Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife?

This week’s dvar Torah is a digest of the answers given by the Rishonim [1] to a classic question, along with an original answer based on my understanding of Sefer Koheles. 

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Artwork: Honor's Reward, by Izzy

Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife? 

The Question 

Parashas Bechukosai opens with a list of the blessings that Hashem promises to bestow “If you will follow My decrees and observe My commandments and perform them” (Vayikra 26:3). Among these blessings are: rain in its proper time, abundant produce, peace in the land, military success, flourishing of our population, and Divine favor. A similar list of blessings is stated in Parashas Ki Savo (Devarim 28:1-14). 

But there is a shocking omission from both lists of blessings: Olam ha’Ba (the “World to Come” or “afterlife”), the ultimate reward for a life of Torah and mitzvos. 

This is a famous problem. Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? In contrast, the Oral Torah and midrashic literature are replete with references to Olam ha’Ba, the most prominent of which is the Mishnah’s statement: “All of Israel has a portion in Olam ha’Ba” (Sanhedrim 10:1). 

This discrepancy between the Written and Oral Torahs has led modern academics to conclude that the entire notion of an afterlife was a Rabbinic invention, introduced long after the Biblical period. Those who wish to believe such conspiracy theories will not be convinced by any arguments, and I will not even attempt to address them here. Suffice it to say, our Mesorah (tradition) is clear on this point: belief in Olam ha’Ba has always been a unanimously accepted part of Judaism, despite the fact that it is not explicitly referenced in the 24 books of Tanach. 

But the question remains: Why does the Written Torah omit Olam ha’Ba from its lists of rewards? Why does it focus exclusively on the physical blessings? 

Seven Answers from the Rishonim 

The Abravanel [2] raises our question in his Chumash commentary and refers the reader to a book he wrote on the topic of Olam ha’Ba called Tzedek Olamim, in which he answers this question in full. Sadly, this book has been lost to history. Fortunately, the Abravanel provides a brief summary of six answers given to our question by his predecessors, followed by his own seventh answer. Here are my summaries of the Abravanel’s summaries: 

(1) Rambam [3]: The blessings and curses promised in the Torah are not the true reward and punishment for the mitzvos. The true reward is Olam ha’Ba, which is purely spiritual in nature. The reason why the Written Torah didn’t mention this reward is so that a person will follow Torah lishmah (for its own sake) – or, as the Abravanel puts it, “for the sake of perfection” – rather than for the sake of reward or out of fear of punishment. The role of the blessings and curses is to facilitate our pursuit of human perfection for its own sake: to the extent that we follow Hashem, He will provide us with physical goods and remove physical impediments from our lives so that we can continue in our pursuit of perfection without worrying about our material well-being; and to the extent that we neglect His will, He will withhold His blessings and we will be subject to these curses which will impede our pursuit of perfection. 

(2) Ibn Ezra [4]: The reward in Olam ha’Ba is a deep concept which is difficult for the average person to grasp. Since the Written Torah was given to the entire Jewish nation – not just the elite scholars – it was necessary to only mention the physical rewards and punishments, which can be understood by everyone. The sode (“secret” or esoteric concept) of Olam ha’Ba was relegated to the realm of the Oral Torah, thereby allowing every teacher to assess their student’s readiness for this concept on an individual basis, in accordance with that student’s level of development. 

(3) Ramban [5] / Sefer ha’Chinuch [6]: Belief in the eternality of the soul and its reward in Olam ha’Ba is a matter that can be rationally demonstrated by way of philosophical argument, and therefore did not need to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. In contrast, the blessings and curses are miraculous [7] phenomena which operate according to the principles of hashgachah (Divine providence) known only through nevuah (prophecy), which is why it was necessary for the Torah to spell them out in detail. 

(4) Ran [8] / Kuzari [9]: The majority of the people, in ancient and modern times, denied the reality of hashgachah pratis (individual Divine providence). This denial was rampant among the Jews as well. Were the Torah to only promise spiritual reward and punishment after death, then these misguided Jews would take this as a confirmation of their deistic worldview. Therefore, it was necessary for the Torah to reinforce the truth of hasghacha pratis by going into great detail about the physical blessings and curses that will transpire as a result of our adherence to Torah. As for the reality of the spiritual reward and punishment for the soul in Olam ha’Ba: this can be inferred from the physical blessings and curses in Olam ha’Zeh (the physical world). Once we see that God provides us with physical rewards, which relate to the lower part of our nature (i.e. the body), we will realize that certainly He must provide us with spiritual reward, to compensate the higher part of our nature (i.e. the soul). 

(5) Saadia Gaon [10]: The ovdei avodah zarah (idolaters) engaged in various behaviors which they believed would bring them material success and protection from physical harm. When Hashem prohibited these idolatrous practices, He didn’t want His people to think that they would lose out on these material benefits. Therefore, He promised us as part of His covenant that by keeping the Torah, we would enjoy rewards in the physical world greater than anything that the ovdei avodah zarah hoped for from their false gods, since Hashem is the true God of heaven and earth, Who has the ability to bestow such blessings as He sees fit. There was no need to mention spiritual rewards, since the promises of physical rewards were only included in the covenant to refute the false promise of physical blessings by the ovdei avodah zarah. (Apparently, the ovdei avodah zarah of that era did not yearn for spiritual rewards, which is why there was no need to mention them in the covenant.) 

(6) Kuzari [11] / Ran [12]: The afterlife of the soul is explicitly mentioned in the blessings promised by the Torah in such statements as: “I [Hashem] will walk among you” (Vayikra 26:12), “I will place My dwelling among you” (ibid. 26:11), “I will be God unto you” (ibid. 26:12). [The Abravanel then goes on to explain how, if the nature of this spiritual reward is properly understood, then even the promises of physical blessings will serve as a proof that the souls of the righteous will survive after death. However, I’m not 100% sure that I follow every step of his explanation, and I would rather omit it from my summary than risk misrepresenting this line of reasoning.] 

(7) Abravanel [13]: It would not be proper to mention Olam ha’Ba in the context of Bechukosai and Ki Savo, since these blessings are for the nation as a whole rather than for individuals, whereas the spiritual rewards of the afterlife are for individuals and not for the nation as a whole. If the Torah had mentioned Olam ha’Ba in its lists of blessings, this might lead to misconceptions about the nature of the reward in the afterlife. For example, one might mistakenly conclude that one’s portion in Olam ha’Ba is determined or affected by the righteousness and wickedness of the majority of nation, as is the case with the physical blessings and curses. 

An Eighth Answer 

Shlomo ha'Melech says: “Give a portion to seven but also to eight” (Koheles 11:2). While the seven of the aforementioned answers all have their merits, I would like to offer an eighth answer – one which lines up with that of the Rambam, but with a twist. 

The Rambam [14] devotes the final chapter of Hilchos Teshuvah to a discussion of the motives for serving Hashem. He opens his discussion by defining two levels of Divine service: 

A person should not say, “I will do the mitzvos of the Torah and involve myself in its wisdom in order to receive all of the blessings that are written in it,” or “in order that I will merit life in Olam ha’Ba” and “I will separate myself from the transgressions about which the Torah warns us, in order to escape from the curses written in the Torah” or “so that I will not be cut off from Olam ha’Ba.”  

It is not proper to serve Hashem in this manner, for one who serves Hashem in this manner is called “oveid mi’yirah” (“one who serves out of fear”). This is neither a virtue of the prophets nor of the wise. The only ones who should serve Hashem in this manner are the ignoramuses, the women, and the children, whom we train to serve out of fear until their minds develop and they serve out of love.  

An “oveid me’ahavah” (“one who serves out of love”) involves himself in Torah and mitzvos and walks on the paths of wisdom not because of anything in the world, neither out of fear of the bad nor out of a desire to inherit the good. Rather, he does what is true because it is true, and the good will come of its own accord … 

It is easy to understand why doing mitzvos in order to receive the blessings promised by the Torah is considered to be an inferior motive, but why should this apply to one whose service is motivated by the prospect of reward in Olam ha’Ba? Didn’t the Rambam write earlier [15] that Olam ha’Ba is the greatest good? 

The [ultimate] goodness which is hidden away for tzadikim is Olam ha’Ba. This is the life which has no death with it, and the good which has no bad. This is what is written in the Torah, “so that it will be good for you, and you will prolong your days” (Devarim 22:7). From the Oral Torah we learn: “so that it will be good for you” [refers] to the world which is entirely good, and “you will prolong your days” [refers] to the world which is entirely long – and this is Olam ha’Ba. 

