Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife?

This week’s dvar Torah is a digest of the answers given by the Rishonim [1] to a classic question, along with an original answer based on my understanding of Sefer Koheles. 

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Artwork: Honor's Reward, by Izzy

Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife? 

The Question 

Parashas Bechukosai opens with a list of the blessings that Hashem promises to bestow “If you will follow My decrees and observe My commandments and perform them” (Vayikra 26:3). Among these blessings are: rain in its proper time, abundant produce, peace in the land, military success, flourishing of our population, and Divine favor. A similar list of blessings is stated in Parashas Ki Savo (Devarim 28:1-14). 

But there is a shocking omission from both lists of blessings: Olam ha’Ba (the “World to Come” or “afterlife”), the ultimate reward for a life of Torah and mitzvos. 

This is a famous problem. Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? In contrast, the Oral Torah and midrashic literature are replete with references to Olam ha’Ba, the most prominent of which is the Mishnah’s statement: “All of Israel has a portion in Olam ha’Ba” (Sanhedrim 10:1). 

This discrepancy between the Written and Oral Torahs has led modern academics to conclude that the entire notion of an afterlife was a Rabbinic invention, introduced long after the Biblical period. Those who wish to believe such conspiracy theories will not be convinced by any arguments, and I will not even attempt to address them here. Suffice it to say, our Mesorah (tradition) is clear on this point: belief in Olam ha’Ba has always been a unanimously accepted part of Judaism, despite the fact that it is not explicitly referenced in the 24 books of Tanach. 

But the question remains: Why does the Written Torah omit Olam ha’Ba from its lists of rewards? Why does it focus exclusively on the physical blessings? 

Seven Answers from the Rishonim 

The Abravanel [2] raises our question in his Chumash commentary and refers the reader to a book he wrote on the topic of Olam ha’Ba called Tzedek Olamim, in which he answers this question in full. Sadly, this book has been lost to history. Fortunately, the Abravanel provides a brief summary of six answers given to our question by his predecessors, followed by his own seventh answer. Here are my summaries of the Abravanel’s summaries: 

(1) Rambam [3]: The blessings and curses promised in the Torah are not the true reward and punishment for the mitzvos. The true reward is Olam ha’Ba, which is purely spiritual in nature. The reason why the Written Torah didn’t mention this reward is so that a person will follow Torah lishmah (for its own sake) – or, as the Abravanel puts it, “for the sake of perfection” – rather than for the sake of reward or out of fear of punishment. The role of the blessings and curses is to facilitate our pursuit of human perfection for its own sake: to the extent that we follow Hashem, He will provide us with physical goods and remove physical impediments from our lives so that we can continue in our pursuit of perfection without worrying about our material well-being; and to the extent that we neglect His will, He will withhold His blessings and we will be subject to these curses which will impede our pursuit of perfection. 

(2) Ibn Ezra [4]: The reward in Olam ha’Ba is a deep concept which is difficult for the average person to grasp. Since the Written Torah was given to the entire Jewish nation – not just the elite scholars – it was necessary to only mention the physical rewards and punishments, which can be understood by everyone. The sode (“secret” or esoteric concept) of Olam ha’Ba was relegated to the realm of the Oral Torah, thereby allowing every teacher to assess their student’s readiness for this concept on an individual basis, in accordance with that student’s level of development. 

(3) Ramban [5] / Sefer ha’Chinuch [6]: Belief in the eternality of the soul and its reward in Olam ha’Ba is a matter that can be rationally demonstrated by way of philosophical argument, and therefore did not need to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. In contrast, the blessings and curses are miraculous [7] phenomena which operate according to the principles of hashgachah (Divine providence) known only through nevuah (prophecy), which is why it was necessary for the Torah to spell them out in detail. 

(4) Ran [8] / Kuzari [9]: The majority of the people, in ancient and modern times, denied the reality of hashgachah pratis (individual Divine providence). This denial was rampant among the Jews as well. Were the Torah to only promise spiritual reward and punishment after death, then these misguided Jews would take this as a confirmation of their deistic worldview. Therefore, it was necessary for the Torah to reinforce the truth of hasghacha pratis by going into great detail about the physical blessings and curses that will transpire as a result of our adherence to Torah. As for the reality of the spiritual reward and punishment for the soul in Olam ha’Ba: this can be inferred from the physical blessings and curses in Olam ha’Zeh (the physical world). Once we see that God provides us with physical rewards, which relate to the lower part of our nature (i.e. the body), we will realize that certainly He must provide us with spiritual reward, to compensate the higher part of our nature (i.e. the soul). 

(5) Saadia Gaon [10]: The ovdei avodah zarah (idolaters) engaged in various behaviors which they believed would bring them material success and protection from physical harm. When Hashem prohibited these idolatrous practices, He didn’t want His people to think that they would lose out on these material benefits. Therefore, He promised us as part of His covenant that by keeping the Torah, we would enjoy rewards in the physical world greater than anything that the ovdei avodah zarah hoped for from their false gods, since Hashem is the true God of heaven and earth, Who has the ability to bestow such blessings as He sees fit. There was no need to mention spiritual rewards, since the promises of physical rewards were only included in the covenant to refute the false promise of physical blessings by the ovdei avodah zarah. (Apparently, the ovdei avodah zarah of that era did not yearn for spiritual rewards, which is why there was no need to mention them in the covenant.) 

(6) Kuzari [11] / Ran [12]: The afterlife of the soul is explicitly mentioned in the blessings promised by the Torah in such statements as: “I [Hashem] will walk among you” (Vayikra 26:12), “I will place My dwelling among you” (ibid. 26:11), “I will be God unto you” (ibid. 26:12). [The Abravanel then goes on to explain how, if the nature of this spiritual reward is properly understood, then even the promises of physical blessings will serve as a proof that the souls of the righteous will survive after death. However, I’m not 100% sure that I follow every step of his explanation, and I would rather omit it from my summary than risk misrepresenting this line of reasoning.] 

(7) Abravanel [13]: It would not be proper to mention Olam ha’Ba in the context of Bechukosai and Ki Savo, since these blessings are for the nation as a whole rather than for individuals, whereas the spiritual rewards of the afterlife are for individuals and not for the nation as a whole. If the Torah had mentioned Olam ha’Ba in its lists of blessings, this might lead to misconceptions about the nature of the reward in the afterlife. For example, one might mistakenly conclude that one’s portion in Olam ha’Ba is determined or affected by the righteousness and wickedness of the majority of nation, as is the case with the physical blessings and curses. 

An Eighth Answer 

Shlomo ha'Melech says: “Give a portion to seven but also to eight” (Koheles 11:2). While the seven of the aforementioned answers all have their merits, I would like to offer an eighth answer – one which lines up with that of the Rambam, but with a twist. 

The Rambam [14] devotes the final chapter of Hilchos Teshuvah to a discussion of the motives for serving Hashem. He opens his discussion by defining two levels of Divine service: 

A person should not say, “I will do the mitzvos of the Torah and involve myself in its wisdom in order to receive all of the blessings that are written in it,” or “in order that I will merit life in Olam ha’Ba” and “I will separate myself from the transgressions about which the Torah warns us, in order to escape from the curses written in the Torah” or “so that I will not be cut off from Olam ha’Ba.”  

It is not proper to serve Hashem in this manner, for one who serves Hashem in this manner is called “oveid mi’yirah” (“one who serves out of fear”). This is neither a virtue of the prophets nor of the wise. The only ones who should serve Hashem in this manner are the ignoramuses, the women, and the children, whom we train to serve out of fear until their minds develop and they serve out of love.  

An “oveid me’ahavah” (“one who serves out of love”) involves himself in Torah and mitzvos and walks on the paths of wisdom not because of anything in the world, neither out of fear of the bad nor out of a desire to inherit the good. Rather, he does what is true because it is true, and the good will come of its own accord … 

It is easy to understand why doing mitzvos in order to receive the blessings promised by the Torah is considered to be an inferior motive, but why should this apply to one whose service is motivated by the prospect of reward in Olam ha’Ba? Didn’t the Rambam write earlier [15] that Olam ha’Ba is the greatest good? 

