobey Him and that it is therefore necessary to fear Him and to dread Him and to take care not to disobey.” The belief in Hashem’s enduring love for the Jewish people belongs to this second category, since Hashem has no actual emotions and “love” is only ascribed to Him by way of metaphor.  

Van der Kolk begins the section of his book “on the minds of children” with the words of Diana Fosha, PhD, known for her work on the psychotherapy of adults suffering the effects of childhood attachment trauma and abuse: “The roots of resilience ... are to be found in the sense of being understood by and existing in the mind and heart of a loving, attuned, and self-possessed other.”

Perhaps Yirmiyahu opened his rebuke with a message of Divine love for this reason. He knew that in order for the Jews to endure their impending destruction and exile with the type of resilience that leads to teshuvah, they needed to feel seen and loved by Hashem. It is known that a baal teshuvah is “cherished and beloved” by Hashem (Hilchos Teshuvah 7:6), but that knowledge is not enough for the sinner. The sinner must also know that “the one whom Hashem loves, He rebukes” (Mishlei 3:12) – that the rebuke, itself, is from love, and reflects a confidence in the intrinsic worth of the sinner, despite their sins.

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle/Chase QuickPay and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you. 

If you would like to sponsor an article, shiur, or podcast episode, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone. 

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast", "The Stoic Jew" Podcast, "Rambam Bekius" Podcast, "Machshavah Lab" Podcast, "The Tefilah Podcast"  For the full guide to all of my Torah content, click here. 

Feynman: On Definitional Neurosis

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Feynman: On Definitional Neurosis

I came across the following (unsourced) quotation from Richard Feynman on the internet:

We cannot define ANYTHING precisely. If we attempt to, we get into that paralysis of thought that comes to philosophers, who sit opposite each other, one saying to the other, “You don't know what you are talking about!” The second one says, “What do you mean by KNOW? What do you mean by TALKING? What do you mean by YOU?"

As a student of Torah, I was “born and bred” in the tradition of Brisk. The derech ha’limud (learning methodology) of my yeshiva is the Brisker Derech, pioneered by Rav Chaim Soloveitchik and developed by his offspring, most notably Rav Yosef Dov ha’Levi Soloveitchik. This methodology focuses heavily on sevara (conceptual definition). My rebbi wrote a profound essay, entitled On Scientific and Halachic Thought, in which he compares the Brisker Derech to the methodology of science. Although there are key differences, the common denominator is the quest for precise, elegant, conceptual definitions.

Few people in the last century understood and appreciated science like Richard Feynman, the Nobel Prize winning theoretical physicist and innovator who also happened to be a highly gifted teacher and lover of knowledge. What, then, are we to make of his statement cited above, in which he appears to denigrate the search for definitions? Surely he can’t actually mean that “we cannot define ANYTHING precisely”!

Karen Horney, in Self-Analysis, identifies two distinguishing features of neuroses:

The outstanding characteristic of neurotic trends is their compulsive nature, a quality that shows itself in two main ways. First, their objectives are pursued indiscriminately … [The second] is the reaction of anxiety that ensues from their frustration.

What Feynman calls “that paralysis of thought that comes to philosophers” I call “definitional neurosis.” The hallmarks of definitional neurosis are (1) the indiscriminate demand for precise definitions, and (2) the reaction of anxiety in their absence. It is true that conceptual definitions are the golden standard of knowledge. However, the nuanced thinker who “says to wisdom, ‘you are my sister,’ and calls understanding a good friend” (cf. Mishlei 7:4) will recognize that the insistence on precise definition can often be an impediment to understanding. This is what Feynman means by “paralysis of thought.”

Ironically, it is often the most highly intelligent people who fall prey to definitional neurosis, obstinately refusing to proceed until every term is precisely defined. Such individuals may fancy themselves the (superior) Socrates and their partners in conversation the (inferior) Athenian youths. In truth, Socrates was sensitive to the minds of his students and used questions to move the discussion forward. In contrast, the definitional neurotics fail to notice when their insistence on definition obstructs the pursuit of knowledge. Worse yet is when pseudo-Socratic tactics are used as a psychological defense mechanism – as a means of stifling or evading a particular line of inquiry.

There is a time to define and a time to refrain from defining. How does one know when to press for definitions and when to follow the flow of the inquiry or discussion? What are the precise criteria for making such a determination? The precise answer to that question is …

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle/Chase QuickPay and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you. 

If you would like to sponsor an article, shiur, or podcast episode, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone. 