If Olam ha’Ba is the ultimate good, why shouldn’t it motivate our observance of mitzvos? 

The answer lies in the fact that it is impossible for us to comprehend the true nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba. The Rambam [16] introduces this difficulty in his introduction to Perek Chelek. He writes: 

Know that just as a blind man cannot experience colors, nor can a deaf man experience sounds, nor can a eunuch [experience] sexual desire, so too, physical bodies cannot experience spiritual enjoyments. And just as a fish does not recognize the element of fire because it (i.e. the fish) is immersed in its opposite, so too, one cannot know the enjoyments of the spiritual world while one is in this physical world, for we have no enjoyment other than bodily enjoyments alone – [such as] the experiences of our senses in eating, drinking, and sex – and everything outside of these [physical enjoyments] is not experienced by us, nor can we recognize it, nor can we apprehend it in our initial analysis, but only after much investigation. This is because we are in a physical world and cannot apprehend anything other than its enjoyments, but enjoyments of the soul are constant and unceasing, and there is no relationship at all whatsoever between these and those. 

Similarly, the Rambam [17] writes in the Mishneh Torah: 

Regarding the great good which the soul will enjoy in Olam ha’Ba: there is no way in Olam ha’Zeh to comprehend it or know it, because we only know in Olam ha’Zeh the good of the body, and that is what we desire; but that good [in Olam ha’Ba] is exceedingly great, and there is no comparison among the goods of Olam ha’Zeh except by way of analogy. 

Indeed, a few paragraphs earlier the Rambam condemns those who harbor foolish notions about the nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba, writing: 

Maybe this good will seem trivial in your eyes, and you’ll imagine that the only reward for mitzvos and for being a person who is perfected in the ways of truth is to eat and drink good foods, have relations with beautiful figures, wear garments made of silk and woven fabrics, dwell in houses of marble, and use gold and silver utensils and other things like this – as is imagined by the foolish and idiotic Arabs who are steeped in lechery.

But the wise and those who possess knowledge know that all of these things are fantasy and nothingness, and there is no hope in them. They are only considered to be a great good for us in Olam ha’Zeh because we have bodies, and all of these things are bodily needs, and the soul only desires them and favors them because they are bodily needs, in order that its desires will be fulfilled and its health maintained. And when there is no body, all of these things will be found to be pointless. 

Having established all of these premises, I would like to propose my own answer to our original question: Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? Because since it is absolutely impossible to conceive of the spiritual enjoyments of Olam ha’Ba, then if we were to be motivated by the promise of such a reward, we would – by definition – be chasing a fantasy. In other words, whatever notion of Olam ha’Ba is driving our motivation must, of necessity, be false, since it is impossible for a physical being to conceive of non-physical enjoyments. 

It is for this reason that the Torah promises physical blessings to those who obey Hashem. The individual whose avodah (Divine service) is motivated by these physical blessings and the individual whose avodah is motivated by Olam ha’Ba are both engaged in avodah she’lo lishmah (not for its own sake), but the former individual is on a higher level because at least he’s being motivated by a reality, whereas the latter is being motivated by a fantasy. 

Make no mistake: Olam ha’Ba itself is a reality, but the version of Olam ha’Ba as a motivator is a fantasy. The vision of Olam ha’Ba in our minds and imaginations, to which our psyche attaches value, and which acts as the proverbial carrot (paired with the proverbial stick) – that notion of Olam ha’Ba has no basis in reality whatsoever. In contrast, “rains in their proper time,” “eating bread in satiety,” “peace in the land” and all of the other physical blessings exist as motivators in our imaginations which do correspond to their physical reality. 

This sheds light on the Divine wisdom in relegating Olam ha’Ba to the Oral Torah. In Hashem’s “Plan A” (so to speak), students would not be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba until they were developmentally ready, as the Rambam [18] describes: 

Therefore, when we teach the children, women, and general populace of laymen, we should only teach them to serve out of fear and in order to receive reward, until their minds mature and they gain additional wisdom; we should reveal this secret to them bit by bit, and accustom them to this concept with pleasantness, until they apprehend it and know it and serve out of love. 

Parents and teachers would motivate their children and students to serve Hashem for the she’lo lishmah motive of obtaining the blessings mentioned in the Written Torah. As they reached the requisite level of psychological and intellectual maturity, they would be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba, which would click into its proper intellectual place as a truth about reality, rather than as a motivator for avodah. In this manner, they would bypass the stage of being motivated by a fantasy notion of Olam ha’Ba altogether. 

Ultimately, we cannot know why Hashem chose not to mention Olam ha’Ba explicitly in His lists of rewards, but these eight theories allow us to appreciate the fact that this was done with reason, and with wisdom. 

[1] This is a general remark, but I might as well mention it here. The line between Rishonim and Achronim is a matter of debate. Some distinguish between the two periods based on dates (e.g. the Rishonim are those who wrote in the 11th century to the 15th century, and the Achronim are post-15th century) or by specifying a cutoff point (e.g. all commentators who came before the composition of the Shulchan Aruch were Rishonim, and all who came after are Achronim). Personally, I don’t like either of these approaches. I prefer to define the two groups by their time period AND their relationship to their predecessors and/or their style. For example, I classify the Abravanel (1437 – 1508) as a Rishon because he argues with his predecessors as a contemporary, rather than a disciple. I classify the Sforno (1475 – 1550) as a Rishon because of his commentary’s style and commentary. 

[2] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 26:3 

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1); Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 9 

[4] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer Devarim 32:39; it should be noted that the Ibn Ezra’s answer to this question parallels his answer to R’ Yehuda ha’Levi’s question on the first of the Aseres ha’Dibros: Why does Hashem introduce Himself to the Jewish people by saying “Who took you out from the land of Egypt” instead of “Who created the heavens and the earth”? See the Ibn Ezra’s long commentary on Shemos 20:2. 

[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 18:29 

[6] Sefer ha’Chinuch: Introduction. The Abravanel doesn’t actually quote the Sefer ha’Chinuch with reference to this view, but since it was the first place I encountered it in my own learning, and since the Sefer ha’Chinuch expands upon this view even more than the Ramban, I decided to attribute this view to him in my list. Moreover, the Abravanel attributes this view to “Rabbeinu Bachya ha’Zaken, as mentioned by the Ibn Ezra” but according to the Warsaw manuscript and H. Norman Strickman, the name mentioned by the Ibn Ezra is actually “Rabbeinu Hai.” This possible misattribution is yet another reason why I opted to label this under the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s name. 

[7] According to the Ramban, as the Abravanel himself points out. 

[8] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran #1 

[9] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi (Kuzari) 1:104-117 

[10] Rabbeinu Saadia Gaon, Emunos v’Deos 9:2 

[11] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi 1:115 

[12] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran, end of #3 

[13] The Abravanel credits the Ramban for this approach, based on the latter’s Commentary on Sefer Devarim 29:20; he also cites the Sefer ha’Ikkarim 4:40, chastising him for citing this answer in his own name rather than in the name of the Ramban. 

[14] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 10:1-2 

[15] ibid. 8:1 

[16] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1) 

[17] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 8:6 

[18] Ibid. 10:5

Rambam: On Lishmah and she'Lo Lishmah

I started writing a blog post about doing mitzvos lishmah (for their own sake) and she'lo lishmah (not for their own sake), and was shocked to discover that I haven't yet posted a translation of the Rambam's discourse on this topic anywhere on my blog. I decided to rectify that by posting my translation without any commentary, since it is something that every student of Torah should read. The paragraph divisions are my own.

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Artwork: Frantic Search, by Mitchell Malloy

Rambam: On Lishmah and she'Lo Lishmah

You, the thoughtful reader, should contemplate the following parable which I will present to you, and then pay attention to understand my words on this entire topic. 

A young child is brought to an educator to learn Torah. This is a tremendous good for him, because of the perfection he will attain from it. However, due to his young age and the deficiency of his mind, he will not understand the value of that good, nor [will he understand the value] of the perfection he will gain. Thus, necessity compels the teacher – who is more perfected than the child – to motivate him to learn by using something which is beloved to him, because of his young age. [The teacher] will say, “Learn and I will give you nuts and figs!” or “I will give you a piece of candy!” Then the student will learn and strive not for the learning itself, whose value he doesn’t know, but in order to attain that piece of food. The eating of that food is more important to him and more beneficial [from his perspective], without a doubt. Therefore, he will consider the learning to be a toil and exertion which he must work at in order to attain that desirable objective – that single nut or piece of candy. 