The [ultimate] goodness which is hidden away for tzadikim is Olam ha’Ba. This is the life which has no death with it, and the good which has no bad. This is what is written in the Torah, “so that it will be good for you, and you will prolong your days” (Devarim 22:7). From the Oral Torah we learn: “so that it will be good for you” [refers] to the world which is entirely good, and “you will prolong your days” [refers] to the world which is entirely long – and this is Olam ha’Ba. 

If Olam ha’Ba is the ultimate good, why shouldn’t it motivate our observance of mitzvos? 

The answer lies in the fact that it is impossible for us to comprehend the true nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba. The Rambam [16] introduces this difficulty in his introduction to Perek Chelek. He writes: 

Know that just as a blind man cannot experience colors, nor can a deaf man experience sounds, nor can a eunuch [experience] sexual desire, so too, physical bodies cannot experience spiritual enjoyments. And just as a fish does not recognize the element of fire because it (i.e. the fish) is immersed in its opposite, so too, one cannot know the enjoyments of the spiritual world while one is in this physical world, for we have no enjoyment other than bodily enjoyments alone – [such as] the experiences of our senses in eating, drinking, and sex – and everything outside of these [physical enjoyments] is not experienced by us, nor can we recognize it, nor can we apprehend it in our initial analysis, but only after much investigation. This is because we are in a physical world and cannot apprehend anything other than its enjoyments, but enjoyments of the soul are constant and unceasing, and there is no relationship at all whatsoever between these and those. 

Similarly, the Rambam [17] writes in the Mishneh Torah: 

Regarding the great good which the soul will enjoy in Olam ha’Ba: there is no way in Olam ha’Zeh to comprehend it or know it, because we only know in Olam ha’Zeh the good of the body, and that is what we desire; but that good [in Olam ha’Ba] is exceedingly great, and there is no comparison among the goods of Olam ha’Zeh except by way of analogy. 

Indeed, a few paragraphs earlier the Rambam condemns those who harbor foolish notions about the nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba, writing: 

Maybe this good will seem trivial in your eyes, and you’ll imagine that the only reward for mitzvos and for being a person who is perfected in the ways of truth is to eat and drink good foods, have relations with beautiful figures, wear garments made of silk and woven fabrics, dwell in houses of marble, and use gold and silver utensils and other things like this – as is imagined by the foolish and idiotic Arabs who are steeped in lechery.

But the wise and those who possess knowledge know that all of these things are fantasy and nothingness, and there is no hope in them. They are only considered to be a great good for us in Olam ha’Zeh because we have bodies, and all of these things are bodily needs, and the soul only desires them and favors them because they are bodily needs, in order that its desires will be fulfilled and its health maintained. And when there is no body, all of these things will be found to be pointless. 

Having established all of these premises, I would like to propose my own answer to our original question: Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? Because since it is absolutely impossible to conceive of the spiritual enjoyments of Olam ha’Ba, then if we were to be motivated by the promise of such a reward, we would – by definition – be chasing a fantasy. In other words, whatever notion of Olam ha’Ba is driving our motivation must, of necessity, be false, since it is impossible for a physical being to conceive of non-physical enjoyments. 

It is for this reason that the Torah promises physical blessings to those who obey Hashem. The individual whose avodah (Divine service) is motivated by these physical blessings and the individual whose avodah is motivated by Olam ha’Ba are both engaged in avodah she’lo lishmah (not for its own sake), but the former individual is on a higher level because at least he’s being motivated by a reality, whereas the latter is being motivated by a fantasy. 

Make no mistake: Olam ha’Ba itself is a reality, but the version of Olam ha’Ba as a motivator is a fantasy. The vision of Olam ha’Ba in our minds and imaginations, to which our psyche attaches value, and which acts as the proverbial carrot (paired with the proverbial stick) – that notion of Olam ha’Ba has no basis in reality whatsoever. In contrast, “rains in their proper time,” “eating bread in satiety,” “peace in the land” and all of the other physical blessings exist as motivators in our imaginations which do correspond to their physical reality. 

This sheds light on the Divine wisdom in relegating Olam ha’Ba to the Oral Torah. In Hashem’s “Plan A” (so to speak), students would not be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba until they were developmentally ready, as the Rambam [18] describes: 

Therefore, when we teach the children, women, and general populace of laymen, we should only teach them to serve out of fear and in order to receive reward, until their minds mature and they gain additional wisdom; we should reveal this secret to them bit by bit, and accustom them to this concept with pleasantness, until they apprehend it and know it and serve out of love. 

Parents and teachers would motivate their children and students to serve Hashem for the she’lo lishmah motive of obtaining the blessings mentioned in the Written Torah. As they reached the requisite level of psychological and intellectual maturity, they would be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba, which would click into its proper intellectual place as a truth about reality, rather than as a motivator for avodah. In this manner, they would bypass the stage of being motivated by a fantasy notion of Olam ha’Ba altogether. 

Ultimately, we cannot know why Hashem chose not to mention Olam ha’Ba explicitly in His lists of rewards, but these eight theories allow us to appreciate the fact that this was done with reason, and with wisdom. 

[1] This is a general remark, but I might as well mention it here. The line between Rishonim and Achronim is a matter of debate. Some distinguish between the two periods based on dates (e.g. the Rishonim are those who wrote in the 11th century to the 15th century, and the Achronim are post-15th century) or by specifying a cutoff point (e.g. all commentators who came before the composition of the Shulchan Aruch were Rishonim, and all who came after are Achronim). Personally, I don’t like either of these approaches. I prefer to define the two groups by their time period AND their relationship to their predecessors and/or their style. For example, I classify the Abravanel (1437 – 1508) as a Rishon because he argues with his predecessors as a contemporary, rather than a disciple. I classify the Sforno (1475 – 1550) as a Rishon because of his commentary’s style and commentary. 

[2] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 26:3 

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1); Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 9 

[4] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer Devarim 32:39; it should be noted that the Ibn Ezra’s answer to this question parallels his answer to R’ Yehuda ha’Levi’s question on the first of the Aseres ha’Dibros: Why does Hashem introduce Himself to the Jewish people by saying “Who took you out from the land of Egypt” instead of “Who created the heavens and the earth”? See the Ibn Ezra’s long commentary on Shemos 20:2. 

[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 18:29 

[6] Sefer ha’Chinuch: Introduction. The Abravanel doesn’t actually quote the Sefer ha’Chinuch with reference to this view, but since it was the first place I encountered it in my own learning, and since the Sefer ha’Chinuch expands upon this view even more than the Ramban, I decided to attribute this view to him in my list. Moreover, the Abravanel attributes this view to “Rabbeinu Bachya ha’Zaken, as mentioned by the Ibn Ezra” but according to the Warsaw manuscript and H. Norman Strickman, the name mentioned by the Ibn Ezra is actually “Rabbeinu Hai.” This possible misattribution is yet another reason why I opted to label this under the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s name. 

[7] According to the Ramban, as the Abravanel himself points out. 

[8] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran #1 

[9] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi (Kuzari) 1:104-117 

[10] Rabbeinu Saadia Gaon, Emunos v’Deos 9:2 

[11] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi 1:115 

[12] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran, end of #3 

[13] The Abravanel credits the Ramban for this approach, based on the latter’s Commentary on Sefer Devarim 29:20; he also cites the Sefer ha’Ikkarim 4:40, chastising him for citing this answer in his own name rather than in the name of the Ramban. 

[14] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 10:1-2 

[15] ibid. 8:1 

[16] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1) 

[17] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 8:6 

[18] Ibid. 10:5

Parashas Emor: Does Hashem Hate Unibrows?

Does Hashem hate unibrows? No, of course not! But then why does the Torah ban a Kohen with a unibrow from serving in the Beis ha’Mikdash? In this dvar Torah we will examine the nature of these physical disqualifications and consider their implications within the Torah system as a whole.

