EFT (Episodic Future Thinking) Training: A Summer 2022 Experiment

The Torah content for these two weeks has been sponsored by Judah and Naomi Dardik in loving memory of Rabbi Moskowitz zt''l, who taught his students to pursue truth by asking questions, who modeled love of Torah and learning, and who exemplified living a life of the mind.

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Artwork: Future Sight, by Dan Scott

EFT (Episodic Future Thinking) Training: A Summer 2022 Experiment

My learning, my teaching, and my life (yes, I realize I just listed three synonyms) are shaped by the books I’m reading. Sometimes I can tell from the outset that a particular book will have a huge impact on my thinking. One of those books is Jane McGonigal’s Imaginable: How to see the future coming and feel ready for anything – even things that seem impossible today, published in 2022. I’m only halfway through, but I figured I should plan ahead by writing this prefatory article now.

McGonigal has the unique distinction of being both a future-forecaster and game designer. Her specialty is creating simulations that help people imagine the biggest global challenges we might face in the future. In 2008 she led a six-week future-forecasting simulation called Superstruct in which 10,000 people worldwide simulated living through five different threats, including a global respiratory pandemic that originated in China. The simulation was based entirely on the imagination of the participants: “we simply asked people to predict how they would feel and what they would do in their own lives during this kind of rapidly spreading outbreak.” Despite the fact that the simulation was entirely imagination-based, it yielded shockingly accurate predictions about the details of pandemic life during Covid-19.

McGonigal advocates a specific use of the imagination called episodic future thinking, or EFT. Here’s her description:

[Episodic future thinking is] the mental ability to transport yourself forward in time and pre-experience a future event. EFT is often described as a kind of “mental time travel” because your brain is working to help you see and feel the future as clearly and vividly as if you were already there. But EFT isn’t just thinking about the future; it’s simulating the future in your mind. It’s the difference between knowing that it’s probably going to rain tomorrow – a kind of “fact” or abstract thought about the future” – and vividly imagining yourself in the rain, trying to pre-feel the rain on your skin, and using everything you know about what tomorrow might be like to make the scenario more detailed and realistic. EFT might entail picturing where exactly you’ll be when it starts to rain, what you might be wearing, who might be with you, whether you’re likely to be annoyed by the rain or delighted by it, whether you’ll rush to get somewhere dry or stroll leisurely through it, and so on.

Her book is an eminently practical one, the full benefits of which can only be unlocked by readers who practice EFT on a regular basis. I’ve read enough to be sold on the power of EFT, and I’ve committed to practicing it every day for the next month. The main utility I hope to derive from my EFT practice can be summed up in Chazal’s definition of a chacham (wise person) as: “eizehu chacham? ha’roeh es ha’nolad” – “Who is wise? One who can see what the future will yield.” My rebbi, Rabbi Moskowitz zt”l, would note that Chazal didn’t say “one who knows the future” but rather “one who sees the future.” Chochmah (wisdom) is when the future is as real to the mind and the emotions as if it were perceived by the senses. How can we make our knowledge of the future real to our minds? By utilizing our imagination. In the introduction to his commentary on Mishlei, Saadia Gaon explains that this is the crux of Shlomo ha’Melech’s method:

Furthermore, sensory knowledge is easier and more real to the [minds of the] masses than intellectual knowledge since the sensory faculties exist in them from birth. Therefore, it is necessary to craft mashalim (examples and metaphors) for [the masses] in order to equate the dictates of the intellect with the dictates of the senses ... For this reason, when the intellect sees something detrimental or hears about something harmful and reveals it to the emotions and sees that they don’t trust it or accept it, [the intellect] should speak with them in a manner that they will understand.

This is why EFT needs to be vivid and detailed. The emotions don’t grasp abstractions and will not be moved by them. It’s not enough to tell the emotions that “the lazy man’s estate will deteriorate.” Instead, you need to say: 

“I passed by the field of a lazy man, the vineyard of a man who lacks understanding, and behold! it was all grown over with thistles, its face was covered with nettles, and the stone wall was broken down. And I beheld, and I applied my mind and took discipline: a little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the hands to recline, and your poverty will come like a traveler, and your lacking like an armed man” (Mishlei 24:31-34). 

The more details you imagine, the more your emotions will be impacted.

This article was just an intro. I hope to expand upon other benefits of EFT over the next few weeks. That is, in the future.

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Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife?

This week’s dvar Torah is a digest of the answers given by the Rishonim [1] to a classic question, along with an original answer based on my understanding of Sefer Koheles. 

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Artwork: Honor's Reward, by Izzy

Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife? 

The Question 

Parashas Bechukosai opens with a list of the blessings that Hashem promises to bestow “If you will follow My decrees and observe My commandments and perform them” (Vayikra 26:3). Among these blessings are: rain in its proper time, abundant produce, peace in the land, military success, flourishing of our population, and Divine favor. A similar list of blessings is stated in Parashas Ki Savo (Devarim 28:1-14). 

But there is a shocking omission from both lists of blessings: Olam ha’Ba (the “World to Come” or “afterlife”), the ultimate reward for a life of Torah and mitzvos. 

This is a famous problem. Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? In contrast, the Oral Torah and midrashic literature are replete with references to Olam ha’Ba, the most prominent of which is the Mishnah’s statement: “All of Israel has a portion in Olam ha’Ba” (Sanhedrim 10:1). 

This discrepancy between the Written and Oral Torahs has led modern academics to conclude that the entire notion of an afterlife was a Rabbinic invention, introduced long after the Biblical period. Those who wish to believe such conspiracy theories will not be convinced by any arguments, and I will not even attempt to address them here. Suffice it to say, our Mesorah (tradition) is clear on this point: belief in Olam ha’Ba has always been a unanimously accepted part of Judaism, despite the fact that it is not explicitly referenced in the 24 books of Tanach. 

But the question remains: Why does the Written Torah omit Olam ha’Ba from its lists of rewards? Why does it focus exclusively on the physical blessings? 

Seven Answers from the Rishonim 

The Abravanel [2] raises our question in his Chumash commentary and refers the reader to a book he wrote on the topic of Olam ha’Ba called Tzedek Olamim, in which he answers this question in full. Sadly, this book has been lost to history. Fortunately, the Abravanel provides a brief summary of six answers given to our question by his predecessors, followed by his own seventh answer. Here are my summaries of the Abravanel’s summaries: 

(1) Rambam [3]: The blessings and curses promised in the Torah are not the true reward and punishment for the mitzvos. The true reward is Olam ha’Ba, which is purely spiritual in nature. The reason why the Written Torah didn’t mention this reward is so that a person will follow Torah lishmah (for its own sake) – or, as the Abravanel puts it, “for the sake of perfection” – rather than for the sake of reward or out of fear of punishment. The role of the blessings and curses is to facilitate our pursuit of human perfection for its own sake: to the extent that we follow Hashem, He will provide us with physical goods and remove physical impediments from our lives so that we can continue in our pursuit of perfection without worrying about our material well-being; and to the extent that we neglect His will, He will withhold His blessings and we will be subject to these curses which will impede our pursuit of perfection. 

(2) Ibn Ezra [4]: The reward in Olam ha’Ba is a deep concept which is difficult for the average person to grasp. Since the Written Torah was given to the entire Jewish nation – not just the elite scholars – it was necessary to only mention the physical rewards and punishments, which can be understood by everyone. The sode (“secret” or esoteric concept) of Olam ha’Ba was relegated to the realm of the Oral Torah, thereby allowing every teacher to assess their student’s readiness for this concept on an individual basis, in accordance with that student’s level of development. 