When the child grows and his intellect is strengthened, and that thing which he used to value becomes less important in his eyes and he goes go on to value other things, we motivate him with that which is even more important in his eyes. The teacher will say to him, “Learn and I will buy these fancy shoes for you” or “an article of clothing with such-and-such an appearance.” Then he will strive not for the learning itself, but for that article of clothing, because that article of clothing will be more valuable to him than the learning, and it will be the objective of the learning. 

When his mind becomes more perfected and that thing becomes less significant in his eyes, we motivate him with something greater than this. His teacher will say to him, “Learn this section or this chapter and I will give you a dollar or two.” Then he will learn and strive in order to earn that money, and the earning of that money will be more significant to him than the learning, for the purpose of learning – to him, at this time – is the earning of the money that was promised to him. 

When he becomes more cognizant and this thing [he once valued] becomes less significant in his eyes and he knows that it is a thing of inferior worth, we motivate him with something that is more important to him. We say to him, “Learn in order to become a rabbi and a judge. People will honor you; they will stand up in your presence; your words will be established and your reputation will grow during your lifetime and after your death, like so-and-so.” Then he will learn and strive in order to achieve that level of distinction, and the ultimate objective – to him – will be that people should honor him, exalt him, and praise him. 

All of this is despicable – yet, it is necessary for us, due to the deficiency of the human psyche (or mind), which causes him to make the purpose of learning something other than the learning [itself]. He will say, “Why should I learn this?” – only in order to achieve something which, in truth, is but a fantasy. This is what the Sages referred to as she’lo lishmah (lit. “not for its own sake”). In other words, he fulfills the mitzvos and does them and learns and strives not for the sake of that thing itself, but for the sake of something else. The Sages (peace be upon them) cautioned us, saying, “Do not make them (i.e. matters of Torah) a crown through which to glorify yourself, nor an axe to chop with” (Avos 4:5). They are alluding to that which I have explained to you, that one should not make the purpose of his learning that people should honor him, nor the acquisition of wealth, nor should he make Hashem’s Torah into a livelihood. 

The purpose of his learning should be nothing other than knowledge itself; likewise, the only purpose of truth is to know that it is true; the mitzvos are true, and therefore, their purpose is their fulfillment. It is prohibited for a perfected person to say, “If I do these good things and if I refrain from these bad things which Hashem prohibited to me, what will be my reward?” For this is like what the child says: “If I learn, what will I be given?” And they say to him, “Such-and-such a thing,” for when we see the deficiency of his mind – that he doesn’t understand the value of this thing, and he seeks out a purpose for the purpose – we answer him in accordance with the degree of his foolishness, [as it is stated,] “answer a fool according to his foolishness” (Mishlei 26:5). 

The Sages already warned us about this – namely, that a person shouldn’t make the purpose of his avodah (service) and his fulfillment of the mitzvos any of these things – in the statement of the pious man who grasped the truth, Antignos of Socho: “Do not be like servants who serve the master with the intention of receiving a prize; rather, be like servants who serve their master with the intention not to receive a prize.” By this they mean that one should believe in truth for the sake of the truth itself. This is what [the Sages] referred to as “oved me’ahavah” (“one who serves out of love”). They said, “he desires His mitzvos exceedingly” (Tehilim 112:1). R’ Elazar said: “His mitzvos” and not “the reward of His mitzvos” (Avodah Zarah 19a). How great is this proof and how clear it is, for this is a clear proof to our preceding words! Even greater than this is the statement of the Sages in Sifrei: “Perhaps a person will say, ‘I will learn Torah so that I can become rich’ or ‘so that I will be called “rebbi”’ or ‘so that I will receive reward in the World to Come’ – but the pasuk says, ‘to love Hashem, your God’; everything you do, you should only do out of love” (Eikev: Devarim 11:13). 

It has been explained and made clear that this is the goal of the mitzvos and the foundation of our Sages’ belief. The only person who will be oblivious to this is a fool and a naïve simpleton who has already been corrupted by crazy, fantastical, imaginary and degenerate notions. This [high level of lishmah] is the level of Avraham Avinu, who was oved me’ahavah (Sotah 31a), and this is the path which we are obligated to strive for. 

But the Sages (of blessed memory) knew that this was a very difficult concept which not every person can grasp. Even if he does grasp it, it will not seem correct at first glance, and it will not seem like a true opinion, since man’s nature is to not do an action unless it will bring him some benefit or enable him to avoid some harm, and if it does neither of these, then the act would be pointless. How is it possible to say to a Torah-observant Jew, “Do these actions and don’t do these,” not out of fear of Hashem’s punishment and not out of a hope for reward? This is very difficult, for not all people grasp the truth and will be like Avraham Avinu. 

Therefore, they permitted the masses to remain in accordance with their mentality, to do the good out of hope for reward and to avoid the bad out of fear of punishment. They encouraged them in this, and strengthened their thoughts about it, until the apprehender apprehends and knows the truth and knows what the perfected path is – just like the youth at the time of learning, according to the aforementioned analogy. They were critical of Antignos of Socho for publicizing among the masses what he publicized, saying, “Sages – be careful with your words! etc.” as we explained in Avos. The masses do not lose out completely by fulfilling the mitzvos out of fear of reward and hope of punishment; they are just not perfected. But it is better for them to do this in order for them to acquire the disposition and preparation for fulfilling Torah, so that they will [eventually] move on to the truth and serve out of love. This is what the Sages (of blessed memory) said: “A person should always be involved in Torah even she’lo lishmah, for from she’lo lishmah he will come to lishmah” (Sanhedrin 105b, Pesachim 50b, Nazir 23b, Sotah 22b and 47a, Horiyos 10b, Erachin 16b).

Tehilim 92: Mizmor Shir l'Yom ha'Shabbos

Although this can be read as a standalone post, I highly recommend reading my How to Learn Tehilim (Psalms) post first, in order to familiarize yourself with the methodology I'll be using.

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Artwork: Wildest Dreams, by Daniel Ljunggren

Tehilim 92: Mizmor Shir l'Yom ha'Shabbos

Here is the text of Tehilim 92:

Tehilim 92 

(1) A psalm, a song for the Sabbath day. (2) It is good to thank Hashem and to sing to Your Name, O Exalted One; (3) to recount Your kindness in the morning, and Your faithfulness in the nights. (4) Upon a ten-stringed instrument and upon lyre, with singing [accompanied] by harp. (5) For You have gladdened me, Hashem, with Your actions; about Your handiwork I will sing joyously. (6) How great are Your works, Hashem; [how] very deep are Your thoughts - (7) a boorish man doesn’t know, and a fool doesn’t understand this - (8) when the wicked bloom like grass, and all the doers of iniquity blossom, it is to destroy them forever and ever. (9) But You [remain] exalted forever, Hashem. (10) For behold Your enemies, Hashem, for behold – Your enemies shall perish; dispersed shall be all doers of iniquity. (11) You raised like a re’eim my pride; I was saturated with fresh oil. (12) My eyes have seen my foes; when those who would harm me rise up my ears have heard. (13) A righteous person will flourish like a date palm, and like a cedar in the Lebanon he will grow tall. (14) Planted in the house of Hashem, in the courtyards of our God they will flourish. (15) They will still be fruitful in old age, vigorous and fresh they will be, (16) to tell that Hashem is upright, my Rock in Whom there is no injustice.

Let's review our basic method. The four questions we're going to try to answer are:

(1) What is this perek about as a whole? What is the main idea? What major insight is this teaching us about Hashem and His relationship to His world - or how He relates to man, in particular?

(2) What is being said in detail, and how? How does each pasuk - or each word and phrase - contribute to the main idea?

(3) Is this perek true, in whole or in part? Remember: it's not enough to know what David ha'Melech thought, nor is it enough to accept the truth of Tehilim based on the authority of Torah she'bi'Chsav (even though we have no choice but to start with this). We must strive to verify the contents of this perek to the satisfaction of our own minds. 

(4) What of it? What "inspiration via knowledge" is this perek written to bring about? How is the main idea in this perek supposed to affect your life, your view of reality, and your relationship with God? What else follows - what is further implied or suggested by the insights? What else can you do to internalize and be moved by these ideas? 

The only question we will not attempt to fully answer is Question #2, since I specifically want to avoid getting too bogged down in details, as I wrote about in my methodology article.

Question #1: What is this perek about as a whole?