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Parashas Emor: Does Hashem Hate Unibrows? 

Parashas Emor introduces the prohibition for a physically blemished Kohen to perform avodah (service) in the Beis ha’Mikdash (Holy Temple): “Any man from among the offspring of Aharon the Kohen who has a blemish shall not approach to offer the fire-offerings of Hashem” (Vayikra 21:21). This parallels the prohibition to offer blemished animals as offerings, which is also discussed in this parashah: “Any [animal offering] in which there is a blemish you shall not offer, for it will not be favorable for you” (ibid. 22:20). 

The pesukim (verses) specify a number of examples of both categories of blemishes which are expanded upon in great detail by Torah she’baal Peh (the Oral Torah). There are a total of 140 physical blemishes that disqualify a Kohen from avodah, 90 of which are unique to human beings, and 50 of which are common to Kohanim and animals. The halacha classifies these 140 blemishes by their location on the body. In order to appreciate the nature and scope of these blemishes, here are a few examples from each category: 

• head (misshapen skull, various forms of baldness)
• neck (too short, too long)
• ears (blindness, too small, asymmetrical in size) 
• eyebrows (unibrow, asymmetrical in appearance)
• eyelids (no eyelashes, too squinty)
• eyes (abnormal positioning, abnormal shape, abnormal size)
• nose (abnormal positioning, abnormal shape, abnormal size)
• lips (over/under-bite, cracked lips, frequent spittle)
• belly (swollen, "outie" navel)
• back (crooked spine, hunchback)
• hands (abnormal number of fingers, webbed fingers, left-handed person)
• reproductive organs (abnormal size, injured scrotum, missing testicle)
• legs (bowlegged, abnormal number of toes, clicking ankles)
• stature (disproportionate trunk, abnormal height)
• skin (albino, very red skin, any type of mole, scarring)
• miscellaneous (deaf, epileptic, suffering from tremors on account of sickness or old age, suffering from severe depression, bad body odor) 

The major question here is: Why should these blemishes disqualify a Kohen from avodah? Does Hashem have something against physically blemished individuals? Does He find clicking ankles to be annoying? Does He regard albinos as subhuman? Does bad B.O. spoil the “fragrant aroma” (Vayikra 1:9) of the burnt offerings? Indeed, some modern readers may find these laws to be not only questionable, but morally reprehensible, and accuse the Torah of stoking the flames of certain forms of discrimination, such as ableism, ageism, and other prejudices. 

Before offering an answer, we will briefly respond to the types of charges against Torah mentioned in the aforementioned paragraph. Renowned pathologist Dr. J. Beckwith begins his historical essay, Congenital Malformations: from Superstition to Understanding, as follows: 

Throughout most of human history, congenital anomalies were perceived as omens, portents, or punishments of supernatural origin. This concept is reflected in the term “monster,” probably derived from the Latin verb monstrare (to show or reveal). Other explanations for congenital abnormalities included witchcraft, astrological configurations, or emotional experiences of the pregnant mother. 

Individuals suffering from physical deformities and bodily abnormalities were feared, shunned, and ostracized in many cultures, especially in ancient times. Dr. Beckwith elaborates on this phenomenon, citing an example from a neighboring ancient civilization to ours: 

Birth defects were interpreted as omens or portents in many early cultures. For example, Babylonian–Assyrian cuneiform tablets include an extensive catalog of anomalies believed to represent omens, some of which are clearly based upon observation of actual cases. 

Torah society stands in stark contrast to these prevailing views and attitudes in the ancient world. Judaism does not regard individuals with physical abnormalities to be inferior in any way to any other person. There is no discrimination when it comes to their religious observance nor are there any limitations to their roles in the community (with the sole exception of Kohanim in Mikdash). These individuals were never regarded as “cursed” or “harbingers of evil” or anything that even remotely negative. Indeed, the Sages decreed that a blessing should be recited upon seeing such an individual: “Blessed are You, Hashem, our God, King of the universe, Who makes creations different.” In other words, physical abnormalities are not viewed as negative, but are regarded positively as expressions of the wisdom and magnificence of the Creator. Moreover, the Torah clearly states that the essence of the human being is the tzelem Elokim (truth-seeking intellect) – not the physical body. Thus, there are no grounds for the assumption that a person should have lesser value in the eyes of God simply because his or her body looks different.

Of course, this only strengthens our question! These laws of Kohanim’s blemishes are an anomaly – the only Torah laws which, on the surface, seem to stigmatize physical imperfections. 

The Sefer ha’Chinuch (Mitzvah #275) answers this question as follows: 

At the root of this mitzvah lies the reason that the majority of people’s actions are favorable to the hearts of those who see them in accordance of the eminence of those who do them. For when a man is distinguished in his appearance and good in his actions, he “will find favor and good success” (Mishlei 3:4) in everything he does in the eyes of all who observe him. If, however, he is the opposite of this – inferior in his form or peculiar in his limbs – then even if he is straight in his ways, his activities will not be so attractive to the heart of those who see him. 

It is therefore truly fitting that the messenger (i.e. the Kohen), on whom atonement depends, should be a man of grace, handsome in appearance and fair in features, and pleasing in all his ways – that the minds of men may be drawn to him. And in addition to this, it is possible that in the perfection of his form lies an intimation of matters through which, as a man’s thoughts dwell on them, his spirit will be cleansed and exalted. 

It is therefore not right in any way that there should be in him [the Kohen] any deviation in any of his forms whatsoever, lest the spirit of the contemplator be distracted on account of the peculiarity and stray from the desired goal. 

According to the Sefer ha’Chinuch, physically blemished Kohanim were not barred from performing the avodah on account of any inherent deficiency or inadequacy on their part. Rather, as we say nowadays, it was all about “the optics.” The Beis ha’Mikdash is meant to be an awe-inspiring place, as the Sefer ha’Chinuch describes (Mitzvah #95): 

Hashem desired the good for human beings, as we have stated. Therefore He commanded us to establish a location that should be pure and clean to the ultimate degree of cleanliness, to purify there the thoughts of people and to rectify and perfect their hearts towards Him. 

Indeed, it is a mitzvah to be in awe of Mikdash, as the Sefer ha’Chinuch writes (Mitzvah #254): 

[He commanded us] to have a reverent awe of the Sanctuary: in other words, that we should regard and establish it in our souls as the place of awe and veneration, so that our hearts will be moved when we come there to pray or to bring offerings, as it is stated: “and you shall revere My Sanctuary” (Vayikra 19:30). 

The Sefer ha’Chinuch’s explanation of the Kohanim’s blemishes is built upon this idea, namely, that in order to produce the proper degree of awe, reverence, and inspiration in those come to the Beis ha’Mikdash, the Kohanim had to be flawless in their appearance. Anything less would detract from the intended effect of the Sanctuary, which was to inspire the visiting Jews to emulate the priestly models of avodah who ministered therein. 

A modern example of this phenomenon can be drawn from the world of fashion. Clothing companies know that in order to sell their products, they must use flawlessly attractive models, in ads and in clothing stores. These companies know that the vast majority of individuals will never live up to the beauty standards of these models, but will nevertheless purchase this clothing hoping that they will partake of some level of attractiveness, like these models. 

Just as attractive models enhance the attractiveness of the clothing they wear and cause the onlookers to aspire to this level of attractiveness, the same is true of the Kohanim. These are individuals who have devoted their lives to Hashem, to learning and teaching Torah, and to giving up their private civilian roles in order to live a life apart as models of avodas Hashem. They are intended to be the equivalent of Hollywood celebrities, epitomizing the life of chochmah (wisdom) and divine service rather than the life of fame and glamour. We are meant to look up to them and want to be like them, knowing full well that their lifestyle will likely be outside of our reach. When a Jew makes a pilgrimage to the Beis ha’Mikdash and sees Kohanim in action, he should be filled with a sense of awe and admiration. If that Kohen were blemished in any way, this would shatter the illusion and dilute the effect, thereby impeding the fundamental mission of Mikdash. 