(3) Ramban [5] / Sefer ha’Chinuch [6]: Belief in the eternality of the soul and its reward in Olam ha’Ba is a matter that can be rationally demonstrated by way of philosophical argument, and therefore did not need to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. In contrast, the blessings and curses are miraculous [7] phenomena which operate according to the principles of hashgachah (Divine providence) known only through nevuah (prophecy), which is why it was necessary for the Torah to spell them out in detail. 

(4) Ran [8] / Kuzari [9]: The majority of the people, in ancient and modern times, denied the reality of hashgachah pratis (individual Divine providence). This denial was rampant among the Jews as well. Were the Torah to only promise spiritual reward and punishment after death, then these misguided Jews would take this as a confirmation of their deistic worldview. Therefore, it was necessary for the Torah to reinforce the truth of hasghacha pratis by going into great detail about the physical blessings and curses that will transpire as a result of our adherence to Torah. As for the reality of the spiritual reward and punishment for the soul in Olam ha’Ba: this can be inferred from the physical blessings and curses in Olam ha’Zeh (the physical world). Once we see that God provides us with physical rewards, which relate to the lower part of our nature (i.e. the body), we will realize that certainly He must provide us with spiritual reward, to compensate the higher part of our nature (i.e. the soul). 

(5) Saadia Gaon [10]: The ovdei avodah zarah (idolaters) engaged in various behaviors which they believed would bring them material success and protection from physical harm. When Hashem prohibited these idolatrous practices, He didn’t want His people to think that they would lose out on these material benefits. Therefore, He promised us as part of His covenant that by keeping the Torah, we would enjoy rewards in the physical world greater than anything that the ovdei avodah zarah hoped for from their false gods, since Hashem is the true God of heaven and earth, Who has the ability to bestow such blessings as He sees fit. There was no need to mention spiritual rewards, since the promises of physical rewards were only included in the covenant to refute the false promise of physical blessings by the ovdei avodah zarah. (Apparently, the ovdei avodah zarah of that era did not yearn for spiritual rewards, which is why there was no need to mention them in the covenant.) 

(6) Kuzari [11] / Ran [12]: The afterlife of the soul is explicitly mentioned in the blessings promised by the Torah in such statements as: “I [Hashem] will walk among you” (Vayikra 26:12), “I will place My dwelling among you” (ibid. 26:11), “I will be God unto you” (ibid. 26:12). [The Abravanel then goes on to explain how, if the nature of this spiritual reward is properly understood, then even the promises of physical blessings will serve as a proof that the souls of the righteous will survive after death. However, I’m not 100% sure that I follow every step of his explanation, and I would rather omit it from my summary than risk misrepresenting this line of reasoning.] 

(7) Abravanel [13]: It would not be proper to mention Olam ha’Ba in the context of Bechukosai and Ki Savo, since these blessings are for the nation as a whole rather than for individuals, whereas the spiritual rewards of the afterlife are for individuals and not for the nation as a whole. If the Torah had mentioned Olam ha’Ba in its lists of blessings, this might lead to misconceptions about the nature of the reward in the afterlife. For example, one might mistakenly conclude that one’s portion in Olam ha’Ba is determined or affected by the righteousness and wickedness of the majority of nation, as is the case with the physical blessings and curses. 

An Eighth Answer 

Shlomo ha'Melech says: “Give a portion to seven but also to eight” (Koheles 11:2). While the seven of the aforementioned answers all have their merits, I would like to offer an eighth answer – one which lines up with that of the Rambam, but with a twist. 

The Rambam [14] devotes the final chapter of Hilchos Teshuvah to a discussion of the motives for serving Hashem. He opens his discussion by defining two levels of Divine service: 

A person should not say, “I will do the mitzvos of the Torah and involve myself in its wisdom in order to receive all of the blessings that are written in it,” or “in order that I will merit life in Olam ha’Ba” and “I will separate myself from the transgressions about which the Torah warns us, in order to escape from the curses written in the Torah” or “so that I will not be cut off from Olam ha’Ba.”  

It is not proper to serve Hashem in this manner, for one who serves Hashem in this manner is called “oveid mi’yirah” (“one who serves out of fear”). This is neither a virtue of the prophets nor of the wise. The only ones who should serve Hashem in this manner are the ignoramuses, the women, and the children, whom we train to serve out of fear until their minds develop and they serve out of love.  

An “oveid me’ahavah” (“one who serves out of love”) involves himself in Torah and mitzvos and walks on the paths of wisdom not because of anything in the world, neither out of fear of the bad nor out of a desire to inherit the good. Rather, he does what is true because it is true, and the good will come of its own accord … 

It is easy to understand why doing mitzvos in order to receive the blessings promised by the Torah is considered to be an inferior motive, but why should this apply to one whose service is motivated by the prospect of reward in Olam ha’Ba? Didn’t the Rambam write earlier [15] that Olam ha’Ba is the greatest good? 

The [ultimate] goodness which is hidden away for tzadikim is Olam ha’Ba. This is the life which has no death with it, and the good which has no bad. This is what is written in the Torah, “so that it will be good for you, and you will prolong your days” (Devarim 22:7). From the Oral Torah we learn: “so that it will be good for you” [refers] to the world which is entirely good, and “you will prolong your days” [refers] to the world which is entirely long – and this is Olam ha’Ba. 

If Olam ha’Ba is the ultimate good, why shouldn’t it motivate our observance of mitzvos? 

The answer lies in the fact that it is impossible for us to comprehend the true nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba. The Rambam [16] introduces this difficulty in his introduction to Perek Chelek. He writes: 

Know that just as a blind man cannot experience colors, nor can a deaf man experience sounds, nor can a eunuch [experience] sexual desire, so too, physical bodies cannot experience spiritual enjoyments. And just as a fish does not recognize the element of fire because it (i.e. the fish) is immersed in its opposite, so too, one cannot know the enjoyments of the spiritual world while one is in this physical world, for we have no enjoyment other than bodily enjoyments alone – [such as] the experiences of our senses in eating, drinking, and sex – and everything outside of these [physical enjoyments] is not experienced by us, nor can we recognize it, nor can we apprehend it in our initial analysis, but only after much investigation. This is because we are in a physical world and cannot apprehend anything other than its enjoyments, but enjoyments of the soul are constant and unceasing, and there is no relationship at all whatsoever between these and those. 

Similarly, the Rambam [17] writes in the Mishneh Torah: 

Regarding the great good which the soul will enjoy in Olam ha’Ba: there is no way in Olam ha’Zeh to comprehend it or know it, because we only know in Olam ha’Zeh the good of the body, and that is what we desire; but that good [in Olam ha’Ba] is exceedingly great, and there is no comparison among the goods of Olam ha’Zeh except by way of analogy. 

Indeed, a few paragraphs earlier the Rambam condemns those who harbor foolish notions about the nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba, writing: 

Maybe this good will seem trivial in your eyes, and you’ll imagine that the only reward for mitzvos and for being a person who is perfected in the ways of truth is to eat and drink good foods, have relations with beautiful figures, wear garments made of silk and woven fabrics, dwell in houses of marble, and use gold and silver utensils and other things like this – as is imagined by the foolish and idiotic Arabs who are steeped in lechery.

But the wise and those who possess knowledge know that all of these things are fantasy and nothingness, and there is no hope in them. They are only considered to be a great good for us in Olam ha’Zeh because we have bodies, and all of these things are bodily needs, and the soul only desires them and favors them because they are bodily needs, in order that its desires will be fulfilled and its health maintained. And when there is no body, all of these things will be found to be pointless. 

Having established all of these premises, I would like to propose my own answer to our original question: Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? Because since it is absolutely impossible to conceive of the spiritual enjoyments of Olam ha’Ba, then if we were to be motivated by the promise of such a reward, we would – by definition – be chasing a fantasy. In other words, whatever notion of Olam ha’Ba is driving our motivation must, of necessity, be false, since it is impossible for a physical being to conceive of non-physical enjoyments. 