According to our methodology, the first step is to find "the pivot point." In this case, the pivot point is obviously verse 7: "a boorish man doesn’t know, and a fool doesn’t understand this." This is a unique type of pivot point in that it can be read with either half of the perek. [1] If read with the first half, it will look like this:

A psalm, a song for the Sabbath day. It is good to thank Hashem and to sing to Your Name, O Exalted One; to recount Your kindness in the morning, and Your faithfulness in the nights. Upon a ten-stringed instrument and upon lyre, with singing [accompanied] by harp. For You have gladdened me, Hashem, with Your actions; about Your handiwork I will sing joyously. How great are Your works, Hashem; [how] very deep are Your thoughts! A boorish man doesn’t know [how great Your works are], and a fool doesn’t understand [how very deep are Your thoughts].

If read in accordance with the second half, it will look like this:

A boorish man doesn’t know, and a fool doesn’t understand [the following phenomenon]: when the wicked bloom like grass, and all the doers of iniquity blossom, it is to destroy them forever and ever. But You [remain] exalted forever, Hashem. For behold Your enemies, Hashem, for behold – Your enemies shall perish; dispersed shall be all doers of iniquity. You raised like a re’eim my pride; I was saturated with fresh oil. My eyes have seen my foes; when those who would harm me rise up my ears have heard. A righteous person will flourish like a date palm, and like a cedar in the Lebanon he will grow tall. Planted in the house of Hashem, in the courtyards of our God they will flourish. They will still be fruitful in old age, vigorous and fresh they will be, to tell that Hashem is upright, my Rock in Whom there is no injustice.

Now that we've discovered the pivot point, the four sub-questions we must answer under the heading of Question #1 are: (a) What is the main idea of the first half? (b) What is the main idea of the second half? (c) What is the unified idea (i.e. the main idea of the perek)? (d) What is the purpose or function of the pivot point? 

In this case, I believe we can answer all four sub-questions in one shot. Here is my summary of the main idea in four sentences:

The purpose of this perek is to answer the question of how the wicked are able to flourish in a world governed by Divine justice.[2] David ha'Melech's answer is that the only person who will be bothered by this question is the foolish, boorish man who doesn't comprehend the perfection, harmony, and depth of God's wisdom in nature. To the extent that a person recognizes how all natural systems operate in accordance with perfect justice - with every component perfectly suited to achieve its end, and each species receiving exactly what it needs for the continuity of the system as a whole - he or she will also recognize that there must be a similarly perfect system which governs human beings; just as there will inevitably be destructive consequences for interfering in a natural system, so too, there will be destructive consequences for those who deviate from the Creator's laws which govern human interactions. True, the wicked may flourish, but their success is short lived, like lowly grasses that quickly wither and die, whereas the righteous flourish like date palms and cedars - tall, long-lasting, and bearing fruit into their old age. 

This answers all of the sub-questions under Question #1: (a) the main idea of the first half is that nature is absolutely perfect and reflects the profound wisdom of the Creator in its lawful design; (b) the main idea of the second half is that the flourishing of the wicked is only temporary and is destined to end in destruction, whereas the flourishing of the righteous is the opposite; (c) the unity in the perek is that the human realm is merely a special case of the general character of the universe as a whole, and operates in accordance with the same principles, the same perfection, and the same justice; (d) the function of the pivot is to bring us to the realization that the key to seeing the justice in the human sphere is to recognize the justice in the natural world, and that to the extent that one recognition is lacking, so will the other. 

Question #2: What is being said in detail, and how?

As I said, I'm not going to go into this part in depth. I'll just write a few brief comments on each pasuk or two in order to give you an idea of how deep and how not deep I like to go when answering Question #2:

(1) Shabbos embodies the main idea of this perek since it is a day devoted to both objectives: recognizing God's wisdom in nature (zeicher l'Maaseh Bereishis - remembering the Act of Creation) and His justice in the human realm (zeicher l'Yetzias Mitzrayim - remembering the Exodus from Egypt). Moreover, Shabbos affords us the opportunity to re-calibrate ourselves to the Maaseh Bereishis framework, since the issur melachah (prohibition of creative work on Shabbos) forces us to withdraw our energies from striving to dominate the material world and to invest that energy in the contemplation of Hashem's reign over the natural world.

(2) Hodaah (giving thanks) and zemirah (singing praise) are two vehicles of achieving the recognition that is central in this perek; David refers to Hashem as "the Exalted One" to emphasize His transcendent supervision of the physical universe.

(3) "your chesed (kindness)" refers to the totality of the Creator's beneficence in nature, as it is stated: "the world was built with chesed" (Tehilim 89:3), and "your  emunah (faithfulness)" refers to the reliability of Hashem's hashgachah klalis (laws of nature); David describes himself as engaging in this praise "morning" and "night" to emphasize the infinite depth and breadth of Hashem's chesed and emunah in the universe, saying that in order to express his recognition, he would have to be involved in praise all day and all night.

(4) Who knows what the significance of the "ten-string instrument," "lyre," and "harp" are? Who even knows what these instruments were? As far as I'm concerned, trying to explain these details would be pure speculation, and the answer isn't going to have any bearing on the main idea anyway. 

(5) David is pointing out yet another benefit of contemplating Hashem's works: not only does this answer the question of how the wicked can flourish, but it is also an enjoyable activity in and of itself!

(6) and (7) we explained in our summary of the main idea.

(8) "it is to destroy them forever and ever" implies that there are two types of destruction that the wicked will suffer: the natural consequences of their lifestyle in Olam ha'Zeh, and the consequences to their soul in Olam ha'Ba.

(9) see my comments on (2).

(11) and (12) contain David's testimony about how he has seen the truth of this perek play out in his own lifetime; in addition to encouraging the reader to check out this claim by examining the events of David's life, this also provides an important piece of advice, namely, that a person should look for evidence of this in his own observations of the wicked and the righteous.

(13) In addition to the general idea that the righteous will succeed, I believe that the "flourishing plants" metaphor also suggests that the righteous person's success goes hand in hand with his development as a tzelem Elokim; plants are a perfect mashal for this, since we associate plants with natural growth and development. 

(14) It is unclear to me whether "house of Hashem" and "courtyards of Hashem" are references to the Beis ha'Mikdash (the Sanctuary) - and, by extension, Batei Kenesiyos (synagogues) and Batei Midrashos (study halls) - or whether they are a reference to the universe as a whole. [3] Either way, the idea is that by aligning oneself with the lawfulness which governs the human realm and seeking to comprehend the lawfulness in nature, a person will, in effect, be "planted" (i.e. permanently established in a manner which provides sustenance and continued growth) as a component part of the system of the universe - in contrast to the wicked, who seek to detach themselves from the system in a futile attempt to dominate it. 

(15) The lifestyle of the righteous as portrayed here will result in a prolonged and enhanced old age, in which the person's tzelem Elokim and righteous actions will continue to bear fruit - as I wrote about in my article On Aging: With (and Without) Torah.

(16) In a very "ecosystem-esque" manner, the righteous who live in this manner will, through their words and their actions, pass on their worldview to the next generation of mankind, thereby moving others to recognize the benefits of praising the Creator.

This is a good example of the level at which I like to answer Question #2. My goal is to be able to read the perek and see how most of the words and phrases contribute to or reflect the main idea. I'm not trying to get everything.

Question #3: Is this perek true, in whole or in part?

Personally, this perek didn't raise any questions of veracity to me. However, if I taught this in school, I would have to be prepared to demonstrate the truth of the following three claims:

1. that nature exhibits profound wisdom and perfection
2. that the success of the wicked is only temporary, and is destined to end in destruction
3. that tzadikim will flourish and enjoy a long life 

Originally I was going to write out how I would go about doing that, but I think this would take us beyond the scale of this blog post. Suffice it to say: watch nature documentaries for #1, and learn Mishlei, for #2 and #3.

Question #4: What of it?

What function does this serve in our avodas Hashem? I think the answer is clear from the perek: whenever we see the wicked flourishing and we feel troubled, we need look no further than the natural world around us. The more we recognize the absolute justice and benevolent functionality of nature, the more we can rest assured that the wicked will get what they deserve, no matter how successful they appear at the present. 

Similarly, if we are in doubt as to whether following the laws of the Torah will result in the best life for ourselves and for society as a whole, all we have to do is contemplate any ecosystem in nature. Each organism is cared for by Hashem's hashgachah klalis, and everything exists in peace and harmony. The same is within the reach of human beings, if only we align ourselves with the will of our Creator.

Concluding Thoughts

I hope this walk-through of Tehilim 92 has been beneficial in its own right, and in familiarizing you with our method of learning Tehilim. I plan on writing a post on Tehilim 23 in the near future, and possibly more later on in the summer. I'd love to hear your feedback! 