This is why physical blemishes only disqualify Kohanim from their role in avodah, and do not invalidate any other Jew from doing any other mitzvah. Only Kohanim in the awe-inspiring Mikdash occupy this celebrity status in Judaism. There are other classes of individuals who are to be admired and emulated – such as talmidei chachamim (Torah scholars), tzadikim (righteous people), chasidim (pious people) – but none of these individuals function in the same capacity as the Kohanim of Mikdash. “For the lips of the Kokhen should safeguard knowledge, and people should seek teaching from his mouth, for he is an angel of Hashem, Master of Legions” (Malachi 2:7). Just as the true “angels of Hashem” are pristine in their metaphysical purity, so must their earthly counterparts be pristine in their physicality. 

I believe that this gives us some insight into the Torah’s general approach in mitzvos. The Rambam (Moreh ha’Nevuchim 3:32), in his famous explanation of korbanos (sacrifices), writes: 

Many commandments in our Torah are the result of a similar course adopted by the same Director, for it is impossible to go suddenly from one extreme to the other; therefore, it is impossible for man – according to human nature – to suddenly discontinue everything to which he has been accustomed. 

The Rambam applies this to korbanos, explaining that it would have been too much for Hashem to completely abolish a mode of worship to which the people had become so attached. He cites an example of Hashem using this approach in a non-mitzvah area: 

There occurs in the Torah a passage which contains exactly the same idea; it is the following: “God did not lead them by way of the land of the Philistines, even though it was near, for God said, ‘lest the people change their mind when they see war, and return to Egypt;’ but God led the people around, by way of the wilderness of the Sea of Reeds” (Shemos 13:17). Here Hashem led the people around, away from the direct road which He originally intended, because He was concerned that they might meet on that way with hardships too great for their ordinary strength; He took them by another road in order to obtain thereby His original goal. In the same manner Hashem refrained from commanding what the people by their natural disposition would be incapable of obeying, and gave the aforementioned commandments as a means of accomplishing His primary goal– namely, knowledge of Him, and the rejection of avodah zarah. 

The disqualifying blemishes of the Kohanim are another example of this phenomenon. On the one hand, the Torah does not assign any inherent value to physical attractiveness. At the same time, the Torah recognizes that it is human nature to care about physical appearances. The Torah can emphasize time and again that the essence of a human being is the tzelem Elokim and that true success lies in the pursuit of knowledge rather than beauty, but at the end of the day, the average Jew will still look askance at a Kohen with a unibrow, will be distracted by a Kohen who is an albino, and will be put off by a Kohen with bad body odor. 

In other words, the Torah must walk a fine line between its idealistic goal of perfecting human beings and the pragmatic realities of catering to human nature. That line can only be drawn by the Creator of man, “the God of the spirits of all flesh” (Bamidbar 16:22). Shlomo ha’Melech said: “Train the youth in accordance with his way (i.e. his nature), and even when he is old, he will not deviate from it” (Mishlei 22:6), and the same pedagogical tactic is employed by the Giver of Torah.

Honoring Our Non-Jewish Elders

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Left: [Great] Uncle William, at the age of 4, in February 1921
Right: [Great] Uncle William, at the age of 101, in July 2018

Honoring Our Non-Jewish Elders

Uncle William

My brother and I recently returned from our annual trip to Hawaii, where our mom's side of the family has lived for several generations. My mom's father was one of thirteen siblings, the oldest of whom was born in 1902. Of those thirteen siblings, only one is still alive: [Great] Uncle William (whom we refer to as "Uncle William," even though he's my grandfather's brother). 

Uncle William was born on April 1st, 1917.

Yes, your math is correct: this past April 1st was his 101st birthday. 

Let's put Uncle William's personal timeline into perspective by using American history and American innovation as a basis of comparison. The year Uncle William was born, Woodrow Wilson was president (#28), and Liliuokalani, the last Queen of Hawaii, was still alive. Hawaii wouldn't become a state until 42 years later. Television wasn't invented until Uncle William was almost 10 years old. He was a teenager during the Great Depression, and in his mid-20's he witnessed the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. He still holds it against FDR for taking America off the gold standard in 1933. He was too old to be in the Korean War, which started in his mid-30's, and he was nearly 60 when the Vietnam War ended. He was 75 at the birth of the World Wide Web, and he was 84 on 9/11. 

Impressive, no?

Uncle William worked as a furniture repair man for most of his life, and only retired at the age of 95, when he started having a hard time getting up after sitting down on the floor to work. He remained active into his 90's, riding his bike into town, trading up his vehicle for a new one (because "the old car didn't fit my lifestyle"), and mowing his own lawn ("it takes me three days").

All the while, his mental faculties didn't dull in the slightest. While not a towering intellectual or even a deep thinker, Uncle William definitely has a reflective soul. Although he didn't go to college or graduate from high school (my grandfather was the only one of his siblings to do that), Uncle William was a reader - especially of newspapers. He followed the news to the point where we could ask him for his opinion on any current event, and he would have something thoughtful to say. (For the record: he didn't like Obama because he was a politician and didn't like Trump because "he's just a big mouth" and he thinks that America is going downhill because Democracy appeals to the lowest common denominator; when we asked him who America's last great leader was, he said, "Clinton was good ... the man - not the wife.")

Unfortunately, Uncle William had a prostate issue two years ago, and needed to start using a catheter, which slowed him down. Things started going downhill from there. He had made it to the age of 98 living on his own, but was finally forced to hire an attendant to help him. By the time we visited him this summer his vision and hearing had deteriorated, and he now has 24-hour care.

And yet, he's still mentally with it! We talked with him for about an hour, and said that we'd visit him next summer ("If I'm still around!").

After visiting Uncle William this summer, I found myself wondering: "What would Torah say? How would Judaism frame my interaction with a man of Uncle William's age?"

I decided I'd look into it. This is what I found.

The Halacha of Honoring Non-Jewish Elders

The "halachic address" of our topic is the mitzvas aseh (positive commandment) of "mipnei seivah takum," which is derived from the pasuk: "In the presence of old age you shall rise, and you shall honor the presence of a sage, and you shall revere your God - I am Hashem" (Vayikra 19:32). Here is the Sefer ha'Chinuch's [1] summary of the basic mitzvah:

[The 257th mitzvah is] to honor chachamim (the wise) and rise before them, as it is stated: "you shall rise up before seivah (lit. white hair)," which Onkelos translated as: "you shall rise up before one who knows Torah." Our Sages of blessed memory explained "and you shall honor the presence of a zakein (lit. elder)" as referring to none other than zeh she'kanah chochmah (one who has acquired wisdom). The reason why Scripture expresses "chacham" as "zakein" is because a young chacham has seen through his chochmah (wisdom) what an elder has seen through the multitude of his years.

While the primary form of this mitzvah is to honor chachamim, we follow the opinion of R' Issi ben Yehudah in the Gemara who says that "[this pasuk] implies all [types of] seivah" which even includes elders who are not chachamim. Here is the Rambam's [2] codification of this secondary component of the mitzvah, which includes the case at hand:

We stand in the presence of a zakein ha'muflag b'ziknah (an elder who is very advanced in age) even though he is not a chacham (wise man). Even a young chacham should stand in the presence of a zakein ha'muflag b'ziknah – though he is not obligated to stand to his full stature, but only enough to show respect to him. And even a non-Jewish elder we honor with words, and we lend him a supporting hand, as it is stated: “rise up in the presence of old age” – which implies old age in any sense of the term.

The Shulchan Aruch [3] brings down the Rambam's formulation almost verbatim. Although there is some debate as to what age would qualify someone as a zakein ha'muflag b'ziknah - with opinions ranging from 60, to 70, to 90 - I suspect everyone would agree that Uncle William's age of 101 years places him firmly within this halachic category.

