Showing posts with label Arbaat ha'Minim. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Arbaat ha'Minim. Show all posts

Sunday, September 19, 2021

The Joyful Progression from Yom ha’Kippurim through Sukkos

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Artwork: Team Pennant, by Anna Fehr

The Joyful Progression from Yom ha'Kippurim Through Sukkos

According to the Abudirham, the sounding of the shofar after Ne’ilah is followed by the recitation of the pasuk: “Go and eat your bread with joy and drink your wine with gladness, for God has already approved of your deeds” (Koheles 9:7). He explains that the source of this minhag is a midrash (Koheles Rabbah 9:7) which says: “When the Jews leave shul at the conclusion of Yom ha’Kippurim, a heavenly voice goes forth and proclaims: ‘Go and eat your bread with joy, for your prayers have been accepted before Me as a pleasing aroma.’”

The Aruch ha’Shulchan (OC 624:7) states that all four days between Yom ha’Kippurim and Sukkos are characterized by the selfsame joy of Motzai Yom ha’Kippurim. They are considered “days of simchah,” which is why we don’t say tachanun or tzidkasecha tzedek. The midrash (Tanchuma 23:18) relates this joy to the Yom Tov of Sukkos itself:

To what may the matter be compared? To two people who entered into judgment before the king, and no one but the king knew what [transpired] between them. The king judged them, but the other people [outside] didn’t know who won. The king said, “Whoever emerges with a palm branch in his hand – it will be known that he won.” So too, Israel and the nations of the world enter into judgment on Yom ha’Kippurim, and nobody knows who won. Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu said: “Take your lulavim in your hand, and they will know that you were meritorious in judgment.”

On the surface, these sources seem to be at odds with the atmosphere of dread and uncertainty on Yom ha’Kippurim itself. Throughout the Yom ha’Kippurim davening we repeatedly acknowledge that our lives hang in the balance. We continually remind ourselves that one more mitzvah or one more aveirah has the power to seal our judgment for life or for death. We continually underscore the notion that our salvation is not guaranteed, and that teshuvah, tefilah, and tzedakah are our only means of removing the evil of the decree. How can we reconcile the mood of apprehensive contingency on the Yom ha’Din with the assurances of our success at its conclusion?

I believe that an answer can be found in the Rambam’s explanation (Moreh ha’Nevuchim 3:36) of the reason for viduyim, korbanos for sins, and taaniyos. After classifying teshuvah as one of the “doctrines which are indispensable for the well-ordered society of Torah adherents,” the Rambam writes:

If man were convinced that he could never straighten his crooked ways, he would forever continue in his errors, and maybe even increase his disobedience if he believed there was no alternative. But with the belief in teshuvah, he will come back to the good and will return to an even more perfected state – even more perfected than he was before he sinned. For this reason, [we are commanded] in many actions which strengthen our belief in this very beneficial principle [of teshuvah]: for example, the viduyim, and the korbanos for sins … and the taaniyos.

The chief purpose of Yom ha’Kippurim is to reinforce our belief in the efficacy of teshuvah. If we didn’t believe in the power of teshuvah to change ourselves and our fate, we would persist in our harmful ways. But in order for the institution of Yom ha’Kippurim to function in this manner, we must allow ourselves to feel that our teshuvah was accepted. If Yom ha’Kippurim ended and we still felt totally in the dark as to whether our teshuvah, tefilah, and tzedakah paid off, we simply wouldn’t put in the effort in the first place. Imagine a struggling student who is encouraged to improve her grades so that she can graduate from college, but is never informed whether she actually graduated, and is never allowed to celebrate success. How could we expect her to put in the hard work without any hopeful promise of joyfully crossing the finish line?

Thus, the urgency and uncertainty we feel on Yom ha’Kippurim and the relief and joy we feel at its conclusion serve a common goal: to strengthen our belief in the efficacy of teshuvah. With this in mind, "go and eat your bread with joy" this Chag ha'Sukkos, knowing that you are priming yourself for greater teshuvah in the future.
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Tuesday, June 20, 2017

"Are Mitzvos Arbitrary?" or "The Pillow Mashal"

Originally published in July 2013. It is recommended to read Rambam: On the Reasons for Mitzvos before reading this post.

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"Are Mitzvos Arbitrary?" or "The Pillow Mashal"

Summary of the Rambam's View

This post is about the Rambam's view of taamei ha'mitzvos (the reasons for the commandments), as stated in his Guide for the Perplexed 3:26. Although I posted the full translation of this chapter yesterday, I'll summarize it here and then state the central question/problem which will be the focus of this post.