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast", "The Stoic Jew" Podcast, "Rambam Bekius" Podcast, "Machshavah Lab" Podcast, "The Tefilah Podcast"  For the full guide to all of my Torah content, click here. 

Bruce Lee: Self-Actualization vs. Self-Image Actualization

The following is an excerpt from Bruce Lee's handwritten notes entitled "The Top Dog and the Underdog." The italics and bold are his (though he used capital letters instead of bold).

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Bruce Lee: Self-Actualization vs. Self-Image Actualization

If we examine the two clowns – the top dog and the underdog – that perform the self-torture game on the stage of our fantasy, then we usually find the two characters to be like this:

The Top Dog

The top dog usually is righteous and authoritarian; he knows best. He is sometimes right, but always righteous. The top dog is a bully and works with “you should” and “you should not.” The top dog manipulates with demands and threats of catastrophe, such as, “If you don’t ... then – you won’t be loved, you won’t get to heaven, you will die,” and so on.

The Underdog

The underdog manipulates with being defensive, apologetic, wheedling, playing the crybaby, and such. The underdog has no power. The underdog is Mickey Mouse. The top dog is the super-mouse. And the underdog works like this: “I try my best,” “Look, I try again and again. I can’t help it if I fail.” “I have such good intentions.” So you see the underdog is cunning, and he usually gets the better of the top dog because the underdog is not as primitive as the top dog. So the top dog and underdog strive for control. Like every parent and child, they strive with each other for control. The person is fragmented into controller and controlled. This inner conflict, the struggle between the top dog and underdog, is never complete, because the top dog as well as the underdog fights for his life.

This is the basis for the famous self-torture game. We usually take for granted that the top dog is right, and in many cases, the top dog makes impossible perfectionistic demands. So if you are cursed with perfectionism, then you’re absolutely sunk. This ideal is a yardstick which always gives you the opportunity to browbeat yourself, to berate yourself and others. Since this ideal is an impossibility, you can never live up to it. You are merely in love with this ideal, and there is no end to the self-torture, to the self-nagging, self-castigating. It hides under the mask of “self-improvement.” It never works.

If the person tries to meet the top dog’s demands of perfectionism, the result is a “nervous breakdown,” or flight into insanity. This is one of the tools of the underdog. Once we recognize the structure of our behavior, which in the case of self-improvement is the split between the top dog and the underdog, and understand how, by listening, we can bring about a reconciliation of these two fighting clowns, then we realize that we cannot deliberately bring about the changes in ourselves or in others.

This is a very decisive point: many people dedicate their lives to actualizing a concept of what they should be like, rather than actualizing themselves. This difference between self-actualizing and self-image actualizing is very important. Most people only live for their image.

Where some people have a self, most people have a void, because they are so busy projecting themselves as this or that. This is again the curse of the ideal. The curse is that you should not be what you are. Every external control, even internalized external control – “you should” – interferes with the healthy working of the organism. There is only one thing that should control the situation. If you understand the situation that you are in, and let the situation that you are in control your actions, then you learn how to cope with life. For example, you don’t drive according to the program, you drive according to the situation (same thing in combat). You drive a different speed when you are tired, when it’s raining, and so forth.

The less confident we are in ourselves, the less we are in touch with ourselves and the world, the more we want to control.

Lishmah and l'Kanter

This can be read as a standalone post, provided that you're familiar with the basic terminology of learning lishmah (for its own sake) and she'lo lishmah (not for its own sake), as explained by the Rambam in his Introduction to Perek Chelek. 

I'll also state a disclaimer here. The subject of lishmah and she'lo lishmah is both deep and broad. The topic is multifaceted, and there are many views within the Mesorah on each facet. The purpose of this post is to analyze one answer to one question - not to serve as a comprehensive overview of the entire subject.

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Artwork: Calculated Dismissal, by Karl Kopinski

Lishmah and l'Kanter

The Question

The Gemara in Pesachim 50b states:

Rava brought up a contradiction: "It is written: 'for Your mercy is great unto the heavens' (Tehilim 57:11) and it is [also] written: 'for Your mercy is great above the heavens' (ibid. 108:5). 

How [can this contradiction be resolved]? [The pasuk which describes His mercy as above the heavens] refers to those who act lishmah, [whereas the pasuk which describes His mercy as merely reaching the heavens] refers to those who act she'lo lishmah."  

[This teaching of Rava] accords with what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: "a person should always engage in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah, because mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah (from she'lo lishmah one will come to lishmah)."