[1] Rabbeinu David Kimchi (Radak), Commentary on Sefer Tehilim 92:7

[2] Note that this is specifically an answer to the question of why the wicked flourish, in a general sense, but this is NOT an answer to the specific problem of tzadik v'ra lo (how can bad things happen to a righteous person) which is addressed in Sefer Iyov.

[3] see, for example the Rambam's explanation of Hashem's praise of Moshe as "the most trustworthy in My house" (Bamidbar 12:7) in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim 1:54.

Parashas Re'eh: When Mitzvos Are Curses

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Artwork: Cursed Scroll, by D. Alexander Gregory

Parashas Re'eh: When Mitzvos Are Curses

Vegan Tefillin

A few weeks ago I came across a post on a Jewish Facebook group by a woman inquiring whether there is an option to use "vegan tefillin" (i.e. tefillin made from non-animal products). When asked what prompted her question, she responded: "How could I wear the skin of a dead animal?! The thought of leather tefillin absolutely disgusts me! I'd only put on tefillin if I could find a vegan version." 

There are many things to discuss here - too many for a single post. I'm only going to focus on one angle: this woman's disgust at the thought of mitzvas tefillin k'hilchesa (i.e. the mitzvah of tefillin as defined by halacha).

Disgusted by Mitzvos

The first thing I associated to was one of the opening pesukim of the tochahah (Rebuke) in Parashas Bechukosai: "if you are disgusted by My decrees, and if your very being is repulsed by My ordinances, so as not to perform all My commandments, so that you annul My covenant - then I will do the same to you etc." (Vayikra 26:15-16). If a person is "disgusted" and "repulsed" by the mitzvos - sentiments which this person on Facebook openly expressed about the mitzvah of tefillin - then Hashem will be "disgusted" and "repulsed" by that person. 

What does it mean for Hashem to be "disgusted" by someone? And why is this the "punishment" for being disgusted by Hashem's decrees and ordinances? The Sefer ha'Chinuch [1] addresses both points in his commentary on the Chumash's use of the term "abomination":

[The Torah states:] "and you shall do none of these abominations" (Vayikra 18:26); this includes all these matters which are an abomination to Hashem, meaning that anyone who engages in these activities becomes distanced from the good and removes himself from Hashem's providence. This is the meaning of "abomination to God" in every instance, according to what I have heard.  

So likewise, what is written at the end of the matter: "for all these abominations the men of the land did who were before you and I abhorred them" (ibid. 20:23). Its sense is to convey that the quality is most ugly; every unusually bad and repulsive thing, Scripture describes as though Hashem detests it, all along the lines that we have stated, and in the vein of what the Sages of blessed memory said in every instance: in order to convey intelligibly to the ear what it is able to hear. 

According to the Sefer ha'Chinuch, when the Torah calls something "an abomination," this means that a person who engages in this behavior is "distancing himself from the good and removing himself from Hashem's providence." Just as a person distances himself from that which he finds repulsive, so too, Hashem "distances Himself" from those who do actions which He regards as "abominations."

To have difficulties and struggles with keeping a mitzvah is natural (for everyone except Moshe Rabbeinu). It is even natural to feel "disgusted" by certain mitzvos. But if a person embraces this disgust to the point where he or she modifies, neglects, or delegitimizes the mitzvos, then this person has actively chosen to distance himself or herself from Hashem's beneficence. In other words, Hashem's statement "then I will do the same to you" should not be understood as a retaliatory "tit for tat" punishment, but as a natural consequence of this person's free-will decision.

Mitzvos as Curses

This week I came across an idea which took this insight even further. The idea is from the Abravanel's commentary on the first pasuk in our parashah, which reads:

See, I place before you today a blessing and a curse. The blessing: that you hearken to the commandments of Hashem, your God, that I command you today. And the curse: if you do not hearken to the commandments of Hashem, your God, and you stray from the path that I command you today, to follow other gods, that you did not know. (Devarim 11:26-28).

Rashi [2] understands the "blessing and curse" in our pasuk to be referring to the blessings and curses on Har Gerizim and Har Eival, which are stated much later on in Parashas Ki Savo (Devarim 27:11-26). His interpretation is based on the fact that the very next pasuk states:

It shall be that when Hashem, your God, brings you to the Land to which you come, to possess it, then you shall deliver the blessing on Har Gerizim and the curse on Har Eival. (ibid. 11:29).

The Abravanel [3] challenges Rashi on this matter, based on the following argument:

[Moshe] stated here: "See, I place before you today a blessing and a curse." He did not say this about the blessings and curses that were given on Har Gerizim and Har Eival; since [those blessings and curses] were not given "today," how could  he say "that I  place before you today"? 

The Abravanel then gives a creative and convincing interpretation:

Rather, Moshe stated that these mitzvos which he gave before them today would be as if he presented them with a blessing and a curse.  

How could the same thing be a blessing and a curse, which are two opposite, contradictory things ...? Namely, [the mitzvos] will be a blessing if [Bnei Yisrael] hearken to them, but they will be a curse to the person who doesn't hearken to them. For even though the mitzvos are good in and of themselves, they [differ] depending on the recipient: sometimes they are a blessing, if they are hearkened to, and sometimes they are a curse, for when they are not fulfilled, they will be for them like a snare and a curse. 

This is in line with what the navi (prophet) said: "for the ways of Hashem are upright: tzadikim (the righteous) walk in them, but posh'im (sinners) stumble in them" (Hoshea 14:10). In other words, they themselves are upright and good; however, on account of the recipients, they can be either good and proper to follow from the standpoint of the tzadikim, but from the standpoint of the sinners they are regarded as a bad path of stumbling. 

This type of thing also happens with good food, like bread, meat, and wine: they are beneficial forms of nutrition in and of themselves, and when a healthy man takes them, he will be sustained, and strengthened, and his health will increase; however, if a sick man [4] takes them, they will harm him or even kill him - not because of the nature of the food, but because of the nature and corruption of the recipient. 

In this vein, [Moshe] said to all of Klal Yisrael - or to each and every one of them, according to the Ibn Ezra - "See, I place before you etc." This means to say: "See through the eyes of your intellect that I am placing before you etc." - not that this blessing and curse is verbal [such that it would be "heard" rather than "seen"], but rather, [both the blessing and curse] potentially exist in the mitzvos, and either blessing or curse can proceed from them, without any in-between state. For if "you hearken to the mitzvos of Hashem, your God, that I command you etc." then I have given you a blessing, for they are good in and of themselves, and they will be a blessing for you - but if you don't hearken to them, they will be considered a curse for you. It is in this sense that I have placed a blessing and curse before you today, in that I have given the mitzvos, which will be a blessing or a curse depending on the recipient. 

This is why [Moshe] made this statement before reminding [Bnei Yisrael] of the mitzvos [throughout the next four parshiyos]. He even said at the end [after reviewing all of these mitzvos]: "See - I have placed before you today the life and the good, and the death and the bad" (Devarim 30:15), and he explained how He has given them these things by saying: "to keep His commandments" (ibid. 30:16) - for by commanding them He has given them "the life and the good" if they hearken to them, but "the death and the bad" if they do not hearken to them and do not observe them. 

The Abravanel's interpretation flows directly from a literal reading of our pesukim: "See, I place before you today a blessing and a curse. The blessing: that you hearken to the commandments of Hashem, your God, that I command you today. And the curse: if you do not hearken to the commandments of Hashem." Hearkening to the mitzvos is the blessing - both the cause and the effect. Not hearkening to the mitzvos is the cause and the effect of the curse.

The first instance in Chumash of the mitzvos being a blessing to those who keep them and a curse to those who don't keep them is the very first sin: Adam and Chava eating the fruit of the Eitz ha'Daas Tov v'Ra (Tree of Knowledge of Good and Bad). Hashem commanded them not to eat from this tree for their own benefit: "for on the day you eat from it, you shall surely die" (Bereishis 2:17). But once the nachash (snake) talked its way into Chava's head, she began to view this mitzvah as a curse rather than a blessing. She viewed this mitzvah as holding her back from the real good.

The nachash said to the woman: "You will not surely die, for God knows that on the day you eat from it, your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and bad." And the woman perceived that the tree was good for eating, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the three was desirable as a means to wisdom, etc. (ibid. 3:4-6).

The Rambam [5] explained that both the cause and effect of the sin of Adam and Chava was the fact that they gave in to the distorted world of subjective values, which tainted their perception of objective truth and falsehood and objective good and bad. (For a detailed explanation, see this post. Also, for the record, I think that the Abravanel's insight sheds light on the curses which resulted from the sin of Adam and Chava ... but that would take us beyond the scope of this post.)

