Rambam: On the Three Types of Ra

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Rambam: On the Three Types of Ra

It is difficult to choose which chapters of the Rambam's Guide for the Perplexed (Moreh ha'Nevuchim) are the most important, from an objective standpoint. I can, however, say that this chapter (Section 3 Chapter 12) is one that has had the greatest impact on me, personally, in my day-to-day life. 

I teach this text as part of my Iyov curriculum. Truthfully, this chapter ought to be read within the context of the several chapters that precede and follow it. However, it can be read as a standalone text. I decided to present a full translation of this single chapter here, without commentary, so that I can more easily make reference to it in future blog posts. 

One important note on translation. The term "ra" (רע) in Hebrew is multifaceted, and is therefore difficult to render into a single English equivalent. Depending on the context, "ra" can be translated as the following nouns and adjectives:

• bad / badness
• (morally) evil
• displeasing / detestable
• detriment / detrimental
• harm / harmful
• loss / destruction / non-existence
• corruption / deterioration
• pain / suffering
• deficiency / lack / privation
• unhealthy
• inferior

Each usage must be inferred from its context. For example, when a pasuk describes Haman as "ra," it clearly means "evil," but when Hashem is described as "bringing ra upon Bnei Yisrael," it means "harm" or "loss" or "destruction." In Paroh's dream, the adjective "raos" used to describe the cows means "unhealthy" or "inferior." When Mishlei speaks of "ra" as a consequence, it means "detrimental" or "painful." 

In an attempt to preserve this omni-comprehensive use of the term "ra," I will keep it as a transliteration throughout this excerpt. The word "ra" will be used for the adjective or singular form of the noun, and "raos" will be used for the plural form of the noun. Accordingly, the transliterations "tov" and "tovos" will be used as a stand-in for "good" and "goods," and should be understood as the opposite of "ra" and "raos." 

The translation below is a fusion of the Friedlander, Pines, and Qafih translations, along with some of my own. The paragraph divisions and headings are my own as well. 

Rambam: Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:12

The Mistaken Assessment of the Ratio of Ra to Tov

Men frequently think that the raos in the world are more numerous than the tovos; many non-Jewish sayings and songs dwell on this idea. They say that tovos are found only exceptionally, whilst raos are numerous and lasting. Not only common people make this mistake, but even many who believe that they are wise. 

Al-Razi wrote a well-known book: On Metaphysics [or Theology]. Among other mad and foolish things, it contains also the idea, discovered by him, that there exists more ra than tov. For if the happiness of man and his pleasure in the times of prosperity be compared with the mishaps that befall him – such as grief, acute pain, defects, paralysis of the limbs, fears, anxieties, and troubles – it would seem as if the existence of man is a punishment and a great ra for him. This author commenced to verify his opinion by counting all the raos one by one; by this means he opposed those who hold the correct view of the tovos bestowed by God and His evident kindness – namely, that God is absolutely Tov, and that all that comes from Him is absolutely tov without a doubt.

The Cause of this Error and its Remedy

The origin of the error is to be found in the circumstance that this ignorant man – and his party among the common people – judge the whole universe by examining one single person. For an ignorant man believes that the whole universe only exists for him, as if nothing else required any consideration. If, therefore, anything happens to him contrary to his expectation, he at once concludes that the whole universe is ra. 

If, however, he would take into consideration the whole universe, form an idea of it, and comprehend what a small portion he is of the universe, he will find the truth. For it is clear that persons who have fallen into this widespread error as regards the multitude of raos in the world, do not find the raos among the angels, the stars and galaxies, the elements, and that which is formed of them, namely, minerals and plants, or in the various species of living beings, but only in some individual instances of mankind. They wonder that a person, who became leprous in consequence of bad food, should be afflicted with so great an illness and suffer such a misfortune; or that he who indulges so much in sensuality as to weaken his sight, should be struck with blindness, and the like. 

The Correct Perspective of Man's Place in the Universe

What we have, in truth, to consider is this: The whole mankind at present in existence, and likewise every other species of animals, form an infinitesimal portion of the permanent universe, as it is stated: “Man is like nothingness” (Tehilim 144:4); “How much less is man, [who is like] a maggot, and a mortal, [who is like a worm?” (Iyov 25:6); “Surely [He finds fault] with those who dwell in houses of clay” (ibid. 4:19); “Behold, all the nations are as a drop from a bucket” (Yishaya 40:15). There are many other passages in the books of the prophets expressing the same idea. 

It is of great advantage that man should know his station, and not erroneously imagine that the whole universe exists only for him. We hold that the universe exists because the Creator wills it so; that mankind is low in rank as compared with the uppermost portion of the universe, namely, with the planets and the stars. But as regards the angels, there cannot be any real comparison between man and angels, although man is the highest of all beings on earth – that is, of all beings formed of the four elements. 

Man's existence is nevertheless a wonderfully tov situation for him, and his distinction and perfection is a divine gift. The numerous raos to which individual persons are exposed are due to the defects existing in the persons themselves. We complain and seek relief from our own faults. We suffer from the raos which we, by our own free will, inflict on ourselves, and we ascribe them to God, Who is far from being connected with them, as it is stated: “Corruption is not His – the blemish is His children’s, a perverse and crooked generation” (Devarim 32:5). This is explained by King Solomon, who says: “A man’s foolishness corrupts his way, but his heart rages against Hashem” (Mishlei 19:3). 

I explain this theory in the following manner. The raos that befall man are of three kinds: 

Type #1: Inherent in Matter

(1) The first kind of ra is that which is caused to man by the circumstance that he is subject to genesis and destruction, or that he possesses a body. It is on account of the body that some persons happen to have great deformities or paralysis of some of the organs. This ra may be part of the natural constitution of these persons, or may have developed subsequently in consequence of changes in the elements, e.g., through bad air, or thunderstorms or landslips. We have already shown that, in accordance with the divine wisdom, genesis can only take place through destruction, and without the destruction of the individual members of the species the species themselves would not exist permanently. Thus the true kindness, and beneficence, and goodness of God is clear. 

He who thinks that he can have flesh and bones without being subject to any external influence, or any of the accidents of matter, unconsciously wishes to reconcile two opposites, namely, to be at the same time subject and not subject to change. If man were never subject to change there could be no generation: there would be one single being, but no individuals forming a species. Galen, in the third section of his book, The Use of the Limbs, says correctly that it would be in vain to expect to see living beings formed of an egg fertilized with sperm, who will not die, will never feel pain, or will move perpetually, or will shine like the sun. This statement of Galen is part of the following more general proposition: Whatever is formed of any matter receives the most perfect form possible in that species of matter; in each individual case the defects are in accordance with the defects of that individual matter. The best and most perfect being that can be formed of the egg and the sperm is the species of man, for as far as man's nature is known, he is living, rational, and mortal. It is therefore impossible that man should be free from this type of ra. 