According to the Rambam, Chazal unanimously held that all mitzvos have reasons and were commanded for our benefit - even chukim. The only thing preventing us from knowing these reasons is our own ignorance. 

However, there is one puzzling statement from Chazal which seems to imply that some mitzvos do not have reasons:
What difference does it make to Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu whether an animal is slaughtered by shechitah (cutting the front of the neck) or by nechirah ("poleaxing it" i.e. chopping the back of its neck)? Surely the mitzvos were only given in order to test human beings, as it is stated: "The word of Hashem is tested (lit. refined)" (Tehilim 18:31).
On the surface, this statement implies that there is no real reason for shechitah over nechirah. This would appear to undermine the otherwise unanimously accepted principle that all of the mitzvos have reasons.

The Rambam resolves this apparent contradiction by making a subdivision. He writes that 
the mitzvos have specific reasons as far as their general character is concerned, and were commanded for a specific purpose; but as regards to their particulars - that is where we say that they have no reason other than being commanded.
He then explains the aforementioned statement of Chazal on the basis of this distinction. The general character of shechitah has a reason (i.e. that we should kill an animal before eating it, instead of eating it while it is still alive), but the particular requirements of shechitah (e.g. cutting the windpipe and esophagus, sharpening the knife, etc.) have no reason other than the commandment itself.

The Question/Problem

The problem is that in the very next sentence, the Rambam asserts that there are reasons for such details! He writes that the specific requirements for shechitah (e.g. cutting the windpipe and esophagus) are designed to ensure an easy death for the animal, and requiring a sharp knife is more convenient than requiring something like a sword or an ax.

The Rambam then proceeds to fall into the same apparent contradiction, but in an even more extreme way. First he boldly states that anyone who spends time seeking reasons for the details of mitzvos is "chasing after a huge delusion," and "will increase difficulties rather than remove them," and "is as far from the truth as one who assume that the entire mitzvah is without any real purpose." But then, at the end of the chapter, he declares his intention to explain the reasons for all of the mitzvos, including "the reasons for many of the conditions and details, as far as these can be discovered"!

And the Rambam follows through on this promise. For example, in his explanation of korbanos, he first writes that "we cannot say why one korban should be a lamb whilst another is a ram, and why a fixed number of them should be brought" and supports this claim with a solid argument. Yet, in subsequent chapters, the Rambam provides philosophical reasons for these very details!

All of this leaves us wondering what the Rambam really holds. The bottom-line question is: Do the details of mitzvos have reasons, or are they arbitrary? If the former, then what does the Rambam mean when he emphatically states that the particulars of mitzvos have no reasons, and that it is delusional to look for such reasons. And if the latter, then how can the Rambam offer reasons for such details? And if some details do have reasons and others are arbitrary, how can we know which is which? 

And, at the end of the day, we are still left with the question: From a philosophical, non-halachic standpoint, does God care about shechitah (vs. nechirah) or not?

The Answer: the Three Tiers of Mitzvah Design

Here's the plan: First I will state my answer with the briefest of explanations. I will then elaborate on the answer by means of a detailed mashal (analogy). I will follow that up by showing how this answer plays out in another mitzvah (arbah minim). I will conclude by answering the question about shechitah.

Every* mitzvah is a complex structural system comprised of many particular halachos. When analyzing taamei ha'mitzvos - that is, engaging in a speculative philosophical analysis of the reasons for mitzvos, as opposed to a purely halachic (or Talmudic) analysis - these halachos can be divided into three groups. For the sake of brevity, we will henceforth refer to these groups as Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3. Here are their definitions:
Tier 1: halachos which are designed to directly facilitate the mitzvah's primary purpose
Tier 2: halachos which serve a secondary purpose - one which may or may not be related to the primary purpose of the mitzvah
Tier 3: halachos that are best described as "arbitrary technicalities" which have no purpose whatsoever, and only exist because of structural necessity
If at this point these distinctions are not clear, have no fear! The following mashal will (I hope) clear everything up.

The Pillow Mashal 

Let us perform a thought-experiment. Imagine that you are an owner of a pillow factory, producing bed pillows for sleeping. You must draft a set of pillow-making regulations and procedures which will yield high-quality pillows.

