Tishah b'Av 5777: Adam ha'Rishon and Tishah b'Av

This post is a sequel to yesterday's post: Tishah b'Av 5777: Hashem's Tzedakah and our Shame. Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Grove of the Burnwillows, by Cliff Childs

Tishah b'Av 5777: Adam ha'Rishon and Tishah b'Av

Review of Yesterday's Blog Post

In yesterday's post we attempted to understand Kinah #19, which is based on the pasuk: "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah (righteousness) and ours is the boshes ha'panim (shamefacedness)" (Daniel 9:7). 

First we defined the central terms of tzedakah and boshes ha'panim. "Tzedakah" refers to "providing a creature with its needs" and boshes ha'panim refers to the type of self-reflective shame which stems from a recognition of how foolishly we have acted. 

We explained the implication of saying that tzedakah "belongs" to Hashem. As the Creator, Hashem's tzedakah is fundamentally different from human tzedakah: He created all creatures, all resources, and determined how their needs are met, whereas we humans merely allocate the resources that Hashem created. We explained that our boshes ha'panim "belongs" to us because it is the result of our free will, which is caused entirely by ourselves. 

Lastly, we explained the theme of the kinah in light of this understanding. Throughout the history of Bnei Yisrael, Hashem has repeatedly provided us with tools and situations designed to facilitate our metaphysical development into a mamleches kohanim v'goy kadosh ("a kingdom of priests and a holy nation"). Not only have we neglected to avail ourselves of this divine assistance, but we have fled in the opposite direction - towards our detriment, rather than our betterment.

In today's blog post I would like to explore another way to learn our kinah - one which is far more speculative. There are two possibilities: either this idea is actually a deeper explanation of our kinah, or it has nothing to do with the kinah per se, but nevertheless provides a deeper insight into the events of Tishah b'Av as a whole. 

Alternative Approach to Question #4: Shamefacedness Belongs to Us

We asked the question: What does it mean that boshes ha'panim belongs to us? In what sense is boshes ha'panim uniquely ours? We answered this question by saying that since boshes ha'panim stems from our exercise of free will, and since free will is entirely self-caused, then the boshes ha'panim belongs exclusively to us, and cannot be attributed to Hashem in any way.

But there is another answer: boshes ha'panim was not part of Hashem's initial plan for creation, but only came about as a result of man. Before the cheit of Adam and Chava, human beings were incapable of feeling bushah (shame), as it is stated: "The two of them were naked, the man and his wife, and they were not ashamed" (Bereishis 2:25). But immediately after the cheit: "The eyes of both of them were opened and they realized that they were naked; and they sewed together a fig leaf and made for themselves aprons" (ibid. 3:7). 

It is in this sense that boshes ha'panim "belongs" to human beings. If Hashem "had His way" (so to speak), there would be no phenomenon of bushah and no condition of boshes ha'panim. We caused shamefacedness to come into being, and this is why it is "ours." 

The Nature of Bushah

In order to grasp the implications of this concept, we need to understand what it means to live in the post-cheit world of bushah. What is the difference between man before the cheit and man after the cheit?

Needless to say, this is a huge topic. We will only delve into it in order to answer the question stated above. The Rambam provides a full explanation of this in the second chapter of the Guide for the Perplexed, which we will now cite - but we will focus specifically on his explanation of bushah. 

The Rambam begins with a question that was posed to him:

Some years ago a learned man asked me a question of great importance. The problem and the solution which we gave in our reply deserve the closest attention … 

The objector said: “It would appear at first sight from the plain meaning of Scripture that man was originally intended to be perfectly equal to the rest of the animal creation – which is not endowed with intellect, reason, or power of distinguishing between good and evil – but that Adam’s disobedience to the command of God caused him to acquire that great perfection which is the uniqueness of man, that is, the power of distinguishing between good and evil – the noblest of all the faculties of our nature, the essential characteristic of the human race. It thus appears strange that the punishment for rebelliousness should be the bestowal of a perfection to which he had not attained previously, namely, the perfection of intellect. This is equivalent to saying that a certain man was rebellious and extremely wicked, wherefore his nature was changed for the better, and he was made to shine as a star in the heavens.” Such was the intent and subject of the question, though not in the exact words of the inquirer. 

The question was: How can the Torah say that man lacked knowledge, then disobeyed God, and was granted intellect as a "punishment"? Isn't this the greatest reward?

Now mark our reply, which was as follows … The intellect which was granted to man as the highest endowment was bestowed on him before his disobedience. With reference to this gift the Torah states that “man was created in the form and like the likeness of God” (Bereishis 1:22). On account of this gift of intellect man was addressed and commanded by God, as it is said: “And Hashem-Elokim commanded Adam” (ibid. 2:16) – for no commandments are given to the animals or to those who are devoid of understanding. Through the intellect man distinguishes between the true and the false. This faculty Adam possessed perfectly and completely. However, the terms “good” and “bad” are terms used in the study of subjective values, not in that of objective truths. For it is not correct to say in reference to the proposition “the heavens are spherical,” that it is “good” or to declare the assertion that “the earth is flat” to be “bad,” but we say of the one “it is true,” of the other “it is false.” Similarly our language expresses the idea of true and false by the terms emes and sheker, and of the morally right and the morally wrong, by tov and ra. It is the function of the intellect to discriminate between the true and the false – a distinction which is applicable to all objects of intellectual perception. 

