Showing posts with label Avraham Avinu. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Avraham Avinu. Show all posts

Friday, October 22, 2021

Parashas Vayeira: Avraham and Islam

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Parashas Vayeira: Avraham and Islam

Avraham Avinu is distressed by Sarah’s instructions to banish Hagar and Yishmael from their home. Hashem addresses Avraham’s concerns:

God said to Avraham, “Do not let the matter of this youth and your maidservant be evil in your eyes. Whatever Sarah tells you, heed her voice, since through Yitzchak will offspring be considered yours. But also the son of the maidservant I will make into a nation, for he is your offspring.” (Bereishis 21:12-13)

The plain pshat of the statement “I will also make [Yishmael] into a nation” is that Yishmael’s offspring will be numerous, as the Rambam explains in his Iggeres Teiman. However, R’ Avraham ben ha’Rambam notes (ibid.) that this statement contains an allusion to another aspect of Yishmael’s destiny:

But also the son etc.this alludes to the revelation of Islam, [the adherents of which] believe in the Oneness of the Creator, [and who descend] from him (i.e. from Yishmael). How precise are His words, exalted is He: “I will make him [into a nation]” [implying] at a later time, after the revelation of the religion of Israel, and at a time of darkness for them, on account of their sins. “He told the end from the beginning” (cf. Yeshayahu 46:10).

R’ Avraham ben ha’Rambam saw the rise of the monotheistic Islam as a fulfillment of the promise to Avraham regarding Yishmael. When the offspring of Yitzchak are in “darkness … on account of their sins,” the offspring of Yishmael will raise the banner of Yichud Hashem (God’s Oneness), as their legacy from Avraham Avinu.

When taken in isolation, these words seem like an unqualified endorsement of Islam. Even more, they would seem to indicate R’ Avraham’s view that Islam is sanctioned by Hashem, Himself! However, this overly simplistic view ignores a comment that R’ Avraham made two pesukim earlier (ibid. 21:10):

The religious perfection that was promised to the offspring of Avraham would not include a partnership between the offspring of Yishmael and the offspring of Yitzchak, for [Yishmael] would not inherit a complete partnership with Yitzchak in terms of perfection. This is true, since the offspring of Yishmael would not be obligated in Torah, and even though they believed in it, they renounced it with claims of invalidation and emptied it with claims of modification and forgery. And even though they believe in the Oneness of the Creator, [their belief] in common with the offspring of Yaakov would only be during times of darkness for the offspring of Yitzchak. Therefore, Yishmael would not inherit perfection with Yitzchak.

R’ Avraham is referring here to the Islamic doctrine of Taḥrīf, by which the Muslims maintain that the Jews modified our Torah to remove references to Mohammad.

We see from here that Judaism’s stance on Islam is nuanced. Some of its features are good enough to be alluded to in Hashem’s promises to Avraham; other features are bad enough to remove Yishmael’s descendants from Avraham’s legacy of perfection. Likewise, the role that Islam will play in the unfolding of Hashem’s plan is unclear. Many Jews have been oppressed and killed at the hands of Muslims – and yet, it is impossible for us to see the big picture from our limited vantage point. Rambam expresses this truth in Hilchos Melachim u’Milchamos 11:4:

But the plans of the Creator of the Universe are not within the capacity of man to grasp, for our ways are not His ways and our thoughts are not His thoughts. All these matters of Jesus of Nazareth and the Ishmaelite who arose after him – all of these have only straightened the path for the Melech ha'Moshiach (King Messiah), and prepared the world to serve Hashem together, as it is stated: "then I will transform all the peoples, that they all will call upon the name of Hashem and serve Him with one purpose" (Tzephania 3:9).
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Friday, July 3, 2020

Chukas/Balak : Ethnic Retribution in Torah

Truthfully, this is more about Ki Seitzei, but I kept the heading since that’s where my investigation started. And to my regular readers: my apologies for the unusual the length of this post!

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Artwork: Campaign of Vengeance, by Igor Kieryluk

Chukas/Balak: Ethnic Retribution in Torah 

Introduction 

Should the descendants of one nation or ethnic group be held accountable for the wrongdoings of their ancestors, or treated differently on the basis of their predecessors’ conduct? 

The answers given to this broad and multifaceted question tend to be opinionated and heated, especially at this particular juncture in American history. For instance, there are those who maintain that the descendants of white slave owners share in the guilt of their ancestors’ crimes and are obligated by the principles of justice to make reparations to the descendants of Black slaves. Some extend this principle even further, regarding slavery as a sin shared by all white people and demanding restitution for all Black people, regardless of their actual familial connection to the institution of American slavery. Others argue that enough time has passed that the descendants of the criminals and victims of American slavery bear no connection to their ancestors – or at least, not enough of a connection to warrant the enactment of transgenerational justice – and that any attempt to enact such justice would be as unjust as punishing a child for his father’s sins. Similar questions have been raised about the wrongs committed against Native Americans by the American government, the crimes committed by the Nazis against the Jews of Europe, and other cases of oppression around the world. 

This article was born out of a desire to explore such cases of “ethnic retribution” in Torah – cases in which the descendants of one nation or ethnic group are subject to some form of discrimination on account of who their ancestors were or what their ancestors did. In this article we will focus on three such groups, each comprised of two nations or ethnicities: (a) Amonites and Moabites, (b) Edomites and Egyptians, (c) Amalekites and Canaanites; the latter includes seven specific nations – the Canaanites, Amorites, Girgashites, Hittites, Hivites, Jebusites, and Perizzites – but we’ll refer to them collectively as “Canaan” for simplicity’s sake. 

Each of these nations is singled out by the Torah on the basis of decisions made by their forebears and are subjected to laws which can be characterized as “retaliatory” in nature. We’ll begin with an overview of how each of these nations is treated according to halacha, as codified by the Rambam. [1] We will then raise some questions on these laws, examine some answers, and discover that the answers generate more questions and problems than they solve. 

Ethnic Discrimination in Marriage 

Four out of the six aforementioned nations are subject to the prohibition of “entering into the congregation of Hashem.” The prohibitions and their reasons are stated in Parashas Ki Seitzei: 

An Amonite or Moabite shall not enter the congregation of Hashem, even their tenth generation shall not enter the congregation of Hashem, to eternity, because of the fact that they did not greet you with bread and water on the road when you were leaving Egypt, and because he hired against you Bilaam son of Beor, of Pesor, Aram Naharaim, to curse you. But Hashem, your God, refused to listen to Bilaam, and Hashem, your God, reversed the curse to a blessing for you, because Hashem, your God, loved you. You shall not seek their peace or their welfare, all your days, forever.
 
