Lishmah and l'Kanter

This can be read as a standalone post, provided that you're familiar with the basic terminology of learning lishmah (for its own sake) and she'lo lishmah (not for its own sake), as explained by the Rambam in his Introduction to Perek Chelek. 

I'll also state a disclaimer here. The subject of lishmah and she'lo lishmah is both deep and broad. The topic is multifaceted, and there are many views within the Mesorah on each facet. The purpose of this post is to analyze one answer to one question - not to serve as a comprehensive overview of the entire subject.

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Artwork: Calculated Dismissal, by Karl Kopinski

Lishmah and l'Kanter

The Question

The Gemara in Pesachim 50b states:

Rava brought up a contradiction: "It is written: 'for Your mercy is great unto the heavens' (Tehilim 57:11) and it is [also] written: 'for Your mercy is great above the heavens' (ibid. 108:5). 

How [can this contradiction be resolved]? [The pasuk which describes His mercy as above the heavens] refers to those who act lishmah, [whereas the pasuk which describes His mercy as merely reaching the heavens] refers to those who act she'lo lishmah."  

[This teaching of Rava] accords with what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: "a person should always engage in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah, because mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah (from she'lo lishmah one will come to lishmah)."

According to the statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav, learning she'lo lishmah is praiseworthy, insofar as it brings a person to lishmah. The Gemara also implies that those who engage in Torah and mitzvos she'lo lishmah merit a high level of Divine mercy, albeit not quite as high as that attained by those who act lishmah.

Elsewhere, however, Chazal make other statements which imply that learning she'lo lishmah is undesirable. For example, the Gemara in Berachos 17a states:

Rava was wont to say: "The objective of wisdom is teshuvah and good deeds, that a person shouldn't read and learn yet spurn his father, and his mother, and his teacher, and one who is greater than he in wisdom and in number, as it is stated, 'the beginning of wisdom is fear of Hashem, a good intellect to all who do them' (Tehilim 111:10) - it is not stated 'to those who do' but rather it is stated 'to those who do them' - [that is,] to those who act lishmah, but not to those who act she'lo lishmah. And anyone who acts she'lo lishmah - it would be better if he hadn't been created.

Another statement which deprecates she'lo lishmah can be found in Taanis 7a:

It was taught in a braisa that R' Benaah would say: "Anyone who engages in Torah lishmah, it becomes an elixir of life for him, as it is stated: 'it is a tree of life to those who grasp it' (Mishlei 3:18), and it says: 'it shall be health to your navel' (ibid. 3:8), and it says: 'for whoever finds me finds life" (ibid. 8:35). And anyone who engages in Torah she'lo lishmah, it will be an elixir of death for him, as it is stated: 'My teaching shall drop [yaarof] like rain' (Devarim 32:2) and arifah means nothing other than killing, as it is stated: 'they shall break the heifer's neck (arefu) there in the valley' (Devarim 21:4)."

Perhaps the most shocking anti-she'lo lishmah statement can be found in Kallah Rabbasi 5:1:

Rebbi Akiva says: "Whoever studies she'lo lishmah, he would have been better off if he had been smothered by his afterbirth."

Broadly stated, the central question that emerges from these and similar sources is: How can Chazal's anti- she'lo lishmah statements be reconciled with their pro- she'lo lishmah statements? If those who learn she'lo lishmah are better off if they were never created, or if their Torah is an elixir of death, or if they should have been smothered by their afterbirth, then how can Chazal encourage us to engage in Torah and mitzvos she'lo lishmah and say that we will be the recipients of Hashem's mercy "unto the heavens"?

[Note: While it's true that aggadic (non-legal) statements were authored by different sages, and don't necessarily have to be reconciled, the commentators by and large seem to assume that these statements about lishmah and she'lo lishmah ought to be. Perhaps this is the assumption here because it would be strange for there to be a genuine disagreement on a topic that is so fundamental as this.]

Tosafos's Answer

Tosafos state their resolution to this difficulty in several places. Although there are nuanced differences between their different formulations of their answer, they mostly boil down to the same thing. I'll cite the most straightforward formulation, which can be found on Taanis 7a:

"and anyone who engages in Torah she'lo lishmah, it will be an elixir of death for him" - This is difficult, for don't we say that "a person should always be involved in Torah even though it's not lishmah because from she'lo lishmah one will come to lishmah"? 