According to the statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav, learning she'lo lishmah is praiseworthy, insofar as it brings a person to lishmah. The Gemara also implies that those who engage in Torah and mitzvos she'lo lishmah merit a high level of Divine mercy, albeit not quite as high as that attained by those who act lishmah.

Elsewhere, however, Chazal make other statements which imply that learning she'lo lishmah is undesirable. For example, the Gemara in Berachos 17a states:

Rava was wont to say: "The objective of wisdom is teshuvah and good deeds, that a person shouldn't read and learn yet spurn his father, and his mother, and his teacher, and one who is greater than he in wisdom and in number, as it is stated, 'the beginning of wisdom is fear of Hashem, a good intellect to all who do them' (Tehilim 111:10) - it is not stated 'to those who do' but rather it is stated 'to those who do them' - [that is,] to those who act lishmah, but not to those who act she'lo lishmah. And anyone who acts she'lo lishmah - it would be better if he hadn't been created.

Another statement which deprecates she'lo lishmah can be found in Taanis 7a:

It was taught in a braisa that R' Benaah would say: "Anyone who engages in Torah lishmah, it becomes an elixir of life for him, as it is stated: 'it is a tree of life to those who grasp it' (Mishlei 3:18), and it says: 'it shall be health to your navel' (ibid. 3:8), and it says: 'for whoever finds me finds life" (ibid. 8:35). And anyone who engages in Torah she'lo lishmah, it will be an elixir of death for him, as it is stated: 'My teaching shall drop [yaarof] like rain' (Devarim 32:2) and arifah means nothing other than killing, as it is stated: 'they shall break the heifer's neck (arefu) there in the valley' (Devarim 21:4)."

Perhaps the most shocking anti-she'lo lishmah statement can be found in Kallah Rabbasi 5:1:

Rebbi Akiva says: "Whoever studies she'lo lishmah, he would have been better off if he had been smothered by his afterbirth."

Broadly stated, the central question that emerges from these and similar sources is: How can Chazal's anti- she'lo lishmah statements be reconciled with their pro- she'lo lishmah statements? If those who learn she'lo lishmah are better off if they were never created, or if their Torah is an elixir of death, or if they should have been smothered by their afterbirth, then how can Chazal encourage us to engage in Torah and mitzvos she'lo lishmah and say that we will be the recipients of Hashem's mercy "unto the heavens"?

[Note: While it's true that aggadic (non-legal) statements were authored by different sages, and don't necessarily have to be reconciled, the commentators by and large seem to assume that these statements about lishmah and she'lo lishmah ought to be. Perhaps this is the assumption here because it would be strange for there to be a genuine disagreement on a topic that is so fundamental as this.]

Tosafos's Answer

Tosafos state their resolution to this difficulty in several places. Although there are nuanced differences between their different formulations of their answer, they mostly boil down to the same thing. I'll cite the most straightforward formulation, which can be found on Taanis 7a:

"and anyone who engages in Torah she'lo lishmah, it will be an elixir of death for him" - This is difficult, for don't we say that "a person should always be involved in Torah even though it's not lishmah because from she'lo lishmah one will come to lishmah"? 

The answer is that there are two types of she'lo lishmah. When we say "a person should always be involved in Torah even she'lo lishmah," this is referring to a case in which [he learns] in order to be called "rabbi" or so that people will honor him, but that which is stated here, [that] "anyone who is involved in Torah she'lo lishmah it becomes an elixir of death for him" - this refers to someone who learns l'kanter.

The term "l'kanter" is a bit tricky to translate. I usually translate it as "to counter" or "to be contrarian." Jastrow translates it as "to chide." I've also seen it translated as "to antagonize," "to provoke," "to break down," "to rebut," "to vanquish," and other similar terms. In their other statements of this answer, the Baalei Tosafos provide some additional clues. On Berachos 17a they use the phrase "l'kanter chaveirav" which implies that l'kanter is an act committed against someone else. On Pesachim 50b they say: "le'hisyaher (to be haughty), l'kanter (to counter), and le'kapeach (to overpower) his fellows in halacha."

Regardless of which translation we use, the general answer provided by Tosafos is clear: there are two types of she'lo lishmah. When Chazal endorse she'lo lishmah learning, they are referring to motives such as seeking honor and wanting to be called "rabbi," and when they speak against she'lo lishmah, they are referring to l'kanter.

Understanding Tosafos's Answer: Approach #1

The main question on Tosafos's answer is: What is the basis of this subdivision within she'lo lishmah? What makes l'kanter different from other she'lo lishmah motives?