The source of the Rambam's halacha is the Gemara in Kiddushin (33a), which states:

R’ Yochanan would rise up in the presence of a non-Jewish elder, saying: “How many experiences he has endured!” Rava would not rise up, but he would show him honor. Abaye would lend his hand to [such] elders.

The Rambam paskins (halachically rules) in accordance with Rava and Abaye that although we do not stand up for a zakein goy (non-Jewish elder) as we would for a zaken Yisrael (Jewish elder), we show him honor in other ways: verbally and by providing assistance.

Although the Rambam's citation of our pasuk and subsequent explanation might seem to imply that he holds that honoring a zakein goy is part of the mitzvah de'oraisa (Biblical obligation), it is pretty clear that this isn't what he actually holds. If it were, then there would be no differentiation between a zakein goy and a zakein Yisrael. Rather, showing honor to a zakein goy is either a mitzvah mi'de'rabbanan [4] (Rabbinic mitzvah), or something we do out of darchei shalom [5] ("ways of peace," intended to maintain peace between Jews and non-Jews). This explains why we differentiate between a zakein goy and a zakein Yisrael - to show that the two acts of giving kavod do not share the same halachic nature.

The Philosophy Behind the Halacha

The Sefer ha'Chinuch offers the following reason for this mitzvah as a whole (i.e. to honor chachamim):

At the root of this mitzvah lies the reason that the main purpose of man's having been created in the world is for the sake of chochmah, so that he will recognize his Creator, therefore, it is fitting for people to honor one who has attained this. As a result, others will be inspired about it. It is based on this reason that Issi ben Yehudah said in the Gemara Kiddushin that even an uneducated elder - i.e. one who is not wise - is included in this mitzvah, for it is befitting to honor him because in his multitude of years he has seen and recognized some of the works and wonders of Hashem, and this is worthy of honor. This is why Rebbi Yochanan said there in the Gemara Kiddushin: "the halacha is in accordance with Issi ben Yehudah" - on the condition that [the elder] is not a confirmed sinner, in which case, he has deprived himself of honor.

Even though we have established that the obligation of honoring a zakein goy is not a part of the mitzvah de'oraisa, the reason behind this act of honor is definitely related. As stated above, R' Yochanan explained his reason for standing in the presence of a zakein goy, saying: "How many (harpatkei) experiences he has endured!" Rashi [6] explains the unusual term "harpatkei":

harpatkei [means] experiences and troubles; and they have seen many miracles and wonders.

According to Rashi, we honor a zakein goy not for any type of specialized chochmah that he may or may not have. Rather, we honor him for the chochmah that he has gained from his life-experience and the wondrous phenomena he has had the opportunity to witness. This would certainly apply to non-Jew elders, no matter where they're from.

Rav Hirsch [7] provides a similar explanation, differentiating between the two reasons for honoring an elder, which he relates to the two words used to denote "old age" (i.e. seivah and ziknah):

He who honors seivah honors experience; that is, he honors the natural human perception that matures through the repeated events of life and nature. He who honors ziknah honors wisdom; that is, he honors the understanding of life and nature that is obtained from God's Word. For God's Word reveals the Divine source and purpose of life and nature, and their significance for our mission. We must pay tribute to both: the clear and circumspect human intellect, which matures through experience; and the spirit of God, which proceeds from the Torah. And whenever we find them, in the aged and in the wise, we are to show our homage by rising and honoring.  

The Ralbag [8] seems to learn our pasuk as teaching two separate mitzvos: "in the presence of old age you shall rise" commands us to honor elders, regardless of their wisdom, and "honor the presence of a sage" commands us to honor chachamim. He explains the first mitzvah very similarly to the Sefer ha'Chinuch, but throws in a Gersonidean twist at the end:

"in the presence of old age you shall rise" is a mitzvas aseh to rise up in the presence of every aged person, in order to honor him. There is a benefit in this: on account of this, those who are young in days will listen to the words of the aged, and their words will be precious to them, and they will behave in accordance with their discipline. For the aged, due to the multitude of worldly events that they have witnessed, will come to know by way of experience many principles of decision-making and ethics. Thus, one who listens to these words will be saved from many afflictions that would have befallen him, were it not for the advice of the aged. Furthermore, [one who honors the aged] will take it to heart to give great honor to Hashem, Who is Eternal - Who never didn't exist, and will never depart [from existence]. 

In other words, this mitzvah operates on two levels. On a practical level, the mitzvah facilitates the bequeathal of valuable life lessons from the older generation to the younger. On a philosophical/psychological level, this mitzvah trains us to have reverence for existence, which - according to the Ralbag - will ultimately strengthen our reverence for Hashem, Whose Existence is Eternal.

Ibn Ezra, [9] however, has a radically different take on this mitzvah:

The meaning of "in the presence of old age you shall rise" is on account of a dead person, because an elder is close to death, since his body is considered to be as though it is dead ... the meaning of "you shall fear your God" is that He will punish you in the days of old age.

According to the Ibn Ezra, we stand up in the presence of the elderly not to show them honor, but to remind ourselves of our impending death!

Concluding Thoughts

As is often the case with taamei ha'mitzvos (reasons for mitzvos), it is entirely possible for multiple explanations to be correct. All of these explanations ring true based on the time I've spent with Uncle William.

Have my encounters with Uncle William led me to value and revere the unique type of wisdom he has attained as a result of his long life? Yes. Am I more inclined to listen closely to his words than I would if I heard them from someone closer to my age? Yes. When I see him, do I become more cognizant of the finitude of my own life, and the eventuality of my own eventual death? Definitely.

And guess what? I even got to perform the mitzvah this trip by lending him a helping hand when he wanted to move to a different chair!

I realize that this blog post didn't break new ground or anything. I just think that it's a great example of how halacha enriches every area of my life, and I wanted to share that example with you.


[1] Sefer ha'Chinuch: Parashas Kedoshim, Mitzvah #257
[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Talmud Torah 6:9
[3] Rav Yosef Karo, Shulchan Aruch: Yoreh Deah 244:7
[4] Rav Yoel Sirkis (Bach), Bayis Chadash: Yoreh Deah 244
[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Yaakov (Semag), Sefer Mitzvos Gadol: Aseh #13
[6] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Talmud Bavli: Kiddushin 33
[7] Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, Commentary on Vayikra 19:32
[8] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on Vayikra 19:32
[9] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Vayikra 19:32

Kadesh Atzmecha b'Assur Lach

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Artwork: Dispel, by Chase Stone

Kadesh Atzmecha b'Assur Lach

What is kedushah?

"Kedushah" is a prominent theme within Judaism. Although this term is typically translated as "holiness,""sanctity," or "sacredness," I have never found such translations to be of much use. If anything, they tend to be a hindrance to understanding. They're vague, they're loaded with foreign connotations, and they fail to convey Judaism's unique take on what it means to be kadosh. 

According to Judaism, "kedushah" is based defined as "transcendence of physicality." Hashem is called "kadosh" because He transcends physicality in an absolute manner: He has no physical body, has no physical characteristics, and is not subject to any physical effects, changes, or occurrences whatsoever. Angels [1] are called "kedoshim" because although they affect the physical world, they, themselves, are not physical.

How can a human being become "kadosh"? After all, we have a physical body and physical drives in addition to our non-physical soul. The answer is: human beings can become kedoshim insofar as we transcend our own physicality by rising above the dictates of our animalistic instincts and psychological drives and living our lives based on, and in service of, our tzelem Elokim (non-physical intellect). 

All mitzvos are instruments of kedushah: they are all serve the Torah regimen's goal of developing man into a knowledge-seeking being, whether by perfecting the body/psyche, or the intellect, or both. We acknowledge the kedushah dimension of mitzvos every time we make a birkas ha'mitzvah (blessing over mitzvos) by saying: "asher kideshanu b'mitzvosav" ("Who made us kadosh through His mitzvos"). 