The answer is that there are two types of she'lo lishmah. When we say "a person should always be involved in Torah even she'lo lishmah," this is referring to a case in which [he learns] in order to be called "rabbi" or so that people will honor him, but that which is stated here, [that] "anyone who is involved in Torah she'lo lishmah it becomes an elixir of death for him" - this refers to someone who learns l'kanter.

The term "l'kanter" is a bit tricky to translate. I usually translate it as "to counter" or "to be contrarian." Jastrow translates it as "to chide." I've also seen it translated as "to antagonize," "to provoke," "to break down," "to rebut," "to vanquish," and other similar terms. In their other statements of this answer, the Baalei Tosafos provide some additional clues. On Berachos 17a they use the phrase "l'kanter chaveirav" which implies that l'kanter is an act committed against someone else. On Pesachim 50b they say: "le'hisyaher (to be haughty), l'kanter (to counter), and le'kapeach (to overpower) his fellows in halacha."

Regardless of which translation we use, the general answer provided by Tosafos is clear: there are two types of she'lo lishmah. When Chazal endorse she'lo lishmah learning, they are referring to motives such as seeking honor and wanting to be called "rabbi," and when they speak against she'lo lishmah, they are referring to l'kanter.

Understanding Tosafos's Answer: Approach #1

The main question on Tosafos's answer is: What is the basis of this subdivision within she'lo lishmah? What makes l'kanter different from other she'lo lishmah motives?

The most common answer I've heard to this question is based on the reasoning Chazal used in their endorsement of learning she'lo lishmah. They said: "a person should always engage in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah, because from she'lo lishmah one will come to lishmah." If l'kanter doesn't fall into this category, then it must be because l'kanter does not bring a person to lishmah.

I have two problems with this approach. The first is that I don't understand why l'kanter cannot bring a person to lishmah. At the end of the day, learning l'kanter doesn't seem to be fundamentally different than learning l'kavod. Some people want the kavod of being called "rabbi," some want the kavod of being knowledgeable in every area of Torah, and the person who learns l'kanter wants the kavod of winning arguments. It's all kavod, and just as the child in the Rambam's parable will eventually "grow out of" his kavod motive and become attached to the learning itself, the same is true for the person who learns l'kanter. 

My second problem with this approach is that it's empirically false. I know a number of people whose initial attachment to learning was as a tool to break other people down - usually parents, teachers,  or community rabbis with whom they disagreed - and many of these individuals eventually came around to learning lishmah. Yes, it's possible to take any of my examples and argue that the individual in question wasn't really learning l'kanter, or that this person had other legitimate she'lo lishmah motives as well, but this type of apologetic navel-gazing quickly strays into the fallacious "no true Scotsman" territory. 

The only basis on which I might be open to accepting this understanding of Tosafos's answer is if l'kanter referred specifically to someone who engages in sophistry, fabrication of sources, intellectual dishonesty, or anything which involves a distortion of truth. The Sefer Chasidim (#294) seems to characterize l'kanter this way, speaking of "[one who learns] l'kanter and to provoke and looks to bring false proofs to undermine your words." If that is what l'kanter means, then I can see how it wouldn't lead to lishmah.

The problem is that I don't see any basis for positing that this is Tosafos's definition of l'kanter. I haven't seen any indications in Tosafos that their concept of l'kanter involves any form of intellectual malfeasance. If this were the essence of their definition of l'kanter, one would expect them to mention it, or at least hint at it. 

At the end of the day, the two aforementioned problems prevent me from accepting this approach to understanding Tosafos: (1) I haven't yet heard a convincing explanation of why l'kanter precludes lishmah, and (2) this distinction clashes with my experience. 

Understanding Tosafos's Answer: Approach #2

I asked our question to my Mishlei rebbi and he had a much more elegant - and, in my opinion, truer - answer. He explained that according to Tosafos, all she'lo lishmah learning leads to lishmah, but despite that, Chazal discouraged learning l'kanter because of its destructive effects. In other words, there is no difference between l'kanter and any other she'lo lishmah motive insofar as "mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah" is concerned. The only reason why Chazal singled out l'kanter (according to Tosafos) is because they wanted to voice their disapproval of forms of learning which lead to bad middos (personality traits) and cause strife in the Beis Midrash or in Klal Yisrael.