You will, nevertheless, find that the raos of the above kind which befall man are very few and rare; for you find countries that have not been flooded or burned for thousands of years; there are thousands of men in perfect health; deformed individuals are a strange and exceptional occurrence; or say few in number if you object to the term exceptional; they are not one-hundredth, not even one-thousandth part of those that are perfectly normal. 

Type #2: Interpersonal 

The second class of raos comprises such raos as people cause to each other, when, for example, some of them use their strength against others. These raos are more numerous than those of the first kind, and their causes are numerous and known. They likewise originate in ourselves, though the sufferer himself cannot avert them. 

This kind of ra is nevertheless not widespread in any country of the whole world. It is of rare occurrence that a man plans to kill his neighbor or to rob him of his property by night. Many persons are, however, afflicted with this kind of ra in great wars, but these are not frequent, if the whole inhabited part of the earth is taken into consideration. 

Type #3: Self-Inflicted 

(3) The third class of raos comprises those which every one causes to himself by his own action. This is the largest class, and is far more numerous than the second class. It is especially of these raos that all men complain, only few men are found that do not sin against themselves by this kind of ra. Those that are afflicted with it are therefore justly blamed in the words of the prophet: “This was brought about by your own hand” (Malachi 1:9); the same is expressed in the following passage: “A destroyer of his own soul will do this” (Mishlei 6:32). In reference to this kind of ra, Solomon says: “A man’s foolishness corrupts his way, but his heart rages against Hashem” (Mishlei 19:3). In the following passage he explains also that this kind of ra is man's own work: “But, see, this I did find: God has made man upright, but they have sought out many scheming calculations” (Koheles 7:29), and these scheming calculations bring the raos upon him. The same subject is referred to in Iyov: “For affliction does not emerge from the dust, nor does misery grow from the earth” (Iyov 5:6). These words are immediately followed by the explanation that man himself is the author of this class of raos: “For man is born to trouble” (Iyov 5:7). 

This class of raos originates in man’s flaws, such as excessive desire for eating, drinking, and sex; indulgence in these things in undue measure, or in improper manner, or partaking of unhealthy food. This course brings diseases and afflictions upon body and soul alike. The sufferings of the body in consequence of these raos are well known. 

Those of the soul are twofold: First, such raos of the soul as are the necessary consequence of changes in the body, insofar as the soul is a force residing in the body; it has therefore been said that the properties of the soul depend on the condition of the body. 

Secondly, the soul, when accustomed to superfluous things, acquires a strong habit of desiring things which are neither necessary for the preservation of the individual nor for that of the species. This desire is without a limit, whilst things which are necessary are few in number and restricted within certain limits; but what is superfluous is without end. 

For example, you desire to have your vessels of silver, but golden vessels are still better; others have even vessels of sapphire, or perhaps they can be made of emerald or rubies, or any other substance that could be suggested. Those who are ignorant and perverse in their thought are constantly in trouble and pain because they cannot get as much of superfluous things as a certain other person possesses. They, as a rule, expose themselves to great dangers, for example, by sea voyage, or service of kings, and all this for the purpose of obtaining that which is superfluous and not necessary. 

Blaming God for Self-Inflicted Harm

When they thus meet with the consequences of the course which they adopt, they complain of the decrees and judgments of God; they begin to blame the time, and wonder at the lack of justice in its changes; that it has not enabled them to acquire great riches, with which they could buy large quantities of wine for the purpose of making themselves drunk, and numerous concubines adorned with various kind of ornaments of gold, embroidery, and jewels, for the purpose of driving themselves to sexual indulgence beyond their capacities – as if the whole universe existed exclusively for the purpose of giving pleasure to these low people. 

The error of the ignorant goes so far as to say that God's power is insufficient, because He has given to this universe the properties which they imagine cause these great ra, and which do not help all ra-disposed persons to obtain the ra which they seek, and to bring their ra souls to the aim of their desires, though these, as we have shown, are really without limit. 

The virtuous and wise, however, see and comprehend the wisdom of God displayed in the universe. Thus David says: “All of the ways of Hashem are kindness and truth, to those who guard His covenant and His testimonies” (Tehilim 25:10). For those who observe the nature of the universe and the commandments of the Torah, and know their purpose, see clearly God's kindness and truth in everything; they seek, therefore, that which the Creator intended to be the aim of man, namely, pursuit of knowledge. Forced by the claims of the body, they seek also that which is necessary for the preservation of the body – “bread to eat and garment to clothe” (Bereishis 28:20), and this is very little; but they seek nothing superfluous. With very slight exertion man can obtain it, so long as he is contented with that which is necessary. 

"You open Your hand and satisfy the desire of every living thing" (Tehilim 145:16)

All the difficulties and troubles we meet in this respect are due to the desire for superfluous things. When we seek unnecessary things, we have difficulty even in finding that which is necessary. For the more we desire to have that which is superfluous, the more we meet with difficulties; our strength and possessions are spent in unnecessary things, and are lacking when required for that which is necessary. 

Observe how nature proves the correctness of this assertion. The more necessary a thing is for living beings, the more easily it is found and the cheaper it is; the less necessary it is, the rarer and dearer it is. For example, air, water, and food are necessary to man. Air is most necessary, for if man is without air a short time he dies, whilst he can be without water a day or two. Air is also undoubtedly found more easily and cheaper [than water]. Water is more necessary than food, for some people can be four or five days without food, provided they have water; water also exists in every country in larger quantities than food, and is also cheaper. The same proportion can be noticed in the different kinds of food; that which is more necessary in a certain place exists there in larger quantities and is cheaper than that which is less necessary. No intelligent person, I think, considers musk, amber, rubies, and emerald as very necessary for man except as medicines – and they, as well as other like substances, can be replaced for this purpose by herbs and minerals. 

This shows the kindness of God to His creatures, even to us weak beings. His righteousness and justice as regards all animals are well known; for in the transient world there is among the various kinds of animals no individual being distinguished from the rest of the same species by a peculiar property or an additional limb. On the contrary – all physical, psychical, and vital forces and organs that are possessed by one individual are found also in the other individuals. If anyone is somehow different, it is by accident, in consequence of some exception, and not by a natural property; it is also a rare occurrence. There is no difference between individuals of a species in the due course of Nature; the difference originates in the various dispositions of their substances. This is the necessary consequence of the nature of the substance of that species: the nature of the species is not more favorable to one individual than to the other. It is no wrong or injustice that one has many bags of finest myrrh and garments embroidered with gold, while another has not those things, which are not necessary for our maintenance; he who has them has not thereby obtained control over anything that could be an essential addition to his nature, but has only obtained something illusory or deceptive. The other, who does not possess that which is not wanted for his maintenance, does not miss anything indispensable. “Whoever took more had nothing extra and whoever took less was not lacking; everyone according to what he eats had they gathered” (Shemos 26:18). This is the rule at all times and in all places; no notice should be taken of exceptional cases, as we have explained. 