The most common answer I've heard to this question is based on the reasoning Chazal used in their endorsement of learning she'lo lishmah. They said: "a person should always engage in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah, because from she'lo lishmah one will come to lishmah." If l'kanter doesn't fall into this category, then it must be because l'kanter does not bring a person to lishmah.

I have two problems with this approach. The first is that I don't understand why l'kanter cannot bring a person to lishmah. At the end of the day, learning l'kanter doesn't seem to be fundamentally different than learning l'kavod. Some people want the kavod of being called "rabbi," some want the kavod of being knowledgeable in every area of Torah, and the person who learns l'kanter wants the kavod of winning arguments. It's all kavod, and just as the child in the Rambam's parable will eventually "grow out of" his kavod motive and become attached to the learning itself, the same is true for the person who learns l'kanter. 

My second problem with this approach is that it's empirically false. I know a number of people whose initial attachment to learning was as a tool to break other people down - usually parents, teachers,  or community rabbis with whom they disagreed - and many of these individuals eventually came around to learning lishmah. Yes, it's possible to take any of my examples and argue that the individual in question wasn't really learning l'kanter, or that this person had other legitimate she'lo lishmah motives as well, but this type of apologetic navel-gazing quickly strays into the fallacious "no true Scotsman" territory. 

The only basis on which I might be open to accepting this understanding of Tosafos's answer is if l'kanter referred specifically to someone who engages in sophistry, fabrication of sources, intellectual dishonesty, or anything which involves a distortion of truth. The Sefer Chasidim (#294) seems to characterize l'kanter this way, speaking of "[one who learns] l'kanter and to provoke and looks to bring false proofs to undermine your words." If that is what l'kanter means, then I can see how it wouldn't lead to lishmah.

The problem is that I don't see any basis for positing that this is Tosafos's definition of l'kanter. I haven't seen any indications in Tosafos that their concept of l'kanter involves any form of intellectual malfeasance. If this were the essence of their definition of l'kanter, one would expect them to mention it, or at least hint at it. 

At the end of the day, the two aforementioned problems prevent me from accepting this approach to understanding Tosafos: (1) I haven't yet heard a convincing explanation of why l'kanter precludes lishmah, and (2) this distinction clashes with my experience. 

Understanding Tosafos's Answer: Approach #2

I asked our question to my Mishlei rebbi and he had a much more elegant - and, in my opinion, truer - answer. He explained that according to Tosafos, all she'lo lishmah learning leads to lishmah, but despite that, Chazal discouraged learning l'kanter because of its destructive effects. In other words, there is no difference between l'kanter and any other she'lo lishmah motive insofar as "mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah" is concerned. The only reason why Chazal singled out l'kanter (according to Tosafos) is because they wanted to voice their disapproval of forms of learning which lead to bad middos (personality traits) and cause strife in the Beis Midrash or in Klal Yisrael.

To clarify the difference between these two approaches, consider the following analogy. A music teacher makes two statements about the practicing piano: (1) "practice makes perfect" and (2) "don't practice all day - remember to go out and play!" It would be possible to reconcile these two statements in the manner of Approach #1 by saying that in general, "practice makes perfect," but practicing all day without going outside to play will not "make perfect." (They say that Chopin forbade his students to practice more than 3-4 hours a day, believing that excess practice is detrimental to musicality.) Alternatively, one can reconcile these two statements by saying that indeed, all practice makes perfect; however, those who only practice but don't go outside to play will suffer additional harm, outside of their musicality, and for that reason it is not advisable to practice all day.

My Mishlei rebbi's approach addresses both of the problems I had with Approach #1. According to this approach, we don't need to grope in the dark for reasons why l'kanter can't lead to lishmah; all we need to do is acknowledge that the harmful effects of l'kanter warranted harsh condemnation by Chazal. Secondly, this approach explains the real-world cases I was referring to earlier: there have been many students who have learned l'kanter and who have arrived at lishmah, even as they wreaked havoc in their middos and communities in the process.

Support from the Rambam

I believe that my Mishlei rebbi's approach to understanding Tosafos is supported by a letter from the Rambam (Sheilat edition p.160). R' Pinchas ha'Dayan had asked the Rambam about the contradictory implications of Chazal's statements about she'lo lishmah. The Rambam answered as follows:

Those two statements regarding one who engages in Torah lishmah and she'lo lishmah do not contradict each other. From both of them we learn that it is only proper to be involved in Torah lishmah, and lishmah is the essence, and we were only commanded to be involved [in Torah] lishmah, and one who is involved [in Torah] she'lo lishmah is better off having never been created. 