To clarify the difference between these two approaches, consider the following analogy. A music teacher makes two statements about the practicing piano: (1) "practice makes perfect" and (2) "don't practice all day - remember to go out and play!" It would be possible to reconcile these two statements in the manner of Approach #1 by saying that in general, "practice makes perfect," but practicing all day without going outside to play will not "make perfect." (They say that Chopin forbade his students to practice more than 3-4 hours a day, believing that excess practice is detrimental to musicality.) Alternatively, one can reconcile these two statements by saying that indeed, all practice makes perfect; however, those who only practice but don't go outside to play will suffer additional harm, outside of their musicality, and for that reason it is not advisable to practice all day.

My Mishlei rebbi's approach addresses both of the problems I had with Approach #1. According to this approach, we don't need to grope in the dark for reasons why l'kanter can't lead to lishmah; all we need to do is acknowledge that the harmful effects of l'kanter warranted harsh condemnation by Chazal. Secondly, this approach explains the real-world cases I was referring to earlier: there have been many students who have learned l'kanter and who have arrived at lishmah, even as they wreaked havoc in their middos and communities in the process.

Support from the Rambam

I believe that my Mishlei rebbi's approach to understanding Tosafos is supported by a letter from the Rambam (Sheilat edition p.160). R' Pinchas ha'Dayan had asked the Rambam about the contradictory implications of Chazal's statements about she'lo lishmah. The Rambam answered as follows:

Those two statements regarding one who engages in Torah lishmah and she'lo lishmah do not contradict each other. From both of them we learn that it is only proper to be involved in Torah lishmah, and lishmah is the essence, and we were only commanded to be involved [in Torah] lishmah, and one who is involved [in Torah] she'lo lishmah is better off having never been created. 

Nevertheless, it is better to be involved [in Torah] she'lo lishmah than to not be involved in it at all, because this person who is involved in it inappropriately will, because of his involvement she'lo lishmah, come to lishmah. 

Unlike the Baalei Tosafos, who resolve the contradiction by subdividing she'lo lishmah into two categories, the Rambam doesn't differentiate between l'kanter and other she'lo lishmah motives. He regards all she'lo lishmah motivations as being equally inferior and equally capable of leading to lishmah.

The proponents of Approach #1 are free to maintain that there is a machlokess (disagreement) between Tosafos and the Rambam on whether l'kanter precludes lishmah, but according to Approach #2, there's no need to posit this. One can simply say that the Rambam and Tosafos are in complete agreement that all she'lo lishmah learning can potentially lead to lishmah, but whereas the Rambam held that these statements of Chazal were intended to convey their views about she'lo lishmah in general, the Baalei Tosafos maintained that they were intended to single out a specific she'lo lishmah motive for condemnation.

Concluding Thoughts

I am curious as to your thoughts on Tosafos's distinction between l'kanter and other she'lo lishmah motives. If you agree with Approach #1 and would like to explain to me why, contrary to the real-world cases I've observed, l'kanter cannot lead to lishmah, then I'm all ears! Alternatively, if you think there's a problem with Approach #2 or if you have a third approach, I'd like to hear that as well. Lastly, if there are other interesting sources, ideas, or questions you'd like to share on the topic of lishmah and she'lo lishmah, please do share!

Parashas Shelach: What is Kareis?

This week I'd like to give a special shout-out to the Abravanel, who did all of the research for me and enabled me to write this dvar Torah on the plane with only his commentary on hand!

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Artwork: Scour from Existence, by Clint Cearley

Parashas Shelach: What is Kareis?

In Parashas Shelach, in the section detailing the various sin-offerings, the Torah mentions the onesh (punishment) commonly referred to as “kareis”: 

But the soul that acts with a high hand, whether the native or the convert – he has blasphemed Hashem; and that soul shall be cut off from among its people. For he has despised the word of Hashem, and has violated His commandment; that soul shall be utterly cut off; his iniquity is upon him (Bamidbar 15:30-31).

The question is: What is kareis? The root of the word kareis (כ.ר.ת.) literally means “to cut” or “to cut off.” This verb is easy to understand if you’re talking about a carrot or a tree branch, but what does it mean for a nefesh (soul) to be “cut off from among its people” or “utterly cut off”? 