In these two ways you will see the mercy of God toward His creatures, how He has provided that which is required, in proper proportions, and treated all individual beings of the same species with perfect equality. In accordance with this correct reflection the chief of the wise men says: “All His ways are justice” (Devarim 32:4). David likewise says: “All of the ways of Hashem are kindness and truth”; he also says explicitly: “Hashem is good to all; His mercies are on all His works” (Tehilim 145:9), for it is an act of great and perfect goodness that He gave us existence; and the creation of the controlling faculty in animals is a proof of His mercy towards them, as has been shown by us.

17th of Tammuz 5779: Sforno - On the Breaking of the Tablets

Technically speaking, this post can be thought of as the completion of 17th of Tammuz: The Breaking of the Tablets (Unfinished). As it so happens, I completely forgot about that unfinished post when I set out to write this one! That's why I decided to make this a standalone. Perhaps it would have led elsewhere if I wrote it as the completion of the unfinished one, but for now, I'm happy I got the main idea down in writing in some form. 

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Karmic Justice, by Ray Lago

17th of Tammuz 5779: Sforno - On the Breaking of the Tablets

Commemorating the Breaking of the Luchos

The mishnah in Taanis 4:6 (Taanis 26a) lists five events which we commemorate by fasting on the 17th of Tammuz:

1. the breaking of the Luchos (i.e. the stone tablets that Moshe Rabbeinu received at Sinai) 
2. the cessation of the tamid (i.e. the daily sacrifice) in the first Mikdash (Holy Temple) 
3. the breaching of the city of Jerusalem prior to the destruction of the second Mikdash
4. the burning of a Torah scroll by Apostomos (a Greek official) during the second Mikdash era
5. the setting up of an idol in the Mikdash 

This year when I sat down to learn about the 17th of Tammuz, I found myself bothered by Event #1 the most. Events #2-5 are all related to the Churban ha'Bayis (destruction of the Temple) in some way, but the breaking of the Luchos doesn't quite seem to jive with the others. The basic question is: Why do we commemorate this particular tragedy with an annual taanis tzibur (communal fast) along with the other four events? Does it share any thematic connection with them at all, or do we commemorate it now simply because it happened on the same calendar date? [1]

Even if we can't answer that question, we at least need to answer the most basic question: What insight are we supposed to get out of commemorating this event? The purpose of these annual commemorative fasts is to promote national teshuvah (repentance), as the Rambam explains in Hilchos Taaniyos 5:1:

There are days on which all of Israel fasts because of the catastrophes that occurred on them, in order to awaken the hearts [of the people] and to open the paths of teshuvah. This will be a remembrance of our corrupt actions and the corrupt actions of our fathers that were like our actions today, which ultimately reached the point that [these corrupt actions] caused these catastrophes for them and for us. Through the remembrance of these things we will return to do good, as it stated, “they will confess their sins and the sins of their fathers” (Vayikra 26:40).

What national cheit (sin) led to the breaking of the luchos, which is still extant in our nation today? 

Why Moshe Broke the Luchos

If you ask the average Jew why Moshe broke the luchos, they'll probably say: "Because of the Cheit ha'Eigel (Sin of the Golden Calf)." Although this answer isn't false, the truth is a bit more complicated than that. Let's review the pesukim in Shemos 32 about the Cheit ha'Eigel:

Hashem spoke to Moshe: "Go, descend - for your people that you brought up from the land of Egypt has become corrupt. They have strayed quickly from the way that I have commanded them. They have made themselves a molten calf, prostrated themselves to it, and sacrificed to it, and they said, 'This is your god, O Israel, which brought you up from the land of Egypt.'" 

Hashem said to Moshe, "I have seen this people, and behold! it is a stiff-necked people. And now, desist from Me, Let My anger flare up against them, and I shall annihilate them; and I shall make you a great nation."

Moshe then davens for Klal Yisrael, and is successful: 

Hashem reconsidered regarding the harm that He declared He would do to His people.  

Moshe turned and descended from the mountain, with the two Tablets of the Testimony in his hand, Tablets inscribed on both their sides; they were inscribed on one side and the other. The Tablets were God's handiwork, and the script was the script of God, engraved on the Tablets. 

Yehoshua heard the sound of the people in its shouting, and he said to Moshe, "The sound of battle is in the camp!" [Moshe] said, "Not a sound of shouting strength nor a sound shouting weakness; a sound of distress do I hear!"  

It happened as he drew near the camp and saw the calf and the dances that Moshe's anger flared up. He threw down the Tablets from his hands and shattered them at the foot of the mountain.

Interestingly enough, it was not the Cheit ha'Egel itself which angered Moshe and moved him to shatter the Luchos. When he was first informed by Hashem of Bnei Yisrael's cheit, Moshe didn't get angry. When he and Yehoshua heard the sounds of Bnei Yisrael's shouts in the camp, Moshe still didn't get angry. It was only when "he drew near the camp and saw the calf and the dances" that Moshe became enraged and that is when he broke the Luchos. The question is: What was it about the dancing that caused him to respond in this manner?

The Sforno offers an explanation which answers our particular question on Shemos and provides insight into what we are fasting about on the 17th of Tammuz:

When [Moshe] saw that they rejoiced in their disgrace - similar to, "when you do evil then you rejoice" (Yirmiyahu 11:15) - this angered him and he despaired that he would be able to repair the crooked in a manner that they would return to their [former] perfection and be worthy [to receive] those tablets.

The Radak, commenting on the pasuk from Yirmiyahu cited by the Sforno, explains the phrase "when you do evil then you rejoice" to mean that "you lack shame and contrition."  

According to the Sforno, Moshe did not get angry at Bnei Yisrael for the Cheit ha'Egel per se, as we noted in our reading of the pesukim. Rather, he got angry when he saw their shameless joy in their transgression, which revealed that they were beyond the point of teshuvah. That is why he broke the Luchos.

In order to appreciate Moshe's seeming change of attitude upon seeing the dancing, we need to understand why the Cheit ha'Egel itself didn't elicit an angry response from Moshe. The Rav (Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik), in his famous shiur On Leadership, provides some context for understanding Moshe's initial take on the Cheit ha'Egel:

The making of the Egel was the result of great primitive fright. The people thought that Moshe was died, they were afraid of the desert, they did not know what the future held in store for them, they were simply overwhelmed by a feeling of loneliness and terror, consequently, they violated the precept of Avodah Zarah (idolatry). There were mitigating circumstances - they wanted the golden calf to substitute for Moshe, as all the Rishonim (medieval commentators) say. 