When Adam was yet in a state of innocence, and was guided solely by reflection and reason – on account of which it is said: “Thou hast made him (man) little lower than the angels” (Tehillim 8:6) – he was not at all able to follow or to understand the principles of subjective values, to the extent that the most obviously inappropriate thing – that is, to appear in a state of nudity – was not considered inappropriate; he could not comprehend why it should be so. 

After man's disobedience, however, when he began to give in to the desires which had their source in his imagination and to the gratification of his bodily appetites, as it is said, “And the woman saw that the tree was good for food and delightful to the eyes” (Bereishis 3:6), he consequently lost part of that intellectual faculty which he had previously possessed. He therefore transgressed a command with which he had been charged on account of his reason; and, having obtained knowledge of the subjective values, he become wholly absorbed in the study of what is “good” and “bad.” Then he fully understood the magnitude of the loss he had sustained, what he had forfeited, and in what situation he was thereby placed. 

Hence we read, “And you shall be like elohim, knowing good and bad,” and not “knowing” or “discerning the true and the false,” for in objective truths we can only apply the words “true and false,” but never “good and bad.” Furthermore observe the passage, “And the eyes of both were opened, and they knew they were naked” (ibid. 3:7): it is not said, “And the eyes of both were opened, and they saw,” for what the man had seen previously and what he saw after this circumstance was precisely the same: there had been no blindness which was now removed, but he received a new faculty whereby he found things wrong which previously he had not regarded as bad … 

In accordance with this interpretation, our text suggests that Adam, as he altered his intention and directed his thoughts to the acquisition of what he was forbidden, he was banished from Paradise. This was his punishment; it was measure for measure. At first he had the privilege of tasting pleasure and happiness, and of enjoying repose and security; but as his appetites grew stronger, and he followed his desires and fantasies, as we have already stated above, and partook of the food he was forbidden to taste, he was deprived of everything, was doomed to subsist on the meanest kind of food, such as he never tasted before, and this even only after exertion and labor, as it is said, “Thorns and thistles shall grow up for thee” (ibid. 3:18), “By the sweat of thy brow,” etc., and in explanation of this the text continues, “And Hashem-Elokim drove him from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground whence he was taken.” He was now with respect to food and many other requirements brought to the level of the lower animals: “Thou shalt eat the grass of the field” (ibid.). Reflecting on his condition, the Psalmist says, “Adam unable to dwell in dignity, was brought to the level of the dumb beast” (Tehillim 49:19). May the Almighty be praised, whose design and wisdom cannot be fathomed.

To summarize: before the cheit, man possessed a fully functioning intellect and operated totally within the world of objective truth (emes and sheker). He wasn't able to comprehend good and bad as subjective values (e.g. "and the woman saw that the tree was good for eating, and desirable to the eyes, and delightful as a means of intelligence"), but only as objective reality ("And God saw all that He had made, and behold! it was very good" e.g. "it is not good for man to be alone"). 

After the cheit, when man "followed his desires and fantasies," he became steeped in the world subjective values (tov and ra) which his mind imposed upon objective reality. It is no longer possible to simply know objective reality and seek out objective good and avoid objective bad. Instead, we must continually contend with our conscience, which labels things as "good" and "bad" based on its own set of criteria (desires, fantasies, upbringing, society, etc.). Since these labels do not necessarily correspond to reality, we must sift through them and sort out whether what we feel is good actually is good and whether what we feel is bad actually is bad. The conscience serves a valuable purpose of keeping the instinctual part of the yetzer ha'ra in check, but it also interferes with our perception of reality, which leads to a host of problems.

Although the post-cheit transformation of human nature has a far-reaching impact on all of our knowledge and all of our emotions, the Torah expressed this entire change by focusing on one emotion: bushah. When the Torah says "the eyes of both of them were opened and they realized that they were naked," this is a shorthand way of saying all of the concepts the Rambam taught us about how the conscience affected our view of reality.

Before the cheit Adam and Chava were not ashamed of their nakedness. Why would they be? From an emes and sheker objective reality standpoint, there is nothing wrong with nakedness. Animals are naked and engage in reproduction to perpetuate their species, and humans should be no different. But after the cheit, when man's view of reality became clouded by the veils of his many desires, fantasies and imperfections, nudity became a source of shame, due to its association all of the strong desires and fantasies associated with sex. In a tov and ra framework, nudity is "bad," and therefore, shameful.

In this vein, when we say "ours is the boshes ha'panim" we are alluding to the fact that we live in a world of bushah, in which our perception of objective reality is warped by our subjective values, and that this is entirely our fault. Hashem created us without bushah, but we - through our cheit - brought the bushah upon ourselves.

Alternative Answer to Question #5: Hashem's Tzedakah vs. Our Shame

Rather than focusing on Hashem's acts of tzedakah in providing Bnei Yisrael with developmental tools and the boshes ha'panim of our free-will decisions to reject this tzedakah, we can now suggest a different theme. The subject of this kinah is the contrast between the objective reality of Hashem's tzedakah - which was intended to help Bnei Yisrael develop as a nation - and Bnei Yisrael's rejection of that tzedakah due to their corrupt subjective values. The boshes ha'panim refers to our recognition of how foolish we were to get caught up in our subjective worldview to the extent that we squandered all of the opportunities that Hashem gave us, for our benefit.

According to this approach, the emphasis of this kinah is not on the outcomes of Bnei Yisrael's behavior (i.e. national development vs. national regression) but on the causes of their transgressions (i.e. instead of recognizing the objective reality of Hashem's tzedakah and taking advantage of it, we turned away from that objective reality in our pursuit of subjective good and bad). 