It is for this reason that the Torah promises physical blessings to those who obey Hashem. The individual whose avodah (Divine service) is motivated by these physical blessings and the individual whose avodah is motivated by Olam ha’Ba are both engaged in avodah she’lo lishmah (not for its own sake), but the former individual is on a higher level because at least he’s being motivated by a reality, whereas the latter is being motivated by a fantasy. 

Make no mistake: Olam ha’Ba itself is a reality, but the version of Olam ha’Ba as a motivator is a fantasy. The vision of Olam ha’Ba in our minds and imaginations, to which our psyche attaches value, and which acts as the proverbial carrot (paired with the proverbial stick) – that notion of Olam ha’Ba has no basis in reality whatsoever. In contrast, “rains in their proper time,” “eating bread in satiety,” “peace in the land” and all of the other physical blessings exist as motivators in our imaginations which do correspond to their physical reality. 

This sheds light on the Divine wisdom in relegating Olam ha’Ba to the Oral Torah. In Hashem’s “Plan A” (so to speak), students would not be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba until they were developmentally ready, as the Rambam [18] describes: 

Therefore, when we teach the children, women, and general populace of laymen, we should only teach them to serve out of fear and in order to receive reward, until their minds mature and they gain additional wisdom; we should reveal this secret to them bit by bit, and accustom them to this concept with pleasantness, until they apprehend it and know it and serve out of love. 

Parents and teachers would motivate their children and students to serve Hashem for the she’lo lishmah motive of obtaining the blessings mentioned in the Written Torah. As they reached the requisite level of psychological and intellectual maturity, they would be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba, which would click into its proper intellectual place as a truth about reality, rather than as a motivator for avodah. In this manner, they would bypass the stage of being motivated by a fantasy notion of Olam ha’Ba altogether. 

Ultimately, we cannot know why Hashem chose not to mention Olam ha’Ba explicitly in His lists of rewards, but these eight theories allow us to appreciate the fact that this was done with reason, and with wisdom. 

[1] This is a general remark, but I might as well mention it here. The line between Rishonim and Achronim is a matter of debate. Some distinguish between the two periods based on dates (e.g. the Rishonim are those who wrote in the 11th century to the 15th century, and the Achronim are post-15th century) or by specifying a cutoff point (e.g. all commentators who came before the composition of the Shulchan Aruch were Rishonim, and all who came after are Achronim). Personally, I don’t like either of these approaches. I prefer to define the two groups by their time period AND their relationship to their predecessors and/or their style. For example, I classify the Abravanel (1437 – 1508) as a Rishon because he argues with his predecessors as a contemporary, rather than a disciple. I classify the Sforno (1475 – 1550) as a Rishon because of his commentary’s style and commentary. 

[2] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 26:3 

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1); Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 9 

[4] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer Devarim 32:39; it should be noted that the Ibn Ezra’s answer to this question parallels his answer to R’ Yehuda ha’Levi’s question on the first of the Aseres ha’Dibros: Why does Hashem introduce Himself to the Jewish people by saying “Who took you out from the land of Egypt” instead of “Who created the heavens and the earth”? See the Ibn Ezra’s long commentary on Shemos 20:2. 

[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 18:29 

[6] Sefer ha’Chinuch: Introduction. The Abravanel doesn’t actually quote the Sefer ha’Chinuch with reference to this view, but since it was the first place I encountered it in my own learning, and since the Sefer ha’Chinuch expands upon this view even more than the Ramban, I decided to attribute this view to him in my list. Moreover, the Abravanel attributes this view to “Rabbeinu Bachya ha’Zaken, as mentioned by the Ibn Ezra” but according to the Warsaw manuscript and H. Norman Strickman, the name mentioned by the Ibn Ezra is actually “Rabbeinu Hai.” This possible misattribution is yet another reason why I opted to label this under the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s name. 

[7] According to the Ramban, as the Abravanel himself points out. 

[8] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran #1 

[9] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi (Kuzari) 1:104-117 

[10] Rabbeinu Saadia Gaon, Emunos v’Deos 9:2 

[11] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi 1:115 

[12] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran, end of #3 

[13] The Abravanel credits the Ramban for this approach, based on the latter’s Commentary on Sefer Devarim 29:20; he also cites the Sefer ha’Ikkarim 4:40, chastising him for citing this answer in his own name rather than in the name of the Ramban. 

[14] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 10:1-2 

[15] ibid. 8:1 

[16] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1) 

[17] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 8:6 

[18] Ibid. 10:5

Acts of Hashem in Mishlei

Originally published on my (now defunct) Mishlei blog in August 2012. I will note that my understanding of hashgachah pratis has evolved significantly since then - mostly due to the influence of Sefer Iyov. Nevertheless, I have chosen not to "update" the frame of reference in this blog post. 

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Acts of Hashem in Mishlei

Introduction

This is intended to serve as a peremptory methodology post on a point that is bound to come up in future Mishlei posts. Rather than explain myself in each individual post, I'd rather be able to link to a full treatment of the subject. 

The methodology principle may be stated as follows: When Shlomo ha'Melech uses the term "Hashem" in Mishlei, he is usually referring to the laws of nature - not hashgachah pratis (individual providence or divine intervention).

I will now expand upon the basis for this principle and cite support from two Rishonim. 

The Purpose and Scope of Mishlei

Different meforshim have different views as to what Mishlei is about. According to Rashi [1] the purpose of Mishlei is "to teach people that they should toil in Torah." Consequently, Rashi interprets many pesukim to be about learning Torah and keeping mitzvos. Ralbag [2] holds that the purpose of Mishlei is "to guide man to intellectual and social success." Therefore, he interprets the pesukim as teaching strategies towards those two ends. The Vilna Gaon [3] learns that Mishlei is essentially a strategy guide on how to wage war against the yetzer ha'ra.

My own approach to Mishlei follows that of Saadia Gaon, as set forth in the introduction to his commentary on Mishlei (and as I explained in my translation and commentary on the first section of that introduction). According to Saadia Gaon Mishlei is a book about how to make intelligent decisions in everyday life - decisions which yield the greatest long-term pleasure with the least long-term pain. 

Since, according to this view, Mishlei is about everyday decision-making, it follows that the overwhelming focus of the sefer will be on how to obtain benefits and avoid harmful consequences within the laws of nature - as opposed to the benefits and consequences which emanate from hashgachah pratis (e.g. berachos and klalos, nissim and hashgachic onesh, tefilah, nevuah etc.). Although these areas of hashgachah pratis are certainly important to learn about, they are too far removed from the everyday decision-making of most people to be included in a practical book like Mishlei. The treatment of these subjects can be found in Sefer Tehilim, Sefer Iyov, and most of the other books of Nach.

This does not mean that Mishlei never talks about hashgachah pratis. On occasion, Shlomo ha'Melech deals with such topics, but only in order to teach practical ideas about decision-making in everyday life.

Acts of Hashem in Mishlei

When we see a pasuk which ascribes a certain act to Hashem in other contexts, our first inclination is often to assume it is talking about an act of hashgachah pratis. For instance, "I am Hashem, your God, Who has taken you out of the land of Egypt, from the house of slavery" (Shemos 20:2) is referring to the miracles and wonders of the Exodus from Egypt. "The meat was still between their teeth, not yet chewed, when the wrath of Hashem flared against the people, and Hashem struck a very mighty blow against the people" (Bamidbar 11:33) refers to Hashem miraculously smiting those who complained about the mahn. "The Lord consumed without pity all the dwellings of Jacob; in His anger He razed the fortresses of the daughter of Yehudah to the ground" (Eichah 2:2) refers to the destruction of Yerushalayim wrought by Hashem as a result of our iniquities. And so on.