Nevertheless, it is better to be involved [in Torah] she'lo lishmah than to not be involved in it at all, because this person who is involved in it inappropriately will, because of his involvement she'lo lishmah, come to lishmah. 

Unlike the Baalei Tosafos, who resolve the contradiction by subdividing she'lo lishmah into two categories, the Rambam doesn't differentiate between l'kanter and other she'lo lishmah motives. He regards all she'lo lishmah motivations as being equally inferior and equally capable of leading to lishmah.

The proponents of Approach #1 are free to maintain that there is a machlokess (disagreement) between Tosafos and the Rambam on whether l'kanter precludes lishmah, but according to Approach #2, there's no need to posit this. One can simply say that the Rambam and Tosafos are in complete agreement that all she'lo lishmah learning can potentially lead to lishmah, but whereas the Rambam held that these statements of Chazal were intended to convey their views about she'lo lishmah in general, the Baalei Tosafos maintained that they were intended to single out a specific she'lo lishmah motive for condemnation.

Concluding Thoughts

I am curious as to your thoughts on Tosafos's distinction between l'kanter and other she'lo lishmah motives. If you agree with Approach #1 and would like to explain to me why, contrary to the real-world cases I've observed, l'kanter cannot lead to lishmah, then I'm all ears! Alternatively, if you think there's a problem with Approach #2 or if you have a third approach, I'd like to hear that as well. Lastly, if there are other interesting sources, ideas, or questions you'd like to share on the topic of lishmah and she'lo lishmah, please do share!

Rambam: On Lishmah and she'Lo Lishmah

I started writing a blog post about doing mitzvos lishmah (for their own sake) and she'lo lishmah (not for their own sake), and was shocked to discover that I haven't yet posted a translation of the Rambam's discourse on this topic anywhere on my blog. I decided to rectify that by posting my translation without any commentary, since it is something that every student of Torah should read. The paragraph divisions are my own.

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Artwork: Frantic Search, by Mitchell Malloy

Rambam: On Lishmah and she'Lo Lishmah

You, the thoughtful reader, should contemplate the following parable which I will present to you, and then pay attention to understand my words on this entire topic. 

A young child is brought to an educator to learn Torah. This is a tremendous good for him, because of the perfection he will attain from it. However, due to his young age and the deficiency of his mind, he will not understand the value of that good, nor [will he understand the value] of the perfection he will gain. Thus, necessity compels the teacher – who is more perfected than the child – to motivate him to learn by using something which is beloved to him, because of his young age. [The teacher] will say, “Learn and I will give you nuts and figs!” or “I will give you a piece of candy!” Then the student will learn and strive not for the learning itself, whose value he doesn’t know, but in order to attain that piece of food. The eating of that food is more important to him and more beneficial [from his perspective], without a doubt. Therefore, he will consider the learning to be a toil and exertion which he must work at in order to attain that desirable objective – that single nut or piece of candy. 

When the child grows and his intellect is strengthened, and that thing which he used to value becomes less important in his eyes and he goes go on to value other things, we motivate him with that which is even more important in his eyes. The teacher will say to him, “Learn and I will buy these fancy shoes for you” or “an article of clothing with such-and-such an appearance.” Then he will strive not for the learning itself, but for that article of clothing, because that article of clothing will be more valuable to him than the learning, and it will be the objective of the learning. 

When his mind becomes more perfected and that thing becomes less significant in his eyes, we motivate him with something greater than this. His teacher will say to him, “Learn this section or this chapter and I will give you a dollar or two.” Then he will learn and strive in order to earn that money, and the earning of that money will be more significant to him than the learning, for the purpose of learning – to him, at this time – is the earning of the money that was promised to him. 

When he becomes more cognizant and this thing [he once valued] becomes less significant in his eyes and he knows that it is a thing of inferior worth, we motivate him with something that is more important to him. We say to him, “Learn in order to become a rabbi and a judge. People will honor you; they will stand up in your presence; your words will be established and your reputation will grow during your lifetime and after your death, like so-and-so.” Then he will learn and strive in order to achieve that level of distinction, and the ultimate objective – to him – will be that people should honor him, exalt him, and praise him. 

All of this is despicable – yet, it is necessary for us, due to the deficiency of the human psyche (or mind), which causes him to make the purpose of learning something other than the learning [itself]. He will say, “Why should I learn this?” – only in order to achieve something which, in truth, is but a fantasy. This is what the Sages referred to as she’lo lishmah (lit. “not for its own sake”). In other words, he fulfills the mitzvos and does them and learns and strives not for the sake of that thing itself, but for the sake of something else. The Sages (peace be upon them) cautioned us, saying, “Do not make them (i.e. matters of Torah) a crown through which to glorify yourself, nor an axe to chop with” (Avos 4:5). They are alluding to that which I have explained to you, that one should not make the purpose of his learning that people should honor him, nor the acquisition of wealth, nor should he make Hashem’s Torah into a livelihood. 