This "warped view of good and bad" is the basis of the blessing and curse in our pasuk, as explained by the Abravanel. To the extent that we set aside our personal, subjective, flawed notions of "the good" and "the bad" and allow ourselves to be shaped by our adherence to the system of Torah, we will move towards an increasingly accurate view of objective reality. We will then be able to recognize the inherent good of the mitzvos, and will regard them as "a blessing," and will actually receive the blessings (i.e. the increase of objective good) that result from their observance.

But to the extent that we cling to our preconceived notions of "the good" and "the bad" and allow our personal value system to compromise our adherence to Torah, we will be held back from clarity and knowledge of objective reality. We will then perceive the the mitzvos as "a curse" and will actually be cursed (i.e. suffer harmful consequences, both objectively and in accordance with our subjective value system) when we neglect their observance.

The Emptiness Comes from Within

To the woman who insisted on only using "vegan tefillin," Moshe Rabbeinu (according to the Abravanel) might offer guidance along the following lines: "I understand and sympathize with your feeling that the use of animal leather in tefillin is inhumane and immoral. However, the fact that the Creator requires tefillin to be made from leather means that He does not share your view - and since His view is objective reality, then there must be some flaw in your thinking. I encourage you to learn from Torah she'bi'Chsav (the Written Torah) and Torah she'baal Peh (the Oral Torah) to try to understand wherein lies your error. Yes, this does mean that you will have to give up your personal view, but if you succeed in arriving at a true understanding, you will come to recognize that all of the mitzvos - including tefillin - are 'for your benefit' (Devarim 10:13), and you will then regard them as 'a blessing' and they will be a blessing."

Chazal midrashically express this approach by expounding on the pasuk: "for [the Torah] is not an empty thing for you (lit. "from you"), for it is your life, and through this matter shall you prolong your days on the Land to which you cross the Jordan, to possess it" (ibid. 32:47). The midrash (Yerushalmi Peah 1:1) states:

"for [the Torah] is not an empty thing from you (ki lo davar reik hu mi'kem)" - and if you find it to be "an empty thing" (davar reik), then it is "from you" (mi'kem hu).

It is natural to perceive "emptiness" (or "deficiencies") in Torah. The question is: Where do we go with this perception? If we regard our own views as the objective reality and conclude that the Torah is flawed, then we are mistaken. Rather, we must recognize that the perceived flaw stems from our own ignorance, and we must search for a true understanding which reveals the holes in our thinking.

To the uninitiated this might sound like a form of intellectually dishonest religious apologetics, but to those who understand the relationship between science and Torah and the place of the proof of Torah mi'Sinai, this is no different than the scientist who must set aside his or her personal opinion in light of the empirical data. Just as we wouldn't accuse the scientist of "apologetics" for subordinating his or her personal opinion to the scientific data, so too, we shouldn't consider it to be "apologetics" when subordinating our personal opinion to the data of Torah she'bi'Chsav and Torah she'baal Peh.

I feel like this post should end with a conclusive "takeaway" message. In that spirit, I would say the following: we all want to be "blessed" by Hashem, and we know that according to the Torah, observance of mitzvos results in "blessing" - but what Moshe Rabbeinu intends to teach us (according to the Abravanel) is that the mitzvos are the blessing. Hence, it's not as though we do the mitzvos and have faith that Hashem will bless us. Rather, by doing the mitzvos, we are guaranteed to receive the blessings which are inextricably bound up in the mitzvos themselves.

Nobody said it better than the Malbim [6] in his commentary on Iyov (which I wrote about in these posts). We will conclude with his analogy:

This may be compared to the following: an ill patient doesn't seek out a reward from his physician [in payment] for obeying his instructions to safeguard his health, nor does the physician punish the patient if he fails to heed his warnings, for the reward and punishment are consequent upon the action itself. If he obeys [the physician’s instructions], he will be healed from his sickness, and that is his reward. If he doesn't obey, he will die, and that is his punishment. [This reward and punishment are not meted out] by the physician, but by [the patient] himself.  

Similarly, the reward [for good actions] is the good path itself, since he acquires perfection of his soul [by following it]; and if he does good for others, he will enjoy benefits from the society [in which he lives]. Conversely, “one who does evil corrupts his soul and his flesh” (Mishlei 11:17), and if he does evil to others, he will suffer from the wickedness of the society. 

If we want Hashem's blessings, then we must see that He has placed them before us, today, in every mitzvah we observe.

[1] Sefer ha'Chinuch, Mitzvah #118
[2] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Devarim 27:11
[3] Don Yitzchak Abravanel ("The Man"), Commentary on Sefer Devarim 27:11
[4] The Abravanel here specifies two types of sickness: "מחלת הצד" and "מחלת המוקדח", but since I wasn't sure which sicknesses he was referring to, I omitted them from my translation.
[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 1:2
[6] Ha'Rav Meir Leibush ben Yechiel Michel Wisser (Malbim), Commentary on Sefer Iyov 35:8

Parashas Eikev: What is Yiras Hashem (Fear of God)?

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Artwork: Oveverwhelming Splendor, by Richard Wright.
The question: Does the fear depicted in this artwork have anything to do with yiras Hashem?

Parashas Eikev: What is Yiras Hashem (Fear of God)?

Only Yirah

This week's parashah contains of the many "fundamentals of Judaism" pesukim in Sefer Devarim. Moshe Rabbeinu declares: 

"Now, O Israel, what does Hashem, your God, ask of you? Only to fear Hashem, your God, to go in all His ways, and to love Him, and to serve Hashem, your God, with all your heart and with all your soul, to observe the commandments of Hashem and His decrees, which I command you today, for your benefit." (Devarim 10:12-13)

Chazal (Talmud Bavli Berachos 33b) are astonished by Moshe's use of the word "only" asking: "Is fear of heaven a small matter?!" They answer: "Yes - for Moshe it was a small matter. This may be compared to [the following case:] if a man is asked for a big item and he has it, then it seems like a small item to him, but if he is asked for a small item and he doesn't have it, then it seems like a big item to him." 

According to Chazal, Moshe's statement was difficult. According to the meforshim (commentators), Chazal's answer is difficult. And every time I've taken up this topic with my chavrusas, it's proven to be difficult.

This week, however, I stumbled upon a 10-page analysis by the Abvravanel [1] of the topic of yiras Hashem in his commentary on our parashah. The Abravanel paraphrases the view of his predecessors (i.e. the Ran and the Rambam), states his objections to it, then offers his own view. His presentation is so valuable that I decided to write a "Set Table" style dvar Torah, with a walk-through of his analysis.

Ordinarily my practice on this blog is to translate and incorporate as many firsthand sources as possible into my treatment of the material. In this case, for the sake of brevity, I will summarize rather than translate - with only a few direct quotations/translations. 

The View of the Ran (and the Rambam - according to the Abravanel [2])

The Ran [3] begins by explaining that there are two types of yirah, in general (i.e. not specifically in relation to Hashem). 

The first type of yirah he defines as "a withdrawal of the soul and a mobilizing of its faculties when it senses something intimidating." In English we refer to this emotion as "fear." We experience this "yirah of fear" when faced with anything that we perceive to be a threat of any kind. The Ran explains that this type of yirah stems from the "animalistic soul" (nefesh ha'chiyunis) and can therefore be found in many animals as well (e.g. the fear felt by a lamb upon seeing a wolf). Examples of this "yirah of fear" in Tanach include: "Rescue me, please, from the hand of my brother, from the hand of Eisav, for I fear him lest he come and strike me down, mother and children" (Bereishis 32:12) and "for I was afraid to say, 'This is my wife,' lest they kill me" (ibid. 26:7).

In contrast, the second type of yirah is a product of the intellect (seichel) and stems from the recognition of something or someone that is exceedingly great. In English we refer to this emotion as "awe." Examples of this "yirah of awe" include: "Why were you not afraid (i.e. sufficiently awed) to speak against My servant, Moshe?" (Bamidbar 12:8) and "And [Yaakov] feared (i.e. was in awe) and said, 'How awesome is this place! This is none other than the abode of God, and this is the gate of the heavens!" (Bereishis 28:17) and "Let your fear (i.e. awe) of your teacher be like your fear of heaven" (Avos 4:12).