There are a number of instances in Mishlei in which Hashem is described as acting to benefit the chacham or tzadik and to bring harm upon the fool or rasha. For instance: "Hashem will not starve the soul of the righteous, but the destructiveness of the wicked will batter them" (10:3), "Hashem will uproot the house of the arrogant, but He upholds the boundary of a widow" (15:25), "Like streams of water is the heart of a king in the hand of Hashem; wherever He wishes, so He directs it" (21:1). Instances of this sort aren't super prevalent in Mishlei, but they occur frequently enough not to be regarded as an anomaly.

If, according to Saadia Gaon, Mishlei is about practical decision-making based on natural consequences, how are we to understand these "acts of God pesukim" which would seem to imply Divine intervention?

This is why, based on Saadia Gaon's approach, it would make sense to interpret these pesukim as referring to cause-and-effect within the laws of nature - that is, Hashem's actions in the middas ha'din (strict justice mode) of the Boreh Olam (Creator of the universe), rather than the middas ha'rachamim (merciful mode) of the Mashgiach ha'Pratim (Supervisor of individuals).

This was how my Mishlei rebbi interpreted references to Hashem in Mishlei. When I was first learning his derech I didn't really question this premise. It wasn't until later that I began to wonder whether there was any precedent in the meforshim for this approach. The more I saw how often the other meforshim explained pesukim like these to be referring to hashgachah pratis, the more

Then I found the Meiri.

Meiri: Non-hashgachic Interpretation of a Seemingly Hashgachic Pasuk

The Meiri's commentary was the first place I saw this methodology principle stated in explicit terms. As noted above, the pasuk: "Hashem will not starve the soul of the righteous, but the destructiveness of the wicked will batter them" (Mishlei 10:3) seems to be referring to hashgachah pratis. It is reminiscent of the pasuk we recite after the Birkas ha'Mazon: "I have been a youth and also aged, but I have not seen a tzadik forsaken, nor his children begging for bread" (Tehilim 37:25). Pesukim like these would seem to imply that there is a special hashgachah on the tzadik, and that Hashem will protect him from starvation.

The Meiri takes a different approach. He interprets the pasuk in an entirely naturalistic manner. According to the Meiri, the subject of the pasuk is the difference between the eating habits of tzadikim and reshaim. He explains that the tzadik eats in moderation, based on his physical and psychological needs. Consequently, his chomer (material body and psyche) will be more receptive to the development of his tzurah (intellect). In contrast, the rasha eats in quantities which are either excessive or insufficient. This leads to a physical and psychological imbalance, which in turn, has a detrimental effect not only on his intellectual development, but on his capacity for psychological satisfaction.

Upon reading the Meiri's naturalistic interpretation, one might object, saying: "Then what does the pasuk mean when it says, 'Hashem will not starve the soul of the tzadik'? Doesn't this imply hashgachah pratis - that Hashem intervenes to prevent the tzadik from starving?" The Meiri [4] answers this question in his commentary:

This matter is ascribed to Hashem, for all things that come about through nature are ascribed to Him, blessed is He. It is as if it the pasuk said, “The tzadik will not be in a state of starvation,” and the rasha will be the opposite, and will never be satisfied, as it is stated, “the belly of the wicked will lack” (Mishlei 13:25).

Simple as that. According to the Meiri, any effect which is brought about by the laws of nature can be described as being brought about by Hashem. The Meiri learns that the tzadik's non-starvation is the result of his own actions, based on the design of the human body. Nevertheless, the pasuk ascribes this result to Hashem - as though it were directly caused by Him. The Meiri even goes so far as to suggest that the pasuk could have omitted mention of Hashem entirely, without losing anything from the main idea.

Rambam: Hashem Guides Sinners on the Path

The first time I noticed the application of this principle in the works of the Rambam was in the section of Hilchos Teshuvah which deals with free will. Chapter 5 of Hilchos Teshuvah is about the fundamental principle of free will, and Chapter 6 is devoted to addressing pesukim in Tanach which appear to undermine that principle.

The Rambam [5] cites the following two pesukim from Tehilim as examples of statements which seem to imply that Hashem interferes with free will: "Good and upright is Hashem; therefore He guides sinners on the path. He leads the humble with justice and teaches His way to the humble" (Tehilim 25:7-8). What does it mean that Hashem "guides sinners on the way" and "leads the humble with justice etc."? Does this imply that Hashem interferes with their free will? Nope. The Rambam explains:

This means that Hashem has sent prophets to them, who teach them the ways of Hashem and help them to return in teshuvah. Moreover, He instilled within them the capacity to learn and to understand - for this tendency is present in every man, that the more he is drawn after the ways of chochmah (wisdom) and tzedek (righteousness), the more he desires them and pursues them. This is what the Sages meant by "ha'ba l'taher, mesayin oso" ("one who comes to be purified is assisted") - in other words, he will find himself assisted in the matter [by the aforementioned natural tendency].

Here again we have a pasuk which, on the surface, appears to be describing a direct interaction between Hashem and human beings - and yet, the Rambam interprets this as referring to natural phenomena (i.e. the nature of man). Even more shocking is the Rambam's treatment of that well-known statement of Chazal. Contrary to appearances, "ha'ba l'taher, mesayin oso" is not referring to hashgachic assistance. It is referring to the way that Hashem designed man, that the more he pursues chochmah and tzedek, the more he is drawn to them.

But all of this is nothing compared to the most eye-opening source yet: the Rambam, in the Guide for the Perplexed.

Rambam: On Ascribing Actions to Hashem

In the final chapter of Book II of the Moreh ha'Nevuchim, the Rambam [6] provides a key which unlocks a whole new level of understanding of maasei Hashem (Divine actions) in Tanach. I will quote the chapter in full, with my underlining for emphasis:

It is clear that everything that is produced must have an immediate cause which produced it, and that cause must have a cause, and so on, until the First Cause – namely, the will and desire of God – is reached. Therefore, the prophets sometimes omit mention of the intermediate causes and ascribe the production of a particular thing directly to God, saying that God has made it [or did it]. This is well-known and we, as well as other men of truth, have already explained it; it is the belief of all adherents of our Torah.

After having heard this remark, listen to what I will explain in this chapter; direct your special attention to it more than you have done to the other chapters of this part. It is this:

Know that regarding the immediate causes of things produced, it makes no difference whether these causes are natural and essential, or of free will, or of chance; by “free will” I mean that of man, or even in the will of another living creature. In all of these cases the prophets ascribe the production directly to God and use such phrases as God has made [or done] it, commanded it, or said it. In all such cases the verbs “to say,” “to speak,” “to command,” “to call” and “to send” are employed. This is what I desired to state in this chapter is this, namely, that according to the hypothesis and theory accepted, it is God Who caused that will to arise in that dumb animal, and He is the One Who necessitated free will for the human being, and He is the One Who guided natural things in accordance with their patterns; and as chance occurrences are part of the good in the natural [order], as has been explained [by Aristotle], and are mostly the result of the combined action of nature, free will, and desire, it can consequently be said of everything which is produced by any of these causes, that God commanded that it should be made [or done], or said that it should be so. I will give you instances, and they will guide you in the interpretation of passages which I do not mention.

As regards phenomena produced regularly by natural causes, such as the melting of the snow when the atmosphere becomes warm and the roaring of the sea when a storm rages [I quote the following passages:] “He issues His command it melts them” (Tehilim 147:18); “He spoke and raised the stormy wind and lifted its waves” (ibid. 107:25); in reference to the rain we read: “I will command the clouds that they shall not rain etc.” (Yeshaya 5:6). 