Where should you begin? By defining the purpose of a bed pillow, of course. The purpose of a bed pillow is to provide support and comfort for the head while sleeping or lying down. (I'm sure someone can come up with a more precise formulation for the purpose of a pillow, but this is sufficient for the purposes of this mashal.) 

This definition of the pillow's function will serve as our guiding principle in pillow-making. If we produce an object which fails to serve this function, then then object is not a successful pillow. Moreover, the superiority and inferiority of our pillows will be measured by the extent to which they achieve this purpose.

Tier 1 Design Features

Basically, there are two structural components of a pillow: the pillowcase and the stuffing. Of the two, the latter is primary, since the pillowcase is only there to contain the stuffing, and would be completely dispensable if the stuffing could be self-contained.

The purpose of a pillow which we outlined above directly dictates the general character of what can and can't be used for stuffing. The general guideline may be stated as follows: in order for a pillow to fulfill its purpose, its stuffing must consist of a material which is soft. Examples of adequate materials are feathers, down, cotton, and certain synthetic materials. A pillow filled with sticks, stones, or shards of glass would not be suitable for the pillow's function.

This is an example of a "Tier 1" feature of the pillow's design, since the requirement of "softness" directly facilitates the primary purpose of the pillow. 

Tier 2 Design Features

But once we've narrowed the field down to "soft materials," this doesn't mean that anything goes. The material we use must possess other qualities which are not directly related to the primary function of the pillow. Some of these qualities might contribute to the primary function in an indirect manner, whereas others will serve secondary roles which are entirely unrelated to the pillow's primary function.

For example, the material we select must be non-perishable. A pillow stuffed with mashed bananas, beef tallow, or carrion might be comfortable, but it wouldn't last very long (and the resulting odor would preclude a comfortable sleep for olfactory reasons). Likewise, the material we select must be available for use. The feathers of the threatened Northern Spotted Owl, the now extinct North Island Giant Moa, or the prehistoric Archaeopteryx might make for a comfy pillow, but the unavailability these materials makes them impractical for pillow-making. The material we select must also be safe. A pillow made of asbestos might provide a satisfying sleep, but it will also shorten your lifespan; a pillow from Chernobyl is just as soft as a pillow from Albequerque, but is likely to produce undesirable effects. 

The need for our pillow-stuffing to be non-perishable, available, and safe are all "Tier 2" requirements. Each of these characteristics serves a purpose, but unlike the "Tier 1" requirement of softness, they do not directly serve the primary function of the pillow (i.e. to provide support and comfort for the head). 

As can be seen from these examples, Tier 2 considerations are often the basis of deciding among otherwise equal or viable Tier 1 candidates. For example, polyester and memory foam are both soft, but memory foam is more hygienic, and is therefore advantageous. Eiderdown and goose down are both soft, but although eiderdown makes for a more comfortable pillow, it is more costly, and might prove to be a disadvantage from a financial standpoint.

But there are other Tier 2 aspects of the design which must be determined even after we settle on the ideal stuffing. One example of this is the aesthetic qualities of the pillow. Sometimes the decisions we make about the appearance of the pillow might be indirectly related to the pillow's primary function. For example, it can be argued that the colors "pure white" and "sky blue" contribute to a greater sense of psychological comfort than "jaundice yellow" or "barf brown." Likewise, a pillow should appear inviting and evoke positive feelings. If a pillow's appearance triggered negative feelings, this might detract from the Tier 1 superiority of the pillow as an object of comfort.

All things being equal, most girls will prefer the pillow on the right based on Tier 2 considerations.

On the other hand, the pillow's appearance might be dictated by factors which have nothing to do with the primary function of the pillow. For example, colored pillows might be more expensive to produce than white pillows, or perhaps a certain color is preferable because it is more popular among a certain consumer population (e.g. pink for girls), or perhaps making pillows in a variety of colors will lead to greater brand exposure.

All of these Tier 2 features are important, and all Tier 2 design-decisions will be made on the basis of specific reasons, but none of these reasons are directly related to the primary function of the pillow.

Tier 3 Design Features

The Tier 3 features are necessary, but arbitrary in their specifics. For example, let's say we choose to make our pillows out of eiderdown because it is the softest material (Tier 1). We are willing to forego the cost (Tier 2) because we plan on marketing our pillows to wealthy consumers (Tier 2). We decide to use eiderdown from Iceland rather than China for political reasons (Tier 2) and we decide to go with "free range" eider ducks in order to make a public statement about animal cruelty (Tier 2), ensuring brand loyalty (Tier 2) among a subsection of our consumers.