Thankfully, the Abravanel does us a tremendous favor by summarizing and critiquing the views of all his predecessors on the matter, and concludes by presenting his own theory [1] Although my usual practice on this blog is to present translations of the meforshim (commentaries) rather than summaries, the Abravanel’s comments here are far too lengthy. For this reason, I will provide my own summary of the Abravanel’s summaries, but I will try to stick to his words as closely as possible. 

For the sake of brevity, I will NOT include the questions and difficulties that the Abravanel raises on each of the views, nor will I include my own analysis. I will leave it to you, the reader, to conduct further research, and to arrive at your own conclusions. 

(1) Saadia Gaon [2] and Ibn Ezra [3]

Both Saadia Gaon and the Ibn Ezra learn that the term nefesh in the context of kareis refers to a person’s physiological vitality, rather than the intellect, or the spiritual part of man. Therefore, they interpret kareis as premature death – the “cutting short” of a person’s life. According to this view, there is no difference between kareis and the other divinely enacted punishment of misah b’ydei shamayim (death by the hands of heaven). 

(2) Rashi [4]

Rashi holds that kareis refers to the premature death of the sinner AND the premature death of his or her children. This latter feature is what differentiates kareis from misah b’ydei shamayim. However, according to Rashi, there is no difference between kareis and the divinely enacted punishment of ariri (childlessness), which is incurred by certain arayos (prohibited sexual relations). [5]

(3) Tosafos [6]

Like Saadia Gaon and the Ibn Ezra, the Baalei Tosafos maintain that kareis refers to premature death. They differentiate between kareis and misah b’ydei shamayim on the basis of when the sinner dies. They hold that someone who is liable for kareis will die before reaching the age of 50, whereas a person who is liable for misah b’ydei shamayim will die before reaching the age of 60.

(4) Tosafos [7]

The Baalei Tosafos offer a second explanation of kareis: that a person will die from an illness, on the third day of that illness. According to this explanation, misah b’ydei shamayim affects the length of a person’s lifespan, whereas kareis affects the duration of (what will turn out to be) a person’s terminal illness. 

(5) Rambam [8]

Unlike the four Rishonim mentioned above, who maintain that kareis affects a person’s physical existence in Olam ha’Zeh (This World), the Rambam maintains that kareis affects a person’s non-physical soul in the purely spiritual Olam ha’Ba (The World to Come). According to the Rambam, kareis refers to the excision and annihilation of the soul after death. The existence of the sinner who incurred kareis will come to an end with his physical demise, just like an animal. Thus, he will be deprived of the everlasting spiritual bliss of Olam ha’Ba, which is the ultimate reward. In contrast, a person who is liable for misah b’ydei shamayim will die prematurely, but his death will provide kaparah (atonement) for him, and his soul will merit existence in Olam ha’Ba. 

(6) Ramban [9]

The Ramban’s view is the most complex of them all. Whereas all of the Rishonim mentioned thus far hold that all instances of kareis are uniform (i.e. the same in every case, no matter who the sinner and no matter what the sin), the Ramban maintains that there are three levels of kareis:

• If a person’s merits outweigh his iniquities, then he will receive a physical kareis in the form of a premature death; his soul, however, will remain untouched in the purely spiritual Gan Eden and in the Messianic Era of Olam ha’Ba after Techiyas ha’Meisim (Resurrection of the Dead). [10] This form of kareis is practically identical with kareis as understood by Saadia Gaon and the Ibn Ezra.
• If a person’s iniquities outweigh his merits, then he will receive a spiritual kareis in the form of his soul being cut off from eternal life in Gan Eden and Olam ha’Ba. This type of kareis is similar to kareis as explained by the Rambam, but whereas the Rambam maintains that the afterlife is purely spiritual, the Ramban maintains that it is a combination of the physical and the spiritual. 
• The most severe form of kareis is reserved for those who worship avodah zarah (idolatry) and for those who commit the transgression of blasphemy; these individuals die prematurely in this world AND their souls are cut off from existence in Gan Eden and Olam ha’Ba.