Events caused by man’s free will, such as war, the dominion of one nation over another, the attempt of one person to hurt another, or to curse him, [are ascribed to God as well;] in reference to the dominion of Nebuchadnezzar and his host: “I have commended my holy ones, also I have called my heroes for my anger” (ibid. 13:3) and “I will send him against a hypocrite nation” (ibid. 10:6); in reference to Shimi ben Gera: “For God said to him, ‘Curse David’” (Shmuel II 16:10); in reference to the deliverance of the righteous Yosef from prison: “He sent a king who released him” (Tehilim 105:20); in reference to the victory of the Persians over the Chaldeans: “I shall send foreigners to Bavel, who will scatter it and empty it” (Yirmiyahu 51:2); in reference to the providing of food to Eliyahu: “Behold, I have commanded a widow to sustain you there” (Melachim I 17:5); and the righteous Yosef said: “It was not you who sent me here, but God” (Bereishis 45:8). 

[The attribution to God of] that which is caused by the will of an animal or its movement towards its needs [may be illustrated by the following instance]: “Then Hashem spoke to the fish [and it spewed out Jonah onto dry land]” (Yonah 2:11); the act is ascribed to God because He gave the fish the will, and not because He made it a prophet or showed it a prophetic vision. Similarly it is said of the locusts that appeared in the days of Yoel ben Petuel: “for those who carry out His word are mighty” (Yoel 2:11); or of the beasts that took possession of the land of Edom when destroyed in the days of Sancheriv: “He cast lots for them, and His hand has distributed [the land] for them with a [measuring] wire” (Yeshaya 34:17). Although here the verbs “to say,” “to command,” “to send” are not used, the meaning is evidently the same, and you must explain all passages that are analogous to it in a similar manner.

This must also be said with regards to events which evidently occur by chance, for example, in reference to Rivka, “and let her be a wife to your master’s son as Hashem has spoken” (Bereishis 24:51); in reference to David and Yehonasan: “go, for Hashem has sent you away” (Shmuel I 20:22); in reference to Yosef: “God sent me before you” (Bereishis 45:7). 

You see clearly that the providing of a cause, in whatever manner this may take place – by nature, chance, free will, or will – is always expressed by one of the five terms: commanding, saying, speaking, sending, or calling. Note this, and apply it everywhere according to the context. Many difficulties will thereby be removed, and passages apparently containing things far from truth will prove to be true.

There you have it. Anything that is produced by nature, chance, free will, or animal will - and certainly, anything brought about by hashgachah pratis - will be described in Tanach as though it was directly caused by Hashem. [7]

Philosophically speaking, this makes perfect sense, insofar as Hashem is the First Cause. What I found to be so shocking was the far-reaching implications of this interpretive principle, as the Rambam himself alluded to by saying that by applying this principle, "many difficulties will thereby be removed, and passages apparently containing things far from the truth will prove to be true."

We see from the Rambam's interpretation of "ha'ba l'taher mesayin oso" that Chazal's statements may be understood in this way as well. This confirms what I already suspected (and employed in my learning for years).

Conclusion

This post was intended to be about how to learn pesukim in Mishlei which refer to Hashem's actions, but ended up taking us far beyond that. I hope that at the very least I have adequately shown the basis of my general approach to such pesukim in Mishlei.

[1] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Mishlei 1:2
[2] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershoom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on Sefer Mishlei: Introduction (note: the Ralbag's introduction is not typically found in the published Mikraos Gedolos)
[3] HaRav Eliyahu Kramer (Vilna Gaon), Commentary on Sefer Mishlei (I don't remember where and I currently do not know where my edition of the Vilna Gaon's commentary on Mishlei is hiding)
[4] Rabbeinu Menachem ha'Meiri, Commentary on Sefer Mishlei 10:3
[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 6:4
[6] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 2:48
[7] I am bothered by the fact that the Rambam concludes by saying that there are five terms which indicate this idea: commanding, saying, speaking, sending, or calling - yet, it seems that this principle is applied to other cases in which actions are ascribed to Hashem without using these five terms. 

Parashas Eikev: When to Take Pesukim Non-literally

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Parashas Eikev: When to Take Pesukim Non-literally

Question: What do the following four pesukim from this week's parashah have in common?

• "Hear, O Israel, today you cross the Jordan, to come and drive out nations that are greater and mightier than you, cities that are great and fortified in the sky" (Devarim 9:1)
• "You shall circumcise the foreskin of your heart, and no longer stiffen your neck" (ibid. 10:16)
• "Behold! To Hashem, your God, belong the heaven and the highest heaven, the earth and everything that is in it" (ibid. 10:14)
• "You shall place these words of Mine upon your heart and upon your soul; you shall bind them as a sign upon your arm and let them be tefillin between your eyes" (ibid. 11:18)

If you read the title of this blog post, then you already know the answer: these are all pesukim which we do not take literally! 

Unlike some of our fundamentalist Christian neighbors, we Jews have never subscribed to Biblical Literalism. "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" (Shemos 21:24) refers to monetary compensation, not literal eye-gouging and tooth-pulling; "with a strong hand and an outstretched arm" (Devarim 4:34) is an allegory, and doesn't mean that God has limbs; "Yisachar is a strong-boned donkey" (Bereishis 49:14) is a metaphor, not a taxonomic statement. The list goes on and on.

The problem is that although there are many instances in which it is obvious that we do not take a pasuk literally, there are others which are not so clear-cut. Is the Torah's account of creation to be taken at face value? Did the snake in the Garden of Eden really talk? Was Avraham Avinu really visited by angels in human form?

If only there was a methodology for how to approach these questions of interpretation! Better yet, it would be great to have a list of interpretive rules and guidelines that we could apply as a litmus test to determine whether a pasuk is literal or non-literal.

Thankfully for us, Saadia Gaon [1] provides us with exactly what we are looking for! He lays out a set of rules for when to interpret a pasuk literally and when not to. According to Saadia Gaon, there are four - and only four - reasons why we would not take a pasuk literally. He even provides us with at least one example from each category. Here is a translation of his treatment of this topic:

It is a well-known fact that every statement found in the Torah is to be understood in its literal sense except for those that cannot be so construed for one of the following four reasons:

Reason #1: It may, for example, either be rejected by the observation of the senses, such as the statement: "And the man called his wife’s name 'Chava' because she was the mother of all living things" (Bereishis 3:20), whereas we see that the ox and the lion are not the offspring of womankind. Hence we must conclude that the implication of the statement embraces human descendants only. 

Reason #2: Or else the literal sense may be negated by rationality, such as that of the statement: "For Hashem, your God, is a devouring fire, a jealous God" (Devarim 4:42). Now fire is something created and defective, for it is subject to extinction. Hence it is logically inadmissible that God resemble it. We must, therefore, impute to this statement the meaning that God’s punishment is like consuming fire, in accordance with the remark made elsewhere in Scripture: "For all the earth shall be devoured with the fire of My jealously" (Zephaniah 3:8).  

Reason #3: Again, [the literal meaning of a Biblical statement may be rendered impossible] by an explicit text of a contradictory nature, in which case it would become necessary to interpret the first statement in a non-literal sense. Thus, for example, it is said in Scripture: "You shall not test Hashem, your God, as you tested Him at Massah" (Devarim 6:16). And it is also said, on the other hand: "And do not test Me now ... if I will not open for you the windows of heaven" (Malachi 3:10). Now the point wherein these two statements agree is that we must not test our Lord as to whether He is able to do a certain thing, as they did of whom it is reported: "And they tested God in their heart by asking food for their craving. They spoke against God, saying: 'Can God prepare a table in the wilderness?'” (Tehilim 78:18-19). It is to these that the remark "as you tested Him in Massah" refers. It is, however, permissible for a servant of God to test his Master’s power by asking whether it will be possible for Him to create a miracle in his behalf. Such a request was indeed made by Gideon, who said: "I will test but this one time through the fleece" (Shoftim 6:39). It was also done by Hezekiah (II Melachim 20:8) and others. 