Let's look at a few examples of the kinah in light of this new approach: 

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because God went out to redeem us as a people unto Himself; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because they [our forefathers] rebelled on the shore of the Sea of Reeds, the nation sinning against its God. 

As we recall every Pesach, Hashem redeemed us from physical and intellectual servitude. He saved us from the harsh and bitter slavery and granted us bodily freedom. He saved us from being enslaved to the avodah zarah (idolatry) of Egypt - which was built on falsehood, and fueled by fears and fantasies - and brought us to the das ha'emes ("religion of reality"). "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah." And how did we respond at the Sea of Reeds? By denying the redemptive nature of our liberation and yearning to return to Egyptian servitude: "What is it that you have done to us to take us out of Egypt? Is this not the statement that we made to you in Egypt, saying: 'Let us be, and we will serve Egypt' - for it is better that we should serve Egypt than that we should die in this wilderness!" (Shemos 14:11-12). So distorted was our view of tov and ra that we accused our Redeemer of bringing us from a better condition to a worse one. "ours is the boshes ha'panim."

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because You feed us [the mahn] that tasted like dough fried in honey; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because on the day [we made the Golden Calf], we brought it an offering of fine flour with oil and honey. 

Not only did Hashem miraculously provide sustenance for us in the Midbar (Wilderness), but He did so in a manner that satisfied our psychological need to enjoy our food. Moreover, He provided our food in a way that trained us in a lifestyle of kedushah (the ability to rise above our animalistic nature). "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah." And how did we respond? By making avodah zarah and attempting to appease it with offerings corresponding to our own palate. So distorted was our view of tov and ra that we turned away from the True God who fed us daily and served a god who was the product of our own psyche. "ours is the boshes ha'panim."

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because of [how You waged war for us with] Sichon and God and all the kings of Canaan; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because of Achan who appropriated for himself from the forbidden loot [of Jericho] and found no excuse [for his crime]. 

Hashem helped the small nation of former slaves defeat the mighty kings and armies of Canaan. The odds were against us, but Hashem waged war for us. All we had to do was follow Yehoshua's instructions not to take any of the spoils, which were to be consecrated for Hashem. "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah." And how did we respond? By lusting after "a lovely Babylonian garment" (Yehoshua 7:21) and some silver and gold. So distorted was Achan's view of tov and ra that he prioritized riches over the lives of his Jewish brethren. "ours is the boshes ha'panim."

The other stanzas can be learned in a similar fashion. This approach compliments, rather than contradicts, our last approach. I believe that it also yields a greater insight into the underlying causes of these chataim, and puts us in a better position to do teshuvah.

Support for this Approach

After this approach occurred to me I was bothered by a nagging doubt. I wondered: "Maybe I've taken this too far. After all, Tishah b'Av is entirely about the Jewish people - not humanity as a whole. Why am I going all the way back to Adam ha'Rishon, who predated even the Avos? Our kinah doesn't even mention Adam ha'Rishon! It may be true that the cheit of Adam and Chava was historically where boshes ha'panim came from, but should our explanation of this kinah rely so heavily on an understanding of the bushah that resulted from the cheit of Adam and Chava? That seems like a real stretch."

I decided to see if I could find any support in the mesorah for this thematic connection between the cheit of Adam and Chava and the cheit of Bnei Yisrael. I figured that if I was making a valid connection between the cheit of Adam and Chava and the chataim of Bnei Yisrael, then surely someone would have mentioned it.

Eventually I stumbled upon a lead. The first half of the first pask in Eichah reads: "Eichah! The city sits in solitude. The one that was great with people has become like a widow" (Eichah 1:1). The Targum [1], which weaves midrashim into the translation of the text, "translates" this pasuk as follows: 

How can it have been decreed upon Yerushalayim and upon the congregation to be punished with exile and to eulogize them with, "Eichah" - just as Adam and Chava were judged and kicked out of Gan Eden, and ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu eulogized them with, "Eichah"?

"Hmm," I thought, "interesting that the Targum midrashically associates the sin and punishment of Yerushalayim with the sin and punishment of Adam and Chava." But I still wasn't convinced that had a real support for my approach .... until I stumbled upon a midrash in Eichah Rabbah.

First, a little bit of background. The authors of the midrashim didn't limit themselves to offering midrashic explanations on individual pesukim. Additionally, they gave "pesichtos" ("proems" or "prefatory midrashic explanations") on the entire sefer. These pesichtos usually take the form of drashos on pesukim from other sefarim, which the authors use to develop an idea or theme that is intended to serve as a framework for reading the entire sefer at hand. 

The following midrash is a pesichta on Megilas Eichah. It was intended to provide an approach for understanding the entire sefer. Here is what the midrash says:

R' Abahu began [his discussion of Eichah by citing the pasuk:] "They are like a man (k'adam) who has broken a covenant" (Hoshea 6:7). [R' Abahu expounded:] This refers to Adam ha'Rishon. Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu said, "I brought him into the Gan Eden, I commended him, he violated My commandment, and I sentenced him to being cast out and sent out, and I lamented over him, "Eichah."  