(7) Abravanel

The Abravanel holds that kareis affects the sinner in Olam ha’Zeh AND in Olam ha’Ba: in Olam ha’Zeh his life is cut short, and in Olam ha’Ba, his soul is “distanced from the radiance of the shechinah (divine presence),” which is its source of spiritual pleasure and reward. The Abravanel maintains that kareis is subject to degrees, based on the severity of the sin. Unlike the Rambam, the Abravanel holds that the soul is never fully cut off from Olam ha’Ba, since it is a “spiritual essence” which, by its very nature, does not deteriorate. The Abravanel holds that kareis causes spiritual “pain” to the soul, but after it receives its punishment, it will be restored to a state of pleasure and reward. 

There you have it: a seven-way machlokess (disagreement) on what kareis is. And these are just the opinions of the Rishonim cited by the Abravanel. I would not be surprised if there are other views to be found in other meforshim.

To my mind, this multiplicity of views raises another question: Why is the Torah’s presentation of kareis so vague? 

Perhaps you will dismiss this question. After all, there are many subjects in Torah on which there is a lot of machlokess, and one might ask the same question in each of these cases. Why ask this question here as opposed to any of those cases?

The reason I believe this question is justified here is based on my understanding of why the Torah mandates onshim (punishments) altogether, which I wrote about in another post. There are seven levels of onshim. In order, from most severe to least severe, they are: skilah (stoning), sreifah (burning), hereg (decapitation), chenek (strangulation), kareis, misah b’ydei shamayim, and malkos (lashes). According to the Rambam, these onshim are designed to indicate the severity of the transgression and to deter the would-be sinner from sinning. When it comes to skilah, sreifah, hereg, chenek, and malkos, we know exactly what each onesh entails. The same goes for misah b’ydei shamayim; although there might be some machlokess on the particulars, everyone agrees that this refers to premature death. And yet, when it comes to the onesh of kareis, there is no consensus on what the Torah means. This is an anomaly among onshim, and poses a problem if one maintains that the purpose of onshim is to serve as a deterrent. How can one be deterred by kareis if the meaning of kareis is so unclear? 

The way I see it, we are forced draw one of two conclusions: either (1) there was once a clear and unanimous understanding of kareis which was lost over time, which eventually gave rise to wide-ranging machlokess, or (2) the Torah’s formulation of kareis was intentionally left vague, and that is why there is an inordinate degree of machlokess. 

If the former is true, this would be comparable to the machlokess on the teruah-blast of the shofar: the Torah was clear about it, but the mesorah (transmission of teaching) was lost over time, and machlokess developed as a result. If the latter is true, this would be comparable to the machlokess on how the messianic era will come to be, about which the Rambam [11] writes: 

All of these matters and those that are like them … even the Sages did not have a tradition in these things, but rather, [they theorized] based on the implications of the pesukim, and that is why there is machlokess.

If the answer is (1), then there is nothing more to say. Somehow, sometime, the understanding of kareis was lost, and machlokess developed, just as it has in other areas of Torah. But if the answer is (2), then we are left with our question: Why did the Torah intentionally present kareis in such a vague manner?

The most I can offer at this point is a speculative answer – one which only works for those who hold that kareis affects the soul (i.e. Rambam, Ramban, Abravanel) and not just the body (i.e. Saadia Gaon, Ibn Ezra, Rashi, Tosafos). The Rambam [12] at the end of Hilchos Teshuvah writes:

A person should not say, “I will do the mitzvos of the Torah and involve myself in its chochmah in order to receive all of the blessings that are written in it,” or “in order that I will merit life in the World to Come,” “and I will distance myself from the transgressions about which the Torah warns us, in order to escape from the curses written in the Torah” or “so that I will not be cut off from the World to Come.” 

It is not proper to serve Hashem in this manner, for one who serves Hashem in this manner is called “oveid mi’yirah” (“one who serves out of fear”). This is neither a virtue of the prophets nor of the chachamim. The only ones who should serve Hashem in this manner are ignorant men, women, and children, whom we train to serve out of fear until their minds develop and they serve out of love. 

Hashem does not want us to serve Him out of yirah (fear). Although it is necessary to begin by serving Him that way, and we encourage people to do so in the initial stages of their learning, this is not an ideal state. The Rambam even goes so far as to say about the various yirah-based motives, “All of this is despicable; however, it is necessary for us, due to the deficiency of the human mind/psyche.” The goal is to gradually wean ourselves from serving God out of yirah and develop the ability to serve Him out of ahavah. This is a slow and delicate process which must progress in step with each person's development, as the Rambam writes:

Therefore, when we teach the children, women, and general populace of laymen, we should only teach them to serve out of yirah and in order to receive reward, until their minds mature and they gain additional wisdom; we should reveal this secret to them bit by bit, and accustom them to this concept with pleasantness, until they apprehend it and know it and serve out of ahavah. 