Reason #4: Finally any Biblical statement to the meaning of which rabbinic tradition has attached a certain qualification is to be interpreted by us in keeping with this authentic tradition. Thus it has been transmitted to us that the punishment of malkos (lashes) consists of thirty-nine blows, although Scripture states: "Forty lashes he shall give him" (Devarim 25:3). We therefore adopt the view that this is just a rough way of saying that there be thirty-nine stripes. The text of Scripture has merely expressed this thought in round numbers, as it has done in the statement: "After the number of days in which you spied out the land, even forty days, for every day a year shall ye bear your iniquities, even forty years" (Bamidbar 14:34). For in reality there were only thirty-nine years, since the first year of Israel’s sojourn in the wilderness did not enter into this punishment. 

Thus, there are only these four possible reasons for a non-literal interpretation of the verses of the Holy Torah, there being no fifth. 

There you have it - the four cases in which we take a pasuk non-literally. Now let's see how these categories to apply to the pesukim from our parashah. 

Example #1: "Hear, O Israel, today you cross the Jordan, to come and drive out nations that are greater and mightier than you, cities that are great and fortified in the sky" (Devarim 9:1)

This pasuk is an example of Saadia Gaon's first category: pesukim we take non-literally because they contradict our senses. It is impossible to actually build cities that are "in the sky" because the sky cannot support such structures. Alternatively, if we read this phrase as "up to the sky," it is still impossible to take this literally, since human beings cannot build structures which reach that high. "Skyscraper" is a figure of speech - not a literal description.

This particular form of non-literal statement is referred to by Chazal (the Sages) as "guzma" or "divrei havai." Chazal [2] teach: "The Torah spoke in an exaggerated manner, the prophets spoke in an exaggerated manner, and the Sages spoke in an exaggerated manner."

Example #2: "You shall circumcise the foreskin of your heart, and no longer stiffen your neck" (ibid. 10:16)

This pasuk is an example of Saadia Gaon's second category: pesukim which we take non-literally because they are negated by rationality. It would be absurd to take this pasuk literally, that Hashem commands each and every Jew to surgically remove their own pericardium. The Ibn Ezra [3] is fond of using this pasuk as an example of when to interpret a commandment in the Torah non-literally if doing so would be irrational. He offers several reasons for why our pasuk falls into this category: the Torah says that we should do this mitzvos and live by them; it is prohibited to murder others, and to murder ourselves; and - my favorite reason - the mitzvah would be impossible to do, since we would die before completing the procedure! Rather, the pshat of this pasuk is "you shall remove the foolishness of your mind," as Onkelos renders it.

Without a question, this is the trickiest of Saadia Gaon's interpretive rules to apply. Whether a pasuk is "negated by rationality" is not always a clear-cut matter. Consider, for example, the three instances mentioned earlier: the Six Days of Creation, the talking snake, and Avraham's visitors. The meforshim (commentators) are divided as to whether these pesukim should be taken literally or not; each side will claim that their interpretation is consistent with rationality. 

Nevertheless, Saadia Gaon's rule still stands. The fact that the application of this rule is subject to difficulty and dispute does not negate its validity. 

Example #3: "Behold! To Hashem, your God, belongs the heaven and the highest heaven, the earth and everything that is in it" (ibid. 10:14)

This pasuk is an example of Saadia Gaon's third category: pesukim which we take non-literally because they are explicitly contradicted by another text in the Torah. Chazal point out the contradiction of our pasuk by using a similar pasuk from Tehilim:

Rebbi Levi raised a contradiction: in one place it is written: "The earth and its fullness belong to Hashem" (Tehilim 24:1), but in another place it is written: "As for the heavens, the heavens are Hashem's, but the earth He has given to mankind" (Tehilim 115:16)! [Which is it? Does the earth belong to Hashem or to mankind?]

[Rebbi Levi answered:] This is not a contradiction: the first pasuk refers to before one recites a blessing; the second is referring to after one recites a blessing.

Like any contradiction, this one is resolved by qualifying each statement such that it doesn't contradict the other. 

Example #4: "You shall place these words of Mine upon your heart and upon your soul; you shall bind them as a sign upon your arm and let them be tefillin between your eyes" (ibid. 11:18)

This pasuk is an example of Saadia Gaon's fourth category: pesukim which we take non-literally because we have a mesorah (oral tradition) for how to interpret the pasuk which overrides its literal meaning. Although the pasuk itself would seem to indicate that we should place our head-tefillin between our eyes, the Torah she'baal Peh (Oral Torah) interpretation that was received by Moshe Rabbeinu at Sinai teaches that the head-tefillin should be placed so that it is resting on one's hairline above the spot that is between one's eyes. Like many of the non-literal interpretations in this category, there would be no way for us to arrive at this reading on our own without the oral tradition. 

And there you have it! Saadia Gaon assures us that these are the only four categories of non-literal pesukim, and thus far in my learning, I have seen no reason to doubt his claim. So next time you wonder whether a pasuk should be taken literally, just whip out Saadia Gaon's checklist, run through all four categories, and that should help you to find your answer!

End Notes:
[1] Saadia ben Yosef al-Fayyumi (Saadia Gaon), Emunos v'Deos 7:2
[2] Talmud Bavli: Maseches Tamid 29a
[3] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer Shemos 20:1; see also Ibn Ezra's introduction to Torah in his regular commentary and in his Shitah Acheres commentary

Parashas Mattos/Masei: Seduced by Particulars

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Parashas Mattos/Masei: Seduced by Particulars

Bnei Yisrael had just vanquished the Midianites and were preparing to finally enter Eretz Yisrael. However, not everyone is so keen about settling in Eretz Yisrael proper. The Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven approach Moshe Rabbeinu with a request: they would like to settle outside of Eretz Yisrael, across the Yarden, where the land is ideal for their abundant livestock.

They said, "If we have found favor in your eyes, let this land be given to your servants as a heritage; do not bring us across the Yarden" (Bamidbar 32:5).

How does Moshe take this? Not very well. He condemns the Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven in no uncertain terms, even going so far as to compare them to the sinful generation of the Meraglim who angered Hashem and caused Bnei Yisrael to wander in the Wilderness for 40 years:

Moshe said to the Bnei Gad and the Bnei Reuven, "Shall your brothers go out to battle while you settle here? Why do you dissuade the heart of Bnei Yisrael from crossing to the Land that Hashem has given them? This is what your fathers did, when I sent them from Kadesh-barnea to see the Land. They went up to the valley of Eshcol and saw the Land and they dissuaded the heart of Bnei Yisrael not to come to the Land that Hashem has given them. The wrath of Hashem burned on that day, and He swore saying, 'If these men who came up from Egypt - from the age of twenty years and above - will see the ground that I swore to Avraham, to Yitzchak, and to Yaakov ... for they have not followed Me fully ... The wrath of Hashem burned against Israel and He made them wander in the Wilderness for forty years, until the end of the entire generation that did evil in the eyes of Hashem. Behold! - you have risen up in place of your fathers, a society of sinful people, to add more to the burning wrath of Hashem against Israel. For if you will turn away from after Him, He will again let it rest in the Wilderness, and you will destroy this entire people (ibid. 32:6-15)

To an impartial reader, this might seem like an overreaction. Was the request made by Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven really as bad as Moshe makes it seem? Moreover, what are we supposed to learn from their cheit? 