You shall not reject an Edomite, for he is your brother; you shall not reject an Egyptian, for you were a sojourner in his land. Children who are born to them in the third generation may enter the congregation of Hashem. (Devarim 23:4-9) 

We will delay our analysis of the reasons given in these pesukim (verses) and will focus instead on the halachic parameters of these restrictions. The Rambam [2] codifies them as follows: 

12:17 – Regarding every [member of] every nation: when they convert and accept upon themselves all the mitzvos of the Torah, and [likewise] slaves upon being freed, they become like an Israelite in every respect, as it is stated: “there shall be one statute for the congregation” (Bamidbar 15:15). And it is permissible for them to enter into the congregation of Hashem immediately – namely, that a male convert or freed slave may marry a native-born Jewish woman, and a native-born Jewish man may marry a female convert or freed slave – except for four nations alone, and they are: Amon, Moav, Egypt, and Edom; regarding these nations, when a member of one of them converts, they are like an Israelite in every respect except with regards to entering the congregation [by marrying a native-born Jew]. 

12:18 – What is their law? The prohibition on Amon and Moav is for all time, on the males but not the females, as it is stated: “no Amoni (literally, male Amonite) or Moavi (literally, male Moabite) may enter” and it is a law given to Moses from Sinai that only a male Amonite and a male Moabite is forever prohibited to marry a native-born Jewish woman – even the son, of a son, of a son, until the end of time – but a female Amonite or Moabite is permitted [to marry a native-born Jew] immediately, like the other nations. [Note: a male Amonite or Moabite may marry another convert or freed slave without restriction.] 

12:19 – Regarding Egyptians and Edomites, whether males or females, the first and second generation are prohibited from entering [the congregation] of Israel, but the third generation is permitted, as it is stated: “children who are born to them in the third generation” … 

To summarize: all gentiles who convert to Judaism are allowed to marry any Jew with the exception of gentiles from four specific nations: Amonite and Moabite men may never marry native-born Jewish women; Edomite and Egyptian men and women are not allowed to marry native-born Jews, nor may their children, but their grandchildren may. 

In the cases of Amonite and Moabite male converts the prohibition is expressed in terms of marriage and is violated through the act of sexual intercourse. However, in the cases of Edomites and Egyptians, although it is prohibited to marry or have relations with 1st and 2nd generation converts, the prohibition is expressed in terms of rejection: “You shall not reject an Edomite … You shall not reject an Egyptian.” What does this mean practically? Rambam [3] writes: 

We are prohibited from rejecting the descendants of Eisav (i.e. the Edomites) after they convert. In other words, we are forbidden to avoid marrying them after they convert … 

We are prohibited from rejecting the Egyptians and avoiding marrying them after they convert … 

In other words, for a native-Jew to reject a first or second generation Edomite or an Egyptian on the basis of their ethnicity is not only permitted, but is actually backed by force of a Torah prohibition – and yet, if a person were to avoid marrying a third generation Edomite or Egyptian convert on the basis of their ethnicity, then they would be in violation of a different Torah prohibition. In this sense it may be said that the Torah legislates the exact parameters of our ethnic discrimination towards Edomites and Egyptians. 

What about Amalek and Canaan? One might assume that the effort to distance ourselves from these nations would be even more extreme – and yet, the opposite is true. According to the Rambam, there is no Torah prohibition to marry an Amalekite or a Canaanite convert whatsoever. The Rambam explicitly states in 12:22: “One who converts from the seven [Canaanite] nations is not prohibited by the Torah to enter into the congregation.” Why mention Canaanites at all if they’re all permissible? Because, as the Rambam goes on to explain, Yehoshua and David subsequently imposed Rabbinic marriage restrictions on the Gibeonites – the only Canaanite community that actually converted. The fact that the Rambam doesn’t even mention Amalekite converts [4] clearly implies that they were included in his statement in 12:17, namely, that they are no different than a convert from any other non-Jewish nation, and “it is permissible for them to enter into the congregation of Hashem immediately.” 

Are these laws observed today? The Rambam concludes the chapter with an answer: 

12:25 – When Sancheriv, King of Assyria, arose, he confounded [the identity of] all the nations, intermingling them with one another and exiling them from their place. [Consequently,] these Egyptians that are presently in the land of Egypt are other people; likewise, the Edomites in the field of Edom. And since these four prohibited nations have assimilated into all of the nations of the world which are permissible, all of them are [now] permissible, since if [a member of] one of them separates himself for conversion, it is assumed that he separated from the majority. [5]

Therefore, when anyone converts in the present era in any location – whether an Edomite, an Egyptian, an Amonite, a Moabite, an Ethiopian, or any other ethnicity, whether male or female – they are permitted to enter the congregation immediately. 

In other words, despite the fact that these Torah prohibitions are still in effect, they are practically not observed anymore because there is no way for us to tell which individuals descended from these nations, thanks to Sancheriv’s campaign of forced international exile and assimilation. [6] Due to the principle of “whoever separates is assumed to have separated from the majority,” every convert is now permitted to marry a native-born Jew because it is assumed that that convert did not come from one of those four nations. 

Ethnic Discrimination in War and Peace 

It is well-known that the Jewish people were commanded to wipe out the seven nations of Canaan upon our initial conquest of the Land of Israel so that we would not be influenced by their corrupt behavior, practices, and beliefs. The Torah states this explicitly: 

But from the cities of these peoples that Hashem, your God, gives you as an inheritance, you shall not allow any person to live. Rather, you shall utterly destroy them – the Hittite, the Amorite, the Canaanite, the Perizzite, the Hivvite, and the Jebusite – as Hashem, your God, has commanded you, so that they will not teach you to act according to all their abominations that they performed for their gods, so that you will sin to Hashem, your God. (Devarim 20:16-18) 

Likewise, it is well-known that we are commanded to wipe out the nation of Amalek in retaliation for their ambush on the Jewish people as we left Egypt: 

Remember what Amalek did to you, on the way, when you were leaving Egypt, that he happened upon you on the way, and he struck those of you who were hindmost, all the weaklings at your rear, when you were faint and exhausted, and did not fear God. It shall be that when Hashem, your God, gives you rest from all your enemies all around, in the Land that Hashem, your God, gives you as an inheritance to possess it, you shall wipe out the memory of Amalek from under the heaven – you shall not forget! (ibid. 25:17-19) 

However, the parameters of these seemingly sweeping genocidal mandates are not as well-known. In order to understand how we are supposed to relate to Amalek and Canaan, and in order to understand the aforementioned commandment regarding Amon and Moav of “you shall not seek their peace or their welfare,” we must familiarize ourselves with the laws of waging war and making peace. Rambam [7] writes: 

6:1 – We do not wage war with anyone in the world unless we first make overtures for peace, whether in an optional war or an obligatory war, as it is stated: “When you approach a city to wage war with it, you shall call out to it in peace” (Devarim 20:10). If they make peace and accept the seven Noahide commandments, we do not kill a single soul, and they become a tributary, as it is stated: “they shall be for you as a tributary and shall serve you” (Devarim 20:11) … 

6:4 – But if they do not make peace, or if they make peace but do not accept the seven commandments, then we make war with them; we kill all of the adult males and take their property and children as spoils, but we do not kill neither woman nor child, as it is stated: “and the women and children” (Devarim 20:14; 2:34) – this refers to males who are minors. 