[R' Abahu then cites Scriptural evidence for each of these claims:] "I brought him into Gan Eden, as it is stated: 'Hashem-Elokim took the man and placed him in Gan Eden' (Bereishis 2:15), and He commanded him, as it is stated: 'Hashem-Elokim commanded the man, saying, "From every tree of the garden [you may freely eat, but of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Bad you must not eat from]"' (ibid. 2:16-17), and he violated His commandment, as it is stated: 'Have you eaten of the tree from which I commanded [you not to eat]?' (ibid. 3:11), and I sentenced him to being cast out, as it is stated: 'He cast out the man' (ibid. 3:24), and I sentenced him to being sent out, 'Hashem sent them out from Gan Eden' (ibid. 3:23), and I lamented 'Eichah?' over them, as it is stated: 'And He said to him, 'Where are you? (אַיֶּכָּה)'  (ibid. 3:9) - which is written as 'Eichah?' (אֵיכָה). 

"The same [happened] with the children [of Adam ha'Rishon:] I brought them into Eretz Yisrael, as it is stated: 'I brought them into a fruitful land' (Yirmiyahu 2:7), and I commanded them, as it is stated: 'Command Bnei Yisrael' (Vayikra 24:2), and they violated My commandment, as it is stated: 'All of Israel violated Your Torah' (Daniel 9:11), and I sentenced them to being cast out, 'I will cast them out from My house' (Hoshea 9:15), and I sentenced them with being sent out, as it is stated: 'Send [them] away from My presence, ad let them go!' (Yirmiyahu 15:1), and I lamented 'Eichah?' over them: 'How can she sit in solitude' (Eichah 1:1)."

To my mind, THIS is a proof that my approach has merit - if not in relation to Kinah #19, then certainly for understanding the destruction of the Beis ha'Mikdash. According to R' Abahu, Eichah should be read with the comparison between Adam's cheit and Bnei Yisrael's cheit at the forefront of our minds.

When we think about it, this fits in perfectly with our understanding of the kinah. Hashem's placement of Adam ha'Rishon in Gan Eden was an act of tzedakah. Adam was given everything he needed: delicious and abundant fruit to eat, a natural world rich with chochmah to learn, a wife for companionship (and procreation), a task with which they were charged to improve the world, and a mitzvah to keep them on the right path. But by giving in to the world of subjective tov and ra, Adam and Chava lost that beneficial tzedakah-setup, and were exiled into a world in which developing their tzelem Elokim would be an uphill battle.

So too, Bnei Yisrael were given everything they needed: a fruitful land to supply their physical needs, a Torah rich with chochmah to learn, a nation descended from the Avos with whom to build a society, a task with which they were charged to improve the world, and a regimen of 613 mitzvos to develop their tzelem Elokim to its greatest potential. But by giving in to the world of subjective tov and ra time after time after time - as detailed by the paytan in our kinah - we lost our Beis ha'Mikdash and were exiled out of our Land into a world in which developing our tzelem Elokim is an extremely difficult uphill battle.

Still, what do we gain from this comparison? Why did R' Abahu feel the need to frame Bnei Yisrael as Bnei Adam ha'Rishon in order to understand Eichah? What do we gain from reading the kinah from this perspective?

I'd like to suggest one possible answer. There are innumerable benefits of the Torah regimen, and there is no question that we desperately need it. However, there are also challenges that come from the fact that the Torah is a regimen. One of these challenges is "losing sight of the forest for the trees" - namely, getting so caught up in the details of the regimen that we forget the purpose of the regimen.

It isn't enough to ask ourselves, "What aveiros (transgressions) have we done, and how can we meet the halachic standards that are expected of us?" This type of teshuvah may be beneficial, but it stops short of the essence. Full teshuvah requires us to examine and correct the distorted subjective views of tov and ra which led us to sin in the first place. In other words, we must approach teshuvah not only from the perspective of Torah, but from the perspective of Adam ha'Rishon.

For example, if a person decides to do teshuvah on speaking lashon ha'ra, it's not enough to inquire, "What are the halachos of lashon ha'ra and what steps can I take to stop myself from speaking it?" This type of teshuvah is lacking because it doesn't even touch the underlying values of tov and ra which lead us to speak lashon ha'ra in the first place. It addresses the symptoms, but not the causes. Instead, one must ask, "What warped notion of tov and ra leads me to believe that engaging in malicious speech about my fellow Jew is not ra? What messed up ideas of tov and ra do I have which allows me to excuse my own lashon ha'ra but condemn the lashon ha'ra that is spoken about me? Why do I believe that public opinion matters at all? Why do I think it's okay to use another human being as a source of amusement in conversation at his expense?"

R' Abahu frames the tragedy of the churban as a repetition of the tragedy of Gan Eden in order to help us realize that Bnei Yisrael's sins stemmed from a more underlying problem: their subjective values of tov and ra. It is only from this perspective that we, as a nation, can do complete teshuvah and merit the ultimate redemption.

Conclusion

This is all I have to say about Kinah #19 and R' Abahu's pesichta. As I said before, these two sources may or may not be related. Perhaps yesterday's interpretation of Kinah #19 is correct, and today's post is merely an explanation of R' Abahu's midrash. Either way, I hope you gained some insight into the nature of man, the sins of Bnei Yisrael, and our path to teshuvah.

I will conclude with the words of Yeshayahu ha'Navi which echo R' Abahu's comparison:

"For Hashem will comfort Tzion, He will comfort all her ruins; He will make her wilderness like Eden and her wasteland like a garden of Hashem; joy and gladness will be found there, thanksgiving and the sound of music." (Yeshayahu 51:3)

May we merit the restoration of Yerushalayim speedily, in our days. 