But now we find ourselves at the eider duck farm in Iceland and it is time to choose which flock of ducks we will use for our first run of pillows. We will have to choose ducks of a certain a size and age in order to ensure the highest quality feathers (Tier 1), but out of the thousands of eider ducks within that large category, which particular ducks will we use? This decision is completely arbitrary (Tier 3). No matter how the decision is made - whether by the age of the ducks, or their size, or by a random lottery - it will be neither informed nor influenced by the primary function of the pillow, nor by any secondary considerations. Tier 1 and Tier 2 decisions must be based on reasons; Tier 3 decisions do not.

Consider another example: the exact size of the pillow. Of course, there will be a certain size-range which is determined based on Tier 1 considerations. Generally speaking, the pillow will need to accommodate an average-sized head. There are four basic pillow sizes: standard (20" by 26"), queen (20" by 30"), king (20" by 36"), and euro (26" by 26").

But why settle on 20" by 26" for a standard sized pillow? Why not 20" by 25.5" or 21" by 27"? The answer is that this aspect of the pillow's design is arbitrary. The range of sizes was set by Tier 1 considerations, but the specific dimensions within that range has absolutely no reason, other than the fact that some length had to be chosen.

One last example of a Tier 3 quality: the particular hue of the pillow's color. We've already mentioned that the color of the pillow is a valid Tier 2 consideration, but within each color, there are an infinite number of hues. There might be a Tier 2 difference between blue and red, and there might even be a Tier 2 difference between light blue and dark blue, but at some point, the choice between hues of blue is arbitrary.

There might be reasons for choosing between 01 and 20,
but the choice of 11 over 10 is arbitrary.

The Answer: Restated

By now I hope the analogy is clear. Just like there are three tiers in the design of pillows, so too, there are three tiers in the design of mitzvos. Certain features of a mitzvah's design are directly dictated by its primary purpose - just like the Tier 1 characteristic of a pillow (i.e. its soft stuffing) is directly dictated by the pillow's function (i.e. to provide support and comfort for the head while sleeping or lying down). Other features of a mitzvah's structure serve secondary purposes which may or may not be related to the primary reason - just like the Tier 2 design considerations of the pillow (e.g. its color, its cost, its durability, etc.). Last but not least, there are aspects of the mitzvah which are completely arbitrary from a taamei ha'mitzvos standpoint - just like the Tier 3 specifications of the pillow (i.e. which specific specimens its materials derive from, its exact dimensions, and its precise hue).

Some people find this last category difficult to accept. "How can a mitzvah contain something arbitrary, without any purpose? Isn't that an imperfection in the Torah? How can we believe that Hashem would command us in something for no reason?" I will repeat the Rambam's response to these types of objections:
It is important for you to know that chochmah demanded it - or, if you prefer, say that necessity dictated - that there should be parts [of the mitzvos] for which reasons are inapplicable; it is, as it were, inherently impossible for the mitzvah not to have something of this type.
Any mitzvah which involves physical phenomena will, of necessity, have quantifiable characteristics, such a length, height, volume, duration, number of components, etc. The Tier 1 and Tier 2 design-considerations will usually dictate a certain range of values for these quantities, but once you get down to a certain level of specificity, the final number will have to be arbitrary. This is what the Rambam meant when he said:
It is almost similar to the nature of a thing which can potentially receive different forms, but actually receives only one of them: we must not ask why it has this form and not another which is likewise possible, because we should have to ask the same question if instead of its actual form the thing had any of the other possible forms. Note this, and understand it.
We will now examine two examples from the mitzvah system - arbah minim and shechitah - in light of our answer.