This would explain why Moshe didn't become enraged when he first learned of the Cheit ha'Eigel. Bnei Yisrael's transgression, though egregious, was not an outright rebellion, but rather a severe lapse of judgment triggered by a national panic. The people were overwhelmed by extreme fear which caused them to temporarily revert back to the primitive religiosity that had been instilled during the Egyptian Exile. 

At least, that's what Moshe thought when Hashem informed him of their cheit. But when he witnessed the dancing, and saw that they related to the worship of the Eigel not in the manner of a scared child clutching a talisman, but in the manner of a wild reveler indulging in an unbridled pagan orgy - at that moment he knew that complete national teshuvah would be an impossible task. This wasn't a brief and temporary regression to an infantile mentality. The joyous dancing was evidence that these were people "who speak of evil as good and of good as evil" (Yeshayahu 5:20), whose obstinacy would doom the nation from the start. [2]

To illustrate this point using a loose analogy: there is a difference between a recovering drug addict who, in a moment of weakness, caves to his craving and relapses, in shame and in private, and a recovering drug addict who joyously leaps off the wagon and throws a drug-fueled house party with music and dancing. Moshe assumed that he would encounter the former, and was shocked to discover the latter.

17th of Tammuz in a New Light

Thanks to the Sforno, we now have a better understanding of the tragedy of the breaking of the Luchos. We aren't just mourning the fact that Bnei Yisrael engaged in avodah zarah so soon after Yetzias Mitzrayim, nor are we just mourning the fact that we lost the symbol of the covenant that Hashem made with us at Sinai (i.e. "the marriage contract" as it were). We are mourning the first time that we, as a nation, reached a point of no return in our degree of transgression. This was the first time that we had become so entrenched in our warped mentality and value system that we actually rejoiced in our degradation. This same phenomenon would occur twice more, in what would prove to be a far more disastrous fashion, in the long series of national iniquities which brought about the destruction of the first and second Beis ha'Mikdash. 

I don't know whether this explanation is sufficient to unify all five events commemorated by the 17th of Tammuz, but at least it gives us something new to reflect on when observing this taanis tzibur. The Jews who worshipped the Eigel crossed a critical threshold in their level of corruption, and we are just as susceptible. Are we close to that point now? Have we already reached it? These are the types of questions we must ask of ourselves as a nation on the 17th of Tammuz. 

[1] I also have a minor question. Maybe it's not even a question, but just something that bothers me. I am 99% certain that the fast of the 17th of Tammuz wasn't instituted until after the destruction of the first Beis ha'Mikdash - an event that took place over 700 years after the breaking of the Luchos. Apparently, the tragedy of the Luchos was not sufficient in and of itself to warrant its own taanis tzibur. If the Beis ha'Mikdash had never been destroyed, we wouldn't observe a commemorative day of mourning for the breaking of the Luchos at all. In this sense, it seems like commemorating the breaking of the Luchos is an afterthought to the essential tragedies associated with Churban ha'Bayis. This just strengthens the question of why we fast for the breaking of the Luchos in the first place.

[2] Rav Hirsch provides a similar explanation of Moshe breaking the Luchos, but with a different emphasis - different enough that I didn't want to include it in the main body of the post, but similar enough that I wanted to at least share it in a footnote. He writes:

As long as pagan delusions, no matter what their form, are based merely on intellectual error and remain confined to the intellect, there is always hope that error will give way to enlightenment, that delusion will give way to truth, and that those afflicted by such notions will readily change for the better. 

Not so, however, when pagan delusion goes beyond intellectual error and corrupts people's character and conduct, and licentiousness is openly worshipped upon the altar of falsehood. In that case, sensuality clings to the roots that offer it such welcome nourishment. Just as it is the character of people sunk in moral corruption, and also difficult to enlighten them.

As long as Moshe knew only of the calf and its deification, he still hoped that he would be able to establish a pure home for the Torah among the people. Hence, when he descended the mountain, he took with him the Testimony of the Torah. But when he saw the calf and the dancing, he realized that the pagan error had already borne its usual fruit - the unleashing of sensuality. He then understood that the nation would have to be re-educated, for the sake of this Torah. So, without hesitation, with both his hands - yadav, the unified plural - he threw down the Tablets and shattered them. By this act he declared in no uncertain terms that the people in its present state was unworthy of the Torah and not fit to receive it. 

Musings on the Wisdom of Charles Ives

Originally published in December of 2008. Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Charles Edward Ives (1874-1954) 

Musings on the Wisdom of Charles Ives

For those of you who do not know, my pre-Judaism life was centered around classical music. The composer who exerted the most influence over my musical development was a man by the name of Charles Ives (1874-1954). Ives - the man and his music - will always have a special place in my life.

Ives was not a philosopher by trade, but possessed a philosopher's insight, a poet's perceptiveness, and the gift of wit - much like Mark Twain. I was recently reading some of Ives's writings and came across several ideas I'd like to share with you. 

Before I do that, I highly encourage you to listen to these quick samples of Ives's music, since his music is the context for the ideas that I'm going to focus on in this post:

• Piano Study No.20: I chose this piece because it features a variety of Ives's musical hallmarks: dissonance, syncopation, complex counterpoint, quotations from American folk songs, ragtime, and more. It's not necessary to listen to the whole thing. In fact, if you can't tolerate the beginning, skip to 3:00.
• Holidays Symphony: Movement III - The Fourth of July: This clip is the last 100 seconds (4:08 - 5:48) of one of his early symphonies, written in 1912. In this movement he attempted "to exemplify the excitement a boy feels during the Fourth of July celebrations and the freedom felt on that special day."
• Concord Sonata: Movement III - The Alcotts: In my opinion, this piece is the exemplar of Ivesian beauty. The theme is a variant on the famous "fate knocking" theme of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. This is the only Ives piece I ever learned how to play on piano. [1]

Ives was unique in many ways. Unlike most other famous composers, Ives did not make his living with his music. Once he came to terms with the fact that his music was decades ahead of its time, Ives ceased holding public performances and decided to go into the life insurance business, keeping his music entirely to himself and his family. He wasn't really "discovered" by the Classical Music World until he was already an old man.

Unlike other artists, Ives did not view his art to be the purpose of life, or larger than life. Rather, as he proclaimed in a letter to his wife, "Music is life," by which he meant, "It comes directly out of the heart of experience of life and thinking about life and living life" [2]. It is this view which makes it possible to view Ives's music as a sort of commentary on life, and his attitude towards music as his philosophy of living.