Parashas Balak: The Appeal of Baal Peor (and Darwin)

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Parashas Balak: The Appeal of Baal Peor (and Darwin)

"Israel settled in Shitim, and the people began to commit harlotry with the daughters of Moav. [The women] called the people to the sacrifices of their gods, and the people ate and bowed down to their gods. Israel attached itself to Baal Peor, and the wrath of Hashem flared against Israel." (Bamidbar 25:3)

It is safe to say that the most disgusting form of avodah zarah (idolatry) mentioned in Tanach is the worship of Baal Peor. The character of this mode of worship is alluded to in the name of the deity itself. "Peor" (פ.ע.ר.) means "to open," and denotes "the opening of an orifice" - in this case, the rectum, as we shall soon see. Thus, "Baal Peor" means "Master of the Rectum Opening." The method of Baal Peor's worship is codified by Torah she'baal Peh (the Oral Torah) in Sanhedrin 7:6:

One who defecates on Baal Peor is liable, for this is how it is customarily worshiped.

The Gemara (Sanhedrin 64a) provides a rather vivid description of how this worship was implemented in practice:

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: There was an incident involving a gentile woman who was very sick. She said, "If I am healed, I will go and worship all of the avodah zarah in the world." She was healed, and went to worship all of the avodah zarah in the world. But when she came to the avodah zarah of Peor, she asked [one of] the priests, "How do you worship this one?" He said, "You eat and drink laxatives and defecate in its face." She said, "I would rather be sick again than to worship avodah zarah like this!" 

The Gemara then reports that the highest level of Baal Peor worship was, sadly, demonstrated by a Jew:

But the Jews were not that way ... There was an incident involving Savta ben Elas who rented out his donkey to a gentile woman. When they reached Peor she said to him, "Wait here until I go in, [worship], and come out." After she came out he said to her, "You, too, wait for me until I go in, [worship], and come out." She asked him, "But aren't you a Jew?" He responded, "That's none of your business." He went in, defecated in its face, and wiped himself on its nose, causing the priests to praise him saying, "We've never seen anyone worship like this before!"

Those who learn these facts about Baal Peor for the first time are likely to react by falling to their knees, gazing heavenward with outspread palms, and exclaiming, "WHYYYY????" 

As "civilized Westerners" with "modern sensibilities" it is difficult enough to relate to the standard modes of avodah zarah, such as bowing down to a statue or offering incense and libations - but at least we can understand the appeal in such rituals. Baal Peor, on the other hand, runs contrary to all of our common-sense assumptions about religion, both modern and primitive. To my knowledge, human feces is regarded as repulsive across all cultures and time periods. The notion of a religion built around bowel movements strikes us as absurd.

The question is: What was the appeal of Baal Peor? [1] How could dung be elevated to the level of devotion? How could people regard excrement as sacrament? How could poo prove piety? ... okay, that's enough scat-talk for now. 

Today I came across an explanation given by Rav Hirsch [2] which opened up [3] an entirely new world of insight for me. He writes:

There were various baalim, deified powers. There was Baal Tzefon, a midnight god of the desert (Shemos 14:2). In contrast, there was Baal Maon (Bamidbar 32:38), a god of dwelling places, and Baal Bris (Shoftim 8:33), a god of the union of people. There was also Baal Zevuv (Melachim II 1:2), apparently a god of decay to whom they would turn in times of illness and inquire of him about life and death.

And there was also Baal Peor, a god of shamelessness, who was worshiped by giving brazen prominence to the most bestial aspects of human life. Hence, Hoshea says: "They came to Baal Peor and dedicated (va'yinazru - from the same root as "nazir") themselves to shamefulness" (Hoshea 9:10) - [that is to say, they] sanctified/designated themselves for shamefulness. 

The cult of Peor is an illustration of the type of Darwinism that glories in man's descent to the level of the beast, where, stripping himself of his Divinely-given nobility, he comes to regard himself as merely a highly-developed animal.

Allow me to repeat the key elements of Rav Hirsch's answer: "Baal Peor, [was] a god of shamelessness ... [Bnei Yisrael] sanctified/designated themselves to shamelessness." This, in essence, was the appeal of Baal Peor and its peculiar form of worship. In order to understand the underlying philosophy and nature of this cult, we need a brief refresher on the relationship between shame and pleasure.

Ever since the cheit (sin) of Adam and Chava, the human psyche has been forced to operate under the ever-present surveillance of the conscience. The fear, shame, and guilt that are generated by the conscience are virtually inescapable. Although the conscience was given to us for our benefit, as a counter-force to keep man's instinctual nature in check to help mitigate the consequences of the cheit [4], it has also given rise to a number of difficulties - some of which are objective (e.g. shoulds and religious guilt), and others of which are subjective. 

One of these subjective difficulties is the fact that it is impossible for us to simply enjoy pleasure, like an animal does. Instead, we are compelled to justify our pursuit of pleasure within the parameters of value systems to which we subscribe. When we partake of a pleasure in a manner that runs contrary to our value systems, we experience cognitive dissonance - usually in the form of fear, shame, or guilt. The easiest way to get out of this state of conflict is through rationalization. Rather than confronting the causes and effects of our "moral failings" [5] it is much easier to hastily explain away our misdeeds by coming up with excuses. If such moral lapses become habit, we tend to alter our value systems in order to legitimize our new pattern of behavior. Ultimately, morality yields to habit and desire.

I believe that the reason why the cult of Baal Peor - "the god of shamelessness" - was so attractive is that it granted license for the unbridled indulgence in physical pleasure by sanctifying the rejection of the conscience. 

In other words, the appeal was two-fold: (1) Baal Peor worshipers were granted the freedom to gratify all of their basest animalistic desires, and (2) their rebellious flaunting of shamelessness - epitomized in the hallowed ritual of public defecation - was imbued with religious value, thereby allowing them to bypass the cognitive dissonance that they ordinarily would have experienced.