The Three Tiers of Arbah Minim

The mitzvah of the arbah minim is to pick up the four species of vegetation specified by the Torah, on the first day of the Chag ha'Sukkos. The Rambam states his theory about the purpose of this mitzvah in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:43:
It appears to me that the four species of the lulav are [an expression of] joy and gladness for going out from the Wilderness – which was a place “without seed, fig, vine, and pomegranate, and without any water to drink” (Bamidbar 20:5) – to a place of fruit-trees and rivers. Therefore, in order to remember this, we take the most beautiful of its fruits, and a fragrant [plant], and beautiful leaves, and the most beautiful of herbs – that is, the willows of the brook.
The Rambam then goes on to explain why these four species in particular (i.e. citron, date palm, myrtle, and brook-willow) were chosen:
These four species have three common denominators. First, they were plentiful in the Land of Israel at that time and everyone was able to obtain them. Secondly, they are exceedingly beautiful in their appearance and aesthetic qualities; some of them – namely, the citron and the myrtle – are fragrant, but the date palm and the willows have neither a good nor a bad smell. The third quality is that they retain their appearance for seven days, which is not the case with peaches, pomegranates, asparagus, nuts, and the like.
Note the difference between the Rambam's two explanations. The explanation in the first paragraph pertains to Tier 1 features, which relate directly to the primary reason for the mitzvah: we joyously pick up beautiful species of plants in order to express our gratitude to Hashem for taking us from the barren Wilderness into the fertile Land of Israel. In contrast, the explanations mentioned in the second paragraph all pertain to Tier 2 features of the mitzvah, and the reasons provided are secondary.

Allow me to spell out the implications of this. The Rambam implies that the mitzvah of arbah minim could have served its primary purpose if we had been required to pick up four species of, say, exotic orchids. The only problem is that orchids are not plentiful in Israel. Similarly, the mitzvah could have served its primary function if we had been commanded to pick up an oleander instead of a myrtle. However, the Gemara (Sukkah 32b) explains that the oleander - which is poisonous - would not be in line with the Torah's nature, as described by Shlomo ha'Melech: "its ways are ways of pleasantness" (Mishlei 3:17). Likewise, the Torah could have even used pomegranates and peaches were it not for the fact that their appearance dwindles in beauty and freshness over the seven day period.

As for Tier 3 features: the Rambam doesn't mention any, but they certainly exist. For example, a lulav must be at least four tefachim (handbreadths) long. The Gemara explains that it must be long enough to shake. Fine; we can understand why being long enough to shake is a Tier 1 or Tier 2 consideration - but why exactly four tefachim? Wouldn't five tefachim also be reasonable? What about 10 etzbaos (finger-breadths), or one amah

The same might be said for the requirement of four species. It would seem that the mitzvah could have fulfilled its primary purpose if three or five species were required. The same can be said for many of the detailed specifications of the halachic blemishes which disqualify the four species: once it became necessary to include blemishes within the structure of the mitzvah (due to Tier 1 reasons), halacha had to define these blemishes in a precise, quantifiable manner. At a certain level of detail, halacha had to draw the line at an arbitrary point, just like in any other legal system or design.

(Note: Some of you might be wondering, "Isn't it necessary for there to be these four specific species to teach us specific ideas, as explained by Chazal - like the four types of Jews, or the four parts of the body used in serving Hashem?" The Rambam maintains that these statements of Chazal are just drash, and don't have anything to do with the real purpose of arbah minim; read Pshat vs. Drash II for an elaboration on this point.)

The Three Tiers of Shechitah

Now we are finally ready to answer our original question: from a philosophical, non-halachic standpoint, does God care about shechitah? The answer is: "no" in a Tier 1 framework, and "yes" in a Tier 2 framework. Rambam explains the reasons for the mitzvah of shechitah in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:48:
It is prohibited to cut off a limb of a living animal and eat it, because such act would produce cruelty, and develop it; the gentile kings used to do this, and it was also done for avodah zarah – namely, they would cut a specific limb of an animal and eat it … The mitzvah concerning the killing of animals is necessary, because the natural food of man consists of vegetables and of the flesh of animals, and the best meat is that of animals permitted to be used as food; no doctor has any doubts about this. Since, therefore, the desire of procuring good food necessitates the slaughtering of animals, the Torah enjoins that the death of the animal should be the easiest, and prohibits us to torment the animal by cutting the throat in a crude manner, or by poleaxing, or by cutting off a limb whilst the animal is alive.
If we consider this excerpt in light of the previously cited excerpt on shechitah, it would seem that according to the Rambam the primary purpose of shechitah is to ensure that we eat the flesh of dead animals, and not living animals. Even non-Jews are prohibited from eating a limb from a living animal. From this Tier 1 perspective, God doesn't care whether we kill an animal by shechitah, nechirah, or bazooka.

However, once God saw fit (so to speak) to obligate us to kill an animal before eating it, He legislated a specific method of killing the animal with specific requirements. Some of these requirements are in line with the primary purpose (i.e. distancing us from animalistic behavior and cruelty), some requirements serve secondary purposes (i.e. the ease of the method and the availability of the slaughtering instrument), and other requirements have no specific purpose at all. From this Tier 2 perspective, there is a big difference between killing an animal through shechitah vs. nechirah, and God does care about that difference. 