When does this [law of sparing women and children] apply? To an optional war with other nations. But [in the case of an obligatory war] with the seven [Canaanite] nations and Amalek, if they do not accept peace, then we do not spare any soul, as it is stated: “thus shall you do to all of the cities … but of the cities of the [seven Canaanite] nations … you shall not allow any soul to live” (Devarim 20:15-16). Likewise, it says about Amalek: “you shall wipe out the memory of Amalek” (Devarim 25:19)

And from where do we know that this [mandate to kill every man, woman, and child] only applies to those who don’t make peace? As it is stated: “There was not a city that made peace with the Children of Israel except for the Hivvite inhabitants of Gibeon; they took everything in battle. For it was from Hashem, to harden their hearts toward battle against Israel, in order to destroy them” (Yehoshua 11:19-20) – this implies that they made peace overtures which were not accepted … 

6:6 – We do not make peace overtures to Amon and Moav, as it is stated: “you shall not seek their peace or their welfare” (Devarim 23:10). The Sages said: Since it was stated, “you shall call out to it in peace” one might think that this is the case with Amon and Moav; therefore, the verse says: “you shall not seek out their peace.” Since it was said: “he shall dwell with you in your midst … for his benefit” (ibid. 23:17) one might think that this is the case with Amon and Moav; therefore, the verse says: “or their welfare.” But even though we do not make peace overtures towards them, if they initiate overtures for peace on their own, we accept them

Note which nations are omitted from these laws: Edom and Egypt. Despite the fact that we single them out when it comes to entering the congregation of Hashem, we treat them the same as any other nation when it comes to waging war and making peace. 

To summarize: we offer peace to almost every nation – including Amalek, Canaan, Edom, and Egypt – but not to Amon and Moav; however, if they offer peace, we accept it. And if a nation doesn’t accept our offers for peace, we only kill the adult males but spare the women and children – except in the case of Amalek and Canaan, in which case we kill everyone. 

We will conclude this section with a chart summarizing how each of these six nations is treated in marriage and in war, with the anomalies emphasized in bold and red: 


Questions, Answers, and Problems 

There are two overarching questions on all of the foregoing laws: (1) On what basis do we discriminate against these six nations? (2) How is it justifiable to discriminate against these people based on what their ancestors did? 

We will begin by reviewing the pesukim – this time with an emphasis on the reasons given: 

An Amonite or Moabite shall not enter the congregation of Hashem, even their tenth generation shall not enter the congregation of Hashem, to eternity, because of the fact that they did not greet you with bread and water on the road when you were leaving Egypt, and because he hired against you Bilaam son of Beor, of Pesor, Aram Haraim, to curse you. But Hashem, your God, refused to listen to Bilaam, and Hashem, your God, reversed the curse to a blessing for you, because Hashem, your God, loved you. You shall not seek their peace or their welfare, all your days, forever. 

You shall not reject an Edomite, for he is your brother; you shall not reject an Egyptian, for you were a sojourner in his land. Children who are born to them in the third generation may enter the congregation of Hashem. (Devarim 23:4-9) 

The Sefer ha’Chinuch [8] explains why the Torah prohibits us from marrying Amonite and Moabite converts based on the reasons mentioned in the pesukim

At the root of this mitzvah lies the reason explicitly given in the parshah: “because of the fact that they did not greet you with bread and water etc. and because he hired against you etc.” Scripture here informs us of the greatness of the quality of gemilus chasadim (acts of kindness) and repulsion towards the qualities of villainy and stinginess. Therefore He commanded us to establish a permanent hatred for them, for they (i.e. the Amonites and Moabites) became so corrupt and abominable as to show the utmost degree of their wickedness and villainy, not meeting with even bread and water a great congregation of weary travelers passing through their borders; and because Moav hired Bilam to curse them. 

According to the Sefer ha’Chinuch, it’s not that the Torah has anything against Amonites and Moabites per se. Rather, the Amonites and Moabites embodied bad middos (character traits) which are antithetical to Jewish values. By prohibiting them from marrying native-born Jews, we highlight our opposition to the bad middos associated with those nations – even if the particular Amonite or Moabite doesn’t exhibit them. In other words, our exclusion of Amonites and Moabites is didactic (i.e. intended to teach and reinforce values) and not xenophobic (i.e. stemming from a prejudiced judgment of this particular person based on his nation of origin). 

In light of this explanation one might ask: Why does the prohibition only applies to Amonite and Moabite men, but not women? If these are national traits, shouldn’t we exclude all Amonites and Moabites, as we do with Edom and Egypt? The Sefer ha’Chinuch [9] answers this question: 

The Sages (Talmud Bavli: Yevamos 76b) said as a reason for this: “because it is the derech (lit. way) of a man to meet [oncoming strangers with hospitality] but not of women”; in other words, the women had no hand in the villainy when the Israelites were not met with bread and water, since it is not a woman’s way to go out, and God will not pervert justice to penalize a woman for the villainy of her man. “Far be it from God that He should do wickedness” (Iyov 34:10). 

According to the Sefer ha’Chinuch, the Amonite and Moabite women did not participate in the “villainy” of refusing to provide the Jews with bread and water, which is why they are not included in the prohibition. Excluding them from marriage would not achieve the didactic aim.

Rav Hirsch, citing the same Gemara, takes a slightly different approach: 

The reason for this halacha (of distinguishing between men and women) is attributed to the reason the Torah gives for this prohibition: because they did not practice international humaneness; they did not offer food and drink to the people who were passing by their territory and who were exhausted from traveling in the wilderness. Such international humaneness is exercised primarily by men. Hence, the women were not to blame … 

The later prophets continued to reprove Moav for this attribute of harshness toward other nations and inhumane coarseness. When the time came for Moav’s destruction, Yeshayahu described the cause of its fall (Yeshayahu 15-16). All the nations bordering on Moav were crying out about the Moabites’ actions (ibid. 15:8). From far off one heard only tales of this nation’s arrogance, pride, and blind fury (ibid. 16:6). The only way for Moav to avert the evil decree is to turn to kindness. While still at the height of its success, while its light shines like the sun at noon, it must show kindness to unfortunate refugees. As Yeshayahu calls out to Moav: “Give thought, imagine the shades of night had already fallen in bright midday. Hide the outcasts, betray no wanderer, let my outcasts find a home with you. Moav, be their protector against the spoiler. For extortion must cease; spoiling must be brought to an end; oppressors must disappear from the land. A throne shall be established through mercy” (ibid. 16:3-5). 