The onshim of the Torah clearly belong to the framework of yirah. All of the other onshim (skilah, sreifah, hereg, chenek, malkos) are things which happen in this world. Fear of them is rooted in observation and experience. Kareis, on the other hand, is not – at least, not according to the Rambam, the Ramban, or the Abravanel. To understand kareis requires knowledge of deep, abstract concepts, such as the nature of the soul, how the soul exists after death, what Olam ha'Ba is, how it relates to techiyas ha'meisim, how we are rewarded and punished after death, etc. These concepts take decades of learning to be able to begin to understand, since they are metaphysical phenomena that are out of this world. Not only that, the imagination is quick to latch onto its own "counterfeit" versions of these ideas, which are rooted in psychological fears and insecurities, and not reality.

Thus, the Torah in a bind. On the one hand, kareis is a reality which has relevance in the halachic system; as such, it must be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. On the other hand, kareis is an exceedingly lofty concept, and any attempt to explain it would only provide the imagination with more fuel for its fantasy-based fear, and threaten to lock a person in yirah-mode.

How did the Torah solve this dilemma? By intentionally speaking about kareis in vague terms. On its most basic level, "to be cut off" is intuitively bad-sounding, even if one doesn't know exactly what that means. Those who are prone to filling in the gaps with their imagination will do so anyway, but at least the Torah will not be lending credence to these detrimental chimerical notions. And since the Torah's formulation of kareis is so vague, it will remain open to reexamination and reevaluation as the individual learns and develops.

I can't say I find this answer to be 100% satisfactory, but I do think it is a fruitful approach. At the very least, I hope you gained from the Abravanel's overview of kareis, and that I've left you with a nice question to think about!

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 15:31 

[2] Rabbeinu Saadia Gaon, Emunos v’Deos 6 

[3] Rabbeinu Avraham ben Ezra (Ibn Ezra), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 15:31 

[4] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben YiTzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Bereishis 17:14; Vayikra 17:9 

[5] Vayikra 20:20-21 

[6] Baalei Tosafos, Yevamos 2a; Shabbos 25a 

[7] The Abravanel seems to say that Tosafos says this on Yevamos 2a, but I can’t seem to find it. If you can track it down, please let me know. 

[8] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Maimonides / Rambam), Commentary on the Mishnah – Sanhedrin 8:6; Introduction to Perek Chelek; Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 3:5-6; 8:1 

[9] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Nachmanides / Ramban), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 18:29; Shaar ha’Gemul [currently do not have access to a precise citation] 

[10] This is neither the time nor the place to go into the Ramban’s view of reward and punishment and the afterlife. If you are interested in this topic, I recommend reading the Shaar ha’Gemul, which is available here in Hebrew, and was translated into English by Chavel. 

[11] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Shoftim, Hilchos Melachim u’Milchamos 12:2 

[12] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 10:2

Megilas Rus: Judging the Judges

My chavrusa and I have been delving into Megilas Rus for the first time this year. So far we haven't yet uncovered any fundamental themes or approaches to the sefer - just individual ideas here and there. I'm going to try to write up a few of them before and after Shavuos. Note: I've been sick since Shabbos and have been feeling quite out of it today. Still, I tried finishing this post in time to meet my daily blogging schedule. Pardon me if it's not up to my usual standards. 

Artwork: Council's Judgment, by Kev Walker

Megilas Rus: Judging the Judges

Rus opens with the following pasuk: 

"And it happened in the days when the judges judged that there was a famine in the land, and a man went from Beis-Lechem in Yehuda to sojourn in the fields of Moav  - he, his wife, and his two sons" (Rus 1:1).

According to the plain pshat, this pasuk is establishing the historical context in which the events of the Megilah took place. Rashi fills us in on the details: "And it happened in the days when the judges judged - before the monarchy of King Shaul, during which the generations were governed by the judges; and this was in the days of Ibtzan." 