Conclusion

I have heard people summarize the Rambam's view by saying, "Rambam holds that the details of mitzvos are arbitrary" or "Rambam holds that there are no reasons for the majority of halacha." There is even a well-known acharon who lambasted the Rambam for this point. 

In my opinion, the Rambam's view is far more nuanced than these crude summaries make it out to be. I believe that if we understand the Rambam's explanation in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim - especially regarding Tier 3 - then the objections raised against his view fall away. I also believe that a number of objections raised by people against mitzvos - in general or in particular - can be easily resolved if one understands the three-tiered nature of mitzvah-design. 

I hope this explanation has clarified the subject of taamei ha'mitzvos, and enhanced your appreciation of the chochmah of the Torah system. 


* This only applies to what Rabbeinu Bachya ibn Paquda refers to as chovos ha'eivarim ("duties of the limbs") - that is to say, mitzvos which involve actions. 

Wednesday, July 15, 2015

Pshat vs. Drash II

Introduction/Recap

In the previous installment on this topic I presented my understanding of the difference between pshat and drash, "Pshat" refers to the meaning of the words as intended by the author, whereas "drash" refers to the homiletic use of the author's words as a platform for expressing an extrinsic idea - an idea which may or may not have anything to do with the author's original intent. I supported these definitions with sources from Ibn Ezra, Ralbag, Radvaz, and Shiltei ha'Giborim.

Subsequent to writing this post, my rebbi introduced me to two more sources which support these definitions: one from the Rashba in his commentary on aggadah, and the other from the Rambam's Moreh ha'Nevuchim. Since both of them make similar points, I decided to incorporate them into a single post.





Rashba: Commentary on Aggadah, Berachos 32b

The Gemara in Berachos 32b focuses on a pasuk in Yeshayahu 49:16. Here is the pasuk (bold) in context:
Zion said, "Hashem has forsaken me; my Lord has forgotten me." Can a woman forget her baby (עוּלָהּ), or not feel compassion for the son of her womb (מֵרַחֵם בֶּן בִּטְנָהּ)? Even these (אֵלֶּה) may forget, but I (אָנֹכֵי) would not forget you. Behold, I have engraved you upon my palms; your walls are before Me always. Your children will hasten [to return], and your ruiners and your destroyers will leave you.
The Gemara expounds on the four Hebrew words I singled out above:
"Can a woman forget her baby (עוּלָהּ), or not feel compassion for the son of her womb (מֵרַחֵם בֶּן בִּטְנָהּ)?" [Hashem said:] "Can I forget the burnt offerings (עוֹלוֹת) and firstborn offerings (פִּטְרֵי רְחָמִים) that Israel has brought before Me in the Wilderness?"

The Congregation of Israel responded: "Master of the universe, since there is no forgetting before the throne of Your glory, perhaps you have not forgotten the incident of the Eigel (Golden Calf)?"

Hashem responded: "Also these (אֵלֶּה) may forget" (the midrash alludes to the incident of the Golden Calf, in which the worshipers said, "These (אֵלֶּה) are your gods, O Israel, who took you out from Egypt!"). 

Israel said before Him: "Since there is forgetfulness before the throne of Your glory, perhaps You have forgotten the Revelation at Mount Sinai?"

Hashem responded: "but I (אָנֹכֵי) would not forget you" (the midrash alludes to the first of the Ten Commandments heard at Sinai, "I (אָנֹכֵי) am Hashem, your God, etc.").
The Rashba prefaces his commentary with a general statement about midrashim.
There are those who mistakenly think that Chazal are actually interpreting the pesukim which are brought in their aggadah, in accordance with their explanations therein. For example, they explain עוּלָהּ (baby) as עוֹלָה (burnt offering), and they explain בֶּן בִּטְנָהּ (son of her womb) as פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם הַבָּא מִן הַבֶּטֶן (a firstborn issue of the the womb), and they explain אֵלֶּה (these) as אֵלֶּה אֱלֹהֶיךָ יִשְׂרָאֵל ("these are your gods, O Israel") and אָנֹכֵי (I) as אָנֹכִי ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ ("I am Hashem, your God"). This leads to mass confusion.