While all mitzvos partake of the general character of kedushah, there are other mitzvos whose specific character is kedushah as well. The Rambam divided all 613 mitzvos into 14 categories, as codified in the 14 books of his Mishneh Torah. His Sefer Kedushah includes two categories of mitzvos: issurei biah (prohibited sexual relations) and maachalos assuros (prohibited foods). These mitzvos are designed to instill kedushah on an individual and national level by targeting the two primary instinctual drives in man: the sexual and the appetitive.

This explanation of kedushah applies to the other groups of mitzvos and halachic institutions which are explicitly associated with kedushah. For example, the mikraei kodesh ("holidays") are time periods devoted to kedushah-development, in which we withdraw from our involvement in melachah (shaping the physical world in accordance with our design) and focusing on the development of our tzelem Elokim. The Beis ha'Mikdash is the national kedushah-center, run by the kohanim ha'kedoshim - those individuals governed additional strictures of kedushah whose job is to process all of the kodshim (consecrated sacrifices) funded by hekdesh (consecrated property). The institution of kiddushin (betrothal and marriage) is designed to instill the relationship between a man and his wife - and, by extension, their home and family - with kedushah. And so on.

Kadesh Atzmecha b'Mutar Lach 

In addition to the kedushah-development that is facilitated through the observance of halacha, Chazal also urge us to practice kedushah beyond what is required by halacha. Parashas Kedoshim begins with the statement of kedoshim tihiyu (you shall be kadosh): 

Hashem spoke to Moshe, saying: Speak to the entire assembly of the Children of Israel and say to them: "You shall be kedoshim, for I, Hashem, your God, am kadosh" (Vayikra 19:2).

The Ramban [2] explains kedoshim tihiyu as a commandment to strive for kedushah within the realm of the permissible:

The idea [of this mitzvah] is that the Torah warned against prohibited sexual relations and prohibited foods, but it permitted the cohabitation of a man with his wife and the [unlimited] consumption of meat and wine. Accordingly, the baal taavah (pleasure addict) can find room [within the parameters of the law] to be steeped in sexual indulgence with his wife or to be "one of the guzzlers of wine and gorgers of meat" (Mishlei 23:20), and to speak as he pleases about all vile things - for the prohibition of [such speech] is not [explicitly] mentioned in the Torah - and thus, he will be a naval bi'reshus ha'Torah (a degenerate within the parameters of the Torah's permission).  

Therefore, this pasuk [of kedoshim tihiyu] comes after [the Torah] detailed the categorical prohibitions, and commands in a general statement that we shall remove ourselves from excess within permissible acts. [For example,] one should be temperate in cohabiting [with his wife] ... utilizing [marital relations] only as needed for the fulfillment of the mitzvah regarding it; he should be kadosh with regard to wine by being temperate in [its consumption] ... similarly, he should guard his mouth and tongue from becoming polluted with excessive, gluttonous eating or with vile speech ... 

It is with regard to these matters and those like them that this general mitzvah [of kedoshim tihiyu] comes [to caution], after [the Torah] detailed all of the transgressions which are categorically prohibited.

Chazal summed up this application of kedoshim tihiyu in the injunction: "kadesh atzmecha b'mutar lach" ("sanctify yourself within what is permissible to you"). Just because the Torah grants freedom within a certain area doesn't mean that it's a free-for-all. Instead of acting like an animal, a person should exercise restraint and strive for moderation even with regard to what is permitted.  

One might ask: "If the Torah is against excessively indulgent behavior, then why didn't it prohibit all forms of such behavior so there would be no need for a separate mitzvah of kedoshim tihiyu?" The answer to this is two-fold. First of all, it is inherently impossible to legislate kedushah in this manner. No matter how far the Torah might have gone in prohibiting a specific type of indulgence, there would always remain a permissible realm, and a person could still be a naval bi'reshus ha'Torah in that area. In other words, as long as there is any amount of reshus (permission), then there is room to be a naval bi'reshus ha'Torah.

Secondly, the Torah recognizes that certain courses of development are most effective if the individual is allowed to tailor the Torah regimen to his own specifications, and to ramp it up at his own pace. For this reason, the Torah regulates the behavior of all Jews in a uniform manner up to a certain point, but beyond that, it is the responsibility of the individual to take on additional strictures and strive to fulfill the Torah's objectives in a personalized manner, beyond what is required by the strict letter of the law. (This is the basis of Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha'Rambam's distinction between the Derech ha'Ahm and the Derech ha'Yachid; see this post for an elaboration.)

According to the Ramban, this is why the Torah included a mitzvah of kedoshim tihiyu. Even though it is impossible and ineffective to legislate this type of kedushah on a particular level, the Torah can still urge us to implement this in a general way by broadly commanding us in kadesh atzmecha b'mutar lach.

Kadesh Atzmecha b'Assur Lach

I would like to coin a new phrase, which is an extension of the Ramban's explanation of kedoshim tihiyu and kadesh atzmecha b'mutar lach. That phrase is "kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach" ("sanctify yourself within what is prohibited to you"). I am not suggesting that this principle is an actual mitzvah or a halacha. I do, however, believe that it is an important part of the Torah's approach to kedushah, and an indispensable practical guideline in the observance of halacha.  

By "kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach" I mean that even when a person violates halacha, he or she should still practice kedushah to the extent possible. In other words, just because the transgressor knows he or she is going to violate halacha doesn't mean that he or she should just say, "To hell with it," and go on to act in a totally unrestrained manner. Instead, he or she should still exercise restraint and self-control within that violation of halacha - and, if feasible, should try to act in accordance with the objectives of the Torah, even though his or her actions are not in line with halacha itself.

Let's use a familiar, non-halachic analogy to illustrate this principle: dieting. Reuven is on a diet which requires him to observe precise dietary restrictions and to moderate his caloric intake. He's been sticking to his diet religiously for months. But one evening, he finds himself standing in front of a wedding smorgasbord featuring his arch-nemesis: UNLIMITED SUSHI. After battling with the urge to consume his favorite food, he admits defeat, and gorges himself on sushi ... and then he has some pasta ... and then some cookies ... and then ice cream ... all while telling himself, "Now that I've gone off my diet, I might as well let loose."

Although we may sympathize with Reuven's plight, we recognize the irrationality of his rationalization. He only lost the battle against sushi. Why should he concede additional territory to pasta, cookies, and ice cream as well? Just because he made one mistake doesn't mean that he should make three more mistakes! Instead, he should some sushi, and then return to his diet.

The same approach applies to halacha. Just as the person who stumbles in his diet should still exercise as much self-control as possible in line with the objectives and principles of his diet, so too, a person who stumbles in halacha should still exercise as much self-control as possible, in line with the objectives and principles of Torah. In doing so, he will at least be practicing kedushah even as he violates halacha. That is what I mean by kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach.

I will expand upon on this by focusing on three related (arguably identical) applications.

Application #1: The Baal Teshuvah

A baal teshuvah is someone who was once involved in a sin, but has engaged in teshuvah (repentance) and changed his or her ways for the good. Strictly speaking, "baal teshuvah" can refer to anyone who routinely engaged in any transgression or transgressions, and has subsequently done teshuvah. Colloquially, this term is reserved for people who "weren't religious" and became religious.

Halacha can be VERY daunting for a baal teshuvah who grew up non-observant. Most areas of halacha are so detailed that it is a challenge to even learn what to do and what not to do, let alone actually change one's lifestyle from non-halachic to halachic. This intimidation-factor can be a huge deterrent for potential baalei teshuvah, pressuring them to feel that they need to go from complete non-observance to being completely shomer Torah u'mitzvos (halachically observant). In many cases there exists a real danger that the would-be baal teshuvah will not even embark on the path of teshuvah because he or she feels the pressure to make an all-or-nothing lifestyle change in a very short amount of time.

This is where kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach comes in. Halacha really is all-or-nothing in terms of its  absolutely binding nature as a legal system, but that doesn't mean that the baal teshuvah should approach his return to halacha with such absolutism. It is often more realistic to take on halachic observance piecemeal, one step at a time, until one is fully shomer Torah u'mitzvos.