As usual, the Ralbag provides a unique perspective on this cheit. He writes:

[From here we learn] a lesson in middos, namely, that it is not proper for a person to be seduced by the particulars to choose one thing over another, except after great deliberation. We see that because Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven had abundant livestock, they were seduced into choosing the land to the east, over the Yarden, since that was a good location for cattle. However, this caused them to later regret [their decision] after the land had been conquered, for they saw that this might cause their descendants to stray away from Hashem. This, in turn, caused them to build an [illegal] altar, as it is stated at the end of Sefer Yehoshua (Chapter 22) [which led to major problems for them]. Additionally, they would be more vulnerable to Israel's enemies. For this reason you will find that the first people to be exiled by the king of Assyria were these tribes. Moreover, the Moabites - whose land we took over from Sichon - were continually like a thorn which afflicted Israel, as we see from the events of Yiftach, the Giladi. 

According to the Ralbag, the main take-away from the cheit of Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven is not about the particular decision to settle outside of Eretz Yisrael per se, but rather, it is an insight about decision-making in general. Their mistake was allowing themselves to be "seduced by the particulars" in their decision about where to settle. As a result of that seduction, they were blind to the harm they would be causing to themselves, their brethren, and their future descendants.

Some might find this lesson to be too obvious for the Ralbag to highlight. Indeed, according to Saadia Gaon, the entire Sefer Mishlei may be viewed as a guidebook to avoid making this very mistake. Shlomo ha'Melech sums up this idea himself, saying: "There is a path which is straight before a man, but at its end are paths of death" (Mishlei 14:12). Then again, Saadia Gaon would also say that although this idea might be clear and obvious "in the eyes of the intellect," that is not the case "in the eyes of the emotions." We are all prone to being blinded by our emotions and being "seduced by the particulars." It is for this reason that we need to review and reinforce this lesson as much as possible.

But it is important to note that the error of the Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven did not occur on a personal level of decision-making, but on a societal level. It would seem that they had the best interests of their tribes and families in mind. They just weren't "thinking fourth-dimensionally" - that is to say, they weren't thinking about how their actions would affect future generations of Gadites and Reubenites. It is difficult enough guarding yourself against "seduction by the particulars" in your own lifetime, but it is even more difficult to do so when thinking about future generations. 

"Gad! Reuven! You're not thinking fourth dimensionally!"

This isn't the only instance where the Ralbag draws our attention to a poor decision made by a group of people to settle in a bad location. The Ralbag learns that this is the very reason why Hashem scattered the Dor ha'Haflagah (Generation of the Dispersion) by mixing up their language. The pesukim state:

The whole earth was of one language and of common principles. And it came to pass, when they migrated from the east, they found a valley in the land of Shinar and settled there (Bereishis 11:1-2). 

The mainstream view is that Hashem intervened because the society of the Dor ha'Haflagah was evil and corrupt, in one way or another. The Ralbag takes a radically different approach. He learns that Hashem intervened to save the human race from potential devastation. Ralbag writes:

Hashem saw that for all of mankind to be gathered in a single location would be detrimental for the continuity of the human species, for it is possible that a catastrophe would occur in that location - whether an earthquake that originated in the bowels of the earth, or a tornado that smashed mountains and broke stones, or by a meteor shower, or a flood, or other such catastrophes. If the entire human species were located in a single location on earth, there is a chance that they would be wiped out if that portion of the earth were destroyed. For this reason, it was necessary for mankind to be scattered throughout all parts of the earth, so that the species would last, and that if a disaster happened to one part, the species would be preserved through the other.

Thus, according to the Ralbag, the error of the Dor ha'Haflagah was similar to the error of Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven: both groups were "seduced by the particulars" when choosing a location to make their home, and both groups were blind to the danger they posed to their offspring - a physical danger to the entire human race in one case, and a spiritual (and physical) danger to their tribes in the other case. 

At this point you might be wondering why I have chosen these two seemingly disparate incidents in Chumash as my focus in this blog post. Well, it just so happens that I was confronted with a similar situation in my own life this week. An article entitled The Really Big One was published a few days ago in The New Yorker. The article is an exposé on what is known as "the Cascadia earthquake and tsunami" - a seismic event of epic proportions which will inevitably happen sometime in the near future. Here is the picture painted by the author:

When the next very big earthquake hits, the northwest edge of the continent, from California to Canada and the continental shelf to the Cascades, will drop by as much as six feet and rebound thirty to a hundred feet to the west—losing, within minutes, all the elevation and compression it has gained over centuries. Some of that shift will take place beneath the ocean, displacing a colossal quantity of seawater ... The water will surge upward into a huge hill, then promptly collapse. One side will rush west, toward Japan. The other side will rush east, in a seven-hundred-mile liquid wall that will reach the Northwest coast, on average, fifteen minutes after the earthquake begins. By the time the shaking has ceased and the tsunami has receded, the region will be unrecognizable. Kenneth Murphy, who directs FEMA’s Region X, the division responsible for Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Alaska, says, “Our operating assumption is that everything west of Interstate 5 will be toast.” 

In the Pacific Northwest, everything west of Interstate 5 covers some hundred and forty thousand square miles, including Seattle, Tacoma, Portland, Eugene, Salem (the capital city of Oregon), Olympia (the capital of Washington), and some seven million people. When the next full-margin rupture happens, that region will suffer the worst natural disaster in the history of North America. Roughly three thousand people died in San Francisco’s 1906 earthquake. Almost two thousand died in Hurricane Katrina. Almost three hundred died in Hurricane Sandy.FEMA projects that nearly thirteen thousand people will die in the Cascadia earthquake and tsunami. Another twenty-seven thousand will be injured, and the agency expects that it will need to provide shelter for a million displaced people, and food and water for another two and a half million. “This is one time that I’m hoping all the science is wrong, and it won’t happen for another thousand years,” Murphy says.

Later on in the article, the author reports that "the odds of the big Cascadia earthquake happening in the next fifty years are roughly one in three. The odds of the very big one are roughly one in ten." Those odds are not good, to say the least. 

As you can imagine, this article caused somewhat of a commotion on the West Coast. Judging by the other articles I skimmed, some people accepted these predictions at face value; other experts reported that the science was correct, but said that the disaster scenarios weren't nearly as bad in all areas as this author made it out to be; others preferred to believe that this disaster was still along ways off - too far off to worry.

This article hit my emotions on a very personal level. I grew up in the Pacific Northwest. My family and many of my friends still live there. I, myself, have seriously considered moving there when I'm ready to settle down. That being said, you can imagine the conflict I felt upon reading this article. 

I immediately began thinking about these findings from a practical standpoint. I found this to be much trickier than I expected. As we go through life, we become more and more adept at making cost-benefit analyses and weighing the various pros and cons. But every once in a while, we are thrown a curve-ball consideration - such as this one - which is so unique that it becomes difficult to factor into our long-term planning. 

Shortly after reading this article, my mind went to the two excerpts from the Ralbag cited in this blog post. I wondered: Am I being seduced by the wonderful particulars of the Pacific Northwest? Am I rationalizing my desire to one day move here? Am I making the same mistake that the Bnei Gad and the Bnei Reuven made when they thought that it was a good decision to settle on the other side of the Yarden? Am I exposing myself and my future progeny to physical danger in the same way as the Dor ha'Haflagah? 

For now, I believe that more investigation is in order before making any dramatic decisions. Nevertheless, I learned a valuable lesson from thinking about this article during the same week I thought about Bnei Gad, Bnei Reuven, and the Dor ha'Haflagah, namely, it is very difficult not to be seduced by the particulars when contemplating very long-term consequences which may or may not even come to pass during one's lifetime. Reading the Ralbag's lesson was one thing, but relating to it by considering this local, personal issue made that lesson much more real to me. 