Here are three ideas from Ives's music/life that I came across and would like to share:

Ives on Musical Appreciation

Ives was always critical of people who have a narrow taste in music. Take, for instance, this excerpt from his memos:

I'd played over the Second Violin Sonata for him - that harmless piece. "After stuff like the that," he said, "if you consider that music, and like it, how can you like Brahms or any good music?" That is a very common attitude among almost all the well-known lilies. They take it for granted - a kind of self-evident axiom, a settled-for-life matter, ipso facto, admitting no argument. The classical is good for all time, the modern is bad for all time - so if you like one, you can't like the other. They don't always limit it to "good and bad." They, in a general way, throw (in their nice little minds) all that fits into their accustomed habits of sound, technique, etc., all together into a classical idiom, good or bad. [3]

What Ives says about music is also true of philosophy. Many people (myself included) have a tendency to accept or reject ideas, not based on their merit or veracity, but on whether they conform to accustomed or "accepted" lines of thought. 

This "evaluation" is made with little analysis or reflection, and is driven by the need to place the idea into a "classical idiom, good or bad." All people care about is, "Is this idea in line with my hashkafah (worldview) or not?" They ask themselves "Is this a good idea or a bad idea?" rather than "Is this a true idea or a false idea?" 

This approach is not the approach of chachamim (the wise), but of "philosophical lilies," as Ives would say - people whose "taste" in philosophy is so narrow and close-minded that they miss out on philosophical truth altogether.

Ives on Musical Beauty

People have a hard time seeing the beauty in Ives's music. According to Ives, this is due to an incorrect notion of beauty:

Beauty in music is too often confused with something that lets the ears lie back in an easy chair. Many sounds that we are used to do not bother us, and for that reason we are inclined to call them beautiful. Frequently, when a new or unfamiliar work is accepted as beautiful on its first hearing, its fundamental quality is one that tends to put the mind to sleep. [4] 

Likewise, I would say: "Truth in ideas is too often confused with something that lets the mind lie back in an easy chair. Many ideas that we are used to do not bother us, and for that reason we are inclined to call them true. Frequently, when a new or unfamiliar idea is accepted as true on its first hearing, its fundamental quality is one that tends to put the mind to sleep."

I also didn't see Ives's music as beautiful at first. But after a lot of hard work and "stretching my ears," as Ives would say, I was finally able to appreciate its beauty, which was unlike anything else I had ever heard. 

This metaphor, I believe, can be extended to the pleasure of learning. Some people are naturally drawn to truth and thinking. They find learning inherently pleasurable from the get-go. I did not. I didn't experience the so-called "joy of learning" until, after years of frustration in yeshiva, I was finally able to begin to experience the beauty of ideas on my own.

Ives on Musical Independence

Ives recognized that his conception of beauty differed greatly from that of his contemporaries. Nevertheless, Ives believed, a man should not be deterred from sticking to his own conception of beauty just because it is not widely held:

A man's life should be a stately march to a sweet but unheard music, and when to his fellows it shall seem irregular and inharmonious, he will only be stepping to a livelier measure, or his nicer ear hurry him into a thousand symphonies and concordant variations. There will be no halt ever, but at most a marching on his post, on such a pause as is richer than any sound, when the melody runs into such depth and wildness as to be no longer heard, but implicitly consented to with the whole life and being. [5] 

This brings to mind the parting words of Socrates to Crito:

But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the many? ... We must not regard what the many say of us: but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error when you advise that we should regard the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable. [6]

What makes Ives's artistic independence unique is that he didn't flaunt it, like so many musical pioneers before him. He knew that the public of the late 19th century was not ready for music this radical, and that he would only cause himself frustration by forcing his music upon them. This is reminiscent of the Rambam's [7] description of those who have grasped certain fundamental truths:

It is right that a man should belong to that class of men who have a conception of truth and understand it, though they do not speak of it. Thus the pious are advised and addressed, "Commune with your own mind upon your bed and be still, Selah!" (Tehilim 4:5).

And when people finally did recognize his music by rewarding him the Pulitzer Prize in 1946 - when he was already 72 years old - Ives didn't haughtily pat himself on the back and indulge in egotistical pleasure. Instead, he gave away half of the prize money and said:

"Prizes are for boys, and I'm all grown up!" [7]

Often when I "succeed" in convincing a person of a certain idea, I often feel a certain illicit sense of pride and achievement. Whenever this happens, I must remember to take a lesson from Ives. Instead of patting myself on the back, I should just be happy that another mind can share in the truth.

In conclusion, I am not trying to elevate Charles Ives to the status of a true philosopher. However, my approach in life is to try to recognize true ideas wherever I see them. If I can associate good music with good ideas, all the better.

[1] At around the same time that this blog post was originally published, I wrote the following comment about my relationship to this piece in an online Charles Ives fan group:

When I was in 11th grade, my family and I moved to a new city and started a new life. That was probably the loneliest, most difficult year of my young life. 

During that time, I learned to play "The Alcotts." I channeled all of my turmoil, loneliness, and longing into that piece. It became my emotional anchor. Whenever I felt myself on the verge of being pulled into the undercurrent of despair, that piece refocused me and helped me to retain a sense of identity. The pain and passion of that piece, climaxing in its glorious conclusion, never fails to give me goosebumps. "The Alcotts" will always hold a special place in my life.

[2] quoted in Charles Ives: A Man and His Music (1968), by Henry and Sidney Cowell

[3] Charles Ives, Memos 121-122

[4] Charles Ives, Essays Before a Sonata

[5] Charles Ives, Thoreau Journal, vol.1, 156

[6] Plato, Crito 47c-d

[7] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 1:50

[8] This anecdote is widely quoted, but I don't know the original source.

Tishah b'Av 5777: Adam ha'Rishon and Tishah b'Av

This post is a sequel to yesterday's post: Tishah b'Av 5777: Hashem's Tzedakah and our Shame. Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Grove of the Burnwillows, by Cliff Childs

Tishah b'Av 5777: Adam ha'Rishon and Tishah b'Av

Review of Yesterday's Blog Post

In yesterday's post we attempted to understand Kinah #19, which is based on the pasuk: "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah (righteousness) and ours is the boshes ha'panim (shamefacedness)" (Daniel 9:7). 

First we defined the central terms of tzedakah and boshes ha'panim. "Tzedakah" refers to "providing a creature with its needs" and boshes ha'panim refers to the type of self-reflective shame which stems from a recognition of how foolishly we have acted. 

We explained the implication of saying that tzedakah "belongs" to Hashem. As the Creator, Hashem's tzedakah is fundamentally different from human tzedakah: He created all creatures, all resources, and determined how their needs are met, whereas we humans merely allocate the resources that Hashem created. We explained that our boshes ha'panim "belongs" to us because it is the result of our free will, which is caused entirely by ourselves. 

Lastly, we explained the theme of the kinah in light of this understanding. Throughout the history of Bnei Yisrael, Hashem has repeatedly provided us with tools and situations designed to facilitate our metaphysical development into a mamleches kohanim v'goy kadosh ("a kingdom of priests and a holy nation"). Not only have we neglected to avail ourselves of this divine assistance, but we have fled in the opposite direction - towards our detriment, rather than our betterment.