According to the halacha, the Moabite women had no part in these attributes; they did not banish from their hearts humane feelings toward other nations and did not cultivate singular national pride. This was credited to them as a double merit, since they had to overcome the influence of the men. 

So, too, we should appreciate Ruth, woman of Moav, a woman of exquisite humanity, who was mother of the Davidic kingdom. In her heart burned a flame of love for people, a love that bridges the barrier that separates nation from nation. Surely she had a part in the spirit that, in the tones of the harp of her great-grandson [David], sings of a future morning when nations will be united around God and heralds the break of that dawn. 

According to Rav Hirsch, it’s not just that the women of Moav happened to not participate in villainy. Rather, there was a completely different culture and value system among Moabite men and Moabite women. Moabite men were cruel, arrogant, and unkind, whereas Moabite women exhibited none of these traits. This distinction is reflected in the structure of the halacha. 

What about the additional reason given for Moav: “because he hired against you Bilaam son of Beor, of Pesor, Aram Haraim, to curse you”? This is somewhat problematic. The Sefer ha’Chinuch only mentions this reason as an afterthought. Based on the pasuk here, which says “because he hired,” the hiring of Bilaam sounds like the decision of one man: Balak, King of Moav. If so, why should it affect our judgment of Moav as a whole? And if the king’s decision was driven by his people, then why does the pasuk speak in the singular? 

Other than that minor issue, the Sefer ha’Chinuch seems to be well on his way to answering our questions. But then he is forced to confront a glaring conundrum: If the Torah distances us from Amonite and Moabite men for all generations because they didn’t provide us with bread and water (and secondarily because of the hiring of Bilaam), then certainly we should treat Egypt the same way, since they enslaved us for 210 years – and yet, we only keep Egypt at a distance for two generations! The Sefer ha’Chinuch then provides a problematic answer: 

Now, even though [the people of] Egypt enslaved us and afflicted us for a long time, we are only kept away from them until the third generation. With this we know that it is better for a person to commit many sins than one great act of villainy. By deciding to do a vile act of villainy, without any concern about exposing his mind and his shame before many nations, one thus shows the evil of his temperament and the utter degree of his baseness, and that there is no longer any corrective measure to make himself worthy and to improve his action. His depravity has become so entrenched that it cannot be fixed. A man like that is not fit to intermingle with the blessed people of holiness

This answer is baffling on a number of levels. First, does this reasoning even make sense? Are 100 acts of moderate violence always better than one act of severe wrongdoing? It’s debatable, at the very least. Second, enslaving us and embittering our lives wasn’t the only thing Egypt did. They also participated in a state-sponsored extermination of all Jewish boys! Does that not qualify as “one great act of villainy”? Doesn't that show a far more reprehensible national character than neglecting to provide a nation with food and water? Third, what about Amalek? Amalek ambushed us in a cowardly manner, preying upon “the weaklings at [our] rear” when we “were weak and exhausted,” and intended to annihilate us completely. Does that not warrant a prohibition against marrying Amalekite converts on par with Amon and Moav? Fourth, his final few sentences suggest that our refusal to marry Amonite and Moabite men is not just didactic, but actually stems from three assumptions: (a) that Amonite and Moabite men actually possess these bad middos, (b) these qualities are so entrenched they are beyond hope of correction, and (c) allowing them to marry native-born Jews will “corrupt” the nation of Israel. These assumptions are highly problematic! Nations and cultures change. Individuals can choose to rise above the trends of their societies. Who is to say that every Amonite or Moabite will embody an incurable condition of cruelty and villainy, to the extent that the Torah needs to impose a blanket prohibition on them to prevent them from “infecting” our people? If the barbaric and lawless Assyrian capital of Nineveh did teshuvah when rebuked by Yonah, how can we say that Amon and Moav are beyond hope?

But wait: it gets even more problematic. In his presentation of the prohibition against rejecting an Edomite and an Egyptian, the Sefer ha’Chinuch raises our initial question and offers his own answer: 

The root reason for this mitzvah is obvious: it is to inform us that we should not behave with a prohibition toward the descendants of Edom, and should not reject them by kal va’chomer (i.e. reasoning from less to more) from the Amonites, saying: “If Amon and Moav, because of one time that they did not meet us with bread and water, were distanced from us by God, how much more so the Edomites and the Egyptians, who made the Israelites suffer so much!” Therefore, the admonition was given us about them, not to refrain from intermarrying with them. For the periods of servitude to which they subjected us were a decree of Hashem for us, and we ought not to set a permanent hatred in our heart for that. They are rather called our brothers when they undergo conversion and come to shelter under the wings of the shechinah (divine presence). With Amon and Moav, though, there is another reason for hatred toward them: that is the matter of the enormous villainous outrage which they found in their heart to commit, as I wrote shortly above. 

What? The first time around he acknowledged that the Egyptian enslavement of Bnei Yisrael really did involve wrongdoing, but because it involved “many sins” rather than “one great act of villainy,” Egypt didn’t warrant the same treatment as Amon and Moav. Now he’s saying that because the servitude was “a decree of Hashem for us,” then we shouldn’t harbor a permanent hatred. On its surface, this would seem to somewhat excuse the Egyptians for their mistreatment of their Hebrew slaves, and opens up a huge can of worms as to the justice (or injustice) of the divine punishment of Egypt through the ten plagues. 

We are left with mixed feelings about the Sefer ha'Chinuch. The crux of his approach has a lot of merit, but in his efforts to consistently explain the discriminatory laws concerning these four nations, he raises new problems, the solutions to which are not readily apparent.

The Abravanel [10] has a completely different take on the Torah's exclusion of Amon and Moav from the congregation of Hashem based on the background information provided way back in Sefer Bereishis. Amon and Moav descended from Lote, Avraham Avinu’s nephew. Avraham saved Lote on two occasions: by rescuing him after he had been taken captive (Bereishis 14:12-16), and by sending messengers to save him from being destroyed along with the other inhabitants of Sedom and Amora (ibid. Chapter 19). Lote’s wife perishes in the escape and he and his two daughters take shelter in a cave. Under the severely mistaken impression that all human civilization had been destroyed, Lote’s daughters ply their father with wine and sleep with him in an effort to repopulate the earth. The resulting offspring become the progenitors of Amon and Moav. On this basis the Abravanel writes: 