This, in turn, made me realize how many of the problems facing the Jewish community are plagued by this same cheit of decision-making. Whether it's problems from within (e.g. the Jewish Day School tuition, the Shidduch crisis, the polarization of Jews to the extreme right or the extreme left) or the problems from without (e.g. U.S. relations, the Palestinians, Iran), it seems that "seduction by the particulars" inevitably exerts its sinister influence. And like the examples in Chumash, the problem is magnified by the fact we are forced to make decisions which affect us, but also shape the lives of future generations. 

I don't know what the solution is, but being the first step is always to recognize the problem, as the Ralbag did in his analysis of the events in our parashah. That is one of the many things I like about the Ralbag's approach to Torah she'bi'Chsav: not only does he bring out deep and lofty ideas in Torah and metaphysics, but he also extracts the humble practical lessons from the narrative. By contemplating and reviewing these lessons as they appear in Torah she'bi'Chsav, we can - with God's help become more adept at applying them to our everyday lives. 

Saadia Gaon's Introduction to Mishlei

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Here is a picture of my set of Nach Mikraos Gedolos. See if you can figure out which volume has been loved to tatters:

If you guessed Sefer Mishlei (the Book of Proverbs), then you are correct! As you can tell, my volume of Mishlei has accumulated a lot of learning-mileage. It is, without a doubt, my favorite sefer of Nach to learn, my favorite class to teach, and has been the source of my most transformative learning.

I plan on featuring a lot more Mishlei on this blog than I have in the past. I thought it would be best to begin with by establishing the foundations of my derech (methodology). My approach to Mishlei evolved from, and in concert with, my rebbi's derech of learning Mishlei, and his derech of learning Mishlei is rooted in Saadia Gaon's introduction to Mishlei. That being said, I figured that this would be a good place to begin.

This post will be a walk-through of the first part of Saadia Gaon's Introduction to Mishlei. Saadia Gaon is so clear and explicit in presenting his derech that I won't need to add much. I'll be using my own translation of Rav Qafih's Hebrew translation of Saadia Gaon's commentary, which was originally written in Judeo-Arabic. My translation incorporates two important changes:

1. I have chosen to omit the pesukim cited by Saadia Gaon for the sake of brevity. 
2. Saadia Gaon switches back and forth between 3rd person and 2nd person, in singular and plural. For the sake of consistency and smooth-reading, I decided to take some liberties in this regard. 

Without further ado: here is the first part of Saadia Gaon's Introduction to Mishlei!

Saadia Gaon begins by identifying the essential difference between man and other creatures. 

Man’s only superiority over the other animals is his rational faculty, just as the only superiority of animals over plants is their ability to move, and just as the only superiority of plants over other entities is their ability to grow.

This hierarchy may seem antiquated to our post-Aristotelian ears, but it still holds valid in the world of Mishlei, as we'll see:

Since man shares a common denominator with the animals in his instinctual nature and behavioral tendencies, but is nobler in his knowledge and discernment, it is therefore necessary for his essential, defining quality to govern the lower element within him. In other words, his intellect should govern his instinctual nature, since his intellect is higher and his instinctual nature is lower. If man acts righteously by causing his intellect to rule over his instinctual nature, then his uniquely human quality will be actualized. But if man acts unjustly by allowing his instincts to rule over his intellect, his behavior will be like that of the animals.

This principle underlined above - namely, that one's intellect should govern one's instinctual nature - is the cornerstone of Mishlei, and embodies the objective of the sefer. Saadia Gaon then goes on to spell out the practical implications of this core tenet:

All of man’s initial impulses (ha’oleh al lev kol bnei adam techilah) originate in his instinctual nature, since it is antecedent in his physical constitution and psychological makeup. Therefore, when something of this nature enters your heart, do not give any thought to practical implementation and [certainly] do not act upon it until after you have presented it before your intellect. If your intellect necessitates the action, then do it; if your intellect necessitates abandoning it, then abandon it.

Likewise, if your intellect necessitates a specific action but your instinctual nature loathes that action and resists it, then it is proper to do the action without paying any attention to your instinctual unwillingness. Similarly, if your intellect cautions you to refrain from a specific action but your instinctual nature inclines toward that action and craves it, it is proper to abandon it without paying any attention to your instinctual desire. 

This parallels the conduct of a righteous judge, who strives for that which is in line with the truth, though it may be undesirable to the litigants, and who pushes away that which opposes the truth, though it may be desirable to the litigants.

Therein lies Mishlei's mission: to bring our instinctual nature under the dominion of our intellect, to the point where the latter is the prime-mover of our decision-making. But Mishlei isn't only aimed at modifying our behavior; it is also trying to reach our emotions, as Saadia Gaon continues:

It is correct for man to rejoice in that which is desirable to his intellect even though his instinctual nature abhors it, and it is proper for him to distance himself from that which his intellect rejects even though his instinctual nature desires it.

In other words, the goal isn't to forcefully override our instinctual resistance to acting in accordance with our intellect; rather, we are trying to get to the point where the dictates of our intellect are real to our emotions, to the extent that we rejoice at that which the intellect deems to be good and are naturally repelled by what the intellect deems to be harmful. 

Saadia Gaon then presents Mishlei's central theory of psychology, which bears as striking resemblance to Freud's pleasure principle (albeit without factoring in the unconscious):

The foundation upon which all of these concepts are based may be stated as follows: man’s instinctual nature lusts after every immediate pleasure without paying any attention to whether the consequences are harmful, whereas the intellect recoils from immediate gratification if it knows that it this will bring pain in the future; likewise, man’s instinctual nature recoils from immediate pain even though contentment and gratification will follow in its footsteps, whereas the intellect will choose to endure exertion and immediate pain if it clearly knows that something good and beneficial will follow in its footsteps.

On the basis of this psychodynamic theory, Saadia Gaon defines the two basic vices which are responsible for all bad decisions:

The instinctual part of man recoils from everything that causes him immediate exertion and pain; this is due to the vice called atzlus (laziness). [Likewise,] the instinctual part of man lusts and inclines toward everything which brings him immediate enjoyment and pleasure; this is due to the vice called taavah (desire).

He then explains why we are in need of Mishleic guidance:

Therefore, everyone needs the guidance of a chacham (wise man) who will reveal to him the consequences of that which causes the instincts to rejoice but is harmful in the eyes of the intellect, and the consequences of that which is unpleasant to the instincts and beneficial in the eyes of the intellect. Then will he be able to withstand the immediate pain and strive toward that which will yield a good outcome, and he will refrain from that which his desires draw him toward, based upon [his recognition of] its harmful nature. 

Due to [man’s] attitude toward this [Mishleic] way of life, if he were left alone to choose whether he would follow it, his instincts would likely lead him astray from it. Therefore, it was necessary for the Wise One (may He be exalted and glorified) to establish a book through the expressions of the chacham, Shlomo ben David (may peace be upon him), in which he reveals the [beneficial] outcomes of that which the instincts loathe and makes known their praise, their value, and their honor, in order that man will strive for them and resist the atzlus within him, and in which he reveals the [harmful] consequences of those things toward which man’s instinctual nature inclines and exposes their bitterness, their evil, and their harm, in order that man will recoil from them and resist the taavah within him. 

Thus, according to Saadia Gaon, we can summarize the goal of Mishlei in a single sentence: Sefer Mishlei teaches us how to live our lives based on our intellects, rather than our emotions, by making intelligent decisions which maximize long-term pleasure and minimize long-term pain.

If that sounds like something you want in your life, then Mishlei is the book for you! Stay tuned for Mishlei-related content every Wednesday, with Hashem's help.