In today's blog post I would like to explore another way to learn our kinah - one which is far more speculative. There are two possibilities: either this idea is actually a deeper explanation of our kinah, or it has nothing to do with the kinah per se, but nevertheless provides a deeper insight into the events of Tishah b'Av as a whole. 

Alternative Approach to Question #4: Shamefacedness Belongs to Us

We asked the question: What does it mean that boshes ha'panim belongs to us? In what sense is boshes ha'panim uniquely ours? We answered this question by saying that since boshes ha'panim stems from our exercise of free will, and since free will is entirely self-caused, then the boshes ha'panim belongs exclusively to us, and cannot be attributed to Hashem in any way.

But there is another answer: boshes ha'panim was not part of Hashem's initial plan for creation, but only came about as a result of man. Before the cheit of Adam and Chava, human beings were incapable of feeling bushah (shame), as it is stated: "The two of them were naked, the man and his wife, and they were not ashamed" (Bereishis 2:25). But immediately after the cheit: "The eyes of both of them were opened and they realized that they were naked; and they sewed together a fig leaf and made for themselves aprons" (ibid. 3:7). 

It is in this sense that boshes ha'panim "belongs" to human beings. If Hashem "had His way" (so to speak), there would be no phenomenon of bushah and no condition of boshes ha'panim. We caused shamefacedness to come into being, and this is why it is "ours." 

The Nature of Bushah

In order to grasp the implications of this concept, we need to understand what it means to live in the post-cheit world of bushah. What is the difference between man before the cheit and man after the cheit?

Needless to say, this is a huge topic. We will only delve into it in order to answer the question stated above. The Rambam provides a full explanation of this in the second chapter of the Guide for the Perplexed, which we will now cite - but we will focus specifically on his explanation of bushah. 

The Rambam begins with a question that was posed to him:

Some years ago a learned man asked me a question of great importance. The problem and the solution which we gave in our reply deserve the closest attention … 

The objector said: “It would appear at first sight from the plain meaning of Scripture that man was originally intended to be perfectly equal to the rest of the animal creation – which is not endowed with intellect, reason, or power of distinguishing between good and evil – but that Adam’s disobedience to the command of God caused him to acquire that great perfection which is the uniqueness of man, that is, the power of distinguishing between good and evil – the noblest of all the faculties of our nature, the essential characteristic of the human race. It thus appears strange that the punishment for rebelliousness should be the bestowal of a perfection to which he had not attained previously, namely, the perfection of intellect. This is equivalent to saying that a certain man was rebellious and extremely wicked, wherefore his nature was changed for the better, and he was made to shine as a star in the heavens.” Such was the intent and subject of the question, though not in the exact words of the inquirer. 

The question was: How can the Torah say that man lacked knowledge, then disobeyed God, and was granted intellect as a "punishment"? Isn't this the greatest reward?

Now mark our reply, which was as follows … The intellect which was granted to man as the highest endowment was bestowed on him before his disobedience. With reference to this gift the Torah states that “man was created in the form and like the likeness of God” (Bereishis 1:22). On account of this gift of intellect man was addressed and commanded by God, as it is said: “And Hashem-Elokim commanded Adam” (ibid. 2:16) – for no commandments are given to the animals or to those who are devoid of understanding. Through the intellect man distinguishes between the true and the false. This faculty Adam possessed perfectly and completely. However, the terms “good” and “bad” are terms used in the study of subjective values, not in that of objective truths. For it is not correct to say in reference to the proposition “the heavens are spherical,” that it is “good” or to declare the assertion that “the earth is flat” to be “bad,” but we say of the one “it is true,” of the other “it is false.” Similarly our language expresses the idea of true and false by the terms emes and sheker, and of the morally right and the morally wrong, by tov and ra. It is the function of the intellect to discriminate between the true and the false – a distinction which is applicable to all objects of intellectual perception. 

When Adam was yet in a state of innocence, and was guided solely by reflection and reason – on account of which it is said: “Thou hast made him (man) little lower than the angels” (Tehillim 8:6) – he was not at all able to follow or to understand the principles of subjective values, to the extent that the most obviously inappropriate thing – that is, to appear in a state of nudity – was not considered inappropriate; he could not comprehend why it should be so. 

After man's disobedience, however, when he began to give in to the desires which had their source in his imagination and to the gratification of his bodily appetites, as it is said, “And the woman saw that the tree was good for food and delightful to the eyes” (Bereishis 3:6), he consequently lost part of that intellectual faculty which he had previously possessed. He therefore transgressed a command with which he had been charged on account of his reason; and, having obtained knowledge of the subjective values, he become wholly absorbed in the study of what is “good” and “bad.” Then he fully understood the magnitude of the loss he had sustained, what he had forfeited, and in what situation he was thereby placed. 

Hence we read, “And you shall be like elohim, knowing good and bad,” and not “knowing” or “discerning the true and the false,” for in objective truths we can only apply the words “true and false,” but never “good and bad.” Furthermore observe the passage, “And the eyes of both were opened, and they knew they were naked” (ibid. 3:7): it is not said, “And the eyes of both were opened, and they saw,” for what the man had seen previously and what he saw after this circumstance was precisely the same: there had been no blindness which was now removed, but he received a new faculty whereby he found things wrong which previously he had not regarded as bad … 

In accordance with this interpretation, our text suggests that Adam, as he altered his intention and directed his thoughts to the acquisition of what he was forbidden, he was banished from Paradise. This was his punishment; it was measure for measure. At first he had the privilege of tasting pleasure and happiness, and of enjoying repose and security; but as his appetites grew stronger, and he followed his desires and fantasies, as we have already stated above, and partook of the food he was forbidden to taste, he was deprived of everything, was doomed to subsist on the meanest kind of food, such as he never tasted before, and this even only after exertion and labor, as it is said, “Thorns and thistles shall grow up for thee” (ibid. 3:18), “By the sweat of thy brow,” etc., and in explanation of this the text continues, “And Hashem-Elokim drove him from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground whence he was taken.” He was now with respect to food and many other requirements brought to the level of the lower animals: “Thou shalt eat the grass of the field” (ibid.). Reflecting on his condition, the Psalmist says, “Adam unable to dwell in dignity, was brought to the level of the dumb beast” (Tehillim 49:19). May the Almighty be praised, whose design and wisdom cannot be fathomed.

To summarize: before the cheit, man possessed a fully functioning intellect and operated totally within the world of objective truth (emes and sheker). He wasn't able to comprehend good and bad as subjective values (e.g. "and the woman saw that the tree was good for eating, and desirable to the eyes, and delightful as a means of intelligence"), but only as objective reality ("And God saw all that He had made, and behold! it was very good" e.g. "it is not good for man to be alone"). 