The first example of this that I witnessed happened in my own home. I was raised irreligious, but our family started becoming baalei teshuvah when I was around 13 years old. My dad was the first one to start keeping kosher in our family. However, he didn't go from zero observance to full observance of kashrus overnight. He began by giving up pork. Next, he stopped eating shellfish. Then he stopped eating milk with meat. After that he stopped eating milk after meat. Eventually, after around two years, we all took the plunge, kashered our kitchen, and kept a fully kosher home.

Now, a person could make the argument that what my dad did would be frowned upon by halacha. After all, almost everything that was cooked in our non-kosher kitchen was technically assur (prohibited), so it's not like he was actually "keeping kosher" until he fully made the switch.

Nevertheless, I believe that this step-by-step approach to doing teshuvah was a kiyum (fulfillment) of the principles of kedushah, even though it was an imperfect kiyum of the halachos of kedushah. It is assur to eating a piece of pork and it is also assur to eat a piece of chicken cooked in a pot that was used to cook pork - yet, my dad's act of resisting the urge to eat pork and forcing himself to eat chicken in order to uphold halacha was an act of kedushah, despite the fact that it involved a transgression.

I would argue that this is true for all of halacha, insofar as all mitzvos are vehicles of kedushah. Every step that a baal teshuvah takes towards halachic observance is a step taken with kedushah, even if it doesn't completely meet the standards of halacha at the present time.

I think that this is an important idea to emphasize with baalei teshuvah as they make their journey, since baalei teshuvah sometimes feel guilty about taking things slowly. Admittedly, it's a difficult balancing act: on the one hand, it must be made clear that halacha is an objective, uniform, Divinely mandated system, and that an aveirah (transgression) is still an aveirah; at the same time, it is psychologically beneficial and philosophically instructive to point out that the transgression of a baal teshuvah on the path towards observance is fundamentally different than the transgression of a non-baal teshuvah.

Application #2: The Teenager

Another demographic that kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach pertains to is teenagers. Teenagers and young adults from all across the shomer Torah u'mitzvos spectrum face a number of challenges throughout this difficult time in their lives. It is quite common for teens to go through lapses in various areas of their halachic observance.

As I - and I'm sure other Jewish Educators - can attest, these young men and women often feel "doomed" by their lapses or by their imperfect observance of halacha. They feel that if they're intentionally and habitually doing one aveirah, they might as well do more aveiros. For example, if they're texting on Shabbos, they might as well turn on lights on Shabbos; if they wear short sleeves, they might as well wear short skirts; if they eat non-kosher candy, they might as well eat at non-kosher restaurants; if they're violating "shomer negiah," they might as well do other things.

I think that the message we give baalei teshuvah should be given to these teenagers as well. Yes, halacha is absolutely binding. No, halacha does not grant you the permission to pick and choose. But if you feel that you can't give an area of halacha your 100%, then at least give it 80%, or 60%, or even 10%. So long as you are still exercising as much control as you can muster, that is still the derech of kedushah, and that is still something worth holding onto.

I witnessed a great example of this involving a teenager who happened to be a baal teshuvah. This incident took place during my second or third year of yeshiva, when I went back to visit my old high school. I sat in on a Q&A session with my Mishlei rebbi and a class of 10th graders. This kid told my rebbi that he was struggling with a certain area of halacha involving self-control. He said that it felt like the halacha was impossible for him to keep, and he wanted to know what to do about it. My rebbi asked him, "Can you control yourself sometimes or never?" The kid answered, "Sometimes." My rebbi then simply said, "Okay. So try to keep the halacha and only give in to your desires when you're in a situation where you can't control yourself," to which the kid replied, "Oh. I guess that makes sense!"

My first thought upon hearing this was, "Duh! Isn't that what the kid had already been doing in the first place? Wasn't he just trying to keep the halacha and then failing when the desire became overpowering? What did my rebbi's advice change in this kid's mind?" But then I realized what had happened. From the kid's question it was clear that he was ready to give up on trying to keep the halacha altogether. What my rebbi essentially did was to say, "Nobody's perfect, and it seems that you can't keep this halacha perfectly right now - but that doesn't mean that it's rational to just stop trying to keep it. Instead, approach the observance and the violation of this halacha with kedushah: try to observe the halacha, and only violate it when you can't control yourself."

Obviously, this must all be done delicately. The expression "give them an inch and they'll take a mile" definitely applies to the average teenager. The approach that my rebbi took worked in that case, but there are a number of ways in which it could have gone wrong. Educators must proceed with caution.

Application #3: The Uncontrollable Yetzer

The last application of kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach relates to a topic I've written about before. Years ago I wrote a blog post about Chazal's advice for someone who is overcome with an irresistible urge to violate halacha. Under certain circumstances, Chazal would instruct such a person to "go to a place where they don’t recognize him, put on black clothes and cover himself in black, and do what his heart desires, and not cause a chillul shem shamayim b'farhesya (public desecration of God's Name)." See what I wrote for a full analysis, which includes important details and qualifications. For our purposes, I'll quote an excerpt from that post which pertains to the topic at hand:

There are so many Jews who have an "all or nothing" attitude when it comes to halachic observance. This is ridiculous. From a philosophical, halachic, and metaphysical standpoint, Torah is an "all or nothing" system. You can't pick and choose which halachos to keep. At the same time, realistically speaking, not every person is able to keep every halacha in every case. But the Torah has advice even for these people. The Torah doesn't just say, "To hell with you. Do whatever you want. See if I care."

This is highlighted very clearly in [Chazal's] teaching. [They are] essentially telling this person: "I understand. You can't control yourself in this case. Your own observance of this halacha will be compromised. But there is still the consideration of chillul shem shamayim, and you should at least retain that consideration as a priority."

Although Chazal identify chilul ha'Shem - not kedushah - as the governing principle, it is still a good illustration of the manner in which kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach should be applied.

Concluding Thoughts

I don't think what I've written about here contains anything new. It is simply a particular application of the principles discussed by the Ramban in his commentary on kedoshim tihiyu. Still, I think that by coining the phrase "kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach," this principle will become easier to think about, to discuss, and to apply in practice. 

[1] Ha! You probably thought that this footnote would define what "angels" are, didn't you? I'm afraid that question is beyond the scope of this blog post. 
[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 19:2

Mikdash, Moadim, and Tzedakah

I set out to write a blog post on a Shavuos related theme, but I realized that this idea doubles as a blog post on Parashas Emor and Parashas Kedoshim (hence the modified title below). This post was difficult to write since the themes it treats are so broad. Hopefully I did it justice.

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Artwork: Plains (Kaladesh), by Clint Cearley

Parashas Emor/Kedoshim: Mikdash, Moadim, and Tzedakah

Parashas Emor is the first comprehensive presentation of the moadim (holidays). The Torah walks us through each of the moadim, providing us with details about their dates, their korbanos, their mitzvos, and - in some cases - their themes.

After completing the presentation of Shavuos, the pesukim take an unexpected detour before moving on to Rosh ha'Shanah. Here is the passage in context:

You shall count for yourselves - from the morrow of the rest day, from the day when you bring the Omer of the waving - seven weeks, they shall be complete. Until the morrow of the seventh week you shall count, fifty days; and you shall offer a new meal-offering to Hashem. From your dwelling places you shall bring bread that shall be waved, two loaves made of two tenth-ephah, they shall be fine flour, they shall be baked leavened; first-offerings to Hashem ... You shall convoke on this very day - there shall be a holy convocation for yourselves - you shall do no laborious work; it is an eternal decree in your dwelling places for your generations. When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not remove completely the corners of your field as you reap and you shall not gather the gleanings of your harvest; for the poor and the convert shall you leave them; I am Hashem, your God. (Vayikra 23:15-21)

Right in the middle of its presentation of the moadim is a reminder about the agricultural tzedakah mitzvos of peah (leaving the corners of the fields unharvested) and leket (leaving the ears of grain that fall to the ground). This unclaimed produce was left to be gathered by the poor, the convert, and the other downtrodden individuals, thereby ensuring their sustenance in a systemic nationwide manner. 