The Amonites and Moabites did not greet [the Children of Israel] with bread and water, nor did they allow them to pass through their land. Since Amon and Moav were descendants of Lote, who received tremendous kindness from Avraham who saved him from the sword and from capture, and in whose merit he escaped from the upheaval of Sedom and Amora, they (i.e. Amon and Moav) were indebted to do so (i.e. to give provisions and allow passage) to Israel – but they did the opposite. Therefore, it is fitting that their punishment be excessive and severe. Additionally, Moav added a rebellious offense to its sin by hiring Bilaam to curse Israel, and although his counsel was thwarted, this is only because Hashem (exalted is He) did not listen to Bilaam and transformed his curse to blessing out of His love for Israel. Therefore, it was fitting that even though [the Children of Israel were commanded] not to provoke war [with Moav] and not to take their land, since they descended from Lote [and were given the Plains of Moav as an inheritance], they were also [commanded] not to seek out their peace and welfare, for just as they were inhospitable to you by not providing you with bread and water, so too, you should not be hospitable to them by allowing them to marry the daughters of Israel. And since they possess a corrupt nature and such a deteriorated character, it is not fitting that they should illicitly intermingle [11] with the seed that Hashem has blessed. For this reason it was stated: “even their tenth generation shall not enter the congregation of Hashem” – meaning to say that this [exclusion] is eternal, which is why it said “all your days, forever.” 

According to the Abravanel, the sin of Amon and Moav was not merely that they refused to provide us with bread and water; rather, it’s that they refused to provide us with bread and water despite being doubly indebted to us, on account of the kindness shown to their forefather Lote by our forefather Avraham. This was more than an act of international inhospitality. It was also an ungrateful refusal to recognize and repay the descendants of Avraham for the acts of kindness which resulted in their very existence. 

The Abravanel then contrasts Amon and Moav with Edom and Egypt: 

It is not fitting to reject [the Edomites and the Egyptians] completely, like Amon and Moav – the Edomite because of his familial relation, “for he is your brother,” and it is appropriate for a person to love his relative even if he is wronged by him, and the Egyptian because “you were sojourners in his land,” and Yaakov went down to Egypt because of the “fevers of famine” (Eichah 5:10) and found [relief] at the time of his trouble, as the Sages said: “they provided lodging at a time of pressing need.” Therefore, even though they did evil to you, it is appropriate for you not to reject them [entirely] and not to withhold their reward. This is [the reason why] “children who are born to them in the third generation” may marry [native-born Jewish] women and enter into the congregation of Hashem. 

Although we were wronged by Edom, we should be more forgiving because they are our brothers. Although we were wronged by Egypt, we were also saved by them at a time when our forefathers were in danger of dying of starvation. Indeed, we owe our existence to Egypt in the same way that Amon and Moav owe their existence to us.

Next, the Abravanel addresses two problems: (1) We are related to Amon and Moav, so why not treat them like Edom? (2) Edom refused to provide us with bread and water, as the pesukim in Bamidbar 20:14-21 [12] imply, so why don’t we treat them like Amon and Moav? He writes: 

But why didn’t it mention a “brotherly covenant” with Amon and Moav as it did with Edom? And why didn’t it mention the fact that Edom didn’t greet us with bread and water, as it mentioned by Amon and Moav? The answer, according to me, is as follows: 

Although Edom harbored animosity [towards Israel] and didn’t allow Israel to pass through its territory and didn’t greet them with bread and water, they had a huge claim against us, because Yaakov took the birthright from Eisav, his older brother, and also took his blessings through deception. It would have been enough for Edom if they didn’t greet Israel with war, as did Amalek. Therefore it said: “do not reject an Edomite, for he is your brother” – in other words, there is a strong relationship between you, and he didn’t harm you, despite having a huge claim against you

However, Amon and Moav did not have a claim [which would constitute a valid reason] to hate Israel and harm them. [To the contrary,] they should have granted them a double benefit, in accordance with the benefit that Avraham gave their father. Neither Lote nor his descendants were subjected to insults from Avraham and his descendants, as Eisav received from Yaakov. Therefore, Amon and Moav were deserving of great punishment for refusing to benefit Israel, whereas Edom was deserving of great reward for not harming them. Additionally, our relatedness to Edom was great and powerful, since Eisav and Yaakov were the sons of Yitzchak and Rivkah. However, even though Lote was related to Avraham, that [relationship] was distant, since he was his nephew; also, the descendants of Lote came about in an improper manner from his two daughters. For this reason, Edom is called “brother” in Scripture (see Malachi 1:2), whereas Amon and Moav are never referred to as [our] “brothers” in any place. 

According to the Abravanel, Edom had every right to hate us, to deny us provisions, to refuse passage through their territory, and – remarkably – to go to war with us, on account of our forefather Yaakov’s taking of the birthright and blessings from their forefather Eisav. Although Edom’s wrongdoing towards Israel still warrants a reprisal, this long-standing claim combined with our kinship mitigates the punishment that they would have otherwise deserved. Amon and Moav may participated in the same international relations misconduct, but their crime is considered far worse on account of their indebtedness to Avraham. That, combined with the fact that they are only “distant cousins” rather than “brothers,” is why the Torah gave them the full degree of punishment they deserved. 

Let us assess the Abravanel’s approach. On the one hand, he avoids many of the problems we raised on the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s explanations. The Abravanel's approach is firmly grounded in the pesukim and even sheds light on the background information about Amon and Moav provided in Sefer Bereishis. 

However, there is one major problem: according to the Abravanel, the Torah is effectively punishing descendants for the wrongdoings of their ancestors. According to the Sefer ha’Chinuch, the Torah excludes Amon and Moav from the congregation in order to reinforce our rejection of the bad middos associated with their nations, and this didactic exclusion from the congregation is equally relevant to any and every generation of Amonites and Moabites. In contrast, the Abravanel's explanation only accounts for why those particular groups of Amonites, Moabites, and Edomites who actually committed these crimes against the Children of Israel in the Wilderness were worthy of punishment. Why should their offspring be similarly punished for all generations? If, for example, the son of a Holocaust survivor had the opportunity to repay the offspring of his father’s liberator and neglected to do so, he would certainly be worthy of censure – but would this justify punishing all of his offspring until the end of time? Lehavdil, when North Koreans commit crimes against the regime which are punishable by life imprisonment, they are subject to the "three generations of punishment" policy established by Kim Il-Sung, by which their children and grandchildren are also imprisoned for life. We recognize this as inexcusably unjust - so how can the Torah punish future generations of Amonites, Moabites, Edomites, and Egyptians for the crimes of a particular generation of their ancestors? “Far be it from God that He should do wickedness” (Iyov 34:10).

Concluding Thoughts 

In this article we set out to answer the question: Should the descendants of one nation or ethnic group be held accountable for the wrongdoings of their predecessors? Our ultimate objective was to shed light on the similar questions being asked in America and around the world today. 

Did we emerge from our investigation with a clear answer to this question? Absolutely not! We now have more questions and problems than we did when we started. 