The purpose of his learning should be nothing other than knowledge itself; likewise, the only purpose of truth is to know that it is true; the mitzvos are true, and therefore, their purpose is their fulfillment. It is prohibited for a perfected person to say, “If I do these good things and if I refrain from these bad things which Hashem prohibited to me, what will be my reward?” For this is like what the child says: “If I learn, what will I be given?” And they say to him, “Such-and-such a thing,” for when we see the deficiency of his mind – that he doesn’t understand the value of this thing, and he seeks out a purpose for the purpose – we answer him in accordance with the degree of his foolishness, [as it is stated,] “answer a fool according to his foolishness” (Mishlei 26:5). 

The Sages already warned us about this – namely, that a person shouldn’t make the purpose of his avodah (service) and his fulfillment of the mitzvos any of these things – in the statement of the pious man who grasped the truth, Antignos of Socho: “Do not be like servants who serve the master with the intention of receiving a prize; rather, be like servants who serve their master with the intention not to receive a prize.” By this they mean that one should believe in truth for the sake of the truth itself. This is what [the Sages] referred to as “oved me’ahavah” (“one who serves out of love”). They said, “he desires His mitzvos exceedingly” (Tehilim 112:1). R’ Elazar said: “His mitzvos” and not “the reward of His mitzvos” (Avodah Zarah 19a). How great is this proof and how clear it is, for this is a clear proof to our preceding words! Even greater than this is the statement of the Sages in Sifrei: “Perhaps a person will say, ‘I will learn Torah so that I can become rich’ or ‘so that I will be called “rebbi”’ or ‘so that I will receive reward in the World to Come’ – but the pasuk says, ‘to love Hashem, your God’; everything you do, you should only do out of love” (Eikev: Devarim 11:13). 

It has been explained and made clear that this is the goal of the mitzvos and the foundation of our Sages’ belief. The only person who will be oblivious to this is a fool and a naïve simpleton who has already been corrupted by crazy, fantastical, imaginary and degenerate notions. This [high level of lishmah] is the level of Avraham Avinu, who was oved me’ahavah (Sotah 31a), and this is the path which we are obligated to strive for. 

But the Sages (of blessed memory) knew that this was a very difficult concept which not every person can grasp. Even if he does grasp it, it will not seem correct at first glance, and it will not seem like a true opinion, since man’s nature is to not do an action unless it will bring him some benefit or enable him to avoid some harm, and if it does neither of these, then the act would be pointless. How is it possible to say to a Torah-observant Jew, “Do these actions and don’t do these,” not out of fear of Hashem’s punishment and not out of a hope for reward? This is very difficult, for not all people grasp the truth and will be like Avraham Avinu. 

Therefore, they permitted the masses to remain in accordance with their mentality, to do the good out of hope for reward and to avoid the bad out of fear of punishment. They encouraged them in this, and strengthened their thoughts about it, until the apprehender apprehends and knows the truth and knows what the perfected path is – just like the youth at the time of learning, according to the aforementioned analogy. They were critical of Antignos of Socho for publicizing among the masses what he publicized, saying, “Sages – be careful with your words! etc.” as we explained in Avos. The masses do not lose out completely by fulfilling the mitzvos out of fear of reward and hope of punishment; they are just not perfected. But it is better for them to do this in order for them to acquire the disposition and preparation for fulfilling Torah, so that they will [eventually] move on to the truth and serve out of love. This is what the Sages (of blessed memory) said: “A person should always be involved in Torah even she’lo lishmah, for from she’lo lishmah he will come to lishmah” (Sanhedrin 105b, Pesachim 50b, Nazir 23b, Sotah 22b and 47a, Horiyos 10b, Erachin 16b).