The Ran explains that both types of yirah can be found in relation to Hashem. Those people who are deficient (anashim chaseirim) are afraid of the punishments that are sent forth from Hashem. Those who are perfected (shleimim) have no such fear. Instead, they have an "intellectual awe of His exaltedness" (yirah sichlis l'romemuso), based on their comprehension of His creations and the lowly place of man in the totality of existence. 

The Rambam [4] provides a beautiful description of this "yirah of awe" in the Mishneh Torah. Since the Rambam maintains that the experience of ahavas Hashem (love of God) and yiras Hashem (fear of God) go hand in hand, and since we will revisit the topic of ahavas Hashem later in this blog post, I will quote his definitions of both yirah and ahavah here:

What is the way of loving and fearing God? When a person contemplates His great and wondrous works and creations and sees from them His infinite and incomparable wisdom, he immediately loves, praises, and extols and is filled with a great desire to know the Great Name, as David said, “My soul thirsts for God, for the living God” (Psalms 42:3). 

And when he reflects on these same principles in relation to himself, he immediately recoils back with fear and dread, and knows that he is a small, insignificant, unenlightened creature standing with a frail and puny mind in the presence of Perfect Knowledge, as David said, “[When I behold Your heavens, the work of Your fingers, the moon and stars that you have set in place, I exclaim,] ‘What is frail man that You should notice him, [and the son of mortal man that You should take note of him?’]” (Psalms 8:4-5).

Later on, the Rambam [5] writes another description of ahavah and yirah, from a slightly different angle:

When a person contemplates all of these things (i.e. all of the phenomena in the universe) and recognizes all of the creations – from angels, to celestial bodies, to man, etc. – and sees the wisdom of HaKadosh Baruch Hu in all of the forms and creations – his love for God will increase, his soul will thirst, and his flesh will yearn to love God; and he will be in fear and trepidation from his own lowliness, insignificance, and frailty when he compares himself to even one of these large, holy bodies – and certainly to one of the pure forms which are utterly separated from matter – and he will find himself to be like a vessel filled with shame and embarrassment, empty and lacking.

This is what the Ran means when he characterizes this yirah as "intellectual" awe: it will only be experienced by a person in proportion to his knowledge and understanding of God's wisdom as manifest in the universe. The Ran adds that this type of yirah will also have an effect on a person's actions: just as one would be ashamed to do something improper in front of a great person, although he doesn't fear any harm, so too, one who recognizes Hashem's greatness will feel ashamed to act contrary to His will. 

Having established these two types of yirah, the Ran returns to our pasuk and asks: Which type of yirah was Moshe Rabbeinu talking about when he said, "what does Hashem, your God, ask of you? Only to fear Hashem, your God etc."? Was Moshe referring to both types of yirah, or was he referring solely to the "yirah of awe"? 

On the surface, both answers present difficulties. If we assume that the yirah mentioned by Moshe includes the "yirah of fear," then there are two problems. The first is that this type of fear doesn't distinguish between between good and bad, true or false, just or unjust. The individual who operates based on this fear is simply responding to a threat, and doing whatever is necessary to avoid the perceived harm. For example, after witnessing Chur get killed by Bnei Yisrael (Shemos Rabbah 41:10), Aharon decided to build the Eigel ha'Zahav (Golden Calf); in other words, his fear led him him to do an aveirah (transgression), for which he was punished with death. [6] It is inconceivable that Hashem would demand a type of avodah which stems exclusively from the animalistic part of man, and doesn't even differentiate between good and bad.

The second problem stems from the aforementioned statement of Chazal, that this type of yirah was "a small thing for Moshe but a large thing for us." Is "yirah of fear" really such a "large thing" for us? Of course not! Even young children and animals have a basic fear of punishment. It would be absurd for Chazal to describe this type of primal fear as "a large thing" for us. 

On the other hand, if we assume that Moshe was only talking about the "yirah of awe," then we run into an even bigger problem: this type of yirah can only be found in the greatest chachamim (wise men) and neviim (prophets), who have reached such a superlative level of scientific knowledge. How could Moshe expect this level to be attained by the entire nation? Even Moshe, at the outset of his prophetic career, was praised for this type of yirah, as it is stated: "and Moshe concealed his face, for he was afraid to gaze at God" (Shemos 3:6). This shows that this was a "big thing" even for Moshe, at this point in his development. To expect all of Klal Yisrael to reach this level is unrealistic.

The Ran proposes a creative answer. He explains that Moshe was, indeed, referring exclusively to "yirah of awe." Why, then, did he describe this yirah as though it were easy and universally attainable? Because he was trying to make a point about the nature of this yirah. Since this yirah stems from the intellect, and since man's intellect naturally yearns for knowledge [6], then this type of yirah is actually an easy thing for the intellect - like walking up the stairs on an upwards escalator. This is what Moshe Rabbeinu was speaking about when he described yirah as "easy." In other words, we shouldn't think about love of learning as something foreign to our nature, which we must fight and work to instill within ourselves. Rather, as human beings, we naturally enjoy learning and seek knowledge.

However, we all have a major impediment which makes things difficult: our physicality, which includes our body, our psyche, and all of our drives, tendencies, and personality traits. The surest way to prevent our physicality from overcoming us and impeding our quest for yirah is to subdue it with threats of punishment - that is, by strategically employing the "yirah of fear" to control our inner animal. For this reason Moshe Rabbeinu follows up his discourse about the intellectual yirah with by reminding Klal Yisrael of the punishments that Hashem wrought in Egypt and in the Wilderness (see Devarim 11). 

Thus, the Ran holds that Moshe Rabbeinu's exhortation was designed to convey the full picture of how to develop yiras Hashem. On the one hand, yirah [of awe] is easy, since the mind of man naturally yearns for knowledge. On the other hand, yirah [of fear] is necessary to keep the animalistic part of man at bay, so that the rational soul can be properly nurtured to the point where it reigns supreme.

The Abravanel's Critiques of the Ran

I liked the Ran's approach quite a bit ... but the Abravanel doesn't. Not only does he disagree with the Ran's explanation of our pasuk and Chazal's commentary, but he even objects to the Ran's two types of yirah and maintains that they cannot be considered "yiras Hashem" in any sense, whatsoever!

The Abravanel begins with a critique of the Ran's explanation of our pasuk, saying that "the rav (i.e. the Ran) wanted to combine two types of yirah as both being necessary - on account of the intellect and physicality - to acquire success." He then explains that the two types of yirah as defined by the Ran are so fundamentally different that they cannot be subsumed under a single category, nor can they coexist within a single person. The "perfected person" will have no need for the "yirah of fear" and the "deficient person" will have no access to the "yirah of awe." 

[My chavrusa and I still feel that we aren't grasping the Abravanel's argument here. Didn't the Ran acknowledge the inherent differences between these two types of yirah? Didn't he explain that because man has an intellectual and an animalistic nature, both types of yirah are necessary? We figured that perhaps the Abravanel is objecting to the fact that Moshe speaks as though he is referring to one type of fear. If these two types of fear only differ quantitatively, and exist on a spectrum, it would be possible to say that he was referring to both types of yirah, and addressing both types of people. But since these types of yirah are qualitatively different, then they cannot be subsumed under Moshe's statement "only to fear Hashem." We're still working on this point.]

Next, the Abravanel dismantles the Ran theory that these two general types of yirah correspond to two levels of yiras Hashem. He explains that the "yirah of fear" cannot possibly have anything to do with Hashem, "since all avodah (service) towards Hashem in all matters must be directed by knowledge and understanding, which are activities of the intellect - whether the theoretical intellect or the practical intellect - but not from the animalistic soul." He explains that the animalistic soul is only affected by physical stimuli, but not by comprehension and intellection. For this reason, fear of Hashem's punishments should not be classified under "animalistic fear," since the former involves knowledge the intellect to some degree. 

Moreover, animalistic fear can't be considered "avodah" because it is really just a form of oneis (duress) and compulsion. As proof the Abravanel cites the midrash (Shabbos 88a) that Hashem held Har Sinai over Bnei Yisrael, saying: "If you accept the Torah - great! If not, this will be your grave," to which Chazal raise a difficulty: "From here we see a strong objection against [our obligation to keep] Torah!" Chazal respond to this difficulty by saying that the Jews accepted the Torah out of love during the days of Mordechai and Esther. Regardless of how we understand Chazal's answer, we see from their question that acceptance of the Torah under a threat which arouses animalistic fear (e.g. being crushed to death by a mountain) does not constitute a valid acceptance of Torah and mitzvos. How, then, could an animalistic fear be a valid form of avodas Hashem - one which Hashem actually desires? The Abravanel even goes so far as to say that doing mitzvos out of an animalistic fear doesn't even qualify as the type of avodah she'lo lishmah (divine service which is not for its own sake) which leads to lishmah (divine service for its own sake).