Chazal are bothered by the seemingly redundant phrase "And it was in the days when the judges judged" (bi'ymei shefot ha'shofetim). The pasuk could have simply said, "And it was in the days of the judges." Why the extra word?

Moreover, we know that whenever a calamity befalls the Jewish community, it is the result of a communal cheit (sin). [1] This was especially true during the period of the Shoftim, when there was a more direct correlation between the hashgachah and righteousness/sinfulness of the people. [2] In light of this we may ask: What was the cheit of this generation? Furthermore, why did this cheit warrant the severe punishment of famine?

The Gemara (Bava Basra 15b) answers both questions in one shot:

R' Yochanan said: What meant by the words, "And it was in the days of shefot ha'shofetim"? - It was a generation which judged its judges. If the judge said to a man, "Take the splinter from between your teeth," he would retort, "Take the beam from between your eyes!" If the judge said, "Your silver is dross," he would retort, "Your liquor is mixed with water!"

By interpreting phrase "shefot ha'shofetim" not as "when the judges judged" but "during the judging of the judges," this midrash identifies the cheit of the generation which caused the famine. But this still needs clarification. What, exactly, was the cheit of "judging the judges"? 

From the examples provided by the Gemara it would seem that the cheit beloged to the judges themselves. Indeed, this is how Rashi interprets our Gemara:

[a generation] which judges its judges - for the judges, themselves, were corrupt; this [corruption] gave the defendant an opening to rebuke his rebuker, for if the judge said to him, "Take the splinter from between your eyes" - remove and separate yourself from the small sin that you have done - he could say back, "Take the beam from between your eyes!" - separate yourself from the major sin that you have done. [3]

The Baalei Tosafos disagree with this interpretation:

a generation which judges its judges - The Ri was astounded by this, for it said in [the first chapter] of Temurah (15b): "All of the 'grape-clusters' (i.e. righteous leaders) who arose for Israel from the time of Moshe until the death of Yosef ben Yoezer were free from the blemish [of sin]." 

The Ri is bothered by Gemara's implication that the judges were corrupt, since Chazal say that the judges were righteous during this time. The Chasam Sofer also rejects Rashi's interpretation, and offers an interpretation of his own:

Heaven forbid that the judge [in the days of Rush] sinned! For we find that Osniel ben Kenaz, Boaz, Eli ha'Kohen, and Shmuel ha'Navi were among them; and even Yiftach and Gideon were "grape-clusters." Heaven forbid that Hashem's spirit would be driven by transgressors! 

Rather, [the meaning of the Gemara is that the judges] didn't watch over Israel in the proper manner, as Chazal said about the Elders who did not rebuke the nobles, and the righteous Eli, who didn't rebuke his sons. This is the meaning of "from between your eyes" - namely, the eyes of the congregation, who were supposed to be watched over.

Personally, I don't know enough about the period of the Shoftim to assess how righteous or corrupt the judges were at that time; I'll leave that argument up to Rashi and Tosafos.

What inclines me to the side of Tosafos is the Gemara's characterization of this problem as a cheit of the generation - not as a cheit of the judges themselves. If the judges were corrupt, the Gemara should have interpreted "shefot ha'shofetim" as "[a generation] in which the judges were judged [by God]" rather than "[a generation] which judged its judges," or something to that effect. Chazal's attribution of the cheit to the people of the generation leads me to believe that the judges were blemish free, as is indicated by the Gemara cited by Tosafos. 

What, then, do we make of the Gemara's examples of the typical dialogue that would take place between the judge and the defendant?

Perhaps we can interpret this dialogue as an expression of the corrupt mindset that plagued the people of that generation. There is a well-known idiom which comes to mind here: "the pot calling the kettle black." The formal name for this is the tu quoque (or "appeal to hypocrisy") fallacy, which Wikipedia defines as "an attempt [to discredit the validity of the opponent's logical argument by asserting the opponent's failure to act consistently in accordance with its conclusion(s)." According to this fallacy, Reuven has no right to point out a flaw in Shimon if Reuven partakes of a similar flaw. While there might be a psychological truth at play here (i.e. people tend not to listen to someone if they view that person as a hypocrite), this way of thinking has little relevance in matters of law, mussar, or practical advice.