This dual-allure of Baal Peor worship carries tremendous power. Imagine informing a lazy student that neglecting his homework and tearing up his tests will earn him an "A" in his least favorite class class, or telling an alcoholic that nightly binge-drinking will win him free booze the next day. Similarly, if a priest of Baal Peor tells people that there is a god who wants them to abandon themselves to their hedonistic tendencies, and that the path to freeing oneself from shame is to revel in shamelessness, then he is bound to attract a multitude of followers. Add to this the perk of not needing to pay exorbitant sums of money for lavish offerings (excluding the cost of food and laxatives), and you've got yourself a recipe for a powerful cult.

We can now understand why the worship of "The God of Shamelessness" was accompanied by the sexual corruption which is emphasized by the Torah as the leading cause of Bnei Yisrael's downfall. On the surface it would seem that there is no relationship between fecal rites and sexual promiscuity, but in light of Rav Hirsch's explanation, the connection is clear: the licentiousness of the daughters of Moav was sanctioned by the religion of shamelessness. Their unrestrained sexual depravity was fueled by their worship of Baal Peor, who - in their minds - found favor in acts of wanton debauchery.

According to Rav Hirsch, this explains the enormous number of Jews who died as a result of their attachment to Baal Peor: "The number of those who died was 24,000" (Bamidbar 25:9). Rav Hirsch compares this tally to the number of deaths at the Cheit ha'Egel (Sin of the Golden Calf) and offers an explanation for the discrepancy:

At the Cheit ha'Egel only 3,000 died. Even though there were other sinners there who died an immediate death, it would seem that the number of deaths here was much greater. [Apparently,] idolatrous worship involving physical licentiousness is infinitely more severe than the metaphysical error of avodah zarah alone. 

In other words, both the Cheit ha'Egel and the cheit of Baal Peor involved "the metaphysical error of avodah zarah," but [7] in the case of Baal Peor, this error became anchored in the world of taivah (addiction to physical pleasure), which opens the doors to a more diverse range of consequences and is far more difficult to remedy - especially when the sexual immorality involves mingling with foreign women and a foreign culture.

It is interesting that Rav Hirsch associates the philosophy of Baal Peor with Darwinism. Rav Hirsch and Charles Darwin were contemporaries, and wrote their major works at around the same time. [8] It is important to note that Rav Hirsch was  not opposed to the theory of evolution per se on religious grounds. To the contrary - he wrote: [9]

Even if this notion [of evolution] were ever to gain complete acceptance by the scientific world, Jewish thought, unlike the reasoning of the high priest of that nation (probably a reference to Thomas Huxley, who advocated Darwinism with missionary fervor—N.S.), would nonetheless never summon us to revere a still extant representative of this primal form (an ape—N.S.) as the supposed ancestor of us all. Rather, Judaism in that case would call upon its adherents to give even greater reverence than ever before to the one, sole God Who, in His boundless creative wisdom and eternal omnipotence, needed to bring into existence no more than one single, amorphous nucleus, and one single law of “adaptation and heredity” in order to bring forth, from what seemed chaos but was in fact a very definite order, the infinite variety of species we know today, each with its unique characteristics that sets it apart from all other creatures.

Nevertheless, Rav Hirsch clearly sensed that Darwinism - as a social ideology - tapped into the same underlying sentiments as the ancient worship of Baal Peor. In contrast to the Baal Peor devotee who assuages his conscience by making a stool deposit at the Shrine of Shamelessness, the Darwinian acolyte rationalizes his animalistic behavior by embracing a philosophy that preaches: "You are essentially an animal; it is only natural to act like one."

Here we have two examples of metaphysical outlooks which come prepackaged with a moral philosophy: the ancient, religious, primitive devotion to Baal Peor and the modern, atheistic, scientific devotion to Darwinism. Both are insidious because they contain a core of truth: the creed of Baal Peor plays upon our latent sense that the conscience is an unnatural burden (which, from the strict standpoint of the Torah's account of creation, is accurate), and dogmatic Darwinism rests upon a foundation of empirical evidence and scientific validity.

The take-away lesson here may be stated as follows: beware the seductiveness of a belief-system which caters to the desire to live like an animal, unsaddled by the yoke of conscience and unbound by confines of objective morality. These doctrines will appear to be legitimate, due to their authoritative veneer - whether it be the religious appeal to the spiritual mind, or the rational appeal to the scientific mind - but know the terrible cost of hearkening to their siren song. How apt is the mashal (allegory) in Mishlei which, according to the Rambam, depicts heresy as a harlot:

For the lips of a forbidden woman drip honey, and her palate is smoother than oil, but her end is as bitter as wormwood, as sharp as a double-edged sword. Her feet lead to death; her footsteps support her to the grave. Lest you liken the path of life [to hers] - her courses wander [astray]; you cannot know.

And now, children, listen to me, and do not stray from the words of my mouth. Distance your way from her, and do not come near the door of her house, lest you give your glory to others, and your years to the cruel one. Lest strangers be sated with your strength, and your painfully earned wealth [be] in a stranger's house. You will groan at your end when your flesh and your body perish. Then you will say, "How could I have hated mussar, and my heart spurned rebuke? I have not listened to the voice of my masters, and have not inclined my ear to my teachers. For a pittance [of enjoyment] I was into everything evil, in the presence of congregation and assembly!" ... (Mishlei 5:3-14)

The woman of foolishness croons; [the woman] of simpleness, who does not know anything. She sits at the door of her house, on a chair at the city heights, to call out to the passerby, who make their ways upright: "Whoever is a simpleton, let him turn here." As for the one who lacks understanding, she says to him: "Stolen waters are sweet, and bread [eaten] in secret places is pleasing." But he does not know that dead men are there, that those she invites are in the deepest grave. (ibid. 9:13-18)

Thus, the account of Baal Peor isn't merely a historical record of a sin committed by our ancestors. It stands as a contemporary warning about the ever-present threat of moral degeneracy masquerading as an elite ideology.