Next, the Abravanel argues that "yirah of awe" also cannot be what the Torah means by "yiras Hashem." First of all, this type yirah should really be called "chochmah" (wisdom) or "yediah" (knowledge), since - according to the Ran - the injunction to "fear Hashem" practically means "gain knowledge of Hashem's wondrous creations and a recognition of your own place in the universe." And if you'll say that it should be called "yirah" because of the emotional affect which emerges from this level of knowledge, it would be more fitting to call this "pliah" ("wonderment"), since the experience creates wonder but doesn't lead to "fear" in any sense. To the contrary, the more knowledge one has of Hashem's exaltedness and man's lowliness, the less yirah he has because he feels even more distant from Hashem. But the more he knows, the more pliah he experiences.

Furthermore, the term "yirah" in Tanach always implies action - not study or knowledge. In fact, the pasuk says: "Fear of Hashem is the beginning of wisdom, good intelligence to all their practitioners" (Tehilim 111:10), which implies that yiras Hashem is a precursor to wisdom - not the result of wisdom. Throughout all of Tanach "yirah" never refers to "advanced knowledge of the universe." 

Lastly, the experienced described by the Ran as "yirah of awe" would more aptly be described as "ahavah" (love) - but it is impossible to simultaneously love and fear someone, since love is a force of attraction and fear is a force of repulsion. And if the Ran is so comfortable saying that there are two categories of yiras Hashem (i.e. intellectual awe and animalistic fear of punishment) then why doesn't he also posit that there are two categories of ahavas Hashem (i.e. intellectual ahavah and animalistic desire for reward)? 

The Abravanel concludes is breakdown by saying that the Ran's view "is not dictated by intellectually straight thinking, nor is it warranted by the pesukim, nor can it be found in the words of Chazal." 

The Abravanel's View

The Abravanel now introduces a completely different paradigm for ahavas Hashem and yiras Hashem. He starts with the foundation of his entire view of avodas Hashem, ahavas Hashem, and yiras Hashem. Since this part is relatively concise, I will translate it instead of summarizing it:

Our avodas Hashem is proper and obligatory on account of the kindnesses which we have received from Him - the bringing into existence of creation and its preservation, as well as His love for our forefathers, His bringing us out from Egypt, His giving of the Torah, His [enabling us to] inherit the Land, and all of the other acts of goodness He did for us that are outside of the patterns of nature, as miracles, in accordance with His absolute will. 

Because of this beneficence which Hashem has done for us, we are obligated to love Him - and from this love, [we are obligated] to serve Him with all of our heart, and all of our soul. This is due to the fact that avodah and ahavah are two in name but one in existence, like the oneness of "potentiality" and "actuality." Ahavah towards Him is a potentiality that is found within the soul that is bound up in it, and avodah is the actualization of that ahavah. 

In addition to the ahavah which is proper towards Him in order to serve Him, man also must guard himself to the utmost degree from sinning before Him or provoking Him, for it would not be proper to have ingratitude to someone who bestowed such kindness and benefits. 

Thus, we have in relation to God an obligation of love, to do His avodah, as well as an obligation to guard ourselves and to be afraid of provoking Him. And there is nothing here that involves His exaltedness, or the wonders and and harmony of of His creations, such that one would need a high degree of understanding and wisdom beyond [a basic recognition] of His kindness in the creation and preservation of the universe, which every person knows. 

And in addition to the fact that this perspective [based on the creation and preservation of the universe] obligates us to love Him and fear Him, there is additional good reward for those who love Him and keep His mitzvos, for Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu will benefit them and give them reward for their love and their avodah. Likewise, their [additional] yirah and caution against sinning will save them from the harms and misfortunes of the world. 

To summarize: our obligation to serve, love, and fear Hashem all stem from our "indebtedness" (so to speak) to Him for all of the good He has done for us, both in creating and maintaining the universe and in the abundant goodness He has shown to our forefathers and our nation. This hakaras ha'tov (gratitude) is equally applicable and accessible to all people, regardless of their level of intelligence and comprehension of His works. No amount of knowledge will change the extent of our indebtedness. The chacham and the simpleton owe equal amounts of gratitude to Hashem for the benefits they have received. This is the Abravanel's view.

Before explaining Moshe's statement, the Abravanel directs our attention to the context in which our pasuk appears. In the pesukim leading up to our pasuk, Moshe reminds Bnei Yisrael of their many rebellions in the Wilderness - the worst of which was the Cheit ha'Eigel (Sin of the Golden Calf). The Abravanel explains what Hashem could have done, and what He actually did:

According to the strict letter of the law, even if Hashem forgave them and atoned for the incident of the Eigel, He could have increased upon them the yoke of Torah and mitzvos. This is what kings do with those who rebel against their service, namely, that even though they are forgiven for their sin and they return to their work, the king imposes upon them more laws than they previously had. But Hashem did not do this. He didn't increase the weight of their yoke, nor did he add even a single mitzvah. Instead, He only warned them that they should be exceedingly vigilant in guarding those mitzvos which He had already given them.

On the basis of his conceptualization of avodah, ahavah, and yirah, and in light of the context established by Moshe's speech, the Abravanel explains our pasuk:

Therefore [Moshe] said: "What does Hashem, your God, ask of you? Only to fear Him" for this request is not hard, but easy - and all the more so after [Bnei Yisrael] wickedly sinned with the Eigel. 

Chazal explained that because "man's inclination is evil" and always inclines towards sin, they asked: "Is yirah a small thing?" Their answer was that in relation to Moshe, who guarded himself from sin, this vigilance was easy. And even in relation to Israel, based on the goods they had received from Him, [yirah] would be proper and right. 

According to the Abravanel, the following analogy may be made. A student is given a generous scholarship to attend a prestigious university - a scholarship which was not earned by merit, but was given out of generosity. But instead of working hard to excel in his courses, he slacks off, disrespects his professors, trashes his dorm, and violates the terms of his student contract. The dean calls him in and says, "Look. We have given you this tremendous opportunity, for your benefit. We will give you another chance to boost your grades, we will forgive you for your chutzpah, we will overlook the damage you have caused to university property, and we will forgive your breach of contract. The ONLY thing we are asking is that you guard yourself from future infractions. Is that an unreasonable request?"

It would seem that the Abravanel is learning Chazal's interpretation of Moshe's statement in the same vein. Moshe was saying: "Yiras Hashem ought to be easy, considering all of the good that Hashem has done for you, and the tolerance He has shown you despite your many rebellions. Not only has He forgiven you for these transgressions, but He has even refrained from increasing your yoke. The only thing He is asking you to do is to exercise vigilance and not violate the mitzvos with which you have been charged." 

Concluding Thoughts

Unfortunately, my chavrusa and I were only able to work on this for two days before I had to write and post this dvar Torah. There are still many questions that we need to resolve, including:

• Which of the Abravanel's critiques of the Ran have merit and which do not? 
• What are the Ran and the Abravanel really arguing about? What is at the root of their disagreement? 
• Which explanation of the pasuk is smoother and more convincing? 
• What is this the Abravanel's concept of being obligated to serve Hashem out of this hakaras ha'tov? How does this differ from other views of the nature of our avodah (e.g. the Ralbag's conceptualization of Torah as part of the unfolding of the hashgachah in the universe)? 
• According to the Abravanel, how do the Ran's two types of yirah fit into Judaism? Was he really serious about animalistic fear playing absolutely no role in our avodah?

Lastly, there is another answer that I'd like to develop based on my understanding of yiras Hashem in Mishlei. That, along with these other questions, will have to wait until a later time.

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Devarim 10:12

[2] I say "the Rambam - according to the Abravanel" because that is the view of the Rambam I intend to write about in this blog post. In other words, this will not be an examination of what the Rambam holds on his own terms. Instead, this should be understood as the Abravanel's understanding of the Rambam's view. 

[2] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha'Ran #10. Full disclosure: although I have learned this drashah inside several times, I am relying on the Abravanel's presentation of the Ran's view.

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah 2:2

[4] ibid. 4:12

[5] This is according to the Abravanel's interpretation, which I wrote about in Parashas Chukas: Moshe Rabbeinu's Sin.

[6] "[Hashem] instilled within [people] the capacity to learn and to understand - for this tendency is present in every man, that the more he is drawn after the ways of chochmah (wisdom) and tzedek (righteousness), the more he desires them and pursues them" (Rambam, Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 6:4)