But does that mean that our investigation was a failure? Not at all! If anything, it has become abundantly clear that the answer to this question is not simple or clear cut by any stretch of the imagination. For example, if one believes that descendants of slave owners should not be held accountable to pay reparations to the descendants of slaves, then why does the Torah hold the descendants of the Amonites and Moabites accountable for their ancestors' injustices towards our ancestors, as the Abravanel explained? And if one maintains that such reparations should be made, due to the centuries of oppression that African American slaves suffered at the hands of their masters, what about the Sefer ha'Chinuch's statement that "it is better for a person to commit many sins than one great act of villainy" or the fact that Egypt's punishment for enslaving Israel is mitigated by the fact that they provided for us in our time of need? Perhaps there is a statute of limitations on this transgenerational justice in the case of slavery as there is in the case of Egypt? And for those who either support or condemn the rioting and looting in the name of BLM, what about the Abravanel's view that the Edomites were somewhat justified in their mistreatment of the Israelites on account of what Yaakov did to Eisav hundreds of years earlier? 

And perhaps someone will object to our entire endeavor to draw parallels and inferences from these Torah laws to other historical cases and current events. That, too, is a legitimate possibility. Perhaps only Hashem, in His Omniscience and love of righteousness and justice, is in the position to enact such transgenerational measures of justice and retribution, but for human beings to even attempt to do so would be sheer folly.

This is precisely the type of confusion that I believe we need in this country right now. In an era plagued by extremism, absolutism, and "us versus them" politics, it is a step in the right direction to acknowledge that the problems with which we are confronted are far more complex and nuanced than we'd like to think. The difficulties we encountered in our analysis should give us pause, and in that pause, we should reassess whether the feelings of certainty we have on current events are backed by reason or merely by passion.


Footnotes:
[1] There are certainly other views on these topics, but I’m most familiar with the Rambam, and I’m sticking to him. 
[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Kedushah, Hilchos Issurei Biah 
[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Sefer ha’Mitzvos: Lo Taaseh #54-55 
[4] Some want to argue that according to the Rambam it is prohibited for an Amalekite to convert to Judaism at all. This argument falls apart when one considers the fact that the Rambam doesn’t mention Amalek at all in the laws of conversion and doesn’t mention conversion in the laws of Amalek. The pasuk says: “David then asked the young man who was telling him, ‘Where are you from?’ and he replied, ‘I am the son of an Amalekite convert’” (II Shmuel 1:13), and we have every indication to believe that the Rambam would take that pasuk at face value. 
[5] This is a general principle in halacha: whenever there is a mixture of indistinguishable entities and one of them separates from the mixture, we assume that it came from the majority component. 
[6] It is for this reason that I decided to characterize these laws as “ethnic retribution” rather than “national retribution.” The Rambam does not say that these marriage restrictions are null and void because the national identities or cultures of Amon, Moav, Edom, and Egypt have ceased to exist. Rather, he says that Amonite, Moabite, Edomite, and Egyptian individuals are still out there – even though their nations have long since vanished – but the problem is that we just can’t tell who they are. In other words, the prohibition focuses on ethnicity, not national identity. Theoretically (albeit not halachically), if we knew for certain that a particular male convert was an ethnic Amonite or Moabite, he would not be allowed to marry a native-born Jewish woman. 
[7] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer Shoftim, Hilchos Melachim u’Milchamos 
[8] Sefer ha’Chinuch: Ki Seitzei Mitzvah #561 
[9] This passage actually comes later on. I’m citing it here to maintain the flow of the article. 
[10] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Devarim 23:4-9 
[11] Here the Abravanel uses the word “kilayim” which means “forbidden mixture.” 
[12] See? I told you this connected to Chukas and Balak!

Wednesday, June 5, 2019

Rambam: On Lishmah and she'Lo Lishmah

I started writing a blog post about doing mitzvos lishmah (for their own sake) and she'lo lishmah (not for their own sake), and was shocked to discover that I haven't yet posted a translation of the Rambam's discourse on this topic anywhere on my blog. I decided to rectify that by posting my translation without any commentary, since it is something that every student of Torah should read. The paragraph divisions are my own.

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Artwork: Frantic Search, by Mitchell Malloy


Rambam: On Lishmah and she'Lo Lishmah

You, the thoughtful reader, should contemplate the following parable which I will present to you, and then pay attention to understand my words on this entire topic. 

A young child is brought to an educator to learn Torah. This is a tremendous good for him, because of the perfection he will attain from it. However, due to his young age and the deficiency of his mind, he will not understand the value of that good, nor [will he understand the value] of the perfection he will gain. Thus, necessity compels the teacher – who is more perfected than the child – to motivate him to learn by using something which is beloved to him, because of his young age. [The teacher] will say, “Learn and I will give you nuts and figs!” or “I will give you a piece of candy!” Then the student will learn and strive not for the learning itself, whose value he doesn’t know, but in order to attain that piece of food. The eating of that food is more important to him and more beneficial [from his perspective], without a doubt. Therefore, he will consider the learning to be a toil and exertion which he must work at in order to attain that desirable objective – that single nut or piece of candy. 

When the child grows and his intellect is strengthened, and that thing which he used to value becomes less important in his eyes and he goes go on to value other things, we motivate him with that which is even more important in his eyes. The teacher will say to him, “Learn and I will buy these fancy shoes for you” or “an article of clothing with such-and-such an appearance.” Then he will strive not for the learning itself, but for that article of clothing, because that article of clothing will be more valuable to him than the learning, and it will be the objective of the learning. 

When his mind becomes more perfected and that thing becomes less significant in his eyes, we motivate him with something greater than this. His teacher will say to him, “Learn this section or this chapter and I will give you a dollar or two.” Then he will learn and strive in order to earn that money, and the earning of that money will be more significant to him than the learning, for the purpose of learning – to him, at this time – is the earning of the money that was promised to him. 

When he becomes more cognizant and this thing [he once valued] becomes less significant in his eyes and he knows that it is a thing of inferior worth, we motivate him with something that is more important to him. We say to him, “Learn in order to become a rabbi and a judge. People will honor you; they will stand up in your presence; your words will be established and your reputation will grow during your lifetime and after your death, like so-and-so.” Then he will learn and strive in order to achieve that level of distinction, and the ultimate objective – to him – will be that people should honor him, exalt him, and praise him. 

All of this is despicable – yet, it is necessary for us, due to the deficiency of the human psyche (or mind), which causes him to make the purpose of learning something other than the learning [itself]. He will say, “Why should I learn this?” – only in order to achieve something which, in truth, is but a fantasy. This is what the Sages referred to as she’lo lishmah (lit. “not for its own sake”). In other words, he fulfills the mitzvos and does them and learns and strives not for the sake of that thing itself, but for the sake of something else. The Sages (peace be upon them) cautioned us, saying, “Do not make them (i.e. matters of Torah) a crown through which to glorify yourself, nor an axe to chop with” (Avos 4:5). They are alluding to that which I have explained to you, that one should not make the purpose of his learning that people should honor him, nor the acquisition of wealth, nor should he make Hashem’s Torah into a livelihood. 