These [mistaken individuals] can be divided into two groups. One group is inclined towards [belief in] the opinions of Chazal and rely upon everything they say; they think that [these midrashim reflect] the true interpretations of these pesukim, since that is how the Sages present them. Another group mistakenly inclines towards kefirah (denial) [of the Chazal's authority]; they think that this was Chazal's intent in explaining these pesukim, and they ascribe error to them. This, in turn, leads to a greater mistake, for they then ascribe error to everything that Chazal taught in their explanation of the Torah and mitzvos. These are true fools - "the opposite of men of understanding" (Yeshayahu 5:21). In order to remove these two errors, I must provide insight and explain their intent in all matters such as these. 
The Rashba then goes on to give a beautiful explanation of the true meaning of the midrash (which we will omit here for the sake of brevity). He concludes by explaining why Chazal adopted this approach in their aggadah:
This is one style in aggadah, namely, that [the Sages] teach whatever it is they intend to teach, and they bring pesukim for their idea as if their intention is to interpret that pasuk in accordance with what they taught - but in truth, [the pasuk] only serves as an allusion and a mnemonic device for their own idea
For example, [they midrashically explain the pasuk, "וַנִּירָם אָבַד חֶשְׁבּוֹן עַד דִּיבֹן" "Their sovereignty over Cheshbon was lost" (Bamidbar 21:30) in the following manner:] "וַנִּירָם" teaches us that the wicked one says, "אין רם" (there is no Exalted One); "אָבַד חֶשְׁבּוֹן" means "אבד חשבונו של עולם" (the accounting of the world has been lost). 
In truth, the Sages had no intention to interpret these pesukim - which speak about the events of the war with Sichon - as speaking about the words, actions, and thoughts of the wicked; rather, their intention in this [midrash] and others like it is to remember the idea by remembering the pasuk, as a mnemonic device. This shows wisdom on their part, for they take important and necessary ideas which have tremendous value and firmly establish them in a language which will not be forgotten (i.e. the text of pesukim).
I'm going to hold off my comments on the Rashba until after we see the Rambam, since their statements are so similar. 



Rambam: Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:43


The final section of the Moreh ha'Nevuchim is devoted to the explanations of the reasons for the mitzvos. Before presenting his own explanation of the mitzvah of the arbaat ha'minim (the Four Species), the Rambam addresses the popular midrashic explanations. Presumably, he is referring to the midrash that the arbaat ha'minim represent the four different types of Jews, and the midrash that the arbaat ha'minim symbolize four parts of the human body which should be utilized in our service of Hashem. Here is what the Rambam has to say:
As regards the arbah minim, our Sages gave specific reasons for them by way of aggadic interpretation, the method of which is well known to those who are acquainted with the style of our Sages. They use the text of the Torah only as a kind of poetical expression [for their own ideas] – not that these are the actual meaning of the text.  
With regards to these midrashic interpretations, people are divided into two groups: some people think that the midrash contains the real explanation of the text, whilst others mock it and ridicule it, since it is clear and obvious that this is not the real meaning of the text. The former struggle and fight to prove and to confirm such interpretations according to their opinion, and to hold on to them as the real meaning of the text; they consider them in the same light as the received laws from the Oral tradition. Neither of the two classes understood that our Sages employ biblical texts merely as poetical expressions, the meaning of which is clear to every reasonable reader. This style was widespread in ancient days; all adopted it in the same way as poets [adopt a certain popular style].  
In reference to the words: “and you shall have a peg (יָתֵד) in addition to your weapon (אֲזֵנֶךָ)” (Devarim 23:14) our Sages teach: “Do not read אֲזֵנֶךָ (your weapon) but אָזְנֶךָ (your ear). You are thus told, that if you hear a person uttering something disgraceful, put your fingers into your ears.”  
Now, I wonder whether those ignorant persons [who take the midrashic explanations as actual interpretations] believe that the author of this saying gave it as the true interpretation of the text quoted and as the meaning of this mitzvah – that in truth, יָתֵד (peg) is used for “finger” and אֲזֵנֶךָ denotes “your ear”? I cannot think that any person whose intellect is sound can admit this. The author employed the text as a beautiful poetical phrase in teaching an excellent moral lesson, namely this: it is as bad to listen to lashon ha’ra as it is to say it. This lesson is poetically connected with the above text. In the same sense you must understand the phrase, "Do not read so, but so," wherever it occurs in the midrash.
According to the Rambam, the midrashic explanations of the symbolism of the arbaat ha'minim were never intended as interpretations of the pesukim or the mitzvos contained therein - just as the midrash about the shovel was never intended as an interpretation of the pasuk in Devarim. Nevertheless, people still take these midrashim as actual interpretations - both l'shvach (to praise Chazal) and l'gnai (to disparage them).