[1] Readers of the old blog might recall a post I wrote - entitled The Yetzer ha'Ra for Avodah Zarah - which offered an explanation of the aforementioned Gemara, along with a general answer to our question. That answer was heavily predicated on a Freudian framework. I will eventually repost it, but I suspect that the answer given in this post will find acceptance by a wider audience.

[2] Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 25:3
[3] No pun intended ... maybe.

[4] For a full treatment of this, see the Rambam's Moreh ha'Nevuchim 1:2. Also, here's a quick summary (from the transcript of an audio shiur) of how the conscience was intended to function:

G-d's punishment is different from that of man. A punishment from G-d is given to help benefit man. An analysis of the verses subsequent to the sin can help us to understand the punishment and its ramifications with respect to the human personality. In chapter 3, verse 7 states, "And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves loincloths." Prior to the sin, the Torah explicitly tells us that they were not ashamed of their nakedness. The Torah is teaching us by contrasting these fact, that prior to the sin, man did not experience embarrassment. Shame is a function of man's conscience. Before man sinned, man's energies were naturally directed to chochmah, to intellectual pursuits. After the sin, man fell prey to the instinctual. The intellectual was overpowered by the instinctual. However, man now had an additional ally to help combat the forces of the physical . . . his conscience. The conscience of man helps him to determine good from evil. The yetzer ha'tov, man's good inclination, helps man to withdraw his energies from the world of the physical and re-direct it to the world of chochmah, wisdom. However, before man sinned, he did not possess the ability to discern good from evil. His mind was naturally drawn to the intellectual. After the sin man's energies flow first to the physical, which is capable of paralyzing him. G-d thereby instilled in man a conscience to help him progress into the world of the ideational and not stagnate in the world of the physical. It is only with the aid of the yetzer ha'tov, the ability to discern good, that man can use his free will and channel his energies to the acquisition of wisdom. It is therefore no coincidence that immediately after G-d pronounced His punishment for the sin (and man was endowed with both good and evil inclinations), man began to utilize his conscience to channel his energies properly. First, he experienced shame and covered his nakedness. Then, as chapter 3, verse 20 relates, "And the man called his wife Eve, because she was the mother of all living." It seems incongruous that this occurs immediately after the pronouncement of man's punishment. However, the reason is now readily apparent. This manifests that man was using the yetzer ha'tov to help direct his energies towards wisdom. He exercised his intelligence to classify and name his wife. It was a definitional exercise that required his intellectual abilities. From this we can ascertain that a punishment from G-d is unique, as it is executed for the benefit of man. This particular event bestowed man with good and evil inclinations. It is only with the aid of the yetzer hatov that man can overcome the pratfalls of sin and can withdraw his energies away from the physical and utilize his intellect to live a life based on wisdom.

[5] I'm using quotation marks because this "moral failing" is defined by the particular value system, which may or may not have any basis in reality.
[6] al tikri "dual" ela "doo-al"
[7] butt
[8] Rav Hirsch: b.1808, d. 1888. Charles Darwin: b.1802, d.1882. Rav Hirsch published his Chumash commentaries in the years spanning 1867-1878. Darwin published On the Origin of Species in 1859, and The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex in 1871.
[9] Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, “The Educational Value of Judaism,” Collected Writings, vol. VII, p. 264

Yom ha'Kippurim 5777: On Being Human

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: (Unknown Zendikar Art)

Yom ha'Kippurim 5777: On Being Human

There is a passage from Richard Mitchell's The Gift of Fire that I think about going into Yom ha'Kippurim. Here is the excerpt in its entirety:

Chapter 1: "Who is Socrates, now that we need him?" 

I imagine some well-informed and largely wise visitor from another world who comes to Earth to study us. He begins by choosing two people at random, and, since time and place are of no importance to him, but only the single fact of humanity, he chooses Socrates and me, leaving aside for the moment every other human being. He begins with an understanding of the single but tremendous attribute that distinguishes us both from all other creatures of Earth. We are capable of Reason. Capable. We can know ourselves, unlike the foxes and the oaks, and can know that we know ourselves. He knows that while we have appetites and urges just like all the other creatures, we have the astonishing power of seeing them not simply as the necessary attributes of what we are, but as separate from us in a strange way, so that we can hold them at arm's length, turning them this way and that, and make judgment of them, and even put them aside, saying, Yes, that is "me," in a way, but, when I choose, it is just a thing, not truly me, but only mine. He sees, in short, what "human" means in "human beings."

And then he considers the specimens he has chosen, Socrates and me. He measures that degree to which they conform to what "human" means in "human beings." With those superior extraterrestrial powers that imagination grants him, he will easily discover:

That I have notions, certain "sayings" in my mind, that flatly contradict one another; believing, for instance, that I can choose for myself the path of my life while blaming other people for the difficulty of the path. With Socrates, this is not the case.