The purpose of his learning should be nothing other than knowledge itself; likewise, the only purpose of truth is to know that it is true; the mitzvos are true, and therefore, their purpose is their fulfillment. It is prohibited for a perfected person to say, “If I do these good things and if I refrain from these bad things which Hashem prohibited to me, what will be my reward?” For this is like what the child says: “If I learn, what will I be given?” And they say to him, “Such-and-such a thing,” for when we see the deficiency of his mind – that he doesn’t understand the value of this thing, and he seeks out a purpose for the purpose – we answer him in accordance with the degree of his foolishness, [as it is stated,] “answer a fool according to his foolishness” (Mishlei 26:5). 

The Sages already warned us about this – namely, that a person shouldn’t make the purpose of his avodah (service) and his fulfillment of the mitzvos any of these things – in the statement of the pious man who grasped the truth, Antignos of Socho: “Do not be like servants who serve the master with the intention of receiving a prize; rather, be like servants who serve their master with the intention not to receive a prize.” By this they mean that one should believe in truth for the sake of the truth itself. This is what [the Sages] referred to as “oved me’ahavah” (“one who serves out of love”). They said, “he desires His mitzvos exceedingly” (Tehilim 112:1). R’ Elazar said: “His mitzvos and not “the reward of His mitzvos” (Avodah Zarah 19a). How great is this proof and how clear it is, for this is a clear proof to our preceding words! Even greater than this is the statement of the Sages in Sifrei: “Perhaps a person will say, ‘I will learn Torah so that I can become rich’ or ‘so that I will be called “rebbi”’ or ‘so that I will receive reward in the World to Come’ – but the pasuk says, ‘to love Hashem, your God’; everything you do, you should only do out of love” (Eikev: Devarim 11:13). 

It has been explained and made clear that this is the goal of the mitzvos and the foundation of our Sages’ belief. The only person who will be oblivious to this is a fool and a naïve simpleton who has already been corrupted by crazy, fantastical, imaginary and degenerate notions. This [high level of lishmah] is the level of Avraham Avinu, who was oved me’ahavah (Sotah 31a), and this is the path which we are obligated to strive for. 

But the Sages (of blessed memory) knew that this was a very difficult concept which not every person can grasp. Even if he does grasp it, it will not seem correct at first glance, and it will not seem like a true opinion, since man’s nature is to not do an action unless it will bring him some benefit or enable him to avoid some harm, and if it does neither of these, then the act would be pointless. How is it possible to say to a Torah-observant Jew, “Do these actions and don’t do these,” not out of fear of Hashem’s punishment and not out of a hope for reward? This is very difficult, for not all people grasp the truth and will be like Avraham Avinu. 

Therefore, they permitted the masses to remain in accordance with their mentality, to do the good out of hope for reward and to avoid the bad out of fear of punishment. They encouraged them in this, and strengthened their thoughts about it, until the apprehender apprehends and knows the truth and knows what the perfected path is – just like the youth at the time of learning, according to the aforementioned analogy. They were critical of Antignos of Socho for publicizing among the masses what he publicized, saying, “Sages – be careful with your words! etc.” as we explained in Avos. The masses do not lose out completely by fulfilling the mitzvos out of fear of reward and hope of punishment; they are just not perfected. But it is better for them to do this in order for them to acquire the disposition and preparation for fulfilling Torah, so that they will [eventually] move on to the truth and serve out of love. This is what the Sages (of blessed memory) said: “A person should always be involved in Torah even she’lo lishmah, for from she’lo lishmah he will come to lishmah” (Sanhedrin 105b, Pesachim 50b, Nazir 23b, Sotah 22b and 47a, Horiyos 10b, Erachin 16b).

Sunday, October 2, 2016

Ralbag: On Akeidas Yitzchak (The Binding of Isaac)

In accordance with (what is apparently) my custom to hurriedly churn out a blog post on the eve of a holiday, mere hours before its onset, I present to you this post on Akeidas Yitzchak. I also urge you to re-read last year's post on Yom ha'Din and Yom Teruah, and ponder the connection between the two.

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Artwork: Nyx-fleece Ram, by Terese Nielsen


Ralbag: On Akeidas Yitzchak (Binding of Isaac)

Disclaimer: Ralbag's Radical Views

The Ralbag has several views which radically diverge from "mainstream Jewish thought," and which some - most notably, the Rambam - might consider to be heretical. Two of these views show up in the Ralbag's treatment of the Akeidah

The first of these radical views has to do with God's Omniscience. In short, the Ralbag holds that God does not have foreknowledge of free will decisions made by human beings.  As one can imagine, this premise has a drastic effect on the Ralbag's reading of Akeidas Yitzchak. Unlike the other meforshim, who are confronted with the question of what it means for Hashem to "test" Avraham Avinu, the Ralbag maintains that the Akeidah was an actual test: Hashem did not know what Avraham would do when confronted with such a commandment, and the only way for Him to find out was to actually issue the command. 

The second radical view involves the difference between the nevuah (prophecy) of Moshe Rabbeinu, and the nevuah of other neviim. I am not too familiar with the details of the Ralbag's view here. Suffice it to say, it appears he holds that Avraham received nevuah in the form of words - not merely visions - and that these words were somewhat ambiguous. Not only that, but the Ralbag learns that Avraham was able to receive nevuah while awake and fully conscious. According to my understanding, the Rambam would vehemently disagree on all three scores, and would say that a navi like Avraham would receive his nevuah in the form of images, and that the meaning of these images would be 100% clear, and that this nevuah would occur while the navi was asleep or in a trance. 

I do not plan on taking up these disagreements between the Ralbag and the other Rishonim in this blog post. This is not the place for such an inquiry, and even if it were, I would not be qualified to conduct it. I am only pointing these things out because I want to make several things clear at the outset: (a) the Ralbag differs in a major way on these major issues, (b) the fact that I write about his views without critiquing them should not be interpreted as an endorsement; (c) do not expect me to assess these views at the present time; and (d) for the purposes of this blog post, we will be working within the Ralbag's premises in order to understand what he holds the Akeidah teaches us.

Having said that, let us now begin.