After the cheit, when man "followed his desires and fantasies," he became steeped in the world subjective values (tov and ra) which his mind imposed upon objective reality. It is no longer possible to simply know objective reality and seek out objective good and avoid objective bad. Instead, we must continually contend with our conscience, which labels things as "good" and "bad" based on its own set of criteria (desires, fantasies, upbringing, society, etc.). Since these labels do not necessarily correspond to reality, we must sift through them and sort out whether what we feel is good actually is good and whether what we feel is bad actually is bad. The conscience serves a valuable purpose of keeping the instinctual part of the yetzer ha'ra in check, but it also interferes with our perception of reality, which leads to a host of problems.

Although the post-cheit transformation of human nature has a far-reaching impact on all of our knowledge and all of our emotions, the Torah expressed this entire change by focusing on one emotion: bushah. When the Torah says "the eyes of both of them were opened and they realized that they were naked," this is a shorthand way of saying all of the concepts the Rambam taught us about how the conscience affected our view of reality.

Before the cheit Adam and Chava were not ashamed of their nakedness. Why would they be? From an emes and sheker objective reality standpoint, there is nothing wrong with nakedness. Animals are naked and engage in reproduction to perpetuate their species, and humans should be no different. But after the cheit, when man's view of reality became clouded by the veils of his many desires, fantasies and imperfections, nudity became a source of shame, due to its association all of the strong desires and fantasies associated with sex. In a tov and ra framework, nudity is "bad," and therefore, shameful.

In this vein, when we say "ours is the boshes ha'panim" we are alluding to the fact that we live in a world of bushah, in which our perception of objective reality is warped by our subjective values, and that this is entirely our fault. Hashem created us without bushah, but we - through our cheit - brought the bushah upon ourselves.

Alternative Answer to Question #5: Hashem's Tzedakah vs. Our Shame

Rather than focusing on Hashem's acts of tzedakah in providing Bnei Yisrael with developmental tools and the boshes ha'panim of our free-will decisions to reject this tzedakah, we can now suggest a different theme. The subject of this kinah is the contrast between the objective reality of Hashem's tzedakah - which was intended to help Bnei Yisrael develop as a nation - and Bnei Yisrael's rejection of that tzedakah due to their corrupt subjective values. The boshes ha'panim refers to our recognition of how foolish we were to get caught up in our subjective worldview to the extent that we squandered all of the opportunities that Hashem gave us, for our benefit.

According to this approach, the emphasis of this kinah is not on the outcomes of Bnei Yisrael's behavior (i.e. national development vs. national regression) but on the causes of their transgressions (i.e. instead of recognizing the objective reality of Hashem's tzedakah and taking advantage of it, we turned away from that objective reality in our pursuit of subjective good and bad). 

Let's look at a few examples of the kinah in light of this new approach: 

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because God went out to redeem us as a people unto Himself; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because they [our forefathers] rebelled on the shore of the Sea of Reeds, the nation sinning against its God. 

As we recall every Pesach, Hashem redeemed us from physical and intellectual servitude. He saved us from the harsh and bitter slavery and granted us bodily freedom. He saved us from being enslaved to the avodah zarah (idolatry) of Egypt - which was built on falsehood, and fueled by fears and fantasies - and brought us to the das ha'emes ("religion of reality"). "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah." And how did we respond at the Sea of Reeds? By denying the redemptive nature of our liberation and yearning to return to Egyptian servitude: "What is it that you have done to us to take us out of Egypt? Is this not the statement that we made to you in Egypt, saying: 'Let us be, and we will serve Egypt' - for it is better that we should serve Egypt than that we should die in this wilderness!" (Shemos 14:11-12). So distorted was our view of tov and ra that we accused our Redeemer of bringing us from a better condition to a worse one. "ours is the boshes ha'panim."

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because You feed us [the mahn] that tasted like dough fried in honey; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because on the day [we made the Golden Calf], we brought it an offering of fine flour with oil and honey. 

Not only did Hashem miraculously provide sustenance for us in the Midbar (Wilderness), but He did so in a manner that satisfied our psychological need to enjoy our food. Moreover, He provided our food in a way that trained us in a lifestyle of kedushah (the ability to rise above our animalistic nature). "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah." And how did we respond? By making avodah zarah and attempting to appease it with offerings corresponding to our own palate. So distorted was our view of tov and ra that we turned away from the True God who fed us daily and served a god who was the product of our own psyche. "ours is the boshes ha'panim."

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because of [how You waged war for us with] Sichon and God and all the kings of Canaan; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because of Achan who appropriated for himself from the forbidden loot [of Jericho] and found no excuse [for his crime]. 

Hashem helped the small nation of former slaves defeat the mighty kings and armies of Canaan. The odds were against us, but Hashem waged war for us. All we had to do was follow Yehoshua's instructions not to take any of the spoils, which were to be consecrated for Hashem. "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah." And how did we respond? By lusting after "a lovely Babylonian garment" (Yehoshua 7:21) and some silver and gold. So distorted was Achan's view of tov and ra that he prioritized riches over the lives of his Jewish brethren. "ours is the boshes ha'panim."

The other stanzas can be learned in a similar fashion. This approach compliments, rather than contradicts, our last approach. I believe that it also yields a greater insight into the underlying causes of these chataim, and puts us in a better position to do teshuvah.

Support for this Approach

After this approach occurred to me I was bothered by a nagging doubt. I wondered: "Maybe I've taken this too far. After all, Tishah b'Av is entirely about the Jewish people - not humanity as a whole. Why am I going all the way back to Adam ha'Rishon, who predated even the Avos? Our kinah doesn't even mention Adam ha'Rishon! It may be true that the cheit of Adam and Chava was historically where boshes ha'panim came from, but should our explanation of this kinah rely so heavily on an understanding of the bushah that resulted from the cheit of Adam and Chava? That seems like a real stretch."

I decided to see if I could find any support in the mesorah for this thematic connection between the cheit of Adam and Chava and the cheit of Bnei Yisrael. I figured that if I was making a valid connection between the cheit of Adam and Chava and the chataim of Bnei Yisrael, then surely someone would have mentioned it.

Eventually I stumbled upon a lead. The first half of the first pask in Eichah reads: "Eichah! The city sits in solitude. The one that was great with people has become like a widow" (Eichah 1:1). The Targum [1], which weaves midrashim into the translation of the text, "translates" this pasuk as follows: 

How can it have been decreed upon Yerushalayim and upon the congregation to be punished with exile and to eulogize them with, "Eichah" - just as Adam and Chava were judged and kicked out of Gan Eden, and ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu eulogized them with, "Eichah"?