Artwork: Corrupted Roots, by Mark Hyzer
The Root of the Problem

The Rambam mentioned the common denominator between the two groups: both of them fail to realize that Chazal were using the text of the pesukim as a poetic and mnemonic device to express their own ideas. But my rebbi asked a further question: What is the root of their error? The Rambam and Rashba paint a clear picture of the symptoms, but what is the underlying disease?

I answered my rebbi's question based on the Rambam's statement about the first group: "they consider [these aggadic explanations] in the same light as the received laws from the Oral tradition." In other words, both groups fail to realize that aggadic midrashim are entirely different than the halachos of Torah she'baal Peh. These groups believe that just as we are obligated to accept the mesorah (oral tradition) from Chazal that "an eye for an eye" refers to monetary compensation rather than corporal punishment, and "pri eitz hadar" refers to an esrog, and "ve'hayu l'totafos bein einecha" is an instruction to place tefilin on one's forehead above the spot between one's eyes, so too, we are obligated to accept Chazal's statements at face value when they write that R' Elazar ben Azariah miraculously grew a white beard at the age of 18, or that Yocheved was 130 when she gave birth to Moshe, or that Moshe Rabbeinu was 18 feet tall. Both of these groups are oblivious to the crucial premise of all aggadic teachings, namely, that they were not given at Sinai, but that they are Chazal's own interpretations, which they arrived at with their own minds and formulated in their own style.

Every student should be aware of Shmuel ha'Nagid's explicit definition of aggadah in his Mevo ha'Talmud:
Hagadah” (a.k.a. “aggadah” or “aggadic midrash”) is any explanation from the Talmud on a non-mitzvah topic - this is hagadah, and we only learn from it that which makes sense. It is incumbent upon you to know that established by the Sages as halacha regarding any mitzvah was received by Moshe Rabbeinu who received it from the Almighty, and we should not add to it nor subtract from it. But as for all of the explanations of the Scriptural verses - each of the Sages explained according to the ideas which occurred to him and what he saw with his mind. We should only learn from these explanations that which makes sense, and the rest we should not rely upon.
The members of the first group feel compelled to accept aggadic explanations in the same way that they accept Chazal's halachic teachings from Torah she'baal Peh, whereas the second group reject aggadic explanations and ultimately reject Chazal's halachic teachings from Torah she'baal Peh. Both groups assume that these teachings are of the same nature, in the same style (i.e. interpretation), and are on the same level of authority. In truth, they are not. I fully agree with Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch's statement that to believe that aggadah was given at Sinai is "a dangerous approach that poses a grave danger for the pupils who grow up believing this concept, for it very nearly opens the gates of heresy before them."

My rebbi gave a different answer. He said that the underlying disease shared by the two groups is a mistake about who Chazal are, namely, both groups believe that Chazal were not chachamim. The Rambam openly states in his introduction to Perek Chelek that the members of the first group "think that the only meaning in the wise words of Chazal is what they, themselves, understand – namely, the literal meaning." It doesn't even occur to them that Chazal are expressing great wisdom which is utterly beyond their own grasp. Consequently, they drag down the words of Chazal to the low level of their own intellects, and assume that this is what Chazal actually intended. Likewise, the Rambam writes that the members of the second group "imagine that their own intelligence is of a higher order than that of Chazal, and that Chazal were simpletons who suffered from inferior intelligence were incapable of attaining genuine wisdom." Their arrogance (in contrast to the first group) renders them even more unlikely to uncover the true wisdom of Chazal's teachings.

Neither group recognizes the chochmah of Chazal. Both groups view Chazal as possessing inferior intelligence. This causes them regard the statements of Chazal as simplistic and superficial. The members of the first group delight in this since it allows them to retain their own childish beliefs about Torah and reality, and the members of the second group enjoy mocking Chazal, rejecting their teachings, and rationalizing their own inclinations and ideas on the basis of their "superior" intelligence.

Unfortunately, these two groups are still at large, and the Jewish world is still plagued by the problems they cause. The best we can do is to turn to Rishonim, such as the Rashba and the Rambam, who truly understood Judaism, and look to them as our guides.