The commentators are bothered by the glaring question: What are these non-moadim-related mitzvos doing in the middle of the Torah's presentation of the moadim? It would be one thing if this were the primary place where the Torah discusses peah and leket, but it's not. In fact, these mitzvos were introduced a few chapters earlier, in Parashas Kedoshim. Their appearance here is clearly intended as a context-specific reminder. Why is this reminder needed?

Rashi [1] cites a midrash from Toras Kohanim [2] which explicitly addresses this question, albeit in a cryptic fashion:

Rav Avdimi b'Rebbi Yossi said: Why did the Torah see fit to place this [reminder] in the middle of the festivals, with Pesach and Atzeres on one side and Rosh ha'Shanah, Yom ha'Kippurim, and Sukkos on the other side? To teach you that anyone who properly gives leket, peah, and shichechah [3] to the poor - it is considered as though he built the Beis ha'Mikdash and brought its korbanos in it.

This answer raises yet another question: How are the mitzvos of leket, peah, and shichechah equivalent to building the Beis ha'Mikdash and offering korbanos in it? The two categories of mitzvos don't even seem related: the former pertains to the realm of agriculture and tzedakah in everyday life, while the latter pertains to the avodah of the kohanim in the world of Mikdash!

The Ibn Ezra provides us with a clue - not in Parashas Emor, but in Parashas Kedoshim, where these mitzvos first appear. The pesukim there follow a similar pattern:

When you slaughter a feast peace-offering to Hashem, you shall slaughter it to find favor for yourselves. On the day of your slaughter shall it be eaten and on the next day, and whatever remains until the third day, it is rejected - it shall not be accepted. Each of those who eat it will bear his iniquity, for what is sacred to Hashem has he desecrated; and that soul shall be cut off from its people. When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not complete your reaping to the corner of your field, and the gleanings of your harvest you shall not take. You shall not pick the undeveloped twigs of your vineyard; and the fallen fruit of your vineyard you shall not gather; for the poor and the convert shall you leave them - I am Hashem, your God. (Vayikra 19:5-10)

Here, too, we see halachos of korbanos followed by a mention of the agricultural mitzvos of leket and peah. The Ibn Ezra [4] remarks on this juxtaposition:

The meaning of "when you reap the harvest" after [these laws of] slaughtering a peace offering [is as follows:] just as you have given the parts of the korban to Hashem, so too, you shall give to the poor and to the convert from the harvest of your land - for the sake of kavod Hashem (honoring Hashem).

Ibn Ezra identifies the common denominator between korbanos and the agricultural mitzvos: they all result in a kiyum (effect/fulfillment) of kavod Hashem. The question is: How?

We tend to think about tzedakah in the framework of kindness, righteousness, and justice - not in the framework of honoring Hashem. This underappreciated aspect of tzedakah is referenced in at least one pasuk: "Honor Hashem with your wealth, and with the first of all your produce" (Mishlei 3:9). Ralbag [5] explains:

"Honor Hashem with your wealth" in the same way as the Torah commands you to give the first of all your produce, seeds, and fruits as gifts to the Kohanim and Leviim for the wondrous benefit of guiding you to recognize that all good things flow from Hashem.

Similarly, Ralbag [6] writes that the purpose of the Mikdash and its korbanos is:

... to guide us to believe in the Existence of God, Lord of all, and that it is proper for Him to be worshiped, for everything is from Him, and therefore we are obligated to honor Him with our wealth; He is of the utmost greatness and glory, and for this reason we make for Him this Mikdash which wondrous in its beauty, artistry, and quality of construction.

Herein lies the connection between the tzedakah-mitzvos of peah, leket, and shichechah, and the purpose of the Mikdash and its korbanos. Mikdash exists for the kavod Hashem, to bring all human beings to the recognition of His Existence, His Malchus (Kingship), and His beneficence which extends to all of His creatures. All of the korbanos and matanos (gifts) we bring to the Mikdash reinforce this recognition. The requirement to give of the fruits of our labor counteracts the kochi v'otzem yadi ("my might and the power of my hand made me this wealth") mentality by prompting us to realize that all of the good we enjoy comes from Hashem, and that "He opens His hand and satisfies the desire of every living thing" (cf. Tehilim 145:16).

However, it is not enough merely to know that Hashem is the Cause of the good. This knowledge must be real to us to the extent that it affects our actions, and compels us to emulate His ways. We were not created to be passive admirers and observers of the Creator, but to be active agents of His Will to do chesed, mishpat, and tzedakah on earth. To praise Hashem for His beneficence and not emulate His ways would be hypocritical, and would constitute a pgam (blemish) in His kavod. By observing these agricultural mitzvos as agents of His will to do chesed, mishat, and tzedakah, we are enhancing His kavod by demonstrating the extent to which the Melech cares for His subjects. By fulfilling the mitzvos of leket, peah, and shichechah, we are demonstrating through our actions that God not only provides for our needs, but He guarantees the provision of the needs of those unfortunate individuals who live on the fringes of society.

This kiyum of kavod Hashem is only complete when both components - Mikdash and tzedakah - are fulfilled in concert with each other. To only discharge our duties vis a vis Mikdash would constitute a recognition of Hashem as ha'Tov ve'ha'Meitiv (the One Who is Good and does good), but the benefit of that recognition would be limited to our own minds, and would not impact the world around us. Likewise, to only fulfill our tzedakah duties would be good insofar as our implementation of chesed, mishpat, and tzedakah in the world are concerned, but our actions would not reflect the recognition that all of the goodness and blessing we enjoy comes from Hashem. The proper framework is only achieved by doing both sets of mitzvos in conjunction with each other, and only then do we achieve the full kiyum of kavod Hashem.

This, I believe, is what the midrash in Toras Kohanim cited by Rashi is getting at. The proper fulfillment of the mitzvos of leket, peah, and shichechah complements the proper fulfillment of the mitzvos of Mikdash and its korbanos. Both sets of mitzvos bring us to an awareness that Hashem is the Cause of all good. The act of giving of tzedakah to the poor produces the same kiyum as building the Mikdash and bringing its korbanos - provided that one is aware of this idea.

In answering our question in his commentary on our pesukim, the Ralbag [7] emphasizes that this idea is especially true in relation to the specific mitzvos associated with Shavuos, namely, the minchas ha'omer (Barley Offering brought after Pesach) and the Shtei ha'Lechem (Two Loaves brought on Shavuos):

This [reminder of leket and peah] came in this place to teach us that for the same reason that Hashem commanded us to offer the Minchas ha'Omer and the Shtei ha'Lechem from the new harvest - namely, to remind us that everything comes from Hashem - He also commanded us to provide benefit from this [harvest] to the poor before it comes into our possession, in order to remind us that this comes from Hashem, and He desired us to provide the poor with their portion and ourselves with the remainder, for everything comes from Him.

Since Shavuos is the Harvest Festival (as will be explained in our next post), the pesukim about Shavuos is the most appropriate place to remind us of this relationship between the agricultural mitzvos and Mikdash, though the idea is pertinent to all moadim and all korbanos in Mikdash year-round.

[1] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Vayikra 23:22
[2] Toras Kohanim 13:12
[3] "shichechah" is another mitzvah in the same category as leket and peah. We are required to leave "forgotten" bundles of grain in the field to be claimed by the poor. Since it's in the same family as leket and peah, I'm going to continue to mention it along with them for the remainder of this post, even if all three aren't specified by the meforshim.
[4] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra (Ibn Ezra), Commentary on Vayikra 19:9
[5] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides) Commentary on Sefer Mishlei 3:9

[6] ibid. Commentary on Sefer Shemos 25, ha'toeles ha'shelishi
[7] ibid. Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 23:22