"Hmm," I thought, "interesting that the Targum midrashically associates the sin and punishment of Yerushalayim with the sin and punishment of Adam and Chava." But I still wasn't convinced that had a real support for my approach .... until I stumbled upon a midrash in Eichah Rabbah.

First, a little bit of background. The authors of the midrashim didn't limit themselves to offering midrashic explanations on individual pesukim. Additionally, they gave "pesichtos" ("proems" or "prefatory midrashic explanations") on the entire sefer. These pesichtos usually take the form of drashos on pesukim from other sefarim, which the authors use to develop an idea or theme that is intended to serve as a framework for reading the entire sefer at hand. 

The following midrash is a pesichta on Megilas Eichah. It was intended to provide an approach for understanding the entire sefer. Here is what the midrash says:

R' Abahu began [his discussion of Eichah by citing the pasuk:] "They are like a man (k'adam) who has broken a covenant" (Hoshea 6:7). [R' Abahu expounded:] This refers to Adam ha'Rishon. Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu said, "I brought him into the Gan Eden, I commended him, he violated My commandment, and I sentenced him to being cast out and sent out, and I lamented over him, "Eichah."  

[R' Abahu then cites Scriptural evidence for each of these claims:] "I brought him into Gan Eden, as it is stated: 'Hashem-Elokim took the man and placed him in Gan Eden' (Bereishis 2:15), and He commanded him, as it is stated: 'Hashem-Elokim commanded the man, saying, "From every tree of the garden [you may freely eat, but of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Bad you must not eat from]"' (ibid. 2:16-17), and he violated His commandment, as it is stated: 'Have you eaten of the tree from which I commanded [you not to eat]?' (ibid. 3:11), and I sentenced him to being cast out, as it is stated: 'He cast out the man' (ibid. 3:24), and I sentenced him to being sent out, 'Hashem sent them out from Gan Eden' (ibid. 3:23), and I lamented 'Eichah?' over them, as it is stated: 'And He said to him, 'Where are you? (אַיֶּכָּה)'  (ibid. 3:9) - which is written as 'Eichah?' (אֵיכָה). 

"The same [happened] with the children [of Adam ha'Rishon:] I brought them into Eretz Yisrael, as it is stated: 'I brought them into a fruitful land' (Yirmiyahu 2:7), and I commanded them, as it is stated: 'Command Bnei Yisrael' (Vayikra 24:2), and they violated My commandment, as it is stated: 'All of Israel violated Your Torah' (Daniel 9:11), and I sentenced them to being cast out, 'I will cast them out from My house' (Hoshea 9:15), and I sentenced them with being sent out, as it is stated: 'Send [them] away from My presence, ad let them go!' (Yirmiyahu 15:1), and I lamented 'Eichah?' over them: 'How can she sit in solitude' (Eichah 1:1)."

To my mind, THIS is a proof that my approach has merit - if not in relation to Kinah #19, then certainly for understanding the destruction of the Beis ha'Mikdash. According to R' Abahu, Eichah should be read with the comparison between Adam's cheit and Bnei Yisrael's cheit at the forefront of our minds.

When we think about it, this fits in perfectly with our understanding of the kinah. Hashem's placement of Adam ha'Rishon in Gan Eden was an act of tzedakah. Adam was given everything he needed: delicious and abundant fruit to eat, a natural world rich with chochmah to learn, a wife for companionship (and procreation), a task with which they were charged to improve the world, and a mitzvah to keep them on the right path. But by giving in to the world of subjective tov and ra, Adam and Chava lost that beneficial tzedakah-setup, and were exiled into a world in which developing their tzelem Elokim would be an uphill battle.

So too, Bnei Yisrael were given everything they needed: a fruitful land to supply their physical needs, a Torah rich with chochmah to learn, a nation descended from the Avos with whom to build a society, a task with which they were charged to improve the world, and a regimen of 613 mitzvos to develop their tzelem Elokim to its greatest potential. But by giving in to the world of subjective tov and ra time after time after time - as detailed by the paytan in our kinah - we lost our Beis ha'Mikdash and were exiled out of our Land into a world in which developing our tzelem Elokim is an extremely difficult uphill battle.

Still, what do we gain from this comparison? Why did R' Abahu feel the need to frame Bnei Yisrael as Bnei Adam ha'Rishon in order to understand Eichah? What do we gain from reading the kinah from this perspective?

I'd like to suggest one possible answer. There are innumerable benefits of the Torah regimen, and there is no question that we desperately need it. However, there are also challenges that come from the fact that the Torah is a regimen. One of these challenges is "losing sight of the forest for the trees" - namely, getting so caught up in the details of the regimen that we forget the purpose of the regimen.

It isn't enough to ask ourselves, "What aveiros (transgressions) have we done, and how can we meet the halachic standards that are expected of us?" This type of teshuvah may be beneficial, but it stops short of the essence. Full teshuvah requires us to examine and correct the distorted subjective views of tov and ra which led us to sin in the first place. In other words, we must approach teshuvah not only from the perspective of Torah, but from the perspective of Adam ha'Rishon.

For example, if a person decides to do teshuvah on speaking lashon ha'ra, it's not enough to inquire, "What are the halachos of lashon ha'ra and what steps can I take to stop myself from speaking it?" This type of teshuvah is lacking because it doesn't even touch the underlying values of tov and ra which lead us to speak lashon ha'ra in the first place. It addresses the symptoms, but not the causes. Instead, one must ask, "What warped notion of tov and ra leads me to believe that engaging in malicious speech about my fellow Jew is not ra? What messed up ideas of tov and ra do I have which allows me to excuse my own lashon ha'ra but condemn the lashon ha'ra that is spoken about me? Why do I believe that public opinion matters at all? Why do I think it's okay to use another human being as a source of amusement in conversation at his expense?"

R' Abahu frames the tragedy of the churban as a repetition of the tragedy of Gan Eden in order to help us realize that Bnei Yisrael's sins stemmed from a more underlying problem: their subjective values of tov and ra. It is only from this perspective that we, as a nation, can do complete teshuvah and merit the ultimate redemption.

Conclusion

This is all I have to say about Kinah #19 and R' Abahu's pesichta. As I said before, these two sources may or may not be related. Perhaps yesterday's interpretation of Kinah #19 is correct, and today's post is merely an explanation of R' Abahu's midrash. Either way, I hope you gained some insight into the nature of man, the sins of Bnei Yisrael, and our path to teshuvah.

I will conclude with the words of Yeshayahu ha'Navi which echo R' Abahu's comparison:

"For Hashem will comfort Tzion, He will comfort all her ruins; He will make her wilderness like Eden and her wasteland like a garden of Hashem; joy and gladness will be found there, thanksgiving and the sound of music." (Yeshayahu 51:3)

May we merit the restoration of Yerushalayim speedily, in our days.