Parashas Shelach: The Torah's View of Temptation

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Artwork: Mother of Runes, by Terese Nielsen
(for the record, this is my mental image of Eishes Potiphar)

Parashas Shelach: The Torah's View of Temptation

The last mitzvah mentioned in this week's parashah is "lo sasuru acharei levavchem v'acharei eineichem" ("you shall not explore after your heart and after your eyes"). [1] Here is the mitzvah in its context:

And they shall be tzitzis (lit. fringes) for you, that you may see it and remember all the mitzvos of Hashem and do them, and you shall not explore after your heart and after your eyes after which you stray. So that you may remember and do all of My mitzvos, and be kedoshim (holy) to your God. I am Hashem, your God, Who has removed you from the land of Egypt to be a God to you; I am Hashem, your God. (Bamidbar 15:39-41)

The Torah she'baal Peh [2] teaches us that each phrase relates to a different category of illicit "exploration":

"after your heart" - this refers to meenus (heresy); "after your eyes" - this refers to  zenus (licentiousness).

Although my usual practice is to provide all of the basic background information for each topic that I introduce, I'm not going to do so in this case because I believe it would distract us from the question we will be focusing on. Suffice it to say, this mitzvah prohibits us from giving in to certain harmful temptations in the realm of our intellectual speculations [3] and sexual desires. [4]

Our central question arises from an inference made by Sifre: [5]

"after your heart and after your eyes": Does this tell us that the eyes follow after the heart, or that the heart follows after the eyes? - You'll argue: "Is there no blind person who does all the abominations in the world?" Indeed, this is why the Torah teaches "do not explore after your heart and after your eyes" - this tells us that the eyes follow after the heart. 

This Sifre is cryptic. What, exactly, does it mean to say that "the eyes follow after the heart"? What are the implications of the Sifre's conclusion? 

The Malbim [6] addresses these questions in his commentary on the Sifre: 

Many people are of the opinion that the heart's desire for transgression is aroused by the senses, as it is said: "The eye sees, and the heart desires" [7], and "a person only desires what his eyes have seen." [8] However, Chazal infer the opposite ... [namely,] were it not for the fact the mind was seized by the preexisting desire-fueled fantasies of the heart, he would not be affected by what his eyes saw - whether in terms of going on a bad path [of licentiousness] or following the ways of heresy to remove from himself the fear of Hashem. [If he goes on the bad path of licentiousness,] this is a sign that his fantasy-based desires have already paved the way ahead of time. Likewise, [this is a sign] that the thoughts of iniquity have already preceded him in his heart and caused him to make light of the fear of Hashem, Who sees his hidden and revealed dimensions. 

In other words, it may be true that a desire will be awakened by what the eyes see, [9] but Sifre is teaching us that the seeing of the eyes will only awaken one's desires if the path was paved ahead of time by the desire-fueled fantasies (tziyurei ha'taavah) of the heart. This, according to the Malbim, is what Chazal mean when they say that "the eyes follow after the heart." 

In order to further elucidate his meaning, the Malbim cites Ibn Ezra's [10] explanation of "lo tachmod" ("you shall not covet") and "lo tisaveh," which reflect the Sifre's view of the relationship between "the heart" and "the eyes." Here is the Ibn Ezra's commentary in his own words:

"you shall not covet": Many people are astounded by this mitzvah, [wondering] "How can a man not covet something which his heart and eyes find to be beautiful?" Now I will give you a mashal (example). Consider a peasant who is of sound mind, and who sees a beautiful princess. He will not covet her in his heart, [desiring] to sleep with her, because he knows that this is impossible. This peasant will not be like the insane, who think they can do impossible things like sprout wings and fly in the sky. Just as a man doesn't desire to sleep with his mother, even though she is beautiful, because he has been raised from youth to know that she is prohibited to him, so too, every rational person needs to know that neither a beautiful woman nor possessions will be found by him through his own wisdom and knowledge, but only as apportioned to him by Hashem ... and because of this, he will neither desire nor covet [the belongings of others]. Once he knows that his friend's wife has been prohibited to him by Hashem, she will be more out of reach to him than the princess in the heart of the peasant. 

The Malbim then goes on to explain how the Ibn Ezra's take on lo tachmod and lo tisaveh follows the view expressed by the Sifre:

On the basis of this approach the Ibn Ezra explained what Hashem commanded - "you shall not desire your friend's house," "you shall not covet your friend's wife" - [saying] that if a person diminishes the desire-fueled fantasies and doesn't bring them to mind, and similarly, if he continually remembers that Hashem commanded him and prohibited him and stands over him and sees his actions, then he will not come into the grips of any desire at all, just as the peasant will not desire the princess. 

This is what is meant by the statement that "the eyes follow after the heart": were it not for the desire-fueled fantasies that are generated in the heart, he would not be moved by the sight of his eyes. It is for this reason that "do not explore after your heart" comes first, since it first must generate the fantasies of desire and the bad middos, and only afterwards will "the eyes explore."