For example, if Reuven the Judge convicts Shimon the Defendant of selling dross labeled as "pure silver," Shimon can accuse Reuven all day long for diluting his liquor with water, but that accusation will not change Shimon's liability in a court of law. True, Shimon might be less willing to accept a ruling from a judge whom he feels is also guilty of a crime, but that has no bearing on the reality of what Shimon did, nor does it exempt him from the legal consequences of his actions. This is true even if Reuven were guilty of a crime - and certainly if Reuven is guilt-free, as Tosafos and the Chasam Sofer would say about the Shoftim in our case.

Likewise, if Reuven - a nutritionist who happens to be obese - advises Shimon to cut back on his excessive consumption of sugar and trans fats because they're bad for his health, and Shimon responds, "Oh, look at the pot calling the kettle black!" who is really acting foolishly here? True, Shimon might feel uncomfortable trusting Reuven's health advice if Reuven doesn't live a healthy lifestyle, but that discomfort doesn't in and and of itself undermine the scientific validity of Reuven's advice. Reuven's expert pronouncement stands on its own merit, regardless of Reuven's personal decisions.

It seems that this was the cheit of the generation at the time of Rus: they viewed halacha as the subjective imposition of human will, rather than an objective system of divine law. We maintain that the Torah's laws are objectively true and real - just as real as the laws of nature. It is evident from the examples mentioned in the Gemara that this generation did not regard the Torah's laws as objective reality, nor did they regard the judges as the knowers and adjudicators of that law. Instead, they relegated the judges' verdicts to the realm of human opinion, such that they could be dismissed on the basis of hypocrisy - whether real or imagined.

Perhaps this sheds light on Rav Avigdor Kohen Tzedek's explanation of the famine:

and there was a famine in the land - Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu said to them: "You stood  [in opposition] against your judges, [so] I will set for you a judge against whom you will not be able to stand. Which [judge] is this? - The plague of famine, which is called "judge," as it is stated: "How much more when I send My four terrible judges: sword, famine, ferocious beast, and pestilence" (Yechezkel 14:21).

This was a midah kneged midah punishment: Bnei Yisrael brushed off the judgments of their judges as subjective impositions of human will; in response, Hashem sent forth an objective "judge," whose sentence could not be brushed off so easily. It is easy to dismiss a human judge's verdict as mere opinion, but it is much more difficult to do the same with the verdict of the True Judge.

Rav Avigdor adds that the gematria of "ויהי בימי שפוט" ("and it was in the days of judging") is equivalent to the gematria of "ילדים שפטו" ("children judged"). If we take this gematria in tandem with Rav Avigdor's earlier citation of our Gemara in Bava Basra, we can clerly see how the people at the time of the Shoftim were behaving like children. The response of, "Oh yeah? Remove the beam from between your eyes!" smacks of the infantile reaction of "Oh yeah? You're not the boss of me!" This is a fine way for a child to retort to the bully on the playground, but if a patient responded this way to his doctor's prescription or a contractor used this statement to deflect an architect's counsel, then disaster is sure to follow. The same is true for those who childishly ignore halachic rulings out of a similarly misguided sentiment of, "Who does that rabbi think he is telling me what to do?"

Unfortunately, this same distortion prevails among Jews today. There are many modern Jews who are willing to disregard the rulings of rabbeim as nothing but biased predilections of men, rather than as objective dictates of the Creator. Even worse is the fact that the members of the rabbinate are guilty of this charge, in certain sectors. Unfortunately, there are rabbis who abuse their positions of authority and allow their personal feelings to influence their adjudication of halacha.

As we prepare for the celebration of the Giving of our Torah, it behooves us to assess our own relationship with the law. To what extent do we regard halacha as a regimen for human success, and to what extent do we relate to it as the imposition of an psychological authority figure's whims upon our own will?

The Torah was given to us by God, but how we receive it is up to us.

[1] See Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishneh Torah: Sefer Zmanim, Hilchos Taaniyos 1:1-1
[2] See Sefer Shoftim, Chapter 2
[3] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary to Talmud Bavli: Bava Basra 15b
[4] Tosafos, Commentary to Talmud Bavli: Bava Basra 15b
[5] Rav Moshe Schreiber (Chasam Sofer), Commentary to Talmud Bavli: Bava Basra 15b
[6] Rabbeinu Avigdor ben Eliyahu ha'Kohen, Commentary to Megilas Rus 1:1