That my mind is full of ideas that are truly nothing more than words, and that as to the meaning of the words I have no clear and constant idea, behaving today as though "justice" were one thing, and tomorrow as though it were another. That, while wanting to be happy and good, I have no clear ideas by which I might distinguish, or might even want to distinguish, happiness from pleasure, and goodness from social acceptability. With Socrates, this is not the case.

That I usually believe what I believe not because I have tested and found it coherent and consistent, and harmonious with evidence, but because it is also believed by the right people, people like me, and because it pleases me. And that furthermore, I live and act and speak as though my believing were no different from my knowing. With Socrates, this is not the case.

That I put myself forth as one who can direct and govern the minds, the inner lives, of others, that, in fact, I make my living as one who can do that, but that my own actions are governed, more often than not, by desire or whim. With Socrates, this is not the case.

That I seem to have a great need for things, and think myself somehow treated unjustly by an insufficiency of them, and that this insufficiency, which seems strangely to persist even after I get hold of the thing whose necessity I have most recently noted, prevents in me that cheerful and temperate disposition to which I deem myself entitled. With Socrates, this is not the case.

That I seem to know what I want, but that I have no way of figuring out whether I should want what I want, and that, indeed, it does not occur to me that I should be able to figure that out. With Socrates, this is not the case.

And that, in short and in general, my mind, the thing that most makes us human, is not doing the steering of this life, but is usually being hustled along on a wild ride by the disorderly and conflicting commands of whole hosts of notions, appetites, hopes, and fears. With Socrates, this is not the case.

How could the alien enquirer help concluding that there is something "wrong" with me, and that the humanness that is indeed in me has been somehow "broken," which he can clearly see by comparing me with Socrates? Must he not decide that Socrates is the normal human, and I the freak, the distortion of human nature?

When he pronounces me the freak, and Socrates the perfectly ordinary, normal human being, living quite obviously, as perhaps only an "alien" can see, by the power of that which most makes a human a human, shall I defend myself by appeal to the principle of majority rule? Shall I say: Well, after all, Socrates is only one human being, and all the others are more like me. Would I not prove myself all the more the freak by my dependence on such a preposterously irrelevant principle? If that visitor were rude, he might well point out that my ability to see, on the one hand, what is natural to human beings, and to claim, on the other, that its absence is only natural, and thus normal, is just the sort of reasoning that he would expect of a freak, whose very freakishness is seen in his inability to do what is simply natural to his species -- that is, to make sense.

But Socrates would defend me. He would say, for this he said very often:

No, my young friend is not truly a freak. All that I can do, he can do; he just doesn't do it. And if he doesn't do it, it is because of something else that is natural to human beings, and just as human as the powers that you rightly find human in me. Before we awaken, we must sleep, and some of us sleep deeper and longer than others. It may be, that unless we are awakened by some help from other human beings, we sleep our lives away, and never come into those powers. But we can be awakened.

In that respect, my friend is not a freak. He might better be thought a sleepwalker, moving about in the world, and getting all sorts of things done, often on time, and sometimes very effectively indeed. But the very power of routine habit by which he can do all that has become the only government that he knows. And the voices of his desires are loud. He is just now not in a condition to give his full attention to any meaning that might be found in all that he does, or to consider carefully how to distinguish between the better and the worse. He might be thought a child, and a perfectly natural child, who lives still in that curious, glorious haze of youth, when only desire seems worthy of obedience, and when the mighty fact of the world that is so very "there" looms immeasurably larger than the fact of the self that is in that world. He might grow up, and it is the "mightness" in him that makes him truly human, however he may look like a freak just now. From time to time, we are all just such freaks, and mindless, for mindlessness is the great background of noise out of which some few certain sounds can be brought forth and harmonized as music.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Although Mitchell's words stand on their own, I find that I associate them to a statement from Chazal, which the Rambam brings down in Hilchos Beis ha'Bechirah 2:2:

There is a unanimous tradition that the place on which David and Shlomo built the Altar, the threshing floor of Arnan, is the location where Abraham built the Altar on which he prepared Yitzchak for sacrifice. Noach built [an altar] on that location when he left the ark. It was also [the place] of the Altar on which Kayin and Hevel brought sacrifices.[Similarly,] Adam, the first man, offered a sacrifice there and was created at that very spot, as our Sages said: "Man was created from the place of his atonement" ("Adam mi'makom kaparaso nivra").

Cheit (sin) is unavoidable. Shlomo ha'Melech said: "There is no [entirely] righteous man on earth who does [only] good and does not sin" (Koheles 7:20). Alexander Pope said: "To err is human." However, even though it is natural to sin, this doesn't mean that to sin is our nature.

This, I believe, is what Mitchell was getting at, and what Chazal were alluding to when they said that man was created from the place of his kaparah. Judaism does not entertain fanciful notions of "saints." The cycles of cheit and teshuvah, avon and kaparah, regression and development, are part of what it means to be human. Our struggle to overcome our natural inclinations to live in line with our true nature is by design.

In this sense, it is a mistake to view cheit as an utter failure. Instead, cheit should be viewed as an opportunity for self-knowledge and development. I believe that this shift in our perspective of cheit is essential in order to have a Yom ha'Kippurim that is a "fresh start" day of growth rather than a "dead end" day of guilt and self-castigation.

"I am only human." This argument is, at the same time, our greatest defense, but also our greatest liability - depending on what we mean when we invoke it. And what better time to contemplate that meaning than Yom ha'Kippurim, when we stand before the Creator and beseech Him to help us live as He designed us to live.

May we all attain kaparah this Yom ha'Kippurim and arrive at a truer relationship with our own humanity.