[Chazal] bring a proof against those who say that the heart is only aroused by fantasies after the eyes draw them in, for even a blind person will commit tremendous abominations, even though he hasn't seen [anything] with his eyes.

Here's another mashal to illustrate the Sifre's idea. A person's cravings might be awakened by the sight of a delectable slice of chocolate cake sitting on the plate in front of him, but if he is informed that the cake was accidentally baked using salt in place of sugar, or that the cake is laced with rat poison, or that it's actually a model made of wax, his desire will quickly subside - despite the fact that the appearance of the cake remained unchanged. And if he knew ahead of time that the cake was disgusting, poison, or fake, then seeing the cake wouldn't have awakened his desires in the first place.

The same is true for all of your desires: they will only be awakened by what "your eyes" see if "your heart" (i.e. your inner thoughts, values, fantasies, beliefs, etc.) has been primed to desire them. In other words, our susceptibility to temptation is fundamentally influenced by our internal thoughts - not by our perceptions of external stimuli. Therefore, in order to master our desires and resist temptation from without, we must start by cultivating our hearts from within.

Even the Sefer ha'Chinuch, [11] who continually emphasizes the impact of our actions on our inner character, nevertheless acknowledges the truth of the Sifre's interpretation, as he writes in his explanation of "lo sasuru etc.":

The root purpose of this mitzvah is evident: for by it a man will be guarded from sinning to Hashem all his days. In truth, this mitzvah is a great foundation of the religion, since evil thoughts are the "fathers" of impurities, and the [resulting] actions are their "children," and if a man will die before begetting any offspring, there will be no remembrance (i.e. trace) of children. Consequently, this prohibition [of "do not explore after your heart and after your eyes"] is a root from which all good things sprout.

The big question is: How do we change our "hearts" to regulate our desires and temptations? The Sifre only establishes the general framework, but doesn't give us any clues as to how to effect real change.

The answer can be found in the pesukim surrounding "lo sasuru etc.":

And they shall be tzitzis (lit. fringes) for you, that you may see it and remember all the mitzvos of Hashem and do them, and you shall not explore after your heart and after your eyes after which you stray. So that you may remember and do all of My mitzvos, and be kedoshim to your God. I am Hashem, your God, Who has removed you from the land of Egypt to be a God to you; I am Hashem, your God. (Bamidbar 15:39-41)

In short, the answer is: mitzvos. One of the many functions of mitzvos is to cultivate within us the quality of kedushah (i.e. rising above the influence of our animalistic tendencies in order to live b'tzelem Elokim). We acknowledge this function in every berachah (blessing) we make over mitzvos: "asher kideshanu b'mitzvosav" ("Who made us kadosh through His mitzvos").

How do the mitzvos make us kedoshim? That is a topic for another day.

[1] It should be noted that the Ralbag maintains that "lo sasuru etc." is not its own mitzvah, but is the reason for the mitzvah of tzitzis; for the purposes of this blog post, it doesn't make a difference.
[2] see Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 2:3; his citation differs from our version, which can be found in Berachos 12b
[3] for an extended treatment of this topic see my blog post entitled Parashas Shoftim: Comparative Religion
[4] see Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Sefer ha'Mitzvos: Lo Taaseh #47, and Sefer ha'Chinuch at the end of Parashas Shelach
[5] Sifre: Piska 115
[6] Rav Meir Leibush ben Yechiel Michel, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 15:39
[7] Yalkut Shimoni: Yeshayahu 445
[8] I wasn't able to locate this source
[9] see Rav Baruch ha'Levi Epstein, Torah Temimah: Sefer Bamidbar 15, 136, who clarifies the scope of the Sifre: 

From the fact that "after your heart" is written first and "after your eyes" is written afterwards, it would seem that this doesn't come to exclude the heart being drawn after the eyes. Don't Chazal explicitly say: "The yetzer ha'ra (evil inclination) only dominates based on what the eyes see" (Sotah 8a)? Likewise they say: "the eye sees, and the heart desires." Rather, the matter is that each one is drawn after the other: the eyes after the heart and the heart after the eyes. And since the heart being drawn after the eyes is an obvious and perceivable matter, therefore the pasuk comes puts the heart before the eyes in order to teach us that sometimes the eyes are drawn after the heart - namely, in the case of someone who has bad thoughts which incite the yetzer ha'ra against him with bad fantasies and musings. This is [why the Sifre] brings a proof from a blind person.

[10] Rabbeinu Avraham Ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer Shemos 20:13
[11] Sefer ha'Chinuch, Mitzvah #387