Avraham's Test

Ralbag begins his commentary with an explanation of the nisayon (test):
The substance of the nisayon - according to my opinion - is that the nevuah came to him in an ambiguous language, namely, that Hashem said to him regarding Yitzchak, "ve'ha'aleihu sham l'olah." 
It is possible for this statement to be understood to mean that he should slaughter [Yitzchak] and make him into an olah (burnt offering) OR that he should "bring him up there" (yaaleihu) to do an olah, in order to educate Yitzchak in avodas Hashem (the service of Hashem). 
Hashem tested him [to see] whether it would be difficult in his eyes to do anything that Hashem commanded him, to the point where he would understand this statement to be other than its straightforward meaning - namely, that he would understand from it that he should bring another olah, rather than sacrifice his son.
In other words, according to the Ralbag, Avraham was deliberately given an ambiguous nevuah: "ha'aleihu sham l'olah." The straightforward meaning of the nevuah was "slaughter your son as a korban olah." If Avraham truly loved Hashem, He would take the commandment at face value, and be willing to sacrifice his precious son, despite the difficulty of the task.

But if his attachment to his son were stronger than his love of Hashem, he would look for a different way to interpret Hashem's instructions, and would end up forcing the reading of "bring your son up onto a mountain to teach him how to bring a korban olah." 

[As an aside, the Ralbag raises the classic question: How could Avraham think that Hashem would command him to slaughter his only son, after promising that Yitzchak would be the source of his progeny? Ralbag answers that since Hashem's promises only come true if the recipients are on the level to merit them, Avraham figured that Yitzchak must have sinned in such a way that he was no longer worthy of this promise being carried out through him.] 

Lo and behold, Avraham passed the test. Not only did he interpret the nevuah according to its straightforward meaning, but he fulfilled the mitzvah with zeal, joy, and alacrity. He got up early in the morning, saddled his own donkey, prepared the wood for the olah, and set out to fulfill the will of his Creator. And when the moment came to slaughter his beloved son, he wasn't plagued with despair and suffering. To the contrary, he was ready to perform the mitzvah with love and gladness - even to the point where he was able to receive the nevuah of the malach (angel) calling out to stop him, while he was awake, which would have been impossible had he been sad, despondent, or in pain.

That, in short, is the Ralbag's account of the Akeidah. Are there questions and problems that remain unanswered? Yes. But this sums up the crux of the sipur (narrative) according to his reading.

The Relevance of the Akeidah for Us

The Akeidah takes on a central role on the day of Rosh ha'Shanah. In addition to reading the Akeidah for the krias ha'Torah (Torah reading) on the second day, we also make repeated references to the Akeidah throughout our tefilos (prayers). One of the most prominent references to the Akeidah can be found at the forefront of the Zichronos (Remembrances) section of the Mussaf prayer:
Remember for us, Hashem, our God, the coveneant, the kindness, and the oath that You swore to our father Avraham on Mount Moriah. Let there appear before You the Akeidah when Avraham, our father, bound Yitzchak, his son, upon the altar and he suppressed his mercy to do Your will wholeheartedly. Therefore, may Your mercy suppress Your anger from upon us, and in Your great good may Your burning anger withdraw from Your people, from Your city, and from Your heritage ... For it is You Who eternally remembers all forgotten things, and there is no forgetfulness before Your Throne of Glory, and may You mercifully remember today the Akeidah of Yitzchak for the sake of his offspring. Blessed are You, Hashem, Who remembers the covenant.
The question is: Why do we recall the Akeidah in pleading for mercy before Hashem? There are many events throughout Torah which we could recall in petitioning Hashem to have mercy. What makes the Akeidah special? 

I would like to offer an answer based on the Ralbag's explanation above. At best, this is a true explanation. But if I am wrong, then this will at least be a useful drush

According to the Ralbag, Avraham's essential test was whether he would understand and accept the dvar Hashem (word of God) at face value, or whether he would twist it and reinterpret it to bring it in line with his own desires. This, I submit, is the test we face every day in our relationship with Hashem by our adherence to Torah and mitzvos.

We were given the dvar Hashem at Sinai, as we emphasize at the beginning of the Shofros section:
You were revealed in Your cloud of glory to Your holy people to speak with them. From the heavens You made them hear Your voice and revealed Yourself to them in thick clouds of purity. Moreover, the entire universe shuddered before You and the creatures of creation trembled before You during Your revelation, our King, on Mount Sinai to teach Your people Torah and mitzvos. You made them hear the majesty of Your voice and Your holy utterances from fiery flames
Like Avraham, we are called upon by the Torah to obey commandments which run contrary to our desires (usually due to our own imperfections). In some cases the Torah merely pushes us slightly beyond our comfort zone, causing us to experience mild frustration, inconvenience, and unpleasantness. In other cases the Torah's demands cause us to recoil with distaste, anger, frustration, revulsion, or horror. And occasionally, the Torah brings us to the very edge, prompting us to confront those aspects of reality - of the world or ourselves - that fill us with absolute dread and terror. It is only through these "skillful frustrations" that we truly grow, but that fact doesn't mitigate the conflict they generate

Like the ambiguous nevuah received by Avraham, the Torah of Moshe is subject to many interpretations - and consequently, many distortions. And, like Avraham, we can choose to flee rather than submit to Hashem. If we so choose, we can warp the dvar Hashem in accordance with our own preconceived notions and values; we can pick and choose within the halachic system to suit our subjective preferences; we can hastily dismiss, deny, or delegitimize those parts of Torah that do not accord with our sensibilities, without conducting an intellectually honest investigation to see whether our understanding is deficient; or we can cope with the cognitive dissonance in the easy way - by violating the dvar Hashem, whether unintentionally, intentionally, or rebelliously, in a particular or with regards to the system as a whole.

By recalling the Akeidah in our tefilos, we are affirming our recognition of this fundamental human choice: will we bend reality to suit our desires, or will we subdue our desires in order to align ourselves with reality? This is the lesson we were taught by Avraham Avinu when he was put to this test in the ultimate way. Most of us would not be able to pass the test that he underwent, but we recognize the correctness of his decision and we strive to live in accordance with his derech to the extent that we can. 

And it is on that basis that we ask Hashem for mercy. We stand before Him and say: "Hashem - we know that we have committed countless errors and sins, and that by our actions alone, we are not worthy of escaping Your anger. But we are Your people, the children of Your covenant, the children of Avraham, Your beloved, to Whom You swore on Mount Moriah - the offspring of Yitzchak, Your akeidah, who was bound on Your altar. We identify with the derech set forth by our patriarch who passed this ultimate test which we have failed, time and again. We aspire to follow in his footsteps because we see with absolute clarity the uprightness of his path at that fateful event. In light of this recognition and longing on our part, please grant us mercy!" 

In other words, it is because the nisayon of Akeidas Yitzchak encompasses kol ha'Torah kulah (all of Torah in its entirety) that we are able to use it as the basis for beseeching Hashem to forgive us for all of our sins. The Akeidah represents the core of zechus Avraham, and by recalling it, we can tap into that zechus and can change the decree. 

May we all merit the rachamim of the Kadosh Baruch Hu this year, and follow in the footsteps of Avraham Avinu!